This chapter examines how evolving global and domestic conditions are shaping capital market development across Africa amid tighter global financial conditions, heightened geopolitical uncertainty and growing external financing constraints. It provides a broad overview of capital market developments across the continent and highlights the role of deeper and more diversified markets in strengthening financial resilience, mobilising domestic savings and supporting long-term investment. It also considers how broader investor participation, enhanced market liquidity, and greater regional integration can strengthen the capacity of financial systems to absorb external shocks and maintain financing continuity.
Africa Capital Markets Report 2026
Abstract
The global macro-financial environment remained challenging in 2025 and into 2026, shaped by geopolitical tensions, tightening monetary conditions, and heightened uncertainty over trade policy and the international economic outlook. These developments contributed to higher volatility and risk premia across international financial markets, compounded by several international economic shocks, including a sudden shift in the international trade context in April 2025 and the rapid spike in energy prices following the outbreak of the Middle East conflict in February 2026. Monetary easing in several economies during 2025 had improved financing conditions, but a renewed energy shock complicated the outlook for inflation and interest rates.
Major African capital markets were affected by these developments through multiple transmission channels. Changes in global risk appetite influenced investor demand for African securities, while higher energy costs put pressure on fiscal positions and corporate cash flows, increasing financing challenges in some markets. Despite the pressures, major African capital markets generally absorbed these shocks well, demonstrating relative resilience across several dimensions. Equity market valuations, for example, fell across most of these jurisdictions at the onset of the Middle East conflict, but subsequently stabilised or rebounded (Figure 1.1).
Note: Data refers to national equity indices. The indices used are respectively EGX 100 EWI IDX, GHANA COMPOSITE GSE-CI, KENYA NAIROBI SE (NSE20), MOROCCO ALL SHARE (MASI), MSCI NIGERIA, TUNISIA TUNINDEX, and FTSE/JSE ALL SHARES. The series are rebased to 100 to facilitate comparison over time and across countries.
Source: LSEG.
African equity markets recorded broadly positive performance across several jurisdictions in 2025 and early 2026, alongside reforms and initiatives to continue efforts to strengthen primary market activity and capital formation. While the region's equity markets remain relatively small and concentrated, they outperformed both emerging and global markets in 2025, with growth driven largely by higher valuations and equity issuance above the recent average (Figure 1.2, Panel A). Corporate debt issuance also stood above the recent trend (Figure 1.2, Panel B), although corporate bond activity remained concentrated in a small number of jurisdictions and substantially underused in comparison to the rest of the world. A more detailed assessment of recent equity market developments and corporate debt markets, and their implications for financial resilience is provided in Chapters 2 and 3.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; FactSet; Bloomberg, see annexes 2.A and 3.A for details.
The impact of global shocks varied across African economies, reflecting differences in reliance on external financing, market depth, currency exposures and commodity dependence. Sovereign bond yields also came under pressure, with 10-year government bond yields rising across some of the largest African issuers by an average of 7.7% from the beginning of the Middle East conflict, in many cases reversing slightly the downward trend in yields observed over the course of 2025 (Figure 1.3). Shorter borrowing maturities increased the frequency at which higher yields feed into sovereign refinancing costs. Average maturities on new domestic-currency debt in sub-Saharan Africa fell from over six years in 2019 to about 3.5 years in 2024, excluding maturities below one year (IMF, 2025[1]). Higher sovereign borrowing costs increase the cost of long-term financing and can further constrain access to international capital markets. As sovereign yields serve as benchmark rates for the broader economy, sustained increases can also raise financing costs for firms and thereby influence private sector investment decisions.
Note: Data refers to yields on domestic-currency sovereign bonds. For Egypt and Morocco, data are based on 10-year benchmark bond yields. The series are rebased to 100 to facilitate comparison over time and across countries.
Source: Bloomberg; LSEG.
Exchange rate developments provide a further indication of how African financial markets responded to the global macro-financial environment. Prior to the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East, exchange rates across the selected African economies were generally stable, with some currencies appreciating against the US dollar. Following the outbreak of the conflict, several of the currencies weakened against the US dollar, although the extent of the depreciation varied across economies (Figure 1.4). In this context, for some economies local-currency borrowing reduced borrowers’ exposure to exchange-rate risk. In South Africa, foreign investors purchase domestically issued rand-denominated bonds in large quantities, enabling borrowers to obtain financing from foreign investors in domestic currency and thereby reducing their exposure to exchange-rate risk; however, this remains an exception among African economies (BIS, 2026[2]). This broad weakening is relevant to capital market resilience where economies and market participants have significant foreign-currency financing or refinancing exposures, underscoring the importance of developing deeper local-currency capital markets as a means of broadening domestic currency financing and reducing reliance on foreign currency.
Note: Data refers to FX rates to USD. The series are rebased to 100 to facilitate comparison over time and across countries.
Source: LSEG.
Global inflation continued to moderate in 2025, including across Africa, where average inflation declined from around 21% to 13%, close to its ten-year average (IMF, 2026[3]). The regional aggregate conceals a wide distribution, with a median inflation rate in sub-Saharan Africa at 3.4% in 2025, reflecting the influence of a smaller group of high-inflation economies. Notwithstanding, inflation remained high in many African economies, continuing to weaken purchasing power and putting upward pressure on central bank policy rates (Figure 1.5). Exchange rates, food supply disruptions, and adjustments to domestic prices continued to reinforce inflationary pressures. Reflecting this, the monetary policy stance remained largely restrictive in key economies within the region, flowing through to sovereign funding costs and tightening the availability of credit to firms and households. Preserving lower and more stable and predictable inflation is especially relevant as households’ willingness to hold long-term assets depends on confidence in their future purchasing power.
Source: IMF (2026[4]), inflation rate dataset, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/CIS/AFQ
Increased energy prices are a key channel through which recent external shocks affect inflation dynamics, compounded by the structural importance of energy to economic activity. Going into 2026, rising oil and gas prices, in particular, have had a significant impact on African markets, where oil makes up 26% of the total energy supply mix, and natural gas accounts for 46% of electricity generation (IEA, 2026[5]). While the vast majority of African countries are net energy importers, the transmission to domestic fuel prices across Africa has been uneven, reflecting differences in domestic pricing regimes, fiscal space available for support measures and exchange-rate conditions. Average diesel prices across 42 African countries were around 25% higher in mid-June 2026 than in mid-January, increasing by more than 40% in several, including an 86% increase in Nigeria in local-currency terms (IFPRI, 2026[6]).
The global trade environment underwent a significant shift over the course of 2025, characterised by an intensification in trade policy activity and growing tensions between major trading partners, which led to the introduction of a record number of new trade measures (WTO, 2025[7]). While these developments heightened uncertainty in global trade, particularly for agricultural and manufacturing exporters, African export performance remained broadly resilient. Across the 16 African economies reviewed, export values increased in 14 economies between 2024 and 2025, particularly in those with stronger agricultural and mineral exports through increases in commodity prices, with differences driven largely by export composition (Figure 1.6). However, this overall rise in exports masks underlying vulnerabilities. In several economies, export earnings remain highly concentrated in a limited number of sectors or commodities, leaving them exposed to shifts in global demand, commodity price volatility, and changes in international trade policies.
Source: WTO (2025[8]), merchandise exports dataset, https://stats.wto.org/?idSavedQuery=93b2c582-0487-40eb-8927-1bc90818ab78
At the same time, the composition of external financing to Africa has evolved, with mobilised private finance by public interventions, and public non-concessional flows playing an increasingly important role alongside official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI). While ODA has moderated from its 2020 peak (Figure 1.7), the decline remained relatively gradual until recently, before accelerating sharply, declining by 26.3% across sub-Saharan Africa in 2025, and is projected to fall further by 11.6% in 2026 (OECD, 2026[9]). FDI also contracted significantly following the COVID-19 pandemic and has not fully recovered. Meanwhile, international sovereign bond issuance has become more sporadic and remains below pre-pandemic levels. These shifts in the composition and availability of external financing have important implications for the macro-financial environment and for the ability of African economies to mobilise capital as global financial conditions evolve. They underscore the growing need for developing deeper domestic capital markets capable of mobilising local savings, broadening financing options, and supporting more resilient and long-term oriented growth.
Capital markets can strengthen economic resilience by diversifying sources of financing and enabling economies to absorb and adjust to financial and external shocks (OECD, 2025[11]). Across 45 African economies over 1997-2017, greater financial market depth was found to be significantly associated with lower growth volatility and more stable economic activity (Avom et al., 2021[12]). Deeper domestic markets can reduce reliance on a narrow set of financing sources, while greater use of local currency and longer-term market-based financing can reduce exposure to exchange rate and external refinancing risks. More liquid, diversified markets can also facilitate the reallocation of capital when financial conditions change, while a diversity of investors provides a range of preferences around duration, with long-term investors such as insurers and pension funds less sensitive to short-term shocks. These channels are particularly important in Africa, where domestic capital markets remain relatively shallow, and many economies remain exposed to external financing conditions and have limited access to bank credit. Companies with access to established and diversified financing sources have greater scope to adapt their funding mix while maintaining investment, employment and production.
Analysis across African economies, covering country-specific recessions identified between 1960 and 2025, suggests a positive relationship between capital market depth prior to a recession and economic resilience during the subsequent recession. The resilience benefits of capital market development therefore depend not only on the overall size of the markets, but also on the availability of different instruments, maturities, currencies and investor bases through which financing can be mobilised.
Figure 1.8 compares the depth of capital markets in the year preceding each country-specific recession with the magnitude of the economic contraction experienced during the recession. It indicates that economies with deeper capital markets generally experienced more moderate contractions than those with less developed markets. This pattern is consistent with the role of deeper capital markets in mobilising domestic financing, cushioning shifts in external financing conditions, and sustaining the allocation of capital during periods of economic stress. By broadening access to financing and diversifying funding sources, deeper capital markets can help maintain investment and economic activity when other channels of finance become constrained. While the relationship should not be interpreted as evidence of causality, it suggests that the depth of domestic capital markets can be an important component of economic resilience and macro-financial stability.
Diversification within capital markets can further strengthen economic resilience by providing alternative financing channels alongside bank lending and sovereign borrowing, while broader domestic and regional investor bases can improve the stability and availability of financing. The resilience benefits of diversified capital markets, however, also depend on the institutional and macroeconomic frameworks underpinning their function. Evidence from 45 African economies over 1997-2017 finds that stronger regulatory quality was significantly associated with lower growth volatility and more stable economic activity (Avom et al., 2021[12]). Strong government effectiveness can also support the credibility and predictability of public policy and its implementation, as well as the broader regulatory environment, helping markets to function more effectively and economies to respond more efficiently to periods of stress. Predictable and credible institutional frameworks can also strengthen investor confidence and support participation in capital markets. Chapters 2 and 3 examine these institutional foundations in greater detail, including how they serve as a precondition for certain market activities, and how alignment with international practices can support investor confidence and contribute to stronger and more resilient capital markets.
Note: OECD calculations for both axes. The Y-axis measures the average depth of capital markets between 2007-2025 during the last year preceding each country-specific recession, based on market capitalisation of listed domestic companies, outstanding corporate bonds, and outstanding sovereign bonds, adjusted by GDP. The X-axis measures the inverse of the average economic contraction during each country-specific recession between 1960-2025, based on GDP per capita. Recessions are identified using the Harding-Pagan economic cycle algorithm.
Source: OECD, Capital Market dataset; LSEG; World Bank, Market Capitalisation of listed companies dataset (2026[13]), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD, GDP dataset (2026[14]), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, GDP per capita dataset (2026[15]), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD
These institutional foundations are particularly relevant to the development and resilience of public equity markets. Analysis across African economies suggests that stronger government effectiveness prior to a recession is associated with greater economic resilience during the subsequent downturn (Figure 1.9). Economies entering a recession with stronger government effectiveness experienced smaller economic contractions, suggesting that institutional capacity may influence an economy's ability to absorb and respond to shocks. While this relationship does not establish causality, it highlights the importance of effective institutions and credible policy frameworks as foundations for resilient capital markets and broader economic resilience.
Note: The Y-axis measures the average Government effectiveness between 1996-2025 during the last year preceding each country-specific recession. It is based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The X-axis measures the inverse of the average economic contraction during each country-specific recession between 1960-2025. It is based on GDP per capita. Recessions are identified using the Harding-Pagan economic cycle algorithm.
Source: World Bank, GDP per capita dataset (2026[15]), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD, Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset (2026[16]), https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators/interactive-data-access
1.2.1. Opportunities to further strengthen resilience
The relative resilience of major African economies in the face of a challenging external and macro-financial environment reflects, in part, ongoing market reforms, expanding domestic investor participation, and continued development of market infrastructure. However, market activity remains uneven, with Africa accounting for just 0.4% of global market capitalisation in 2024 (OECD, 2025[11]). Shallow domestic markets, limited liquidity and continued reliance on bank financing and external official financing remain important structural features of capital market development across the continent. At the same time, the relatively modest scale of Africa’s capital markets contrasts with the pool of domestic financial resources already accumulated across the continent, suggesting an important opportunity to strengthen the deployment of domestic capital through the capital markets.
Domestic capital pools refer to financial assets accumulated within African economies that can potentially be mobilised to finance investment through domestic and regional financial markets. They comprise assets held across banking systems, public development banks, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, insurance companies, other financial intermediaries, and central bank reserves. Across Africa, these domestic capital pools are estimated to exceed USD 4.4 trillion (AFC, 2026[17]). They represent a pool of financial resources already accumulated within African economies which, if more effectively deployed and intermediated through domestic and regional capital markets, could provide a significant source of longer-term financing for productive investment while strengthening financial resilience.
The scale of these pools is particularly relevant in a context of constrained external financing and heightened global uncertainty. Although Africa's domestic capital pools remain modest relative to the largest global financial markets, they represent a meaningful pool of resources in aggregate, accounting for around 0.9% of global financial assets (Figure 1.10).
Note: OECD calculations, with Africa’s aggregate outstandings divided by global aggregate outstandings. Shares are based on the latest source year available.
Source: World Bank, GDP dataset (2026[14]), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD; FSB (2025[18]), Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2025, https://www.fsb.org/2025/12/global-monitoring-report-on-nonbank-financial-intermediation-2025/; Global SWF (2026[19]), State Owned Investors dashboard, https://globalswf.com/; Finance in Common (2026[20]), Public Development Banks at a Glance, https://financeincommon.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/TWO%20PAGERS-%20Digital%20Version_2026.pdf; AFC (2026[17]), State of Africa’s Infrastructure Report 2026, https://www.africafc.org/our-impact/our-publications/state-of-africas-infrastructure-report-2026.
This combination of a domestic asset base and limited capital-market intermediation points to an important opportunity to strengthen the channels through which domestic financial resources are allocated to productive investment, thereby deepening capital markets and enhancing economic resilience. The role of pension funds and insurance companies within these domestic capital pools, and their potential contribution to capital market development and financial resilience, is examined further in Chapter 6.
1.2.2. Key constraints to domestic capital market development
While African capital markets continue to develop, several structural constraints remain relevant to the mobilisation of capital through these markets. Market depth and liquidity remain highly concentrated, with South Africa exhibiting substantially greater market depth than other African markets, with a market-depth score of 98 compared with 61 for Morocco and Mauritius, and 51 for Nigeria, while many other markets score considerably lower (Absa, 2025[21]). The market-depth score provides an indication of the size and liquidity of a country's capital markets relative to the size of its economy, with higher scores indicating greater market depth. This variation in market depth highlights scope for further development across a wider range of African markets, particularly by strengthening liquidity, broadening the investor base, and expanding access to market-based financing for firms. These features, together with recent areas of increased market activity, are discussed further in Chapter 3.
Institutional investor bases and demand for private sector securities remain uneven (OECD, 2025[11]), while elevated public debt and refinancing requirements have increased domestic sovereign issuance across several African economies. This can support market development by establishing benchmarks and strengthening liquidity (OECD, 2025[11]), but a high concentration of financing in sovereign instruments can limit the capacity of domestic markets to support private sector issuers where competition for capital is strong.
Sovereign credit vulnerabilities can also affect the funding conditions of regional financial institutions that play an important role in financing private sector activity. This transmission was illustrated in 2025 when Fitch Ratings downgraded the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) from BBB to BBB- with a negative outlook. The downgrade reflected Fitch's assessment of increased credit risks and weaker risk management, while the negative outlook reflected the risk that debt owed to Afreximbank by some sovereign borrowers could be subject to restructuring (Fitch Ratings, 2025[22]). The downgrade shows how sovereign credit risks can extend beyond government financing conditions to affect the creditworthiness and funding conditions of financial institutions, with implications for their ability to provide trade and infrastructure financing. The role of sovereign bond markets in supporting capital market development, managing financial risks, and strengthening resilience is discussed further in Chapter 4.
African equity markets recorded broadly positive performance across several jurisdictions in 2025 and early 2026, alongside continuing efforts to strengthen primary market activity and capital formation. While the region's equity markets remain relatively small and concentrated, they outperformed both emerging and global markets in 2025, with growth driven largely by higher valuations and secondary offerings from existing listed companies.
Beyond market performance, a number of countries advanced reforms and initiatives aimed at deepening domestic securities markets. Several frontier markets strengthened the foundations for securities market development. Ethiopia launched the Ethiopian Securities Exchange (Ethiopian Securities Exchange, 2025[23]), establishing initial trading infrastructure and a framework for domestic securities market activity. Somalia similarly progressed with the establishment of the National Securities Exchange of Somalia (United Nations Security Council, 2025[24]), marking an early step towards formalising securities market activity. At the other end of the development spectrum, South Africa continued to demonstrate deeper capital market development, with active equity issuance and notable primary market transactions, most notably the listing of Optasia (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2025[25]).
A further example of efforts to renew primary market activity was also evident in Kenya. Recent listings, including that of the Kenya Pipeline Company, a state-owned enterprise (SOE), reflect efforts to reinvigorate initial public offering activity following an extended period of subdued issuance (Kenya Pipeline, 2026[26]). More broadly, the use of capital markets by SOEs can support capital mobilisation, broaden ownership, and strengthen governance and financial transparency, with implications for financial resilience. These issues are discussed further in Chapter 5.
1.3.1. Digitalisation can expand access to capital markets
Digitalisation is increasingly supporting financial access and participation across African financial markets. The share of adults holding an account with a financial institution or mobile-money provider has increased across many African economies (Figure 1.11), indicating broader access to formal financial services and a potentially wider base for participation in financial markets. The expansion of digital financial services can also reduce geographic and other access barriers to financial products and information, creating new channels through which individuals can participate in capital markets. This is particularly relevant in markets where traditional channels for accessing financial products remain limited (OECD, 2026[27]).
In particular, digital platforms are being used to support retail participation in capital markets by reducing the costs and practical barriers associated with opening investment accounts and potentially enabling more first-time and retail investors to participate formally in capital markets. In Nigeria, for example, the Nigerian Exchange Group has used digital platforms to improve financial literacy, increase market accessibility and deepen retail investor participation (Nigerian Exchange Group, 2026[28]), including through digital engagement initiatives targeting young and first-time investors. Other initiatives to strengthen financial literacy and investor participation across African markets are discussed in Chapter 7.
Note: Percentage of people aged 15 and over reporting that they have an account at a bank or other financial institution or used a mobile money service in the last 12 months.
Source: World Bank (2025[29]), Global Findex dataset, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS
1.3.2. Crypto-asset adoption and evolving regulatory frameworks
The growing use of digital financial services, including crypto-assets, points to an increasingly digitally engaged retail user base that could provide opportunities to broaden and diversify participation in financial markets. This has been accompanied by progress in the development of regulatory frameworks, with 13 of the 16 African economies analysed having either adopted or progressed regulatory frameworks applicable to crypto-assets. Chapter 8 provides a detailed assessment of these regulatory frameworks across the jurisdictions covered in the chapter.
Since the publication of the OECD Africa Capital Markets Report in 2025, several jurisdictions have made further progress in developing these frameworks. In Ghana, the Bank of Ghana has developed a regulatory framework for crypto-assets, with safeguarding financial stability identified as one of its objectives (Bank of Ghana, 2025[30]). In Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion, in collaboration with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the Financial Intelligence Unit, has developed or progressed a framework for crypto-asset and virtual asset service providers (Zimbabwe Legal Information Institute, 2025[31]). In Kenya, the National Treasury of Kenya, in collaboration with the Central Bank of Kenya and the Capital Markets Authority, has similarly progressed its framework (National Treasury of Kenya, 2026[32]). These developments, alongside the broader implications of growing crypto- asset and stablecoin activity for financial intermediation, investor participation, market development and financial resilience, are explored further in Chapter 8.
1.3.3. Regional integration and market connectivity as important pillars of capital market development
Efforts to strengthen connectivity between national exchanges have continued to advance. The African Exchanges Linkage Project (AELP) aims to facilitate cross-border trading and improve market connectivity across participating exchanges, with the potential to strengthen market liquidity through greater integration. Consistent with this objective, AELP-participating markets recorded an increase in turnover ratio between 2023 and 2024, while non-participating markets recorded a decline (Figure 1.12). The difference is suggestive of a possible association between greater regional integration and market activity, although it does not establish a causal relationship and may also reflect differences in market structure and other factors across the two groups. More recently, regional benchmark and infrastructure initiatives, including the East Africa Exchanges 20 Share Index and the second phase of the East African Community Capital Markets infrastructure platform, have aimed to enhance comparability, interoperability and cross-border trading, further supporting the development of more integrated regional capital markets.
Source: World Bank (2025[33]), Stocks traded dataset, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR; AELP (2026[34]), Participating exchanges, https://africanexchangeslink.com/
1.3.4. The sustainable finance ecosystem is becoming more established
Sustainable finance continued to expand across African capital markets, creating opportunities to develop new financing instruments and deepen domestic capital markets. As highlighted in the previous edition of this report, meeting climate transition investment needs could require substantial growth in corporate bond markets, particularly in the energy sector. Under a capital-market-driven scenario, energy bond markets would need to grow by an estimated 20.4% annually in North Africa and 14.9% in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) between 2024 and 2050. The expansion of sustainable finance can potentially support not only the financing of climate-related investment, but also the development of deeper and more diversified capital markets (OECD, 2025[11]).
South Africa remains the continent’s most developed sustainable finance market, with a comparatively advanced climate finance ecosystem, institutional investor base and regulatory framework (Climate Policy Initiative, 2025[35]). At the same time, a growing number of other jurisdictions advanced sustainable finance initiatives, indicating a gradual broadening of participation beyond more established markets. Nigeria issued its third sovereign green bond in 2025 to finance renewable energy and climate-resilient infrastructure projects (Ministry of Information and National Orientation, 2025[36]). Kenya advanced its sustainable finance framework architecture, including further development of its green bond framework and related capital market guidelines (Central Bank of Kenya, 2025[37]). Regional initiatives, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Green Bonds Programme, also continued to support the development of sustainable finance standards and institutional capacity across multiple jurisdictions. The programme launched SADC Green and Sustainable Bond Guidelines and supported the development of green bond listing guidelines, issuer pipelines and market capacity across the region. Together, these developments illustrate the growing integration of sustainable finance into national and regional capital-market frameworks, with implications for capital-market development and financial resilience. These implications are discussed further in Chapter 9.
1.3.5. Continued progress provides a foundation for further capital market development
Taken together, these developments point to gradual progress in the depth, participation and connectivity of African capital markets. Progress remains uneven, however, and translating these initiatives into deeper, more liquid and resilient capital markets will require continued efforts to broaden investor participation, strengthen market infrastructure and improve the mobilisation of long-term domestic savings. The thematic chapters that follow examine these developments in greater detail and consider the policy and market measures that can help African economies deepen their capital markets, broaden participation and strengthen their resilience.
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[8] WTO (2025), Merchandise Exports, https://stats.wto.org/?idSavedQuery=93b2c582-0487-40eb-8927-1bc90818ab78.
[31] Zimbabwe Legal Information Institute (2025), Finance Act, https://zimlii.org/akn/zw/act/2025/7/eng@2025-12-29 (accessed on 4 September 2026).