Paula Garda
Hugo Ñopo
Expanding Social Protection and Addressing Informality in Latin America
With the support of Sofia Hidalgo and Jerson Veliz. Group for the Analysis of Development. GRADE.
This chapter builds on an original background report prepared by Hugo Ñopo for the OECD. The current version has been substantially revised, edited and expanded by Aida Caldera and Paula Garda (both OECD), incorporating additional analysis and updates based on the OECD Economic Survey for Peru 2023.
Abstract
Peru has reduced poverty and inequality markedly over the past two decades, but the pandemic exposed deep gaps in its social protection system. With over 70% of workers in informal employment, most lack access to pensions, health insurance, or employment protection, reinforcing inequality and limiting inclusive growth. To significantly increase formalisation and social protection coverage, deep reforms to social security, including the pension and health systems, and social assistance schemes are needed. These reforms will require additional fiscal resources. Additionally, the reform agenda should include productive policies, improving the country’s capability to create more and better jobs. A politically viable sequencing and prioritisation of reforms must balance the dual goals of boosting productivity and using it for the benefit of all, especially those who need it most.
The Peruvian constitution guarantees the universal and progressive right to social security to ensure protection against vulnerabilities and improve quality of life. However, the legislation governing the social protection system ties access to healthcare, unemployment benefits and pensions primarily to contributions from formal salaried employment, leaving a significant portion of population with limited or no coverage.
Peru has a high level of labour informality, exceeding what would be expected based on its GDP per capita (Loayza, 2016[1]). This informality is largely driven by a high number of self-employed and unpaid family workers, who are more likely to remain outside the formal sector (Figure 10.1). However, informality is widespread and high across all occupations and disproportionately affects women: 73% of employed women were in informal jobs in 2024, often with low-quality jobs such as unpaid family work or micro-enterprises. Persistent gender norms, unequal time spent on unpaid care, and exposure to gender-based violence further constrain women's access to formal employment.
Labour informality exists across all income groups in Peru, but it is most common among the poorest households. Peru is one of the few Latin American countries where the gap in informality between the top and bottom income quintiles is the largest (Figure 10.2, panel A) (OECD/ILO, 2019[2]). The poorest households rely very little on formal labour income (Figure 10.2, panel B), with half of their income from informal work and the rest from transfers (both public and private). As households move up the income distribution, the share of income from formal labour increases.
Informal employment in Peru has remained high and largely unchanged, even during periods of high economic growth (OECD/ILO, 2019[2]) (Figure 10.3). Over the past twenty years, non-wage labour costs have consistently represented about 40% of average wages for formal employees and employers (Alaimo et al., 2017[3]; Heckman and Pages, 2000[4]). While non-wage costs have decreased for certain employment regimes, such as small and micro enterprises, where they fell by around 14 percentage points (Ñopo, 2021[5]), informal employment continues to be prevalent in micro enterprises. This is because such schemes based on the firm size have generated pervasive incentives for the firms to grow and formalise (OECD, 2023[6]; OECD, 2025[7]).
Reducing informality in Peru requires tackling its multidimensional causes through a holistic approach. Key factors include limited access to quality education and training, weak institutions, and inadequate enforcement of labour and tax laws. Low business and worker productivity—driven by limited innovation, skills gaps, and restricted access to finance and technology—makes formalisation unaffordable for many. High regulatory and administrative burden, compliance costs and complex SME tax regimes contribute to informality by discouraging businesses from growing and formalizing (OECD, 2023[6]; OECD, 2025[7]). Policies should not only support the creation of micro and small enterprises but also their growth and consolidation, by facilitating access to markets, finance, and technology. Encouraging innovation and the adoption of new technologies across firms can enhance productivity and competitiveness, making formalisation more viable. Promoting formalisation through supply-chain linkages—where formal firms buy from and sell to formal suppliers—can also create strong incentives for smaller firms to operate formally. Highlighting formalisation benefits, such as better access to finance and markets, can also encourage participation in the formal economy. Boosting productivity through better skills, skills certification programmes, infrastructure, innovation, and technology adoption is critical to expand the supply of quality, formal jobs. Addressing corruption and strengthening judicial independence can improve incentives of formalisation, as businesses and workers are more likely to operate formally when they trust that laws and regulations are applied fairly. Improving public spending efficiency by enhancing the quality of public services and infrastructure can also make formalisation more appealing by demonstrating tangible benefits from tax and social contributions.
Note: Data refer to the year 2020. The National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI for its Spanish acronym) defines the informal workers as those who either: (i) work in informal productive units, or (ii) with in formal productive units but without contributing to a pension plan, or (iii) works as non-salaried family worker (TFNR for its Spanish acronym).
Source: Adapted from Ñopo (2021).
The role of the social protection system in shaping informality cannot be overlooked. Its current design limits coverage and discourages formal employment due to high social contributions that fall disproportionately on low-income workers. Shifting to a universal benefits model funded by general tax revenues and adopting a progressive social contribution system, with lower rates for low-income workers where informality incentives are strongest, would ensure universal coverage while reducing informality incentives. While boosting worker and firm productivity is vital and much needed, these reforms take time to deliver. In contrast, social protection reform can have a more immediate impact on formalisation, though advancing such reforms may face political economy constraints that require careful sequencing and broad support. When embedded in a broader agenda that tackles structural drivers, social protection reform can help disrupt the cycle of informality, improve living standards, and foster inclusive growth.
Note: Panel A: Quintiles are based on per-capita consumption distribution of all households. Panel B: Only monetary and regular household income is considered. The income from work is from the main and secondary activity.
Source: OECD-ILO (2019); INEI Households survey (2018).
Note: Change in GDP growth measure as the mean of the period-to-period differences in GDP.
Source: OECD-ILO (2019).
Peru's social protection system comprises healthcare, pensions, and social assistance programs for poverty alleviation. The system is fragmented, with most high-income workers accessing contributory schemes and some of the poorest workers relying on non-contributory programmes. This fragmentation perpetuates informality: the high cost of formal work incentivises workers and firms to remain informal, while informal businesses avoid growth to escape regulatory scrutiny. This contributes to lower economic growth, keeps incomes low (Ñopo, 2021[5]), and requires non-contributory programmes to support vulnerable workers, which indirectly sustain informality by reducing its cost, reinforcing system fragmentation.
The fragmented system creates inequalities, inefficiencies, and coverage gaps. Most high-income workers benefit from formal employment-linked insurance, while some low-income informal workers access limited non-contributory programs. Middle-income workers, frequently transitioning between formal and informal employment, often lack access to either system. As a result, unless properly implemented, social and labour protection, despite its good intentions, can ultimately worsen conditions for workers (Jaramillo, Almonacid and Flor, 2019[8]).
Limited funding further constrains the system's ability to improve coverage and benefits. Social spending in Peru, at less than 5% of GDP (ILO, 2022[9]), is among the lowest in the region and far below levels in developed economies, where spending reaches 15% of GDP (Figure 10.4). Peru also lags behind South America’s average of 13.5% of GDP (ECLAC, 2020[10]). Taxes and transfers do little to reduce inequality; after redistribution policies, the Gini coefficient drops only slightly from 0.50 to 0.46. While inefficiency is often cited, evidence suggests insufficient overall spending is the primary issue (Jaramillo, 2013[11]).
Note: Social spending includes social protection, education, health, housing, environment protection and culture and religion.
Source: ECLAC (2020).
Social contributions to health and pensions, levied both on the employee and the employer, amount to 23.4% in Peru for workers with an average income. This is slightly above the OECD average. However, there is a wider difference between the OECD and Peru for low-income workers and those earning the minimum wage (Figure 10.5, Panel A). Although social security contributions do not seem extremely high, often the employer and employee agree not to contribute to pension and healthcare so that the employer reduces its labour costs and the employee increases its net payment, thereby encouraging informality. For low-income groups, these contributions are particularly prohibitive: for informal salaried workers in the bottom income decile, they can equal 124% of their labour income, making them unaffordable (OECD, 2019[12]). This issue arises because the minimum mandatory contribution is based on the minimum wage, disproportionately affecting those earning less than the minimum wage—approximately 80% of informal workers and 20% of formal workers.
Peru has special regimes with reduced social security contributions for self-employed workers and employees in micro and small firms (Table 10.1; Figure 10.5, Panel B). Self-employed workers who declare income to tax authorities pay lower health contributions unless they belong to poor households, in which case they are exempt. Pension contributions for self-employed workers are voluntary, but even at reduced rates, these contributions amount to 90% of the income of self-employed workers in the fourth income decile, creating a significant barrier to formalisation (OECD, 2019[12]). Additionally, regulations such as unemployment benefits, paid annual leave, profit sharing, and family allowances impose considerably higher costs on medium and large firms, further discouraging formal employment. For example, there is evidence that profit-sharing requirements for firms with over 20 employees increase labour costs, discouraging formal employment, investment, and productivity growth (IMF, 2024[13]).
Although these special regimes and cost difference were set up to encourage formal firm and job creation, they add complexity and create strong distortions discouraging firms to grow or promoting splitting into small units (Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen, 2016[14]; Dabla-Norris et al., 2018[15]) and encourage informal employment (Dabla-Norris et al., 2018[15]). It would indeed be important to lower social security contributions for low-income workers while avoiding large jumps depending on firms’ size. One option is shifting from the schemes based on firm size to progressive social security contributions linked to workers’ income. This would remove the current disincentives for firms to grow and formalise while incentivising labour formalisation in a fiscally neutral manner. Evidence from the 2012 reform in Colombia shows the importance of decreasing non-wage labour costs to reduce informality (Bernal et al., 2017[16]; Morales and Medina, 2017[17]; Garlati-Bertoldi, 2018[18]). Several OECD countries, including France and Germany, have implemented strategies to encourage the employment of low-income workers by reducing their social contributions for this group (Cahuc and Carcillo, 2012[19]; Galassi, 2021[20]). Lower social contributions for low-income workers in Germany have shown to boost female employment (Konle-Seidl, 2021[21]). Similarly, Chile has introduced programmes aimed at formalising vulnerable workers, particularly youth and women, through employment subsidies that cover a portion of total social contributions and have proven effective in promoting formal employment (Bravo and Rau, 2013[22]).
Note: Data refer to single individuals without children, within the age range 15-64 and working as dependent workers in formal sector. Low income refers to 67% of the average wages; average-income refers to 100% of average wages; high-income refers to 167% of average wages. For Peru, the obligatory universal contributions paid by the employer comprise Health Insurance and the employer’s contribution to the unemployment benefit system (Compensación por Tiempo de Servicio, CTS, compensation for length of service). Those paid by the employee are contributions to the pension system.
Source: Data for the OECD come from Taxing Wages 2017, data for Peru are OECD calculations based on information provided in Policy Questionnaire by MTPE and ENAHO 2016.
Note: Profit sharing applies for firms of more than 20 workers and depends on the sector of activity, For labour legislation, micro enterprises are those with annual sales below 150 Tax Units (UIT, which is approximately USD 1200), small enterprises are those with annual sales between 150 UIT (approximately USD 180 000) and 1700 UIT (approximately USD 2 million), and enterprises with higher sales fall under the General Regime.
Source: OECD based on (Ñopo, 2021[5]).
Peru has made significant progress towards universal health coverage during the past decades. Health coverage has increased from 37% in 2004 to 95% in 2019, according to the register of the universal health insurance, but socio-economic and geographic inequalities persist. The health system in Peru is highly fragmented, with multiple regimes and different rules (Box 10.1). It is composed of three regimes: a non-contributory mechanism, called the Integral Health System (SIS); a contributory system called the Social Security in Health (EsSalud); and private supplementary healthcare providers (EPS). Access to health systems is largely determined by household income (Figure 10.6). The non-contributory mechanism (SIS) covers around 60% of the population, mostly belonging to the lowest income percentiles and informal workers and is primarily financed by general taxation. Part of this system is also semi-contributory, although it makes up a minority of SIS affiliates, as non-poor self-employed and microentrepreneurs can contribute a small amount and enrol. As of 2023, the contributory system, EsSalud, covers 24% of the population, mostly higher-wage workers, and is financed exclusively by labour charges. The private health insurance is only held by 1.2% of the highest-income population. Each system provides the same services to its affiliated population with its own budget, working in parallel with no coordination of functions and are managed by different ministries with limited effective stewardship of the health ministry. This segmentation leads to duplication of services in some areas and gaps in others, especially rural regions, and results in inefficiencies and unequal access to care. Peruvians covered by EsSalud often rely on hospital services even for primary care, while many SIS beneficiaries face long wait times and under-resourced facilities (OECD, 2025[23]).
EsSalud provides health coverage to (i) regular affiliates (formal salaried workers who comply with the contribution obligation), (ii) pensioners of the contributory system, and (iii) self-employed workers who voluntarily contribute. It is the primary entity responsible for providing health services to formal workers and their families, whose employers contribute 9% of their salary, with some exceptions. Historically, EsSalud has catered primarily to the country’s middle class. EsSalud is financed exclusively through worker contributions, and at the end of the year, the State covers any operating deficit. A recent ILO study (2019) estimates that, the annual deficit ranges from 2% to 3% of the operating budget (1.6% of GDP). EsSalud currently covers 24% of the labour force and 22% of the total population. While the range of services it provides is broader than other regimes, the waiting time for care is often long.
The private supplementary health insurance providers (EPS) offer a voluntary contributory scheme that supplements EsSalud, negotiated between employers and workers, aimed at higher-income earners. Employers may redirect 2.25% of the EsSalud contribution toward the EPS premium. This scheme requires additional copayments at the point of care, and affiliation of dependents (spouse and children) is mandatory; otherwise, they lose access to EsSalud. The EPS system covers 0.5% of the labour force, primarily those in higher income brackets. Waiting times for services provided by EPS are shorter, services are perceived as high quality tailored to wealthier segments, within prime city locations.
The Integrated Health System (SIS), created in 2002, is a non-contributory social security mechanism. Initially designed to support people in poverty and extreme poverty, the SIS has expanded its coverage in recent years to include households above the poverty line. It now offers five insurance plans: (i) Free SIS, for people in extreme poverty, as well as pregnant women, children, firefighters, and other specific groups; (ii) SIS for All, for individuals without health insurance, regardless of economic status; (iii) SIS Independent, for those self-employed workers who can afford to pay a low cost; (iv) SIS Microenterprises, for micro-enterprise owners who want to enrol their workers; and (v) SIS Entrepreneur, for self-employed individuals like bricklayers, hairdressers, and dressmakers. SIS covers 43% of the employed population.
The health regimes provide services that differ significantly, resulting in inequities. SIS offers a large primary coverage, but with inadequate infrastructure and equipment (Phillips, 2022[24]). For example, while SIS has 40 primary care facilities for every 100,000 affiliated, EsSalud has only four leading to longer waiting times for appointments. On the other side, EsSalud has a better provision of more complex health care interventions (Ñopo, 2021[5]) and better cost coverage (Seinfeld et al., 2021[25]). As a result, out-of-pocket expenses can differ significantly depending on the health scheme and typically higher for households affiliated to SIS for complex illnesses.
The financing of the health system incentivises informality (Torres, 2021[26]). While the non-contributory system SIS provides free access, formal workers need to contribute 9% of the monthly salary to EsSalud at the minimum wage. However, users’ satisfaction with both systems is similar (Ñopo, 2021[5]). This leads to formal workers paying for what informal workers receive for free or at a very low cost, and leads to contributions to the health system viewed as a tax on formality by workers and employers. This perception is particularly strong among low-wage workers, for whom formalisation brings immediate costs with limited perceived benefits. The health system creates other complexities that result in awkward incentives. For instance, there are semi-contributory regimes that require self-employed and microentrepreneurs to pay for identical coverage as the free schemes.
Note: SIS is the non-contributory health system, EsSalud is the contributory system and EPS are private institutions.
Source: INEI-Encuesta Nacional de Hogares.
Despite high insurance coverage, actual access to care remains unequal. In regions like Puno, the share of individuals reporting unmet medical needs is nearly twice as high as in Lima (40% versus 23%). Women report more unmet needs (33%) than men (29%), and also face longer waiting times (OECD, 2025[23]). These inequalities reflect both geographic and socio-demographic disparities in service provision, as well as the fragmentation of infrastructure and human resources.
Public healthcare in Peru is also underfunded and resources are fragmented over the different subsystems, creating inequalities for access. While public health expenditures rose to 4.2% of GDP in 2024, spending has not kept pace with the expansion of the coverage, and is well below the OECD average of 9% of GDPPer capita spending in EsSalud is 40% higher than per capita spending in SIS (World Bank, 2021[27]), reflecting unequal financing across scheme. While technical inefficiencies, including low capacities, may partially explain low public expenditure, underfunding remains a clear issue that leads to high out-of-pocket spending. At 30% of total health expenditure, out-of-pocket spending in healthcare is among the highest in the OECD. Out-of-pocket spending is primarily borne by the wealthiest households, but only because they can afford such expenses, meaning that poorer households lack access to certain services.
10.4.1. Achieving universal high-quality health care services is possible
To achieve universal access to high-quality healthcare services and reduce inequities and incentives for informality, increasing public healthcare spending is necessary. According to the World Bank, an additional 1.2% of GDP is required to achieve universalisation and increase the quality of health services (World Bank, 2021[27]). Since health financing through labour charges creates disincentives for formal job creation, increasing the financing from general taxation is key. To boost formalisation incentives, health contributions for low-income workers could be lower, particularly around the minimum wage where formality incentives matter the most. A gradual schedule of health contributions could be based on workers’ income, shifting more of the burden into higher income ranges, away from the vicinity of the minimum wage, by starting at zero for poor workers and increasing for higher-income groups (World Bank, 2021[27]).
To address inefficiencies and inequities in Peru’s health system, it is crucial to strengthen coordination among public insurers (SIS and EsSalud) (OECD, 2025[23]). This could be achieved through service-exchange agreements, standardising care providers, and establishing minimum quality standards (OECD, 2023[6]). Harmonising the minimum benefit packages across both systems would reduce inequalities in coverage and facilitate a more unified delivery model. Developing a unified national health data system and adopting a national quality assurance framework to improve accountability and transparency. Strengthening primary care, especially through the PROFAM programme and expanded telemedicine, is vital to serve rural populations and reduce pressure on hospitals (OECD, 2025[23]). Moreover, achieving universal health coverage cannot be accomplished without significant improvements in the quality of healthcare provision, which requires further reforms across the system.
The Peruvian pension system consists of two parallel contributory schemes and a small non-contributory scheme called Pension 65. In 2019, less than half of the elderly population in Peru received pensions, with 26.1% receiving contributory pensions and 21.1% non-contributory pensions. The contributory pension system is, mandatory for all formal workers, and is composed of the public National Pension System (SNP, according to its Spanish acronym) a public pay-as-you-go system, and a Private Pension System (SPP, according to its acronym in Spanish), an individual capitalisation system. Special regimes also exist for the armed forces, police, and public servants, but many of these have been closed to new entrants. The two parallel contributory schemes, one public and one private, have different rules leading to different pensions even with the same contributions and lack coordination and integration among the overseeing institutions (Table 10.2). Formal workers are free to choose to which system they contribute, but very few workers do. In 2021, 18% of workers contributed to the private scheme and 8% contributed to the public one, mostly upper-income workers (Figure 10.7). Although contributions are not mandatory for self-employed workers, they can voluntarily choose to contribute to either system. Workers affiliated with the private system may also make additional voluntary contributions to their pension accounts.
The low coverage of pensions in Peru is largely due to high informality and low frequency of contributions. Approximately 50% of working-age men in Peru have never contributed to the pension system, and for women, this number is even higher at around 75%. Those who contribute do not do so systematically because of frequent job rotation into the informal sector (Jaramillo and Campos, 2021[28]). Indeed, on average workers contribute during 36% of their active lives, while those in the lowest income quintile only 28% in the private pension system (Bernal, 2020[29]).
The pandemic has worsened the situation. Seven extraordinary withdrawals from private pension funds between 2020 and 2024, equivalent to 12% of GDP, have significantly reduced accumulated savings. As a result, 85% of affiliates (2.4 million workers) had fully depleted their individual accounts by the sixth withdrawal. While withdrawals early in the pandemic could be justified because of the sharp slowdown in economic activity, later withdrawals continued to deplete the private pension scheme, where assets have declined from 22% of GDP in 2020 to around 10% in 2024. This continued to worsen with an eighth extraordinary withdrawal of pension funds in 2025.
Not all workers who contribute to the public system are able to get a pension. The system requires at least 20 years of contributions and only one in five workers meet these criteria, usually those belonging to the highest income quintile (Ñopo, 2021[5]). A reform in 2021 facilitated access for those with at least 10 years of contributions, but very few contributors meet this minimum requirement. Those who do not meet the requirements do not receive any benefits or refunds, implying a redistribution from low to high income workers.
Percentile of per capita household income, %, 2020
Note: INEI - Households survey (2020).
Source: Percentage moving averages are shown (9 percentiles per data point). Public pension is the pension from the National Pension System. Private pension is the pension of the Private Pension System.
Both public and private contributory systems in Peru give low benefits (Figure 10.8, Panel A). Moreover, workers with similar career paths can receive different pensions under the two schemes (Figure 10.8, Panel B). In the public system, the minimum and maximum pensions have been updated only once in 2019, resulting in large losses of purchasing power and extremely low replacement rates. In the private system, low replacement rates of less than 30% (Freudenberg and Toscani, 2019[30]) are driven by low mandatory contributions compared to international standards (OECD average of 18.2% against 13% in Peru), low labour incomes and low frequency of contributions due to informality. Because pensions are capped in the public system, high-income workers tend to affiliate in the private system. While low-income workers would prefer to stay in the public system to get access to the minimum pension, stringent requirements access dissuade them. Early withdrawals from the private system are possible under numerous situations (OECD, 2019[31]). Most people (95%) withdraw most of their accumulated savings (up to 95.5%) when they reach the retirement age (Ñopo, 2021[5]), as this is allowed. As a result, the private system has become a way to save up to the retirement age, undermining one of the main purposes of a pension system which is to insure people in old age beyond retirement.
The non-contributory pension programme, Pension 65, mainly covers the poorest workers, leaving many vulnerable workers without any pension benefits. Although successful in alleviating extreme poverty in old age, benefits and coverage remain low (monthly PEN 125 or USD 32, 36% of the poverty line or 13% of the minimum wage in 2021). While coverage has increased since the programme’s inception in 2011, it only reached 24% of the elderly (627 924 beneficiaries) by the end of 2022. Benefits remain the same since the programme inception, even though the monthly cost of the food basket per person at the extreme poverty line has increased by over 38%. Despite increasing resources, spending remains low, with a budget of 0.1% of GDP (0.45% of the public budget) in 2021.
Note: Panel A: Year 2019. It shows the hypothetical gross replacement rates based on current pension system characteristics and rules. They are calculated for someone entering the labour market at age 20 and working a full career until the normal retirement age. Price inflation is assumed to be 2.5%, real earnings growth is 2% and the real rate or return is 3.5%. Panel B, is a calculated example of a workers that affiliated to the system between 1994 and 2019 with 20 years of contributions and contribution density of 77%. It compares the benefits the workers would receive in the public pension system or the private pension system with a profitability from AFP Integra (annuity interest=3%). LAC-6 is the unweighted average of ARG, BRA, CHL, COL, CRI, and MEX.
Source: OECD Pension models and (Ñopo, 2021[5]).
10.5.1. Reforming the pension system to provide universal protection and better benefits
A comprehensive reform of the pension system is necessary to improve coverage, increase benefits and address informality. This includes a deep reform to the contributory schemes, ensuring that public and private components complement each other, operate efficiently, and support the fiscal long-term sustainability.
A recent pension reform aligns with several past OECD recommendations (OECD, 2019[31]; OECD, 2023[6]), including efforts to expand coverage, and limit pension fund withdrawals. In late 2024, Congress approved the Law for the Modernisation of the Pension System, establishing a four-pillar framework—non-contributory, semi-contributory, contributory, and voluntary—to improve coverage and adequacy. Implementation is pending, and the regulatory decrees were published in September 2025. Under the contributory pillar, enrolment is now mandatory in either the public or private scheme, with default enrolment in the public pay-as-you-go scheme, which will transition to a notional defined contribution model by 2030. Although the reform required self-employed workers, who had previously been exempt, to gradually start contributing, a law passed in September reversed this measure, approved an eighth withdrawal of pension funds, and reinstated the possibility of withdrawing 95.5% of accumulated funds upon retirement. Employees continue contributing 13% in the public scheme and 10% plus fees and insurance in the private scheme. The retirement age remains at 65 but will be revised every five years maximum. The semi-contributory pillar introduces a harmonised minimum pension of PEN 600 (53% of the minimum wage) for those with over 20 years of contributions, with proportional benefits for those with 10–19 years. This minimum benefit is guaranteed by the state across both public and private schemes, provided eligibility conditions are met. The non-contributory pillar will gradually expand Pension 65 coverage to all elderly in poverty, with benefits capped at 25% of the minimum pension, subject to fiscal space. The voluntary pillar introduces a 1% tax on electronic purchases (with caps per transaction and annually) that channels contributions to individual accounts. A matching state contribution is foreseen for low-income affiliates, subject to budget availability.
This reform is consistent with OECD recommendations on mandatory enrolment, expanded non-contributory pensions, and minimum benefit guarantees. However, it does not fully resolve persistent gaps in coverage, driven by informality and intermittent contributions. Non-contributory pensions also remain inadequate. Addressing these issues would require policies to reduce informality as claimed in chapter 1 of this book. This could be done by delivering a universal non-contributory minimum pension to all residents aged 65 and above. For example, providing a universal minimum pension equivalent to the poverty line to all Peruvians residents aged 65 and over – around 3 million people –, which would cost 1.6% of GDP (1.5% of GDP net of current expenditure in Pension 65), raising to 1.8% of GDP by 2050. Such benefit would provide a replacement rate of 40% to minimum wage earners. There would be a need also to indexing the benefit with at least basic consumption basket, or inflation at least ensure that the elderly maintain their purchasing power (OECD, 2019[31]).
To encourage formal job creation, this minimum pension would be financed from general taxation, which would require mobilising additional tax revenues. Options for raising more revenues are discussed in the recent OECD Economic Surveys of Peru (2023[6]; OECD, 2025[7]). One important advantage of implementing such a universal minimum pension scheme is that it allows to reduce contribution rates within the contributory system for low-income workers, thereby promoting formal employment.
To top up the non-contributory pension workers would contribute to the pension system, for which enrolment would become automatic and mandatory for all workers. To preserve incentives for formalisation, mandatory contributory rates could be made progressive, with lower contributions for wage earners below the minimum wage, where incentives for informality matter the most, and increasing gradually for higher wages. The contribution rates could be calibrated to achieve replacement rates of around 60% of pre-retirement earnings, close to the average OECD replacement rate for men, to ensure adequate pensions and fiscal sustainability. This could imply very low contributions for the lowest-income workers, and higher than current contributions for the higher-income workers.
An alternative to address informality and reduce labour costs instead of progressive contribution rates is subsidising the social security contributions of low- and middle-income workers (OECD, 2019[31]), with the subsidy decreasing with income. Evidence from Chile shows that subsidising social contributions has increased formal employment for vulnerable groups (OECD, 2022[32]). The risk is creating an incentive to remain informal or to under declare income, so it must be designed very carefully. Other reforms to the contributory pension system are needed, including granting proportional benefits for those with fewer than 10 years of contributions in the public scheme, and improved coordination between public and private schemes.
Since the 1990s Peru has increased social spending to fight poverty, expanded coverage of social services and developed targeted social programmes. However, cash transfer programmes continue to provide low coverage and limited generosity, leaving many households without any support. Juntos, the main anti-poverty programme, is a conditional cash transfer programme introduced in 2005 for Peruvian families living in extreme poverty in rural areas. It aims to generate human capital and break the cycle of poverty by providing monetary incentives to households with at least one programme target member, such as pregnant women or children/adolescents, provided the household falls within the socioeconomic classification of poverty or extreme poverty and resides in a district with a poverty incidence higher than 40%. Evidence shows that Juntos increased demand for health checks for children, increased household consumption, and reduced poverty levels (Perova and Vakis, 2012[33]). It also had positive impacts on nutritional, cognitive and educational outcomes (Sánchez, Meléndez and Behrman, 2020[34]; Sánchez and Jaramillo, 2012[35]; Gaentzsch, 2020[36]).
Despite its positive effects, a low share of Peruvian families benefited from Juntos (Figure 10.9), and spending was low (0.1% of GDP in 2022). Limited budget mean that there is a 36.7% gap between the number of beneficiaries and the total number of possible beneficiaries. Benefit levels are also low, limiting their impact on families and poverty. Juntos provides PEN 100 (USD 26) per household monthly, equivalent to 30% of the poverty line in 2021, one of the lowest in emerging markets (ILO, 2017[37]), where on average amounts to USD 78 (Gentilini et al., 2021[38]). In 2023, the Juntos programme introduced a PEN 80 (USD 22) monthly top-up for households with children in the final three grades of secondary school, provided they met specific conditions, and the cash transfer represented 44.6% of the poverty line in 2023. The benefit does not consider household characteristics and has not been updated since 2005, resulting in a loss of purchasing power.
Note: Data refer to 2019.
Source: World Bank, Atlas of social protection: Indicators of resilience and equity (ASPIRE).
Juntos has been redesigned in 2021 to improve coverage and impact. The programme now targets extremely poor households regardless of their geographical location and gives benefit top ups to incentivise further human capital development and health. An early childhood transfer of an additional PEN 50 is conditioned on access to basic health services, and a pilot programme offers an additional transfer of PEN 80 for households with children in secondary school in areas with higher school dropout rates.
The pandemic exposed the need for broader measures to protect vulnerable populations, as emergency cash transfers, such as "Bono Yo me quedo en Casa" and "Bono Familiar Universal" (300-700 PEN), only temporarily mitigated poverty and income losses (World Bank, 2023[39]). In 2020, households in the lowest income brackets relied more on these transfers than informal labour (Figure 10.10), reflecting the severe impact of 4.8 million job losses in the informal sector compared to 600,000 in the formal sector (Lavado, 2021). Permanent solutions are necessary to address poverty and income stability during crises.
Note: Only monetary and regular household income is considered. The income from work is from the main and secondary activity.
Source: INEI, Households survey (2020).
10.6.1. Setting up a “Minimum income guarantee”:
To better support the poorest, it is crucial to expand the reach and benefits of cash transfer programmes. One option is to extend the coverage of Juntos to include all individuals living in poverty and provide them a benefit equivalent to the extreme poverty line. This would cost around 2.4% of GDP in 2021. Another option to better consider the household characteristics and to contain fiscal costs is to transform Juntos into a guaranteed-minimum-income scheme for the population below 65. This would involve a periodic cash transfer to supplement household incomes. This programme could build on Juntos and be financed from general tax revenues. By setting the guaranteed minimum income to the poverty line, an illustrative calculation using household surveys, indicates that such programme would cost 1.1% of GDP in 2021 or 1% net of the expenditure in Juntos. The benefit of choosing the national poverty line calculated by the National Statistics Institute, is that the minimum income would adjust automatically to changes in prices in the basic food basket. When children are part of the household, the cash transfer could be conditional on human capital accumulation and desired health behaviours, as in Juntos, to generate incentives for investing in education and health. The size of the benefit can also consider children’s age and educational level. Finally, it could eventually also be adapted to the costs of living of the different territories in Peru.
To maintain incentives for formal work and avoid that beneficiaries are reluctant to take up formal work for fear of losing their benefit, a graduation phase, in which the value of the transfer forgone is smaller than any additional income made should also be considered. For those already working, more hours worked, or better jobs could be encouraged, by reducing by a smaller amount the benefit for the extra income they earn. Ex-ante and ex-post impact assessments should be systematically conducted to evaluate the effects on formal labour force participation and adjust the design if necessary. Cash transfers could be also ideally tied to individual behaviour that promotes future employment outcomes such as school completion, training, and participation in public employment services to help families overcome poverty.
An alternative to the proposed guaranteed-minimum-income scheme is a negative income tax or earned income tax credit, which has shown positive effects on labour force participation, poverty reduction and reduction of informality in United States and some developing countries (Hoynes and Patel, 2017[40]; Gunter, 2013[41]). The main difference between the proposed scheme and the negative income tax is that the latter is financed directly through a progressive income tax that could offset social security contributions incentivising labour formality (Acosta, Pienknagura and Pizzinelli, 2022[42]). The advantage of the conditional cash transfer programmes is that it provides more flexibility to condition the transfer on positive educational and health behaviours.
Peru does not have an unemployment insurance system and only very few workers have some income protection against job loss. The main protection mechanisms are the end-of-service severance pay and the individual unemployment savings accounts. The individual unemployment savings accounts (Compensación por Tiempo de Servicios) are financed by the employer and are compulsory for medium and large firms, but not for micro and small firms. As a result these instruments are typically only available to permanent workers, who constitute 5% of the total workforce and belong mainly to the highest deciles of the income distribution (de la Cruz, Manzano and Loterszpil, 2020[43]). During 2021, only 40% of private salaried workers was covered by this mechanism. This leaves a significant proportion of the population vulnerable to job loss. Moreover, the ability to withdraw funds from the individual accounts for non-unemployment-related purposes suggests that this mechanism does not effectively function as a protection against job loss. Instead, it operates more like a mandatory savings system. Several rounds of extraordinary withdrawals during and after the pandemic have further depleted CTS balances, reducing their ability to provide any meaningful income support.
Implementing cash transfer programmes, such as the guaranteed-minimum income discussed above, could provide protection to workers during unemployment. For example, for workers earning the minimum wage, a cash benefit equivalent to the poverty line would imply a non-negligible 40% replacement rate. This would cost an additional 0.1% of GDP if all unemployed workers were to be covered for three months (the average duration of unemployment). For workers above the minimum wage, a contributory pillar could supplement the guaranteed-minimum-income and provide top-up benefits to achieve a replacement rate more in line with other OECD countries (60% on average). This contributory pillar could be primarily based on the existing individual unemployment accounts, or be mixed, as in Chile, where individual savings are supplemented by a solidarity fund financed by employer’s contributions and general taxation. The advantage of individual unemployment savings accounts is that they limit the risk of moral hazard and incentivise workers to prevent job loss and return to work quickly (ILO, 2019[44]; OECD, 2018[45]). However, individual unemployment accounts do not provide risk sharing. Individuals with lower contributory capacity are at higher risk of unemployment and have weaker protection, which is why the cash transfer programmes such as the guaranteed minimum income could serve as a minimum protection floor. Another option proposed by the ILO is to introduce an unemployment benefit system based on individual contributions of 1.16% of wages of all salaried workers with permanent or temporary contracts to a common unemployment fund (ILO, 2022[9]).
Strengthening protection via non-contributory cash transfers would ensure basic support to all workers against unemployment, including the self-employed who usually do not contribute to unemployment insurance schemes. It would also have the added benefit of reducing labour costs for employers and encourage the creation of formal jobs. Currently, employers are mandated to contribute around 9.8% of wages to the individual unemployment savings accounts, which is high compared to a median of 2.8% for advanced countries or 1.5% for emerging economies (ILO, 2019[44]). For example, in Chile workers’ and employer’s contributions amount to a maximum 3% of wages in a very similar setup. Additionally, restricting withdrawals from the individual savings accounts to job dismissals and crediting any surplus contributions as pension entitlements upon retirement would help achieve the system’s original objective of protection during unemployment. Contributions can also be limited to a maximum number of years to accumulate sufficient resources to cover unemployment eventualities, such as 11 years in Chile.
All unemployed workers, with previous informal or formal jobs, should register with the labour market intermediation services (Centros de Empleo) to support their employment and training search. Registration is voluntary under current law, and individuals may also use private employment services. Strengthening labour orientation and intermediation services, including training, to help the unemployed enrol in cash transfer or unemployment benefits programmes while receiving support in their job search. Currently, the Public Employment Services (PES) in Peru do not manage cash transfers or unemployment benefit programmes. Rather, PES focuses on delivering active labour market policies such as job intermediation, vocational guidance, and labour certification. Services remain small in scale, including Jóvenes Productivos, which offers training and job placement for vulnerable youth, and Capacita-T, a free online platform to boost employability; both need to expand, and their certifications must be valued by employers to improve impact. The Public Employment Services are understaffed and there is a need to strengthen recruitment and training programmes for caseworkers (OECD, 2019[46]) to provide effective support.
The proposed reforms in this chapter would have an estimated cost of 3.8% of GDP. These costs are an illustrative as the costs of this reforms depends on the exact details of implementation. The implementation of such reforms should be gradual and be accompanied by a comprehensive fiscal reform to achieve higher spending efficiency and tax collection and redistribution. The higher employment formalisation and growth driven by these reforms would also increase tax collection. Furthermore, boosting the potential with structural reforms, as discussed in the (2023[6]; 2025[7]) OECD Economic Surveys of Peru, would result in higher employment and higher incomes for individuals and, in that way, increase tax collection.
10.8.1. Improving the efficiency of public spending
A key financing strategy for Peru is to improve the efficiency of public spending, which remains low due to weak governance, corruption, and incomplete fiscal decentralisation. The World Bank (2021) identifies several spending areas where efficiency gains could enhance service delivery without compromising equity. For example, improving efficiency in the health sector could generate fiscal savings that can be reallocated to priority areas, while also advancing Peru’s progress toward building a modern health system. Technical inefficiencies in public procurement and civil service could also be addressed. Estimates of these inefficiencies account for between 1.2% of GDP (BCRP, 2023[47]) and 2.5% of GDP (Izquierdo, Pessino and Vuletin, 2018[48]). Peru’s decentralisation system suffers from unclear delineation of spending responsibilities across national, regional, and municipal levels and a distortionary financing structure, exacerbating regional inequalities in economic development, poverty, and access to services (OECD, 2023[6]), Peru needs to spend wisely to address its human capital, social protection and infrastructure gaps and enhance its growth potential.
Reducing corruption is critical to improving spending efficiency in Peru. Corruption remains pervasive (Fernandez, 2021[49]): for example, despite a government budget of PRN 972.7 million for 29 hospital infrastructure projects, none has exceeded 60% completion. Illicit financial flows, including money laundering, bribery, tax evasion, and trade mispricing, drain approximately PEN 10 billion annually, equivalent to 4.5% of GDP (Bejarano, 2022[50]). This amount surpasses 118% of education spending, 183% of health spending, and 512% of social protection spending. Eliminating these financial crimes would free resources for priority areas, enhancing service delivery and addressing critical development needs.
10.8.2. Increasing tax revenues
The tax system in Peru is characterised by a relatively low tax burden and a narrow tax base. The tax-to-GDP ratio is at 17% well below the OECD average of 34% and the Latin American average of 30% (Figure 10.11), and insufficient to meet rising social needs and bolster necessary public investment in infrastructure, education, and health. As in other Latin American countries, the country relies heavily on indirect taxes such as the value-added tax, while higher-income OECD countries depend more on revenues from personal income taxes and social security contributions. While the reliance on indirect taxes is beneficial from an economic-growth perspective, it leads to a low progressivity of the tax system (OECD et al., 2023[51]).
Note: The tax-to-GDP ratio measures tax revenues (including social security contributions paid to the general government) as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP). Year 2020.for OECD panel B LAC6 is the simple average of ARG, BRA, CHL, COL, CRI, MEX.
Source: OECD, Global tax revenue database and OECD Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean.
There are several measures available to increase tax revenues as discussed in the 2023 and 2025 OECD Economic Surveys of Peru. One of the main problems is Peru’s narrow tax base, exacerbated by high tax evasion and poorly designed tax regimes. VAT non-compliance alone costs 2.6% of GDP, while exemptions and reduced rates account for an additional 1% of GDP. Corporate tax evasion, at 33.1% of potential revenue, further limits collection. The complexity of multiple small business tax regimes fosters evasion and informality, contributing little to revenue while discouraging growth. To address these issues, Peru should modernise its tax administration by improving human capital, leveraging advanced technologies, and expanding electronic invoicing. Simplifying tax regimes, phasing out ineffective tax expenditures, and targeting exemptions and reduced rates while compensating vulnerable groups through transfers could significantly enhance tax collection and equity.
Peru’s low tax revenues can also be attributed to the country’s very low revenues from personal income taxes compared to OECD countries, a common issue across Latin American countries. Personal income tax revenues in Peru are over four times lower than the OECD average, limiting redistribution (Barreix, Bés and Roca, 2012[52]; Jaramillo, 2013[11]; Lustig, 2016[53]). There is significant potential to bring more people into the personal income tax system without affecting the bottom half of the income distribution. Only 20% of formal workers or 8% of the total workforce pay personal income tax (Acosta Ormaechea, Pienknagura and Pizzinelli, 2022[54]; World Bank, 2023[39]), due to a high labour income threshold below which no personal income tax needs to be paid, as discussed in the 2023 and 2025 OECD Economic Surveys of Peru. A complementary two step reform would increase the tax base and make the system more progressive. The first step would involve gradually lowering the basic personal income tax threshold while simultaneously reducing the entry tax rate. In a second step, to reduce informality, social security contribution rates for low-income workers should be reduced, as discussed above. The combined effect of these changes would be progressive because those newly subject to the personal income tax would have higher incomes than those benefiting from reduced social security contributions, ensuring the overall progressivity of the reform. By reducing informality, this reform would also boost productivity and growth. Introducing an earned income tax credit would enhance progressivity further and promote stronger formal labour market participation among low-skilled workers (Pessino et al., 2021[55]). A compulsory and universal income tax declaration could be established in tandem to create a culture of declaring and paying taxes.
References
[54] Acosta Ormaechea, S., S. Pienknagura and C. Pizzinelli (2022), Tax Policy for Inclusive Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/01/21/Tax-Policy-for-Inclusive-Growth-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean-511829.
[42] Acosta, S., S. Pienknagura and C. Pizzinelli (2022), Tax Policy for Inclusive Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/01/21/Tax-Policy-for-Inclusive-Growth-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean-511829.
[3] Alaimo, V. et al. (2017), Measuring the Cost of Salaried Labor in Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, https://doi.org/10.18235/0000758.
[52] Barreix, A., M. Bés and J. Roca (2012), Resolviendo la trinidad imposible de los impuestos al consumo: el IVA personalizado, https://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/1456.
[47] BCRP (2023), Recuadro 2. Ineficias del gasto público. Reporte de Inflación Marzo 2023., Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
[50] Bejarano, R. (2022), Peru loses $10,000 million each year due to illicit financial flows. News Beezer., https://newsbeezer.com/perueng/peru-loses-10000-million-each-year-to-illicit-financial-flows-rmmn-economy/.
[29] Bernal, N. (2020), El sistema de pensiones en el Perú. Institucionalidad, gasto público y sostenibilidad financiera., CEPAL.
[16] Bernal, R. et al. (2017), “Switching from Payroll Taxes to Corporate Income Taxes: Firms’ Employment and Wages after the Colombian 2012 Tax Reform”, IDB Technical Note, No. 1268, Inter-American Development Bank.
[22] Bravo, D. and T. Rau (2013), Effects of Large-scale Youth Employment Subsidies: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design.
[19] Cahuc, P. and S. Carcillo (2012), Les conséquences des allégements généraux de cotisations patronales sur les bas salaires, https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03461125/document.
[43] Castilleja-Vargas, L. and M. Deza (eds.) (2020), Cómo acelerar el crecimiento económico y fortalecer la clase media: Perú, Inter-American Development Bank, https://doi.org/10.18235/0002604.
[15] Dabla-Norris, E. et al. (2018), “Size Dependent Policies, Informality and Misallocation”, IMF Working Papers, Vol. 18/179, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484372340.001.
[10] ECLAC (2020), Social Panorama of Latin America 2020, https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/46688-social-panorama-latin-america-2020.
[49] Fernandez, C. (2021), Prescription for Chaos: Corruption and Mismanagement of the Covid-19 Pandemic in Peru, https://gfintegrity.org/prescription-for-chaos-corruption-and-mismanagement-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-in-peru/.
[30] Freudenberg, C. and F. Toscani (2019), “Informality and the Challenge of Pension Adequacy”, IMF Working Papers, Vol. 19/149, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498318525.001.
[36] Gaentzsch, A. (2020), “Do conditional cash transfers (CCTs) raise educational attainment? An impact evaluation of <i>Juntos</i> in Peru”, Development Policy Review, Vol. 38/6, pp. 747-765, https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12468.
[20] Galassi, G. (2021), Labor Demand Response to Labor Supply Incentives: Lessons from the German Mini-Job Reform.
[14] Garicano, L., C. Lelarge and J. Van Reenen (2016), “Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France”, American Economic Review, Vol. 106/11, pp. 3439-3479, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130232.
[18] Garlati-Bertoldi, P. (2018), “Payroll Taxes, Social Security and Informality. The 2012 Tax Reform in Colombia”, http://www.dotec-colombia.org/index.php/series/416-universidad-javeriana-bogota/vniversitas-economica/16722-pablo-adrian-garlati-bertoldi.
[38] Gentilini, U. et al. (2021), Social Protection and Jobs Responses to COVID-19 : A Real-Time Review of Country Measures.
[41] Gunter, S. (2013), “STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS AND PARTICIPATION IN REGULAR AND INFORMAL WORK”, National Tax Journal, Vol. 66/1, pp. 33-62, https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2013.1.02.
[4] Heckman, J. and C. Pages (2000), The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, https://doi.org/10.3386/w7773.
[40] Hoynes, H. and A. Patel (2017), “Effective Policy for Reducing Poverty and Inequality?”, Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 53/4, pp. 859-890, https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.53.4.1115.7494r1.
[9] ILO (2022), Propuesta de desarrollo e implementación del Esquema Integral de Protección ante el Desempleo.
[44] ILO (2019), Unemployment insurance schemes around the world: Evidence and policy options.
[37] ILO (2017), World Social Protection Report 2017-19: Universal social protection to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.
[13] IMF (2024), Peru. IMF Staff Country Reports. Art IV, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Western Hemisphere Dept., https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400276729.002.
[48] Izquierdo, A., C. Pessino and G. Vuletin (2018), Better Spending for Better Lives How Latin America and the Caribbean Can Do More with Less, Interamerican Development Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.iadb.org/DIA2018spending (accessed on 25 January 2019).
[11] Jaramillo, M. (2013), “The Incidence of Social Spending and Taxes in Peru”, Public Finance Review, Vol. 42/3, pp. 391-412, https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142113496134.
[8] Jaramillo, M., J. Almonacid and L. Flor (2019), Los efectos desprotectores de la protección del empleo. El impacto de la reforma del contrato laboral de 2001.
[28] Jaramillo, M. and D. Campos (2021), La dinámica del mercado laboral peruano. Creación y destrucción de empleos y flujos de trabajadores, GRADE. Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo.
[21] Konle-Seidl, R. (2021), “Precarious but popular? The German mini-job scheme in comparative research on work and welfare”, Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy, Vol. 37/3, pp. 293-306, https://doi.org/10.1017/ics.2021.11.
[1] Loayza, N. (2016), “Informality in the Process of Development and Growth”, The World Economy, Vol. 39/12, pp. 1856-1916, https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12480.
[53] Lustig, N. (2016), “Inequality and Fiscal Redistribution in Middle Income Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru and South Africa”, Journal of Globalization and Development, Vol. 7/1, https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2016-0015.
[17] Morales, L. and C. Medina (2017), “Assessing the Effect of Payroll Taxes on Formal Employment: The Case of the 2012 Tax Reform in Colombia”, Economia Journal, Vol. 18/1, pp. 75-124, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/676997/pdf.
[5] Ñopo, H. (2021), Políticas de protección social y laboral en el Perú. Una espiral de buenas intenciones, malos resultados y peores respuestas, GRADE.
[7] OECD (2025), OECD Economic Surveys: Peru 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/76f6eb73-en.
[23] OECD (2025), OECD Reviews of Health Systems: Peru 2025, OECD Reviews of Health Systems, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f3ddb6a4-en.
[6] OECD (2023), OECD Economic Surveys: Peru 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/081e0906-en.
[32] OECD (2022), OECD Economic Surveys: Chile 2022, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/311ec37e-en.
[46] OECD (2019), Investing in Youth: Peru, Investing in Youth, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264305823-en.
[12] OECD (2019), Multi-dimensional Review of Peru: Volume 3. From Analysis to Action, OECD Development Pathways, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6c23d2c-en.
[31] OECD (2019), OECD Reviews of Pension Systems: Peru, OECD Reviews of Pension Systems, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e80b4071-en.
[45] OECD (2018), Good jobs for all in a changing world of work: The OECD Jobs Strategy, OECD Publishing, Paris.
[51] OECD et al. (2023), Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a7640683-en.
[2] OECD/ILO (2019), Tackling Vulnerability in the Informal Economy, Development Centre Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/939b7bcd-en.
[33] Perova, E. and R. Vakis (2012), “5 Years in Juntos: New Evidence on the Program’s Short and Long-Term Impacts”, Economia, Vol. 35/69, pp. 53-82, https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/economia/article/view/2710 (accessed on 15 December 2022).
[55] Pessino, C. et al. (2021), Now it is the time to Foster Labor Formalization in Latin America and the Caribbean, https://blogs.iadb.org/gestion-fiscal/en/now-it-is-the-time-to-foster-labor-formalization-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.
[24] Phillips, F. (2022), En qué página de la agenda del gobierno está la cobertura universal de salud (CUS)?, Instituto Peruano de Economía, https://www.ipe.org.pe/portal/en-que-pagina-de-la-agenda-del-gobierno-esta-la-cobertura-universal-de-salud-cus-desafio-peru/.
[35] Sánchez, A. and M. Jaramillo (2012), Impacto del programa Juntos sobre nutrición temprana.
[34] Sánchez, A., G. Meléndez and J. Behrman (2020), “Impact of the Juntos Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Nutritional and Cognitive Outcomes in Peru: Comparison between Younger and Older Initial Exposure”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 68/3, pp. 865-897, https://doi.org/10.1086/701233.
[25] Seinfeld, J. et al. (2021), Cambios en el sistema de salud centrados en el ciudadano, Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social, https://cies.org.pe/publicaciones/cambios-en-el-sistema-de-salud-centrados-en-el-ciudadano/.
[26] Torres, J. (2021), “Unintended Effects From the Expansion of the Non-Contributory Health System in Peru”, IMF Working Papers, Vol. 2021/106, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513572758.001.
[39] World Bank (2023), Rising Strong: Peru Poverty and Equity Assestment, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/peru/publication/resurgir-fortalecidos-evaluacion-de-pobreza-y-equidad-en-el-peru.
[27] World Bank (2021), Financiamiento para la cobertura universal de salud en el Perú después de la COVID-19, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/272151632979757783/pdf/Financiamiento-para-la-Cobertura-Universal-de-Salud-en-el-Peru-Despues-de-la-COVID-19.pdf.