Most countries maintain judicial and prosecutorial integrity safeguards to enable judges and prosecutors to enforce anti-corruption laws and regulations and ensure accountability for breaches. However, merit-based procedures for selecting, appointing and promoting judges and prosecutors could be improved to protect their integrity. Standards of conduct for judges and prosecutors are common, but implementation could be improved, especially around conflicts of interest. Reporting mechanisms for judicial and prosecutorial misconduct are generally implemented but countries could raise public awareness of them and train staff on handling reports.
Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026
Harnessing the Integrity Advantage
Abstract
Judges and prosecutors are key actors in enforcing laws and regulations and ensuring accountability for corruption crimes and breaches of anti-corruption policies. To carry out these roles effectively and uphold the rule of law, judges and prosecutors must have integrity and be impartial, honest and competent. Strong policies and processes are therefore needed to ensure meritocracy, and safeguard against undue influence and corruption within the justice system. Therefore, Principle 11 of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls on countries to ensure that enforcement mechanisms provide appropriate responses to all suspected violations of public integrity standards by public officials and all others involved in the violations. This includes ensuring that cases of corruption and integrity violations are decided objectively, fairly, and based on legal grounds and evidence (OECD, 2017[11]).
Moreover, integrity is a key driver of public trust in the justice system and, more broadly, of confidence in democratic institutions. When countries adopt and implement robust integrity frameworks, justice systems are more likely to be perceived as impartial and fair. Conversely, weaknesses in integrity safeguards can erode public confidence, regardless of formal legal guarantees. Indeed, evidence indicates that OECD Member countries fulfil on average 66% of OECD criteria on regulatory safeguards for judicial integrity, while more than half (54%) also have high or moderately high trust in the courts and judicial system (OECD, 2026[41]; OECD, 2024[8]).
This chapter explores how the integrity safeguards of OECD Member and partner countries’ justice systems and disciplinary measures for civil servants are performing. It shows that:
Basic safeguards for judicial and prosecutorial integrity are in place in the majority of countries, but stronger procedures for the selection, appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors are needed in many countries to protect judicial independence and prosecutorial integrity.
Standards of conduct for judges and prosecutors exist but implementation could be improved, particularly for managing conflicts of interest.
Whistleblowing mechanisms for reporting judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, including corruption, are generally being implemented but could be improved through strengthened public awareness of existing reporting procedures, as well as training for staff handling reports.
Most OECD Member and partner countries have basic safeguards in place for judicial and prosecutorial integrity. OECD Member countries fulfill an average 66% of OECD criteria for regulations on judicial integrity and an equal share of criteria on prosecutorial integrity. OECD partner countries fulfill an average 75% of the regulatory criteria on judicial integrity and 63% for prosecutorial integrity. As shown in Table 8.1, countries commonly have regulations in place to establish:
Constitutional safeguards for the independence of judges.
Objective grounds for the dismissal of judges and prosecutors.
Guaranteed tenure for judges until mandatory retirement age, the expiry of their term of office or dismissal from office.
Circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for judges and prosecutors outside public office, as well as sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest obligations depending on the severity of the violation.
Circumstances where judges and prosecutors should recuse themselves, as well as procedures for deciding whether they should continue on the case or how the procedural conflict of interest should be resolved.
Appeals against prosecutorial decisions regarding criminal investigations and against decisions to prosecute or not prosecute.
Note: The table presents data based on the following 31 OECD Member countries assessed in 2025: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia (judges), Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark except for criterion 11.2.16), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico (prosecutors), the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States (except for criteria on grounds for prosecutorial dismissal and appeal of prosecutorial decisions). Data not provided for regulation and practice criteria for Colombia (prosecutors), Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico (judges), New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom. Data for OECD partner countries are calculated based on the following 15 countries assessed in 2025: Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, Peru, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine.
How to read: 93% of OECD Members and 93% of OECD partner countries have laws establishing objective grounds for the dismissal of judges.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
Moreover, most OECD Member and partner countries have a meritocratic judicial career progression system. Currently, 67% of OECD Members and 73% of OECD partner countries have laws establishing objective procedures for the selection and promotion of judges that include, as a minimum, exams or panel interviews. These procedures are implemented throughout the judicial career, including for senior judicial positions: only 7% of OECD Members and 20% of OECD partner countries do not apply merit-based procedures for the selection of candidates to senior judicial positions. In practice, these procedures are generally conducted by an independent body in 67% of OECD Members and 73% of OECD partner countries (Figure 8.1). Challenges in safeguarding merit in selection and promotion procedures may also arise in countries where judges are elected. Countries can address these challenges by ensuring that objective merit-based criteria facilitate the selection of individuals based on integrity, competence and impartiality.
Note: The figure presents data based on the following 30 OECD Member countries assessed in 2025: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States. Data not provided for Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico (judges), New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom. Data for OECD partner countries are calculated based on the following 15 countries assessed in 2025: Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, Peru, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine.
How to read: France fulfils the regulatory criterion “The law establishes merit-based, objective procedures for the selection and promotion of judges” (outer ring) and the practice criterion “An independent body conducts exams and interviews for the selection and promotion of judges based on merit and competence” (inner ring).
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
In comparison, only 43% of OECD Member countries and 40% of OECD partner countries have adopted regulations establishing merit-based and objective procedures that are implemented for all prosecutors. This lower performance in selection procedures of prosecutors can be attributed to the different institutional roles of judges and prosecutors, and the various legal traditions across countries. Whereas judges are in most countries fully independent and act as impartial adjudicators, prosecutors are in some cases positioned within the executive branch. By comparison, 10 OECD Member countries and 8 OECD partner countries do not have such procedures in place for senior prosecutorial positions, such as prosecutors general. While various models exist for the appointment of prosecutors general, a meritocratic selection of candidates for these senior positions can strengthen the integrity of the prosecution service as a whole by ensuring that the selected persons have the necessary legal expertise and experience, as well as characteristics of integrity leadership to prevent risks of undue influence (OECD, 2020[14]). These skills are even more crucial in the prosecution of corruption crimes, which can be a politically sensitive issue. Especially in cases of high-level corruption, political actors may seek to exert illegal influence on investigations. In this context, regulatory frameworks governing the recruitment and promotion of those leading such investigations play a key role in providing guarantees for integrity and impartial, accountable decision making (OECD, 2024[18]; Council of Europe, 2024[42]; Council of Europe, 2019[43]). Beyond that, corruption cases often involve complex financial schemes requiring technical skills for their effective investigation. The detection of those schemes and the overall enforcement of anti-corruption systems relies on selecting senior prosecutors with demonstrated capacities in those areas.
Beyond merit, judicial integrity also depends on the independence of the bodies taking decisions on the appointment and promotion of judges. Such bodies can ensure independence by operating autonomously from the executive and the legislative, for example through transparent criteria for the selection, appointment and removal of their members. To avoid risks of corporatism these bodies may have a mixed composition, but international standards, such as the Council of Europe's 2010 recommendation on judicial independence, stress that not less than half of members should be judges elected by their peers (Council of Europe, 2010[44]).
While several countries (23 OECD Member and 12 partner countries) have established advisory bodies with a key role in recruitment and promotion procedures, only a few have adequate safeguards in place to ensure the internal independence and integrity of their decisions. Currently, 47% of OECD Member countries appoint judges based on the recommendations of an independent body that operates autonomously from the executive and legislative branches of government, and whose members are selected through non-partisan processes with clear criteria for their appointment and removal. This is similar in OECD partner countries, where 53% also base decisions on judicial appointments on the recommendations of independent bodies. The share of OECD Member countries that involve independent bodies in decisions on promotion is even lower at 40%. Among OECD partner countries, 60% of these currently consider recommendations of independent bodies in promotion decisions (Figure 8.2).
Note: The figure presents data based on the following 30 OECD Member countries assessed in 2025: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States. Data not provided for Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico (judges), New Zealand, Poland and the United Kingdom. Data for OECD partner countries are calculated based on the following 15 countries assessed in 2025: Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, Peru, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine.
How to read: Italy fulfils the criterion “Regulations establish that the appointment of judges is decided by an independent body” (outer ring) and the criterion “Regulations establish that the promotion of judges is decided by an independent body” (inner ring).
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
Taken together, such gaps could undermine the independence and impartiality of the justice system. Regulatory safeguards ensure that there are checks and balances, so that no branch of government or institution can exercise disproportionate influence over any other. For example, when decisions concerning judicial career progression are reached without the involvement of independent bodies, judges may be exposed to political pressure, leading to distorted judicial actions. Both judges and prosecutors hold considerable powers, which should be exercised lawfully and accountably. Therefore, merit-based decisions regarding their recruitment and promotion can avert potential risks of political patronage. Although actors may still attempt to unfairly influence the system, objective decision-making processes make it more difficult to appoint people to positions when they do not qualify for them (OECD, 2020[14]).
Recourse mechanisms are another measure to ensure that the best qualified candidates are selected for judicial and prosecutorial positions, and that the relevant decisions are transparent and accountable. Without a possibility to challenge those decisions, corruption or favouritism can operate unchecked. Currently, judicial candidates have a right to appeal decisions on appointment and promotion in 37% of OECD Member and 60% of partner countries. When it comes to prosecutors, candidates can appeal selection and promotion procedures in 40% of OECD Member countries and 53% of OECD partner countries (Figure 8.3).
Note: The figure presents data based on the following 31 OECD Member countries assessed in 2025: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia (judges), Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico (prosecutors), the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States (judges). Data not provided for Colombia (prosecutors), Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico (judges), New Zealand, Poland and the United Kingdom and the United States (prosecutors). Data for OECD partner countries are calculated based on the following 15 countries assessed in 2025: Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, Peru, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine.
How to read: 43% of OECD Members and 46% of OECD partner countries fulfil the criterion “Regulations establish the right of candidates to appeal decisions on the selection, appointment and promotion of prosecutors”.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
Tailored standards of conduct and ethical behavior for judges and prosecutors can help officials navigate the ethical challenges specific to their positions. The majority of OECD Members and OECD partner countries have established and publicly available standards. However, measures to facilitate implementation of the standards, including guidance and consultation mechanisms, are underutilised (Table 8.2). On average, 47% of OECD Member countries have established integrity advisory bodies for judges and 53% have established such bodies for prosecutors. In OECD partner countries, 53% have integrity advisory bodies in place for judges and 47% of OECD partner countries have established these bodies for prosecutors.
Note: The table presents data based on the following 31 OECD Members assessed in 2025: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia (judges), Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico (prosecutors), the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States. Data not provided for regulation and practice criteria for Colombia (prosecutors), Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico (judges), New Zealand, Poland and the United Kingdom. Data for OECD partner countries are calculated based on the following 15 countries assessed in 2025: Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, Peru, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine.
How to read: In Canada, standards of conduct are published and applicable to all judges, and an ethics advisory body is operational within the judiciary. Canada has also published standards of conduct that are applicable to all prosecutors and an ethics advisory body that is operational within the public prosecution service.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
The majority of OECD Member (77%) and partner (73%) countries have conflict-of-interest policies in place for judges, whereas for prosecutors these averages are 87% and 80% respectively. However, only 5 countries (Latvia, Slovak Republic, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine) were able to demonstrate that responsible authorities with a mandate to oversee implementation of conflict-of-interest policies for judges have issued recommendations for resolution within 12 months for all cases of conflict of interest detected. The lack of data in this area suggests that countries do not monitor the timeliness of the resolution of conflicts of interest, which can undermine effective management.
Interest disclosure requirements, one of the tools that countries can use to manage conflict-of-interest situations, are in place for senior judges in 53% of OECD Members and 100% of OECD partner countries, and in many countries (60% of OECD Members and 100% of OECD partner countries) requirements for disclosing extend to all national judges. Members of the highest prosecutorial authorities are also required to disclose their interest in 60% of OECD Members and 93% of OECD partner countries. However, compliance with disclosure requirements remains lacking (Figure 8.4). For OECD Members, the submission rate of judicial and prosecutorial interest declarations is lower compared to other categories of public officials suggesting that compliance is more rigorously monitored with regards to members of government, parliamentarians and top-tier civil servants as opposed to judges and prosecutors. In addition, there is a need to strengthen verification of submitted interest declarations. Only 13% of OECD Members and an equal share of partner countries verify a substantial number of declarations submitted from judges (at least 60% of declarations). The situation is similar for prosecutors, with 13% of OECD Members and an equal share of partner countries verifying at least 60% of submitted declarations. One explanation for this trend is that judges and prosecutors are less often subject to external oversight due to independence considerations. For example, in countries like Chile, the Czech Republic, Portugal and Türkiye interest declarations of judges are submitted to judicial self-governance bodies or courts, which may not necessarily have the required financial expertise to conduct verifications.
Note: The figure presents data based on the following 31 OECD Members assessed in 2025: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia (judges), Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France (except for 11.4.6, 11.4.7 and 11.5.4), Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico (prosecutors), the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States (except for the criterion 11.4.7 on the submission rate of interest declarations from national judges). Data not provided for regulation and practice criteria for Colombia (prosecutors), Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico (judges), New Zealand, Poland and the United Kingdom and the United States (prosecutors). Data for OECD partner countries are calculated based on the following 14 countries assessed in 2025: Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, Peru, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine Data for Croatia was not provided.
How to read: In 33% of OECD Members and 47% of OECD partner countries more than 80% senior judges have submitted interest declarations in line with legal requirements.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
Mechanisms for reporting judicial and prosecutorial misconduct is not a novel concept, as complaints are a common trigger of disciplinary investigations across countries. However, persons reporting this type of misconduct under general disciplinary complaints procedures do not necessarily enjoy legal safeguards ensuring confidentiality or protection from retaliation. To strengthen protection, countries are implementing whistleblower protection frameworks in the judiciary and the prosecution services. In many countries (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Costa Rica, Germany and Peru), protection measures are provided in general whistleblower protection laws and regulations applying to the whole public sector, whereas countries like the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden and Slovenia have further tailored implementation through dedicated guidance and policies for the judiciary and prosecutors. Internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in the judiciary are currently established in regulations in 57% of OECD Members and in 60% of OECD partner countries. While in practice, most OECD Members that regulate internal reporting channels are operationalising them, there is an implementation gap of 13 percentage points for OECD partner countries. Regarding the establishment of internal whistleblowing channels in public prosecutors’ offices (Figure 8.5), the implementation gap for OECD Members is 12 percentage points, and 13 percentage points for OECD partner countries. In turn, protection against retaliation for whistleblowers reporting judicial misconduct is provided in the law in 57% of OECD Members, and in 47% of OECD partner countries.
Clear and comprehensive whistleblower protection frameworks complemented by effective communication can inform judges and prosecutors, but also users of the justice system, about reporting procedures, their rights and the resources available to them (OECD, 2020[14]). However, few countries implement measures to strengthen awareness regarding the protection of whistleblowers reporting judicial and prosecutorial misconduct. On average, only 39% of OECD Members and 27% of OECD partner countries maintain government portals providing information on reporting procedures and whistleblowers’ rights.
The effectiveness of reporting mechanisms also depends on the capacity of staff handling reports, which requires technical skills to ensure confidentiality. Proper confidentiality measures protect the whistleblower’s identity, reduce the risk of retaliation and promote a culture of openness encouraging others to come forward. Nurturing this culture of openness is even more important in hierarchical organisational structures such as the judiciary and the prosecution service. Yet opportunities for mandatory training on confidentiality for staff handling reports in courts and public prosecutors’ offices is limited in OECD countries and close to non-existent across partners countries (Figure 8.6).
Note: The figure presents data based on the following 31 OECD Members assessed in 2025: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia (judges), Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico (prosecutors), the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and United States (prosecutors). Data not provided for regulation and practice criteria for Colombia (prosecutors), Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico (judges), New Zealand, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States (judges). Data for OECD partner countries are calculated based on the following 15 countries assessed in 2025: Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, Peru, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine.
How to read: 57% of OECD Members have regulations establishing internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in the judiciary and in 52% of OECD Member countries these internal reporting channels exist in practice.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
Note: The figure presents data based on the following 31 OECD Members assessed in 2025: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia (judges), Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark (judges), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico (prosecutors), the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States (judges). Data not provided for regulation and practice criteria for Colombia (prosecutors), Denmark (prosecutors), Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico (judges), New Zealand, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Data for OECD partner countries are calculated based on the following 15 countries assessed in 2025: Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, Peru, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine.
How to read: 26% of OECD Members and 7% of partner countries fulfil the criterion “Staff handling reports in public prosecutors’ offices undergo mandatory training on confidentiality”.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).