This chapter analyses structural and institutional factors that influence labour mobility and contribute to geographic differences in labour market outcomes in Austria. The analysis focuses on four policy areas: i) family-related social policies, particularly childcare provision and child-related social benefit entitlements, ii) regional differences in the housing market, iii) the integration of asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants, including their initial dispersal, mobility restrictions and access to integration courses, and iv) the potential to scope the interplay between seasonal work permits and cross-regional placement efforts. For each area, the chapter reviews the current situation in Austria and draws lessons from international good practices in OECD countries.
Addressing Regional Labour Market Imbalances in Austria
Abstract
Reducing geographic labour market imbalances in the long-term will require tackling the structural factors that limit labour mobility towards high-demand regions
Vienna provides the most generous childcare among Austrian states, presenting a mobility barrier to families and women. While 89.2% of three- to five-year-old children enrolled in childcare attend full-time employment-compatible childcare facilities in Vienna, only 52.8% do so in the remaining federal states. Since the lack of such facilities likely represents a mobility barrier to families and, in particular, to women, opening hours of childcare centres outside of Vienna could be extended to accommodate parental full-time work.
Child allowances in the social benefit system (Sozialhilfe/Mindestsicherung) are substantially higher in Vienna than in other federal states, potentially incentivising non-employment-related relocation towards the capital and limiting out-migration. For example, in 2025 families with four children receiving social assistance were entitled 2 996 EUR and 2 297 EUR in Vienna and Upper Austria, respectively. The benefit amounts received, including partial benefit reception, also reflect these regional differences as families with four or more children received an average of EUR 1 797 in Vienna compared with EUR 1 041 in Upper Austria in 2023. Harmonising child-related social assistance benefits across Austria’s federal states would help ensure that moving between regions does not affect entitlements or influence location decisions.
The relatively higher share of affordable social housing in Vienna likely reduces its residents’ willingness to relocate to other regions. In Vienna, more than twice as many residents live in social housing (42%) than in other federal state on average, thereby offering affordable accommodation to a large share of its population and dampening rents in the private market. To foster labour mobility, social housing could be increased outside Vienna, for example through a more widespread use of social housing provisions in development agreements. Social housing can also create lock-in effects, as tenants are less likely to move if relocation would entail significantly higher housing costs elsewhere. In the short-term, while social housing supply is increased, such lock-in effects in social housing could be reduced by waiving queuing requirements for tenants who relocate to another federal state for employment and by granting those who move for work a temporary right to return to social housing in their home region.
Shortcomings in the labour market integration of asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants contribute to geographic labour market imbalances. Humanitarian migrants, defined as individuals who have been granted residence on humanitarian grounds, including refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary or temporary protection, face structural employment barriers. The initial dispersal system for asylum seekers does not take local labour market demand into account, and once protection is granted, free geographic mobility has led to a concentration of around 78% of humanitarian migrants in Vienna. Limited early access to integration courses further hampers labour market outcomes. As a result, humanitarian migrants accounted for 25% of all people registered with the Public Employment Service (Arbeitsmarktservice – AMS) in Vienna, and for 70% of all jobseekers considered for cross-regional placement in 2025. The labour market integration of humanitarian migrants could be strengthened by considering local labour demand in the initial dispersal of asylum seekers, by limiting subsequent non-employment-related moves to areas with already high concentrations of humanitarian migrants, and by providing integration courses during the asylum procedure to applicants with a high probability of receiving protection.
Austria could assess the scope for improved co-ordination between relocation efforts from Vienna and seasonal work permit policies for non-EU nationals1. In 2026, the national quota for seasonal work permits in tourism will rise to around 8 000, representing a sixfold increase from the 1 300 permits issued in 2020. The 8 000 permits correspond to about 57% of the monthly average number of tourism vacancies registered with the AMS in 2025 and roughly 2.2% of total employment in the sector. The large number of seasonal work permits for non-EU nationals could ease the incentive for employers to improve working conditions, potentially making jobs in tourism and agriculture unattractive for domestic jobseekers. To support the AMS’s cross-regional placement of jobseekers, Austria could aim to better analyse the effect of seasonal workers on wages and working conditions in the tourism sector and, if relevant, co‑ordinate between relocation efforts from Vienna and seasonal work permit policies for non-EU nationals.
1. Throughout the report, the term non-EU nationals refers to individuals who are nationals of countries outside both the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). References to the EU in this report are used in an extended sense and also cover the EFTA countries, i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
Structural factors can shape geographic differences in labour market outcomes by influencing individuals’ incentives to move to certain locations over others. Consistent with previous OECD work, this report adopts a broad definition of structural factors, referring to the structural and institutional policy framework that affects the static and dynamic allocation of resources within the economy (Tompson and Dang, 2010[1]). Policies influencing these factors typically fall outside the remit of the Austrian Public Employment Service. While labour mobility is not the primary goal of structural policies, and often not even an explicit policy objective, they can have unintended effects that indirectly influence mobility. This is particularly relevant when structural factors, such as housing or welfare policies, differ across regions and create incentives to reside in one federal state rather than another, even when economic conditions and labour market opportunities would favour relocation and contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources.
This chapter focuses on four structural factors that, due to their regional variation, may influence the allocation of workers across Austria: housing policies, asylum and migration policies, and family-friendly social policies, such as childcare availability and welfare policies. It examines how these factors can shape the residential choices of workers and jobseekers and, in turn, may contribute to geographic labour market disparities. The chapter then draws on academic research and good-practice examples from across the OECD to provide recommendations for reducing policy-induced incentives that could lead to an inefficient allocation of labour.
More generous social policies for families may reduce out-mobility and attract beneficiaries. In theory, higher social benefit entitlements raise the reservation wage of jobseekers (i.e. the wage for which they accept a job offer), making employment-related relocations less likely (Schapiro et al., 2022[2]). Evidence on this link exists for certain types of social benefits: for example, in Finland, earnings-based unemployment benefits reduce the geographic mobility of laid-off workers (Maczulskij and Böckerman, 2023[3]). Additionally, tenants in social housing show lower mobility than those renting in the private market (see section below). Although there is no systematic evidence that other forms of social policies, such as the provision of childcare and basic income support for the (long-term) unemployed, attract individuals or reduce out-mobility from regions with higher entitlements by raising their reservation wage, evidence exists for parts of the population. For example, humanitarian migrants who moved to Vienna from other federal states are almost twice as likely (52%) to mention higher social benefits as reason for their relocation, than those moving to other federal states (27%) (ICMPD, 2025[4]).1 Additionally, unemployed women from Vienna are substantially less likely to relocate for work than men, partially due to childcare responsibilities (see chapter Regional labour market imbalances and labour mobility in Austria). Indeed, better childcare availability and quality in Vienna than elsewhere in Austria were mentioned during focus group interviews as a major factor affecting her the decision to relocate.
More widely available free childcare in Vienna leads to higher attendance rates among children than in other Austrian states. Austria has successfully expanded childcare over the past decade (OECD, 2024[5]). Although the national government financially supports federal states in its childcare offer, the design of the latter falls into the states’ remit, leading to large geographical differences in generosity. Vienna offers Austria’s most generous childcare system by providing free full-day childcare for children under six, while most other federal states only provide free half-day childcare for certain age groups. For example, half-day childcare for children aged four to six, and three to six is free in Tyrol and Salzburg, respectively (Bundeskanzleramt, 2025[6]). Consequently, while the childcare attendance among children aged three to five is relatively similar across federal states (94.3% on average), attendance among those aged zero to two is substantially higher in Vienna (46.4%) compared to the remaining federal states (33.3%), in particular Upper Austria (24.9%), Salzburg (30.6%) and Tyrol (32.8%).
Additionally, the early childcare system in Vienna allows for a better compatibility of work and childcare than in other Austrian states. Austria considers childcare facilities that open for at least 45 hours per week, operating for 9.5 hours on four weekdays, as full-time employment-compatible (VIF). Even larger regional differences than in the general enrolment rate emerge among children enrolled in VIF childcare across federal states, with 89.2% of three-to-five-years-olds in childcare attending VIF centres in Vienna (88.8% for ages zero to two) compared to only 52.8% across the other Austrian federal states on average (52.1 for ages zero to two). Although, more than 90% of childcare facilities operate for more than six hours per day (considered full-day) in all federal states (Statistik Austria, 2025[7]), many of them likely fall short of the VIF criterion outside of Vienna. These differences are due to differences in funding and political priorities across Austrian states.
Similarly, the Austrian social benefit system (Sozialhilfe or Mindestsicherung) lies within the states’ competence, leading to large geographic differences in generosity. Austrian states have relatively large autonomy in determining their means-tested social benefit entitlements. In 2019, the Austrian federal government switched from defining minimum benefit entitlements (under Mindestsicherung), which regions could increase at their discretion, to setting maximum entitlements (under Sozialhilfe), which cannot be surpassed by regional governments. These maximum entitlements amount to 1 209 EUR for single households and 1 693 EUR for couple households without children as of 2025. However, the new law has not yet been implemented in Tyrol, where benefit entitlements remain above the maximum amounts (1 814 EUR instead of 1 693 EUR for a couple household without children), and only partially so in Vienna (BMASGPK, 2025[8]).
Although the basic allowances are similar across Austrian states, special allowances, for example for children and housing, lead to large regional differences in benefit entitlements. Austrian states have full discretion in setting entitlements up to a maximum amount per under-age child in households. As a result, in some states child-related entitlements decrease in the number of children, for example from 302 EUR for a family with one child to 145 EUR per child for a family with five children in Lower Austria, while Vienna, Salzburg, Carinthia, and Burgenland pay a constant amount of for each additional child. This constant amount is highest in Vienna with 325 EUR per child. Additionally, states can increase the maximum entitlement by 30% due to high housing costs (Wohnkostenpauschale), which has traditionally been used in Vienna, Vorarlberg, Tyrol and Salzburg (BMASGPK, 2025[48]). This discretion in setting the entitlement (along with cross-regional differences in the composition of recipients) leads to a 37% higher average monthly benefit amount per household in Vorarlberg (921 Euros) than in Burgenland (671 Euros) in 2023 (Figure 4.1).
Share of social benefit recipients (as % of total population) and the average amount received by households by TL2 region, 2023.
Note: The data refer to Sozialhilfe in all federal states except for Tyrol (Mindestsicherung) and Vienna (combination of Mindestsicherung and Sozialhilfe). The average amount received includes social assistance for living expenses and housing (Lebensunterhalt und Wohnen).
Source: Statistik Austria (2024[9])
Although social benefit recipients concentrate in Vienna, the average social benefit amount received is not higher than in other federal states, partially due to the composition of recipients. Approximately 70% of all social benefit recipients reside in Vienna, compared to around 20% of Austria’s population. Yet, recipients in Vienna receive a similar monthly amount (805 EUR) on average than in other states (777 EUR) (Figure 4.1), despite significantly higher benefit entitlements for certain subgroups, for example for families with children. Two characteristics of jobseekers likely lower the average benefit amount in Vienna: first, single households, for which entitlements are relatively similar across states, account for a high share of recipients in Vienna (70%) compared to other states (63%). Second, the share of recipients who receive only partial benefit payments, due to other sources of income (e.g. labour income or unemployment benefits) is also higher in Vienna (75%) than in other states (66%) (BMASGPK, 2023[10]). However, differences in the generosity of social benefits can be particularly large for subgroups of the population, for example for families with children.
Social benefits in Vienna are particularly generous for families with many children. One aspect in which benefit entitlements differ across states is the child allowance, which increases by a constant amount in some states, including Vienna, while it decreases in the number of children in many other states. Federal states with constant increases in child allowances, namely Vienna (326 EUR per child), Salzburg (302 EUR), and Burgenland (278 EUR) tend to also offer the most generous social benefit entitlements overall. For example, Vienna offers the most generous social benefit entitlements for a family with four children (disregarding housing allowances), which receives a basic allowance for couples (1 692 EUR) and child-related supplements (1 304 EUR), amounting to a maximum of 2 996 EUR per month in total compared to 2 297 EUR in in Upper Austria. Salzburg (2 900 EUR) and Burgenland (2 804 EUR) follow Vienna in offering the most generous social benefit entitlements for households with these characteristics. The amounts received by beneficiaries, including partial benefit reception, reflect these regional differences in entitlements, as families with four or more children received on average 1 797 EUR in Vienna but only 1 041 EUR in Upper Austria in 2023 (Figure 4.2). An exception is Tyrol, where households with four children receive the highest average amounts among all federal states, despite rather low maximum entitlements across states (2 414 EUR per month excluding housing allowances). This difference is potentially due to particularly generous housing allowances in Tyrol.
Average amount received in social assistance per household by number of children and TL2 region, 2023.
Note: data on the average amount received by the number of children are available for Vorarlberg.
Source: Statistik Austria (2024[9])
Various features of the housing market shape internal labour mobility. Evidence shows that home owners are less likely to relocate to another region in the country than tenants, since homeownership increases the cost of moving (Ferreira, Gyourko and Tracy, 2010[11]). Similarly, tenants in social housing are less likely to relocate to another region than tenants in the private market, likely because they would give up their cheaper rental contract when moving (Causa and Pichelmann, 2020[12]). These dynamics likely play an important role for internal mobility in Austria, as housing market conditions between Vienna and urban areas in the West of the country differ significantly.
In most OECD countries housing is (becoming) substantially more expensive in metropolitan areas than in the rest of the country, yet Vienna remains relatively affordable. House prices are 27% higher in large FUAs (i.e. with a population of more than 1.5 million) than in the country on average across the OECD. Since large metropolitan areas usually concentrate much of a country’s economic activity, they attract workers and raise the demand for housing, and eventually prices. However, in Vienna, houses are only 9% more expensive compared to the country average (OECD, 2024[13]).
Average Monthly housing costs, including running costs, and the share of the population in different housing arrangements by Austrian TL2 regions, 2024.
Note: Data on costs for homeowners not available. The dark blue bars (left axis) show the monthly average cost per apartment (i.e. rent including running costs), disregarding differences in the size of the apartment. No data are available for housing costs for homeowners (i.e. mortgages). The light blue bars (right axis) show the share of the population that rents (either social housing or in the private market) or and owns their apartment. The federal state of Burgenland is omitted due to the lack of data on one form of social housing, specifically those provided by the municipality (Gemeindewohungen).
Source: Statistik Austria (2025[14])
Vienna’s large provision of affordable social housing may reduce its residents’ willingness to relocate to other regions. The share of residents in social housing is more than twice as high in Vienna (41.7%) as in any other Austrian state, except for Styria (22.3%) (Figure 4.3). Social housing in Vienna costs on average 550 EUR per flat per month and is 32% cheaper than rent in the private market (807 EUR per month). This high share of affordable social housing dampens overall rent prices in the capital (OECD, 2024[15]). Consequently, rent in the private market in Vienna is approximately comparable to other regions with large (i.e. exceeding 100 000 inhabitants), but substantially smaller cities. Specifically, private market rent is higher in Salzburg (874 EUR), and Tyrol (864 EUR) and lower in Styria (655 EUR) and Upper Austria (694 EUR) than in Vienna (807 EUR). These regional patterns in the rental market stay qualitatively similar both for contracts signed recently and for those signed in earlier decades (Figure 4.4). As research shows that lower rent and social housing reduces internal mobility (Causa and Pichelmann, 2020[12]), the affordable housing market in Vienna may contribute to low out-mobility from Vienna. Focus group participants also highlighted the role of the housing market in relocation decisions, noting the relative affordability of housing in Vienna and the difficulty of securing accommodation elsewhere as key factors limiting mobility. Consequently, they consider support in finding accommodation, either through the AMS or employers, helpful.
Although public financial support for the construction of residential buildings has decreased throughout Austria, Vienna’s legislation continues to promote social housing. Financial support for the construction of residential buildings has decreased in all Austrian federal states over the last three decades. This drop in financial support amounts to 49% in real terms between the periods 1996-1998 and 2020-2022 both at the national level and in Vienna (GBV, 2024[16]). Nevertheless, Austria’s spatial planning conference (Raumordnungskonferenz) renewed its commitment to providing its residents with affordable housing in 2021 (ÖROK, 2021[17]). In Vienna, the provision of social housing focuses not only on low-income and vulnerable groups, but also on middle-income households. In contrast to all other federal states, Vienna requires large, new residential real estate projects to include two-thirds of their housing units as social housing since 2019. Under this legislation Vienna approved construction projects containing 490 000 square metres of social housing, equivalent to 4 900 apartments until 2022 (Austrian Court of Audit, 2023[18]). Other OECD countries, such as Australia, Germany, Italy, the United States, also employ this practice known as “inclusionary zoning” (OECD, 2022[19]).
Employers and the Public Employment Service (Arbeitsmarktservice – AMS) emphasise that high housing costs in parts of Austria’s Western federal states make relocations financially unattractive for jobseekers from Vienna. Several employers from Tyrol and Salzburg, as well as AMS staff voiced their concern that high housing costs are an obstacle to cross-regional job take-up, especially for jobseekers from Vienna. This particularly applies to jobseekers with lower qualifications and apprenticeship seekers, as the higher housing costs are not compensated through higher wages when moving, as well as to those moving to high rent areas, such as Innsbruck and Salzburg. In contrast, high rents are less relevant for jobs in the tourism industry, as these employers provide accommodation. In response, many employers outside the tourism industry seek to assist future employees in the search for accommodation, through the provision of employment. According to AMS staff, providing accommodation for employees is becoming more common even outside the tourism industry.
Average rent of main apartment including running costs by contract duration and Austrian TL2 regions, 2023.
Notes: The figure shows the average rent (including running costs) of all currently valid rental contracts by duration of the contract. For example, tenants in Vienna who signed their rental contract less than two years ago paid on average 839 EUR in rent in 2023.
Source: Statistik Austria (2025[14])
Asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants are highly concentrated in Vienna, where they account for around one quarter of all jobseekers. Approximately seven in ten humanitarian migrants registered with the Public Employment Service (i.e. they are either unemployed or in training) reside in Vienna, which hosts the country’s largest diasporas from major refugee origin countries, including Syria, Afghanistan, and Turkey (Statistik Austria, 2025[20]; BMASGPK, 2023[10]). Across the OECD, humanitarian migrants are less likely to be employed than the native-born population and other migrant groups (OECD, 2024[21]). Their labour market prospects are particularly weak in Vienna, where only around 60% of refugees who arrived in 2015 and are aged over 18 were employed in 2023, compared with 80% in Western Austria (ÖIF, 2025[22]). This geographic concentration of humanitarian migrants, combined with lower employment outcomes, contributes to Vienna’s comparatively high unemployment rate (see chapter Regional labour market imbalances and labour mobility in Austria).
Network effects from Vienna’s large diaspora communities likely attract humanitarian migrants to the capital and reduce their out-mobility. Social ties are an important determinant of immigrants’ location choices between and within countries, as they help newcomers navigate administrative procedures, access job opportunities and build a social environment (Beine, Docquier and Özden, 2011[23]; Munshi, 2003[24]; OECD, 2021[25]). Since humanitarian refugees can relocate freely regardless of their employment status, these pull factors help explain their high concentration among jobseekers in Vienna and likely reduce their willingness to take up employment in Western Austria, despite arguably weaker labour market prospects in the capital.
Asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants therefore constitute an essential target group to reduce geographic labour market mismatch in Austria. To connect jobseekers in Vienna with existing job opportunities in the West, jobseekers need to be prepared for the domestic labour market. In the case of asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants, this requires specific integration measures (e.g. language courses). Additionally, well-designed dispersal systems can lead to a more balanced allocation of asylum seekers across the country, thereby reducing geographic labour market imbalances and benefitting the integration of asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants.
This section reviews academic evidence and OECD good practices on how to promote the labour market integration of asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants without exacerbating geographic labour market disparities. It first examines the design of dispersal policies for newly arrived asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants, exploring how such systems can take labour market opportunities into account while limiting mobility unrelated to employment. It then discusses how early access to integration courses can support the labour market participation of humanitarian migrants at their initial place of residence.
Designing asylum seeker dispersal systems that support balanced settlement and stronger labour market outcomes of humanitarian migrants
Some OECD countries consider employment opportunities when allocating asylum seekers across the country, a policy that can support labour market integration. OECD countries have different approaches to allocating asylum seekers across the country. To spread the required resources across the country and avoid segregation, most countries, especially those with a substantial inflow of asylum seekers, employ dispersal policies. Countries differ in which regional characteristics these dispersal policies consider. Common characteristics include population size, GDP and housing availability (OECD, 2016[26]; Galera et al., 2018[27]). However, dispersal policies that assign asylum seekers irrespective of local labour market conditions can worsen their later employment outcomes (OECD, 2021[25]). While humanitarian migrants who were dispersed show a 4.5 percentage point larger employment gap with other immigrants than non-dispersed ones in an analysis of 20 EU countries (Fasani, Frattini and Minale, 2022[28]), accounting for labour market conditions when assigning asylum seekers can substantially improve their employment, thereby allowing countries to both avoid segregation and foster the labour market integration of asylum seekers prospects (Bansak et al., 2018[29]; Ahani et al., 2021[30]). As of 2015, dispersal policies in only a handful of countries considered the asylum seekers’ or humanitarian migrants’ employment prospects, including Estonia, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Portugal and Sweden (OECD, 2016[26]). Box 4.1 discusses the Swedish example.
Once protection is granted, allowing humanitarian migrants to relocate only for employment-related reasons can help prevent their concentration in areas with limited job opportunities. While Austria does not currently restrict the movement of humanitarian migrants after protection is granted, a number of OECD countries have introduced policies to promote a more balanced geographic distribution. As of 2020, thirteen OECD countries apply out-migration restrictions from their initially assigned location not only to asylum seekers but also to humanitarian migrants who hold protection status (OECD, 2021[25]).2 Such policies are typically enforced by linking a migrant’s place of residence to their eligibility for social benefits, while explicitly allowing relocations for employment purposes, recognising that secondary migration for employment has been shown to improve labour market outcomes (OECD, 2016[26]). An example from Germany is discussed in Box 4.1. An evaluation of the German model further concluded that restricting migration only to specific urban centres experiencing high congestion pressures could reduce the administrative burden associated with the residence obligation while achieving the same policy objective.
Some OECD countries steer settlement of asylum seekers and recognised refugees through dispersal policies. These policies include quota-based dispersal systems and residence obligations.
Sweden disperses humanitarian migrants after protection is granted and considers future employment prospects
In Sweden, the Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) takes future employment prospects into account when allocating recognised refugees to municipalities under the 2016 Settlement Act. Asylum seekers are initially assigned to reception facilities based on capacity, with certain exceptions, for example, individuals with disabilities whose needs can only be met in specific locations. Once protection is granted, the national government determines county-level quotas (länstal), based primarily on labour market indicators such as total local employment by occupation, unemployment and labour turnover (80%), and on the number of asylum seekers already in municipal reception systems (20%). The County Administrative Boards (Länsstyrelsen) then set municipal quotas (kommuntal), considering local labour market conditions, population size and the number of asylum seekers already residing in the municipality. Refugees are allocated on a case-by-case basis, also taking into account individual employment prospects and job offers. Although recognised refugees are not obliged to accept their assigned municipality, those who decline must forgo housing support and allowances.
An evaluation of the 2016 Settlement Act by the Swedish National Audit Office (Riksrevisionen) found that the reform led to a more even geographic distribution of recognised refugees and improved their employment outcomes. Refugees allocated to municipalities with lower unemployment rates showed stronger labour market integration after three years, reflected in higher employment and earnings.
Germany restricts inter-state mobility to specific motives including employment take-up
Germany allocates asylum seekers to its federal states (Bundesländer) through a quota-based system and restricts their mobility after protection is granted to specific reasons, including employment-related relocation. Under the dispersal system (Königsteiner Schlüssel), asylum seekers are distributed across federal states according to a formula based on two-thirds tax revenue and one-third population size. The federal states then allocate asylum seekers to municipalities, primarily based on population and capacity. Once asylum is granted, a residence obligation (Wohnsitzregelung) requires humanitarian migrants to maintain their residence in the initially assigned federal state for up to three years, while also allowing states to designate or restrict residence in specific locations. Exemptions from this requirement include cases where an individual has secured employment subject to social security contributions in another federal state.
An evaluation of the residence obligations commissioned by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees found mixed effects on employment. The residence obligation appears to foster labour market integration within the first year but may reduce employment among humanitarian migrants three years after recognition. Qualitative evidence suggests this may occur when refugees remain in areas with weaker labour market conditions or limited integration support.
Source: Baba et al. (2024[31]), Evaluation der Wohnsitzregelung nach § 12a, Migrationsverket (n.d.[32]), Boende för asylsökande, Migrationsverket (2025[33]), Förslag på länstal 2026, Regleringsbrevsuppdrag 8, Anvisning av nyanlända till kommuner, Riksrevisionen (2021[34]), Act on the Reception of Certain Newly Arrived Immigrants for Settlement (Settlement Act) – has the reform met the intentions?
No consideration of local labour demand in Austria’s initial dispersal of asylum seekers, combined with the unrestricted mobility of humanitarian migrants after protection is granted, helps explain the high concentration among jobseekers in Vienna. Austria allocates asylum seekers to federal states using a quota-based system determined by population size, with Vienna’s share set at roughly 20%. Although Vienna received a smaller share of around 15% (3 186 asylum seekers) in 2023 in practice (BMI, 2023[35]), the dispersal system’s quotas do not align with labour demand across federal states (Figure 4.5). Once protection is granted, humanitarian migrants are free to move anywhere in the country, and many subsequently relocate to Vienna (ECRE, 2024[36]). Among asylum seekers who arrived in 2015 and where assigned to the western or central parts of Austria, 29% relocated to Vienna and 12% to the remaining Eastern federal states, namely Lower Austria and Burgenland, by 2023 (ÖIF, 2025[22]). Consequently, the share of individuals with asylum status receiving social benefits (Sozialhilfe or Mindestsicherung) and residing in Vienna reached 73% in 2023, far exceeding the planned 20% for asylum seekers (Figure 4.6). This concentration is even higher among refugees with subsidiary protection, who do not face any mobility restriction either, and of which 81% (8 732) resided in Vienna in 2023 (BMI, 2023[35]). Humanitarian migrants who arrived in Austria between 2014 and 2018 most commonly cited employment opportunities (67%), higher social benefits (52%) and a better cultural offer (49%) as reasons for relocating to Vienna from other federal states. By contrast, humanitarian migrants who moved to other federal states (i.e. not to Vienna) were substantially less likely to cite higher social benefits as a reason for their relocation, with only 27% doing so (ICMPD, 2025[4]).
The theoretical quota set in the dispersal system for asylum seekers (vertical axis) and labour market tightness (i.e. vacancies / unemployed people) across federal states, 2023.
Note: The theoretical quota often differs from the share of asylum seekers each federal state receives in practice.
Source: Asylkoordination Österreich (2024[37]); AMS (2025[38])
Aligning the geographic distribution of humanitarian migrants with the planned dispersal quotas might reduce unemployment in Vienna by an estimated 1.2 percentage points, equivalent to around 65 times the number of cross-regional job placements achieved in recent years. If only 20% of all unemployed humanitarian migrants resided in Vienna, corresponding to the city’s share under the initial dispersal quota for asylum seekers, there would be approximately 13 500 fewer humanitarian migrants among jobseekers and Vienna’s unemployment rate would accordingly fall from 12.9% to 11.7% in 2025. By comparison, AMS cross-regional placement efforts led to a peak of 198 jobseekers finding employment outside Vienna in 2024 (AMS, 2025[39]).3 This suggests that achieving a geographic distribution of asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants in line with the dispersal quotas would have an effect equivalent to 65 times the current level of cross-regional placements.
Share of all asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants in Austria residing in Vienna, 2023.
Note: the share of all asylum seekers residing in Vienna corresponds to the share that Vienna received in practice, rather than the higher official quota (roughly 20%) defined in the current dispersal system. Humanitarian migrants include immigrants with refugee status and those receiving subsidiary protection.
Source: BMI (2023[35])
Integration courses and labour market access
Although Austria grants asylum seekers relatively quick access to the labour market in principle, administrative and legal hurdles for employers, as well as insufficient language skills, continue to limit their employment opportunities. Since 2021, employers across all sectors have been able to request a work permit (Beschäftigungsbewilligung) for asylum seekers three months after their initial asylum application, including for apprenticeships. The AMS reviews such applications within six weeks and grants a permit if the vacancy cannot be filled by native jobseekers or those from EU countries. In 2023, the AMS approved 3 240 permits out of 5 243 requests (61.7%). Taking this procedure into account, asylum seekers in Austria could effectively start working approximately five months after their asylum application, provided they receive a work permit (Europäisches Migrationsnetzwerk, 2023[40]). Between 2019 and 2023, around 7 300 work permits were issued compared to 239 095 asylum requests over the same period, equivalent to about 3%. Most permits in 2023 were issued in the tourism (57.8%), wholesale and retail trade (7.9%), and manufacturing (5.6%) sectors (Europäisches Migrationsnetzwerk, 2024[41]). The relatively low number of permits reflects barriers faced by employers, including legal and planning uncertainties, administrative burdens linked to the permit process, and the limited employability of asylum seekers due to language constraints and other skill gaps (Europäisches Migrationsnetzwerk, 2023[40]).
Early access to integration courses can improve the labour market integration of asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants. Evidence shows that asylum seekers with access to integration measures, including language courses, integrate better in the host country’s society and the labour market (Foged, Hasager and Peri, 2024[42]). Additionally, in the Austrian context, language skills have a large impact on employment prospects (see chapter Regional labour market imbalances and labour mobility in Austria). Given that the asylum decision process can be lengthy, it is important to ensure that asylum seekers, particularly those with a high likelihood of receiving protection, can access such measures shortly after submitting their asylum application. Longer asylum procedures are associated with worse long-term labour market outcomes, as they delay participation in language and employment programmes (Aslund, Engdahl and Rosenqvist, 2022[43]). In Austria, asylum seekers received a first-instance decision after 5.5 months on average in 2023, compared to 6.8 in Germany (Europäisches Migrationsnetzwerk, 2023[40]; BAMF, 2024[44]).
The Austrian Integration Fund (Österreichische Integrationsfonds - ÖIF) and the AMS co-operate in the provision of language courses for humanitarian migrants and other immigrants, but information exchange between the two institutions could be more efficient. Under the 2017 Integration Act (Integrationsgesetz) and its 2019 amendments, the ÖIF is responsible for implementing and co-ordinating mandatory integration and language courses nationwide and for certifying asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants once they complete the required courses.4 These courses cover levels from A1 up to B1 as part of the legally mandated integration pathway. Additional courses up to level C1 are offered but not mandatory. Apart from language courses, the ÖIF is also responsible for courses on civic orientation, values and everyday guidance. The ÖIF is required to share information on acquired language skills and the completion of integration courses with the AMS and the federal institutions responsible for welfare benefits. However, in the past, this data exchange between the Austrian Integration Fund and the AMS has not been fully efficient. To facilitate the efficient labour market integration of all migrants, timely transmission of certified German language proficiency is essential, as it is a prerequisite for participation in AMS activation measures and for access to subsequent language courses administered by the AMS. The AMS provides more advanced, industry-specific and part-time, employment-compatible language courses for all jobseekers registered with the AMS, including humanitarian migrants. Following the 2019 amendments to the Integration Act, responsibility for integration measures was transferred fully to the Austrian Integration Fund, while the AMS remains a key partner and contributes to these efforts by supporting the labour market transition of humanitarian migrants.
In Austria, asylum seekers with a high probability of being granted protection are in principle eligible to participate in integration courses, but current resource constraints mean that this rarely occurs in practice. Since 2017, integration courses, focused primarily on language acquisition and originally designed for humanitarian migrants with protection status, have also been open to asylum seekers likely to receive protection, although participation is not a legal entitlement. Eligibility generally applies to asylum seekers from countries of origin with an acceptance rate above 75% and at least 200 annual cases, such as the Syrian Arab Republic between 2017 and 2021 and Iran in 2018. However, access to integration courses depends on available funding and organisational capacity. Budget cuts in 2018–19 significantly reduced the resources allocated for integration measures and the current budget no longer covers language courses for asylum seekers with a high likelihood of receiving protection (Europäisches Migrationsnetzwerk, 2023[40]).
In response to labour shortages, many OECD countries aim to attract workers from non-EU countries by granting seasonal work permits. OECD governments grant different work permits through streamlined procedures for non-EU nationals. To mitigate shortages in different sectors and segments of the economy, separate procedures often exist for high-skilled workers, specific shortage sectors or occupations, and seasonal workers. In the context of this report, seasonal work permits, which last for a maximum duration of six months in Austria, are the most relevant type of work permit.
Austria grants an increasing number of seasonal work permits to fill vacancies in the tourism sector. The Austrian government increased the maximum amount of seasonal work permits in the tourism industry for 2026 to approximately 8 000, composed of 5 500 for nationals from any non-EU country and an additional 2 500 permits for workers specifically from the Western Balkan (Figure 4.7). This represents a six-fold increase compared to the maximum amount of 1 300 permits in 2020. In addition, the national quota can be exceeded by 50% during peak season. In the tourism industry, seasonal work permits account for 57% of the monthly average of vacancies (13 902) registered with the AMS in 2025 or 2.2% of employment in 2024 (BMWET, 2024[45]).5 Tirol (28%) and Salzburg (27%) account for the majority of all work permits in tourism. Employers can request a seasonal work permit at the regional AMS branch, which approves the request subject to availability and if the vacancy cannot be filled with a domestic jobseeker, the vacancy meets the legal requirements in terms of working conditions and pay, and the employer provides accommodation. Seasonal workers who already received a seasonal work permit in prior years are excluded from annual quotas and can receive subsequent work permits regardless of availability (Europäisches Migrationsnetzwerk, 2020[46]). Seasonal work permits are also granted for work in agriculture. In the agricultural sector, seasonal work permits increased marginally, from 3 000 in 2020 to 3 500 for 2026.
The maximum number of seasonal work permits in Austria by industry and year, from 2020 to 2026.
Note: The figure above shows the maximum amount of seasonal work permits approved by Austria each year. The number for 2026 includes a quota of 2 500 workers from West Balkan countries.
Source: Saisonkontingenteverordnungen 2020 - 2025.
Seasonal work permits may reduce the incentive for employers to improve working conditions, potentially making jobs in tourism and agriculture less attractive for domestic jobseekers. Seasonal work permits are only granted if the vacancy cannot be filled with a domestic worker or jobseeker. However, whether the latter are willing to take up the job depends on the offered working conditions, such as the wage, the provided accommodation, and working hours. Since jobseekers residing in Vienna have a higher reservation wage on average due to relatively generous social benefit entitlements and affordable housing than seasonal workers from abroad, they are often not willing to accept job offers at the given conditions. Simultaneously, the availability of seasonal work permits may in theory lower the pressure for employers to improve working conditions, which may cause a reinforcing dynamic in which domestic jobseekers do not accept job offers because wages are too low, which are then filled with workers from abroad as no domestic workers can be found for the job (Europäisches Migrationsnetzwerk, 2020[46]). Evidence on these theoretical mechanisms is limited to seasonal work permits for agricultural workers in the United States, where the exclusion of Mexican seasonal farm workers and the requirement to give hiring preference to domestic workers had little effect on domestic workers’ wages and employment, potentially due to increased use of technology (Clemens, Lewis and Postel, 2018[47]; Clemens, 2022[48]). However, the effects of seasonal work permits could affect wages in the tourism industry differently, as it may be more difficult to replace service workers through technological advances. Furthermore, wage trends in Austria are broadly consistent with a dampening effect of seasonal work permits on wages: posted salaries in the tourism industry have generally not increased faster than in other sectors, with the exception of Tyrol (see chapter Regional labour market imbalances and labour mobility in Austria).
Seasonal work permits and AMS cross-regional job placement pursue similar objectives but are not fully co-ordinated. The six-fold increase in seasonal work permits in the tourism sector responds to the same underlying labour market pressures as the AMS’s intensified efforts to place jobseekers from Vienna in other regions. While it remains uncertain to what extent a lower number of seasonal work permits would lead to increased cross-regional placements from Vienna to Austria’s western federal states, stronger co-ordination between these policy approaches could be considered, particularly regarding their potential complementarities and their broader effects on wages and working conditions.
Harmonise family-related social policies across Austrian federal states to decrease the incentive to relocate to Vienna
Family-related social policies, namely childcare and social assistance for families with multiple children, are more generous in Vienna than in other federal states, thereby potentially attracting beneficiaries and reducing out-mobility. Vienna is Austria’s only federal state with free full-day childcare for children up to six years and childcare facilities tend to have longer opening hours than in other federal states. This makes Vienna’s childcare offer substantially more attractive for working parents, while lower childcare availability outside of Vienna may hinder families to relocate to other parts of Austria. Additionally, large differences in the generosity of social benefits (Mindestsicherung and Sozialhilfe) exist across the Austrian federal states for households with multiple children. Since social benefit entitlements in Vienna increase by a constant, rather than a decreasing, amount for each additional child they are among the most generous in Austria for large families, together with Salzburg and Burgenland. For example, families with four or more children receive on average 1 797 EUR in Vienna but only 1 041 EUR in Upper Austria.
Expanding the availability of full-time employment-compatible childcare outside Vienna could encourage families with children to relocate to other parts of Austria. In the Western federal states of Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg, and Upper Austria, more than half of all children are enrolled in half-day childcare facilities. These could be made employment-compatible by extending opening hours to at least 45 hours per week, including 9.5 hours on four weekdays, which would be more cost-efficient than building new childcare centres. Drawing on the “social pricing” model used in Catalonia, Spain, federal states could link childcare costs to family income to maintain affordability within tight fiscal budgets, ensuring low costs for low-income households.
Harmonising child-related social assistance benefits across Austria’s federal states would help ensure that moving between regions does not affect entitlements or influence location decisions. The 2019 social benefit reform established roughly equivalent basic entitlements for adults by setting maximum levels, below which states can determine benefits freely. However, child allowances still differ, with some states applying constant increases for each additional child and others using decreasing amounts. In line with Austria’s current government programme, federal states could harmonise these allowances by introducing clearer legal parameters for how entitlements are calculated by number of children. To avoid distorting labour mobility, child-related benefits could be designed to be broadly equal across federal states in relative terms, regardless of whether additional amounts are constant or decreasing. Adapting the social benefit entitlements to a regional housing cost index would account for regional differences in housing affordability.
Reduce regional disparities in housing costs by increasing the supply of (social) housing in high-demand areas outside Vienna and mitigate the lock-in effect in social housing system
Vienna’s housing market is characterised by comparatively low rents and a large share of social housing. Pronounced differences between Vienna and western urban areas in homeownership and access to social housing are likely to reduce internal labour mobility. Unlike most large OECD metropolitan areas, where house prices are about 27% above national averages, prices in Vienna are only around 9% higher, and rents have increased at roughly the same pace as in smaller Austrian regions. Vienna’s extensive social housing supply, including a two-thirds subsidised housing requirement in new developments, helps keep rents low. In total, 41.7% of Vienna’s residents live in social housing, more than twice the average across other Austrian federal states, and social rents are approximately 32% below private market levels. Together, these factors reduce incentives for residents to relocate to other Austrian regions.
Increasing the supply of social housing through provisions in development agreements in regions outside Vienna could help make housing comparably affordable. Since 2019, Vienna has required real estate developers to reserve two-thirds of housing units for social housing in large construction projects. While other federal states often include social housing provisions in development agreements, few have binding legal requirements. Drawing on Vienna’s experience and international examples such as Australia, Italy, Germany and New Zealand, other Austrian federal states could consider adopting “inclusionary zoning” legislation requiring developers to allocate a fixed share of new housing as affordable social units. Such measures would be particularly relevant in high-demand areas outside Vienna, including Tyrol, Salzburg and Vorarlberg, where housing prices are comparatively high.
Lock-in effects in social housing could be reduced in the short term by waiving queuing requirements for tenants who relocate to another federal state for employment and granting those who move for employment the right to return to social housing in their home region. Social housing can limit mobility because tenants often cannot find equally affordable housing in other regions. As a short-term policy measure, while social housing supply outside Vienna is increased, the Austrian government, in co-operation with federal states, could mitigate this by exempting jobseekers who leave social housing to take up work elsewhere from residency or queuing requirements in their new location. While such a measure could apply to all employment-related moves, it would particularly benefit Vienna, where a disproportionately large share of residents lives in social housing. To further reduce barriers for seasonal or temporary workers, the policy could grant those who move for employment the right to return to social housing in their home region within a defined period. This would lower the perceived risk of accepting seasonal or trial employment opportunities in other parts of Austria.
Improve the labour market integration of humanitarian migrants by considering regional labour market conditions in the initial dispersal of asylum seekers, limiting their cross-regional mobility to employment-related moves and providing early access to integration courses
Local employment prospects could be incorporated into Austria’s quota-based dispersal system to strengthen the later labour market integration of humanitarian migrants. In 2020, thirteen OECD countries, including Austria, applied dispersal policies not only to asylum seekers but also to humanitarian migrants to prevent excessive geographic concentration (OECD, 2021[25]). Austria’s current dispersal system of asylum seekers does not take regional labour market conditions into account, even though evidence suggests that if asylum seekers are allocated to labour markets with stronger labour demand, this can improve their employment outcomes once they obtain protection status and full access to the labour market (Riksrevisionen, 2021[34]). Employment prospects and access to integration and social services are therefore considered essential elements of well-designed asylum seeker dispersal systems (OECD, 2019[49]; OECD, 2018[50]). In Sweden, for example, labour market indicators such as unemployment rates and projected labour force needs determine 80% of the regional allocation quota (Box 4.1). In Austria, incorporating similar labour market criteria would likely reduce allocations to Vienna, where unemployment is relatively high. To further improve the matching process of asylum seekers to locations and improve employment prospects, Austria’s dispersal mechanism could account for asylum seekers’ age, education, language skills, and nationality (Bansak et al., 2018[29]). Adjusting the dispersal system would require close co-ordination with local authorities regarding policy design, assignment decisions and the preparation of adequate facilities (OECD, 2018[50]).
To ensure the effective implementation of an improved asylum seeker dispersal system, all Austrian federal states need to build the administrative and housing capacity to host their allocated share. Currently, compliance with Austria’s quota-based system varies widely across federal states, as it is based on an intergovernmental agreement (Grundversorgungsvereinbarung) rather than on legislation. Therefore, implementation depends on each state’s willingness and capacity to co-operate. In 2023, Vorarlberg, Tyrol and Upper Austria received 70%, 35% and 26% more asylum seekers, respectively, than foreseen in the agreement, while none of the other federal states met their assigned quota. The agreement does not include sanctions for non-compliance, meaning that asylum seekers cannot be transferred from the Federal Agency for Reception and Support Services (Bundesbetreuungseinrichtung) to states that have not accepted their share (Asylkoordination Österreich, 2024[37]). Although the concentration of humanitarian migrants in Vienna results from post-recognition mobility rather than the initial dispersal process, reforms to the latter can only be effective if federal states adhere to their assigned quotas by building the administrative and housing capacity needed.
Mobility restrictions on non-employment-related moves for humanitarian migrants could reduce their concentration in Vienna and support better labour market integration. The high concentration of humanitarian migrants in Vienna emerges through relocation to the capital after asylum has been granted. Following a German policy example, mobility restrictions on non-employment-related relocations, for example across federal states, could help prevent the concentration of humanitarian migrants in areas with limited job opportunities. As concluded by an evaluation of the current German policy, limiting inflow restrictions on non-employment-related moves to areas with already high concentrations (“hotspot areas”) could limit interference with free movement while directly addressing the main area of concentration, Vienna. These non-employment-related mobility restrictions could be enforced by linking eligibility for social benefits to the place of residence. In Austria, mobility restrictions of this kind could potentially not only reduce unemployment in Vienna but also improve employment outcomes among humanitarian migrants, as labour demand for their skill profiles is stronger outside the capital. Implementing mobility restrictions would require close co-ordination between national, federal and local authorities to ensure sufficient integration and housing support in the destination regions. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that reducing the share of social benefit-dependent humanitarian migrants in Vienna to 20%, corresponding to its quota under the current dispersal system, could have lowered the city’s unemployment rate by 1.2 percentage points in 2025, an effect equivalent to around 65 times the number of cross-regional placements achieved at their peak in 2022.
Data exchange and co-ordination efforts between the ÖIF and the AMS could be improved. Linking integration and labour market measures could be made more efficient through a data interface that enables real-time transmission of information on the integration progress of humanitarian migrants. The existing shared database (Integrationsschnittstelle) could be further developed to enable automatic data entry and real-time data transmission between the ÖIF and the AMS. The database could further support caseworkers in assessing the profile and employment potential of jobseekers. For example, a record of the speed at which humanitarian migrants progress in learning German could provide useful information to support more efficient allocation into subsequent language courses.
In co-ordination with the AMS, the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF) could provide integration courses more systematically to asylum seekers with a high probability of receiving protection to support their integration at the place of first arrival. Facilitating early labour market integration can help asylum seekers build ties to their local community and potentially reduce secondary migration. While humanitarian migrants with protection status have access to integration courses on the same basis as other legal residents, asylum seekers can currently participate only if sufficient funding and personnel are available. To strengthen future labour market outcomes, the Austrian government could consider increasing resources for integration and language courses to ensure that asylum seekers with a high likelihood of receiving protection can access these integration measures.
Assess the scope for improved co-ordination between cross-regional placement efforts of jobseekers and seasonal work permit policies for non-EU nationals
Austria has sharply increased the number of seasonal work permits in tourism to address reported labour shortages, a policy that could potentially affect cross-regional job placement efforts. In 2026, the national quota will rise to around 8 000 seasonal work permits, up sixfold from 1 300 in 2020. These permits now account for about 57% of registered monthly tourism vacancies and are concentrated in Tyrol (28%) and Salzburg (27%). Although the AMS issues permits only when vacancies cannot be filled domestically and legal working conditions are met, the availability of seasonal foreign labour could potentially affect wages and working conditions in the sector. This, in turn, may affect jobseekers in other parts of Austria for whom these jobs could become less attractive.
Austria could seek to better understand the impact of seasonal workers on wages and working conditions in the tourism sector and strengthen co-ordination of policies that address labour shortages in the sector. To support more evidence-based decision-making, Austria could analyse in greater detail how seasonal workers influence wages and working conditions in tourism, and whether these effects reduce the sector’s attractiveness for domestic jobseekers. If this is confirmed, related policy efforts could be more closely aligned. While the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection (BMASGPK) already consults social partners, including the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, the Chamber of Agriculture and trade unions, when setting seasonal work permit quotas, co-ordination with the AMS could be strengthened. Quota decisions could account for the number of domestic jobseekers the AMS expects to place in the tourism sector, including through cross-regional placements. In addition to past placement figures, these assessments could consider the share of domestic jobseekers who could potentially fill these roles based on relevant skills, such as language proficiency.
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← 1. The term “humanitarian migrants” refers to recognised refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, and sponsored or resettled refugees and is used throughout this report (OECD, 2023[51]).
← 2. These countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United States as of 2020 (OECD, 2021[25]).
← 3. These calculations are based on the number of humanitarian migrants registered with the AMS, assuming that an identical share of registered individuals is unemployed (rather than in training) across federal states (ÖIF, 2025[52]), and the total number of jobseekers and employees (AMS, 2025[38]).
← 4. The target group for the Austrian Integration Fund since 2019 are primarily asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants. Nonetheless, the Austrian Integration Fund also provides integration and language courses for non-EU nationals, who are not humanitarian migrants, as it also responsible for implementing the integration agreement (Integrationsvereinbarung), which requires certain non-EU nationals to complete German language and integration courses as part of their residence procedures.
← 5. The tourism industry corresponds to accommodation and food services (NACE code I) in these statistics.