Only a few African countries rank among the leading producers globally of the six minerals included in this study – cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium, manganese, and nickel. Their global share ranges from just 1% (Namibia’s lithium) to over 70% (Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s cobalt). Africa, in aggregate, is a notable producer of only cobalt and manganese (cobalt from DRC and manganese mainly from South Africa and Gabon).
Critical minerals in Africa
A regional overview
Note: Mineral Commodity Summaries by the US Geological Survey (USGS) only include data for the top 10 to 15 global producers of each mineral, so it is not a comprehensive list of production by all countries. Data for 2024 from 2025 editions was used for all minerals except nickel for which data were collected from the British Geological Survey, being Africa absent from USGS data given its limited role in global production.
Source: Authors’ construct using data from “USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries” by mineral.
Cobalt and graphite are among the most strategically vulnerable minerals due to production and market concentration, i.e. heavy reliance on a small number of countries for both supply and demand. For example, 76% of the world’s cobalt – used in batteries, including energy storage and electric vehicles (EVs) batteries – is extracted from the DRC, with 60% of it being refined in China (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]). In contrast, minerals like copper are widely produced and traded, suggesting a more stable and competitive market environment.1
African production of the minerals included in this study has grown since 2008.2 Covid-19 disruptions temporarily slowed this trajectory. Nonetheless, notable increases in African production of cobalt, graphite, and manganese can be seen leading up to 2021, driven by increased demand associated with green technologies, defence systems, and digital infrastructure.
Beyond the six minerals in this study, Africa is central to production of bauxite (Guinea, 25% of world output), platinum group metals (PGMs) and chromium (South Africa), and iron ore (Guinea’s Simandou deposit) (Guj et al., 2025). These feed into essential supply chains - from steel and renewables to EV motors and electronics - broadening Africa’s strategic role.
1.2.1. Cobalt
Africa’s production is concentrated in the DRC, which accounts for roughly 76% of global mined cobalt (2024), followed by very marginal production in Zambia and Madagascar (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]). Proven reserves in DRC and Madagascar represent about 57% of the world’s total reserves (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]). Cobalt underpins EVs and battery storage, superalloys, power cables, electrification, motors, renewable plant wiring (U.S. Geological Survey, 2022[2]).
Current trends: Global cobalt mine and refinery production reached record highs in 2024, driven by expansion in DRC and Indonesia. Refined cobalt production and consumption remain dominated by China (though the rapid growth of cobalt-free lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries in the Chinese market has reduced the proportional demand for cobalt-intensive chemistries) (Cobalt Institute, 2025[3]) (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2025[4]) (International Energy Agency, 2023[5]). New production of mined and refined cobalt has led to excess global supply and lower cobalt prices, triggering global reactions – most notably, a ban on cobalt exports introduced by the DRC in February 2025 aimed at constraining supply and shoring up cobalt prices (which ban has since been converted into an export quota).
Future demand and supply: Cobalt demand will increase by almost 70% by 2040 largely driven by EVs. Production at current project pipeline is expected to decrease after 2030. The risk of interrupted cobalt supply, illustrated clearly with the DRC’s 2025 cobalt export ban, is hastening technology innovations away from cobalt to low-cobalt or no-cobalt battery alternatives, which will reduce demand for cobalt in the coming years. Regardless of demand trends for cobalt, it will continue to be produced where it is a co-product of mining other key minerals, notably nickel in Indonesia and copper in DRC and Zambia. The DRC’s global cobalt production share will decrease by 2040, but it will remain the main global producer, accounting for around 50% of global supply. Supply from Indonesia will expand as nickel production increases. No African country contributes or will contribute significantly to global refining (International Energy Agency, 2025[6]).
1.2.2. Copper
African production is largely concentrated in Zambia and DRC, comprising 14.5% and 3% of global production in 2024, respectively. In 2024, the DRC was the second largest producer of copper globally, after Chile (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]). It overtook Chile to be the world’s second-largest copper refiner (cathode stage), producing 8% of global supply, after China, which maintains dominance of global refined copper supply with 45% of production in 2024 (International Energy Agency, 2025[6]). Proven African reserves are in the DRC and Zambia, together accounting for 10% of global reserves (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]). Copper underpins electrical wiring, renewable technologies and infrastructure, and power transmission.
Current trends: Copper prices have steadily increased over the past decade, driven by rising demand and a supply trajectory that - unlike most other critical minerals - has not kept pace with global needs. Recent disruptions at several major copper mines have further tightened supply.3 As both demand and prices continue to rise, African producers - particularly the DRC and Zambia - stand to benefit, especially if they are able to scale up production to help address the anticipated global supply deficit.
Future demand and supply: Copper demand will increase by over 37% by 2040 driven by the electricity sector and EVs. The DRC will be the second largest global supplier by 2040, providing 14% of global supply, after Chile (26%), increasing its share from 12% in 2024.4
1.2.3. Graphite
African production is concentrated in Madagascar and Mozambique, which produce 5.5% and 4.6% of global production, respectively, with Tanzania being a more minor producer at 1.5% of global production (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]). Reserves are in the same countries, together accounting for 25% of the world’s total (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]). Graphite is used in lubricants, the anodes of batteries, and fuel cells (U.S. Geological Survey, 2022[2]).
Current trends: In 2024, China was the world’s leading graphite producer, producing an estimated 78% of total world production; however, African supply is expected to grow as global markets seek diversification. Demand fluctuations in the battery sector and the rise of synthetic graphite have depressed prices recently (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]), but medium-term prospects remain positive given growing interest in natural graphite from Africa.
Future demand and supply: Africa is expected to become the second largest producer of graphite by 2040 after China, with Mozambique and Madagascar supplying 23% of global supply, up from 6% in 2024.5
1.2.4. Lithium
African production is mostly in Zimbabwe, which accounted for 9.3% of global production in 2024, with more limited output in Namibia. Zimbabwe holds nearly all of Africa’s 1.6% share of global reserves6, with Namibia accounting for a very small share (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]). Lithium is vital for rechargeable batteries, especially EV batteries (U.S. Geological Survey, 2022[2]), with battery energy storage systems (BESS) becoming a fast-growing source of lithium demand, expected to shape market dynamics in the coming years (Lee, 2025[7]). It also has significant use in several modern technological applications, such as in mobile phones, nuclear fusion, air purification, specialised alloys and fuel additives for aeronautical use (Guj et al., 2025[8]).
Current trends: Global production increased by 18% in 2024 driven by strong demand from the lithium-ion battery market and high lithium prices from 2021 to early 2023. Global consumption in 2024 increased by 29% compared to 2023. Concern about a short-term lithium oversupply and weaker-than-expected EV sales worldwide during the first half of 2024 caused the price for lithium to decrease considerably throughout the year. Despite many lithium projects being postponed or cancelled in 2024 owing to low prices, significant production capacity expansions occurred in Argentina, Chile, China, and Zimbabwe where projects were already underway (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]).
Future demand and supply: Lithium demand will increase almost six-fold by 2040. Supply at current pipeline projects will peak around 2030 and then start decreasing. African output will remain modest with Zimbabwe decreasing from 9% of global production in 2024 to 6% in 2040. Although lithium refining is taking place in Zimbabwe, no African country will contribute significantly to global refining.7
1.2.5. Manganese
Production is dominated by South Africa and Gabon, followed by Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Together, they account for 66% of global production, with South Africa and Gabon accounting for almost 37% of global reserves (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025[1]). Traditionally tied to steelmaking (utilizing approximately 90% of the global supply), demand is increasingly driven by high-purity manganese for EV batteries. Manganese has no viable substitute to date, especially for steel production (U.S. Geological Survey, 2022[2]).
Future demand and supply: Demand will grow, driven by increasing demand from the steel and EV and energy storage battery sectors.
1.2.6. Nickel
African production remains limited, contributing about 3% of global output mainly from Madagascar (1%), South Africa (0.7%) and Cote d’Ivoire (0.7%) (Idoine et al., 2025).8 African reserves in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar accounted for around 5% of global reserves in 2023 (Guj et al., 2025[8]) (Nickel Institute, n.d.[9]). Nickel is used in stainless steel, superalloys, and rechargeable batteries (U.S. Geological Survey, 2022[2]). While nickel has long been used in nickel-cadmium batteries, its growing role in lithium-ion battery production for energy storage and EV batteries is an important shift in its applications, which accounted for 13% of global nickel consumption in 2023 (Government of Canada, 2026[10]). Nickel acts as a substitute for the more expensive cobalt in the manufacturing of EV batteries, which has led to global momentum in the development of new nickel mining projects (Idoine et al., 2025).
Current trends: Global nickel production between 2019-2023 has increased by 47%, and in 2024 has grown by more than 15%, driven by huge growth in Indonesia (Idoine et al., 2025[11]).
Future demand and supply: Nickel demand will continue to increase globally driven by energy storage and EV batteries and so will production at current pipeline projects. No African country makes it to the top producers in 2024, and it is not expected to do so by 2040.9
Africa’s mineral endowment is strategically important both for advancing its own industrialisation agenda and for meeting the needs of external partners seeking secure supplies. Yet persistent structural and policy constraints risk locking the continent into a low-value, extractive role. The core challenges holding back African mineral processing and value addition – financial, governance-related, geography-related, infrastructural, dynamics of global markets, and geopolitical – are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing. African economies’ ability to benefit from the rising demand for key minerals will depend on what share of new investment in exploration and mining Africa can secure, as well as the extent of mineral processing and value addition they are able to achieve. Policy, regulatory, and investment conditions – not geology alone – will determine whether the continent can benefit from growing demand for the metals essential to the global defense industry, digital and clean-energy transitions (Guj et al., 2025[8]) (Galeazzi, Cust and Steinbuks, 2020[12]).
A comparison of Africa’s share of global production and reserves reveals structural asymmetries. For some minerals like cobalt and manganese, Africa produces a much larger share of global supply than its share of known reserves. For example, Gabon produces 23.2% of the world's manganese but holds only 3.6% of proven reserves (United States Geological Survey, 2025[13]). One would expect production to roughly match the reserve share, yet this is not the case. This mismatch could mean African deposits are easier or cheaper to mine than deposits elsewhere. However, it more likely indicates that reserves are underestimated because too little exploration has been done.
The opposite pattern also exists. For minerals like graphite and nickel, Africa has a large share of reserves but produces less than expected. This means the minerals are present but are not being extracted - often because of difficult investment conditions, remote or expensive deposits, or because other countries have better deposits that are easier or cheaper to mine.
Overall, the continent’s mineral wealth is likely understated. Expanded exploration efforts could therefore substantially reshape global assessments of Africa’s role in critical mineral supply.
Note:Mineral Commodity Summaries only include data for top 10-15 global producers of each mineral, so it is not a comprehensive list of production by all countries. Data for 2024 from 2025 editions was used for all minerals except nickel; data for nickel is for 2014 from 2015 edition as no African countries appear in leading nickel producers after 2020.
Source: Author construct using data from “USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries” by mineral, 2025.
1.3.1. Underinvestment in African exploration
The underinvestment in African exploration is seen by Africa’s share of global exploration investment having declined from 16% in 2004 to just 10.4% in 2024 (Baskaran, 2025[14]). This is despite Africa hosting 20% of new mineral discoveries (Guj et al., 2025[8]).
Source: S&P Global Capital IQ Database via Baskaran, 2025.
Primary drivers behind the decline of exploration investment in Africa are political instability and conflict, as well as increased resource nationalism, which has led to policy changes less favourable to investors, thereby discouraging exploration investment (Baskaran, 2025[14]). Volatile political environments and armed conflict raise the cost of doing business and the risk of damage to infrastructure, discouraging investment. Unpredictable regulatory environments and concerns over changes to fiscal regimes or contract stability, including the risk of retroactive contract renegotiations, deter long-term commitments. These risks disproportionately affect smaller, junior mining companies, who contribute to over 60% of new discoveries today. Discouraging juniors from exploration reduces the future pipeline of mine development in a country.
The comparatively low attractiveness of some African countries as investment destinations is also seen in Africa’s low rankings on the Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2024. Half of the 10 least attractive jurisdictions for mining investment globally (of those included in the 2024 survey) were African countries (Ethiopia, Niger, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Guinea Conakry), and Africa’s overall investment attractiveness scores were the lowest of any region (Mejía and Aliakbari, 2025[15]). This poor showing is driven more by low scoring on the policy perception index (which measures the impact of government policy on attitudes toward exploration investment) than by perceptions of mineral potential (based on geographical attractiveness), suggesting the issue lies with policy and regulatory frameworks rather than mineral potential (Mejía and Aliakbari, 2025[15]) (Mejía and Aliakbari, 2025[16]).
Exploration budgets remain heavily concentrated in gold, which accounted for 45% of global exploration in 2024 (Joaquin, 2024[17]) – the lowest share in a decade - though lithium and copper are attracting rising interest (Guj et al., 2025[8]).
Despite Africa’s advantages – the cost per significant discovery is about 30% lower than the global average ($154m vs $219m), reflecting favourable geological conditions and lower baseline costs (Guj et al., 2025[8]) – exploration investment remains constrained. As a result, exploration funds are increasingly directed toward brownfield projects (expansions of existing mines) and mergers and acquisitions rather than greenfield discoveries, prioritising short-term returns over frontier exploration (Guj et al., 2025[8]).
1.3.2. Barriers to local value addition
Finance constraints and unfavourable global market dynamics also limit downstream development. Upgrading from extraction to refining or component manufacturing requires significant long-term capital, technical skills, enabling infrastructure, easy market access, and cheap, reliable energy – conditions still scarce in most African economies. New processing facilities, including in Africa, face extraordinary difficulties competing with established facilities that have far greater economies of scale, cheaper inputs, and which benefit from clustering of different mineral processing operations and closer proximity to consumer markets. While new financing models (e.g. blended finance, concessional loans, anchor offtakes) are emerging, the cost of capital for mineral processing projects remains elevated, reflecting high perceived risks. Many midstream and downstream beneficiation projects remain economically unviable in the current global market – without strong public-private partnerships that provide cheaper inputs for new processing initiatives, most countries will continue exporting raw concentrates (World Economic Forum, 2025[18]) (International Monetary Fund, 2024[19]). At the same time, it is far from clear that African governments should use limited public funding to subsidise mineral processing and value addition.
1.3.3. Governance gaps and informality
Many resource-rich states still lack the institutional capacity to negotiate complex concession contracts, monitor compliance, or capture fair fiscal rents. Weak oversight fuels corruption, social tensions, and environmental degradation. Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) compounds these governance challenges. ASM provides essential livelihoods and supplies notable shares of global cobalt and gold, but it remains largely informal, associated with unsafe working conditions, child labour, and environmental damage. Formalisation – through cooperatives, transparent licensing, and responsible sourcing frameworks – is critical both for community welfare and for ensuring international offtake credibility (United States Institute of Peace, 2024[20]). Lessons must be learned from previous formalisation initiatives, the vast majority of which have had poor outcomes – the benefits of formalisation must exceed the costs to ASM participants, otherwise formalisation efforts will not succeed (World Bank, 2024[21]).
1.3.4. Infrastructure and logistical bottlenecks
Effective industrial transformation requires ports, railways, reliable power and skilled labour – areas where Africa still lags. Corridor projects (for example, the Lobito Corridor linking mineral-rich DRC and Zambia to Angola’s Lobito port) show the potential payoff, but they also illustrate long lead times, complex financing needs, geopolitical competition over routes, and the risk that they offer more efficient mineral extraction rather than transformative development for African countries.
1.3.5. Regional cooperation
Fragmented fiscal regimes, inconsistent regulations, and limited regional infrastructure prevent African countries from pooling leverage or achieving economies of scale in mineral processing. Coordinated policies – such as harmonised royalty frameworks, shared processing hubs, and cross-border infrastructure corridors – could reduce costs and strengthen bargaining power. Emerging continental frameworks (such as the African Green Minerals Strategy and the African Continental Free Trade Area) offer an opportunity to move in that direction, but implementation remains uneven. Without stronger regional coordination, African countries will compete against each other for the same investors rather than integrating value chains.
1.3.6. Dependency on exports and price volatility
Dependence on unprocessed commodity exports amplifies macroeconomic volatility and threatens government budgets in countries where mineral revenues form a significant portion of public income. Recent years illustrate various price swings driven by changes in the balance between demand and supply. Shifts in demand have resulted from global recessions, Covid-19 economic slowdowns, and growing demand for EVs, for example, and changes in supply have arisen from changes in commodity price, production disruptions, and trade restrictions imposed by dominant producers. Price changes either erode or bolster revenues from the sector, for governments as well as mining companies. Prices for some minerals (such as lithium carbonate and nickel) have declined as supply growth has outpaced demand growth, whereas supply has failed to keep pace with demand with other minerals (such as copper).
Some notable 2025 price trends include rising cobalt and copper prices. The DRC’s 2025 cobalt export restrictions (temporary export ban from February to October 2025, replaced then by export quotas) curbed global cobalt supply and so rallied the international cobalt price. This demonstrates how producer policy can affect global prices in instances where a producer holds a notable share of global market supply (Cook, 2025[22]). But such measures, which disrupt exports or drive-up mineral prices, can accelerate mineral substitution or investor flight if not part of a broader industrial strategy. Copper prices have rallied in 2025 due to lower supply resulting from suspended operations at several leading mines, as outlined earlier. Although these mine issues are being resolved and there is increased production by Codelco mines in Chile, growth in demand for copper will continue to outpace growth in supply for the foreseeable future, leading to sustained high prices.
Note: Copper prices have been converted from USD/lb to USD/t for comparability. Price data for lithium carbonate is priced in CNY and has been converted (at annual average exchange rates) to USD for comparability. Data for lithium carbonate is only available for the last five years. Cobalt Prices apply to the secondary axis.
Source: Authors’ construct using data from Trading Economics.
Substitution adds another layer of risk. The US Department of Energy and leading automakers (e.g., Volkswagen and Tesla) are funding technologies aimed at phasing out cobalt and lithium from EV batteries by 2030. If these efforts succeed, African producers overly dependent on these minerals could face sudden demand shocks. Diversification – into refining, midstream processing, or other economic sectors – will be critical for resilience (Guj et al., 2025[8]).
The minerals sector remains a cornerstone of economic activity in many African countries. Over the past decade, mining has accounted for 8.8% of GDP on average and over half of export revenues in 15 mineral-rich sub-Saharan economies (Guj et al., 2025[8]). Beyond its fiscal importance, the sector provides millions of direct and indirect jobs, catalysing local economies through demand for services, logistics, and infrastructure.
As global narratives increasingly frame minerals as critical to the energy transition and national security, African governments are reinterpreting the concept of “criticality” through a developmental lens. For Africa, these minerals are not only strategic for global decarbonisation – they are also potential levers for industrialisation, economic diversification, and geopolitical empowerment, driving a wave of national and continental strategies that seek to link resource endowments to domestic and regional value creation.
1.4.1. Continental and regional frameworks
1. The Africa Mining Vision (AMV), adopted by the African Union in 2009 is the central policy framework guiding the continent’s approach to mineral governance. The AMV’s objective is to move from extractive rent-seeking to a “knowledge-driven African mining sector that catalyses inclusive growth, sustainable development and structural transformation” (African Union, n.d.[23]). It promotes mineral-based industrialisation, local content policies, and regional linkages rather than isolated national projects. The African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC) (African Union, n.d.[24]) – its implementing arm, established in 2013 – is tasked with coordinating the implementation and domestication of the AMV. However, so far, only four countries, namely Guinea, Mali, Zambia and Nigeria, have ratified the statute. A minimum of 15 ratifications is required to put the statutes in force and fully operationalise the centre. Only a few African countries have been nationally implementing the AMV. While countries such as Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia have integrated aspects of the AMV into national legislation, others have progressed more slowly, constrained by fiscal and technical capacity, competing donor frameworks, and overlapping regional mandates.
2. The African Green Minerals Strategy (AGMS). In March 2025, the AU adopted the AGMS, its most ambitious attempt to reposition Africa within global clean-energy value chains. Recognising that the continent holds a significant share of the world’s green minerals, the AGMS provides a continental roadmap built on four strategic pillars10:
a. Advancing mineral development through improved governance, exploration, and sustainable extraction practices.
b. Investing in human capital and technological capacity to build expertise in mining, processing, and downstream industries.
c. Developing value chains that capture more economic benefits domestically, including refining, smelting, and battery production.
d. Promoting resource stewardship, encompassing environmental protection, transparency, and responsible sourcing (African Union, 2024[25]).
The AGMS is anchored in Agenda 2063’s vision of “an Africa that harnesses its resources for inclusive growth” (African Union Commission, 2015[26]), positioning mineral wealth as a lever for economic diversification, climate resilience, and poverty reduction. The strategy identifies several core green minerals critical to the energy transition and industrial development: cobalt, natural graphite, lithium, manganese, phosphorus and vanadium for batteries; aluminium and copper for electrical networks; chromium, nickel and zinc for renewable energy infrastructure; platinum group metals for hydrogen technologies; rare earth elements (REEs) for magnets in electric motors and generators; plus iron, steel and alloys used throughout the economy. The AGMS frames rising global demand as an opportunity to link mineral development with economic diversification and poverty reduction through inclusive growth.
1.4.2. National strategies and policy shifts
On the country level, several mineral-rich countries have identified minerals that are strategic to their economy and global industrial demand. African states are deploying diverse instruments to translate continental frameworks into practice, ranging from fiscal reforms and export bans to local content requirements and public–private partnerships. While outcomes vary, these strategies reveal a growing willingness to experiment with industrial policy in a sector long dominated by foreign actors.
Beyond adopting export restrictions – part of a wider global trend (UNCTAD, 2025[27]) – several countries are revising fiscal regimes to attempt to capture greater value from extraction. This includes DRC introducing a super-profit tax and Ghana increasing the royalty rate on lithium to 10% (Radley, 2018[28]) (Gyeyir and Scurfield, 2025[29]). These efforts have not always been successful, however. For example, Zimbabwe's attempt to double the royalty rate on gold from 5% to 10% was abandoned after pushback from gold miners as it would impair the economic viability of mines (Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2025[30]).
Yet, comprehensive critical minerals strategies are widely missing across Africa, even for countries with high economic reliance on minerals. Very few countries have policies and regulations related to critical minerals, although there is a growing recognition of the importance of critical minerals on the continent. Those countries that have adopted critical minerals strategies appear to have done so primarily in response to external interest in their resources. For example, Zambia launched its critical minerals strategy in 2024 and South Africa in 2025.
Others have policies and regulations that govern certain minerals. The DRC for instance, following the Mining Code (2018), issued Decree No. 18/042 classifying cobalt, coltan, and germanium as strategic minerals. By processing some of its cobalt locally, DRC nearly tripled its export value, with $6 billion cobalt exports in 2022, compared to $167 million from previously unprocessed cobalt (UNCTAD, 2024[31]).
1.5.1. Trade flow and Africa’s role in global supply chains
In 2023, global trade in raw and semi-processed minerals reached approximately $2.57 trillion in imports and $2.52 trillion in exports, representing over 10% of total global exports and highlighting the sector’s critical role in the international economy (UNCTAD, 2025[32]). Africa exported nearly $266 billion, equivalent to 10.6% of world trade in raw and semi-processed minerals, while imports stood at $68 billion (UNCTAD, 2025[32]). This shows Africa as a relatively minor supplier of critical minerals overall, as seen in the graph below, although its relevance is expected to grow in coming years. Of all African critical mineral exports, 24% are raw and 72% are semi-processed, predominantly ores and concentrates (ITC, 2023[33]).
Source: UNCTAD, 2025.
Minerals essential for the energy transition accounted for over 40% of global critical mineral exports by value, reaching $773 billion in 2023. Africa records steady growth with a gradual rise in energy transition-related minerals but continues to trail most other regions in mineral exports, as seen below.
Source: UNCTAD, 2025a
Africa emerged as the breakout performer in copper, nearly doubling exports from 2019 to 2023 (+98.2% to $44 billion) to meet surging demand for electrical infrastructure and electric vehicles – though overall production remains behind the Americas, Asia and Europe. The continent also led nickel growth with a remarkable 122.8% surge, although off a very low base (UNCTAD, 2025[32]).
1.5.2. Investment patterns
Despite growing demand, developing economies face an estimated $225 billion investment gap in mining and processing projects, particularly in infrastructure (in particular transport and power) and productive diversification through the development of downstream processing and manufacturing capabilities beyond raw material extraction (UNCTAD, 2024[34]). Over the last two decades, Africa’s mining landscape has been reshaped by a handful of dominant investors and hundreds of smaller exploration firms.
Between 2005-2017, Chinese companies alone invested US$58 billion in African mining and related infrastructure; cumulative investments now exceed US$120 billion, with recent peaks in 2019 and 2023 (Mudronova, 2018[35]) (Guj et al., 2025[8]). Chinese state-owned and private enterprises have stakes in most large-scale projects in cobalt and lithium (Guj et al., 2025[8]).
In 2023, junior and intermediate firms listed in Australia and Canada remain the most active in exploration, accounting for over 50% of exploration budgets on the continent, with much of this exploration capital coming from equity raised on foreign stock exchanges, while Chinese companies contributed only around 3% to exploration budgets in Africa – their preferred approach is to instead buy projects from juniors once discoveries have been made (Guj et al., 2025[8]) (Landry, 2025[36]).
Traditionally, gold and diamonds absorbed most mining FDI in Africa due to more predictable returns and lower infrastructure costs. Recently though, exploration spending has increasingly diversified toward energy transition minerals – notably copper and lithium (S&P Global, 2024[37]). Yet, periods of elevated gold prices will continue to redirect exploration capital back toward gold, demand for which is unconnected to industry as its primary use is as a store of wealth. Critical minerals are more subject to the cyclical nature of investment driven by commodity prices.
Source: USGS 2024 via African Mining, 2024
Foreign investment in Africa’s minerals sector remains overwhelmingly upstream-oriented, although Chinese firms have an increasing number of smelters and refineries in African countries. While processing facilities exist across the continent - particularly for traditional commodities like copper and platinum group metals - midstream processing (refining, smelting, cathode production) continues to largely take place abroad, reinforcing Africa’s subordinate position in global value chains.
1.5.3. Competing strategies of key foreign players
There is no universal definition for the term ‘critical minerals’; different countries and institutions define it based on varying criteria, including economic importance, supply chain vulnerability, and substitutability (for example, see US list in Energy Act of 2020, and EU list in Critical Raw Materials Act of 2023).
Developed countries focus more on supply risks and developing countries more on the role of minerals in generating government revenue and foreign exchange (UNCTAD, 2025[32]). In addition, the assessment of criticality changes over time as technologies, supply chain dynamics, and strategic focus evolve. Therefore, the list of critical minerals is never fixed for any country or region but requires regular update.
Diverging definitions and taxonomies of “critical” minerals among major economies reflect different industrial priorities, and force African states to navigate a fragmented landscape of standards, financing models, and political conditionalities. This fragmentation, however, also offers leverage: African producers can strategically align with multiple partners seeking access to the same materials.
China does not publish a “critical minerals list” in the same way some other jurisdictions do, but it has strategic mineral/metal lists, export control lists, and official planning documents that cover “strategic/critical” minerals. For example, China’s National Mineral Resources Plan (2016-2020) identified 24 minerals considered strategic (International Energy Agency, 2025[38]). China has also expanded export controls on REEs and other minerals (tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, indium, molybdenum) for which it now requires export licences, reflecting that these are deemed “critical” for national security, local industry, or supply-chain leverage (Exiger, 2025[39]).
China’s dominance in the mineral value chain is structural and comprehensive. Though there is relatively less visibility on China’s global mining investments, upstream extraction is prioritised (Escobar et al., 2025[40]), and tends to be closely integrated with midstream processing and downstream demand: Chinese-built refineries and hydrometallurgical plants in Africa (e.g., the Bikita lithium sulphate plant in Zimbabwe) feed directly into China’s domestic battery and EV industries. Beijing provides concessional finance (Escobar et al., 2025[40]), infrastructure, and technology, often bundled in state-backed agreements that lock in long-term offtake contracts. However, this model faces growing scrutiny in Africa. Governments increasingly demand transparency, local content, and environmental standards, while Chinese firms face growing external scrutiny linked to ESG performance, particularly where projects rely on international finance or seek integration into European supply chains.
In 2024, Chinese FDI stock in African mining projects (including oil and gas) stood at $10 billion, accounting for 23% of total Chinese FDI on the continent, second only to construction (China Africa Research Initiative, 2025[41]). In 2018 Chinese companies collectively accounted for around 7% of Africa's mine production while the mining giant Anglo-American PLC alone represented more than double that share (Ericsson, Löf and Löf, 2020[42]) (Herzer Risi and Doyle, 2023[43]). More recent collated data is not readily available, though Chinese acquisitions since 2018 — particularly in cobalt, copper, and lithium — suggest the share has grown at the aggregate level while becoming significantly more concentrated in strategically critical commodities. In terms of mine ownership, China ranks fifth in African mine ownership, behind the US, Australia, Canada, and the UK, with ownership increasing 20% since 2019 (Barich, 2024[44]). However, the distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese ownership is increasingly complex, as many global mining firms now feature significant Chinese equity stakes (Landry, 2025[36]). Beyond FDI, Chinese policy banks and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have also extended substantial loans to mineral-rich African governments, often structured as resource-backed arrangements in which infrastructure finance is collateralized by future commodity export revenues — supporting the acquisition, development, or expansion of mines and related infrastructure (Landry, 2025[36]) (Escobar et al., 2025[40]).
Note: Due to rounding, the total adds up to slightly over 100%.
Source: Ericsson, Löf and Löf, 2020 via Soulé, 2024.
Chinese firms, the majority of which are SOEs (Landry, 2025[36]) have more foreign investments on the African continent than any other continent, estimated at 79 out of 184 identified active operational mines outside of China with at least 10% Chinese ownership in 2022 (Landry, 2025[36]). But the concentration of Chinese investment is highly geographically focused and strategic. Out of the 79 Chinese-owned mines in Africa, 30 were in the DRC, 10 in South Africa, and 8 in Zambia, with 35 out of the 38 mines in the DRC and Zambia producing copper and/or cobalt (Landry, 2025[36]). For perspective, Chinese entities own or have stakes in 29 of the approximately 40 active cobalt and copper properties in DRC (Landry, 2025[36]). Chinese miners have invested $4.5 billion between 2022 and 2023 to secure significant holdings in most African lithium mines in countries such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Mali (Guj et al., 2025[8]). They also operate large-scale copper concessions in Zambia.
Trade patterns show a shift in African exports to China from fuel mineral (primarily coal) to non-fuel minerals and metals: the share of non-fuel minerals and metals rose from 20% in 2002 to 45% in 2023 (Development Reimagined, 2024[45]). Most exports remain unrefined, consistent with the wider trend of African exports to China being raw materials (Development Reimagined, 2024[45]). China is not unique in this regard, however, as other miners also predominantly export minerals from Africa in raw or semi-processed form.
The European Union issued its latest CRMs list in 2023 via the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), identifying 34 critical minerals – up from 20 in 2020 (European Commission, n.d.[46]). The EU revises its list every three years, with the next revision due in 2026. The Act introduced binding 2030 benchmarks — 10% domestic extraction, 40% processing, 15% recycling, and a 65% cap on dependency on any single third country — signalling a shift from strategy to regulatory ambition. However, in February 2026, the European Court of Auditors published a report concluding that the EU is not on course to fulfil its CRMA stated objectives.
Lacking a significant foothold in the critical minerals value chain globally, Europe’s strategy with Africa centres on diversification, sustainability, and partnership rather than ownership. The CRMA and Global Gateway initiative articulate a dual objective: to secure supply while supporting African industrialisation and responsible sourcing.
The EU has signed strategic partnerships on critical minerals with Namibia (2022), the DRC and Zambia (2023), Rwanda (2024), and more recently the Clean Trade and Investment Partnership with South Africa (2025). These agreements aim to integrate African producers into European value chains through co-investment in refining, certification, and skills development. However, actual investment volumes remain limited; only four projects in Africa were granted ‘strategic project’ status under CRMA (out of a total of 60 strategic projects globally), with these projects still being in feasibility or financing stages.
Although the RESourceEU Action Plan adopted by the European Commission in December 2025 aims to address known shortcomings, including financing gaps, accelerating permitting, and reducing China dependency, and the European Investment Bank has recently signalled its willingness to fund mining and mineral processing projects, challenges remain. Development finance institutions of EU member states largely do not invest in mining and mining and mineral processing are also not included in the EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomy, barring use of sustainable finance for these sectors. Though revisions have been proposed (Platform on Sustainable Finance, 2025[47]), the failure to align these broader EU approaches with EU objectives to scale up participation in mining and mineral processing has undoubtedly contributed to little progress on the EU side.
The United States issues its critical minerals list via the United States Geological Survey (USGS), with the most recent version released in 2025 (updated every three years). It identified 60 mineral commodities as critical (Mineral Resources Program, 2025[48]), up from 50 in 2022 (U.S. Geological Survey, 2022[2]).
Under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP), a coalition of 14 countries, the US sought to reduce dependency on China by financing “trusted” supply chains. The 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial held in Washington marked a more overtly strategic posture. New initiatives such as Project Vault—designed to coordinate strategic stockpiling and secure long-term offtake among like-minded partners—and Project Forge, aimed at accelerating midstream processing and refining capacity outside China, signal a move beyond project-by-project finance toward systemic supply chain restructuring.
At the same time, the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC) continues to align its investment portfolio with national objectives. In late 2025, DFC partnered with US investment firm Orion and Abu Dhabi–based ADQ to launch the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium (Orion CMC), a $1.8 billion financing vehicle targeting production in emerging markets. DFC pledged support for projects in Angola (REEs), Gabon (potash), Malawi (REEs), Mozambique (graphite), South Africa (REEs), Tanzania (nickel), Uganda (graphite) and Zambia (copper), alongside its commitment to the Lobito Corridor. Washington has also engaged bilaterally with Namibia, Tanzania, and the DRC to explore co-investment in refining and battery assembly. However, compared to China, the US footprint remainsfocused on selective, high-profile projects rather than systemic investment in African industrial ecosystems.
For Gulf states, metals, precious stones and minerals are the main export product from Africa. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are emerging as influential players in African mining. While gold takes the lion’s share especially for the UAE, other minerals are the second most exported product (Procopio and Čok, 2024[49]). This expansion is not merely commercial. It reflects a deliberate strategy embedded in Gulf economic diversification agendas (e.g. Saudi Vision 2030) including positioning around new energies and artificial intelligence economies, which rely on control over minerals. Gulf sovereign wealth funds are acquiring strategic stakes in several key minerals in Africa and beyond, often coupled with logistics and energy infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia’s Ma’aden and its Public Investment Fund backing, has announced partnerships in REEs and phosphate projects across East and Southern Africa. Saudi Arabia’s parallel push to position itself as a regional minerals processing and trading hub—reinforced through high-profile convenings such as the Future Minerals Forum—suggests intentions to export minerals from African countries in raw or semi-processed forms, reserving processing opportunities for Saudi industry.
The UAE, through entities such as ADQ, Mubadala, and International Resources Holding (IRH) has taken controlling stakes in key assets such as Zambia’s Mopani Copper Mines (Procopio and Čok, 2024[49]), and recently expanded its footprint through further copper, lithium, tin, iron ore and graphite investments, underscoring a long-term asset accumulation strategy rather than short-term portfolio investing. and a deliberate pivot toward securing a diversified critical minerals portfolio across Central, East, and Southern Africa. The investments also reflect an interest in securing dual-use minerals critical for both clean energy technologies and defence supply chains (Ardemagni, 2024[50]).
More broadly, across the Gulf, critical mineral engagement is part of a broader geopolitical pivot into Africa, leveraging strengths in commodity trading, port infrastructure, and financial intermediation to position themselves as pivotal intermediaries between African producers and Asian and Western markets (Aboudouh, 2026[51]). This model does not necessarily prioritise local industrialisation in Africa but can contribute to it.
Other actors are increasingly entering Africa’s minerals sector, driven by the imperative of supply security. Japan and South Korea, highly dependent on imports, are pursuing strategic partnerships with African states, driven by tech and automotive industries. Under the umbrella of the Mineral Security Partnership, they often combine technology transfer and offtake guarantees. India has also entered the competition, investing in copper, lithium and phosphate projects, motivated by domestic EV and fertilizer industries.
← 1. See Figure 10 in UNCTAD, “Critical minerals_ Trade in critical minerals shapes energy transition, digital transformation and industrial development worldwide,” 26 June 2025, https://sdgpulse.unctad.org/critical-minerals/#Ref_5PK8SI37.
← 2. 2021 is the last year for which production figures are available for all countries, not just the leading global producers covered in USGS’s annual Mineral Commodity Summaries.
← 3. Including suspended production following seismic activity and flooding at the Kakula mine in the DRC, a fatal collapse at the El Teniente mine in Chile, and a mudflow at the Grasberg mine in Indonesia. Andy Home, “Copper Study Group highlights impact of supply hits,” Reuters, 27 October 2025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/copper-study-group-highlights-impact-mine-supply-hits-2025-10-24/.
← 4. Authors’ calculations based on International Energy Agency, 2025, https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/critical-minerals-data-explorer.
← 5. Authors’ calculations based on International Energy Agency, 2025, Announced pledges scenario https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/critical-minerals-data-explorer.
← 6. US Department of the Interior/USUS Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025,” Version 1.2, March 2025, p. 111, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2025/mcs2025.pdf. Note that there is a significant discrepancy with the World Bank report, where Africa is reported to represent 15.9 % of total world reserves. The reason for the discrepancy might be that the USGS report does not account for the announced resources/reserves in DRC, expected to be very large. See World Bank, “Mineral Resources of Africa,” 15 October2025, pp. 104-105.
← 7. Authors’ calculations based on International Energy Agency 2025, announced pledges scenario https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/critical-minerals-data-explorer.
← 8. The USGS database largely used for data in this report did not provide any data on Africa’s nickel production. USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries only include data for the top 10 to 15 global producers of each mineral, and no African country makes it to the top. We used instead the British Geological Survey (N.E. Idoine, et al., 2025) for production data and the World Bank and Nickel Institute for reserves and resources.
← 9. Authors’ calculations based on International Energy Agency, 2025, Announced pledges scenario https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/critical-minerals-data-explorer.
← 10. For more analysis, see Africa Policy Research Institute (2026), A guide to the African Green Minerals Strategy (AGMS), https://afripoli.org/projects/factsheet/au-crm/.