Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013‑2024

Key trends

Climate finance grew in 2023-2024, to levels well above the USD 100 billion goal

In 2023 and 2024, developed countries provided and mobilised a total of USD 132.8 billion and USD 136.7 billion in climate finance for developing countries respectively (Figure 1 and Table 1). The collective annual USD 100 billion goal was thus exceeded in 2023 and 2024, after being reached for the first time in 2022, two years after the initial 2020 target year. Following a record hike between 2021 and 2022 (USD 26 billion), the annual growth was again notable in 2023 (close to USD 17 billion). The 2022‑2024 levels are significantly above OECD projections from 2021 based on forward-looking commitments and estimates (OECD, 2021[2]).

• Public climate finance (bilateral and multilateral attributable to developed countries) continued to account for about three-quarters of the total in 2023 and 2024. Within this, multilateral public climate finance increased steadily by USD 3.5 billion (7%) each year, reaching USD 57.7 billion in 2024. In contrast, bilateral public climate finance grew by USD 9.1 billion (22%) in 2023, the largest annual increase observed since 2013, before dropping by USD 6.3 billion (12%) in 2024.

• Private finance mobilised by public climate finance, for which comparable data are available only from 2016 onwards, increased modestly by USD 1 billion (5%) in 2023, followed in 2024 by the biggest annual growth to date of this component, with USD 7.6 billion (33%).

• Climate-related export credits constitute a small share of total climate finance but rose to a record level in 2023 (USD 5.6 billion) before moderating in 2024 (USD 4.6 billion). As for export credits more generally, volumes are relatively volatile, driven by a limited number of large-scale projects.

Figure 1. Climate finance provided and mobilised in 2013-2024 (USD billion)

Note: The sum of components may not add up to totals due to rounding. The gap in time series in 2015 for mobilised private finance results from the implementation of enhanced measurement methods. As a result, grand totals in 2016-24 and in 2013-14 are not directly comparable. Figures only account for the share of multilateral finance and private finance mobilised attributable to developed countries (see Data and methods).

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

Table 1. Climate finance provided and mobilised in 2013-2024 per component and sub-component

(Amounts in USD billion)	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Bilateral public climate finance (1)	22.5	23.1	25.9	28.0	27.0	32.0	28.7	31.4	34.5	41.0	50.2	43.9
Multilateral public climate finance attributed to developed countries (2)	15.5	20.4	16.2	18.9	27.1	30.5	34.7	36.9	38.7	50.6	54.1	57.7
Multilateral development banks	13.0	18.0	14.4	15.7	23.8	26.7	30.5	33.2	34.3	46.9	48.2	50.5
Multilateral climate funds	2.2	2.0	1.4	2.6	2.9	3.5	3.8	3.5	4.2	3.4	5.6	6.8
Inflows to multilateral institutions (where outflows are unavailable)	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4
Subtotal (1+2)	37.9	43.5	42.1	46.9	54.1	62.5	63.4	68.4	73.1	91.6	104.3	101.6
Climate-related officially supported export credits (3)	1.6	1.6	2.5	1.5	3.0	2.7	2.6	1.9	2.1	2.4	5.6	4.6
Subtotal (1+2+3)	39.5	45.1	44.6	48.5	57.1	65.2	66	70.2	75.2	94.1	109.9	106.2
Mobilised private climate finance (4)	12.8	16.7	N/A	10.1	14.5	14.7	14.4	13.1	14.4	21.9	22.9	30.5
By bilateral public climate finance	6.5	8.1	N/A	5.2	4.0	3.8	5.8	5.1	5.6	9.2	6.5	8.6
By multilateral development banks attributed to developed countries	6.2	8.6	N/A	4.5	10.3	9.9	6.9	6.7	7.0	10.7	14.3	17.4
By multilateral climate funds attributed to developed countries			N/A	0.4	0.2	1.0	1.7	1.4	1.8	2.0	2.0	4.5
Grand Total (1+2+3+4)	52.4	61.8	N/A	58.5	71.6	79.9	80.4	83.3	89.6	115.9	132.8	136.7

Note: The sum of components may not add up to totals due to rounding. The gap in time series in 2015 for mobilised private finance results from the implementation of enhanced measurement methods. As a result, grand totals in 2016-24 and in 2013-14 are not directly comparable. Figures only account for the share of multilateral finance and private finance mobilised attributable to developed countries (see Data and methods).

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

Doubling adaptation finance from 2019 levels requires strong growth in 2025

Total adaptation finance provided and mobilised by developed countries increased over the observed time series, reaching USD 33.6 billion and USD 34.7 billion in 2023 and 2024, respectively (Figure 2). The annual growth between 2022 and 2024 has, however, been modest (about USD 1 billion per year). In 2023 and 2024, public climate finance continued to represent over 90% of total adaptation finance, amounting to USD 30.6 billion and USD 31.7 billion, respectively. Within public adaptation finance, bilateral flows increased steadily over the past three years, while multilateral flows declined between 2022 and 2023 before showing a modest recovery in 2024. This overall pattern is driven by diverging trends across different categories of multilateral institutions: adaptation finance from multilateral development banks declined by 16% over the same period, while it more than doubled for multilateral climate funds. Private finance mobilised for adaptation also increased overall, reaching around USD 3 billion in 2023 and2024, compared to USD 0.4 billion in 2016, noting that relatively larger volumes in given years are primarily due to a small number of large-scale projects.

Figure 2. Adaptation finance provided and mobilised in 2016-2024 per component (USD billion)

Note: The sum of components may not add up to totals due to rounding. Figures only account for the share of multilateral public climate finance and of private finance mobilised attributable to developed countries (see Data and methods).

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

The 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact urged developed countries to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025. Work under the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance (UNFCCC SCF) addressed issues relating to the baseline, methods and available evidence up to 2020 (UNFCCC SCF, 2023[4]). The outcomes of the first Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement reiterated this urging (UNFCCC, 2023[5]). More recently, the outcome of COP30 called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance.

The amount of adaptation finance tracked by the OECD in 2019 based on data reported by bilateral and multilateral providers was USD 18.8 billion. If OECD public finance figures are taken as the baseline, adaptation finance would need to increase by a further USD 5.8 billion (18%) in 2025 to meet the doubling of the goal. In addition, between 2019 and 2024, adaptation finance mobilised from the private sector doubled, from USD 1.5 billion to USD 3 billion, despite some year-to-year fluctuations over the period.

Year-on-year variations in aggregate amounts, as well as in the thematic distribution of climate finance, may be influenced by both large individual projects (notably infrastructure) and adjustments in the methodologies used by providers to determine climate-specific amounts (percentage or component of a total project value reported as climate finance). The marked increase in total climate finance provided and mobilised in 2023 was in part due to a limited number of large-scale projects, which also influence the distribution across climate themes. Furthermore, 2023 and 2024 bilateral climate finance data was unavailable for one provider and thus had to be estimated on the basis of best available evidence (see the Data sources section of the Data and methods chapter). Such estimates may also influence the thematic split.

There are in practice a range of challenges and opportunities to scale up adaptation finance in developing countries. Challenges can relate to economic and financial constraints, technical and knowledge-based limitations, institutional capacity and fragmentation. Potential action areas for international providers include targeted support to strengthen developing countries’ capacities and enabling environments for adaptation finance, improvements in the delivery of finance for adaptation, further deployment of blended finance instruments to mobilise private finance for adaptation, and tapping into alternative financing sources (OECD, 2023[6]).

In terms of the overall thematic composition of total climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries (Figure 3), the share of adaptation previously increased, from 17% in 2016 to a peak of 34% in 2020 and was around 25% in both 2023 and 2024. Mitigation finance continues to represent the large majority of total climate finance, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. In 2023, mitigation finance reached USD 87.3 billion, growing by USD 17.4 billion compared to 2022, after a similarly strong increase between 2021 and 2022. In 2024, volumes plateaued at USD 86.9 billion. Meanwhile, cross-cutting activities that address both mitigation and adaptation increased from USD 11.9 billion in 2023 to USD 15.1 billion in 2024. The share of cross-cutting activities fluctuated over the observed period within a relatively stable range of 7% to 13%.

Figure 3. Climate finance provided and mobilised in 2016-2024 per climate theme (USD billion)

Note: The sum of individual theme components may not add up to totals due to rounding.

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

The sectoral composition of climate finance has remained broadly stable since 2016 (Figure 4). Over 2016‑2024, energy represented a very significant share (41%) of mitigation finance. In contrast, adaptation finance was distributed more evenly across a wider range of sectors, with water (18%) and agriculture (17%) accounting for the largest shares. The relatively large share of “all other sectors” of adaptation reflects the aggregation of a diverse set of smaller sectors, including multisector (12%), disaster risk reduction (6%), social infrastructure and services (5%), general environmental protection (5%), government and civil society (4%) and health (3%). This reflects the cross-sectoral nature of adaptation finance, where interventions are often context-specific and not concentrated within certain dominant sectors. Climate finance reported as “cross-cutting” is primarily composed of general environmental protection (17%) and multisector (13%), reflecting the multi-dimensional nature of these activities.

Figure 4. Sectoral distribution of climate finance provided and mobilised in 2016-2024

Note: The sum of individual sector components may not add up to 100% due to rounding. “All other sectors” mainly includes activities targeting multisector, general environment protection, government and civil society, social infrastructure and services, and disaster preparedness.

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

Loans continue to represent most of public climate finance, but the share of grants in climate finance for low-income countries is high

Public climate finance provided by developed countries, bilaterally and through multilateral channels, increased overall over the period, with notable rises in 2022 and 2023 to reach a peak of USD 104.3 billion in 2023. This was followed by a slight decline to USD 101.6 billion in 2024 (Figure 5). This evolution occurs in the context of increases in official development finance over the same period (OECD, 2026[7]), including a continued growth of multilateral outflows over the past three years, which reached a new peak in 2024 (OECD, 2026[8]).

In 2023 and 2024, as in previous years, public climate finance mainly took the form of loans (73% or USD 75.6 billion in 2023, and 67% or USD 68.5 billion in 2024) and, to a lesser extent, grants (24% or USD 24.8 billion in 2023 and 29% or USD 29.7 billion in 2024), while volumes of equity investments remained comparatively small (4% or USD 3.7 billion in 2023 and 3% or USD 3.3 billion in 2024) (Figure 5). Loans increased substantially in 2023, before dropping in 2024. Fluctuations in loan volumes are particularly sensitive to the timing of financial commitments for large-scale projects. For example, a small number of loans exceeding USD 1 billion accounted for more than 10% of total public climate finance loans committed in 2023, highlighting the influence of such large transactions on aggregate volumes.

Such decrease was partially offset by growth in grants, notably those extended by bilateral providers. While bilateral climate finance decreased in 2024, the share of grants within this component reached its highest level since 2016 at nearly half of the total. Over the observed 2016-2024 period, both loans and grants have increased significantly. By 2024, the annual level of grants had more than doubled compared to 2016, increasing by USD 17.4 billion, while public loans grew by USD 35.2 billion, reflecting sustained expansion across both instruments.

Figure 5. Public climate finance provided in 2016-2024 per financial instruments (USD billion)

Note: The sum of individual instrument components may not add up to totals due to rounding.

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC and OECD DAC statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

The instrument mix varied across provider types, reflecting different mandates and the varied nature of activities financed (Figure 6). Over the period, financing by multilateral development banks (MDBs) was predominantly provided in the form of loans, often associated with larger-scale projects. In contrast, the instrument mix was more balanced for multilateral climate funds and bilateral providers, which made greater use of grants alongside loans and tended to support a broader range of activities and project types.

As illustrated in previous OECD reports, the share of concessional loans (extended on more preferential terms than those available on the market, including below-market interest rates, extended grace periods, or a combination of both) and non-concessional loans tends to differ significantly across provider types. In 2023 and 2024, 73% of loans extended by bilateral providers were concessional, compared with 79% between 2016 and 2022, as highlighted in previous analysis (OECD, 2024[1]). This difference could be due to a higher share of loans with undetermined concessionality at the time of reporting (9% in 2023-2024 compared to 3% over 2016-2022). For multilateral climate funds and MDBs, the share of concessional loans remained stable in 2023-2024 compared to 2016-2022, at slightly below half and a quarter respectively (OECD, 2024[1]). However, these percentages are not comparable to the percentages for bilateral providers, as the reporting of concessional and non-concessional loans is underpinned by different definitions for members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) on the one hand, and for multilateral institutions on the other.

Figure 6. Public climate finance provided in 2016-2024 per provider and financial instruments

Note: The sum of individual instrument components may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC and OECD DAC statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

The use of public finance instruments varies significantly across income groups, a pattern that remained broadly unchanged in 2023 and 2024 (Figure 7). Over 2016-2024, loans accounted for most public climate finance in higher-income groups, representing 92% in high-income countries (HICs), 87% in upper middle‑income countries (UMICs), and 85% in lower middle-income countries (LMICs). In contrast, grant financing was significantly more prominent in low-income countries (LICs), where it accounted for around 65% of total public climate finance provided, reflecting specific needs such as adaptation, as well as more constrained capacity to access and reimburse debt. These differences are also consistent with thematic patterns, whereby a larger share of adaptation and cross-cutting public finance is typically provided in the form of grants, whereas mitigation finance continues to be predominantly loan-based.

Figure 7. Public climate finance provided and mobilised in 2016-2024 per developing country income group and financial instrument

Note: The sum of individual instrument components may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC and OECD DAC statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

Within the overall set of financial instruments, providers deploy public finance via a range of mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms are specifically designed to mobilise private finance, notably through de‑risking approaches such as first loss loans and guarantees, as presented in the following section. At the same time, providers have been adopting new approaches to better respond to the diverse needs and circumstances of developing countries, as well as to tap into new sources of climate finance. Examples of relevance to the period and time series covered by the present report include:

• Debt-for-nature swaps have been identified as having the potential to help redirect significant volumes of debt in developing countries to nature restoration and climate adaptation (OECD, 2025[9]). However, such operations are not always straightforward to identify in the underlying data, as they are not systematically captured under a dedicated reporting category. In practice, they can sometimes be identified through project titles or descriptions referencing terms such as “debt swap” or “debt conversion”. For example, recent data include operations described as debt swaps supporting environmental objectives in small island developing states, debt conversion arrangements linked to conservation outcomes in middle-income countries, and bilateral agreements restructuring sovereign debt in exchange for climate-related investments.

• The rechannelling of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), an international reserve asset hosted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), contributed to the creation in 2022 of the IMF Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST). In addition to SDR rechannelling, its main funding source, the RST is further financed through voluntary loan contributions, as well as grant-like deposit and reserve resources provided by some countries, which help subsidise lending and cover financial risks. The IMF RST supports low-income and vulnerable middle-income countries in building resilience to external shocks, including those related to climate change. In the context of this report, activities carried out by the IMF RST are captured as part of the multilateral public climate finance component. Examples of such support include policy-based financing for macro-critical reforms to strengthen climate-related fiscal and macroeconomic resilience, integrate climate risks into public financial management and enhance countries’ capacity to manage climate-related risks.

Private finance mobilisation for climate action in developing countries continued on an upward trajectory

Mobilising private finance is a key component of efforts to scale up climate finance for developing countries. International providers can use public finance strategically to mobilise private investment at the level of individual activities and transactions, notably through the use of de-risking mechanisms, as well as provide support to contribute to improving the conditions, scale and effectiveness of private finance for climate action in developing countries (OECD, 2023[10]). As detailed under the Measure of private finance mobilised section of the Data and methods chapter, volumes of private finance included in the figures presented in this report capture private finance mobilised by mechanisms and instruments deployed by bilateral and multilateral development finance providers at activity and transaction level.

Following a marked increase in 2022 after several years of relative stagnation, private finance mobilised by public climate finance grew modestly to USD 22.9 billion in 2023, before increasing sharply to reach USD 30.5 billion in 2024 (Figure 8). Such growth in volumes was driven primarily by multilateral development banks (MDBs), whose mobilisation rose from USD 14.3 billion in 2023 to USD 17.4 billion in 2024. Private finance mobilised by multilateral climate funds more than doubled between 2023 and 2024 to reach a peak of USD 4.5 billion. Meanwhile, mobilisation by bilateral providers remained more variable over time, declining in 2023 before increasing again in 2024.

Overall, the recent upward trend reflects the expansion of public climate finance, strengthened mobilisation efforts by MDBs and the growing contribution of multilateral climate funds. These developments take place in the context of similar trends in total private finance mobilisation tracked by the OECD DAC, which grew between 2022 and 2024, reaching their highest levels in 2024 (OECD, 2026[11]). This suggests that the increase in private finance mobilised for climate is part of a wider expansion in mobilised efforts for development, particularly driven by multilateral providers.

Volumes of private finance mobilisation are, however, also influenced by a limited number of large transactions accounting for a notable share of the total in certain years. For example, the top 20 largest projects in 2023 and 2024 accounted for close to a quarter of private finance mobilised for climate, indicating that aggregate mobilisation levels and breakdowns across time can be affected by the timing and scale of these operations.

Figure 8. Private finance mobilised in 2016-2024 per category of public climate finance providers (USD billion)

Note: The sum of individual provider group components may not add up to totals due to rounding.

Source: Based on OECD DAC statistics and complementary reporting to the OECD.

Public climate finance providers mobilised private finance primarily through direct investment in companies, guarantees and syndicated loans, which together accounted for over 70% of private climate finance mobilised over 2016-2024 (Figure 9). This distribution is broadly consistent with recent patterns observed in total private finance mobilised by official development finance more generally (OECD, 2026[11]). Different types of public finance providers, however, tend to rely on different mechanisms, reflecting different mandates as well as the need to adapt the choice and use of such mechanisms in different country and sector contexts.

Figure 9. Private finance mobilised in 2016-2024 per leveraging mechanism

Note: The sum of individual leveraging mechanism components may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Source: Based on OECD DAC statistics and complementary reporting to the OECD.

The energy sector continues to account for the largest share of the growth in 2023 to 2024, representing 41% total private climate finance mobilised over the period 2016-2024 (Figure 10). A majority of private finance also remains mobilised in middle-income countries (MICs) at 66% and low-income countries (LICs) represented only a minimal share of 3%.

Figure 10. Private climate finance mobilised in 2016-2024 per sectors and income groups

Note: The sum of individual sector components may not add up to 100% due to rounding. “All other sectors” mainly includes activities targeting business and other services, general environment protection, multisector, communications, social infrastructure and services.

Source: Based on OECD DAC statistics and complementary reporting to the OECD.

Climate finance remained concentrated in middle-income countries with specific patterns in SIDS and LDCs

In terms of income groups, LMICs were the main beneficiaries, accounting for a relatively stable 39% (annual average of USD 52.5 billion) of total climate finance provided and mobilised in 2023-24, increasing from USD 23.2 billion in 2016 (Figure 11). The share represented by UMICs was similarly stable (32% in 2023-24, 28% in 2016). The share of finance provided and mobilised for LICs represented 7% in 2023-24. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, finance for LICs (USD 9.6 billion) showed a four-fold increase since 2016 with, however, a relative stabilisation in most recent years. As much as 19% of climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries could not be allocated to a specific income group, owning primarily to activities with a regional or multi-country scope at the point of reporting.

In terms of broad regions, throughout 2016 to 2024, Asia was the main targeted region of climate finance provided and mobilised (39% of the total), although its share declined over time from 46% in 2016 to 36% in 2024. Africa followed with 29% and has seen its share grow over time, from 24% in 2016 to 31% in 2024. The Americas (18%), Europe (5%) and Oceania (0.8%) accounted for smaller and broadly stable shares. These regional shares should be interpreted with caution in light of the number and variety of individual countries they include, differences in population size, income levels, economic structures and exposure to climate risks, which all contribute, along with other factors, to shaping both the demand for and allocation of climate finance.

Figure 11. Climate finance provided and mobilised in 2016-2024 per developing country income group (USD billion)

Note: The sum of individual income group components may not add up to totals due to rounding.

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

Focusing on Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), volumes showed overall growth for both groups over the period. Despite a slight drop in 2024 compared to 2023, climate finance for LDCs continued to rise in the last two years, reaching an annual average of USD 24.5 billion in 2023-24. Climate finance for SIDS was multiplied more than 3.8 times since 2016, reaching USD 3.8 billion in both 2023 and 2024. Between 2016 and 2024, LDCs and SIDS benefitted, respectively, from an annual average of USD 16.5 billion (17% of total climate finance provided and mobilised), and USD 2.4 billion (3%) (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Climate finance provided and mobilised in 2016-2024 in SIDS and LDCs (USD billion)

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.

Climate finance to SIDS and LDCs has specific patterns. Over the period 2016-2024, adaptation accounted for a larger share (46%) of climate finance in LDCs and SIDS compared to one quarter across all developing countries (Figure 13). For both SIDS and LDCs, public climate finance plays a particularly central role, as it represents a higher share of total climate finance provided and mobilised (89% and 86% respectively) than the average for all developing countries (78%). More specifically, half of public finance provided to SIDS was grant-based, while grants accounted for 45% of public finance provided to LDCs. In contrast, private finance mobilised in LDCs and SIDS is significantly lower in relative terms (7% and 10% respectively), than when considering all developing countries (18%), owing to significant challenges and barriers these countries face in attracting private investment (OECD, 2023[10]). On a per capita basis, SIDS received significantly higher climate finance, while LDCs were broadly in line with the average across all developing countries.

Figure 13. Thematic split of climate finance provided and mobilised in 2016-2024 in SIDS and LDCs

Note: The sum of individual theme components may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.