This chapter seeks to highlight potential improvements to social assistance in Thailand over the short and medium term. It first discusses the country’s challenges in terms of social protection coverage, benefit adequacy and population ageing. It then provides an overview of the main social assistance programmes and highlights areas for improvement. Finally, the chapter presents reform scenarios to improve social assistance coverage and benefit adequacy and simulates their costs over the next five years.
Financing Social Protection through General Tax Revenues, Social Security Contributions and Formalisation in Thailand
Abstract
In 2023, social protection expenditure (excluding healthcare) reached 2.1% of Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP), significantly below the Asia and the Pacific regional average of 8% (Figure 1.1). Thailand’s social assistance expenditure stands at 0.8% of GDP, which is lower than the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) regional average of 1% and significantly below the upper-middle-income countries (UMIC) average of 1.9% and the high-income countries (HIC) average of 1.5% of GDP (Figure 1.2). Expenditure in contributory pension schemes amounts to 1.9% of GDP in Thailand, which is similar to the regional average for the EAP region (2%) but significantly below the UMIC average (4%) and the HIC average (4.4.%) (Figure 1.2). Health expenditure is also comparatively low, with 1.7% of GDP allocated to health spending. This expenditure falls short of both regional and global averages and is below the health expenditure level for UMICs, which allocate 3.4% of GDP to health.
As many as 61% of individuals in Thailand are covered by at least one social protection programme (excluding healthcare), which largely exceeds the average for Southeast Asia and the Pacific (SEAP) (48%) (Figure 1.3). Thai women have greater social protection coverage (63%) than men (58%). While both women and men have similar coverage under social insurance schemes (29%), women have higher coverage rates in social assistance programmes (39% compared to 33%). This chapter relies, unless otherwise stated, on the last Socio-Economic Survey (SES) survey conducted in 2023.
The coverage through non-contributory social assistance exceeds the coverage through contributory social insurance. In 2023, 29% of the Thai population was covered by at least one social insurance programme and 36.3% by at least one social assistance cash benefit programme (Figure 1.4). Thailand’s social insurance coverage falls short of the UMIC average (50%) and top SEAP performers like Singapore (74%) and Japan (82%), although it far exceeds the regional average (19.4%). The gap with HICs (70%) is much wider. By contrast, Thailand’s social assistance coverage exceeds (36%) both UMIC and SEAP averages (respectively, 21% and 28%). If non-contributory health programmes are included, social assistance in Thailand nears universal coverage, with the Universal Health Coverage Scheme (UHCS) reaching 46.5 million people, or 73% of the total population, and 98.2% of the target population, i.e. those not covered by other health insurance schemes.
While access to cash benefits is almost universal for the elderly, coverage is more limited for families with children and people with disabilities. The presence of children and, to a lesser extent, elders significantly increases the prevalence of poverty among households (15.8% and 8.9%, respectively, compared to 6.7% for households without children or elders). This highlights the importance of child and old-age benefits in combating poverty. In 2023, as many as 97% of individuals aged 60 or older received an old-age pension (Figure 1.5). However, this overall figure masks a wide gap between non-contributory schemes, which cover 89% of the elderly, and contributory schemes, which cover just 19%. In other words, Thailand’s universal social pension helps bridge the coverage gap of contributory pensions. Only 36% of the labour force actively contributes to a pension scheme, which exceeds the SEAP average (31%) but lags far behind the UMIC average (73%). As a result, a significant fraction of workers is excluded from contributory schemes and will not receive a pension from a contributory scheme at old age.
Social protection spending as a share of GDP, 2023 or latest available year
Source: Budget Bureau data for Thailand and ILO (2024[2]), World Social Protection Report 2024-26: Universal Social Protection for Climate Action and a Just Transition, https://www.ilo.org/publications/flagship-reports/world-social-protection-report-2024-26-universal-social-protection-climate.
Social assistance and contributory pension spending as a share of GDP, 2021 or latest available year
Note: EAP = East Asia and Pacific. For Thailand, data on social assistance are from 2018-20 and contributory pension schemes from 2019-21.
Source: World Bank (2024[3]), ASPIRE Database, https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/aspire/indicator/social-expenditure.
Percentage of population covered by at least one social protection programme in Thailand and benchmarking countries, 2023 or latest available year
Note: For Thailand, social insurance includes the Social Security Fund (SSF) Articles 33, 39 and 40, the Workmen’s Compensation Fund (WCF), the Civil Servant Benefits Scheme (CSBS) and the State Enterprises Employees’ Benefits Scheme (SEEBS). In turn, social assistance includes the Child Support Grant (CSG), Old-Age Allowance (OAA), Disability Allowance (DA), State Welfare Card (SWC), and government scholarships (Equitable Education Fund [EEF]). To allow comparison with ILO estimates for benchmarking countries and regions, the Universal Health Coverage Scheme (UHCS) and other health insurance schemes are excluded, and only social protection cash benefits are included.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2023 SES data for Thailand and ILO (2024[2]), World Social Protection Report 2024-26: Universal Social Protection for Climate Action and a Just Transition, https://www.ilo.org/publications/flagship-reports/world-social-protection-report-2024-26-universal-social-protection-climate for peer countries and regions.
Social insurance and social assistance coverage (excluding health) in Thailand and selected countries, in %, 2023 or latest available year
Note: For Thailand, social insurance includes the SSF Articles 33, 39 and 40, WCF, CSBS and SEEBS. Social assistance includes the CSG, OAA, DA, SWC, and government scholarships (EEF). To allow comparison with ILO estimates for benchmarking countries and regions, the UHCS and other health insurance schemes are excluded. For social assistance, only cash benefits are included.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2023 SES data for Thailand, and ILO (2024[2]), World Social Protection Report 2024-26: Universal Social Protection for Climate Action and a Just Transition, https://www.ilo.org/publications/flagship-reports/world-social-protection-report-2024-26-universal-social-protection-climate for peer countries and regions.
Percentage of social protection coverage in Thailand for different population groups, 2023
Note: Older persons = individuals aged at least 60. Vulnerable persons = individuals not covered by social insurance, as defined by ILO (2024[2]). In Thailand, individuals are eligible for old-age benefits – contributory or non-contributory – starting at age 60, except workers insured under SSF Articles 33 and 39 whose official retirement age is 55.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2023 SES data.
Thailand provides cash benefits for young children, while older children primarily receive in-kind benefits. While 61% of children aged 0-6 have access to at least one social protection cash benefit (contributory or non-contributory), coverage plummets to 21% among children aged 7-15 and 28% among children aged 16-18. This decline in cash benefit coverage is attributed to the increased prevalence of in-kind benefits. In fact, after age 6, children typically enter school and become eligible for in-kind benefit programmes such as free school lunches, tuition fees, textbooks, learning materials, school uniforms and free school milk (the latter only applies for children up to primary school). There are also conditional cash transfers targeted at poor households with school-enrolled children, some of which might not be adequately captured under the SES survey due to their low coverage.
Social assistance coverage gaps persist among other population groups. Some 71% of persons with disabilities, are covered under the Disability Allowance (DA). While this rate significantly exceeds the SEAP and UMIC averages (respectively, 30.4% and 50%), potential remains to extend coverage further. Moreover, social assistance cash benefits cover less than half of the vulnerable population –defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as those not covered by social insurance, though they may be covered by private insurance – with women better covered (50%) than men (43%). Nonetheless, it should be noted that this coverage is relatively high by regional standards.
Many individuals remain uncovered, both in the lowest-income and middle-income households. Only half of people experiencing poverty are covered by at least one social assistance programme (Figure 1.6), with higher coverage for women (55%) than men (48%). Moreover, the SES data show that a significant share of the population, across all deciles, is neither covered by social insurance nor social assistance (Figure 1.6). At the third quintile of the consumption expenditure distribution, slightly more than 20% are covered by social insurance and less than 40% by social assistance. This means that around 40% of middle-income households are not covered by social protection. The percentage of uncovered individuals is similar to that of individuals in the bottom quintile. Moreover, less than 60% of individuals living in top-quintile households are covered by social insurance.
Percentage of the population covered by at least one social assistance or insurance programme in Thailand, by quintile of the household consumption expenditure, 2023
Note: For Thailand, social insurance includes the SSF Articles 33, 39 and 40, WCF, CSBS and SEEBS. Social assistance includes the CSG, OAA, DA, SWC, and government scholarships (EEF).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2023 SES data.
Social insurance is well established for most salaried workers but fails to effectively cover the self-employed. Only one-third of the Thai population is covered by a social insurance scheme. Existing contributory schemes provide relatively comprehensive benefit entitlements to civil servants and formal private sector employees. However, self-employed workers are not obligated to contribute to the social protection system. Instead, the self-employed can choose to register for voluntary saving schemes that provide social insurance, but the coverage remains low (see Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion). Moreover, the social security system, either de jure or de facto, insufficiently addresses the needs of certain groups of workers, including stateless persons, domestic, migrant, occasional, seasonal and platform workers. The Thai government is aware of this situation and is considering extending social insurance coverage to non-standard forms of employment.
The population is declining in size and rapidly ageing. Thailand’s population is estimated to decrease by 2.9% between 2020 and 2040, declining from 71.6 to 69.5 million inhabitants (Figure 1.7). Projections show that the total dependency ratio (the number of dependents – children and elderly – relative to the working-age population) will increase by almost half, from 59% in 2025 to 79% in 2040, driven by the increase in the elderly population. The number of children is expected to decrease by 15% over the period, with the child dependency ratio decreasing from 23% in 2025 to 21% in 2040. By contrast, the old-age dependency ratio is expected to double over the same period, reaching 58% in 2040 (compared to 36% in 2025), with the number of persons aged 60 years or older exceeding the working-age population by 2052.
Projected total population and dependency ratios in %, 2020-40
Note: Total population in thousands (left axis). Child dependency ratio (right axis) = number of children (0-14 years old) in percentage of the working-age population (15-59). Old-age dependency ratio (right axis) = number of older persons (60 years or over) in percentage of the working-age population. Total dependency ratio (right axis) = number of children and older persons in percentage of the working-age population.
Source: United Nations (2024[4]), World Population Prospects 2024, https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/world-population-prospects-2024.
Age-related public expenditure in Thailand is expected to rise sharply in the next decades (Figure 1.8). As a result of rapid ageing, pension and healthcare expenditure are projected to rise from 5% of GDP in 2022 to 19% by 2060 (OECD/ERIA, 2025[5]). Without reforms, general tax revenues will need to rise significantly to finance these additional social protection spending needs. Furthermore, general tax revenues, particularly those from indirect taxes, are likely to decline due to the limited purchasing power of the elderly if the older population has reduced purchasing power.
Pension and healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP in 2022 and projections for 2060
Source: Adapted from OECD/ERIA (2025[5]), Promoting Active Ageing in Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1787/22849f38-en; data from S&P Global (2023[6]), Global Aging 2023: The Clock Ticks, https://www.maalot.co.il/Publications/TS20230130101316.pdf.
Thailand’s social protection landscape encompasses a multitude of programmes that cut across different stages of the lifecycle (Table 1.1). These programmes span healthcare, support for children and families, income replacement during the active age, and old-age assistance. The following sections describe the main social assistance programmes (see 0, Table 1.A.1 for a detailed description).
Mapping of programmes by functional classification using the ILO social protection floor pillars
Source: ILO et al. (2022[7]), Thailand Social Protection Diagnostic Review: Social Protection for Migrant Workers and Their Families in Thailand, https://publications.iom.int/books/thailand-social-protection-diagnostic-review-social-protection-migrant-workers-and-their.
Universal Health Coverage Scheme
The coverage of the non-contributory Universal Health Coverage Scheme (UHCS) is high, with 66% of the population enrolled in 2024. Launched in 2002, the UHCS scheme provides a comprehensive package of benefits, including preventive care, treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care, to Thai nationals who are not eligible for healthcare under the Social Security Fund (SSF) or the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS). Access barriers to healthcare persist for some vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities or individuals living in remote areas. The scheme recently launched a programme to make health services accessible outside of the area where beneficiaries are registered. Beneficiaries of the UHCS enjoy the same benefits as beneficiaries of the social insurance health scheme.
The UHCS is financed by general tax revenue and does not require any copayment from beneficiaries, although beneficiaries can contribute THB 30 on a voluntary basis (as of early July 2025, 1 Thai baht was approximately 0.031 USD) The budget of UHCS has tripled since its inception in 2002 and continues to rise at an annual rate of nearly 3%. In 2022, the budget allocated to the scheme amounted to THB 199 billion in total (THB 141 billion excluding salaries of healthcare providers), equivalent to 1.2% of GDP. According to the International Monetary Fund (2019[8]), total public health expenditure (including expenditure financed by contributions) is projected to increase from 2.9% of GDP in 2017 to 4% in 2035 and 4.9% in 2060.
Child cash benefits
The means-tested Child Support Grant (CSG), which aims to provide support for children younger than six years old raised in low-income families, faces significant targeting challenges. The CSG provides a monthly cash transfer of THB 600 per child to all families with children up to six whose household income per capita is less than THB 100 000 per year. The National Commission on Social Welfare Promotion (NCSWP) has proposed to expand the CSG to pregnant Thai women from the second trimester of pregnancy onwards, regardless of family income. The Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MSDHS) is implementing this reform and plans to raise the monthly grant to THB 3 000 for pregnant women. According to the latest available data, the CSG’s total expenditure amounted to THB 17.5 billion in 2023, and coverage reached 1.76 million beneficiaries in 2020. The main problem with the CSG is poor targeting, which results in around 30% of eligible children not being covered (UNICEF, 2019[9]). In contrast, some higher-income households receive the CSG despite not being eligible (see Table 1.2 further below). The MSDHS has undertaken initial efforts to enhance access to the CSG, including developing a mobile application to facilitate enrolment and service delivery.
The Conditional Cash Transfer for Extremely Poor Students, another proxy means-tested programme, also encounters significant targeting errors. The programme targets students between 3 and 17 years old enrolled in schools administered by particular organisations1. To be eligible, applicants must be students from households with an average monthly income per person not exceeding THB 3 000 and possess a proxy means test score of over 50 points. The proxy means test score assesses household income or poverty status using observable characteristics and socio-economic indicators – such as housing stability, asset ownership, access to basic utilities, and family caregiving responsibilities – rather than relying solely on reported income. The programme targets the 15% poorest households in the country (EEF, 2025[10]). However, only 13.5% of the eligible population is covered (UNICEF and ILO, 2022[11]). Since 2024, benefits have increased, and for the 2026 academic year, eligible students will annually receive THB 4 000 when they are enrolled in preschool and THB 7 200 when they are enrolled in primary and lower secondary education of Border Patrol Police (BPP) schools, or THB 4 200 if they are enrolled in other schools. Students from BPP schools also receive an annual cash transfer at the upper-secondary education level that will reach THB 7 200.
State Welfare Card
The effectiveness of the State Welfare Card (SWC) is undermined by inadequate targeting and restrictions that limit the use of the cash transfer to selected shops. The SWC targets Thai citizens aged at least 18 years old who are unemployed or have an annual income below THB 100 000. Additionally, eligible individuals must have no financial assets exceeding THB 100 000 and not own any immovable property. Eligible individuals with an annual income below THB 30 000 receive a voucher of THB 300 per month to purchase consumer goods from Thong Fah Pracharat stores. The benefit is reduced to THB 200 per month for households with an income that ranges from THB 30 000 to THB 100 000. The SWC also provides additional benefits for cooking gas (THB 45 per quarter), for the Bangkok mass transit bus and sky train fares (THB 500 per month), for bus fares (THB 500 per month), and for train fares (THB 500 per month). Like other means-tested social assistance programmes, the SWC suffers significant targeting errors. The SWC was initially planned to be temporary, but the programme has remained, covering 14 million people in 2023. The costs of the SWC are at THB 52.2 billion. Because registration is not conducted on an ongoing basis, individuals who have recently fallen into poverty are excluded. Unlike other major social assistance programmes, the SWC is not administered by the MSDHS but is implemented by the Ministry of Finance. A recent study suggests that the SWC has no significant impact on poverty reduction and is even associated with a decline in food expenditure (Durongkaveroj, 2022[12]). The limited effectiveness of the vouchers provided under the SWC has been attributed to the restricted range of goods available in eligible stores and prices often higher than elsewhere.
Old-Age Allowance
The Old-Age Allowance (OAA) ensures broad coverage for the elderly, yet the adequacy of its benefits and its financing remain significant policy challenges. The benefit is provided to all the elderly aged 60 or older who are not receiving a regular civil servant pension and are not living in a state care home. Insured individuals under the SSF can receive the OAA in addition to their SSF pension. The benefit is a monthly pension that increases with age: THB 600 for individuals aged 60-69, THB 700 for those aged 70-79, THB 800 for those aged 80-89, and THB 1 000 for those aged 90 and above. The programme benefited 9.1 million elderly citizens in 2019, nearly 82% of those aged 60 and above. Given demographic trends, the number of OAA beneficiaries is expected to increase to more than 16 million by 2040. In 2023, THB 90.2 billion were spent on the OAA. In line with other social assistance programmes, the problem with the OAA lies mainly in the low adequacy of the benefit. A current reform proposal by the NCSWP recommends increasing the benefit levels as follows: THB 700 between 60-69, THB 850 between 70-79, THB 1 000 between 80-89, and THB 1 250 starting from 90 years old.
Disability Allowance
Restrictive eligibility criteria limit the coverage of the Disability Allowance (DA). Thai citizens who hold a valid Disability Identification Card and do not live in a state care home are entitled to a monthly cash transfer of THB 800 if they are adults or THB 1 000 if they are aged under 18. The MSDHS and the NCSWP have recently proposed replacing the current allowance with a flat-rate benefit of THB 1 000 for all beneficiaries regardless of age. While this benefit is theoretically universal, only 70.5% of the people with disabilities receive it due to the restrictive definition of disability applied by the programme, which is based on the total loss of function (Organization et al., 2022[7]). The total cost of the DA reached THB 19.8 billion in 2023, according to the latest estimates by NESDC.
While the CSG and the SWC are primarily designed to assist the poorest populations, they are susceptible to inclusion errors. While most of the CSG and the SWC beneficiaries belong to the bottom quintiles of the household consumption expenditure distribution, a relatively high proportion of beneficiaries earn income in the higher quintiles (Table 1.2). Notably, 37% of SWC beneficiaries do not belong to the first two quintiles, which are the target population for the SWC.
Distribution of beneficiaries across household consumption expenditure quintiles, in %, 2023
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2023 SES data.
Beneficiaries of programmes that are not means-tested, such as the OAA and UHCS, exhibit a more uniform distribution across consumption quintiles, as expected. OAA coverage is more evenly distributed, with 23% of beneficiaries in the lowest quintile and 12% in the highest. The UHCS, as a universal programme, shows a more balanced distribution across all consumption expenditure quintiles but a declining coverage in the highest quintile, as wealthier individuals are more likely to be covered by social or private health insurance. The DA reaches 34% of the lowest quintile and diminishes progressively to 5% in the highest quintile. Box 1.1 discusses advantages and disadvantages of universal and targeted benefits.
Errors in targeting means-tested benefits also contribute to the exclusion of the poor from social assistance. As mentioned previously in this chapter, challenges in targeting the poor, particularly in programmes like the CSG and the SWC, contribute to substantial exclusion errors that impact coverage. More specifically, 45% of children eligible for the CSG, 65% of individuals eligible for the SWC, and 30% of persons eligible for the DA do not benefit from these programmes. The number of SWC recipients exceeds the number of people below the national poverty line (Yang, Wang and Dewina, 2020[13]), which suggests that the exclusion errors are a result of challenges in accurately targeting people experiencing poverty. For the DA, exclusion errors stem from the restrictive definition of disability used to determine eligibility. According to two reports by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Thailand’s disability protection framework is comprehensive and aligned with international standards, but implementation gaps persist, particularly in the coverage of children with disabilities and other eligible groups (UNICEF, 2023[14]; 2019[15]). The Thai government is gradually addressing these issues by revising the DA eligibility criteria. In addition, the government is improving the welfare database to strengthen targeting, enhance administrative efficiency, improve implementation effectiveness, and increase the adequacy of social protection benefits for those in need.
Programmes can statistically limit “leakage” to the non-poor by using means tests or proxy means tests, improving cost-effectiveness. However, accurate targeting is hard to achieve in practice, as significant informational constraints, shifting household incomes, and data inaccuracies undermine these methods. From an administrative perspective, targeting can be demanding: collecting and verifying detailed information is often expensive and time-consuming. Some countries have begun using social registries as centralised systems to consolidate the processes of outreach, intake, registration, and needs assessment to evaluate potential eligibility for multiple programmes (Leite et al., 2017[16]). Nonetheless, on a global scale, income-tested programmes that aim to assist the poorest 25% of the population frequently fall short of their objectives. According to an assessment of 38 programmes implemented in 23 low- and middle-income countries, Bolsa Familia, in Brazil, stood out as the programme with the lowest exclusion error. Even in this case, the means-tested programme does not include 44% of its target population (Kidd and Athias, 2020[17]).
By contrast, universal categorical targeting relies on easily observable characteristics, such as age, location or demographic groups. Though more costly, universal schemes are the most effective in reaching both their intended recipients and the poorest 20%. Although universal social protection leads to the inclusion of non-poor beneficiaries, it circumvents the complexity of income verification. Thus, it is administratively more feasible, especially in contexts with weak infrastructure and low administrative capacity. Politically, universal or categorical schemes often garner broad public support since they are easier to understand, less likely to create social stigma, and can be viewed as fair and transparent, as everyone within a category is treated equally (Kolev, La and Manfredi, 2023[18]).
A middle-ground is affluence testing, where instead of specifically targeting the most impoverished individuals, these programmes aim to exclude those who are relatively better off. While these schemes do not perform as effectively as universal programmes, they have significantly fewer exclusion errors than programmes that target only the poorest members of society (Kidd and Athias, 2020[17]). Such benefits may foster trust in public institutions (Kolev, La and Manfredi, 2023[18]). Universal social protection programmes have been deployed in 52 low- and middle-income countries, such as Argentina, Mongolia, Nepal and Uganda (Kidd et al., 2020[19]).
Source: Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004[20]), Targeting of Transfers in Developing Countries: Review of Lessons and Experience, http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14902; Schüring and Gassmann (2016[21]), “The political economy of targeting – a critical review”, https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12185.
Cash transfers from social assistance programmes, particularly the Old Age Allowance (OAA), the State Welfare Card (SWC), the Child Support Grant (CSG) and the Disability Allowance (DA), are insufficient to lift beneficiaries out of poverty. While 11.5% of households benefiting from one programme live in poverty, this figure increases to 14% for those receiving support from two programmes and 18% for households covered by three different programmes. The persistence of poverty among households that receive more than one cash transfer indicates that the values of the cash transfers are low. Comparing benefit amounts to key benchmarks, such as the poverty line or the income levels of the first quintile of the consumption distribution, further highlights their inadequacy (Figure 1.9).
Cash transfers in absolute terms and as a share of the national poverty line and the average wage in the first quintile of the distribution by social assistance programme, 2023
Note: SWC 1 = State Welfare Card (beneficiaries whose household income per capita ranges between THB 2 500 and 8 333 per month). SWC 2 = State Welfare Card (beneficiaries whose household income per capita falls below THB 2 500 per month). CSG = Child Support Grant. DA = Disability Allowance. OAA = Old-Age Allowance (benefit amount varies according to beneficiaries’ age group). Cash transfers are shown in absolute terms (left axis) and as a percentage of the poverty line and the average wage in the first quintile (right axis). The national poverty line in 2023 was THB 3 043 per month (NESDC, 2024[22]). The average wage in the first quintile amounted to THB 7 102 per month.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2023 SES and the 2023 Informal Employment Survey (IES).
In contrast to international best practices, cash transfers in Thailand are not periodically adjusted to inflation. The lack of indexation has led to a significant reduction in the purchasing power of benefits over time. For instance, the OAA has already lost more than 10% of its purchasing power since 2011 (Organization et al., 2022[7]). By establishing inflation as the minimum standard, policymakers retain the flexibility to implement ad hoc increases in benefits to respond to extraordinary economic conditions or unforeseen crises. Projecting social assistance benefit values relative to the poverty line over the next decade highlights the impact of not indexing benefits to inflation (Table 1.4).
Note: The status quo scenario assumes that Thailand will not raise the benefits and that the poverty line adjusts for inflation.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2023 SES data and inflation projections from IMF (2024[23]) World Economic Outlook data.
In Thailand, numerous laws govern social protection programmes and schemes, while strategic plans provide guidance on the way forward. More than 30 laws regulate social protection programmes and schemes (Organization et al., 2022[7]). Plans that provide strategic guidelines aiming to achieve universal social protection coverage include the National Strategy (2018-2037), the Master Plan on Equity and Social Protection, and the 13th National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDC, 2022[24]).
The social protection system in Thailand is fragmented across multiple institutions. Table 1.5 lists the institutions responsible for each main social protection programme. The MSDHS oversees social assistance programmes, including the Child Support Grant, the Old-Age Allowance and the Disability Grant. However, for both the OAA and the DA, the MSDHS is only involved in monitoring and evaluation. Budgeting and implementation, including the registration, verification and validation of beneficiaries, fall under the responsibility of local government authorities (Organization et al., 2022[7]). Other ministries also provide social assistance, notably the Ministry of Finance with the State Welfare Card (SWC) and the Ministry of Education with the 15-year Free Education Programme, the Equitable Education Fund (EEF) and the Fund for Primary School Lunches Programme. Regarding social insurance, the Social Security Office (SSO) under the Ministry of Labour covers private sector employees and self-employed workers through the SSF and the Workmen’s Compensation Fund (WCF). In contrast, the Ministry of Finance covers civil servants through the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), the Civil Servant Pension Scheme (CSPS) and the Government Pension Fund (GPF). The Ministry of Finance also administers the National Savings Fund (NSF), which targets informal workers not covered under the SSF. There is currently no national registry for social protection in Thailand, and the management information system of the social protection sector includes numerous unintegrated databases [apart from those the SSO and NSF deal with (Organization et al., 2022[7])]. The complex architecture of the social protection system, characterised by fragmentation and lack of information sharing, likely affects the coherence and effectiveness of interventions. Centralising the administration of social assistance programmes within a single ministry could help reduce fragmentation and lower administrative costs.
Source: ILO et al. (2022[7]), Thailand Social Protection Diagnostic Review: Social Protection for Migrant Workers and Their Families in Thailand, https://publications.iom.int/books/thailand-social-protection-diagnostic-review-social-protection-migrant-workers-and-their; World Bank (2021[25]), Towards Social Protection 4.0: An Assessment of Thailand’s Social Protection and Labor Market Systems, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/637711622718440573/pdf/Towards-Social-Protection-4-0-An-Assessment-of-Thailand-s-Social-Protection-and-Labor-Market-Systems.pdf.
The National Commission on Social Welfare Promotion (NCSWP) within the MSDHS could be endowed with additional power to implement reforms of the social protection system. The NCSWP is already in place within the MSDHS, vice-chaired by the minister of the MSDHS. The commission currently only deals with day-to-day operational matters rather than strategic issues. This commission, which emerged in the absence of an overarching strategy and governance structure for the sector, includes other line ministries; however, the MSDHS has no leverage on them. The commission’s mandate could be reviewed, and the organisational structure of the commission could be adapted, placing it above the ministerial level, possibly the Prime Minister’s Office, and bringing together representatives from all stakeholders, including civil society, workers’ and employers’ organisations.
Given demographic trends, the number of beneficiaries of the OAA is projected to increase substantially, while the number of beneficiaries of the other programmes is expected to remain relatively stable in the absence of reforms. OAA beneficiaries are projected to increase from 14.2 million to 18 million between 2024 and 2034 (Figure 1.10). This trend reflects Thailand’s population ageing and the resulting continuous expansion of OAA coverage. In the absence of inflation indexation of income thresholds, eligibility for means-tested programmes like the SWC and the CSG is expected to decline. The number of SWC beneficiaries is projected to decline from 14.2 to 13.9 million by 2034. The CSG exhibits a gradual decrease in the projected number of beneficiaries from 2.5 to 2.2 million over the same period. The declining number of beneficiaries of the CSG can be explained by the declining fertility rate.
Social assistance spending on cash benefits as a share of GDP will decline due to an absence of indexation of benefits and eligibility thresholds with inflation. Despite stable or slightly increasing nominal costs, social assistance spending on cash benefits is projected to gradually reduce in real value, affecting the coverage and adequacy of benefits. The OAA is the only programme that exhibits a rise in total expenditure in nominal terms, from THB 131 billion to THB 168 billion between 2024 and 2034 (Table 1.6). As Thailand’s elderly population grows, more individuals become eligible for the OAA. However, as a share of GDP, spending declines from 0.7% to 0.5%. Without inflation-adjusted benefits, expenditure will quickly lag behind economic growth, causing its proportion of GDP to shrink even as the number of beneficiaries increases. The SWC and CSG costs display a more pronounced decline as a share of GDP due to the combined effects of unindexed benefits and fixed income eligibility thresholds.
Projected number of beneficiaries and share of beneficiaries (as a percentage of the total population) of social assistance programmes with the status quo scenario, 2024-34
Note: The number of beneficiaries per programme is first calculated for 2023 based on SES data (in millions, left axis). See Annex 1.B for a description of the assumptions made. The figure indicates the share of beneficiaries (as a percentage of the total population) for 2024 and 2034.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2023 SES data and United Nations (2024[4]), World Population Prospects 2024, https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/world-population-prospects-2024.
Projected social assistance expenditures with the status quo scenario, by social assistance programme, 2024-34
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2023 SES data and GDP projections from IMF (2024[23]) World Economic Outlook data.
To ensure adequate and sustainable social protection, increased spending is necessary. A study by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2024[26]) using the Social Protection Program Module – which evaluates over 15 different social protection programmes, including cash and in-kind benefits, contributory and non-contributory schemes, health insurance, and active labour market programmes (ALMPs) –estimates that Thailand would need to increase social insurance expenditure by 1.6% of GDP and social assistance expenditure by 3.3% of GDP to fully implement comprehensive social protection floors by 2030. These figures underscore the scale of investment required to build a robust and inclusive social protection system. Currently, there appears to be a short-term window of opportunity to expand social assistance until 2030. However, over the medium to long term, the fiscal pressures of financing old-age pensions and healthcare for an ageing population are expected to pose significant and growing challenges.
This section discusses three types of reform areas regarding social assistance cash benefits: improving the adequacy of benefits, expanding coverage through social assistance by transitioning toward categorical targeting and reducing disincentives to formalisation. This section examines scenarios to increase benefit levels and broaden coverage of some social assistance programmes in the short and medium term. More concretely, this section simulates the costs of the reforms for four critical social assistance cash benefits programmes: the Old Age Allowance, the Child Support Grant, the Disability Allowance, and the State Welfare Card. Each of these programmes is analysed under a range of reform scenarios that vary in their level of comprehensiveness. The proposed reforms build on the plans shared by the MSDHS and the National Commission on Social Welfare Promotion which is considering moving from means-testing targeting to a universal approach and expanding social assistance benefits to get closer to the poverty line.
The SWC could be replaced by an unconditional cash transfer (UCT). The proposal to switch from a voucher (SWC) to a cash transfer would allow beneficiaries more flexibility. However, it should be acknowledged that the UCT will not resolve the existing targeting issues of the current tiered, means-tested SWC. These challenges stem partly from high informality, which is unlikely to be significantly reduced soon. The UCT could be seen as a first-best scenario, which includes a phase-out mechanism that would gradually reduce the benefit as income increases. This mechanism would reduce incentives for wage bunching and undeclared cash payments to avoid losing the cash benefit. As a second-best policy, the existing upper-income thresholds for eligibility under the SWC cash transfer could be retained but applied solely at the time of initial benefit granting. Thereafter, entitlement to the benefit could be restricted to a fixed duration (e.g. two years).
Proposed reforms to enhance the adequacy of benefits:
Index benefits to inflation.
Retain the tiered OAA benefit structure, allowing higher benefits for older age groups that are more likely to experience poverty.
Raise benefit amounts to half of the poverty line for the CSG, OAA and the DA.
Proposed reforms to increase coverage:
Revise the eligibility criteria of the DA.
Transform the CSG into a universal cash benefit, eliminating the means test that currently limits access.
Replace the current SWC voucher system with a UCT of THB 750.
Proposed reforms to reduce disincentives to formalisation:
Eliminate the means test for the CSG.
Implement a phase-out mechanism for the UCT as a first-best option. This mechanism would gradually reduce the benefit until it fully phases out at an income of THB 14 700 per month (further discussed in Chapter 3).2
The proposed reforms for the short-medium term are modelled for the four social assistance programmes: OAA, DA, CSG and SWC/UCT. For each programme, various reform scenarios – from the least to the most ambitious – are compared against the status quo, assessing the fiscal impacts and changes in beneficiary coverage associated with each approach. The initial reform scenarios for the OAA, DA, and CSG are derived from the NCSWP’s proposed reforms (Scenario 1), which differ slightly from the MSDHS’s reform plan. The primary difference is that the MSDHS recommends implementing a flat benefit rate for the OAA, which is reflected in OAA Reform Scenario 2. It is important to note that the costing model does not account for the implementation time of these reforms. This is because the timeline for implementing these reforms is inherently uncertain, and the primary focus of the costing section is to assess the fiscal impact of each reform scenario once fully implemented.
A tiered benefit system can deliver greater protection for older age groups that are at a higher risk of falling into poverty. Currently, the OAA ranges from THB 600 per month for those aged 60-69 to THB 1 000 per month for those aged 90 and older. Under reform Scenario 1, which replicates the NCSWP proposed reform, these amounts would increase slightly, leading to an overall expense rise of just 5% in 2025 (Figure 1.11). Opportunities to earn income decline with age and the oldest are often the poorest. A tiered benefit system would be a cost-effective targeting method to direct support to the most vulnerable without introducing the administrative complexity of means testing. This approach proves less costly than introducing a flat-rate universal benefit of THB 1 000 per month, as envisaged by the MSDHS, which would increase costs by 28% in 2025 (reform Scenario 2).
The proposed scenarios aim to ensure disabled individuals receive the best support while minimising overlaps across schemes. In reform Scenario 1, the disability benefit (THB 1 000 per person, according to both NCSWP and MSDHS proposed reforms) automatically transitions into the OAA at age 80 because both benefits match at the THB 1 000 rate. Disabled individuals aged 60-79 are excluded from the OAA, ensuring that those who cannot work – or have only partial capacity to work – receive the higher disability benefit instead of the lower OAA for that age group. This approach offers more generous support to vulnerable older adults until they reach age 80 when the disability benefit seamlessly becomes the OAA.
Reform Scenario 3 includes a tiered benefit structure with slightly more generous benefits. In this scenario, which is a more generous variant of the NCSWP proposed reform, monthly payments would rise from THB 600 to THB 1 000 for those aged 60-69, from THB 700 to THB 1 250 for those aged 70-79, from THB 800 to THB 2 000 for those aged 80-89 and reach THB 3 000 for those 90 and above – nearly the poverty line. This results in a 64% increase in costs compared to the current system in 2025. Additionally, the disability benefit would automatically convert to the OAA at age 60 under this plan.
Costs as a share of GDP and in THB billions for the OAA reforms
Note: Data labels attached to the bars represent costs in THB billions. Reform Scenario 1 replicates the NCSWP’s proposed reform, which aims to raise the OAA from THB 600 to THB 700 for those aged 60-69, from THB 700 to THB 850 for those aged 70-79, from THB 800 to THB 1 000 for those aged 80-89, and from THB 1 000 to THB 1 250 for those aged 90 and above. Reform Scenario 2 follows MSDHS’ plan to remove the age-tiered benefit structure by introducing a flat-rate benefit of THB 1 000 per beneficiary. Reform Scenario 3 is a more generous variant of the NCSWP proposed reform, which increases the OAA from THB 600 to THB 1 000 for those aged 60-69, from THB 700 to THB 1 250 for those aged 70-79, from THB 800 to THB 2 000 for those aged 80-89, and from THB 1 000 to THB 3 000 for those aged 90 and above. Disabled people under age 80 are excluded from Scenarios 1 and 3 because they already receive a higher disability benefit, which automatically transfers to an OAA benefit once they turn 80. In Scenario 2, this automated transfer takes place at age 60.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The scenarios considered for the DA expand coverage and increase adequacy at a moderate cost. In reform Scenario 1, the flat-rate benefit of the DA is THB 1 000 per month, and the DA transitions to the OAA only at age 80, which keeps total spending increases relatively contained (Figure 1.12). In contrast, reform Scenario 2 offers a higher flat-rate benefit (THB 1 500 per month) and shifts recipients onto the OAA at an earlier age (60), broadening the support of the DA but also driving up overall fiscal costs (0.16% of GDP in 2030). DA costs would increase from THB 1.48 million under the status quo to THB 2.38 million and THB 1.84 million by 2030 in reform Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively.
Costs as a share of GDP and in THB billions for the DA reforms
Note: Data labels attached to the bars represent costs in THB billions. Reform Scenario 1 replicates NCSWP and MSDHS proposed reforms, which aim to increase the DA to THB 1 000 for all beneficiaries regardless of age. DA automatically turns into the OAA benefit at age 80 and above. Under reform Scenario 2, the flat-rate benefit is raised to THB 1 500, and DA turns into the OAA benefit at age 60 and above.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
As the status quo cost of the CSG diminishes relative to GDP over time due to a decline in fertility rates, an opportunity to reform this benefit arises. Under the status quo, the costs of the CSG as a percentage of GDP are projected to decrease from 0.11% in 2025 to 0.08% by 2030 (Figure 1.13). This downward trend provides a fiscal window for considering policy reforms such as expanding coverage or increasing the benefits without imposing extra constraints on the government budget.
The removal of the means test is expected to increase cost-effectiveness. Removing the means test and extending the benefit to pregnant women from the second trimester of their pregnancy onwards nearly doubles the number of CSG recipients compared to the status quo. This reform would increase the total cost of the benefit. However, this universal approach reduces administrative costs since eligibility checks become unnecessary. Although reform Scenario 1 would raise expenditures above the current system, its overall impact remains modest when viewed as a share of national GDP (Figure 1.13). The advantages of reducing the programme administration costs need to be weighed with the increased spending when the benefit becomes available to a larger share of the population. In the medium term, Thailand could potentially exclude the richest households through an affluence test.
Costs as a share of GDP and in THB billions for the CSG reforms
Note: Data labels attached to the bars represent costs in THB billions. Scenarios 1 and 2 would give THB 3 000 to pregnant women in the second and third semesters while keeping the grant at THB 600 per child aged 0-6, as the NCSWP and MSDHS proposed. Scenario 2 increases the benefit amount for children aged 0-6 to TBH 1 500.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Thailand could consider a more ambitious strategy to reform the CSG – such as increasing the child benefit to THB 1 500 (Scenario 2). Even with these enhancements, the programme’s expenses would remain well below half a percentage point of GDP. In essence, adopting a universal design that includes pregnant women and raises benefit levels offers a substantially higher level of support while retaining overall budgetary feasibility.
Replacing the SWC with a gradually phased-out UCT slightly increases costs but better targets assistance to those most in need. Unlike the current SWC, which includes older adults, the proposed UCT only covers working-age individuals (aged 18-60). As a result, some non-poor people receive a part of the benefit (which decreases with income), but the poorest recipients receive a notably higher amount, with their average benefit reaching THB 675 per month compared to the overall average of THB 487, thereby ensuring that those most in need still gain the greatest support (Figure 1.14). It is important to note that although the UCT scenario allocates resources to individuals above the poverty threshold, the benefit begins phasing out immediately at zero income.
Costs as a share of GDP and in THB billions for replacing the SWC with a phased-out UCT
Notes: Data labels attached to the bars represent costs in THB billions.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The reforms of the cash benefit programmes would increase spending by 0.88% of GDP. This reform package would increase total spending of the main social assistance cash benefits (OAA, DA, CSG and SWC) from 1.19% to 2.08% of GDP in 2025 under the most ambitious reform scenarios (Table 1.7).
Cost of alternative social assistance expenditure scenarios as a percentage of GDP
Note: The “more ambitious” scenario includes Scenarios OAA 3, DA 2, CSG 2 and SWC 1. The National Commission on Social Welfare Promotion scenario includes Scenarios OAA 1, DA 1, CSG 1 and SWC status quo.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Enhance the adequacy of benefits
Index benefits to inflation across the OAA, DA, CSG and SWC programmes.
Retain the tiered OAA benefit structure, allowing higher benefits for older age groups who face greater poverty risks.
Raise benefit amounts to one-half of the poverty line for the CSG and the DA. For the OAA, raise the benefit level to the poverty line for the oldest elders.
Replace SWC vouchers with an unconditional cash transfer indexed to inflation to increase flexibility and reduce the impact of higher prices and limited choice in eligible stores.
Increase coverage
Expand the coverage of the DA by revising its eligibility criteria.
Remove the means test for the CSG.
Include pregnant women from the second trimester onwards in the CSG and give them a benefit of TBH 3 000.
Index the income eligibility threshold for means-tested benefits.
Reduce disincentives to formalise
Implement a phase-out for the unconditional cash transfer to replace the SWC.
Eliminate the means test for the CSG.
Reduce fragmentation and overlap among the social assistance programmes
Restrict the unconditional cash transfer to the working-age population.
Exclude DA beneficiaries from receiving the OAA allowance and vice versa.
References
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The costing model is inspired by van de Meerendonk, Heins and Nimeh (2024[26]) and is used to make projections for the future on the cost of selected social assistance programmes based on the latest available data from the Household Socio-Economic Survey (SES) conducted in 2023.
The first step consists of identifying the share of the population eligible for each social assistance programme for the status quo:
OAA: Eligible individuals were categorised in the model based on their age to identify those who become elders and what benefit they should receive according to their age, except for those receiving civil servants’ or private teachers’ pensions. Data on private teachers’ pensions are not available in the SES. Therefore, this criterion was not considered, which could be considered a limitation. In 2023, 84% of individuals aged 60 or older were not receiving social security benefits and were considered, therefore, eligible for the OAA. This share is assumed to remain constant.
DA: Eligible individuals were assessed in the model based on a self-reported measure of disability according to the SES. Those who indicated that they had a disability (either mental, physical or both) were marked as eligible for the allowance, while all others were marked as ineligible.
CSG: The model then assesses children’s eligibility based on age and enrolment status to determine those within the qualifying age range (0-6 years). The eligibility threshold, set at an annual household income per capita of THB 100 000 and assets worth not exceeding THB 100 000, has not been adjusted for inflation in recent years, and it is assumed that this will remain unchanged going forward.
SWC: The model distinguishes between two types of benefits: a THB 300 allowance for those with very low incomes and a THB 200 allowance for those with slightly higher incomes. Eligibility for the THB 300 benefit was determined by selecting individuals aged 18 and above whose per capita income fell below THB 2 500 and who owned assets valued at less than THB 100 000. If these criteria were met, the individuals were marked as eligible; otherwise, they were marked as ineligible. For the THB 200 benefit, the eligibility threshold was set for individuals within a higher income range (between THB 2 500 and THB 8 333) but still with the same asset limitation. The eligibility thresholds, similar to the CSG, have not been adjusted for inflation in recent years, and it is assumed that this will remain unchanged going forward. It is important to note that only the cash benefit part of the SWC is being costed as there is no administrative data on the take-up rates of the voucher components of the programme, making modelling challenging.
The second step involves calculating the number of beneficiaries for 2023, taking into account targeting errors, which are assumed to remain constant over time. Since the income threshold for means-tested benefits is not indexed to inflation, a smaller portion of the population qualifies for these benefits over time. The underlying assumption is that if the income threshold were indexed to inflation, the same share of the population would meet the eligibility criteria. This assumption is based on the premise that average incomes grow in line with inflation rather than GDP growth. Ideally, data on wage growth for low-income individuals – particularly informal workers – would provide a more accurate basis for this assumption, as their income growth may differ from average wage growth trends.
The third step borrows from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) World Population Prospects (WPP) population projections for Thailand, where the eligible population and the number of beneficiaries are calculated for each year within the projection period.
The fourth step is cost calculation, which involves multiplying the number of beneficiaries by the benefit amount. For programmes like SWC and OAA, beneficiaries are divided based on the specific benefit amounts they are eligible to receive. Regarding inclusion errors, the assumption is that the benefit amount for those incorrectly included is similar to that of eligible recipients. For OAA and SWC, which offer multiple benefit levels, the total cost is divided by the benefits allocated to eligible recipients to determine the average benefit amount. This average is then applied to all beneficiaries who fall under inclusion errors. The assumption is that all four benefits are long term, meaning that people will receive them throughout the year. The benefits are not being indexed to inflation, so their value diminishes over time. In the absence of administrative data, estimates of administrative costs (calculated as a percentage of total benefit costs) follow (International Labour Organization, 2007[27]) these assumptions: 15% for universal cash benefits like OAA and DA, and 33% for targeted cash benefits to poor households like CSG and SWC. These administrative costs are included in the total cost projections. It is important to note the deviation from the administrative costs calculated from the ILO statistics as those seem improbably high.
The fifth step involves comparing programme costs to GDP for the same year to assess the economic burden of social protection spending. The GDP projections used in this analysis are sourced from the IMF’s WEO data up to 2028. For projections beyond 2028, GDP estimates are extended to 2034 using a growth formula. This formula calculates an annual growth rate by comparing GDP values at the start and end of the projection period. Constant prices are utilised for GDP values to control for inflationary effects, ensuring that comparisons reflect real economic growth rather than changes driven by price level variations.
The sixth step integrates the proposed reforms into the projections, following the same process as the status quo but with key differences:
In the first step, the number of eligible individuals changes for the OAA and DA. Under the reform scenarios, individuals with disabilities who reach age 60 become eligible for the OAA but can no longer receive both the DA and OAA simultaneously. For the CSG, eligibility expands to include pregnant women in their third trimester. This is accounted for by taking the projected number of newborns in the following year (e.g. for 2026) and multiplying it by 3/12 to estimate the number of pregnant beneficiaries in 2025. The reform in which the UCT replaces the SWC targets only the working-age population.
The second step differs in that the number of eligible individuals is assumed to match the actual covered population under each reform scenario. Additionally, for the UCT, which is means-tested, the income threshold is indexed to inflation, ensuring that the same share of the population remains eligible throughout the projection period.
The third step remains unchanged, continuing to use UN DESA World Population Prospects (WPP) projections to estimate the number of eligible individuals and beneficiaries for each year.
The fourth step also follows the same methodology: the updated number of beneficiaries is multiplied by the benefit amount. This includes the revised, higher benefit levels under the reform scenarios where applicable.
The fifth step remains similar, comparing total programme costs to GDP projections to assess the fiscal impact of the reforms.
← 1. The Conditional Cash Transfer for Extremely Poor Students targets schools administered by the following organisations: Office of the Basic Education Commission (OBEC), Local Administrative Organizations (LAO), Border Patrol Police (BPP), Office of the Private Education Commission (OPEC), Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), and National Office of Buddhism (NOB).
← 2. . This threshold corresponds to 1.5 times the minimum wage and 0.85 times the average wage of private sector workers in Thailand. The justification for the phase-out mechanism is discussed in Chapter 3.