Infrastructure and connectivity play a crucial role in fostering economic growth and regional integration by enhancing transport, energy and digital networks. This chapter assesses the extent to which the six Western Balkan economies have developed the infrastructure networks necessary to support economic growth, drawing on seven indicators. It first examines the density and utilisation of transport infrastructure, covering road density, rail density and rail freight intensity relative to economic size, before turning to energy infrastructure, assessed through power losses and electricity costs for non-household consumers. The chapter concludes with an analysis of digital infrastructure, focusing on population coverage by at least 4G networks and broadband speed.
Economic Convergence Scoreboard for the Western Balkans 2026
3. Infrastructure and connectivity cluster
Copy link to 3. Infrastructure and connectivity clusterAbstract
Key findings
Copy link to Key findingsWith an average score of 55 in 2023-2024, the Infrastructure and Connectivity cluster records the third-highest performance across all six clusters. At the same time, it has seen the second-fastest pace of convergence, with the regional average rising by 22 points since 2014-2016. Despite this progress, the regional average remains 25 points below the average of EU neighbouring economies, which share broadly comparable geographical and topographic conditions with the Western Balkan economies, indicating that a substantial convergence gap persists. Serbia leads the regional ranking, while Albania is the lowest-performing economy (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1. Infrastructure and connectivity cluster scores by economy (EU average=100), 2023-2024
Copy link to Figure 3.1. Infrastructure and connectivity cluster scores by economy (EU average=100), 2023-2024
Notes: “EU neighbours average” is the average cluster score of Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. For more information on score calculation and the overall methodological approach, please consult the Methodology section.
Over the last decade, the Western Balkan economies have made notable progress in digital infrastructure, with 4G penetration now matching EU levels across all six economies (Figure 3.2). However, a broadband speed gap persists, with the regional average at 60% of the EU average; the high share of the rural population also challenges efforts to extend high-speed network coverage.
By contrast, transport infrastructure remains the cluster's weakest area (Figure 3.2). Road density has remained broadly stable over the last decade, constrained by an investment pattern skewed towards upgrading existing corridors rather than expanding network coverage, as well as slow project implementation, leaving the region at only 23% of EU levels. Rail infrastructure has continued to deteriorate over the same period, reflecting a pattern of structural disinvestment, leading to a considerable decline in rail freight traffic.
The energy infrastructure presents a contrasting picture (Figure 3.2). Power losses remain structurally elevated at more than 2.5 times the EU average, reflecting primarily ageing generation and distribution infrastructure. Electricity costs for non-household consumers have nonetheless remained contained; however, EU accession prospects will increasingly put pressure on existing coal-based subsidies, as alignment with EU state aid rules and the Emissions Trading System will raise the cost of coal-based electricity production.
Figure 3.2. Infrastructure and connectivity indicator scores by economy (EU average=100), 2023-2024
Copy link to Figure 3.2. Infrastructure and connectivity indicator scores by economy (EU average=100), 2023-2024
Notes: Scores are rounded to the nearest whole number. “EU neighbours average” is the average indicator score of Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. For more information on score calculation and the overall methodological approach, please consult the Methodology section.
IC.01. Road infrastructure density
Copy link to IC.01. Road infrastructure densityThe coverage and quality of road infrastructure shape economic convergence, determining the extent to which producers and consumers can access domestic and regional markets. Road network density thus offers a useful measure of the spatial extent of road infrastructure and, indirectly, of connectivity. However, differences across economies also reflect factors such as population density, geography, topography and settlement patterns, meaning that higher road density does not necessarily imply adequate infrastructure provision. This indicator should therefore be interpreted alongside other measures of transport infrastructure and connectivity.
With an average road infrastructure density of approximately 41 km per 100 km² in 2023-2024, the Western Balkan economies fall short of the EU average of 175 km per 100 km2 (Figure 3.3). Nonetheless, when compared with the EU neighbouring economies, which share similar population densities1 and broadly comparable geographical characteristics, the Western Balkan economies still reach only 38% of this benchmark (108 km per 100 km²). This gap points to constraints on network development characterised by insufficient maintenance spending,2 an investment pattern skewed towards upgrading existing corridors rather than expanding network coverage3 and persistently slow project implementation.4 Road density has remained broadly stable across most economies over the last decade, indicating an investment pace insufficient to close the gap.
Montenegro leads the region in road density, standing at 74 km per 100 km2, while Albania, at 13 km per 100 km2, ranks lowest and is the only economy to have experienced a decline over the period.
Figure 3.3. Road infrastructure density in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Copy link to Figure 3.3. Road infrastructure density in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Notes: Data are unavailable for Montenegro (2014, 2015, 2024), Austria (2024), Cyprus (2024), Germany, Denmark (2024), Spain (2024), Greece, Italy (2024), Luxembourg (2024), Latvia (2024), Malta (2014, 2015, 2017), Poland (2024) and Romania (2024).
Sources: (OECD, 2026[1]). Data for Cyprus from (Eurostat, 2026[2]). Data for Kosovo sent by KAS to the OECD. Data are imputed for Malta (2016), Denmark (2023), Latvia (2023), Luxembourg (2023) and Poland (2023). For more details on imputations, please refer to the Technical Annex, published separately from this report.
IC.02. Rail infrastructure density
Copy link to IC.02. Rail infrastructure densityComplementing road infrastructure, rail can support economic growth and competitiveness by improving the movement of people and goods, strengthening domestic and regional connectivity and enabling a more sustainable mobility network. As with road infrastructure, differences in geography, topography and settlement patterns should also be considered when interpreting cross-economy comparisons.
Rail infrastructure density has declined across most Western Balkan economies over the last decade, driven by a pattern of structural disinvestment in which rail has consistently been deprioritised relative to road infrastructure.5 With a regional average of approximately 2.4 km per 100 km² in 2023-2024 (Figure 3.4), rail infrastructure density in the Western Balkan economies falls short of the EU average of 5.7 km per 100 km². Nonetheless, when compared with the EU neighbouring economies, which share similar population densities and broadly comparable geographical characteristics, the Western Balkan economies still reach only around 50% of this benchmark (4.8 km per 100 km²). Maintenance spending in the Western Balkans remains insufficient, with works fragmented across isolated sections rather than organised around a comprehensive network upgrade.6
Serbia leads the region with a density of 4.0 km per 100 km², while Albania records the lowest, at 0.9 km per 100 km², with the sharpest contraction in the region, at over 28%, since 2014-2016.
Figure 3.4. Rail infrastructure density in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Copy link to Figure 3.4. Rail infrastructure density in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Note: Data are unavailable for Cyprus, Malta, and Kosovo (2014, 2015).
Sources: (Eurostat, 2026[3]). Data for Kosovo (2016, 2023, 2024) sent by KAS to the OECD.
IC.03. Rail freight intensity
Copy link to IC.03. Rail freight intensityThe deterioration of rail infrastructure documented above has directly led to the underutilisation of railways for freight transport across the region.
Rail freight intensity, measured as tonne-kilometres per unit of GDP in 2021 USD, expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP),7 has declined across most Western Balkan economies over the last decade. This trend has been driven primarily by a contraction in absolute rail freight volumes,8 reflecting the progressive erosion of network capacity and service reliability resulting from sustained underinvestment in maintenance.9 With a regional average of 7.2 tonne-kilometres per thousand units of GDP in 2023-2024 (Figure 3.5), the Western Balkan economies stand at 34.2% of the EU neighbouring economies' average (21.6).
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, which were broadly in line with the EU neighbouring economies' average in 2014-2016, have recorded significant declines, with performance at 16% and 37% below the EU neighbours’ average in 2023-2024, respectively. Albania and Kosovo are the economies where rail freight remains marginal, with negligible volumes.
Figure 3.5. Rail freight intensity in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Copy link to Figure 3.5. Rail freight intensity in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Notes: Data are unavailable for Belgium, Cyprus, Greece (2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2023), Malta, Albania (2024), and Montenegro (2021, 2023).
Sources: (Eurostat, 2026[4]). Data for Albania from (INSTAT, 2026[5]). Data for Kosovo (2015-2023) from (KAS, 2024[6]) and (KAS, 2026[7]) for the year 2024. Data for Montenegro (2021, 2023) from (MONSTAT, 2024[8]). Data for Serbia from (SORS, 2026[9]). GDP data from (World Bank, 2026[10]). Data are imputed for Greece (2022). For more details on imputations, please refer to the Technical Annex, published separately from this report.
IC.04. Power losses
Copy link to IC.04. Power lossesPower losses, measured as the share of energy injected into transmission and distribution grids that fails to reach end users, capture the efficiency of energy infrastructure in delivering available electricity to consumers.
The Western Balkan economies recorded an average loss rate of 15.2% in 2023-2024 (Figure 3.6), more than 2.5 times the EU average (6.0%) and significantly above the average for EU neighbouring economies (9.2%). The regional average has remained unchanged since 2014-2016, reflecting the combined effect of an ageing generation and distribution infrastructure10 and outdated metering systems that contribute to non-technical losses.11
This stagnation conceals diverging trends across the region. Albania and Kosovo, despite reducing their loss rates over the period, continue to record the highest levels in the region at 19.4% and 21.9% in 2023-2024, respectively. It should be noted that in Kosovo, a significant share of non-technical losses in the northern municipalities stems from unbilled energy, which is currently treated as power losses; the gradual integration of these municipalities into the domestic electricity billing and collection system is expected to help reduce non-technical losses in the future. Power losses have meanwhile risen across the remaining economies; Bosnia and Herzegovina records the lowest rate in the region at 10.4%, a level broadly aligned with the EU neighbours.
Figure 3.6. Power losses in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Copy link to Figure 3.6. Power losses in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Note: Data are unavailable for Luxembourg (2014, 2015), Slovakia (2014, 2015, 2019).
Sources: (Council of European Energy Regulators, 2025[11]; 2020[12]). Data for Albania (2023), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2023), Kosovo (2023), Montenegro (2023), North Macedonia (2023) and Serbia (2023) have been sent by the Energy Community to the OECD. Data for Kosovo (2024) have been sent by the KAS to the OECD. Data are imputed for Bulgaria (2014-2016), Denmark (2014-2016), the Netherlands (2014-2016) and the EU economies (2023). For more details on imputations, please refer to the Technical Annex, published separately from this report.
IC.05. Electricity cost for non-household consumers
Copy link to IC.05. Electricity cost for non-household consumersIn contrast to power losses, electricity costs for non-household consumers represent a strength for the competitiveness of Western Balkan businesses, with half of the economies maintaining prices below EU levels.
The regional average stands at USD 0.25 per kWh in 2023-2024 (Figure 3.7), broadly in line with the EU average (USD 0.26) and well below the average for EU neighbouring economies (USD 0.36). This relatively contained cost level reflects the region's reliance on domestically produced coal,12 supported by substantial fossil fuel subsidies13 that have so far shielded businesses from global energy market pressures. However, EU accession prospects increasingly challenge the sustainability of this competitive advantage, as alignment with EU state aid rules and the Emissions Trading System would raise the cost of coal-based electricity production.
Kosovo records the lowest prices in the region at USD 0.18 per kWh, around 30% below the EU average. North Macedonia records the highest, at USD 0.38 per kWh, nearly 50% above the EU average, reflecting its particularly high dependence on energy imports.
Figure 3.7. Electricity prices for non-household consumers in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Copy link to Figure 3.7. Electricity prices for non-household consumers in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Note: Data are unavailable for Albania (2014, 2015, 2017, 2018).
Sources: (Council of European Energy Regulators, 2025[11]; 2020[12]). Data for Albania (2023), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2023), Kosovo (2023), Montenegro (2023), North Macedonia (2023) and Serbia (2023) have been sent by the Energy Community to the OECD. Data are imputed for Albania (2016). For more details on imputations, please refer to the Technical Annex, published separately from this report.
IC.06. 4G penetration
Copy link to IC.06. 4G penetrationPopulation coverage by at least 4G networks14 measures the breadth of digital infrastructure deployment, a prerequisite for businesses and individuals to adopt digital tools and participate in the digital economy.
Convergence on this indicator since 2014-2016 has been the most pronounced of any in the cluster, with the regional average rising from 58% to 99.3% of the population (Figure 3.8), now matching the EU average, driven by sustained private investment in mobile network expansion.15 Progress has been particularly notable in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 4G networks had yet to be deployed in 2014-2016 and reached 98% in 2023-2024, and in Albania, where coverage has increased from 38% to nearly 100% over the same period.
Figure 3.8. 4G penetration in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Copy link to Figure 3.8. 4G penetration in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Note: Data are unavailable for Kosovo (2017, 2019, 2020).
Sources: (World Bank, 2026[13]). Data for Kosovo (2022, 2023, 2024) from (Electronic and Postal Communications Regulatory Authority, 2025[14]), year 2021 from (Electronic and Postal Communications Regulatory Authority, 2022[15]) and year 2018 from (Electronic and Postal Communications Regulatory Authority, 2019[16]).
IC.07. Broadband speed
Copy link to IC.07. Broadband speedWhile 4G penetration shows near-complete convergence, broadband speed reveals a remaining gap in the quality of digital infrastructure, constraining businesses' capacity to adopt data-intensive digital tools and processes.
With a regional average of 58.6 Mbit/s in 2023-2024 (Figure 3.9), the Western Balkan economies reach 60% of the EU average. The progress recorded since 2014-2016 is nonetheless substantial, with the regional average rising eightfold, driven by significant investment in high-speed networks over the last decade.16
North Macedonia is the regional leader, even exceeding the average of EU neighbouring economies (72.3 Mbit/s), at 88.5 Mbit/s. Albania, however, records the lowest broadband speed in the region at 27.6 Mbit/s, with convergence remaining modest, rising from 25% to 28% of the EU average over the past decade. Overall, closing the remaining gap with the EU will require addressing the challenge of rural connectivity: with approximately 37.8% of the Western Balkan population residing in rural areas, against an EU average of 25% (World Bank, 2026[17]), the deployment of the high-speed network infrastructure will require public support to offset the higher costs that deter private operators from extending coverage beyond urban centres.
Figure 3.9. Broadband speed in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Copy link to Figure 3.9. Broadband speed in the Western Balkan economies and the EU, 2014-2024
Note: Data are unavailable for all economies (2014, 2015).
Source: (Cable.co.uk, 2025[18]). Data are imputed for all economies (2016). For more details on imputations, please refer to the Technical Annex, published separately from this report.
References
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[22] CEPS (2023), The Solution to Phasing Out Coal in the Western Balkans? Extending the EU ETS to the Region, Centre for European Policy Studies, https://cdn.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/CEPS-PB2023-04_Phasing-out-coal-in-Western-Balkans.pdf.
[11] Council of European Energy Regulators (2025), 3rd CEER Report on Power Losses, https://www.ceer.eu/publication/3rd-ceer-report-on-power-losses/.
[12] Council of European Energy Regulators (2020), 2nd CEER Report on Power Losses, Council of European Energy Regulators, https://www.ceer.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/C19-EQS-101-03_Report_on_Power_Losses_3.pdf.
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[16] Electronic and Postal Communications Regulatory Authority (2019), Annual Work Report 2018, https://www.arkep-rks.org/desk/inc/media/A6F11C95-9ACD-4DB8-A02D-C45625CFC66E.pdf.
[4] Eurostat (2026), Goods Transported, https://doi.org/10.2908/RAIL_GO_TOTAL (accessed on 16 April 2026).
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[5] INSTAT (2026), Transport, Accidents and Characteristics of Road Vehicles: Rail Transport Statistics, Publications, Institute of Statistics, https://www.instat.gov.al/en/themes/industry-trade-and-services/transport-accidents-and-characteristics-of-road-vehicles/#tab3 (accessed on 16 April 2026).
[7] KAS (2026), Transportation Statistics 2025, https://askapi.rks-gov.net/Custom/b59846ef-ca36-4911-a7b0-35b21fc77f1f.pdf.
[6] KAS (2024), Transportation Statistics 2023, Kosovo Agency of Statistics, https://askapi.rks-gov.net/Custom/793bd5c5-fa63-4f00-a914-2a234bfb4885.pdf.
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[1] OECD (2026), Annual Length of Inland Transport Infrastructure. Combined measure: Inland, Road, Length of transport infrastructure, Roads, OECD, Paris, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/4c4 (accessed on 15 June 2026).
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Notes
Copy link to Notes← 1. The average population density of the Western Balkan economies is 83.5 inhabitants per km² in 2024, while the EU neighbours' average is 84.3 (World Bank, 2026[24]).
← 2. Available data indicate increasing efforts in most Western Balkan economies, albeit to varying degrees. Serbia has had the highest maintenance spending, reaching EUR 374.7 million in 2024, or 0.45% of GDP, compared to 0.32% in the EU neighbouring economies (data not available for Greece and Romania). Spending has also risen in Albania, but efforts remain below the EU average at 0.15% of GDP. In North Macedonia, annual spending remained below EUR 15 million over 2014-2024 and stood at only 0.02% of GDP in 2024, posing challenges to the sustainability of road infrastructure (OECD, 2025[21]).
← 3. Between 2009 and 2025, more than 1000 km of roads were built or upgraded in the region through the WBIF, including 215 km of newly constructed motorways (Western Balkans Investment Framework, 2025[19]).
← 4. Most road extension projects in the region suffer delays of over two years following their approval (OECD, 2024[20]).
← 5. In 2024, available data for Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia indicated that investment in rail amounted to, respectively, 5.4%, 0.3% and 29.1% of investment in road infrastructure (OECD, 2025[21]).
← 6. Only 15% of the overall investment earmarked for the maintenance of the Trans-European Transport Network was realised in 2023 (Transport Community, 2023[29]).
← 7. Unless otherwise stated, USD refers to 2021 USD PPP throughout the chapter.
← 8. Apart from Montenegro, where the freight volumes in tonne-km have increased by 43.6% from 2014 to 2024, all the Western Balkan economies have experienced a decline, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (-22.4%), North Macedonia (-61.6%) (Eurostat, 2026[3]) and Kosovo (-99.6%).
← 9. In 2023, an estimated 42.5% of the core and 46.3% of the comprehensive networks were in poor or very poor condition (Transport Community, 2023[29]). This share has increased to 45% in 2025 (Transport Community, 2025[28]), indicating a continued deterioration of the regional railway network.
← 10. As of 2023, around 50% of the installed generation capacity was more than 35 years old, while the lifetime duration of thermal power plants is estimated to be around 40 years (CEPS, 2023[22]).
← 11. Non-technical losses refer to electricity that is consumed but not billed, arising principally from energy theft, metering errors and conveyance inaccuracies. In the Western Balkan economies, the limited deployment of smart metering infrastructure across the region contributes to elevated non-technical loss rates, although modernisation efforts are underway in Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia (EIB, 2024[23]).
← 12. Western Balkan economies consumed 61 million tonnes of brown coal in 2023, an increase of 13% compared with 1990. Brown coal still plays a major role in electricity generation in the region, providing 39% of the electricity generation in Montenegro, 40% in North Macedonia, 56% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 60% in Serbia and 91% in Kosovo (Eurostat, 2025[30]).
← 13. Between 2018 and 2023, the Western Balkan economies provided EUR 5.8 billion in transfers and credit to their energy sectors, mostly to fossil fuels (OECD, 2025[26]).
← 14. The 2026 edition replaces mobile cellular penetration with population coverage by at least 4G networks, providing a more accurate measure of meaningful mobile connectivity and eliminating distortions generated by multi-SIM usage and non-resident mobile subscriptions in the previous indicator.
← 15. Private capital and infrastructure sharing have played an increasing role in the expansion of mobile networks in the region. In January 2024, an Actis-led consortium, with EBRD support, acquired around 1 800 mobile network towers from Telekom Srbija across Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, establishing the first independent tower company headquartered in the Western Balkan economies. The transaction transfers state-owned telecommunications infrastructure to private ownership and is intended to facilitate infrastructure sharing among operators, thereby supporting 5G roll-out and improving network coverage (EBRD, 2024[27]).
← 16. In line with the Gigabit Society targets, the Western Balkan economies have invested significantly in developing high-speed networks, leading to the emergence of fibre-to-the-premises (FTTP) technology in the region. As of 2024, 56.6% of households in the Western Balkan economies used FTTP technology, up from 33.8% in 2021; however, these figures remain below the EU average of 69.2% in 2024 (Regional Cooperation Council, 2026[25]).