Organised crime is a significant threat to the global economy and societies across the world, with organised criminals increasingly seeking to gain undue advantage by using corruption to infiltrate the legal economy and public services and fraud to appropriate public funds.. In response, countries must introduce coherent strategic frameworks which account for the connections between corruption and organised crime, address governance gaps, weaknesses and inefficiencies which organised criminals can exploit, and improve cross-government and international co-operation. As part of this upgraded, more strategic approach, countries should build upstream resilience against organised crime by improving prevention tools and enhancing the integrity of public institutions, particularly in vulnerable sectors like licencing, borders, planning and procurement.
Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026
Abstract
Organised crime presents a significant threat to the global economy and societies across the world, with recent estimates suggesting that its global costs amount to as much as 5% of annual global GDP (UNODC, 2025[13]). The 2024 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions highlighted that an average of 30% of people across the 30 participating countries name crime and violence among the top three issues facing their country (OECD, 2024[8]). Criminal networks are increasingly exploiting global supply chains, cross-border money laundering schemes, and digital tools to diversify and expand their activities. As a result, tackling the growing threats of organised crime which used to be a priority for a few OECD Member and partner countries has now become one for most, if not all.
Organised crime groups use corruption, coercion and the exploitation of legitimate business and government structures to increase their influence across the private and public sectors, as well as within wider society. Corruption helps capture public service provision, defraud the state, obstruct justice and unduly influence the policy cycle, particularly at the local level. Although many countries are taking action to counter organised crime, its link with corruption could be better understood and addressed.
This chapter assesses how a stronger and more strategic response to organised criminals’ reliance on corruption and exploitation of institutional vulnerabilities is needed from governments, the private sector, and society at large. Without it, organised crime will continue to weaken the integrity of public and private sectors, the cost to economies will increase, and the stability and effectiveness of democratic institutions will be undermined. This chapter finds that:
Organised criminals are increasingly seeking to gain undue advantage by using corruption to infiltrate the legal economy and public services, and fraud to appropriate public funds
More countries could strengthen their strategic frameworks and improve interinstitutional co-operation to tackle the corruption threat posed by organised crime
Countries could build resilience against organised crime by enhancing the integrity of public institutions in particular those vulnerable to it
While definitions of organised crime vary between OECD Member and partner countries, they generally emphasise the presence of three characteristics: structure, continuity and purpose (Figure 11.1).
Source: OECD elaboration
These core elements remain consistent, but their reach, complexity and impact are increasing due to globalisation and digitalisation. These developments have, for instance, enabled criminals to reach victims across jurisdictions and to move money through complex financial schemes with minimal traceability. Dark markets and crypto currencies have made illicit goods and services more available and enabled more effective sharing of knowledge and resources among criminal actors. Online communications platforms, including social media, offer opportunities for organised criminals to network, organise and collaborate, in many instances without fear of detection due to encryption and anonymity.
As a result, the cost of organised crime is growing. Organised crime has a deep economic impact, costing the global economy an estimated 2-5% of global annual GDP, or between USD 800 billion and USD 2 trillion every year (UNODC, 2025[13]). These costs are reflected in country and regional-level estimates (albeit based on slightly different methodologies), with the cost of organised crime estimated at 2% of GDP in the United Kingdom, 3.5% in the LAC region, and up to 4% in Australia which is considering its indirect costs to society. In addition to this economic impact, organised crime also carries a high societal cost, with organised criminals undermining the rule of law and trust in public institutions through manipulating procurements, defrauding the state, obstructing justice, or establishing informal service provision and governance systems which are not accountable to those living in them. It can even have an impact on national security, where the line between organised crime and politically motivated disruption becomes blurred and criminal groups provide logistics, intelligence sources, funding channels, or disinformation services to hybrid threat actors (Europol, 2025[52]).
To support and scale their activities, organised crime groups are increasingly using corruption in their business models and targeting certain areas of the public and private sectors. Indeed, 71% of organised crime groups which were reported to Europol in 2024 engage in corruption, up from 60% in 2021 (Europol, 2024[94]) (Europol, 2021[95]). While corruption has always been part of the toolbox of criminal networks, this upward trend may reflect both the spatial and sectoral expansion of organised crime activities, as well as the increasing number of intermediaries that they can target within the public and private sectors.
Unlike with other forms of corruption, however, the incentives offered by organised criminals are often larger and reinforced by threats, intimidation and violence, and their targets often differ from more traditional forms of corruption. This combination of tactics increases targets’ susceptibility to corruption and hinders detection and enforcement, including by reducing targets’ willingness to engage with law enforcement agencies. The use of corruption in this way is particularly prevalent in illegal, high-profit markets such as drugs, trafficking and prostitution, where organised criminals target public officials and private sector workers working in customs, borders, logistics, local government and law enforcement to facilitate their illicit activity and gain advantage over their competitors (Europol, 2025[52]). Ultimately, corruption by organised criminal groups can go beyond, by trying to unduly influence political systems and capture political office holders, particularly at the local level. Recent research in Sweden has shown that around 10% of surveyed national, regional and municipal-level politicians had experienced threats or violence from serious organised crime groups during their time in office (Brå, 2023[96]). As such, corruption has become an important tool for criminal groups to consolidate power, strengthen their licit and illicit business interests and gain market advantages.
Beyond targeting the public sector and capturing political decision making, criminal networks are also increasingly infiltrating the licit economy. While legal, corporate, and financial actors can serve as gatekeepers that help prevent and detect crime, they can also become enablers for organised crime – whether knowingly or unknowingly – by helping to conceal, transfer or launder illicit assets. Professional enablers that may use their expertise to help clients commit crimes include tax professionals, legal service providers, accountants, financial advisors, company formation agents, registered agents, notaries, business trustees, financial institutions, and trust and corporate service providers. Beyond the legal and financial sectors, other corporate sectors are also prone to organised crime activities, knowingly or unknowingly, as well as voluntarily or coerced. Criminal organisations tend to use legal business structures as multipurpose platforms for criminal activities and money laundering. While all sectors are at risk, common targets include construction and real estate, cash-intensive businesses, such as hospitality, and logistics, namely transport and import/export companies (Europol, 2025[52]).
Modern organised crime is characterised by less centralisation, more networking and greater engagement across groups pursuing common criminal objectives. At different points in the criminal process, criminals can operate in or provide services to several different networks. These increasingly complex crime-as-a-service models and the enlistment or corruption of public officials, legitimate business, and even civilians into organised criminal activity can extend the influence of organised crime groups into the private sector and wider society. These dynamics make tackling organised crime more complex, demanding a correspondingly sophisticated and coherent response from governments. Without such co-ordination, efforts risk becoming fragmented and less effective, allowing criminals to exploit gaps between disconnected government responses (Europol, 2021[95]).
To that end, international co-operation has been critically important to countries’ efforts to counter organised crime. Such efforts have evolved significantly since INTERPOL's creation in 1923. Key milestones include the establishment of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989 to address illicit financial flows, and the near-universal ratification of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) by 194 countries since 2000. Major international cooperation instruments, like UNODC, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, EPPO and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention facilitate law enforcement co-ordination, intelligence-sharing, and anti-corruption measures. Civil society organisations, such as the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, contribute research and monitoring capabilities.
Despite this progress, significant challenges persist. Trust deficits between jurisdictions, divergent legal standards, limited data collaboration and uneven implementation of international frameworks hinder effective co-operation, particularly in lower-capacity countries. Criminal networks exploit these gaps and regulatory inconsistencies to evade enforcement across borders. To that end, identifying ways to strengthen international engagement will help build countries’ resilience to criminal infiltration. The increasing complexity and diversity of criminal activities also point to the opportunity to increase international co-operation in areas such as anti-corruption, tax transparency, responsible business conduct, and governance, which will offer novel approaches and bring additional perspectives to respond to the emerging challenges posed by organised crime.
For their part, governments’ strategic frameworks should respond to organised criminals’ increasing complexity by promoting co-ordination and co-operation between public agencies, particularly between anti-corruption authorities and those tackling organised crime. Not doing so risks leaving countries exposed to fragmentation, duplication, and inefficiency, as policy responses are less likely to be co-ordinated between responsible government actors, and separating anti-corruption and anti-organised crime efforts creates artificial distinctions that do not reflect how criminal organisations operate. However, while 24 OECD Members have an anti-corruption strategy, only eight contain strategic objectives related to tackling organised crime. Similarly, only 29% of OECD Members include strategic objectives to address corruption in their national strategies against organised crime (Table 11.1).
How to read: The figure shows the alignment of OECD Member countries’ anti-corruption and anti-organised crime strategies, by highlighting the incorporation of anti-organised crime objectives into anti-corruption strategies, and the presence of anti-organised crime strategies incorporating anti-corruption measures. For example, Australia has an active anti-corruption strategy and an anti-organised crime strategy, though they do not cross-reference one another.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
A strategic approach to tackling organised crime and corruption goes beyond cross-references between strategic documents and includes a collaborative process for strategy development and implementation. As OECD Member countries have recognised, such processes should be based on proactive consultation across public authorities involved in tackling corruption and organised crime, including law enforcement, financial intelligence units, border management, and anti-corruption authorities, along with engagement with the private sector and civil society (Box 11.1). As the strategy chapter notes, while there is no need to duplicate strategic planning across different strategic frameworks, aligning across strategies through consultation and co-ordinated planning enables the most coherent and effective responses to the most complex problems.
On 17 October 2023, Finland’s Ministry of Justice appointed a working group involving a range of public sector authorities working on issues related to organised crime to prepare a strategy and the associated action plan to combat organised crime. In its deliberations, the working group made broad use of information held by the authorities and pursued close co-operation with the numerous ongoing Government Programme projects on related topics. The resulting strategy to combat organised crime, running from 2025-2030, has the following goals:
co-operation among the key actors is effective and established
the proceeds of crime to offenders have decreased, criminal activities have become more difficult to pursue, and the risks entailed have grown greater
organised crime infiltration into the basic structures of society has been prevented
people who are particularly vulnerable to crime are better protected.
This strategy places prevention at the centre of Finland’s work, by prioritising tackling proceeds of crime, supporting exit from crime and criminal groups, and enhancing co-operation between the government and the education sector.
Importantly, the strategy contains a strong focus on the risks of corruption generated by organised crime by starting a government-wide research process to understand the current levels of undue influence of public officials and potential prevention measures.
To support this work, the strategy establishes ongoing collaboration between actors across all levels of governance in Finland, including various ministries, local government actors and ports, as well as with European Union institutions.
Source: Finnish Ministry of Justice (2025), Government Resolution on a strategy and action plan to combat organised crime (2025-2030).
In addition to promoting cross-government strategic alignment, building resilience to organised crime will demand coherent multi-level governance frameworks that connect national strategies with the operational realities of subnational authorities, including port authorities, local governments and municipalities, as well as local enforcement agencies. This connection is critical because subnational authorities often represent the point of engagement between the government and organised criminal operations. Given their control over administrative procedures (such as local permitting processes, zoning or construction approvals), public service delivery (such as waste-management and policing), and logistical hubs such as ports or airports, officials at these levels can often be important intermediaries in organised criminal groups’ illicit business operations and money laundering activities, making them prime targets for bribery or coercion. This risk is exacerbated since subnational authorities often have fewer resources and less-developed oversight mechanisms, including lower internal auditing or control capacity, creating gaps and opportunities for criminal networks to exploit.
Building resilience to organised crime therefore demands clear roles and responsibilities, effective co-ordination across levels of government, and robust integrity mechanisms that align local capacity with national policy objectives. Aligning national and subnational strategic planning can help to mitigate these risks by bringing national-level insights, resources, and capabilities to bear on risks at the subnational level. Given the shared experiences and threats faced by subnational authorities, furthermore, promoting international collaboration across port authorities, municipal, and national government officials with relevant experience will be an important component of building state capacity. Enabling subnational authorities to access specialised expertise, share effective practices, and build peer networks will foster cross-border co-ordination in a way that addresses inherently transnational criminal networks.
Tackling organised crime and its use of corruption is a core responsibility of law enforcement agencies, in terms of detection, investigation, and enforcement on one side, as well as with respect to prevention and building resilience to the threats posed on the other side. This prevention role can be indirect, including through the deterrent effect of law enforcement actions or officers’ physical presence in certain locations. It can also be direct, including through risk analysis and awareness raising activities. Providing sufficient resources, developing domestic and international information sharing, and building technological skills will all be key to improving law enforcement agencies’ reactive and prevention roles relating to the increasingly disparate and complex threat from organised criminal networks in the coming years.
Enhancing integrity in public institutions can supplement law enforcement efforts and build upstream resilience to criminal actors’ efforts to use corruption to influence decision making processes and divert public services to facilitate their illegal activities. Such measures can include vetting procedures and integrity checks, which identify corruption risk upon employees’ entry into roles and periodically throughout their employment. These checks must be balanced with personal privacy and data protection principles. However, they can reveal signs of possible connections with organised crime, such as higher-risk personal relationships between employees and external parties or unusual financial transactions and unexplained wealth. They can also help to identify employees’ potential vulnerabilities to exploitation by organised criminals due to, for example, financial hardship. Vetting procedures and integrity checks are therefore an important tool for public authorities to identify and manage actual and potential influence from organised crime.
Additionally, strong conflict of interest and asset declaration systems can also be a useful tool to reveal where individuals could – or have – benefitted from illicit relationships with organised criminals. Taking a risk-based approach to managing asset and interest declarations can help authorities identify possible anomalies among those employees for whom relationships with, or undue influence from, organised criminals could be most harmful to the public interest. Such at-risk office holders include elected officials (as explored further in Chapter 5 on “Political financing”) and those holding senior, decision making roles. It also includes those working in sectors of particular interest to organised criminals such as licencing, borders, planning, logistics, or public procurement (as explored further in Chapter 10 on “Integrity in public procurement”). There is scope for countries to strengthen requirements for officials in at-risk roles to submit asset or interest declarations, with 64% of OECD Members and 69% of all countries assessed through the Public Integrity Indicators having such a requirement in place. As also explained in Chapter 4 on “Conflict of interest”, regulatory requirements for asset and interest declarations should be supported by appropriate implementation measures, including effective oversight and verification processes, the appropriate use of sanctions for breaches, and targeted awareness raising materials. Such measures also reduce the risk that employees’ self-declarations may be inaccurate of untruthful, helping authorities gain a clearer picture of the potential influences over office holders and to put appropriate mitigation measures in place.
Effective processes for reporting wrongdoing, including whistleblowing channels, are another important tool for authorities to identify the possible influence of organised crime. Creating open cultures in which employees feel able to raise concerns and talk about attempted or actual influence by organised crime is crucial to authorities’ ability to mitigate the risks of influence which otherwise may remain covert. Offering effective whistleblower protections, which allow employees to raise concerns related to organised crime to appropriate authorities without fear of reprisals, is also vital.
Strong risk management and internal control systems are also important tools for authorities to mitigate the risk of organised crime-related corruption. Corruption risk management processes can help authorities identify the source and quantify exposure to corruption risks, including related to organised crime, and to put appropriate mitigations in place. Internal control provides assurance that public resources are applied efficiently, effectively and in line with their intended purpose, and can therefore help to identify where organised criminals may be seeking to divert resources and services to facilitate their activities. 70% of OECD Members have issued guidelines on fraud and corruption prevention as part of their internal control systems, and 71% of countries explicitly address these risks in their risk management framework. Further gains could be made by highlighting organised crime in these frameworks as a key driver of corruption risk, particularly in sectors such as licencing or public procurement.
Automating compliance processes, digitalising administrative procedures and strengthening internal control measures can also provide greater checks on decision making and identify areas of exposure to influence from organised criminals. Certifying auditors can improve both the effectiveness of internal audit as a means of identifying the influence of organised crime, and the resilience of internal auditors to the undue influence of organised criminals. On the one hand, certified auditors adhere to professional standards and robust audit methodologies, enabling them to identify patterns associated with fraud, collusion, and misuse of funds, all common features of organised crime schemes. Certified auditing also enhances prevention by providing assurance that corruption controls are working and, where they are not, identifying how integrity systems’ resilience to corruption and organised crime can be improved. On the other hand, subjecting auditors to external accreditation introduces an important institutional safeguard that interferes with the operating space of organised criminal networks. Through proper accreditation, auditors become bound by professional standards, external oversight, and independent disciplinary mechanisms, which can make them harder to manipulate or intimidate and more likely to report such influence attempts, including to law enforcement and professional standards bodies. Using certified auditors in both the public and private sectors can therefore raise the risk and consequences of detection, meaning criminal actors’ cost-benefit calculation shifts. More countries could reap these benefits in their public institutions. Although many OECD Members have a certification scheme for internal audit professionals in place at the national level, in only three OECD Member countries have at least 85% of public officials performing internal audit functions obtained a national or international certificate (Figure 11.2).
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database, October 2025.
Several OECD Member countries have recognised the value of nurturing upstream resilience to organised crime through developing public integrity, particularly in higher-risk sectors such as local governance, and are working to address systemic vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by organised criminals (Box 11.2). Overall, nurturing preventative, upstream resilience can help to reduce the opportunities for organised crime groups to use corruption as a tool to advance their interests and gain undue advantage. In support of enforcement action, strengthening integrity at every level of government and with non-government partners can make it harder for criminal groups to take hold within societies, to infiltrate and challenge the authority of the state, and to skew markets and gain undue economic advantage (UNODC, 2021[97]).
Several OECD Member countries are taking steps to enhance their upstream resilience to organised crime-related corruption. For example:
Australia's 2018 National Strategy to Fight Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime provides a holistic approach to addressing organised crime, including: drawing on all tools of government to use the right intervention at the right time; strong partnerships across government and civil society; and enhanced capability through appropriate skills and technology.
The 2025 Finnish strategy and action plan to combat organised crime includes effective co-operation across stakeholders and the prevention of organised crime infiltration into the basic structures of society as two of its strategic objectives.
Sweden’s 2024-2027 Action Plan Against Corruption and Undue Influence introduces a range of measures to reduce the increased risks of corruption in Swedish society due to the growing threat of organised crime. The Action Plan focuses several of these measures at improving resilience to corruption and organised crime at the subnational level, which Swedish authorities have identified as being particularly vulnerable to the influence of organised criminals.
The Netherlands is developing its concept of subversive crimes to include not just the prosecution of criminals through more law enforcement powers, but also an increased focus on reinforcing societal resilience and mobilising both the public and private sectors against organised crime.
Source: OECD elaboration