Effective digital government depends on making smart investments in digital technologies and having the people and skills needed to deliver results. Drawing on findings from the 2025 Digital Government Index, this chapter shows that progress has been strongest in the early stages of investment - planning, needs identification and securing funding - but weaker in what happens next, including adjusting funding as work progresses, managing risk throughout delivery, procuring in ways suited to modern digital projects, and evaluating whether investments have actually worked. These gaps limit governments' ability to scale what works, stop what does not and learn consistently from experience. By bringing together digital investment management and digital talent and skills as two mutually reinforcing priorities, this chapter shows how better-governed investment and stronger internal capability can jointly improve value for money, reduce dependence on external providers and sustain digital transformation over time, including as AI adoption accelerates.
Digital Government Outlook 2026
From Foundations to Transformational Impact
Abstract
Digital government only delivers when governments manage investments and build capabilities at the same time. Technology alone does not transform government and its public services. Governments need to plan and spend on digital technologies in ways that generate real results, and they need the right people and skills to make those investments work. When investment management and capability building are treated as separate concerns, both suffer. When they work together, governments can deliver more reliably, adapt quickly and demonstrate clear value for money.
Planning, funding, risk management and procurement guidance are all improving, but have not yet adapted to the way modern digital projects work. Most OECD countries have processes for assessing ex ante the value of digital investments, dedicated funding mechanisms, stronger procurement guidance, and more systematic risk assessments. However, these tools remain largely designed around upfront approval and annual budget cycles rather than the staged, iterative delivery that digital projects require. Risk assessment methods are often too generic to capture the specific challenges of digital and AI-enabled initiatives, and procurement approaches suited to flexible delivery see uneven uptake. This limits governments' ability to adjust investments as technologies evolve, scale up what is working, stop what is not, spot problems early, and avoid long-term dependency on individual suppliers.
Monitoring is common, but evaluating whether investments have delivered remains the missing link. Most OECD governments track project progress during delivery, but few systematically assess whether their digital investments achieved the results they promised. Only one in four OECD countries conducts cost-benefit analysis of completed digital projects. Without this, governments cannot learn consistently from experience, demonstrate value for money or make better investment decisions over time.
Digital skills efforts are expanding, but remain fragmented and disconnected from long-term workforce planning. OECD countries are doing more to assess skills gaps, attract digital talent and provide training. But these efforts are often isolated initiatives rather than parts of a coherent, government-wide workforce strategy. Only six OECD countries have a dedicated strategy for digital talent and skills in the public sector. Without a more strategic approach, governments risk remaining under-equipped to manage data-intensive systems, oversee AI responsibly and sustain digital transformation over time.
Governments need the right balance between outsourcing and in-house capability to sustain transformation and preserve agency. External providers can bring skills and capacity that government does not have and accelerate delivery. But over-reliance hollows out the internal knowledge and judgement that governments need to define what they want, assess whether they are getting it, hold suppliers to account and adapt systems when circumstances change. Several OECD countries are actively rebuilding internal digital capability. The goal is not to bring everything in-house, but to ensure government retains the core expertise needed to govern digital transformation responsibly.
Effective digital government depends on making smart investments in digital technologies and having the people and skills needed to deliver results. This chapter looks at both: how governments manage their digital investments, and how they build the internal capability to make those investments work.
Getting digital investment right means more than approving the right projects at the outset. It means actively managing them throughout, from identifying needs and making the case for funding, through delivery and adaptation, to decommissioning systems when they are no longer fit for purpose. This full cycle matters because digital technologies evolve quickly, risks change during delivery, and what looks like a sound decision at the approval stage may need to be revisited as circumstances change. Governments that manage this cycle well can scale what works, stop what does not, and learn consistently from experience. Those that do not tend to accumulate costly, outdated systems, repeat avoidable mistakes and lose control over the technologies they depend on.
As public sector spending on digital technologies grows, so does the importance of governing investments in ways that maximise value and avoid inefficiencies (OECD, 2025[1]). The 2025 Digital Government Index (DGI) shows that OECD countries have made strong progress on the early stages of this cycle: identifying needs, building the case for investment and securing funding. However, important capabilities are often missing once delivery starts. Many governments lack flexible funding that can be adjusted as work progresses, clear decision points to decide whether to continue or change courses, procurement approaches suited to modern digital delivery, and regular reviews that examine what is working and why. When these elements are missing, governments struggle to adapt to changing technologies, user needs and risks, and it is harder to demonstrate that public money is being well spent.
The same pattern appears in digital skills. Governments increasingly recognise the need to build digital capability, and many are doing more to assess skills gaps, attract talent and provide training. But these efforts are often fragmented and disconnected from longer-term workforce planning. Without a coherent, government-wide approach to building and retaining the right skills, governments risk becoming overly dependent on external technology providers, losing institutional knowledge and lacking the internal expertise needed to govern, oversee and adapt digital systems responsibly.
This chapter examines both challenges in sequence. It first looks at how government manage digital spending, covering planning and funding, risk management and procurement, and monitoring and evaluation. It then examines how governments can build and sustain digital skills and talent. Finally, it addresses the question of how governments can strike the right balance between developing capability in-house and drawing on external providers.
3.2.1. Stronger central oversight is improving investment decisions, but lifecycle management remains uneven
Investing well in digital technologies requires more than securing the right budget. It means making sound decisions throughout the full life of an investment, from identifying needs and assessing options, through delivery and adjustment, to reviewing outcomes and decommissioning systems when they are no longer needed. When this is done well, governments can get better value for money, avoid accumulating outdated systems, and retain control over the technologies they rely on. When it is not, spending grows without clear results, systems become harder to update or replace, and governments find themselves locked into arrangements that no longer serve their needs (OECD, 2025[1]; OECD, 2024[2]).
The OECD Recommendation on Digital Government Strategies underlines the importance of coherent and well-governed investment arrangements to steer digital transformation and safeguard long-term value. Building on this, the OECD Digital Government Investments Framework translates these principles into actionable tools and guidance for managing investments throughout their full life - from early planning and business cases through to delivery, scaling and continuous improvement (Figure 3.1).
Three pillars to guide the management of investments throughout the project lifecycle
Source: (OECD, 2025[1])
A first step towards better investment management is giving the central digital government authority a clear mandate to oversee spending across government. This helps align investments with strategic priorities, identify opportunities to share costs and infrastructure, and avoid duplicating spending across agencies (OECD, 2025[1]; OECD, 2021[3]). According to the 2025 DGI, 33 out of 36 OECD countries (92%) report that their leading digital government institution is responsible for prioritising digital and ICT investment projects across central government, up from 85% in 2023 (Figure 3.2 and Annex Table 3.A.1). This reflects growing recognition that fragmented agency-by-agency decisions can undermine coherence, duplicate spending, and make it harder for systems to work together. While countries have developed different models for central oversight (Box 3.1), the direction is consistent: stronger central roles create better conditions for managing investments strategically and keeping digital systems reliable and adaptable over time.
Total of OECD countries with specific decision-making responsibilities of digital government leading institutions, 2023 and 2025
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Germany, Greece, Slovak Republic, Switzerland and the United States. Refer to Annex Table 3.A.1 for comprehensive OECD and Accession country data.
Clear mandates and governance arrangements ensure that digital investments are prioritised strategically, managed coherently, and held accountable for results, rather than fragmented across ministries with no one responsible. Most OECD countries have strengthened the mandate and role of digital government authorities to manage digital investments, making it a strong lever to exert this role and steer a whole-of-government digital transformation:
New Zealand’s Government Chief Digital Officer has progressively strengthened cross-government oversight of digital spending to reduce duplication and improve value for money, including through closer scrutiny of investment proposals and greater use of common platforms and shared services.
Chile’s Secretariat of Digital Government, within the Ministry of Finance, plays a central role in coordinating and financing digital government initiatives, aligning funding decisions with the broader State Modernisation Agenda.
Korea uses legal mandates to give the Ministry of the Interior and Safety binding authority over project selection, prioritisation and management through its E-Government Project Support Programme. Annual funding is agreed with the Ministry of Economy and Finance, creating a direct link between investment and budget allocation.
Alongside a clear mandate, governments benefit from managing investments in a joined-up way across their lifecycle – not just at the point of initial approval. Joined-up approaches help governments track whether expected benefits are being realised, spot problems early and adjust course when needed (OECD, 2025[1]). The 2025 DGI suggests that many investment management systems remain focused primarily on the planning stage and are not well connected to delivery oversight, funding decisions or evaluation. As a result, governments often lack the feedback they need during delivery to identify when something is going wrong or when a project should be changed or stopped (OECD, 2025[1]). More integrated approaches, where regular reviews link funding to progress and outcomes, can help governments manage complex programmes more effectively and keep investments aligned with evolving needs (Box 3.2).
Some OECD countries are advancing in the development of integrated approaches to managing digital investments, from the moment of appraisal to the evaluation of results.
Australia’s Digital and ICT Investment Oversight Framework brings together policies, processes and tools to manage investments from initial planning through to completion. It requires agencies to define, track, and report on the benefits they expect to achieve, supported by central guidance from the Digital Transformation Agency. Funding is released in stages, tied to milestone completion. Portfolio-level tools - including Digital Investment Overview and a Major Digital Projects Report – provide transparency across both planned and active investments.
Switzerland applies HERMES, a whole-of-government project management approach, to oversee digital investments across their lifecycle. It embeds business case development and review – covering objectives, value for money and risk – and mandates final evaluations to assess outcomes and capture lessons learned. Project documentation is recorded in a central portfolio management tool, giving departments visibility across investments. For strategic initiatives, progress is published via the Digital Switzerland Action Plan portal.
3.2.2. Planning tools are widely available, but not yet adapted to the pace of modern digital delivery
Most OECD countries have put in place the basic tools to plan and estimate spending on digital government. According to the 2025 DGI, 33 out of 36 OECD countries (89%) having such mechanism, broadly unchanged from 88% in 2023, reflecting established planning standards across the OECD area.
However, in many countries these tools were designed for a different era of technology delivery. They work well for large, one-off projects with fixed requirements and predictable costs. They work less well for the way digital projects are now typically delivered - in stages, with requirements that evolve as work progresses, using flexible technologies such as cloud services that are paid for on a subscription basis rather than as a one-off purchase, or AI tools that need to be tested and adapted over time.
In practice, planning tools are often used to justify an investment at the approval stage rather than to guide its delivery, adaptation or oversight as the work progresses. Projects may appear sound when first approved but become harder to adjust as technology change, risk emerge or user needs evolve. More flexible planning and funding approaches – one that allows decision to be revisited and investments to be adjusted as new information becomes available – would better protect value for money and reduce the risk of governments becoming locked into approaches that no longer work.
Several OECD countries are adapting their planning processes to address this, introducing greater flexibility and more risk-proportionate review (Box 3.3).
Several OECD countries are adapting their investment planning processes to better support digital delivery:
Canada requires departments to develop a concept case before proceeding to a full business case. This helps clarify the problem or opportunity, provides an early indication of potential investments, and ensures alignment with strategic and departmental priorities before significant resources are committed.
New Zealand’s Better Business Cases framework adjusts the level of scrutiny to the scale and complexity of a project – lighter touch for smaller or lower-risk investments, more rigorous for larger or more complex ones.
The United Kingdom has updated its investment appraisal guidance and is piloting staged funding approaches that allow early funding for initial exploration and testing, reducing the risk of committing too early to a particular solution.
Australia’s Digital and ICT Investment Oversight Framework manages investments from planning through to completion, requiring agencies to define and track expected benefits. For higher-risk proposals, funding may be released in stages tied to milestone completion to help de-risk the investment, supported by portfolio-level transparency tools across planned and active projects.
3.2.3. Dedicated funding for digital government is growing, but is not yet flexible enough
Having a dedicated source of funding for digital investments, separate from general departmental budgets, helps governments fund shared platforms and systems for government institutions that would not have the budget to build alone. The share of countries with such dedicated funding has risen from 73% in 2023 to 81% in 2025 (29 out of 36 countries), reflecting a growing recognition that strategic digital investment requires stable, purpose-built funding mechanisms (Figure 3.3).
However, most of these funding mechanisms are still tied to annual budget cycles and upfront approval processes. They are designed to approve spending at the start of a project, not to adjust it as the project evolves. This makes it harder to manage investments that span multiple years, change in scope as technology develops, or need to scale up once an initial phase has demonstrated results. It also makes it difficult to stop or redirect spending when a project is underperforming, since funding decisions have typically already been made.
Moving towards more outcome-focused funding - where resources are released progressively based on demonstrated progress rather than committed upfront in full - would better support the way digital projects actually work and improve governments' ability to get value from their investments (Box 3.4).
Availability of a dedicated funding programme or initiative for ICT/digital projects in government, 2023 and 2025
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Several OECD countries are adapting how digital investment funding works in practice:
The United Kingdom is piloting staged funding for digital projects, testing approaches where funding is released in tranches tied to demonstrated progress, with regular reviews informing subsequent tranches.
France’s Public Action Transformation Fund (FTAP) awards funding based on expected return on investment and alignment with identified priorities, with the Interministerial Digital Directorate (DINUM) playing a central review and co-ordination role. This model demonstrates how dedicated funding can be paired with central oversight and performance mechanisms.
Japan’s co-ordinates digital and technology budgeting centrally thorough its Digital Agency, allocating strategic investment funds to ministries in a way that promotes alignment with cross-government objectives and reduce fragmentation.
Norway’s co-financing scheme requires the agencies receiving funding to contribute a share themselves, reinforcing ownership and accountability, and linking funding to assessed benefits.
3.2.4. Risk management is improving, but it is not yet consistently tailored to digital delivery
Identifying and managing risks is a fundamental part of making good investments decisions. For digital projects specifically, this matters because risks can change significantly during delivery – as technologies evolve, dependencies on other systems emerge, or user needs shift in ways that were not anticipated at the outset. Governments that manage risk well throughout a project’s life are better placed to spot problems early, adjust course before issues become costly, and avoid accumulating outdated or poorly performing systems.
Most OECD countries have put strong foundations in place for managing cybersecurity risks. All OECD countries have:
a strategy or policy for information security
legislation or regulation covering the security of critical digital infrastructure
a leading institution to co-ordinate cybersecurity at the national level
an institution with a mandate to investigate and prosecute cybercrime
Almost all also have a national team to respond to cybersecurity incidents - Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) - and a dedicated security operation function - Security Operations Centre (SOC). This reflects the priority governments place on keeping the systems and infrastructure that underpin public services secure and available.
However, managing cybersecurity risks is only part of the picture. Digital projects also carry delivery risks - the risk that a project takes longer or costs more than expected; governance risks - the risk that accountability is unclear or oversight is inadequate; and technology-specific risks such as dependency on a single supplier, difficulties integrating with existing systems, or uncertainty about how AI tools will perform in practice. These risks require different assessment approaches from those used for traditional infrastructure or administrative projects, and many governments have not yet adapted their methods accordingly.
The number of OECD countries where the leading digital government body conducts dedicated risk assessments for all or selected digital projects increased from 23 out of 33 countries in 2023 (70%) to 28 out of 36 in 2025 (77%) – a meaningful improvement, indicating that such assessments are being mainstreamed across the OECD area (Figure 3.4, Panel A). Where risk assessments do exist, they frequently rely on generic tools designed for traditional projects and can become a compliance exercise — completed at the approval stage and rarely revisited during delivery. This means that new risks emerging during a project - changes in technology, shifts in user needs, problems with supplier performance - may not be picked up until they have already caused significant disruption or cost. Furthermore, existing risks assessment methods prioritise cybersecurity and service continuity risk analysis, followed by risks associated to legacy technologies (Figure 3.4, Panel B). Several OECD countries are taking concrete actions to have a more tailored and fit-for-purpose approach to managing risks in digital and ICT investments (Box 3.5).
Note: Panel A represents the individual responses to the question “Has the leading digital government unit conducted dedicated risk assessments for digital/ICT projects at the central/federal government?”. Panel B represents the aggregated responses for OECD countries to the question “Please specify what kind of risks were included for such assessments”. 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Slovak Republic, Switzerland and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Source: OECD Survey on Digital Government 3.0 (2025); OECD (2026[4]).
Several OECD countries are strengthening how they assess and manage digital-specific risks, including by linking risk assessment more explicitly to investment decisions and funding:
Ireland embeds oversight for major digital initiatives within a wider public spending and infrastructure governance framework, supported by the Digital Government Oversight Unit and the Public Spending Code. Higher-value digital projects receive structured scrutiny against risk and feasibility criteria before proceeding.
Lithuania uses a structured method for evaluating and prioritising digital initiatives that includes explicit criteria on feasibility, governance capacity and cybersecurity, linking project approval to compliance with these requirements.
New Zealand’s Digital Investment Office support business case review and investment decisions, with a focus on risk-sensitive assessment, strategic alignment and managing the overall portfolio of digital investments across government.
3.2.5. Procurement guidance is improving, but purchasing practices have not yet caught up
Public procurement – the process by which governments buy products and services from external providers, including digital technologies and services – is one of the most important levers governments have for getting value from digital investment. How governments buy shapes what they get: the flexibility of contracts, the range of suppliers they can access, and their ability to adjust as needs change during delivery.
Central guidance on procuring digital technologies has improved significantly. The number of OECD countries with dedicated procurement guidelines for digital and technology projects increased from 22 out of 33 countries (67%) in 2023 to 27 out of 36 (75%) in 2025. However, having good guidance is not the same as procuring in ways that suit modern digital delivery. Many digital projects today do not follow a simple pattern of specifying requirements upfront, selecting a supplier and delivering a fixed product. They are iterative – requirements evolve as work progresses, technologies change, and what is needed at the end may look quite different from what was envisaged at the start. Procurement procedures designed for traditional, fixed-scope projects are poorly suited to this reality.
When looking at the uptake of procurement mechanisms, several countries have developed central platforms and co-ordinated purchasing arrangements that make it easier for agencies to buy consistently and at better value (Box 3.6). This reflects growing maturity in procurement governance and a recognition that co-ordinated approaches reduce duplication and transaction costs (OECD, 2022[25]).In contrast, the 2025 DGI shows that more flexible and innovation-oriented procurement mechanisms see uneven uptake. This includes purchasing arrangements that allow the supplier pool to be updated over time, contracts structured around outcomes rather than fixed specifications, dialogue-based processes that allow governments and suppliers to explore solutions together, and partnerships designed specifically to develop new approaches. Only 20 out of 36 OECD countries (55%) report using a broader set of procurement mechanisms suitable for digital delivery, an improvement from 44% in 2023 but still one of the weakest performance areas across the investment lifecycle (Annex Table 3.A.2).
This gap reflects several practical challenges. Procurement teams may lack the skills and organisational conditions to use more flexible approaches. Risk-averse cultures can make officials reluctant to move away from familiar compliance-driven processes. Budget and approval cycles may not align with iterative delivery models. And central guidance, while valuable for consistency, can inadvertently reinforce standardised approaches if it is not accompanied by training, support and outcome-focused contract models (OECD, 2017[26]; OECD, 2025[1]).
Moving toward adaptive procurement approaches that are better suited to digital delivery is essential for government to work effectively with a wider range of suppliers – including smaller, more innovative companies – manage delivery more flexibly, and avoid becoming locked into long-term arrangements that are difficult and costly to exit (Box 3.6). In line with more traditional procurement mechanisms, agile procurement benefits from adequate planning, capability and governance arrangements, which remain essential to obtain expected outcomes.
Several OECD countries are establishing dedicated frameworks and capabilities to better procure digital technologies in governments:
Australia’s Digital Transformation Agency manages whole-of-government digital procurement through BuyICT, a central platform covering purchasing arrangements, framework agreements, flexible supplier panels and contract management. This provides consistent and coordinated access to digital suppliers across departments.
The United Kingdom uses its Digital Marketplace and Crown Commercial Service agreements to procure digital services and specialists. These platforms simplify access to suppliers and support more flexible sourcing, including smaller suppliers that might not succeed in traditional large-contract procurement processes.
Korea organises centralised digital procurement through the Smart Nara Marketplace and Digital Service Mall, supported by legal and procedural guidance. These mechanisms support transparency, co-ordination and consistent practice across government.
3.2.6. Monitoring is common, but evaluating results remain the missing link
Getting real value from digital investment depends on three connected capabilities: keeping delivery on track while work is underway; tracking performance as work progresses; and assessing whether the expected benefits were actually achieved once a project is complete. In most OECD countries, the first of these is reasonably well established. The second and third remain significantly weaker – and this gap limits governments' ability to learn from experience, demonstrate value for money and make better investment decisions over time.
Monitoring is the most mature of the three. The 2025 DGI shows that 31 out of 36 OECD countries (86%) have central monitoring mechanisms to track the progress of digital projects, broadly unchanged from 85% in 2023. This widespread adoption is a solid foundation. However, what is being tracked matters as much as whether tracking exists. In most countries, monitoring focuses on inputs and process - whether milestones have been met and budgets spent - rather than on whether projects are delivering the outcomes they were designed to achieve or whether new risks are emerging that require a change in direction. This kind of compliance-focused monitoring is useful for basic accountability, but it does not tell governments whether their investments are working in practice.
Public transparency around monitoring results is also limited. Only 17 out of 36 countries (48%) published progress or monitoring data online in 2025, up from 39% in 2023. This positive trend notwithstanding, in more than half of OECD countries information about how major digital projects are performing is not routinely available to parliament, civil society or the public, reducing the scope for external scrutiny, independent challenge and shared learning across government.
The use of more iterative project management approaches – which builds in regular review points and allows plans to be adjusted as work progresses – has increased from 39% of countries in 2023 to 53% in 2025. This is encouraging progress, but these approaches remain a minority practice. Many oversight systems are still better suited to large, linear projects than to the more flexible, staged delivery that modern digital projects, including those involving AI, typically require.
Policy evaluation – systematically assessing whether investments achieved their intended results after completion – is the least developed area. Challenges in establishing strong evaluation systems are not limited to the evaluation of digital investments. The need to systematise and strengthen policy evaluation efforts across government is reflected in the adoption of the OECD Recommendation on Public Policy Evaluation, which supports countries in developing robust evaluation systems (OECD, 2022[32]). By way of example, only 9 out of 36 OECD countries (25%) conduct cost-benefit analysis of completed digital projects, virtually unchanged from 27% in 2023. Only 16 out of 36 countries (44%) have a common method or tool for evaluating digital projects, up from 39% in 2023. These figures reflect a significant gap: governments are approving and funding digital investments without consistently measuring whether those investments delivered what was promised.
Without this feedback, governments find it harder to understand what worked and what did not, to scale up initiatives that are delivering results, or to stop funding approaches that are not. They may repeat avoidable mistakes, accumulate systems that no longer serve their purpose and struggle to make the case to decision-makers and the public that digital spending is worthwhile. As governments take on more complex digital programmes, particularly involving AI and large-scale data systems, the absence of systematic evaluation becomes an increasingly significant gap in investment governance.
Figure 3.5 illustrates this imbalance clearly: monitoring is broadly in place across OECD governments, but evaluation of outcomes and impact after delivery remains far less common. Qualitative evidence from the 2025 DGI suggests that evaluation tends to happen sporadically — triggered by individual project requirements, audits or external reviews rather than as a standard, built-in part of how digital investments are governed.
Note: Panel A represents the individual responses to the question “Does the central/federal government have a monitoring system to track progress of digital/ICT projects?”. Panel B represents the individual responses to the question “Has the leading digital government institution conducted any ex-post cost-benefit analysis of digital/ICT projects at the central/federal government level?”. 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Several OECD countries are making monitoring a more systematic and routine part of how digital investments are managed (Box 3.7). For investments evaluation, countries are moving away from one-off reviews towards ongoing performance tracking that informs both current delivery and future investment decisions. These practices show how consistent evaluation can help governments learn from implementation, scale what is working, redirect initiatives that are falling short, and build a more evidence-based approach to digital investment over time (Box 3.8).
Some OECD countries have developed structured approaches to embedding monitoring and tracking into their digital investment frameworks:
Australia builds continuous benefits tracking into its Digital and ICT Investment Oversight Framework, linking the identification, monitoring and review of expected benefits to key decision points. This connects funding decisions to measurable outcomes rather than process compliance.
Denmark’s national IT council publishes twice-yearly public assessments of large digital projects using a traffic-light system to signal their status. This provides both transparency and an early warning mechanism, surfacing problems while there is still time to address them.
Italy makes data on the progress and delivery of digital projects and programmes publicly available through dashboards and observatories, enabling ongoing scrutiny of how investments are performing.
Korea's e-Government Performance Management Plan institutionalises a data-driven approach to tracking the performance and impact of public-sector digital initiatives. Two tools sit at its core. The Integrated Evaluation System (e-IPSES) is a central digital platform that consolidates performance data from all government agencies in real time, aligning results against strategic goals and providing an evidence base for financial planning and resource allocation. Performance-Based Budgeting ensures that budget decisions are directly informed by programme outcomes: agencies submit annual performance plans and results, conduct self-assessments and participate in targeted evaluations, with findings feeding directly into the budgeting process. Together, these tools link fiscal decisions to demonstrated public value.
New Zealand's Department of Internal Affairs runs a system assurance function that provides independent oversight of high-risk digital investments. The oversight is conducted by assessors who are independent of the programmes being reviewed, strengthening its credibility. The Department also manages a pre-qualified panel of independent assurance providers — the GCDO Assurance Services Panel — giving agencies straightforward access to external assessment without a full procurement process.
Iceland's Digital Iceland has developed a common evaluation toolkit for assessing the impact of digital projects after completion. Published evaluations quantify the benefits achieved — including from the Digital Mailbox and online application systems, creating a direct feedback loop between delivery experience and future investment prioritisation.
Portugal uses a shared monitoring and evaluation platform (e-avalia) operated by the Agency for State Technology Reform, to track performance and outcomes consistently across digital initiatives. By providing a common platform rather than leaving each agency to develop its own approach, the tool supports more consistent assessment and enables course correction where projects deviate from their intended objectives.
Digital transformation is not only a technology challenge, but also a people challenge. The public sector needs people who can lead and deliver digital change: who understand user needs, can work with data, oversee AI systems responsibly, and collaborate across organisational boundaries. Technology alone cannot substitute for these capabilities. When the right skills are absent, digital investments underperform, external providers gain disproportionate influence over government systems, and the public sector loses the institutional knowledge it needs to govern technology well over the long term.
Three interconnected things need to work together to build a capable digital workforce: (1) creating the organisational conditions that support digital ways of working; (2) equipping public servants with the right technical, leadership, data and user-focused skills; and (3) putting in place systems to attract, develop and retain digital talent over time (Figure 3.6) (OECD, 2021[41]; Burtscher, Piano and Welby, 2024[42]; OECD, 2025[43]). Leadership, cross-functional teamwork and a culture of continuous learning are central to all three.
The 2025 DGI shows that OECD countries are making progress across all three areas, but that efforts remain fragmented and are not yet anchored in coherent, government-wide workforce strategies. Without this shift, governments risk falling behind in the skills needed to manage data-intensive systems, oversee AI responsibly and lead digital transformation with confidence.
Source: (OECD, 2021[41])
3.3.1. Most countries have some strategic direction on digital skills, but dedicated strategies remain rare
A coherent approach to building digital talent starts with a strategy, one that looks ahead, identifies what capabilities will be needed, and connects recruitment, training and career development into a single, consistent effort. When digital skills strategies are aligned with broader workforce planning, governments can anticipate emerging roles, guide recruitment and retraining, and build sustainable internal capability over time.
OECD countries increasingly recognise the importance of digital skills, and most have included them within broader strategies. According to the 2025 DGI, 32 out of 36 OECD countries (90%) have some strategic direction in place for digital talent and skills (Figure 3.7). However, only six of these countries have a dedicated strategy focused specifically on digital talent and skills – Australia, Austria, Chile, Israel, Italy and Portugal – a slight increase since 2023 but still a small minority. Most countries address digital skills as one component of a broader digital government or workforce rather than a priority. Four countries did not report including digital talent and skills in any form of strategy.
A dedicated strategy matters because it creates the focus and accountability needed to act consistently at scale. Countries with dedicated strategies are better positioned to set clear targets, allocate resources specifically to digital capability and track progress over time (Box 3.9).
Availability of a digital talent and skills strategy for civil servants at the central/federal government, 2023 and 2025
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023. Data for Canada were updated following a request from the country to requalify their Digital Talent and Skills Strategy as a dedicated strategy after the publication of the 2025 DGI; therefore, this change is not reflected in the 2025 DGI results.
Korea’s Comprehensive Plan for Civil Servant Talent Development, led by Ministry of Personnel Management, aims to build a capable and adaptable public workforce. The plan strengthens digital and AI skills alongside broader policy-execution capability, and promotes self-directed learning through training tailored to roles and career stages. The plan combines foundational training for new recruits with continuous professional development, ethical-AI training and expanded use of digital learning platforms, aligned with long-term challenges including demographic change and technological transformation.
Australia’s Data, Digital and Cyber Workforce Plan 2025-2030 sets out a government-wide approach to building sustainable digital capabilities across the civil service, organised around four priorities: (1) attracting, recruiting and retaining a data, digital and cyber workforce; (2) enhancing technical capabilities; (3) growing and deploying specialist cohorts; and (4) increasing capability planning across agencies.
3.3.2. Skills assessments are improving, but gaps in action remain
Knowing where skills gaps exist is a prerequisite for addressing them. Without a clear picture of current capabilities and future needs, workforce development efforts risk being misdirected, training people in skills that are already available while leaving genuine gaps unaddressed.
The 2025 DGI shows that OECD countries are doing more to assess their digital skills needs. 26 out of 36 countries (72%) have conducted an assessment of digital talent and skills in the public sector, an improvement from 64% in 2023. However, 10 out of 36 countries (28%) still have not done so (Figure 3.8). Countries that have not assessed their skills base risk making workforce development decisions that are not grounded in evidence or targeted at the right areas. These results are consistent with broader challenges to conduct strategic workforce planning in government. Most countries that carry out workforce planning do it only at Ministry level (40%), and in 17% of countries workforce planning is carried out by the central HR body (OECD, 2025[45]).
Conduction of an assessment of digital talent and skills in the public sector, 2023 and 2025
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Beyond assessment, translating findings into action is the harder challenge. Despite more countries having assessed their skills needs, practical efforts by central digital government bodies to build capabilities have risen more modestly — from 51% of countries in 2023 to 62% in 2025. This gap between identifying needs and acting on them systematically suggests that many countries have not yet put in place the mechanisms – targeted learning pathways, strengthened digital leadership, co-ordinated workforce planning – needed to turn strategic awareness into real capability. Examples from Australia, Canada and France show how skills assessments can be connected directly to action (Box 3.10).
France assesses its digital skills needs through a formal, evidence-based approach led by the Interministerial Digital Directorate (DINUM), which identifies workforce gaps and coordinates action across ministries. This includes digital HR hubs, strengthened governance between ministries, and a Digital Campus to support training, assessment and career development.
Australia analyses data about its civil service workforce to understand current skills gaps across different locations and functions. It also uses data about its digital government investments and the services or skills it is buying from the market to anticipate future demand and identify where internal capability needs to be strengthened.
Canada links investment planning data to strategic workforce planning to critical organizational priorities, creating a joined-up view of current and planned digital talent needs, sourcing decisions, and development activities based on data collected from agencies in annual planning and reporting exercises.
3.3.3. Attracting and retaining digital talent in government remains a persistent challenge
As governments expand their use of digital technologies, data and AI, attracting and keeping people with the right skills is increasingly difficult. Competition from the private sector is strong, particularly in areas such as data science, AI, cybersecurity and digital service design, and governments cannot typically match private sector salaries. Without strong internal capability, governments risk over-reliance on external suppliers, loosing institutional knowledge, and lacking the expertise needed to govern, oversee and adapt digital systems responsibly.
Addressing this challenge requires more than competitive remuneration: it calls for clear career pathways, meaningful and mission-driven work, continuous learning opportunities and modern, flexible working arrangements. Embedding digital skills and specialist expertise across policy, operational and leadership roles would ensure that digital transformation becomes part of core decision-making rather than confined to technical teams.
The 2025 DGI shows progress. The average score across initiatives to attract digital talent to the public sector increased from 58% in 2023 to 75% in 2025. As shown in Figure 3.9, across OECD countries:
30 countries have established clear job descriptions and profiles.
26 countries run proactive recruitment strategies.
27 countries are trying to actively promote on public sector as an employer.
25 countries have implemented measures to reduce biases in recruitment.
Percentage of OECD countries with selected initiatives to attract public-sector digital talent, 2023 and 2025
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Germany, Greece, Slovak Republic, Switzerland and the United States. Refer to Annex Table 3.A.3 for comprehensive OECD and Accession country data.
These are encouraging developments. However, many governments still need to go further — particularly as the demand for people who can work with AI systems, govern their use and assess their risks grows rapidly. Several OECD countries are experimenting with innovative approaches to broaden the talent pipeline, including fast-track immigration routes, international talent programmes and regional skills partnerships (Box 3.11).
Canada’s Global Talent Stream Skills Strategy offers fast-track enables the rapid hiring of highly skilled workers in in-demand fields, including digital and technology roles, through expedited work permits (often within two weeks) and enhanced employer support. for highly skilled technology workers, allowing employers to fill critical digital roles quickly;
Finland’s Talent Boost programme supports employers in urban and regional areas to attract international experts, with a particular focus on the technology sector;
France’s Tech Visa provides a fast-track immigration pathway for technology founders, employees and investors, reinforcing the country's image as a destination for digital talent and entrepreneurship;
Estonia’s pioneering e-Residency program allows entrepreneurs worldwide to establish and manage EU-based digital businesses remotely, enhancing the country’s profile as a digital hub, and attracting internationally mobile digital professionals;
the United Kingdom’s Digital Skills Partnerships addresses regional skills gaps by bringing together government, industry and education providers to deliver tailored digital training at a local level.
Progress in attracting talent needs to be matched by stronger efforts to keep it. The 2025 DGI indicator on actions to develop and maintain digital skills rose from 36% in 2023 to 55% in 2025 — an improvement, but still low for such a critical area. As shown in Figure 3.10, the most common initiative is offering opportunities for professional and personal development. However, fewer countries provide clear career pathways for digital roles or formal recognition and reward for digital expertise. The number of countries offering work-life balance plans and modern working conditions, which matter significantly for retention, particularly among younger digital professionals, has declined since 2023. Strengthening these areas is essential if governments are to build and keep the internal capability they need, particularly as AI, large-scale data systems and cloud-based service delivery become more central to how government operates.
These findings are consistent with what public employees themselves report. A 2025 survey of nearly 57 000 employees from central government ministries and agencies in eight European Union countries showed that learning opportunities were the strongest drivers of engagement and wellbeing (OECD, 2025[45]). Public employees who have opportunities for mobility and to develop their digital skills tend to have more positive perceptions of organisational performance, and professional growth is particularly important for employee engagement. However, only half of employees feel that they are growing professionally, or that their organisation provides regular opportunities to build their digital skills, while only a third feel that their organisation supports mobility for career building.
Percentage of OECD countries with selected activities to develop and maintain digital skills in the public sector, 2023 and 2025
Several OECD countries illustrate how performance frameworks, well-being initiatives and organisational continuity can support retention (Box 3.12).
Greece has introduced performance-based incentives linked to the achievement of annual objectives, supported by individual development plans that align personal skill development (including digital skills) with organisational priorities. This approach strengthens motivation while reinforcing accountability and professional growth.
Chile requires public institutions to implement work-life balance protocols under national quality-of-work-life standards, helping public servants sustain long-term careers in government.
Estonia supports continuity by maintaining long-serving technical staff within core digital bodies, such as central IT and digital leadership functions, preserving institutional memory and stable digital governance over time.
Sources: OECD Survey on Digital Government 3.0 (2025)
Looking ahead, governments need to move beyond scattered initiatives towards a more strategic and sustained approach to building internal digital capability. Progress in recruitment and training is encouraging, but future efforts must embed these within coherent workforce strategies that connect skills development, career progression and working conditions to long-term institutional needs. Governments that invest consistently in clear career pathways, continuous learning and supportive working environments will be better placed to compete with the private sector for digital talent, retain critical expertise and reduce their dependence on external providers.
As governments expand use of digital technologies and AI, they face a fundamental question about how to deploy limited resources: what should be built or developed internally, and what should be bought from external providers? This is not a purely technical question. It has significant implications for long-term capability, accountability and value for money.
External providers can offer skills and capacity that governments do not have, accelerate delivery and provide access to specialist expertise. But over-reliance on the market poses risks. If governments outsource too much, they can lose the internal knowledge and judgement needed to define what they actually need, assess whether they are getting it, hold suppliers to account and adapt systems when circumstances change. These risks are compounded when the technologies involved demand transparency, such as AI models whose inner workings may not be fully visible to the buyer, or raise questions around data quality, dependency and ethical use that require strong in-house capacity to govern. When this happens, governments become dependent on external providers in ways that are difficult and costly to reverse, and that can undermine their ability to govern digital systems responsibly.
Within the spectrum of possibilities, the right answer is not to choose one approach over the other, but to be deliberate about the balance. Governments need sufficient internal expertise to define needs clearly, procure responsibly, manage suppliers effectively and maintain oversight across the life of a contract. External providers can then complement this internal capability, used strategically for specific skills or capacity rather than as a substitute for core expertise that governments should hold itself.
As AI adoption accelerates, the question of what governments should build in-house and what they should procure externally has become more pressing. AI systems require ongoing oversight, adaptation and governance, not just initial deployment. Governments that lack internal expertise in AI risk adopting systems they do not fully understand, cannot effectively evaluate and cannot adjust when they produce poor or harmful outcomes.
At the same time, AI creates real demand for highly specialised skills that can be difficult to build internally at pace. Data scientists, machine learning engineers and AI governance specialists are in high demand across both the public and private sectors. For specific, well-defined applications where mature solutions already exist, procuring AI from the market, with appropriate safeguards, can be faster and more cost-effective than building in-house. For high-impact, mission-critical or data-sensitive applications, however, the case for internal development or at minimum strong and highly skilled internal oversight is much stronger.
In practice, the most sustainable approach is usually a deliberate combination: sufficient internal expertise to define needs, assess options, manage procurement, evaluate performance and govern AI systems responsibly, combined with selective use of external providers where the market is better placed to deliver. Matched to the risk profile and strategic importance of each initiative, this approach offers governments the best chance of using AI effectively while maintaining accountability and control (OECD, 2025[55]).
This sits within a broader effort across OECD countries to bolster internal digital capability while using external providers more strategically. Increasingly, the goal is not to eliminate external dependence altogether, but to ensure government retains enough expertise in-house to shape decisions, manage procurement, and govern digital and AI-enabled services effectively (Box 3.13).
Several OECD countries are taking active steps to reduce reliance on external consultants and strengthen in-house digital expertise:
the United Kingdom has introduced controls on consultancy spending and is investing in permanent digital, data and technology roles, supported by clearer career and pay frameworks for digital professionals across government;
Canada has taken steps to rebalance spending away from external professional services, including technology contractors, by expanding targeted recruitment and upskilling of internal staff to build in-house digital capacity. These efforts are complemented by strengthened enterprise oversight of digital sourcing and contracting practices to reduce dependence reliance on the market external professional services for core digital delivery;
Australia is reducing labour-hire and consultancy spending while reinvesting in data, digital and cybersecurity capability – backed by a dedicated workforce plan setting out how internal capability will be built and sustained through 2030;
France has strengthened central digital capacity and governance through its Interministerial Digital Directorate (DINUM), reducing fragmentation across government and decreasing dependence on outsourced delivery.
These examples point to a shared direction of travel: governments recognising that outsourcing can accelerate delivery in the short term but risks hollowing out the internal expertise needed to sustain digital transformation over time. Maintaining internal capability is not just about cost - it is about preserving the knowledge, judgement and accountability that effective digital government requires. Governments that develop this capability-led approach, balancing outsourcing with internal expertise, will be better placed to adapt to evolving technologies, govern AI responsibly and deliver secure, high-quality public services over the long term.
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Procurement mechanisms used for acquiring digital/ICT goods and services in the central/federal government
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Availability of initiatives at central/federal government have initiatives to attract digital talents implemented by either the leading digital government institution or the civil service office (or equivalent)
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
References
[38] ARTE (2024), e-avalia, Agência para a Reforma Tecnológica do Estado, https://eavalia.arte.gov.pt/.
[27] Australian Government (2026), BuyICT, https://www.buyict.gov.au/public.
[14] Australian Government (2026), Digital and ICT Investment Oversight Framework, https://www.digital.gov.au/investment.
[44] Australian Government (2025), APS Data, Digital and Cyber Workforce Plan 2025-30, https://www.dataanddigital.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2025-10/APS%20Data%2C%20Digital%20and%20Cyber%20Workforce%20Plan%202025-30_v1.0.pdf.
[42] Burtscher, M., S. Piano and B. Welby (2024), “Developing skills for digital government: A review of good practices across OECD governments”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 303, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f4dab2e9-en.
[57] Cabinet Office (2024), New controls across government to curb consultancy spend and save over £1.2 billion by 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-controls-across-government-to-curb-consultancy-spend-and-save-over-12-billion-by-2026.
[29] Crown Commercial Service (2026), Search agreements, https://www.crowncommercial.gov.uk/agreements.
[54] Department of Science, Innovation and Technology (2023), Digital Skills Partnership, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/digital-skills-partnership.
[21] Digital Agency, Japan (2025), Control and management of national information systems, https://www.digital.go.jp/en/policies/development_management.
[36] Digital Iceland (2025), Benefits of digital processes, https://island.is/en/o/digital-iceland/benefits-of-digital-processes.
[37] Digital Iceland (2024), About 2.8 billion in benefits from the Ísland.is Digital Mailbox 2024, https://island.is/en/news/about-2-8-billion-in-benefits-from-the-island-is-digital-mailbox-2024.
[11] Digital Switzerland (2025), Action plan, https://digital.swiss/en/action-plan/.
[59] Gallagher, K. (2024), APS set to bring more than half a billion dollars of core work in-house, https://ministers.pmc.gov.au/gallagher/2024/aps-set-bring-more-half-billion-dollars-core-work-house.
[46] General Council of the Economy (2023), The State’s human resources in digital technology, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/cge/filiere-numerique-Etat#haut-de-page.
[58] Giswold, J. and J. Stanton (2024), Refocusing Government Spending in 2023-24, https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2324-024-C--refocusing-government-spending-in-2023-24--recentrer-depenses-gouvernementales-2023-2024.
[28] GOV.UK (2026), Digital Marketplace, Government of the United Kingdom, https://www.applytosupply.digitalmarketplace.service.gov.uk/.
[56] Government Digital Service (2025), Government Digital and Data Profession Capability Framework, https://ddat-capability-framework.service.gov.uk/.
[49] Government of Canada (2025), Directive on Digital Talent: Learn more about how the Government of Canada is strengthening the talent base of the GC digital community, https://talent.canada.ca/en/directive-on-digital-talent.
[50] Government of Canada (2025), Hire a top foreign talent through the Global Talent Stream, https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/foreign-workers/global-talent.html.
[17] Government of Canada (2025), Policy on the Planning and Management of Investments, https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32593.
[48] Government of Canada (2024), The Government of Canada Digital Talent Strategy, https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-talent-strategy.html.
[47] Government of Canada (2023), Directive on Digital Talent, https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32749.
[53] Government of Estonia (2026), E-Residency of Estonia, https://www.e-resident.gov.ee/.
[23] Government of Ireland (2023), The Public Spending Code, https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-public-expenditure-infrastructure-public-service-reform-and-digitalisation/publications/the-public-spending-code/.
[24] Government of New Zealand (2025), Digital Investment Office, https://www.digital.govt.nz/standards-and-guidance/governance/investment/digital-investment-office.
[40] Government of New Zealand (2019), Assuring Digital Government Outcomes, https://www.digital.govt.nz/assets/Documents/All-of-Government-ICT-Operations-Assurance-Framework.pdf.
[12] HERMES (2025), Final project evaluation, https://www.hermes.admin.ch/en/project-management/outcomes/final-project-evaluation.html.
[10] HERMES (2025), Method overview: HERMES project management - The big picture, https://www.hermes.admin.ch/en/project-management/method-overview.html.
[15] HM Treasury (2024), Agile digital and IT projects: clarification of business case guidance, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/agile-digital-and-it-projects-clarification-of-business-case-guidance/agile-digital-and-it-projects-clarification-of-business-case-guidance.
[19] HM Treasury/DSIT/GDS (2025), Performance Review of Digital Spend, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/performance-review-of-digital-spend.
[34] Italiadomani (2026), Andamento dell’attuazione del piano, https://www.italiadomani.gov.it/content/sogei-ng/it/it/strumenti/andamento-sull-attuazione-del-piano.html?orderby=%40jcr%3Acontent%2FyearAndSemesterLabel&sort=desc.
[35] Korea Institute of Public Finance (2019), Performance Management of Budgetary Systems, https://www.kipf.re.kr/cpemeng/Ecpm_CpemInfo1.do.
[18] Korean Government (2022), ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT ACT, https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/eng/engLsSc.do?menuId=2§ion=lawNm&query=ELECTRONIC+GOVERNMENT+ACT&x=28&y=23#liBgcolor0.
[52] La French Tech (2023), French Tech Visa, https://lafrenchtech.gouv.fr/en/come-work-in-france/french-tech-visa/.
[7] Ministerio de Hacienda (2026), Coordinación de Modernización del Estado, https://www.hacienda.cl/areas-de-trabajo/modernizacion-del-estado.
[51] Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (2026), Talent Boost, https://tem.fi/en/talent-boost-en.
[8] Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2022), E-Government Act, https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?efYd=20220712&lsiSeq=239279#0000.
[60] Moal, C. (2026), La nouvelle voie de la Dinum, https://www.alliancy.fr/fr/la-nouvelle-voie-de-la-dinum-7a473c1d-74c7-42cd-974f-3be20756099e.
[6] New Zealand Government (2025), Driving down the cost of digital in government, https://www.digital.govt.nz/news/driving-down-the-cost-of-digital-in-government.
[4] OECD (2026), “Digital Government Index and Open, Useful and Re-usable Data Index: 2025 Results and Key Findings”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 90, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6347ec74-en.
[9] OECD (2025), Digital Government in Australia: Enhancing Digital Investment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/91c22326-en.
[13] OECD (2025), Digital Government Review of Korea: Harnessing Digital and Data to Transform Government, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9defc197-en.
[1] OECD (2025), “Effectively Managing Investments in Digital Government: An OECD Policy Framework”, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 76, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5c324e91-en.
[43] OECD (2025), Harnessing Artificial Intelligence in Social Security: Use Cases, Governance and Workforce Readiness, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b52405c1-en.
[55] OECD (2025), Public Procurement of Artificial Intelligence: A Driver of AI Implementation in the Public Sector, Internal document, unpublished.
[45] OECD (2025), Workforce Insights from Central Governments: Findings of the 2024 OECD/EU Survey on Public Servants, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2f9080b1-en.
[5] OECD (2024), “2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings”, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en.
[2] OECD (2024), Good Practices for Procuring Computers and Laptops in Latin America: Fostering Neutrality and Market Engagement, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/cdf11f4d-en.
[32] OECD (2022), “Recommendation of the Council on Public Policy Evaluation”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0478, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0478.
[25] OECD (2022), Towards Agile ICT Procurement in the Slovak Republic: Good Practices and Recommendations, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b0a5d50f-en.
[3] OECD (2021), The E-Leaders Handbook on the Governance of Digital Government, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac7f2531-en.
[41] OECD (2021), “The OECD Framework for digital talent and skills in the public sector”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 45, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4e7c3f58-en.
[26] OECD (2017), Public Procurement for Innovation: Good Practices and Strategies, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris,, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264265820-en.
[22] OGCIO (2024), Digital Oversight, https://www.ogcio.gov.ie/en/corporate-pages/policy/digital-oversight/.
[33] Økonomistyrelsen (2026), Statusrapporter, https://oes.dk/it-og-oekonomistyring/statens-it-raad/statusrapporter/.
[31] Public Procurement Service (2026), Digital Service Mail, https://digitalmall.g2b.go.kr/.
[30] Public Procurement Service (2026), Nara Market, https://www.g2b.go.kr/.
[20] République française (2024), Lauréats guichets numériques du Fonds pour la transformation de l’action publique (FTAP), https://www.data.gouv.fr/datasets/laureats-guichets-numeriques-du-fonds-pour-la-transformation-de-laction-publique-ftap.
[16] The Treasury (2025), Better Business Cases, https://www.treasury.govt.nz/information-and-services/public-sector-leadership/investment-management/better-business-cases.
[39] Yang, S. and A. Torneo (2015), “Government Performance Management and Evaluation in South Korea: History and Current Practices”, Public Performance & Management Review, Vol. 39/2, pp. 279-296, https://doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2015.1108767.