This chapter examines the mobility requirements placed on jobseekers and the policies designed to enable and support geographic labour mobility in Austria. It first compares mobility requirements for jobseekers across OECD countries. The chapter then reviews Austria’s current measures to support geographic mobility in three areas: information provision, financial incentives and training programmes. For each area, it discusses international good practices and empirical evidence on effectiveness. Building on these comparisons, the chapter identifies shortcomings in Austria’s current policies and concludes with recommendations to improve their design and impact.
Addressing Regional Labour Market Imbalances in Austria
Abstract
Broader eligibility for cross-regional placement, stronger financial incentives, better information and targeted training can improve geographic mobility of jobseekers and reduce labour market imbalances
Jobseekers in Austria face less strict mobility requirements than in many other OECD countries, but sanctions and enforcement tend to be comparatively strict. Austrian law requires jobseekers to accept job offers with a daily commute of up to two hours, placing Austria in the mid-range of the OECD Strictness of Activation Index on mobility requirements. Following a 2025 Austrian Administrative Court ruling, extensions of this requirement of up to three hours per day are now permissible. Sanctions for non-compliance are mild at first but become severe in repeated cases, and the Public Employment Service (Arbeitsmarktservice – AMS) applies them relatively consistently. Across the OECD, countries with stricter mobility requirements tend to enforce them less rigorously, and neither longer required commuting times nor mandated relocations are associated with higher geographic mobility.
Less than 10% of jobseekers are currently considered eligible for cross-regional placement by the AMS in Vienna, a target group that could be broadened. The AMS focuses its cross-regional placement efforts on the tourism industry and on less-qualified jobseekers, as 80% of job vacancies in Western Austria are in tourism and 45% of less-qualified jobseekers are registered in Vienna. At present, cross-regional placement is only possible when employers in the destination region provide accommodation, and jobseekers with care responsibilities or health limitations are excluded. These narrow criteria limit the target group to under 10% of all jobseekers in Vienna, around 70% of whom are humanitarian migrants1. The current approach does not take into account labour shortages in other sectors or jobs with higher skill requirements in Austria’s Western federal states, some of which match the qualifications of jobseekers from Vienna. Broadening the target group to include all jobseekers who have recently moved to the capital and lifting the requirement for employer-provided accommodation for placements outside tourism could help address geographic labour market imbalances.
Existing financial relocation programmes in Austria are likely too small to significantly increase geographic mobility among less educated jobseekers. The AMS currently supports jobseekers with travel and commuting allowances (Vorstellungs-/ Arbeits-/ Lehrantrittsbeihilfe and Entfernungsbeihilfe) to encourage cross-regional employment take-up, while a previous relocation incentive was discontinued in 2016 due to low demand. Empirical evidence indicates that financial relocation incentives need to be substantially higher and provided on an ongoing basis, particularly when targeting less-qualified jobseekers who tend to have a lower propensity to move, as is currently the case in the AMS programme.
Information campaigns to advertise work outside Vienna are broadly comparable to practices in other OECD countries, but widening the scope of job fairs and a single integrated digital platform on cross-regional employment opportunities could reduce search costs. Between 2018 and 2024, cross-regional job fairs in Vienna placed only 73 jobseekers in other federal states, underscoring their limited effectiveness. Other information initiatives in Austria, such as the tourism coach (TourismusCoach), an initiative to promote employment opportunities in Schladming-Dachstein (Styria), also focus predominantly on the tourism sector. While the design of job fairs and company visits are in line with good practices in other OECD countries, a broader sectoral scope could widen the target group. An information platform that integrates existing tools such as the job barometer (Jobbarometer), the career compass (Karrierekompass) and the job information system (Berufsinformationssystem) could bring together regional labour market data, job opportunities and available financial and educational support and thereby reduce information frictions about employment opportunities in other regions.
Training programmes for jobseekers in Austria that aim to place candidates in jobs outside Vienna could cover a broader range of industries and be better co‑ordinated. Selected initiatives in Austria already account for geographical imbalances in the labour market but show limited success in supporting labour mobility. For example, the New Skills Courses, six-week training programmes in Vienna featuring a one-week internship in the target region, led to at most 56 cross-regional placements in 2019. Despite these modest results, the programmes contain important elements highlighted in academic literature. Occupation-specific training, particularly when combined with internships with employers in other regions, tends to strengthen employer engagement and increase employment take-up after programme completion. The one-week internships included in the New Skills Courses cover this aspect, though they could be extended in duration. Going forward, the Centre for Cross-Regional Placement could serve as a nationwide interface for co-ordinating interregional job placements across all federal states, facilitating information exchange and campaigns, and aligning training offers with regional labour market needs.
1. The term “humanitarian migrants” refers to recognised refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, and sponsored or resettled refugees and is used throughout this report (OECD, 2023[36]).
This chapter presents the labour mobility-enhancing policies currently in place in Austria. These are embedded in the larger legal framework that defines when jobseekers need to commute or relocate for a job, and what sanctions they face in the case of not complying with this legislation. The first section, thus, presents the legal (activation) requirements for the jobseekers’ geographic mobility and the potential sanctions for failing to meet them.
Legal commuting and relocation requirements for jobseekers can be compared across countries based on the OECD’s Strictness of Activation Requirements for Benefit Recipients indicator. Two aspects of activation requirements for benefit recipients are particularly important in the context of this study: first, the daily commuting time to and from the potential new job that each country’s legislation deems acceptable. Second, the sanctions which jobseekers face in case of refusing a job offer within the acceptable commuting time. This study compares the strictness of Austria’s legislation with that of other countries using the OECD’s Strictness of Activation Requirements for Benefit Recipients indicator (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018[1]). Box 3.1 describes the methodology used to construct the indicator in detail. It is important to note that the indicator only considers the rules as defined by the law, not their enforcement. Differences in enforcement across countries might affect how strict their mobility requirements are in practice.
The OECD periodically monitors the activity-related eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits and maintains a database with indices on the strictness of activation requirements for benefit recipients. The aggregated index quantifies member countries’ policies and is based on three weighted sub-indicators, each composed of several items. These items codify each country's respective rules on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least strict and 5 being the strictest. Aggregating these items produces a composite index for comparing overall strictness across countries, while the sub indicators and items reveal the individual aspects where countries are more lenient or stricter.
The three sub-indicators include availability requirements, job search requirements and monitoring procedures, and sanctions. Each of the three sub-indicators features several items that are weighted based on the number of items included in the sub-indicator. Each sub-indictor is equal to one third of the aggregate index. This report focuses on three specific items: Item 3 of the availability requirements sub-indicator, namely demands on geographical mobility, as well as items 8 and 9 of the sanctions sub-indicator, specifically sanctions for refusals of suitable job offers and sanctions for repeated refusal of suitable job offers, respectively. The geographical mobility item ranges from no mobility requirements to an obligation to relocate, with most countries requiring jobseekers to be willing to commute for a pre-defined duration each day. Sanctions for job refusals differ in the length of unemployment benefit suspension, with the strictest level being loss of eligibility.
Source: Immervoll and Knotz (2018[1]), How demanding are activation requirements for jobseekers
Geographic mobility requirements vary substantially across OECD countries. With few exceptions, most OECD countries require jobseekers to accept job offers within an acceptable commuting time from their place of residence (Figure 3.1). These requirements range from less than two hours in countries such as Spain, the United States or Portugal, to commutes of up to four hours per day in Canada, Israel and Japan. Iceland, Korea, Norway, and Croatia even require jobseekers to relocate for a new job. Five countries, namely Romania, the Slovak Republic, Ireland, France, and Czechia are exceptions as they do not impose mobility requirements on jobseekers.
Requirements for geographic mobility of jobseekers (see notes for interpretation), 2024.
Note: The index values have the following interpretation: 1 = no mobility requirements; 2 = commuting up to 2 hours per day; 3 = commuting up to 4 hours per day; 4 = commuting up to 4 hours per day; 5 = obligation to relocate.
Source: OECD strictness of activation criteria database.
Austria ranks in the middle range in terms of the strictness of its mobility requirements when compared internationally. In Austria, the maximum acceptable commuting time is currently set at two hours per day for individuals without health issues or care responsibilities (Figure 3.1). A recent ruling by the Austrian Administrative Court clarified that extending this limit by up to 50% is permissible, meaning that the maximum acceptable commuting time for full-time employees may reach up to three hours per day in practice. Jobseekers are only required to relocate if the employer provides accommodation (Box 3.2). While five out of 40 countries analysed have no mobility requirement at all, 24 require longer commutes than Austria, in some cases exceeding four hours per day (e.g. Canada, Israel, Japan, Malta). Iceland, Korea, Norway, and Croatia require jobseekers to relocate for a new job. This places Austria in the middle range in terms of its mobility requirements.
In Austria, jobseekers are required to accept job offers within commuting distance but are not generally obliged to relocate. Daily commutes of up to two hours for full-time positions (1.5 hours for part-time) are considered reasonable. Refusal to accept a suitable job within this commuting distance can result in sanctions by the Austrian Public Employment Service (Arbeitsmarktservice – AMS), including suspension of unemployment benefits for six to eight weeks. Jobs outside this commuting distance are not mandatory to accept, as they typically involve relocation, unless the employer provides temporary accommodation, which occurs mainly in the tourism sector. Exemptions from these requirements apply in cases of health limitations or care responsibilities.
The Centre for Cross-Regional Placement
The Centre for Cross-Regional Placement (Fachzentrum Vermittlung Überregional - VÜR) co‑ordinates co‑operation between regional AMS branches. It supports the AMS in Vienna in identifying suitable candidates for vacancies in the Western federal states by collecting vacancy information and jobseeker profiles from across regions. The Centre also organises initiatives to enable cross-regional mobility, including job fairs, information events, study trips with jobseekers and AMS staff to hiring firms, and job preparation courses that include internships in other states.
The Centre currently focuses on the tourism industry for three main reasons. First, 80% of tourism vacancies are located in Austria’s western regions, while 45% of jobseekers with relevant experience live in Vienna, creating significant geographic imbalances. Second, tourism employers are among the few able to provide accommodation, which makes relocation obligations enforceable. Accommodation costs can be subtracted from the wage, which must comply with minimum wage legislation after deduction of accommodation costs. Third, tourism jobs typically require relatively low qualifications, aligning with the profile of many jobseekers in Vienna, who often have limited formal qualifications.
Due to its focus on the tourism industry, the Centre targets only a small share of jobseekers for cross-regional placement. Eligibility includes jobseekers with prior experience in tourism and humanitarian migrants, who are often considered suitable due to lower levels of recognised education and the relatively limited skill requirements of many tourism jobs. In May 2025, 10 800 jobseekers (9.5% of the 113 400 registered in Vienna) met these criteria. Jobseekers with health conditions or care responsibilities are exempt from mobility requirements. Humanitarian migrants represent around 70% of the eligible group.
Source: Information obtained from the Austrian Public Employment Service.
Legal provisions on commuting requirements in Austria serve as general guidance, although in practice longer commuting times are often considered acceptable. The Austrian Unemployment Insurance Act (Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz) specifies that job offers are acceptable if the place of employment “can be reached within a reasonable time” (Article 9). An amendment introduced in 2007 clarified that daily commutes up to two hours is considered reasonable for most workers. It further states that even longer commuting times can be acceptable if no realistic employment opportunities for the jobseeker exist within that radius. A recent directive from September 2025 (Bundesrichtlinie zum Verfahren nach den §§ 9, 10 AlVG), accounting for rulings by the Austrian Administrative Court, provides more guidance on acceptable commuting times. It considers commuting times exceeding the usual two-hour limit by up to 50% as acceptable in any case, effectively extending the mobility requirement for jobseekers to three hours for full-time employment. Both the legislative amendment and the directive underline that mobility should be supported and that commuting-time regulations should not prevent jobseekers from taking up employment. The directive also allows for commuting times of up to four hours for full-time positions, subject to individual case assessment.
The requirement that relocation is conditional on the employer providing accommodation effectively restricts relocations to the tourism sector, which is one of the few sectors capable of offering free housing. The Austrian Unemployment Insurance Act also states that employment offers have to be accepted if “suitable accommodation is available at the place of work”, which constitutes a relocation obligation. However, the condition that accommodation must be provided by the employer effectively limits cross-regional placement to the tourism sector, as that sector is one of the few that can offer such cost-free accommodation. In addition, the Centre for Cross-Regional Placement (Fachzentrum Vermittlung Überregional – VÜR) facilitates these placements primarily in the tourism sector (Box 3.2). While the Centre is tasked with supporting interregional co-operation between regional Public Employment Service (Arbeitsmarktservice – AMS) branches and enabling cross-regional mobility, particularly from Vienna to the western parts of Austria, its current focus lies on the tourism sector. This is due to the fact that around 45% of jobseekers with relevant experience in that sector are registered in Vienna, while vacancies in the tourism sector account for about 80% of all open positions in the western regions of Austria.
Countries typically sanction non-compliance with job offer refusals, including refusals related to mobility requirements, by suspending unemployment benefits for a defined period. Most countries distinguish between a first refusal of a job offer within the acceptable commuting distance and subsequent refusals. Among the countries analysed, sanctions range from five to nine weeks of benefit suspension to the full loss of benefit entitlement (Figure 3.2). The same sanctions apply when jobseekers refuse an acceptable job offer in terms of commuting time and job type, fail to apply for a vacancy proposed by the Public Employment Service (PES), miss an application-related appointment, behave inappropriately during a job interview, or do not attend mandatory training programmes.
Sanctions in Austria are relatively mild for first-time job refusals but become severe for repeated refusals of suitable job offers within the acceptable commuting time. Jobseekers who refuse a suitable offer for the first time face a suspension of unemployment benefits for six to eight weeks (Figure 3.2), placing Austria among the countries with more moderate sanctions for initial refusals; Switzerland, Czechia, the Slovak Republic and Italy impose longer suspensions. For repeated refusals, however, Austria applies comparatively long suspensions of more than 14 weeks. Only Italy, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia impose more severe sanctions, which can entail a complete loss of entitlement.
Strictness of sanctions in case of job refusals by first and repeated refusal (see notes for interpretation), 2024.
Note: The index values represent for how long unemployment benefits are suspended in case of the first and repeated job refusals: 1 = 0 to 4 weeks; 2 = 5 to 9 weeks; 3 = 10 – 14 weeks; 4 = more than 14 weeks; 5 = loss of entitlement.
Source: OECD strictness of activation criteria database.
OECD countries with stringent geographic mobility requirements tend to not enforce them, whereas the AMS, operating with milder requirements, issues sanctions more regularly. The OECD Strictness of Activation Requirement index, described in Box 3.1, measures the strictness of legal provisions regarding mobility requirements and the severeness of sanctions in case of non-compliance. However, countries may or may not enforce these legal provisions in practice. Although systematic evidence on the enforcement of sanctions for non-compliance is limited, countries with the strictest legal mobility requirements appear to rarely apply them (Box 3.3). Although international data on sanctions are not fully comparable due to differences in legal bases and definitions, the AMS sanctions jobseekers who refuse to participate in employment-related training or to accept suitable job offers (i.e. not limited to geographic mobility) more strictly than, for instance, the German PES. While the AMS supported 426 012 jobseekers via its unemployment insurance, 162 435 sanctions were imposed for failing to comply with any of the requirements placed on jobseekers in 2024. The ratio of sanctions for refusing or impeding training or employment to the number of jobseekers, which may include multiple sanctions applied to the same individual, was 8% in Austria. In Germany, the ratio of sanctions applied for refusing a job offer, declining a training measure or abandoning a training programme to jobseekers was 3% in 2023.1
Some countries require unemployed individuals to relocate if suitable employment is available elsewhere in the country, placing the highest demands on geographic mobility. In practice, however, these relocation requirements often function primarily as a deterrent and are not strictly enforced.
In Norway, the National Insurance Act (Folketrygdloven) states that benefit recipients must accept work anywhere in Norway in order to be considered a genuine jobseeker. The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV - Arbeids- og velferdsetaten) elaborates in a directive (rundskriv R04-00), that Norway as a whole is considered as one labour market and that benefits recipients have to be willing to move or find temporary accommodation where work is available. Within the National Insurance Act, sanctions for refusing a job offer based on location are 8 weeks of benefit suspension for first occurrences and six months for repeated refusals within 12 months. A NAV research article analysing transitions from benefits to employment shows that, in the period studied, 31% of jobseekers found work in the same municipality and in their former occupation (Kann et al., 2018[2]). Among the other jobseekers who found employment, 54% changed occupation, 33% began commuting to another municipality, and only 3% relocated, noting that these categories are not exclusive. Overall, sanctions are used as a deterrent rather than actually enforced: between 2014 and 2019, only 3% of benefit recipients were sanctioned for breaking any of the jobseeker requirements.
In Iceland, the Icelandic Unemployment Insurance Act (Lög um atvinnuleysistryggingar No. 54/2006) states similarly that an individual is a genuine jobseeker only if they are willing to take work anywhere in Iceland. The Act details sanctions for refusing a suitable job offer, where a first refusal leads to a loss of benefits for two months and repeated occurrences leading to a loss of benefits for three months. Welfare Appeals Committee rulings and parliamentary ombudsman opinions underscore the geographic mobility clause, but there are no public rulings where this specific legal provision was enforced.
Source: Alþingi (2006[3]), 54/2006: Lög um atvinnuleysistryggingar, Ekelund and Sørbø (2024[4]), Jeg er ikke her for å stanse penger: Nav-veilederes bruk av sanksjonsregelverket for dagpenger, Kann et al (2018[2]), Geografisk og yrkesmessig mobilitet blant arbeidsledige, Stortinget (n.d.[5]), Lov om folketrygd (folketrygdloven) – Kapittel 4. Dagpenger under arbeidsløshet.
This section discusses Austria’s policies designed to directly support labour mobility. These include information provision, financial incentives and training programmes that equip jobseekers with the skills needed to take up work outside their place of residence. In addition to outlining Austria’s current mobility-enhancing measures, the section reviews academic evidence on the effectiveness of these policy types and draws lessons from best-practice examples in other OECD countries.
Information provision
Information about job opportunities in other regions can help expand the search radius of both jobseekers and employers by reducing information asymmetries. Limited knowledge about available vacancies, job conditions, employers or local contexts may prevent jobseekers from applying, while employers benefit from learning about potential candidates early in the recruitment process. Such information asymmetries are often particularly pronounced in cross-regional jobseeker–employer matching. OECD countries use various approaches to reduce such information frictions, including job fairs, on-site employer visits with jobseekers, and initiatives that strengthen information exchange and co‑operation between regional PES branches.
Although information on open positions is widely available nowadays, evidence from academic studies shows that information provision can lead to small positive effects on mobility in a cost-effective way. In the presence of information asymmetries, the provision of information can lead to better matching of jobseekers and vacancies. For example, newspaper advertisement on vacancies in the US fracking industry increased out-mobility in areas where the ads appeared by 2.4% (Wilson, 2021[6]; Wilson, 2020[7]). Information provision is most effective if i) the information provided is sufficiently specific2 (Schwartz, Mihaly and Gala, 2016[8]), ii) labour demand in origin regions is low (Wilson, 2021[6]), and iii) if it is combined with additional relocation support (Bergman et al., 2024[9]). In line with this evidence, jobseekers from Vienna participating in focus group interviews stated that they would benefit from systematic information on job vacancies in other parts of Austria, in particular Salzburg and Tyrol.
The AMS facilitates the flow of information on cross-regional placements, in particular in the tourism industry, through job fairs, coaching of recently placed employees, and through the exchange of information between employers and employees, but the number of jobseekers placed through these efforts has been limited. Job fairs focus on connecting jobseekers from Vienna with employers from a specific region and industry, for example, the tourism symposium (Tourismus Symposium) focusing on Pongau (Salzburg) and the tourism industry (Table 3.1). Other fairs are open to employers from all regions and industries. In the tourism coaches (Tourismus Coaches) programme, AMS staff support jobseekers interested in working in the tourism industry in Styria throughout the integration process, including the job search, training, and adaptation to the new work environment. Additionally, specifically trained AMS staff support cross-regional placement in the tourism industry in Styria by sharing relevant information between jobseekers, employers and other AMS staff as part of the tourism pioneers (TourismuspionierInnen) programme. Between 2018 and 2024, 73 jobseekers from Vienna found employment elsewhere through job fairs, ranging from zero in 2020, the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, to 31 in 2018.
Source: Based on information provided by the AMS.
Labour market information tools can improve transparency about distant labour markets, but available AMS tools are not yet consolidated in one place. Table 3.2 summarises several dispersed AMS labour market information tools and highlights areas of overlap between them. Compared to information platforms in other countries, such as Job Bank in Canada, described in more detail in Box 3.4, information about occupations and distant labour markets must be gathered from different websites, leading to higher search costs. AMS platforms also lack comprehensive regional wage data, which would help individuals form realistic expectations about distant labour markets and could influence relocation decisions. Findings from focus group interviews conducted for this study indicate that jobseekers in Vienna struggle to independently locate relevant labour market information, as resources on employment opportunities and available support are dispersed across multiple websites and must be compiled individually. Participants also expressed low confidence in the AMS’s ability to support distant job searches or provide targeted referrals with a good match between jobs and skills. In addition, they noted the need for better information on vacancies and living conditions in other regions before considering relocation. Overall, these information frictions and high search costs likely reduce jobseekers’ ability to access the information necessary to relocate successfully for work.
Overview of the online tools offered by AMS in respect to labour market information
Source: Based on publicly available information from the AMS.
The so-called Job Bank serves as the national entry point of the Canadian Public Employment Service (PES) and combines both information about vacancies as well as detailed labour market insights. The platform offers advanced search functions such as job matching, job transition tools, and a dedicated section for career planning advice. The latter encourages jobseekers to make use of the platform’s comprehensive labour market information which includes employment outlooks and wage comparisons by region and occupation, as well as detailed job profiles. The platform uses the Occupational and Skills Information System (OaSIS) to provide an overview of the skills and competencies needed for each job profile. While the impact of this web-based solution on interregional labour mobility has not been analysed to date, evaluations by the Canadian PES indicate that the integration of these different services in one platform enables jobseekers to obtain distant labour market information and decreases information asymmetries and search costs. Since 2018, the job matching service integrated into Job Bank directly supports geographic labour mobility, as jobseekers indicate their willingness to relocate when creating their profile, facilitating interregional hiring. Other countries provide similar services with a strong emphasis on labour market information, accessible employment, wage and industry outlooks as well as job transition tools including the UK, Australia, and the US.
Source: Employment and Social Development Canada (2017[10]), Evaluation of Learning and Labour Market Information as Disseminated by ESDC Using a Web-based Consolidated Approach, Employment and Social Development Canada (2021[11]), Evaluation of the Job Match service: connecting jobseekers to Canadian employers, Employment and Social Development Canada (n.d.[12]), Job Bank.
Financial incentives
Financial incentives to support the geographic mobility of jobseekers can help overcome liquidity constraints and enable moves when real wage premia are not sufficiently large. Reimbursing or covering moving costs upfront reduces immediate financial burdens that may otherwise deter jobseekers from considering opportunities in other regions. Such support is particularly important for low-income jobseekers, who often face tighter borrowing constraints and have limited savings. Relocation grants, often paid as lump-sum amounts or as a continuous housing allowance, can encourage jobseekers to broaden their search radius and take up employment in cases where moving does not generate a substantial wage premium. This is especially relevant for individuals whose expected earnings gains from relocating are modest and for whom the gap between unemployment benefits or other social welfare payments and potential earnings is small in absolute terms. The overall objective of these financial support programmes is to widen the set of feasible job matches and contribute to a more efficient allocation of labour across regions.
Austria provides financial support to jobseekers when applying to and when accepting a job outside their location of residence, however, the number of beneficiaries is relatively low. The AMS compensates jobseekers “in financial distress” for the travel- and accommodation costs resulting from job interviews in another region (Vorstellungsbeihilfe) (Table 3.3). On average, there were 2528 beneficiaries receiving approximately EUR 300 on average in 2024. Furthermore, the AMS supports jobseekers who take up a job outside their region of residence (Entfernungsbeihilfe). It does so by subsidising commuting costs by up to EUR 260 per month or rental costs resulting from a secondary home by EUR 400 per month. Jobseekers who are about to accept a job with a gross income of up to EUR 2 700 per month are eligible for this policy. There were 665 recipients receiving approximately EUR 1 500 on average in 2024. Like the German relocation assistance, Austria used to support jobseekers who relocated for a job with a lump sum payment of up to EUR 4 632 (up to a gross income of EUR 2 300) until 2016. However, the policy was removed due to low demand from jobseekers (e.g. only 156 recipients in 2012).
Source: Based on information provided by the AMS.
Across the OECD, many countries operate financial support programmes to facilitate relocation, comparable to the measures in place in Austria. Most OECD countries, similar to Austria, provide or have provided lump-sum relocation grants to cover moving-related costs, although the scope of eligible costs varies across countries. These grants are typically linked to actual expenses incurred, meaning that not all recipients receive the full amount. As in Austria, most countries do not tie relocation grants to specific destinations. Australia is an exception: the relocation grant was initially structured so that the amount received depended on whether the recipient moved to a regional or a capital area. In addition to one-time relocation grants, two other countries offer more continuous forms of support in the form of housing subsidies similar to Austria’s distance allowance. In Germany, jobseekers may receive a secondary accommodation subsidy of EUR 260 per month for up to six months if their daily commute exceeds 2.5 hours. In Romania, the mobility subsidy can be paid for up to 36 months. However, it targets low-income workers, with a monthly household income ceiling of RON 5 000, and is available only to jobseekers in nationally designated disadvantaged areas. Importantly, the Romanian subsidy supports full relocations rather than temporary relocations or secondary accommodation (Box 3.5).
Many OECD countries support the geographic mobility of jobseekers through different types of financial support programmes. Geographic mobility programmes, including financial relocation incentives, vary in their structure.
Germany provides temporary accommodation subsidies (EUR 260 per month for up to six months if daily commuting exceeds 2.5 hours) as well as relocation assistance covering moving costs of up to EUR 4 500 to all jobseekers. These support instruments are discretionary and can be granted when caseworkers consider them necessary to help a jobseeker take up work in a distant region and is not tied to regions with labour shortages.
In Australia, until 2022, long-term unemployed workers could receive a relocation grant of up to AUD 6 000 for moves to regional areas or AUD 3 000 for moves to capital cities (Relocation and Assistance to Take Up a Job Programme). This programme has been reformed since 2022, now covering a narrower range of moving related costs while offering upfront payments with no national financial cap to ease liquidity constraints. In addition, the grant is now available to a wider range of jobseekers and only requires a move of at least ninety minutes from the current residence, without differentiating between regional contexts. If participants left the job voluntarily within the first six months or were dismissed for misconduct, they could be sanctioned with a 12-week suspension of income support.
Romania offers a relocation grant (prima de instalare) and a mobility subsidy (prima de relocare) in the form of a monthly housing allowance. The relocation grant is available to jobseekers from disadvantaged areas defined in the National Mobility Plan (Planul Național de Mobilitate) who take up employment more than 50 km from their current residence and move to the new locality. It amounts to RON 12 500 for individuals and RON 15 500 for families, paid in two equal instalments upon relocation and after 12 months of employment. While the relocation grant has no income ceiling, the monthly mobility subsidy targets households with net earnings of up to RON 5 000. The subsidy is supposed to be used to cover 75% of housing costs, capped at RON 900 per month, and can be paid for up to 36 months. Both programmes require jobseekers to have lived in the origin locality for at least 36 months and to remain in the destination locality for at least 12 months. In addition, jobseekers are ineligible if they have benefited from another mobility programme in the previous 36 months (including the commuting allowance (prima de încadrare)). In 2024, 1 117 workers benefited from the commuting allowance, 77 jobseekers received the relocation grant, and 221 workers were supported the mobility subsidy, compared to around 183 000 jobseekers who transitioned into employment in the same year through PES measures and programmes.
Source: ANOFM (2002[13]), Lege nr. 76 din 16 ianuarie 2002 privind sistemul asigurărilor pentru şomaj şi stimularea ocupării forţei de muncă, ANOFM (2025[14]), Raport PO – Decembrie 2024, Australian Government. Department of Jobs and Small Business (2018[15]), Relocation Assistance to Take Up a Job Evaluation Report, Caliendo, Künn and Mahlstedt, (2017[16]), The Return to Labor Market Mobility: An Evaluation of Relocation Assistance for the Unemployed, Caliendo et al (2023[17]), The intended and unintended effects of promoting labour market mobility.
Evidence suggests that financial support to promote geographic mobility needs to be substantial to be effective for jobseekers with low levels of education, whereas extending such programmes to highly educated jobseekers tends to generate high take-up among individuals who would have moved even without support. Low-educated jobseekers are less mobile than those with high levels of education (Wozniak, 2010[18]; Notowidigdo, 2020[19]). For example, in the United States, jobseekers with a university degree are 4.5 times more likely to relocate for a job than those without. Closing this mobility gap would require a continuous support payment equivalent to 27% of the monthly wage (Amior, 2024[20]). In absolute terms, such a wage subsidy would equate to USD 10 800 annually for a hypothetical high school graduate earning USD 40 000 per year in the US. For comparison, in 2022, the average gross annual salary of a full-time employee with only compulsory education in Austria was EUR 36 638 (Statistik Austria, 2025[21]). Assuming that the subsidy to bridge the mobility gap between low and highly qualified jobseekers would need to amount to an equal share of income in Austria as in the United States, the necessary continuous subsidy would need to be more than twice the amount of the former relocation incentive (Übersiedlungsbeihilfe). Evidence from Germany further supports the notion that the current financial support is likely to low to incentivise less-educated jobseekers to relocate for employment. A mobility programme offering either a monthly subsidy of EUR 260 for a secondary residence or a lump-sum payment of EUR 4 500 for relocation increased the employment probability 24 months after the programme by 24 percentage points and led to 25% higher wages through relocation among programme participants (Caliendo, Künn and Mahlstedt, 2017[16]). However, the positive effects were entirely concentrated among highly educated male jobseekers.
The payout structure of relocation incentives needs to be designed in a way that helps jobseekers overcome liquidity constraints. A study of the Australian financial relocation incentive programme “RATTUAJ” (Relocation Assistance to Take Up a Job) from 2014 to 2016 demonstrates success in increasing employment for long-term unemployed workers (Australian Government Department of Jobs and Small Business, 2018[15]). However, findings show that limited financial support, the high administrative burden and tight deadlines to receive relocation support may have led to rushed relocations and poorer job matches.3
One-off relocation support can help overcome the initial barriers to moving, but only continuous wage subsidies are likely to support sustainable relocations among less educated jobseekers. Empirical evidence shows that less educated workers are less geographically mobile than highly educated workers, in part because they gain far less from long-distance moves, whereas college-educated workers often experience substantial wage increases when relocating (Amior, 2024[20]; Wozniak, 2010[18]). To foster sustainable moves among less-educated jobseekers, financial incentives would thus have to be designed to provide a continuously higher wage income. Findings from focus group interviews with Viennese jobseekers further support this conclusion. Participants stated that they would need a considerably higher salary to be incentivised to relocate, an aspect not addressed by a one-time payment. For jobseekers residing in Vienna, a lump-sum relocation incentive can thus reduce the upfront costs of moving, but it does not provide the ongoing financial support needed to offset other advantages of remaining in Vienna, discussed in detail in chapter Structural and institutional factors shaping geographic differences in labour market outcomes. A continuous wage subsidy also gives jobseekers an incentive to remain employed throughout the subsidy period, while one-off payments risk that recipients return to their original location once the payment is received and any contractual obligation to stay in the destination has expired.
Country-specific evaluations of mobility programmes show that these instruments can support geographic mobility, employment and, earnings but require the support of caseworkers. In Australia, an evaluation of the RATTUAJ-programme (Relocation Assistance to Take Up a Job) between 2014 to 2016, which only targets long-term unemployed jobseekers, found positive effects over time on employment retention and remaining off welfare support for a narrow cohort of jobseekers. In addition, 71% of programme participants moved to regional areas, underlining the programme’s success in incentivising moves to these areas. Within the evaluation, the authors concluded that relocations were the most successful, when they were well-planned and actively supported by PES caseworkers (Australian Government Department of Jobs and Small Business, 2018[15]).
Training programmes
Training programmes can increase both geographic and occupational labour market mobility. Skills acquisition enlarges the jobseekers’ employment opportunities to other occupations and jobs in other industries. Training programmes may also support employment take-up in other regions, due to differences in the industrial structure and in the regional availability of specific job profiles. By acquiring new skills jobseekers may also benefit from a wage premium to their new skill set, which can make relocations more attractive by (partially) compensating moving costs with higher wages. OECD countries seek to improve the jobseekers’ employability through trainings that enhance both general skills (e.g. digital literacy) and job- or industry-specific skills. These programmes generally show positive effects on employment take-up.
Austria offers programmes that combine industry-specific training with practical experience in a different region, and courses that prepare jobseekers for the application and relocation process to other regions. New Skills courses train jobseekers for positions in a wide range of industries (e.g. IT, care, tourism, and administration) over a period ranging from several weeks to months, followed by a shorter internship in a destination region (Table 3.4). According to AMS staff, this programme is most likely to place jobseekers in another region if the training already takes place in the destination region. Other programmes enable cross-regional employment take-up through mobility-specific coaching and assistance. Specifically, b.mobile supports refugees aged 18-30 in finding an apprenticeship in target industries (e.g. tourism and health) and prepares them for the latter as well as for the relocation. Ticket2West was a pilot programme with a similar approach but focusing on specialised workers in a larger number of industries, including construction, metal works, and utilities.
Note: Ticket2West has been completed as a pilot project in April 2022.
Source: Based on information provided by the AMS.
The strong association between the level of education and geographic mobility suggests that training programmes can increase mobility to some extent despite the lack of strong evidence on the training-mobility link. High-skilled jobseekers are more mobile than their low-skilled counterparts (Amior, 2024[20]; Notowidigdo, 2020[19]), which is driven by the acquisition of skills (Malamud and Wozniak, 2012[22]). In theory, this opens the possibility for training programmes to increase jobseekers’ geographic mobility by providing them with training opportunities, especially in the case of low-skilled jobseekers. While training programmes increase the jobseekers’ chances of finding employment subsequently (Rodríguez-Planas and Jacob, 2009[23]; Kluve, 2010[24]; Eppel et al., 2022[25]), there is no evidence on whether they impact geographic mobility.
Job-specific training programmes, that focus on occupational and technical skills rather than broad general skills tend to have a more positive effect on labour market outcomes of jobseekers. In the short-term, job-specific trainings help unemployed workers find employment faster, which in turn leads to higher initial earnings (Wood, Neels and Vujić, 2024[26]; Stenberg and Westerlund, 2015[27]). These effects are particularly strong if they include workplace experience and feature direct employer engagement (Wood, Neels and Vujić, 2024[26]; Greenstone and Looney, 2011[28]). Conversely, general training, i.e. classroom-based training aimed at general education, motivation and job-search skills, tends to show limited immediate effects but rather yields a long-term positive effect through improved lifetime earnings and more adaptable skillsets (Wood, Neels and Vujić, 2024[26]; Chan and Suen, 2003[29]), in particular for less educated individuals (Stenberg and Westerlund, 2015[27]). Evidence further suggests that integrated approaches, which blend general training with workplace-based, vocational and sector-specific elements yield the best results in regard to sustaining employment and earning outcomes (Greenstone and Looney, 2011[28]; Stenberg and Westerlund, 2015[27]).
Austrian training programmes have incentivised only a limited number of jobseekers to relocate for employment to the West of Austria. B.mobile resulted in 35 cross-regional placements in 2024, while 24 out of 629 persons attending the programme at least once took up employment outside of Vienna through Ticket2West.4 New Skills courses led to 118 placements of jobseekers from Vienna in other regions between 2018 and 2024, ranging from no placements in some years to a maximum of 56 in 2019 (AMS, 2025[30]). Focus group participants reported poor information provision about training programmes and perceived limited efforts by the AMS to place jobseekers into suitable courses. Less-qualified jobseekers noted that available programmes often do not match their interests or career aspirations. Highly qualified jobseekers described the training they received as of limited relevance and pointed to a general lack of support measures for those with higher education. Jobseekers with a migration background reported long waiting times and limited availability of German language courses, which may further reduce their willingness to move to more rural areas where a strong command of German is often essential for employment.
Expand target groups among jobseekers for cross-regional job placement beyond tourism and refugees
The AMS currently classifies only a small share of jobseekers as eligible for cross-regional placement, focusing mainly on less educated jobseekers who can fill positions in the tourism sector. Of the 113 400 jobseekers registered in Vienna in May 2025, only 10 800 were considered for cross-regional placement, 70% of whom are humanitarian migrants. This narrow focus reflects two factors. First, under current legislation, cross-regional placement is permitted only when the employer provides accommodation, effectively restricting placements to the tourism sector, one of the few industries able to meet this requirement. Second, in 2025, 80% of all vacancies in the tourism sector were posted by employers in Austria’s Western federal states, while 45% of jobseekers qualified for these positions were located in Vienna.
Austria could consider expanding its cross-regional placement programme to include registered jobseekers who have recently moved to Vienna and relaxing the requirement for employers to provide accommodation for positions outside the tourism sector. The current focus on less educated jobseekers for tourism only partially addresses labour shortages in Austria’s Western federal states. Interviews with employers in Tyrol and Salzburg indicate that shortages also exist in occupations requiring higher education and skills. To maximise impact, interregional mobility programmes could cover all jobseekers rather than being limited to specific subgroups. In practice, the AMS could classify all jobseekers who have recently relocated to Vienna as eligible for interregional placement, thereby targeting individuals who have already demonstrated mobility and discouraging non-employment-related moves to the capital. Individuals with care obligations or health limitations could continue to be exempt. To further increase cross-regional placements, the requirement for employers to provide accommodation could be relaxed for sectors beyond tourism, where jobs are more stable and often located in areas with larger housing markets. The reform to mobility requirements for those considered eligible for interregional placement could be complemented by financial support to help cover relocation costs.
Enhance information provision through an integrated AMS platform and economy-wide cross-regional job events
The AMS already offers several useful tools to inform jobseekers about employment opportunities in other regions, but integrating these services into a single, comprehensive platform could help reduce information barriers. Drawing inspiration from Canada, the AMS could consolidate its existing online tools into an integrated one-stop shop that provides information on regional labour markets, industries, job profiles, career transitions, training opportunities, and available financial support. This could include tools such as the job barometer(JobBarometer ,occupational and skills trends, regional outlooks), job information system (Berufsinformationssystem, job profiles and required competencies), career compass (Karrierekompass, career and wage information), training compass (Ausbildungskompass, training and education opportunities), and job compass (Berufskompass, career orientation), along with information on financial aid schemes such as the interview and commuting allowance (Entfernungs- und Vorstellungsbeihilfe), and any future relocation incentives. Integrating these resources into a single platform would lower search costs, improve accessibility, and reduce uncertainty about job opportunities in other regions, thereby supporting interregional mobility.
Austria’s cross-regional information initiatives currently focus mainly on the tourism sector, but the AMS could broaden their scope to cover additional industries and regions. While tourism-focused initiatives serve an important purpose to inform Vienna-based jobseekers about opportunities in other federal states, labour shortages also affect other sectors in Western Austria, some of which require higher skills and face greater recruitment challenges. Expanding information and recruitment initiatives to these industries could help reduce uncertainty and align expectations between employers and jobseekers. Existing practices such as cross-regional job fairs and company visits already provide a strong foundation and are in line with good practices in other OECD countries. The Centre for Cross-Regional Placement could use its knowledge of local labour market needs to initiate targeted information campaigns in regions with significant numbers of suitable jobseekers. Local AMS branches, supported by the Centre, could also conduct pre-selection of jobseekers for activities such as company visits to ensure appropriate skill matching in advance.
Strengthen the Centre for Cross-Regional Placement’s role in co-ordinating cross-regional matching efforts and aligning regional skill shortages with targeted training
The AMS could strengthen the Centre for Cross-Regional Placement’s role as a national co‑ordination body to improve cross-regional matching and address information gaps between regional labour markets. Comparative evidence from OECD countries shows that both jobseekers and local caseworkers often struggle to identify suitable candidates for relocation, largely due to limited knowledge of labour market conditions in other regions. Stronger co‑ordination and collaboration between regional AMS branches are therefore needed. The Centre for Cross-Regional Placement could be given greater capacity and responsibility within Austria’s labour mobility strategy to act as an interface between local AMS branches. As a national co‑ordination body, the Centre could monitor complementarities across regional labour markets and help balance occupational shortages and surpluses. In doing so, it would strengthen interregional collaboration, serve as a knowledge resource for local AMS staff, and facilitate more effective cross-regional referrals and recruitment.
The AMS could expand and better target training programmes that address regional skill shortages and promote short-term internships as a way to test cross-regional placements. The Centre for Cross-Regional Placement could work closely with regional AMS offices to identify regional skill and labour shortages and design targeted training programmes. Regional AMS branches could actively select jobseekers for cross-regional matching to ensure strong skill matches, while the Centre could oversee national strategy, co‑ordination and monitoring given the limited capacity of local and regional offices. Existing programmes such as b.mobile and Ticket2West support interregional mobility through occupation-specific training, counselling and relocation assistance to regions with high labour demand, but their scope remains limited in terms of target groups and industries. The New Skills Courses programme helps address these gaps by being open to all jobseekers and covering a wider range of sectors. While it already provides targeted, occupation-specific training, the short internships within these courses could be extended. Evidence from across the OECD shows that such placements improve the quality of labour market matches, a finding echoed by employers in Austria’s Western federal states, as well as jobseekers in Vienna, who both view short internships as good practice for ensuring suitable matches for both jobseekers and employers.
Given the high share of humanitarian migrants among jobseekers in Vienna considered suitable for cross-regional placement, integration and language courses could help prepare them for the labour market and potential relocation. Among jobseekers registered with the AMS in Vienna, around 66% have a migration background, almost all from non-German-speaking countries, and approximately one quarter (27%) are humanitarian migrants. Many job opportunities in other federal states require at least basic German language skills, which strongly influence employment prospects in Austria. To support cross-regional placement, the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF), in co-operation with the AMS, could consider expanding access to integration and language courses specifically for humanitarian migrants.
Re-design financial relocation incentives
A reformed financial relocation incentive in Austria could consist of two components: reimbursement of actual relocation costs and continuous payments to encourage permanent relocation. Comparative evidence from across the OECD suggests that financial incentives are more effective when they reimburse documented moving costs rather than providing a fixed lump-sum payment, as it ensures that funds are used for their intended purpose by recipients (Australian Government Department of Jobs and Small Business, 2018[15]; Westerlund, 1998[31]). The first component could therefore cover verified relocation costs incurred by the jobseeker and their household, offering a more cost-efficient and equitable approach than fixed lump-sum payments, as it reflects distance-related cost differences. To ease liquidity constraints for jobseekers with limited financial means, the AMS could provide this support through vouchers or direct payments to suppliers. A second component, drawing on evidence and practices from Romania and academic research, could take the form of continuous payments to incentivise lasting moves to regions or municipalities facing labour shortages (Amior, 2024[20]; Australian Government Department of Jobs and Small Business, 2018[15]; Molinder, 2022[32]). However, it has to be noted that such continuous support would need to be restricted in duration for fiscal reasons.5 In Austria, this amount could be scaled according to regional labour market needs and distance, reflecting, for example, the imbalance between Vienna and the Western federal states.
Relocation incentives for less educated jobseekers would need to be substantially increased to generate significant macroeconomic effects. As in other OECD countries, less educated individuals in Austria are considerably less mobile than those with higher education. In 2016, a survey of workers aged 15-34 showed that 18% of university graduates in Austria had moved for their current job compared with only 3% of individuals with compulsory education (Statistik Austria, 2017[33]). Similarly, evidence from the United States suggests that jobseekers with a university degree are 4.5 times more likely to relocate for a job across states than those without. Bridging this mobility gap in the United States would require a wage subsidy equivalent to around 27% of annual earnings. For a high-school graduate earning USD 40 000 per year, this would represent roughly USD 10 800, paid out as a monthly wage subsidy (Amior, 2024[20]). Assuming the needed wage subsidy is of equal proportion in Austria, it would need to amount to EUR 9 900 annually for a jobseeker with only compulsory education, earning roughly EUR 36 638 in 2022. While the estimate for the wage subsidy is based on the United States and may not be fully transferable to Austria, it illustrates the scale of support that would be needed to meaningfully affect relocation decisions. Against this background, Austria’s discontinued relocation grant (Übersiedlungsbeihilfe), although comparable in size to similar current and former programmes in Australia (AUD 3 000–6 000), New Zealand (NZD 5 000), Romania (RON 12 500 – 15 000) and Germany (EUR 4 500), was likely far too low to significantly increase mobility among this group.
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← 1. The German PES imposed roughly 749 000 sanctions (Sperrzeiten) in 2023. In the same year, an average of roughly 799 000 unemployed workers received benefits through the German unemployment insurance. It has to be noted, that a benefit recipient may incur multiple sanctions. The main legal grounds for imposing sanctions are delayed registration with the German PES (verspätete Arbeitsuchendmeldung) and voluntary unemployment (Arbeitsaufgabe), which together account for around 75% of all sanctions imposed. However, when it comes to sanctioning refusals related to employment or participation in training programmes, the German PES appears to sanction less frequently. In 2023, 0.8% of all jobseekers were sanctioned for refusing a job offer (Arbeitsablehnung), while 1.9% were sanctioned for refusing a training measure (Ablehnung einer beruflichen Eingliederungsmaßnahme) and 0.5% for abandoning a training programme (Abbruch einer berufl. Eingliederungsmaßnahme) (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2024[34]). Similar categories for sanctions appeared more frequently in Austria in 2024, where 8% of jobseekers were sanctioned for refusing or impeding employment or training (Verweigerung bzw. Vereitlung Arbeit/Schulung) while unwillingness to work (Ablehnungen/Einstellungen mangels Arbeitswilligkeit) accounted for another 0.35%. In addition, the AMS sanctions per diem absences from training programmes, which affected 10.4% of all jobseekers (ORF, 2025[35])
← 2. This study tested whether housing vouchers paired with free mobility counselling can increase relocations to “opportunity neighbourhoods” in the Chicago metropolitan area. The study finds that information provision is most effective when it is specific and immediately actionable rather than through generic, information-heavy materials. This finding is likely to be transferable to interregional labour mobility of jobseekers in the sense, where clear, easily accessible and explicit information on job opportunities and living conditions in destination regions may be the most conducive to labour mobility.
← 3. Findings from the focus group interviews suggest that not only the costs related to moving create a barrier to labour mobility, but also finding suitable accommodation. Some participants mentioned the need for assistance in finding housing, either through the AMS or the employer. For the Australian context, caseworkers provide logistical support for relocations on a case-by-case basis (Australian Government Department of Jobs and Small Business, 2018[15]). The evaluation further recommends formalizing housing guidance, as one of its findings shows that poorly planned relocations often lead to hardship and weaker labour market outcomes.
← 4. An additional 48 were placed in Vienna.
← 5. A continuous but time-limited wage subsidy would mitigate the issues linked to one-off payments. If a recipient leaves the job voluntarily or is dismissed for misconduct within a defined period, the subsidy can simply stop, whereas a lump-sum payment would require repayment. This reduces the administrative burden for the AMS and likely increases its cost-efficiency. Moreover, the support could be capped to a set number of months, giving jobseekers the option to use it across several episodes of seasonal employment or to use it all at once to support a more long-term relocation