Early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean

Executive summary

Cartels are serious infringements of competition law, yet cartel enforcement requires considerable time and resources. Against this background, many jurisdictions have adopted mechanisms that allow cartel cases to be resolved before the end of a regular procedure. These mechanisms, commonly referred to as early case resolution tools, include settlements, plea agreements and commitments. Their primary objective is to enable competition authorities to conclude cases more efficiently, while allowing resources to be redirected towards the detection and prosecution of additional cartels. At the same time, investigated parties may benefit from greater certainty, reduced financial exposure and faster resolution of proceedings.

This paper examines the policy considerations, legal frameworks and enforcement experiences surrounding the early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It reviews how jurisdictions in the region have designed and implemented these tools, the incentives they provide to investigated parties and the broader implications for cartel enforcement. The analysis draws on legislation, regulations, guidelines and case experiences from across the region to identify common trends, challenges and lessons for policymakers and competition authorities.

Policy considerations, legal frameworks and enforcement experiences in LAC

Early case resolution mechanisms can advance several policy objectives. They can reduce the duration and costs of proceedings, increase the certainty and finality of enforcement outcomes and enable corrective measures to be implemented more rapidly. In some jurisdictions, they also support cartel enforcement by requiring investigated parties to co-operate with ongoing investigations and provide evidence against other participants. Authorities nevertheless face important trade-offs when designing these programmes. The extent of co-operation required, the existence of admissions of guilt or facts and the level of financial obligations can affect the attractiveness of the programme and its interaction with wider enforcement goals such as leniency, deterrence, private damages and criminal liability.

The legal frameworks in LAC jurisdictions reveal some diversity. Some jurisdictions rely on settlement models that involve admissions and financial sanctions, while others use commitment-based systems centred on legally binding obligations. Several jurisdictions combine elements of both approaches. Requirements also vary across jurisdictions, particularly regarding admissions of guilt or facts, duties to co-operate with the authority, financial contributions and behavioural or structural commitments. Despite these differences, all systems seek to balance incentives for participation with the need to preserve effective enforcement.

Experience in the region demonstrates that competition authorities have incorporated commitments aimed at restoring competition, strengthening compliance, reversing the effects of infringements, strengthening investigations with evidence and addressing market conditions that may have facilitated collusion. Cases from Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru show how negotiated outcomes may include structural remedies, compliance programmes, compensation measures or other commitments designed to generate competitive benefits. The selection of cases suitable for early resolution also reflects broader enforcement priorities, including considerations relating to deterrence, the gravity of the infringement and the value of judicial precedent.

Key takeaways

Early resolution mechanisms are already part of the cartel enforcement toolkit in many LAC jurisdictions, although their use remains limited. As competition authorities continue to strengthen cartel enforcement, these mechanisms offer opportunities to improve procedural efficiency, expand enforcement reach and achieve outcomes that support competition policy objectives. Their successful implementation requires a careful balancing of incentives, enforcement goals and institutional realities. When properly designed and applied, early resolution programmes can become a valuable complement to traditional cartel enforcement and contribute to more effective competition law enforcement across the region.