This chapter offers recommendations to strengthen the institutional architecture for integrity in the Dominican Republic. Proposals include reinforcing the independence of the Directorate General of Ethics and Government Integrity, establishing an inter-institutional co-ordination mechanism and a national system on integrity and transparency. The chapter also recommends reforming the Government Integrity and Regulatory Compliance Commissions in public entities and provides guidance on how to reach local administrations. Finally, it recommends implementing evidence-based and participatory national integrity strategies.
OECD Integrity Review of the Dominican Republic
Implementing a Strategic Vision for Public Integrity and Anti-Corruption
Abstract
Ensuring public integrity means upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector (OECD, 2017[1]). Achieving a culture of integrity is a challenge for all countries, yet it is vital for maintaining citizens’ trust in state institutions and democracy, and for guaranteeing the efficiency of public spending and the effectiveness of public policies. Strong integrity systems protect countries against corruption, fraud and waste, contribute to safeguarding citizens’ health, safety, education and quality of life and strengthens the resilience of countries against organised crime and other threats (OECD, 2024[2]; OECD, 2026[3]).
A strong integrity system acknowledges that purely punitive strategies are not enough to deal with these challenges. While detecting and sanctioning cases of wrongdoing is necessary, prevention measures often do not get the attention and resources they deserve. Therefore, the 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity highlights, first, the relevance of an integrity system that allows for a co-ordinated strategic approach with clear rules and responsibilities. Second, the need to go beyond laws and create a culture of integrity in the public sector while acknowledging the co-responsibility of the whole of society. Third, that accountability mechanisms must be established to manage risks and to identify and sanction wrongdoing (Figure 1.1).
Source: (OECD, 2017[1])
This Integrity Review examines the Dominican Republic's progress, challenges and risks related to integrity and anti-corruption. It identifies gaps in the regulatory framework and in its implementation and proposes recommendations to strengthen the country's integrity system. The following nine chapters of this Integrity Review cover all the principles set out in the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity. This first chapter analyses the institutional architecture of the Dominican integrity system. Chapter 2 examines how conflict of interest is managed in the public sector. Chapter 3 focuses on building of a culture of integrity in the public administration through training, meritocratic processes, integrity leadership and the promotion of open organisational cultures. Chapter 4 explores transparency and access to information. Chapter 5 analyses how citizens, the private sector and civil society are contribute to upholding and promoting a culture of integrity in the country. Chapter 6 analyses risk management frameworks as well as internal and external audit. Chapter 7 focuses on reporting mechanisms and whistleblower protection, as well as on how corruption and integrity violations are investigated and sanctioned. Chapter 8 examines the regulation of lobbying activities and Chapter 9 analyses political financing mechanisms.
1.1.1. Strengthening the integrity system can make the Dominican Republic more resilient and prepared to face recent and emerging contextual challenges
Over the past decades, corruption scandals in the Dominican Republic had impacted the credibility of its governments and undermined citizens' trust. However, in recent years the country has made significant efforts to advance in promoting public integrity, learning from international good practices. These reforms are the starting point for this Integrity Review.
Today, the country’s commitment to public integrity is at the heart of government policy. Reflecting this commitment, the Dominican Republic agreed to be measured by the OECD's Public Integrity Indicators (PIIs), which assess the performance of countries in relation to key variables established in the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity. The PII do not provide an aggregate score, but rather evidence regulatory and implementation gaps. For instance, the PIIs show that the Dominican Republic currently does not have a strategic framework for public integrity. Consequently, the Dominican Republic decided to start developing its first National Integrity Strategy, with methodological support provided by the OECD, based on this Integrity Review and following the criteria underpinning the “Quality of strategic framework” indicators of the PII. Most recently, the President of the Republic publicly reaffirmed the country’s commitment to adhere to the highest standards of integrity at the opening of the 2026 OECD Global Anti-Corruption and Integrity Forum.
The progress made over the last decade is reflected in rankings by international organisations such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), in which the country has achieved a statistically significant increase of 6 points on a scale of 0-100 between 2016 (31 points) and 2025 (37 points). Similarly, the country’s score increased from 32 to 42 points out of 100 between 2014 and 2024 on the World Bank's “Control of Corruption” indicator (World Bank, 2025[4]). The country’s position in the Capacity to Combat Corruption Index in Latin America based on three categories: legal capacity, democracy and political institutions, and society and media, has also strongly improved: the country moved from rank 13 (out of 15) in 2020 to rank 5 (out of 15) in 2023 (Winter and Aalbers, 2023[5]).
Dominicans themselves have noticed improvements. In the 2022-2023 Democratic Culture Survey launched by the former Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development (Ministerio de Economía, Planificación y Desarrollo, MEPyD), the proportion of people who believe corruption in the country increased in the last year fell from 79% to 54% between 2018 and 2020 (Oliva Álvarez and Cañete Alonso, 2024[6]). Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 below show that the public sector in the Dominican Republic is held in relatively high esteem by its inhabitants. They perceive that the government makes decisions in an informed, collaborative and participatory manner is above the OECD average (Figure 1.2). Levels of trust in institutions and the civil service are higher than the Latin American average, with a higher proportion of people believing that public servants put the common interest before private interests (Figure 1.3) (OECD, 2025[7]).
Percentage of people who agree with these statements
Note: The OECD average for the indicator on “Percentage of people who believe their government collaborates with other actors to face long-term challenges” is not available as it was included in the 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC but not in the 2023 Trust Survey for all OECD countries.
Source: Adapted from (OECD, 2025[7])
Note: The first set of three columns show the percentage of people who responded between 6-10 to the question “On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust ...”. The last set of three columns show the proportion of people who agree with each statement.
Source: Adapted from (OECD, 2025[7])
However, it is vital to demonstrate that the recent achievements are sustainable and that the country continues to address impunity as well as regulatory and implementation gaps. A strengthened integrity system can make the Dominican Republic more resilient and prepared to face recent and emerging contextual challenges.
First, drug trafficking in the country has intensified in recent years. Narcotics seizures suggest that, after a lull of several decades, the Caribbean region is once again part of the strategic cocaine trafficking route from South America to Europe, where cocaine use has doubled between 2011 and 2023 (UNODC, 2023[8]; Torrusio, 2024[9]). Corruption is an important tool for criminal groups to consolidate power, strengthen their licit and illicit business interests and gain market advantages (OECD, 2026[3]). Figure 1.4 shows that, similar to the region, 48.5% of citizens in the Dominican Republic cite Crime/Violence as the most relevant policy issue, closely followed by corruption (41.1%) and rising prices (40.2%) (OECD, 2025[7]).
Share of population who view the listed policy issue as among the three most important ones facing their country, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the unweighted Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and OECD averages of the share of people who select the respective answer choice in response to the question “What do you think are the three most important issues facing [COUNTRY]?”. Immigration was not a response option in Mexico and Norway. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD, including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC countries.
Source: Adapted from the 2023 OECD Trust Survey and (OECD, 2025[7]).
Second, the country’s geography and location make its population, economy and infrastructure particularly vulnerable to climate risks such as floods, cyclones, forest fires, extreme temperatures and water scarcity (GFDRR, 2025[10]; World Bank, 2023[11]). Undue influence by vested interests in policymaking could undermine passing effective legislation or policies to address these challenges (OECD, 2017[12]; OECD, 2021[13]). Corruption could lead to approval of projects that violate environmental regulations or fail to meet climate change mitigation and adaptation goals, undermine the implementation of environmental regulations and facilitate environmental crimes such as illegal logging, mining or trafficking in protected flora and fauna (GI-TOC, 2023[14]). Environmental corruption accelerates the degradation of ecosystems and generates public health risks (UNODC/World Bank, 2024[15]; Gverdtsiteli and Martinez B. Kukutschka, 2025[16]).
Third, the political instability in Haiti continues to be a challenge. Haiti’s vulnerable population could become victim to abuses by both Haitian and Dominican authorities, especially at the border, with implications for integrity in the Dominican Republic (Matera et al., 2019[17]).
1.1.2. The regulatory framework of the Dominican Republic for integrity has been strengthened but some gaps remain and the institutional set up can be further improved
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity highlights that commitment is also demonstrated by ensuring that the public integrity system “defines, supports, controls and enforces public integrity, and is integrated into the wider public management and governance framework” and that “appropriate legislative and institutional frameworks are in place to enable public-sector organisations to take responsibility for effectively managing the integrity of their activities” (OECD, 2017[1]).
The Dominican Republic has a range of laws and regulations governing matters related to integrity (Table 1.1). The country is a signatory to several international treaties such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) and the Inter-American Action Plan on Democratic Governance. These commitments are reflected in Article 146 of the country's Constitution, prohibiting the abuse of a public position to extract State funds or to obtain benefits for oneself or a third party.
Source: OECD author’s elaboration.
While the regulatory framework for integrity has been strengthened in recent years, there are still gaps that need to be addressed. For example, the country has no legislation governing the integrity and transparency of lobbying activities, yet a draft bill to regulate lobbying in the Dominican Republic is pending at the Senate (Bill No. 00360-2020). This and other regulatory gaps will be reviewed in depth in later chapters in this Integrity Review.
Fostering integrity also involves several public sector actors playing various roles as part of a national integrity system (Table 1.2). Although civil society and the private sector share a joint responsibility to generate a culture of integrity (see Chapter 5), public entities are the key drivers of public integrity. These include institutions, units or individuals responsible for implementing, developing and enforcing integrity policies, as well as complementary actors performing core support functions for integrity, such as public finance, external audit, human resources management or public procurement (OECD, 2022[18]).
In the Dominican Republic, the main institutional actors whose functions will be examined in this Integrity Review are the following:
The governing body for ethics, transparency, open government, combating corruption, conflict of interest and access to information in the governmental administrative sphere is the Directorate General of Ethics and Government Integrity (Dirección General de Ética e Integridad Gubernamental, DIGEIG). It reports to the Ministry of the Presidency (Ministerio de la Presidencia) and its role will be examined in more detail in this chapter and throughout the Integrity Review.
The Ministry of Public Administration (Ministerio de Administración Pública, MAP) is responsible for public employment, institutional reinforcement in the Public Administration and institutional management processes. The Ministry’s National Institute of Public Administration (Instituto Nacional de la Administración Pública, INAP) regulates the subsystem for the training, capacity building and career development of public servants. In addition to its capacity building functions, the MAP has a role in the Ethics and Disciplinary Regime (see Chapters 2 and 7).
The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, CGR), a body of the executive branch, is responsible for internal control policies, performing internal audits, monitoring the collection, management, use and investment of public resources, and authorising payment orders. Since 2021, the CGR has an Anti-Fraud Unit which performs special administrative investigations. The functioning of the CGR and the internal audit units will be examined in Chapter 6.
The Specialised Prosecutor's Office for the Prosecution of Administrative Corruption (Procuraduría Especializada de Persecución de la Corrupción Administrativa, PEPCA) belongs to the Public Prosector’s Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República o Ministerio Público, PGR-MP) and is an organ of the justice system. The mandate of the PEPCA includes: establishing the policy for prosecuting cases of administrative corruption, co-ordinating with all Public Prosecutor Offices the processing of cases, assuming, if necessary, the investigation within their area of expertise, maintaining a record of cases processed within their area, assisting in or assuming the processing of cases involving administrative corruption and providing specialised technical assistance and support to representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office. Co-operation and exchange of information for law enforcement purposes will be addressed in Chapter 7.
The Chamber of Accounts of the Dominican Republic (Cámara de Cuentas de la República Dominicana, CCRD), an autonomous body with constitutional powers, is the Dominican Republic’s Supreme Audit Institution (SAI). The CCRD carries out external audits of public funds, administrative processes and public assets. Since the enactment of Law No. 311-2014, it is also responsible for ensuring that asset declarations are completed and verified (see Chapter 2). The audit and control functions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
The Central Electoral Board (Junta Central Electoral, JCE) is a constitutional body with powers to oversee and manage electoral processes, compliance with regulations on political financing and the accountability of political parties. This will be examined in Chapter 9.
The institutions of the legislative branch (the bicameral National Congress) and the judicial branch, including the National Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura), the Supreme Court (Suprema Corte de Justicia) and the Judicial Council (Consejo del Poder Judicial), are key to maintaining the separation of powers and ensure accountability.
Other institutional actors with relevant integrity roles include the Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), the Public Assets Recovery Team (Equipo de Recuperación del Patrimonio Público), the Financial Analysis Unit (Unidad de Análisis Financiero, UAF) and the Directorate General of Public Procurement (Dirección General de Contrataciones Públicas, DGCP).
The following section focuses on the Directorate General of Ethics and Government Integrity (DIGEIG) and on how co-ordination and co-operation among public entities can be boosted. The chapter then examines how to improve the effective implementation of integrity measures throughout the public administration, both at the organisational and subnational levels. Finally, the chapter concludes with recommendations for ensuring a strategic and evidence-based approach to public integrity.
1.2.1. The Dominican Republic should strengthen the DIGEIG by establishing it through a law with safeguards for its independence and by reinforcing its capacities as governing body of the integrity system
There is no silver bullet or one-size-fits-all model for how anti-corruption bodies should be designed. Among OECD Members, countries vary extensively in how they organise their public integrity systems, and in many cases, responsibilities are shared between various institutions (OECD, 2017[20]). An overview carried out by the OECD looking at 19 anti-corruption bodies in different parts of the world allowed to identify three broad types: a multi-purpose model, a law enforcement model and preventive bodies. The latter typically differ significantly from one another in the breath of their mandate with the only commonality that they focus on prevention only, including, for example, policy design, co-ordination, awareness-raising and training, advice, mentoring, etc. (OECD, 2013[21]).
A key dimension of the organisation of such anti-corruption bodies is their independence. While a certain degree of independence is always an advantage to ensure continuity of efforts to promote integrity and anti-corruption policies over time, strong and credible safeguards for independence become a critical success factor if the agency deals with sensitive information, has investigative and/or sanctioning powers to mitigate the risk of real or perceived politicisation and selective investigations (OECD, 2013[21]; Recanatini, 2011[22]; Hussmann, Hechler and Peñailillo, 2009[23]; Schütte, 2015[24]).
The DIGEIG is the governing body responsible for the Dominican Republic’s integrity policy. It reports to the Ministry of the Presidency, which ensures its access to ministries, highlights the relevance of integrity and transparency in the government's agenda and helps to mainstream measures across the public sector. The DIGEIG’s functions include developing and implementing measures to build a culture of ethics and integrity, developing legal initiatives to strengthen public integrity, creating policies on transparency, access to information and open government, producing educational and awareness-raising material and providing support to strengthen capacities of public institutions. The DIGEIG also directs the Government Integrity and Regulatory Compliance Commissions (CIGCN) and the Integrity Officers (see section below). In addition, the DIGEIG receives reports of alleged wrongdoing, has powers to investigate transgressions of public servants to the disciplinary and ethical regime established by Law No. 41-2008 (see Chapter 7) as well as allegations of administrative corruption, and can recommend administrative sanctions when the institution where the public servant works does not take action (Art. 2, 20, 21 and 31 of Decree No. 486-2012).
Despite these powers to investigate and recommend sanctions, the DIGEIG currently lacks adequate safeguards for its independence. It is created by Decree (Decree No. 486-2012), which could be revoked by future governments, and it contemplates that the entity reports to the Presidency and that the entity’s director general is appointed directly by the President of the Republic, without providing criteria ensuring its personal independence. Decree No. 486-2012 also does not include provisions to safeguard the entity’s financial, functional and administrative (operational) independence. The Decree No. 486-2012 does not protect the position from the risk of political influence in the future. Furthermore, director generals of the DIGEIG could become victims of their own success, leading to political retaliation against them or against their institution, which could go up to eliminating the DIGEIG. It is essential to protect the DIGEIG and its head from such repercussions.
Citizens and public officials must be able to trust that an agency with the current powers of the DIGEIG is independent and will remain apolitical when following up on reports from whistleblowers, investigating administrative corruption or translating criminal cases to the responsible authorities, regardless of the entity or person involved. Such independence is also critical if the DIGEIG’s future competence were to include the application of sanctions (e.g. on access to information, see Chapter 4, conflict of interest, see Chapter 2, or lobbying, see Chapter 8).
Therefore, the Dominican Republic should establish independence safeguards for the DIGEIG by law instead of by a Decree. The law could establish a fixed-term mandate for the director general that overlaps with election cycles (e.g. a mandate of 5 to 7 years), and a transparent appointment process that aims at selecting a candidate with political consensus and based on merit. Director generals of the DIGEIG should be protected by ensuring job security and the existence of legal dismissal procedures based on a limited set of specific grounds and a non-political removal process. At the level of directors, criteria for merit-based selection and job security should exist as well. In addition, the DIGEIG would benefit from an adequate level of financial, functional and administrative independence, allowing it to decide on how to use its budget, freely decide on its objectives and activities and to hire its own staff. The ability to independently select, retain and motivate the staff is a key determinant of the ability of employees to act independently and take objective and evidence-based decisions (OECD, 2017[25]).
In 2025, the DIGEIG prepared a Draft Organic Law aimed at establishing the Directorate of Integrity, Transparency and Government Ethics (Dirección de Integridad, Transparencia y Ética Gubernamental, DIGITEG), which aimed at strengthening the independence of the institution. It was presented in Congress in June 2026 for discussion and approval. The Draft Organic Law includes provisions for the creation of subsystems in several areas of this Integrity Review, particularly on open government, conflict of interest and whistleblowing, and where the existence of a strong and independent oversight institution is essential for the effective implementation of policies in these areas. Once approved, the subsystems could be developed including recommendations from this and subsequent chapters.
In addition to safeguarding its independence, the DIGEIG should ensure a strict separation between its work related to enforcement (investigation and the recommendation of administrative sanctions) and to prevention. This is key to mitigate the risk of undermining the credibility of the DIGEIG’s advisory functions. Indeed, experience has shown that public managers and public officials may not trust in the advisory role and not communicate openly about challenges as they fear that this information might be used against them.
Furthermore, to address the risk of misunderstandings, the DIGEIG could clearly communicate to citizens and public officials that criminal investigations and sanctions are not part of the DIGEIG’s mandate, and that whenever an administrative investigation presents indications of a criminal dimension the case will be systematically and timely transferred to the responsible authorities. At the same time, the DIGEIG should continue efforts to further strengthen its co-ordination with the PEPCA, the MAP, the CGR and the CCRD, for example through establishing an inter-institutional working group dedicated to enforcement as recommended below.
Finally, bodies that perform both prevention and enforcement functions tend to dedicate more efforts and resources to handling and investigating reports than to tasks related to prevention (OECD, 2021[26]). The DIGEIG is facing the same risk, as the reception and investigation of reports require a significant amount of resources. However, given its key role in governing and co-ordinating national integrity policies and the need to sustain and step up efforts related to prevention, the DIGEIG need to allocate sufficient budget and build relevant internal capacities.
Capacities include, for example, skills and competencies related to the following areas:
Strategic and operational planning to steer the development of national integrity policies (see section below).
Monitoring and evaluation of integrity policies, including the gathering and analysis of qualitative and quantitative evidence on the performance of integrity policies as well as the drafting of reports.
Promoting inter-agency co-ordination and co-operation among integrity system actors, potentially through the reformed CPTA as recommended below.
Proposing and promoting regulations, guidelines and directives for implementing integrity policies based on international standards and good practices.
Supporting and guiding public entities in the design and implementation of integrity measures, e.g. regarding reporting mechanisms and whistleblower protection measures.
Encouraging and developing capacity related to integrity for public servants in general and for leaders in particular, in co-ordination with the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP) (see Chapter 3).
Providing support and guidance to public servants on managing conflict of interest.
1.2.2. The Dominican Republic could strengthen and institutionalise the Presidential Transparency and Anti-Corruption Commission (CPTA) as a permanent mechanism for inter-institutional co-ordination, governed by the DIGEIG
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity states that the entities of the integrity system should have clearly defined mandates and recommends that co-ordination mechanisms exist between them to exploit synergies and ensure integrity measures are consistently applied (OECD, 2017[1]). Co-ordination mechanisms can take various forms and fulfil different functions. Table 1.3 details some of the institutional co-ordination mechanisms that exist in Latin America and the actors involved.
Source: Based on (OECD, 2019[27]), updated to reflect (OECD, 2021[28]; OECD, 2025[29]; OECD, 2025[30]).
In the Dominican Republic, some formal and informal activities currently serve as co-ordination fora between government entities. For instance, the Ethics Week organised around the National Ethics Day, established by Decree No. 144-2017, brings together different actors in activities aimed at promoting integrity in the country. An oversight committee headed by the Chamber of Accounts (CCRD) and including the Comptroller General (CGR) and the Ministry of Finance, aims at ensuring synergies between relevant institutions. Law No. 18-2024 recently established a single audit system calling for co-ordination to avoid duplication between the CGR and the CCRD. Some co-ordination efforts are also taking place between the CGR, the DIGEIG and the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP). On a more informal basis, some inter-institutional co-ordination channels, both virtual and face-to-face, also operate using e-mails and instant messaging groups.
In February 2025, Decree No. 76-2025 created a Presidential Transparency and Anti-Corruption Commission (CPTA), led by a national co-ordinating committee chaired by the DIGEIG and an executive board headed by the Directorate General of Public Procurement (DGCP). Its members are: the Anti-Fraud and Internal Audit units of the CGR, the Legal Consultancy to the Executive Branch (Consultoría Jurídica del Poder Ejecutivo), the Directorate General of Internal Taxes (Dirección General de Impuestos Internos, DGII), the Administrative Ministry of the Presidency (Ministerio Administrativo de la Presidencia, MAPRE), the Ministry of the Presidency (Ministerio de la Presidencia, MINPRE), the Directorate General for the Budget (Dirección General de Presupuesto, DIGEPRES), the Financial Analysis Unit (Unidad de Análisis Financiero, UAF), the Directorate of Strategy and Government Communication (Dirección de Estrategía y Comunicación Gubernamental), the Public Assets Recovery Team (Equipo de Recuperación del Patrimonio Público, ERPP), and two representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working on anti-corruption appointed by the executive branch.
The creation of the CPTA is a positive development that could facilitate institutional co-ordination among executive branch entities in the future. However, it should include the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP) and the focus on the executive branch omits actors with roles and information that are relevant to public integrity, such as the Specialised Prosecutor of Administrative Corruption (PEPCA), the Chamber of Accounts (CCRD), the Ombudsman and the Central Electoral Board. Furthermore, civil society organisations may question whether the two representatives from NGOs that are appointed by the executive branch are representing civil society as a whole or whether they may just be the ones that are less critical to government. Finally, it is not clear how the private sector perspective could be involved through the CPTA.
In July 2025, the President of the Dominican Republic, through Decree No. 407-2025, created a temporary inter-institutional commission to oversee developing and implementing the country's integrity system. It is also responsible for developing, with support from the OECD, the country’s first National Integrity Strategy. This commission, co-ordinated by the DIGEIG, brings together representatives of the executive, namely the Ministry of the Presidency (President's Office), Ministry of Finance, Ministry of the Interior and Police, Ministry of Public Administration, Ministry of Education, the Comptroller General's Office and the Directorate General for Public Procurement. The commission also co-ordinates with actors outside the executive branch, including the PEPCA and the Prosecutor’s Office, the Judicial Council, the Chamber of Accounts and the legislative.
Building on this progress and the experience of the temporary inter-institutional commission, the Dominican Republic could strengthen and reform the Presidential Transparency and Anti-Corruption Commission (CPTA), led by the DIGEIG, to become the main co-ordination mechanism on integrity. Concretely, the Dominican Republic could reform Decree No. 76-2025, which created the CPTA, or include a reformed CPTA into the already mentioned Draft Organic Law establishing the Directorate of Integrity, Transparency and Government Ethics (Dirección de Integridad, Transparencia y Ética Gubernamental, DIGITEG). Including the reform into the Draft Organic Law would provide a more stable footing to the CPTA and incorporate it clearly into the logic of the Dominican integrity system.
In this context, the Dominican Republic could consider the following reforms to the CPTA:
Include the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP) in the CPTA. As the governing body of public employment, the MAP has an important role to play in the Ethics and Disciplinary regime (see Chapter 7) and in the inclusion of integrity in selection, promotion and training criteria for civil servants (see Chapter 3). The Dominican Municipal League (Liga Municipal Dominicana, LMD) could be included as well to ensure a local government perspective and encourage the implementation of integrity policies throughout the country (see section below).
Strengthen co-ordination with integrity actors outside the executive branch. For example, invitations to participate (regularly or on an ad hoc basis) “with voice but without vote” could be extended to the PEPCA and the Prosecutor’s Office, the Judicial Council, the Chamber of Accounts and the legislative representatives of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Central Electoral Board, the Financial Intelligence Unit (UAF) and the National Police, among others. This would enable co-ordination and the exchange of information, while respecting the autonomy of the respective bodies.
Such a reformed CPTA could play a key role in discussing progress and challenges in the implementation of national integrity strategies. In addition, the CPTA could commission an independent evaluation of such national strategies (see section below).
The CPTA could be enshrined in law. As Table 1.4 shows, similar commissions formed in the past subsequently disappeared, had limited impact and/or went unnoticed by the public (Aquino Méndez, 2025[31]). In that sense, giving the CPTA legal status could signal a lasting commitment to integrity. For instance, the reform of the CPTA could be included in a Draft Organic Law aimed at strengthening the independence of the current DIGEIG. This would also clarify that the DIGEIG and the CPTA are complementary and that their functions are not overlapping: the DIGEIG is the governing body of the integrity system, while the CPTA is a co-ordination mechanism, steered by the DIGEIG. International examples of co-ordination mechanisms established by law are Colombia's National Moralisation Commission, created by Law No. 1474-2011, steered by the Transparency Secretariat (Secretaría de Transparencia), and Peru's High-Level Commission against Corruption, created by Law No. 29976-2013, steered by the Secretariat for Public Integrity (Secretaría de Integridad Pública) (OECD, 2017[32]; OECD, 2017[33]).
Under the authority of the CPTA, the DIGEIG should issue regular public reports to the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers to inform decision making. A proactive communication with the public is vital to support the work of the CPTA and to explain the commission’s role and added value. A communication strategy could also contribute to continue changing the narrative of the fight against corruption in the country from a reactive approach (detecting and sanctioning cases), to a preventive and proactive approach that aims at solving underlying problems and strengthens the various dimensions and the coherence of the integrity system (OECD, 2019[27]).
Finally, rather than appointing two NGOs, the Dominican Republic should consider opening an application process open to any NGO working on related issues and elect two organisations for a specific period (e.g. two years). For example, in Costa Rica, the Institutional Commission for Open Parliament issues a call for applications and the civil society representatives are chosen by the executive of the Legislative Assembly (OECD, 2022[18]). Alternatively, rather than having permanent NGO representatives, the CPTA could be legally obliged to consult regularly with civil society and the private sector through formal and transparent channels. This could help avoid potential concerns regarding the representativeness and independence of the participating civil society organisations, while ensuring broad opportunities for participation (see Chapter 5).
Finally, the Dominican Republic is currently considering the establishment of a National System of Transparency and Public Integrity (Sistema Nacional de Transparencia e Integridad Pública) that merges integrity, transparency and data protection, reflecting DIGEIG’s current role. This reform has been included in the Draft Organic Law mentioned above. Ideally, this system would be steered by a reformed DIGEIG and incorporate a reformed CPTA as national co-ordination mechanism (as recommended above) as well as the strengthened Government Integrity and Regulatory Compliance Commissions (see section below). Brazil, for example, has recently established a System of Integrity, Transparency and Access to Information led by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (CGU) (OECD, 2025[37]). Similarly, Peru is currently considering a National Integrity and Transparency System, designed on the basis of OECD recommendations (Prensa Perú, 2025[38]; OECD, 2024[39]). While each context is different and reforms in one country cannot simply be replicated in another, the OECD’s main recommendations for building Peru’s joint system, and which could be relevant for the Dominican Republic, are summarised in Box 1.1.
Key OECD recommendations for the creation of a National Integrity and Transparency System are:
Create a National Integrity and Transparency System (SNIT), merging the areas of integrity, active and passive transparency, and personal data protection, and a National Authority of Integrity, Transparency and Personal Data Protection (Autoridad Nacional de Integridad, Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales, ANITAP), as governing body of the SNIT. The ANITAP would merge the current Secretariat of Public Integrity (Secretaría de Integridad Pública, SIP), the current National Authority for Transparency and Access to Information (Autoridad Nacional de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, ANTAIP) and the current National Authority for Personal Data Protection (Autoridad Nacional de Protección de Datos Personales, ANPD). The ANITAP should be a specialised technical body, attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, characterised by technical, budgetary and functional independence.
Foster inter-institutional co-ordination at the strategic level within the SNIT. A reformed High-Level Anti-Corruption Commission (Comisión de Alto Nivel Anticorrupción, CAN), steered by the ANITAP, could bring together the National Authority of Civil Service (SERVIR), the Secretariat of Public Management (Secretaría de Gestión Pública, SGP), the General Archive and the State Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General del Estado, PGE). The Ombudsman and the Comptroller General could continue to participate with voice, but without a vote. Through the CAN and other mechanisms, the SNIT should co-ordinate with related systems (Archives, Control, Justice, Electoral and Contracting) and with the legislative and judicial branches, regional governments and municipalities, the private sector and civil society.
Promote the implementation of integrity and transparency policies. The SNIT provides an opportunity to reform the Integrity Model and to strengthen the Institutional Integrity Offices (Oficinas de Integridad Institucional, OIIs) and Public Officials Responsible for Access to Public Information (Funcionarios Responsables de Acceso a la Información Pública, FRAIPs). The FRAIPs could become part of the OIIs to become “Integrity and Transparency Offices” (OITs).
Source: (OECD, 2024[39])
1.2.3. The Dominican Republic could establish a technical working group to improve co-ordination and co-operation between entities mandated to detect integrity violations and carry out administrative and criminal investigations
In the Dominican Republic, as in other countries, a variety of entities are responsible for receiving reports of alleged wrongdoing, investigating disciplinary offences, reporting possible offences and investigating and prosecuting offences in criminal proceedings. Therefore, clear policies and procedures for co-operation and co-ordination are key for ensuring that integrity violations, whether of disciplinary or criminal nature, are detected and sanctioned effectively. Interviews carried out during this Integrity Review suggest that this co-ordination and co-operation amongst enforcement actors could be strengthened.
Therefore, an inter-institutional technical working group to strengthen co-ordination related to tracking reports and conducting administrative and criminal investigations into corruption cases and integrity violations could be created (see also Chapter 7). While a strengthened CPTA, as recommended above, would deal with strategic questions and promote a national policy dialogue, this technical working group would focus on strengthening the effectiveness of detecting, investigating and sanctioning case.
This technical working group could be steered by the DIGEIG and include the PEPCA, expert staff from the CGR's Anti-Fraud Unit, auditors from the CCRD specialised in fraud, the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF) to include the perspective of money laundering (Law No. 155-2017), expert staff from the MAP for the disciplinary dimension and the DGCP, which has developed advanced capacities to prevent and detect corruption in public procurement operations. In addition, the working group could include other actors considered to be relevant as permanent members or on an ad hoc base.
Concretely, the technical working group’s role could include:
Developing standards or protocols aimed at, for example, facilitating the exchange of information about cases, guaranteeing the consistency and quality of the information reported, ensuring the coherence of criteria applied during investigations or using data analytics and technology in the detection and investigation of corruption cases.
Improving capacities by facilitating joint technical training programmes including employees of the control bodies and the PEPCA to promote exchange and dialogue between these actors. Such training could include, for example, training in auditing and how to investigate corruption and fraud cases (e.g. on criteria and techniques for finding, securing and documenting evidence such as such as statements, reports of alleged wrongdoing, operational and financial data records, testimonies, documents, expert reports etc.). This approach would help oversight bodies to ensure that their techniques and processes align with the needs of the criminal justice system.
Issuing periodic reports to a strengthened CPTA to provide inputs to inform policy formulation and strategic decision making on integrity and anti-corruption, including on complex schemes and areas, such as the link between corruption and organised crime or environmental corruption. Such reports could allow considering the knowledge accumulated by investigative bodies on areas of risk and corrupt practices when formulating anti-corruption policies and regulatory frameworks.
According to the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, governments also demonstrate their commitment to integrity by “ensuring that the public integrity system defines, supports, controls and enforces public integrity, and is integrated into the wider public management and governance framework”, and “ensuring that the appropriate legislative and institutional frameworks are in place to enable public-sector organisations to take responsibility for effectively managing the integrity of their activities as well as that of the public officials who carry out those activities” (OECD, 2017[1]).
1.3.1. The Dominican Republic could strengthen the Government Integrity and Regulatory Compliance Commissions transforming them into dedicated integrity units
Integrity is the responsibility of all public servants, regardless of the branch, sector or level of government in which they work. As will be further explored in Chapter 3, leaders at all levels of a public body can play a crucial role in fostering a culture of integrity by leading by example and managing integrity (OECD, 2017[1]; OECD, 2009[40]; OECD, 2020[19]). They are also instrumental for ensuring integrity policies are implemented in their organisations. In France, senior managers are personally accountable for the effective implementation and development of integrity programmes in their organisation (AFA, 2020[41]). In Colombia, the Integrated Planning and Management Model (Modelo Integrado de Planeación y Gestión, MIPG) requires public managers to report regularly on their actions regarding integrity, transparency and other cross-cutting issues.
In addition, supporting actors dedicated to integrity issues in public entities, such as units or committees, help meet the challenge of mainstreaming the implementation of integrity policies throughout the public sector. International experience shows the value of having a dedicated and specialised person or office that is responsible and accountable for the internal implementation and promotion of integrity-related policies and laws, as summarised in Box 1.2 (OECD, 2009[40]; G20, 2017[42]; OECD, 2019[27]).
There are several reasons why it is important to have a dedicated integrity function (a person or a unit) in an organisation:
It leads and co-ordinates integrity measures, such as developing and implementing a code of ethics, providing advice for manging conflict of interest or ethical dilemmas, providing guidance on how to file a complaint or a report or how to identify, assess and manage integrity risks.
It creates a safe space in the organisation, where employees can come forward with questions, dilemmas and problems without fear of reprisals. A stable workforce allows the necessary trust to be built for this safe space to exist.
It enables a genuine accumulation of experience by bringing together recommendations, perspectives and best practices within a single area in the organisation.
It can facilitate the continuity of integrity policies. Even when integrity management generates interest and enthusiasm at the outset, this commonly wanes over time. This risk is reduced when there are staff dedicated to integrity and who are required to report on progress made.
It has a symbolic component. It sends a signal that integrity is considered important within the organisation. Organisational design theory typically states that “structure follows strategy”: the areas of strategic importance to the organisation are reflected in its structure. If an organisation wants to highlight the importance of integrity, this must be visible in its organisational chart.
It enables co-ordination and the generation of synergies to foster integrity in other key areas, such as human resources management, procurement, management or financial management.
Source: Based on (OECD, 2019[43]; OECD, 2021[28]; OECD, 2009[40])
The function of the Dominican Republic’s Government Integrity and Regulatory Compliance Commissions (CIGCNs), which report to the DIGEIG, is to promote the institutionalisation of ethics and the encouragement of conduct of integrity in public servants, overseeing compliance with the Code of Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants, as well as acting as an operational body for the standardisation of programmes and policies for regulatory compliance, risk prevention, anti-bribery and management of government integrity tools (Decree No. 791-2021 and Implementing Regulation No. 1-2022 of the DIGEIG). As of 2025, 192 institutions had a CIGCN or an Integrity Officer (DIGEIG, 2025[44]).
A CIGCN has five members elected for three years, representing each of the civil service’s job categories (general services, administrative support, technical officers, professionals, supervision and management), plus a technical body of four persons with specific functions and responsibilities within the CIGCN (Table 1.5). In the case of small entities and/or those that do not have job categories, Government Integrity Officers (Oficiales de Integridad Gubernamental, OIGs) act as a CIGCN.
However, due to their elected collegiate nature, CIGCNs may be susceptible to similar weaknesses as identified by the OECD in studies on Brazil and Mexico, which have comparable committees (OECD, 2017[45]; OECD, 2021[46]; OECD, 2019[47]; OECD, 2021[28]).
Although Decree No. 791-2021 states that members of CIGCNs must have certain core competences, they often lack prior experience in the field and require training. While the DIGEIG provides and promotes capacity building for CIGCN members, this knowledge is lost each time new representatives are elected. This affects the learning, continuity and effectiveness of CIGCNs.
The rotation of officers makes it difficult to establish trust and a “visible face” for integrity in the public entity, which could undermine their role of providing advice on often sensitive issues.
In the technical team, the absence of an HR management dimension is a weakness, considering that this area is key to fostering a culture of integrity in the public entity (see Chapter 3).
Since membership of the CIGCN is an added task without additional remuneration, integrity-related work will often be only the second priority or depend largely on how motivated the elected individuals are. The interviews conducted for this Integrity Review did indeed reveal disparities in motivation levels among CIGCN members, for example, between elected and technical staff members, or between the elected members themselves.
The interviews also revealed that CIGCNs often do not have the necessary resources and lack top-level support. The CIGCN are not part of the entity's organigramme, so they do not have their own funding or targets assigned in the annual operational plans. This implies that the resources and the priority given to integrity depend largely on the direct line managers of the members of the CIGCN. Furthermore, the lack of administrative and managerial support within the entity makes it difficult for the CIGCN to fulfil its mandate, especially in entities with only one Integrity Officer.
Finally, there appears to be some confusion about the precise role of the CIGCN, both among public servants and among CIGCN members. For example, there have been cases of CIGCN receiving requests for information or complaints about colleagues that they are not authorised to handle. In part, this confusion may lie in the fact that the functions of the CIGCN defined in Decree No. 791-2021 are broad and ambiguous, so the measures carried out depend on the plans defined by the entity and the resources assigned to them. There is no article containing more specific definitions of their roles and responsibilities.
It is worth mentioning that some public institutions have a committee or officer responsible for implementing the Integrated Compliance and Anti-Bribery Management System (Sistema de Gestión Integrado de Cumplimiento y Antisoborno, SGI), set up to align the entity with the international standards ISO 37001 and ISO 37301. For example, the Customs Directorate General (Dirección General de Aduanas, DGA) created a Compliance and Anti-Bribery Management Committee in 2023; the Comptroller General (CGR) has a Compliance and Anti-Bribery Officer, and the Directorate General of Internal Taxes (Dirección General de Impuestos Internos, DGII) gives similar functions to its audit manager. However, the narrow focus of ISO 37001 on bribery could be duplicating the CIGCN model which, given its broader scope, should automatically include bribery as a specific integrity risk (OECD, 2021[48]; Murphy, 2019[49]).
To strengthen the CIGCNs, address some of the challenges and avoid duplication with anti-bribery areas set up to meet ISO standards, the DIGEIG could build on lessons learned and progress already achieved, and transform the CIGCNs into dedicated integrity units, i.e. units with dedicated staff that specialise in integrity issues, including anti-bribery. These reformed CIGCNs should be embedded in the entities' organisational charts and have clear job descriptions and guidance on their roles and responsibilities (see also the next section).
The DIGEIG could stipulate that these new integrity units have three core functions and competencies that are clearly preventive and supportive, the CIGCN should not perform any role in receiving reports or investigating cases:
1. Co-ordinating and monitoring compliance with the integrity policies to be implemented in the entity, as stipulated by the DIGEIG.
2. Providing guidance to the head of the entity, senior and middle managers and capacity-building to public officials in areas related to public integrity, e.g. guidance and training on public service values, dealing with ethical dilemmas and developing integrity leadership skills.
3. Providing guidance to the head of the entity and support to managers and public officials on integrity risk management, including conflict of interest management.
The transformation of CIGCN into integrity units could be done gradually, starting in a few priority entities that could serve as pilots. Differences between entities should be considered: Depending on the size and integrity risks, such a unit could consist of a single dedicated person. For inspiration, the DIGEIG could look at the experience of developing such systems and units in Brazil or Peru (Box 1.3).
Brazil
The Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) is the internal control body of the federal government. Since its creation in 2001, it has been a core element of the federal government’s strategy to enhance integrity and prevent corruption in Brazil, leading integrity policies in the federal executive branch.
In 2023, Brazil established the System of Integrity, Transparency and Access to Information of the Federal Public Administration (Sistema de Integridade, Transparência e Acesso à Informação da Administração Pública Federal, SITAI) by Decree No. 11.529-2023. The SITAI expands the concept of integrity to measures aimed at preventing and detecting breaches or disregards of rights, values and principles, such as discrimination of any kind, sexual harassment and moral harassment, that harm institutional trust, credibility and reputation. The SITAI also revised the scope of the already existing institutional integrity programmes that all federal entities needed to implement.
The SITAI aims to co-ordinate activities related to integrity, transparency and access to information, as well as to establish standards, practices and measures related to these topics. The SITAI is led by the CGU and includes SITAI's Sectoral Units (Unidades Setoriais do SITAI) (herein “Sectoral Units”), in all public institutions of the direct, autarchic and foundational federal public administration (administração pública federal direta, autárquica e fundacional).
Peru
Peru has developed and implemented the “Integrity Model” (Supreme Decree No. 044-2018-PCM, extended by Supreme Decree No. 180-2021-PCM). The Integrity Model establishes a systematic structure to strengthen institutions’ preventive and response capacities to corruption and other unethical practices. This model advocates for strict adherence to normative dispositions and encourages the use of specialised tools and the implementation of good practices. The Integrity Model has nine mandatory components: (1) senior management commitment; (2) risk management; (3) integrity policies; (4) transparency, open data and accountability; (5) internal control; (6) communication and training; (7) reporting channel; (8) supervision and monitoring of the Integrity Model; (9) Integrity Model manager.
The Institutional Integrity Offices (Oficinas de Integridad Institucional, OIIs), which are mandatory in every public entity in Peru, are responsible for managing the Integrity Model (OECD, 2019[43]). These offices are tasked with promoting integrity within their respective entities, ensuring the implementation of the regulations and guidelines established by the Secretariat of Public Integrity (SIP) of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the governing body for integrity in Peru.
The SIP provides guidance and technical support to the OIIs. This includes training OII officials on ethics and integrity issues, providing educational materials and technical assistance for the implementation of integrity programmes. The SIP monitors OIIs' performance and assesses their effectiveness in fostering integrity, providing feedback and recommending improvements when needed. The SIP can issue resolutions and directives to establish rules and procedures for fostering integrity in the public sector. It also partially regulates the operation of OIIs, establishing the requirements and competencies for those responsible for these offices (OECD, 2024[39]).
To monitor the implementation of the Integrity Model, the SIP has developed a set of public indicators to track progress. The sub-indicators can be broken down by entity, by sector or aggregated in an index of corruption prevention capacity (Índice de Capacidad Preventiva frente a la corrupción, ICP).
Source: For Brazil, see (OECD, 2025[29]). For Peru, see (OECD, 2019[43]; OECD, 2024[39]).
1.3.2. The DIGEIG could empower the CIGCN, or the new integrity units, as the main institutional channel for public servants to seek ethical guidance and advice, and raise awareness of this new role
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity emphasises the importance of providing easily accessible formal and informal guidance and consultation mechanisms that public officials can turn to when they have concerns or ethical dilemmas in their daily work (OECD, 2018[50]). The institutionalisation of an integrity advisory function can take different forms: within a central government body; through an independent or semi-independent specialised body; or through integrity units or advisers integrated within the competent entities (OECD, 2020[19]).
In the Dominican Republic, public servants who require this type of guidance currently must approach the DIGEIG. While the DIGEIG has the technical capacity to provide ethics advice, it is also responsible for receiving and investigating reports of alleged wrongdoing. As mentioned above, this dual role, acting as both advisor and investigator at the same time, may create a disincentive for public servants to raise ethical concerns or dilemmas, for fear that this may lead to a formal investigation. Similarly, the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP) has a Directorate for Labour Relations (Dirección de Relaciones Laborales) that provides advice to civil servants on how to manage ethical dilemmas and emits binding recommendations tied to Law No. 41-2008.
Public servants would be encouraged to seek support more confidently and regularly if there was a dedicated integrity actor in the entity they are working in and whose functions include providing confidential and proactive ethical guidance and advice. This would make advisory services more accessible, streamline the process and allow recommendations to be more relevant and tailored to institutional realities. However, the CIGCNs do not provide ethical guidance and advice to public servants on managing ethical dilemmas and conflict of interest, nor do they currently have the capacity to do so.
Therefore, the DIGEIG could empower the CIGCN, or better yet, the dedicated integrity units recommended in the previous section, making them the main institutional channel for public servants to seek ethical guidance and advice. In this process, special attention needs to be paid to the creation of mechanisms ensuring that the exchanges between CIGCN/integrity units and public servants are confidential, to create a “safe space” within the organisation where public servants can take their questions, dilemmas or concerns without fear of reprisals.
The DIGEIG and the CIGCN/integrity units should also work together to clearly and extensively communicate this new function, emphasising the confidential nature of any exchanges, the procedures for contacting the CIGCNs/integrity units and the expected response times to manage expectations. The difference between reporting alleged wrongdoing and seeking advice should also be clarified. The scope of the advice to be provided by the CIGCN/integrity units must be clearly communicated (e.g. clarifying that it does not amount to a legal opinion), to protect both the members of the CIGCNs/integrity units and public servants from possible misunderstandings or misuse of the guidance provided.
Within their ethical guidance and advice functions, and with support from the DIGEIG, the CIGCN/integrity units could proactively provide guidance to public servants on key integrity issues and recurring questions, including on how to identify and manage conflict of interest and how to deal with ethical dilemmas that are specifically relevant to their entities. While it is vital to respect the confidentiality of exchanges with anyone who asks for advice, CIGCN/integrity units may identify areas where further guidance is needed and provide proactive recommendations to the head of their entity, based on requests for advice received or recurring issues of a systemic or sector-specific nature. The information in these recommendations should be formulated in a general manner, without giving details that would reveal the identity of anyone who has sought advice.
Finally, the DIGEIG could provide fora for dialogue and regular meetings between CIGCNs or new integrity units. Complementing the advice that the DIGEIG can provide to CIGCN/integrity units on request, this would allow them to share experience on their common challenges and on good practices to overcome them. Integrity officer networks are a good practice that exists in several countries. The examples of Austria, Canada, Germany and Sweden are detailed in Box 1.4.
The Austrian Network of Integrity Officers
To mainstream integrity into the public sector, Austria has established the Network of Integrity Officers, which aims to place integrity officers in various federal institutions (e.g. ministries). Tasks performed by the officers include: performing advisory services for employees and senior officials; circulating information on integrity and awareness raising; providing training; analysing the risk of corruption; collaboration and experience sharing; serving as the focal point for compliance-related issues. The Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption is responsible for managing the network, generating and collecting expertise on the topic of integrity, and providing basic training and training materials to the officers.
Formal and informal co-operation mechanisms in Canada
In Canada the central agency, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS), hosts two communities of practice: the Interdepartmental Values and Ethics Network and the Senior Officers for Internal Disclosure Group (whistleblowing). These communities of practice meet regularly and mutually benefit from sharing good practices and lessons learned. The communities and their regular exchanges provide the TBS with an informal means of keeping up with emerging issues and evolving challenges. Their input can also help shape integrity policies as well as the Secretariat’s awareness-raising and communications activities.
The German network of contact persons for corruption prevention
In Germany, the lead federal ministry for corruption prevention and integrity is the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. Since preventing corruption does not involve having a supervisory role over other ministries, co-operation is essential to reach a common understanding of integrity policies and comprehensive standards for their implementation. For the German federal administration, the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries regulates (among other issues) co-operation within the federal government. Article 19 stipulates that “in matters affecting the remits of more than one Federal Ministry, those Ministries will work together to ensure that the Federal Government speaks and acts consistently”. In practical terms, co-operation happens through a network of contact persons for corruption prevention that meets frequently. The network also develops guidelines, handbooks and recommendations for implementing the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration.
The Network against Corruption for Swedish State Agencies
The Swedish Agency for Public Management hosts the Network against Corruption for Swedish State Agencies. Delegates participating in the network include heads of administrative departments and heads of legal departments. The network meets four times a year, and each meeting usually gathers close to 100 agencies. The purpose of the network is to share experiences, learn about good examples and take part in the production of handbooks, reports, and other publications of the Swedish Agency for Public Management on anti-corruption measures, internal control, and efficiency.
Source: Austria: (IBN, 2020[51]); Germany: information provided by the Ministry of the Interior; Sweden: information provided by the Swedish Agency for Public Management; Canada: Adapted from inputs shared by the Treasury Board Secretariat.
1.3.3. The DIGEIG could promote and support the implementation of integrity measures in local administrations
Given both their proximity to citizens and the services that they provide, sub-national governments are vital for good governance, people's quality of life and public trust in democratic institutions. They can be drivers of innovation, economic development and productivity and can play a key role in building social capital. Integrity at the subnational level can help maximise the full potential of a region in terms of trade, revenue collection and public and private, foreign and domestic investment. Similarly, successful integrity policies at subnational level can help combat threats such as organised crime and contribute to build trust in democracy (OECD, 2019[27]).
In the Dominican Republic, municipalities rank as the fourth most trusted institution in the country and the only one for which the trust indicator rose by a statistically significant amount in the 2022-2023 Democratic Culture Survey (Figure 1.5). The survey also showed that forms of political participation are evolving, and while only 13% of respondents said they had given money or time to support a party or candidate, 27% (that is, more than twice as many) said they had been involved in activities to address issues in their community (Oliva Álvarez and Cañete Alonso, 2024[6]). As the level closest to communities, municipal governments can play a key role in helping to channel and enhance the impact of this willingness to participate in public life to solve collective problems.
Percentage of citizens who responded that they had “some” or “a great deal” of trust in each institution
Source: Adapted from (Oliva Álvarez and Cañete Alonso, 2024[6]).
At the same time, capacities and resources are different at the local level, and so are corruption and integrity risks. These also vary between local governments depending on their size and context. Many anti-corruption strategies, however, overlook the importance of ensuring that measures adopted at the national level are properly implemented at the sub-national level, or fail to adapt them to take these differences into account (OECD, 2019[27]).
The Dominican Republic is a unitary country subdivided into a National District (the city of Santo Domingo de Guzmán), 10 regions, 31 provinces, 158 municipalities and 235 districts. The basic political administrative entity of the Dominican State is the Municipal Council (Ayuntamiento), composed of a Mayor's Office (Alcaldía), which acts as the executive body, and a normative, regulatory and supervisory body of Councillors (Concejo de Regidores), both elected for four years. Decentralisation in the Dominican Republic is relatively recent and limited, and it remains one of the most centralised countries in Central America, with low levels of municipal spending and few taxation powers for local governments (ECLAC, 2025[52]; Radics et al., 2023[53]). Local governments therefore have limited control of own funds to fulfil their mandates and tend to be dependent on transfers from the national government. Meanwhile, municipalities’ responsibilities in the Dominican Republic include urban planning, the management of the municipal police and the provision of a wide range of public services: education, health, security and justice, waste management, licenses and permits, etc.
Integrity risks in these areas can undermine the delivery of these services and have a direct impact on citizens’ experience and perception. Yet, the only reference to preventing corruption at sub-national level in Law No. 176-2007 is that the Municipal Comptroller must co-ordinate with the CGR and the CCRD and collaborate with anti-corruption activities. With resources for fulfilling their mandate being scarce, municipalities struggle to dedicate full-time staff to integrity-related functions such as internal auditors, ethics advisers or transparency officers. To minimise some of these risks and challenges and gradually strengthen local governments’ public integrity capacities, national entities in the Dominican Republic with a mandate to prevent and fight corruption should therefore play a more active, focused and flexible role in supporting subnational governments.
To that end, some existing initiatives can be leveraged. For example, as recommended above, the Dominican Municipal League (LMD), set up under Law No. 176-2007 to provide technical and planning advice to municipalities, could be part of the Presidential Transparency and Anti-Corruption Commission (CPTA). The LMD could also work with the DIGEIG to support municipalities in the implementation of integrity measures and monitor their progress. Indeed, the LMD already provides support related to transparency and public information within the framework of the internal management system to strengthen municipal institutions known as the Municipal Public Administration Monitoring System (Sistema de Monitoreo de la Administración Pública, SISMAP). The Municipal SISMAP is a portal that allows local governments’ situation and progress to be tracked using indicators grouped by eight dimensions of internal management and institutional strengthening, including asset declarations, access to information and integrity, among others.
The Municipal SISMAP could encourage the implementation of anti-corruption and integrity measures and help local governments monitor them. To do this, however, the DIGEIG and the LMD, together with other relevant actors and in co-ordination with the MAP, should revise the SISMAP to include realistic key variables, perhaps differentiating by size of local governments, that measure vital aspects of public integrity. These indicators could form a new thematic axis, or be incorporated into existing ones, as there is some overlap in the areas they cover.
Additionally, the Dominican Republic could use the Dominican Federation of Municipalities (Federación Dominicana de Municipios, FEDOMU), comprising over 150 local governments, to provide a space for dialogue and collaboration on integrity issues. FEDOMU also provides training, promotes inter-institutional dialogue and provides legal and technical assistance on matters such as the drafting of Municipal Development Plans, asset declarations and on how to implement participatory budgets. It could, therefore, in co-operation with DIGEIG and ensuring its activities are consistent with those of the LMD, provide training, support and/or technical assistance on integrity matters, drawing on its experience in related areas such as human resources, budget management, procurement and contracting, transparency and citizen participation.
Lastly, consideration could be given to adapting the guidelines issued at the national level to the local context, leaving some flexibility to allow for differences in terms of capacities and resources, as well as in terms of integrity risks. For example, the DIGEIG is starting to promote CIGCNs in local governments. Considering lessons learned from the national level and the recommendations of this Integrity Review, this process could test different approaches tailored to municipalities' capacities, specific challenges and level of institutional maturity. The requirements could, for example, differ for large, medium and small municipalities. This would ensure that the guidelines are realistic and increase the likelihood that they will be implemented effectively. The example from France (Box 1.5), and experiences from other Latin American countries such as Peru, Costa Rica, Chile and Colombia (OECD, 2021[54]; OECD, 2021[55]) could provide the Dominican Republic with additional ideas and alternatives for extending integrity policies to municipalities.
In France, some major cities and regions have designed and implemented an integrity policy and specific functions. Since 2014, the City of Paris has an ethics commission responsible for the disclosure of conflict of interest, assets, gifts and gratuities, interpretation and application of the code of conduct, and counselling and advice. In 2014, the City of Strasbourg assigned a similar role to an independent ethics officer for promoting the integrity of political leaders and managers of the municipality.
Regions that have adopted a comparable approach include Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur. The 2016 revision of civil service status introduced a right to access ethics counselling in public organisations for all civil servants regardless of their status. The organisations must assign this responsibility, internally or externally. However, there are close to 35 000 municipalities, among which more than 90% have less than 5 000 inhabitants and have limited financial and human resources. Consequently, some of the integrity functions are either the responsibility of a local management centre, general director or other designated person(s) of the administration, or they are not assigned locally and rely upon other actors in the integrity system.
The French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence Française Anticorruption, AFA) also supports local governments through the development of tools such as the “Practical guide for municipal authorities to manage integrity risks” (AFA, 2024[56]). It defines different types of integrity risks, providing specific examples of situations of risk and the expected response in such cases, and provides twelve fact sheets illustrating particular cases, questionnaires for assessing the risk, a step-by-step action guide and “Do and Don't” sections. Themes covered include gifts and invitations, recruitment processes, rules governing agents leaving municipal employment; tenders, grants, and urban development.
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity states that adherents should develop a strategic approach for the public sector that is based on evidence and aimed at mitigating public integrity risks, in particular through (OECD, 2017[1]):
Setting strategic objectives and priorities for the public integrity system based on a risk-based approach to violations of public integrity standards, and that considers factors that contribute to effective public integrity policies.
Developing benchmarks and indicators and gathering credible and relevant data on the level of implementation, performance and overall effectiveness of the public integrity system.
Adopting strategic objectives on anti-corruption and integrity is becoming increasingly common practice around the world, including in OECD Member countries. 25 OECD Member countries (66%) and 22 OECD partner countries (88%) have a national, strategic framework in place that was adopted at the highest level of government. The 2024 Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook noted a wave of countries that adopted their first strategy: Costa Rica, Finland, France, Switzerland, and the United States. Chile, Greece, Guatemala, Spain, and Italy have now also adopted their strategies at the highest level of government (OECD, 2026[3]).
1.4.1. The Dominican Republic could develop a first national integrity strategy to set strategic goals and foster co-ordination between integrity actors outside the executive
A public integrity strategy is essential to support a coherent and comprehensive integrity system. A strategy is not an end but rather a means to an end, and the process of developing it is arguably as important as the strategy itself. A rigorous process that ensures participation of all relevant stakeholders can help define strategic and relevant objectives that are meaningful to citizens and businesses, prioritise and sequence actions to address the most critical integrity risks and provide the evidence needed to make measures more efficient and more likely to have the greatest impact. Such strategies are also a way of demonstrating commitment and can be used to define institutional responsibilities and foster interinstitutional co-ordination (OECD, 2020[19]).
The Dominican Republic currently does not have a national integrity strategy. The country is, however, taking initial steps to develop its first strategy with methodological support from the OECD. As mentioned, in July 2025, a temporary inter-institutional commission was established by the DIGEIG to co-ordinate this process. The strategy is an opportunity to define a first strategic vision, in line with international good practices and the quality criteria set out in the OECD Public Integrity Indicators. Moreover, the strategy should be linked to other strategic plans such as the National Development Strategy 2030 and the VI Open Government Action Plan. This would ensure strategic alignment and coherence between these national strategies.
The discussions on preliminary findings and recommendations during the process of this Integrity Review have informed the analysis of the status quo and the definition of strategic objectives and specific measures. These discussions, involving institutional actors beyond the executive branch, signal the country’s willingness to have a strategy supported by the State, not only by the government. In addition, the Dominican Republic is considering to opt for a long-term horizon to promote continuity of efforts across electoral cycles. Examples from countries such as Costa Rica and Chile could inspire the Dominican Republic (Box 1.6).
Costa Rica
Costa Rica's National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Integridad y Prevención de la Corrupción, ENIPC) establishes a strategic framework for action by the State and all actors in society, with a long-term horizon that prioritises prevention, the promotion of integrity and the creation of a culture of legality that minimises corruption. The ENIPC identified five priority areas: 1. Governance to combat corruption; 2. Managing human talent to combat corruption; 3. Encouraging citizen participation and oversight; 4. Managing the risk of corruption in public-private interactions; and 5. Access to information of public interest and accountability. The ENIPC is being implemented over ten years (2021-2030) and includes short-, medium- and long-term measures.
Chile
Chile's National Public Integrity Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Integridad Pública, ENIP) is a participatory, evidence-based and long-term policy with a proactive approach aimed at improving transparency, integrity and anti-corruption standards in the country. The ENIP’s objectives cover five thematic areas: 1. civil service; 2. public resources; 3. Transparency; 4. Politics; and 5. the private sector, with a ten-year horizon (2023-2033). Each of these thematic areas has an action plan setting out over 200 measures to be implemented in the short, medium and long term.
1.4.2. The DIGEIG should promote and co-ordinate the implementation of an integrity strategy via a monitoring system, continuous learning and accountability through evaluations, and build trust through communication strategies
Monitoring and evaluation are key to understanding how well an integrity strategy is being implemented, whether it is contributing to reducing the risks of corruption and fraud, and if not, why. Monitoring and evaluation go hand in hand. Both generate actionable information, which can help the Dominican Republic identify what really works and address what does not. Monitoring and evaluation also allow progress and results to be communicated to stakeholders and the public, providing a basis for transparency and accountability and enabling ownership. Such mechanisms should be established from the start for ensuring measurability, progress reports and accountability (OECD, 2020[19]).
Designing a monitoring system steered by the DIGEIG and leveraging the Presidential Transparency and Anti-Corruption Commission (CPTA) to manage and co-ordinate implementation through indicators and constructive dialogue
Monitoring is a routine process of data collection and reporting to ensure that resources are adequately spent, activities implemented on time, outputs successfully delivered and milestones met. It requires the systematic collection of information on specific indicators to provide key stakeholders with information on its progress and any obstacles encountered. Monitoring principally informs operational decisions: it enables to identify challenges and opportunities to make timely decisions and allow for adjustments to ensure activities meet the objectives of the strategy.
Monitoring happens at different levels. Every entity responsible for implementing parts of the future national strategy should monitor the actions corresponding to its responsibilities. This monitoring should form part of the entity’s daily routine and be embedded in the entity’s established monitoring routine. In addition, a central integrity monitoring system helps to collect, unify and analyse this decentralised data and information. It allows to analyse progress and delays in the implementation of activities, as well as the main milestones from a broad perspective. To achieve this, the indicators to track the implementation at this level should be clear and meaningful. Also, clear mechanisms and procedures are needed to make sure that the information is used to guiding high-level discussions on implementation and that implementing agencies remain engaged and motivated. Monitoring should not be perceived as a control mechanism designed to name and shame. It should be clearly communicated that it is a joint exercise to analyse and overcome obstacles.
Concretely, the DIGEIG should steer a process helping the agencies responsible for implementing parts of the strategy to define realistic milestones and collect relevant information to track and report progress. During implementation, the DIGEIG should then collect and organise this information to produce regular, concise monitoring reports. The Presidential Transparency and Anti-Corruption Commission (CPTA) could serve as a high-level dialogue forum to discuss the information generated by the monitoring reports of the future strategy. At this level, decision can be made if any adjustments are needed. The content and communication of monitoring reports are discussed below.
Establishing procedures and criteria to ensure regular and independent evaluations to enable learning and continuous improvement
The OECD defines public policy evaluation as “the structured and evidence-based assessment of the design, implementation or results of a planned, ongoing or completed public intervention” (OECD, 2022[62]). Its aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability as well as the value or significance of a policy. As such, evaluations ask questions beyond the implementation status of a policy. Above all, evaluations should lead to learning and enable continuity and coherence over time. One of the criteria used in the OECD's Public Integrity Indicators for the quality of the strategy framework is precisely whether strategies use evidence from the evaluations of previous strategies to inform their approach. Evaluation principally informs strategic decisions.
When developing a strategy and its monitoring system, it is recommended to plan regular evaluations. Ideally, these evaluations should be carried out by an independent actor or organisation. External evaluations can be perceived as more objective and credible by outsiders and stakeholders. When the person responsible for the design and/or implementation of a policy is also responsible for evaluating its success, there is a risk the evaluation will not be impartial. An external and independent view also helps to gain new and different perspectives.
An evaluation calendar can be established in line with the time horizon of the Dominican Republic's future integrity strategy. The monitoring process is then complemented by interim evaluations which are essential for adjusting the implementation and monitoring process or adapting strategic objectives. For example, an interim evaluation every two years could allow to review progress made and reassess strategic priorities. In turn, a final evaluation ensures learning, accountability and is the starting point for informing future strategy design processes. Some key questions that the evaluation of the Dominican Republic's new strategy could address in the future are detailed in Box 1.7.
A policy evaluation does not assess whether or to what extent each measure in a given strategy has been implemented, but rather whether the strategy has successfully contributed to achieving the stated goals and objectives (OECD, 2017[63]). To assess if the expected results and objectives of a national integrity strategy have been achieved, the following dimensions could, therefore, be considered:
Relevance: Was the strategy designed to respond to the country's needs and priorities? To what extent are the objectives still valid? Do stakeholders feel a sense of ownership?
Coherence: Was it coherent with other governance reforms and policies in relevant key areas (external coherence)? Were the different objectives of the national integrity strategy designed in a way that they reinforce one other and create synergies, and were the activities relevant to contributing to the achievement of the results and objectives (internal coherence)?
Effectiveness: To what extent did the strategy achieve the desired impacts and a proper level of implementation? What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
Efficiency: How well were the available resources used to achieve the objectives? Were the objectives achieved on time?
Impact: What differences has the strategy made? What were the positive changes and were there any unintended consequences?
Sustainability: How did it build on previous efforts to prevent and combat corruption and promote integrity, and how likely are the implemented changes to last over time?
To answer these questions, evaluations can use both quantitative and qualitative methods.
Source: Adapted from (OECD, 2021[64]) and based on (OECD, 2020[65]; OECD, 2017[63]). The criteria are based on OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and the OECD Recommendation on Public Policy Evaluation (OECD, 2022[62]).
Ensuring clear and fluid communication on the implementation and results of the strategy is key to building trust and supporting reforms
Communication with both internal and external stakeholders enables accountability, boosts the credibility of integrity efforts and stimulates ownership and action. The benefit of monitoring and evaluation for management, policy design and organisational learning depends largely on how processes and results are communicated (OECD, 2017[63]). As such, communication is considered an integral part of an integrity strategy and its monitoring and evaluation framework.
Therefore, the DIGEIG could take the lead in reporting and communication on the monitoring and evaluation activities outlined in the previous sections. Communicating regularly and clearly about progress towards goals can help build trust and demonstrate that gradual change is possible. Communication also helps to strengthen accountability processes and support stakeholder dialogue and evidence-based decision making. Communication on the implementation of the national integrity strategy can be facilitated, for example, through annual and biannual public reports, as well as through a dedicated website. Additionally, the implementing agencies could include integrity-related indicators into their own annual reports. Some aspects that the DIGEIG could consider when drafting monitoring and evaluation reports are summarised in Table 1.5.
Source: OECD Secretariat, based on, amongst others, (European Commission - European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), 2016[66]; 2022[67]).
However, communication strategies need to be carefully designed to make sure that messages are delivered and received as intended. There is ample evidence showing that well-meaning campaigns can have unintended and counter-productive effects (Gino, Ayal and Ariely, 2009[68]; Robert and Arnab, 2013[69]; Ajzenman, 2021[70]; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009[71]; Corbacho et al., 2016[72]; OECD, 2018[50]). Such risks related to poor communication can be prevented by carefully designing campaigns that focus on the achievements of integrity policies, demonstrating that change is possible. Clearly, such results must be real to prevent cynicism and diminished trust in government and discourage citizens from engaging constructively in politics (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014[73]).
1.4.3. The Dominican Republic could improve its evidence base for the monitoring and evaluation of integrity policies
Tracking the country's performance requires objective, up-to-date and comprehensive information to inform public decisions on integrity and anti-corruption and to encourage the implementation of measures through a benchmarking effect. This information must be made available to citizens and civil society organisations to generate debate and, above all, improvements. Several international indicators currently measure corruption levels, the rule of law and democratic conditions in the Dominican Republic. However, they do not consider the specific nature of the country and are largely based on experts’ perceptions. The OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PIIs) measure the performance of the Dominican Republic with respect to key variables in the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity. They can inform reforms by identifying gaps and show progress.
In addition to international indicators, the Dominican Republic also produces own data sets that could be used for monitoring and evaluation of the national integrity strategy. For instance, the Democratic Culture Survey performed by the former Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development (MEPyD) includes questions on corruption and clientelism and can be used as indicators for results. The DIGEIG's Standardised Transparency Index (Índice de Transparencia Estandarizado, ITE) monitors the compliance of transpareny portals of public entities with the regulations. Since 2010, the Ministry of Public Administration’s Public Management Monitoring System (Sistema de Monitoreo de la Administración Pública, SISMAP) monitors progress in public management of the executive branch's entities and bodies and covers areas related to the Professionalisation of Public Employment, Institutional Strengthening and Quality. The Public Management SISMAP is currently undergoing a process of technological improvements (Circular 004462). As mentioned above, the Municipal Public Administration Monitoring System could be useful to track the implementation of objectives of the national integrity strategy related to the subnational level.
The Dominican Republic, could consider reviewing the underlying questionnaires to leverage the mentioned datasets:
Democratic Culture Survey: The institution that has assumed the relevant functions previously carried out by the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development could consider including questions measuring perceptions, attitudes and experiences of citizens with respect to corruption and integrity.
Public Management SISMAP and Municipal SISMAP: The Ministry of Public Administration, in co-ordination with DIGEIG and the Dominican Municipal League, could consider including additional integrity indicators into existing dimensions or creating a new axis to measure key dimensions of public integrity.
The Standardised Transparency Index (ITE): Inspired by good practices such as those in South Korea or Peru (Box 1.8), the DIGEIG could complement the ITA with a Standardised Integrity Index (IIE) or transforming the ITE into a Standardised Transparency and Integrity Index (Índice de Transparencia e Integridad Estandarizado, ITIS).
South Korea
The Korean Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) uses two complementary frameworks to monitor and evaluate the quality of implementation of anti-corruption efforts, as well as their results:
Integrity Assessment: An annual assessment of integrity in all government bodies through standardised surveys, asking staff about their experience and perception of corruption. Citizens who have had contact with the respective bodies are also surveyed, as well as stakeholders and experts who have an interest in their functioning. The responses, along with other information are used to generate a Comprehensive Integrity Score.
Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment: A comparative assessment of integrity policies in all South Korean government bodies. The bodies selected for assessment submit a performance report on their implementation of integrity policies. The information is verified through on-site visits and then scored by an external evaluation team. This allows the ACRC to observe willingness and efforts made to ensure integrity across the public sector.
The results are public and the direct comparison of different government bodies’ integrity scores creates competition between them. The results are also included in the Government Performance Assessment. There are also rewards for high performance at the institutional and individual level, such as a study programme abroad for public officials whose integrity performance was outstanding. The permanent improvement found in performance results suggests that these incentives could be effective.
Peru
The Secretariat of Public Integrity (SIP) has developed an Integrity Model as part of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Plan. The Model contains a set of guidelines, mechanisms and procedures to strengthen public entities’ internal capacity to prevent and punish corruption, as well as to reinforce measures to combat unethical practices. As part of this programme, the SIP developed an index of corruption prevention capacity (ICP), which assesses the progress of the Integrity Model.
The ICP information is collected using a form that includes guidelines on the current standards with general indications and a description of the alternatives for each question, so that the evaluation criteria are transparent. The questions cover the aspects to be assessed for each component. Each response alternative is assigned a score according to the progress made on implementing and compliance of the evaluated aspect. This score is averaged together with the scores for the other questions to obtain the entity's global average ICP. The assessed Standard is scored on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 means no standardised corruption prevention mechanisms and 1 means full compliance with the Standard.
Source: Korea: Based on information provided to the OECD by Korea. Peru: Based on information provided by Peru and (SIP, 2024[74]).
Strengthening the governance and the co-ordination of the integrity system
The Dominican Republic should strengthen the DIGEIG by establishing it through a law with safeguards for its independence and by reinforcing its capacities as governing body of the integrity system.
The Dominican Republic could strengthen and institutionalise the Presidential Transparency and Anti-Corruption Commission (CPTA) as a permanent mechanism for inter-institutional co-ordination, governed by the DIGEIG.
The Dominican Republic could establish a technical working group to improve co-ordination and co-operation between entities mandated to detect integrity violations and carry out administrative and criminal investigations.
Encouraging the implementation of integrity policies throughout the public sector
The Dominican Republic could strengthen the Government Integrity and Regulatory Compliance Commissions transforming them into dedicated integrity units.
The DIGEIG could empower the CIGCN, or the new integrity units, as the main institutional channel for public servants to seek ethical guidance and advice, and raise awareness of this new role.
The DIGEIG could promote and support the implementation of integrity measures in local administrations.
Ensuring a strategic approach to strengthening public integrity
The Dominican Republic could develop a first national integrity strategy to set strategic goals and foster co-ordination between integrity actors outside the executive.
The DIGEIG should promote and co-ordinate the implementation of an integrity strategy via a monitoring system, continuous learning and accountability through evaluations, and build trust through communication strategies.
The Dominican Republic could improve its evidence base for the monitoring and evaluation of integrity policies.
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