Adolfo Rodriguez-Vargas
OECD Economic Surveys: Switzerland 2026
Abstract
Switzerland’s productivity is high compared to peers, but its growth has been mostly sustained by a few export-oriented industries. Boosting productivity growth across all sectors of the economy and among domestically-oriented firms will require tackling several long-standing structural challenges. Streamlining and digitalising administrative processes would reduce the burden on infrastructure deployment, boost business creation, and support innovation. Closing persistent skills shortages, lowering many non-tariff barriers, and increasing competition in some sectors, including by reducing extensive state involvement, would help generate positive productivity spillovers. Tackling skill gaps requires increasing the flexibility of educational pathways, and promoting the labour market integration of women, skilled migrants and older workers. Preserving Switzerland’s leading position in global innovation rankings would also involve enhancing knowledge and technology transfers between relevant stakeholders.
Switzerland’s productivity is among the highest in the OECD (Figure 4.1, Panel A). Many factors sustain this strong productivity performance, including a highly skilled workforce, good infrastructure, and strong policy settings. However, most of the productivity growth over recent decades came from a few high-value added firms in sectors mostly oriented towards exports, like pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, precision manufacturing, and financial services (Figure 4.1, Panel B). Multifactor productivity growth has outpaced the OECD average in recent years, although it still lags the best-performing countries (Figure 4.1, Panel C). The productivity gap between top performing firms and those further behind has widened. Small and medium-sized enterprises, which make up around 99% of all firms, often struggle to become more productive. Labour productivity in large companies increased by around 31% in the decade before the pandemic, while productivity for small firms grew only 4% and fell for micro-enterprises with less than 10 employees (Lauter and Nussbaumer, 2025[1]).
Note: 1. Activities auxiliary to insurance and finance. In Panel B, labour productivity at previous year's prices, full-time equivalent employment.
Source: OECD Productivity Database; Productivity statistics, Federal Statistical Office.
Boosting productivity spillovers from high-productivity, export-oriented sectors and firms to domestically-oriented and smaller firms can lift overall productivity and would improve the resilience of the economy, lowering vulnerabilities to external shocks or technological disruptions. This chapter reviews policy options to foster productivity growth across a wide range of industries and firms. It is structured around the three pillars of the OECD Foundations for Growth and Competitiveness Framework (OECD, 2026[2]).
Business dynamism, as measured by firm entry rates, varies considerably across industries. Entry rates are higher in high-productivity sectors, like information and communications, finance, and scientific activities, including research and development and engineering (Figure 4.2). By contrast, sectors with lower productivity, including manufacturing, hospitality activities and retail, display much lower entry rates. In these less dynamic sectors, firms can face barriers to entry or are subject to operation restrictions. This limited market dynamism hinders the economy’s ability to learn from top performing firms through movements of workers and capital. This section will discuss policy recommendations to facilitate the entry and exit of firms in all sectors of the economy, promoting the efficient reallocation of resources and increasing the scale of productivity spillovers.
Switzerland performs close to the OECD average in the OECD Product Market Regulation indicators (PMR) (Figure 4.3), which measure the extent to which a country's regulatory framework promotes or hinders competition in product markets. Switzerland has improved on the overall indicator since 2018, but this progress masks persistent weaknesses in several areas, notably on entry to network sectors and in administrative burdens on firms. Sector-specific regulations continue to hold back competition in energy, communications, professional services, and retail. A monitoring exercise of existing regulation shows that the number of regulatory obligations for companies under federal law has increased by 50% over the 2005-2025 period, and the average annual cost of levies, fees and permits is estimated at CHF 1 114 per employee, around 16% of the median wage (SECO, 2026[3]). OECD estimates suggest that removing barriers to entry in several sectors and reducing the regulatory burden could raise employment by 2.9% and output by 4% (Box 4.1).
Entry rates by sector, average 2013-2023
Note: Sectors follow the General Classification of Economic Activities (NOGA 2008). Information and communications comprise print and audiovisual media publishing, broadcasting, telecommunications, software and information services. Specialised and scientific activities include scientific research and development, engineering and architectural services, legal and accounting services, market research, and industrial design. Industry and energy comprise manufacturing, chemicals, and electricity and water. Trade and repairs include wholesale and retail trade, and repair of vehicles.
Source: Federal Statistical Office.
PMR overall indicator, 2023
Note: Indicator (0 = best – 6 = worst).
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation database.
The OECD Long-Term Model can be used to estimate the effects on productivity, employment, and potential output of implementing competition-enhancing reforms suggested in this survey, based on the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicator. The exercise compares the trajectories of these variables in a potential reform scenario with those from a situation where no reforms are implemented. The results suggest that reforms proposed in this Economic Survey could increase productivity by 1.2%, boost potential output by up to 4% and employment by up to 2.9% by 2050, over and above the growth expected under current policies.
Percent difference in potential output and employment compared to no reform scenario
Note: The simulation assumes further streamlining and digitalising procedures, implementation of the silence-is-consent and once-only principles in regulation, elimination of barriers in network sectors, and elimination of restrictions to the practice of several professions. Implementing these reforms improves the PMR indicator from its 2025 value of 1.33, close to the OECD average, to a value of 0.91, which is among the best in the OECD.
Source: OECD Long-Term Model (Guillemette and Château, 2023[4]).
4.1.1. Promoting fairer competition
Increasing competition can help foster productivity spillovers towards less productive sectors and firms as it strengthens firms’ incentives to improve efficiency and gain market share through technology adoption (CMA, 2025[5]). In many sectors of the Swiss economy, competition is adequate, with stable and moderate concentration levels, comparatively low mark-ups, and international firms ensuring competitive pressure even in less competitive markets (Danne et al., 2026[6]). However, barriers to competition remain in a few areas including network sectors, where potential measures to level the playing field for all firms could include reforms to state involvement, competition legislation, and the role of the competition authority.
Several sectors still face competitive distortions
The OECD Product Market Regulation indicators suggest that barriers to competition in network sectors like energy and communications are higher than the OECD average (Figure 4.5). Since network sectors are key inputs for essentially all other parts of the economy, where they provide on average more than a third of intermediate inputs across the OECD, improvements in pricing, quality, or product choice offered by these sectors affect the performance of downstream firms across the whole economy (OECD, n.d.[7]).
PMR Networks sector indicator, 2023
Note: Indicator (0 = best – 6 = worst). The overall indicator is the average of indicators for energy (electricity, natural gas), transport (rail, road, water, air), and e-communications (fixed, mobile).
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation database.
Energy is an important cost component for more than half of firms (Benhima, Fuster and Mikosch, 2024[8]), but only large consumers can freely choose their retail electricity or gas supplier, or sell excess own-produced electricity to third parties (Chapter 3). Regional monopolies continue to dominate retail electricity markets. Local suppliers set their tariffs annually, which are subject to subsequent review by the independent Federal Electricity Commission. The limited ability of providers to react to market signals may contribute to higher costs and tends to put upward pressure on prices in the long run (Mergele, Wehrli and Winistörfer, 2026[9]). Stronger competition in electricity markets should be promoted. The new electricity agreement with the European Union (EU) is expected to achieve this in line with EU requirements, leading to progressively lower retail electricity prices (Chapter 3). The agreement still requires final approval by Parliament and citizens.
Policy measures to foster the sharing of information and infrastructure could strengthen competition in communications markets. Operators of mobile services are allowed to share infrastructure but the lack of published guidelines or specific rules limits the extent to which this possibility is used. An electronic platform where providers publish and obtain updated data about the state of network infrastructure could reduce the costs of planning and deployment of new networks, potentially enhancing consumer choices. Switzerland could consider developing a platform similar to Portugal’s Suitable Infrastructure Information System (SIIA), which contains complete, georeferenced information on infrastructure suitable for hosting electronic communications networks, and detailed procedures and conditions for third-party access (ANACOM, n.d.[10]).
State participation remains high in some network sectors, weakening competition and obscuring market signals for consumers. Swisscom, a company in which the Swiss confederation has a majority stake, has a market share of 54% in mobile services and 45% in broadband (Communications Commission, n.d.[11]), while fully state-owned Swiss Post holds over 70 % of the postal market (PostCom, 2025[12]). The letter market is a legal monopoly, but the parcel market is open to competition. Swiss Post has expanded into activities with few synergies with its core business, like business software and some sector-specific logistic services, some of which are not profitable (Figure 4.6). Swiss Post is explicitly allowed to cover losses from competitive services with monopoly revenues where these are part of the universal service, which can distort competition (Mergele, Wehrli and Winistörfer, 2026[9]). In its logistics operation, the lack of separate cost accounting for letters and parcels raises the potential for cross-subsidies between these segments. In 2024, the Federal Council mandated that federal companies must not have significant competitive advantages when offering services outside their mandate. In June 2026, authorities put for consultation a revised draft of the Swiss Post Organisation Act to clarify the areas where the company is allowed to operate and introduce a procedure for reviewing economically significant acquisitions. Swiss Post could consider moving towards independent operation and management of the divisions unrelated to postal services and separate accounting for parcels and letters to increase transparency. Separating out some of its divisions and opening them to private participation could also be considered.
A planned State Aid Monitoring Act aims to improve the competitive environment by extending monitoring of state aid to firms beyond air transport, the only sector currently covered. Switzerland’s state aid will be monitored through a two-pillar approach including a Swiss state aid supervisory authority and the competent Swiss courts. This proposal is compatible with the Swiss constitution and respects the competences of the cantons, the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council (Federal Council, 2026[13]).
Cantonal regulations continue to hinder competition in professional services, which are used by companies from a wide range of sectors. Notaries, for example, are regulated almost entirely at the cantonal level, with requirements varying widely across cantons. Some cantons even impose residency requirements to be admitted as a notary. Allowing nationwide competition for notaries is a pending task for the full implementation of the Internal Market Law, which is meant to give businesses or professions the right to operate in all cantons once they are allowed to operate in one. A report commissioned by Parliament on how to open the notary profession to competition is due for 2026. Seven cantons set licencing procedures for architects or civil engineers, like proof of qualifications and entry into a cantonal registry. Cantons also require healthcare professionals to obtain two separate licenses, one to practice the profession and one to bill services to mandatory health insurance providers.
Regulatory reform could also promote the free operation of retail outlets. Shop opening hours are regulated, and businesses are only permitted to open on four Sundays a year, requiring special permits to hire staff for those days. Regulations vary across cantons, which complicates the logistics and staffing decisions for retailers with several outlets. A welcome draft law put forward by Parliament in April 2026 would allow firms to open on up to 12 Sundays a year and abolish special hiring permit requirements.
Operating profit by business segment
Source: Swiss Post Financial Reports
Strengthening the competition framework
In 2025, Parliament passed a partial reform of the Cartel Act which replaces the qualified dominance test in merger control, whereby the Competition Commission (ComCo) may prohibit a transaction only if it creates or strengthens a dominant position, as determined by the Significant Impediment to Effective Competition (SIEC) test. The reform lowers the threshold for intervention, allowing ComCo to intervene in cases that would hinder competition even if a dominant position is not established. The introduction of the SIEC test allows authorities to weigh all likely effects in competition, both positive and negative, and should lead to more balanced decisions. The reform also streamlines procedures for international companies, by introducing reporting exemptions for some cross-border mergers. Some procedural changes would increase efficiency and legal certainty, like setting statutory time frames for competition authorities and appeal courts.
The reform moves rulings on restrictions like price-fixing or customer‑allocation agreements closer to an effects-based approach. In a by-object approach, this type of restrictions is deemed to significantly hinder competition by their very nature, leaving limited room to consider efficiency justifications. The reform requires ComCo to examine whether harm to competition can occur under the specific conditions of the market, weighing both qualitative and quantitative factors. The latter might include quantitative analysis of market share, market position, or entry barriers. The successful implementation of this aspect of the reform will require ensuring that ComCo has enough resources and expertise to conduct the more demanding tasks that the reform entails.
An institutional reform of the Competition Commission (ComCo) could strengthen its transparency and effectiveness, most notably by more clearly separating the investigating and decision-making authorities. Currently, the Secretariat conducts investigations and submits sanction requests against companies while the Commission issues the first-instance ruling. However, the Secretariat needs the agreement of the Commission´s president to open investigations and to conduct procedural orders. The Secretariat acts both as prosecutor during the investigation phase, and then as court clerk and advisor during deliberations, which could give rise to potential conflict of interest concerns. The Secretariat works on a case, then transfers control of the proceedings to the Commission, but remains as advisor answering questions during deliberations, which could hamper the neutrality of the advice the Commission receives. A draft bill aims to address these challenges and accelerate proceedings by eliminating involvement of Commission members during the investigation phase and restricting the role of the Secretariat during the deliberations phase. Appointing judges to the Federal Administrative Court with expertise in economics and competition law can also speed up procedures.
4.1.2. Reducing administrative burdens and promoting e-government
In addition to the sectoral barriers to competition described above, unnecessary administrative burdens can also hold back the ability of resources to move across firms and economic activities, and with that, the diffusion of productivity improvements across the economy.
Streamlining administrative procedures for firms
Swiss entrepreneurs face administrative burdens that exceed the OECD average, and the costs for firms of dealing with regulation have increased (Figure 4.7). For instance, establishing a limited liability company and proving the deposit of minimum capital requirements requires in-person appearance at a notary, whereas in most OECD countries those are not required or can be done online. Minimum capital requirements, at 23% of per capita GDP, are also high compared to the average of 5% across the OECD (OECD, n.d.[14]). A complex regulatory environment may disproportionately penalise new or small firms as compliance and administrative burdens often act as fixed costs. SMEs can be particularly affected by the costs required to understand rules, redesign processes and products, invest in equipment and IT systems, and train staff (Andrews, Turban and Tyros, 2026[15]). A higher burden of regulatory compliance can slow technology adoption by shifting tasks from innovation to paperwork, especially in young and small firms lacking enough resources (European Commission, 2025[16]). The negative impact of regulations on business dynamism can also be self-reinforcing, as large incumbent firms could have an incentive to support regulations that raise costs to small and new firms (Andrews, Turban and Tyros, 2026[15]).
While proximity between citizens, businesses, and political authorities can sometimes be an advantage of a federal system, navigating the complex system of licenses and permits can also entail costs for firms. Cantonal authorities regulate businesses in their jurisdiction, with each of the 26 cantons having in some sectors their own regulations for licenses and permits, while municipalities can add additional requirements. Procedures, documentation requirements, and review times for the same activity can vary widely across cantons and municipalities. This regulatory heterogeneity in a small country can make planning more difficult and costly for firms, especially small and medium enterprises. Businesses must identify the appropriate licenses for operation across several levels of government and jurisdictions, and the associated data requirements, sequencing, or renewals, which can add to legal costs, and increase the likelihood of fines or delays. Applying silence-is-consent rules and once-only principles for licensing low-risk activities can accelerate firm creation, foster entrepreneurship, and reduce paperwork, following the examples of other OECD countries including France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. For other activities, the stringency of license requirements could be made proportional to the risks involved. The Corporate Relief Act, enacted in 2024, establishes the principle of risk-based oversight of companies at the national level. Offering tailored assistance to support entrepreneurs with the process of starting their business could also be considered.
Further improvements in the design of regulations can reduce compliance costs more widely. The Corporate Relief Act introduces in-depth ex post evaluations through sectoral studies to streamline existing regulation and promote digitalisation. The implementation of these studies should be based on clear, rigorous, and standardised methodologies to minimise arbitrariness, facilitate analysis, and ease communication. Authorities already implemented or scheduled for consultation several measures to streamline administrative procedures in areas like infrastructure, taxes, and digitalisation of procedures (Box 4.2). The Corporate Relief Act also requires looking for relief options for companies when designing new regulations, and the estimation of regulatory costs for companies. When designing regulations, authorities conduct early-stage stakeholder engagement on the nature of the problem and possible solutions, but this phase is not open to the public. Making early‑stage consultations on laws and regulations more systematic and open can help policymakers ensure that all stakeholders have the chance to provide input into the resulting policies (OECD, 2025[17]).
In 2025, the Federal Council adopted a package of measures to streamline administrative procedures for firms, based on a review of existing regulations conducted by all departments.
Infrastructure. Measures include an exemption of road marking from authorisation for night work, administrative streamlining on the Telecommunication Service Ordinance to strengthen the resilience of the mobile phone network, a project to simplify the authorisation procedures for construction and operation of mobile phone installations.
Taxes. Projects to be put to consultation include the elimination of a minimum turnover for the application of the annual VAT and easing administrative procedures for the stamp duty.
Digitalisation of procedures will affect the housing evaluation system, procedures for waste movements, and many documents related to aviation safety monitoring. Further measures aim at easier issuance of electronic identities for companies, acceptance of electronic signatures in 'Business to Government' interactions, and harmonisation with electronic identification within the EU. They also include a mandate to enable the mutual recognition of electronic signatures with the EU.
In addition, a digital solution for the transmission of applications to the Commercial register is expected to be integrated into the one-stop platform for government services (EasyGov) by 2029.
Data collection. Projects include single data collection and further easing of administrative burdens in the health system, avoiding duplicates in data collection from companies for the Federal Office of Energy and a simplification of procedures regarding air passenger data communication.
Other measures include the relaxation of restrictions on publicity of some products, consultations on the streamlining of product safety measures, a project for consultation on removing trade barriers to imports of timber and wood products from the EU and an ongoing study on regulation of industrial companies.
Source: Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER).
Note: A: Indicator (0 = best – 6 = worst). The value for 2024 shows the simulated value of the indicator that incorporates the principle of risk-based oversight of companies at a national level set forth in the Corporate Relief Act enacted in 2024, after the cut-off date for the database. B: Change in the share of employment devoted to regulatory tasks.
Source: A: OECD Product Market Regulation database. B: OECD calculations based on (Andrews, Turban and Tyros, 2026[15]), ”Regulatory compliance costs and productivity: New task-based evidence”.
Local authorities could follow the OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy to improve licensing and permitting, ensuring that they remain evidence-based, risk-proportionate, linked with enforcement, streamlined and responsive to changing needs (OECD, 2025[18]). Minimising and standardising information obligations should be a priority, while providing enough technological resources and safeguards to protect data privacy. Cantons and municipalities could also harmonise regulations, for example through binding mutual recognition agreements, as done in Canada (OECD, 2025[19]). The SME forum, an extra-parliamentary commission of experts that assesses the implementation of planned federal measures, is a good example that could be emulated at the local level. Local authorities could adopt a workshop-based approach to engage stakeholders to identify costly bureaucratic procedures and potential solutions, as implemented in Germany (OECD, 2025[20]), or open digital channels to receive feedback from citizens and businesses about burdensome, unnecessary or outdated regulations, as recently done in Argentina (OECD, 2025[21]).
Making e-Government work better for firms
Digital services and e-government are a promising way to reduce regulatory burdens, facilitate the reallocation of resources and enhance productivity diffusion across the economy. The Swiss authorities are stepping up efforts to increase their roll-out. Over 40 % of municipalities and almost 60 % of cantons now have relevant agreements on e-Government matters (DPSS/SECO, 2025[22]). However, close to 40 % of businesses think the municipalities should increase their range of online services, and around a third believe that the cantons and the Confederation should do the same. The Digital Public Services Switzerland Strategy for 2024– 2027 aims to expand digital public services through cooperation across all levels of government, including the implementation of end-to-end digital platforms, the introduction of a state e-ID set for the first half of 2027, and the adoption of cloud technologies for public authorities. The Corporate Relief Act mandates federal and cantonal authorities that enforce federal law to offer their services for business through the one-stop platform EasyGov.
The deployment of e-Government services is likely to require additional resources. Authorities, especially at lower levels of government, report that staff shortages, insufficient staff knowledge, and budget restrictions are slowing down their efforts (DPSS/SECO, 2025[22]). Fulfilling the vision set out in the Strategy will entail ensuring appropriate resources to build the infrastructure and providing staff with the digital skills needed, especially at the local level. In Korea, the Digital Civil Servant Competency Framework categorises essential skills in technology usage, data-based policy analysis, and digital citizen engagement, and offers a tool to assess civil servants’ current competencies and a strategic guide for targeted upskilling (OECD, 2025[23]). In Norway, the Learning Management System provides training covering user needs and service design skills, among other topics (OECD, 2024[24]). Cantons where digital skills are lagging could use the OECD Framework for Digital Talent and Skills in the Public Sector to assess what skills are needed and devise actions to close those gaps, which should include providing enough resources for training and reskilling (OECD, 2021[25]).
Many firms still lack enough knowledge about public digital services, and many find them difficult to use. Awareness of EasyGov has grown, but so far only one in four companies are registered to use it, only 37 % of firms are familiar with the platform, and many seem unaware of the full array of services available (DPSS/SECO, 2025[22]). AGOV, a single login to access several digital services, is a first step towards one-stop government but it is known only by a third of the public and has only been available in some cantons since early 2024. Businesses say that complex and lengthy registration processes are the main obstacle to use digital government services, while also citing difficulties in identifying the right government services, and low user-friendliness. Authorities should ensure the timely implementation of planned targeted measures to increase recognition and user-friendliness, while highlighting the advantages of these digital services for running businesses. Applying AI tools could boost engagement and ease of use by implementing chatbots to help firms with inquiries, providing users with pre-filled forms and targeted information, and increasing accessibility. Implementing this type of technological solution will also hinge on providing staff with the appropriate knowledge and skills.
EasyGov has been expanded with new capabilities and services since the last OECD Economic Survey and offers access to around 62 government services. The platform now includes several procedures regarding employment of foreign workers, like the registration for short-term employment and cross-border commuter permits. A new company relocation service allows firms to report a change of address to all relevant authorities in one go, while the business closure service assists companies with all the necessary steps, from registering to liquidation and deletion. Registering in the platform now also makes it easier to report to the transparency register of legal entities. Still, only a few procedures involving cantonal authorities can be currently handled through EasyGov, like entry in the commercial registry or short-term employment notifications. Integrating more cantonal governments’ services in the platform can increase its reach and boost usefulness for firms, as is the case with Norway’s government portal (Box 4.3). A new version of EasyGov is expected to launch in late 2027, with a new architecture that will allow authorities to develop customised applications while incorporating AI to increase efficiency in processes.
Altinn is the Norwegian authorities’ joint portal for reporting and dialogue with business and citizens, with more than 70 state agencies and municipalities offering services. Public entities employ an open-source platform to quicky develop and deploy applications to Altinn, by using templates for the most common digital services scenarios. Altinn currently hosts almost 1000 active solutions.
Firms can use the portal to register business information, file taxes and reports, submit forms, and handle employer reporting and regulatory compliance. The full array of services covers services for private individuals; business information; taxes, fees, and accounting; health, safety, and environmental regulations; salaries and personnel; authorisations and qualifications; grants and compensation; and services targeted to 14 industries.
The platform is used by over 90% of the Norwegian population and almost 100% of the businesses. Savings to businesses from using Altinn have been estimated at close to half a percent point of GDP per year.
Source: Norwegian Digitalisation Agency (https://info.altinn.no/en/).
Some services in EasyGov still require time-consuming offline steps. To register, Swiss-based companies and self-employed persons must wait for an activation code sent by post, and foreign companies need to apply for an identification number through the Federal Statistical Office, processes that can take days or even weeks. Firms wishing to involve third parties like legal or accounting advisors must obtain a power of attorney and send it to the competent authority. Requisites like these weaken the usefulness of the platform and can discourage firms from using it. The introduction of e-ID and the implementation of the Act on Digitisation in the Notary Profession will eliminate some of these hurdles. Authorities should keep streamlining and digitalising procedures to minimise offline requirements in EasyGov and other digital services.
4.1.3. Lowering remaining non-tariff barriers
Openness to trade and foreign direct investment have underpinned Switzerland’s integration into global value chains, by attracting multinational companies and allowing domestic ones to invest and operate abroad. Strong intellectual property protection, a robust research and development (R&D) environment, a skilled workforce, stable political and macroeconomic framework conditions, and a favourable tax environment have helped turn Switzerland into an attractive business location. Recent measures to lower trade costs can increase that attractiveness but scope for building on this progress remains in several areas.
Industrial tariffs were unilaterally abolished in 2024, regardless of product origin or delivery route, and custom procedures were streamlined for industrial products. Switzerland now has one of the lowest average tariff rates in the OECD (Figure 4.8, Panel A). During the first year after the abolition, a significant share of companies, especially in the wholesale sector, reported lower purchasing costs. In the automotive sector, the reduction in administrative burdens enabled independent importers to strengthen their position in the market, thereby increasing competition in the industry. Overall, industrial goods’ prices fell by around 1.15%, with the highest effect in clothing and footwear (Lehmann et al., 2026[26]).
An on-going reform of custom procedures will further reduce costs for firms. The Federal Office for Customs and Border Security (FOCBS) published its revised Customs Duties Act, which focuses only on the remission of customs duties, while a new legal framework, the Enforcement Tasks Act, centralises and standardises the rules for the FOCBS. The revision reduces administrative burdens by harmonising procedures for levy collection and border checks, and standardising appeal procedures for all levies. Another key aspect of the new law is the introduction of a simplified goods declaration for smaller shipments. The new declaration will require only basic information and should significantly streamline and speed up the customs clearance process, reducing costs for importers and exporters. A new customs clearance system (Passar), handles transit, import and export processes in an automated, fully digital manner. The import process (Passar 2.0) is being rolled out in phases to fully replace the current system by early 2027. Digitalisation of specialist procedures such as inward processing and temporary imports will follow. The new system gives firms real-time information on the customs status, enhancing planning across their supply chains. The gains in efficiency for firms from using this new obligatory system are likely to outweigh the short-run costs of implementing it.
The share of trade exposed to harmful policy measures, defined as those containing discrimination against foreign commercial interests, has increased (Figure 4.8, Panel B). While tariffs are generally low, non-tariff barriers continue to impose costs to firms. Some of these measures seek to ensure the safety and quality of products for consumers but others can be used to shield domestic firms from foreign competition. Companies still spend time and resources navigating technical barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and quantitative restrictions, before being able to access the Swiss market. Non-tariff barriers remain, relevant for nearly all imports of food, animal and plant products, chemicals, and machinery and equipment (World Bank, n.d.[27]). Revisions of the laws on technical barriers to trade and on product safety are currently under public consultation.
Local technical specifications and standards for industrial products may imply additional testing by Swiss-approved bodies, which can increase the cost of imported inputs for Swiss SMEs. For imports of agricultural products alone, the median ad valorem equivalent tariff of technical barriers has been estimated at around 35% (Fiankor, 2023[28]). Several measures have helped to limit the coverage of technical barriers to trade. For example, any product that is legally sold in the EU or the EEA can be sold in Switzerland without undergoing additional conformity assessments, with some exemptions, including food. Switzerland has also signed six mutual recognition agreements (MRA), including one with the EU covering 73% of Swiss industrial exports to the EU (Federal Council, 2025[29]). Establishing MRAs with other markets can help lower the administrative and financial burden of technical barriers for Swiss exporters.
Agricultural imports still face additional import restrictions. Quantitative restrictions like tariff quotas limit the volume of some agricultural goods that can enter at a lower duty, while seasonal import restrictions apply to some fruits and vegetables. Imports of agricultural products subject to tariff quotas or phytosanitary requirements are subject to non-automatic licensing. By 2023, the average applied most-favoured-nation tariff on agricultural imports was 28.5%, well above the average of 1.3% for non-agricultural products at the time (OECD, 2025[30]), and even more so since the 2024 abolition of industrial tariffs. Seasonal tariff quotas raise the prices of most vegetables by over 20% compared to neighbouring countries on peak harvest season (Loginova, Portmann and Huber, 2021[31]).
Note: A. Data for Switzerland, New Zealand, Costa Rica, Peru, United Kingdom, Israel, the United States, Japan, Canada, Iceland, Mexico, Norway, Colombia, Türkiye, and Korea are for 2024; the rest is for 2023.
Source: A: World Trade Organisation. B: Global Trade Alert.
There is also further room to ease barriers to trade in services. Switzerland performs slightly worse than the OECD average in the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (Figure 4.9), but the index value is relatively low compared to all countries in the sample, and has decreased in recent years (OECD, 2026[32]). Courier services, broadcasting, and freight-forwarding face the most salient restrictions compared to other countries, mainly due to restrictions on foreign entry and on the movement of people, and to barriers to competition. The acquisition and use of land and real estate by foreigners is restricted, and at least one of the board members in a corporation must be a resident. There are quotas for stays exceeding four months and labour market tests for non-EEA workers seeking to temporarily provide services in the country as intra-corporate transferees, contractual services suppliers, or independent services suppliers. Easing restrictions on foreign entry and to the movement of non-EEA workers can facilitate knowledge and technology transfers to Swiss firms.
Lowering trade barriers by signing new free trade agreements (FTAs) and deepening existing ones would increase competition, boosting firms’ efficiency, and offer more opportunities for businesses to benefit from knowledge spillovers through higher integration into global value chains. Switzerland has signed 35 FTAs with 45 partners, besides those with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Convention and the EU. While FTAs are usually negotiated along with EFTA partners, Switzerland can also conduct bilateral agreements, as it has done with China and the United Kingdom. Swiss companies’ usage of FTAs could also be increased. Facilitating compliance with rules of origin and giving firms clearly structured and understandable information in a centralised location would reduce firms’ costs to access the benefits of FTAs (OECD, 2024[33]).
The Switzerland-EU package deal is also an opportunity to reduce non-tariff trade barriers and increase sales for Swiss firms (Chapter 1). The institutional elements integrated in the package are designed to ensure that agreements remain up‑to‑date with EU legislation, uniformly interpreted, and jointly supervised. The Mutual Recognition Agreement will continue to ensure alignment with EU on technical specifications for industrial products. The food safety agreement is subject to dynamic adoption of EU legislation and should remove all related non-tariff trade barriers by creating a common food safety area, while the electricity agreement simplifies the exchange and trade of electricity (Chapter 3). Other agreements concern air and land transportation, which would facilitate logistics for importers and exporters in the EU.
Services Trade Restrictiveness Index 2025
Note: The STRI indices take values between zero and one, one being the most restrictive. The STRI database records measures on a Most Favoured Nations basis. Air transport and road freight cover only commercial establishment (with accompanying movement of people). The indices are based on laws and regulations made public by 31 October 2025 and in force on 31 December 2025.
Source: OECD STRI (http://oe.cd/stri-db) and TiVA databases.
4.1.4. Facilitating restructuring or exit for ailing firms
Fostering the diffusion of productivity improvements across the economy also implies facilitating the orderly exit of low-performing firms. Switzerland ranks lower than the average in the OECD insolvency indicator and its performance has weakened between 2016 and the latest update in 2022 (Figure 4.10). Although some particularities of the Swiss insolvency system make it difficult to obtain comparable data, this generally reflects costly insolvency proceedings for failed entrepreneurs, which can delay the initiation and resolution of proceedings. There is no general statutory discharge, nor a legal fresh start for honest natural-person debtors once they have gone through the required insolvency process, unlike other OECD countries.
Bankruptcy procedures can be particularly burdensome for SMEs, which often opt for closing rather than going through costly and lengthy proceedings. Several reforms have been introduced or are currently under discussion to address these drawbacks. Possible ways to make bankruptcy proceedings easier for SMEs include establishing alternative means of dispute resolution and binding out-of-court instruments, following the examples of Italy and Portugal (OECD, 2026[34]; OECD, 2021[35]). Creating financially attractive out-of-court schemes for firm liquidation can reduce exit costs on entrepreneurs and create the right entrepreneurial environment for a “second chance” (OECD, 2020[36]). SMEs could also benefit particularly from prevention measures, some of which are lacking in Switzerland, including early-warning tools for firms like on-line self-tests or training, and affordable pre-insolvency procedures for restructuring.
Several reforms entered into force in 2025 to prevent companies from abusing the bankruptcy law, helping to avoid damage to creditors and promote fairer competition. Claims by the public sector like taxes or social security contributions must now be enforced through bankruptcy procedures instead of seizure. Before the change, companies in the commercial register that were at risk of bankruptcy kept operating because they could avoid paying their debts without consequences. A new Federal Act on Combating Abusive Bankruptcy introduced stricter criminal and civil sanctions, nullified shell company transfers to avoid debts, and extended disclosure and cooperation duties for corporate officers. Several stricter procedures now apply, notably criminal reporting obligations for bankruptcy officials and earlier and stricter corporate reporting obligations.
OECD insolvency indicator
Note: Indicator (0 = best – 1 = worst).
Source: (André and Demmou, 2022[37]). “Enhancing insolvency frameworks to support economic renewal”.
A project to introduce simplified restructuring proceedings and a discharge for natural persons, which would also benefit SMEs, is currently under discussion in Parliament. The reform would introduce two main changes. First, the rules for settlement agreements would be slightly simplified, including the possibility for firms to pay privileged claims over the course of the agreement rather than at the start, and for creditors to vote electronically without the need of a formal meeting to reach an agreement. Second, the law would include a simple procedure for all durably insolvent natural persons, introducing the possibility of discharge after four years of good behaviour. Few exceptions to the discharge would be allowed, like fines or family support payments, and firms would not be able to file for this benefit until after 15 years past the previous discharge. This proposal should be approved to reduce costs and increase opportunities for SMEs.
Developing a more structured early warning system for struggling businesses could help avoid unnecessary bankruptcies, especially for SMEs. The current early warning mechanism relies on internal governance obligations for firms, especially regarding liquidity planning. In Denmark, for example, the state-funded Early Warning programme provides free and confidential assistance to firms, including assessment of the business viability, preparation of turnaround or restructuring plans, or legal assistance of insolvency lawyers if needed. This model has been adapted into the Early Warning Europe network to support SMEs.
4.2.1. The Swiss innovation model has been successful
A favourable environment for private sector innovation can support business creation and survival, and boost productivity diffusion by allowing less efficient firms to catch up (Bogetoft et al., 2024[38]; Howell, 2017[39]). Switzerland reliably ranks among the world’s most innovative countries (Figure 4.11), hosting domestic and multinational firms that continually aim to improve their products, services, and processes, allowing them to remain competitive despite a strong Swiss franc and through external headwinds. The Swiss model avoids targeted industrial policy, favouring support for research and development, and providing sound framework conditions. Innovation indicators highlight the attractiveness of its research systems, which has significant collaborative scientific publication output; a qualified population with a high share of research students; and supportive infrastructure and institutions (European Commission, 2024[40]; WIPO, 2025[41]).
The Swiss innovation system prioritises grants for basic research and for programmes that integrate higher‑education institutions with industry, while offering comparatively limited direct subsidies (Box 4.4). Tax incentives also play a less prominent role. The Swiss National Science Foundation awards public research funding, while Innosuisse supports science-based innovation aimed at creating new firms or new products and services. The system also includes networks of research centres and innovation parks based in universities.
The Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) is a private foundation with a government mandate to support scientific research in all academic disciplines in universities and other institutions. Its main task is to award public research funding through a competitive process, paying special attention to promoting early-career researchers.
Innosuisse is the Swiss Innovation Promotion Agency, whose goal is to foster science-based innovation to develop Swiss start-ups, and innovative products and services by SMEs and other organisations. It supports the partnership between academia and the private sector through innovation projects, networking, training, and coaching, working closely with national partners like SNSF and the Secretariat of Education, Research and Innovation (SERI). It provides funds to the university partner, while the private partner must cover at least 50% of the project costs.
The National Centres of Competence in Research (NCCR) are based in Swiss universities and aim to foster research in new areas of strategic importance. Work is based on interdisciplinary networks with other higher education institutions pursuing fundamental research, and cooperation with the private and public sectors. NCCRs receive federal funding, supplemented with contributions from participating universities, the private sector, and third-party research groups. NCCRs run for a maximum of 12 years.
Research Institutions of National Significance are funded by private partners and the Federal Government in a subsidiary role. They perform complementary tasks to those of the universities and institutions in the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology.
The Switzerland Innovation Foundation manages the Swiss Innovation Park network, which comprises six main sites, including at the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology of Zurich and Lausanne. The sites are funded by cantons and private investors as a public-private partnership, and the federal government gives guarantees for special-purpose loans and leases land to facilitate the expansion of the network.
Regional Innovation Systems (RIS) aim to stimulate innovation dynamics in the regions by improving the coordination of existing innovation promotion offers for SMEs, bringing together companies, training, and research institutions, as well as public authorities.
Around 9.5% of companies have received funding from Innosuisse, 4.9% of firms have benefited from cantonal or other regional innovation funding, 2.2% have received other type of Swiss funding, and 2.7% of firms have received EU funds. The use of Innosuisse funds increases with firm size, with mid-size and larger companies (250 full-time employees or more) using the funding to about the same extent while micro-enterprises use it to very small degree (Barjak et al., 2026[42]).
Source: SNSF, Innosuisse, NCCR, Switzerland Innovation.
Global Innovation Index 2025
Note: The index summarises 78 indicators, 63 of which are hard data, 10 are composite indicators, and 5 are survey questions from the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey (3) and from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor's National Expert Survey (2). These variables cover institutional, regulatory, and business environment; human capital and research; infrastructure and ecological sustainability; credit and investment; availability of knowledge workers, innovation linkages and knowledge absorption; knowledge creation, impact, and diffusion; and creative outputs.
Source: WIPO.
Given its fragmented nature, evaluation of the system is not systematic. Funding from Innosuisse has been found to increase firm sales by 21% and employment by 18% on average over 5 years (Hulfeld, Spescha and Wörter, 2024[43]). A benchmark exercise of innovation parks has shown high survival rate of companies, a high proportion of fast-growing companies, and comparable good performance of companies in the parks and those that moved out of them (Swissparks, 2022[44]). A more frequent and systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of all components of the innovation system, and heavier input from research based on granular data would improve the scientific basis for the formulation of innovation policy.
4.2.2. Switzerland’s lead in innovation is diminishing
Innovation activity, although comparatively high (Figure 4.12), seems to be slowing. In fact, the share of firms conducting research and development has halved since 2000, with a larger fall in smaller companies. Instead, R&D outsourcing has become more prevalent (Gersbach and Wörter, 2024[45]; Spescha, Tran and Wörter, 2025[46]). Most sales do not come from new-to-market innovations, but from refinement to existing products, processes or technologies, and the share of firms applying for patents is slightly below the OECD mean. Despite high collaboration in the Swiss innovation system, the share of firms engaging in collaboration in innovation is now the lowest in the OECD (Figure 4.12).
Business surveys consistently point to high costs as the main barrier to innovation (Figure 4.13), especially in capital and technology-intensive sectors. Commercial viability of innovative products has remained constant, but the expenditures required to generate innovations have increased significantly (Gersbach and Wörter, 2024[45]). Access to data is expensive for all firms but specially for SMEs, due to the cost of data sharing and to the resources needed to train or hire staff. Companies might prioritise process improvements or design upgrades over major innovations because of cost limitations. High costs also hinder sustainability innovations across all sectors (Barjak et al., 2026[42]).
Source: OECD Innovation Indicators database 2023
Regulations can also hamper innovation. Data protection, environmental, and process-related regulations have become more important for firms in nearly all industries, often translating into demand for more qualified staff, higher uncertainty, and changes in business processes. Firms active in R&D report higher influence of regulation on innovation activity. Differences in cantonal regulations can also add to the burden and limit incentives to invest in innovation. Health-sector companies, for example, highlight cantonal regulations of ethical approvals of clinical trials or collaboration with hospitals. Fintechs, on the other hand, point to cantonal differences in digital land registers and processes for the registration of property transactions (Barjak et al., 2026[42]). Building and zoning regulations, usually implemented at the municipality level, have become one of the most mentioned barriers by firms in the sense that they limit opportunities for the expansion of installations (Chapter 2) (Figure 4.13). Streamlining regulations can reduce costs and shorten time‑to‑market (Section 4.1.2). Establishing sector-specific experimental environments for regulation, like regulatory sandboxes adopted in Switzerland for fintech in 2019, and in Japan, France, and Portugal, can help develop more innovation-friendly regulation. The OECD Regulatory Sandbox Toolkit (OECD, 2025[47]) is a useful resource to establish and manage regulatory sandboxes effectively.
Labour shortages are also a growing obstacle for innovation (Section 4.3, Figure 4.13). Difficulties in attracting and retaining qualified personnel, notably in specialised technical fields, can weaken innovation pipelines by hindering R&D, digitalisation, or the adoption of technologies that could boost innovation, like AI (Section 1.5). Increasing incentives for graduates of selected STEM programmes to remain in Switzerland, ensuring appropriate provision of childcare, providing more family-friendly working conditions, increasing permeability in the education system, and tackling gender stereotypes about career choices can help close skill gaps and support innovation.
Access to financing remains a concern, although its importance has subsided. Although total venture capital investment as a share of GDP is close to the OECD average, the share of that investment going to start-up and other early-stage businesses in 2024 was lower than the OECD mean (OECD, n.d.[48]), which limits the scaling-up phase of projects. Some start-ups might need to seek financing abroad, which can be helpful when expanding into international markets, but also entails the risk that start-ups decide to relocate abroad. Large-scale financing is particularly scarce, hampering efforts to scale up more ambitious projects, especially in energy and clean tech investments, as private partners are often not able to match the resources required (Barjak, Foray and Wörter, 2023[49]). The Deep Tech Nation foundation was set up in 2024 to mobilise venture capital, increase awareness of funding opportunities and contribute to foster attractive investment conditions. Recently Innosuisse began providing direct funding for science-based projects of start-ups with innovation potential. Firms also report burdensome and lengthy application processes and processing times, and lack of knowledge about funding instruments and support available for innovation. Streamlining application processes and ensuring effective communication of funding opportunities can lower entry barriers, particularly for SMEs. Rebalancing public support between project stages, so that more resources are allocated for innovation at an early-stage, and relaxing rules regarding the share of funds that private partners must bring to projects co-financed by Innosuisse, could attract more investors and boost start-up development.
Note: Companies facing high barriers score 4 in a 4-point scale.
Source: KOF Innovation Survey 2023.
Enhancing support for SMEs can increase their engagement in R&D activities. Research using firm-level data shows that tax incentives raise R&D investment, with larger increases for SMEs, and that R&D produces significant knowledge spillovers (OECD, 2023[50]). Since 2020, patent revenues are taxed differently from other commercial revenues to provide incentives for R&D, and most cantons also offer tax relief for R&D expenditures. Streamlining the application process for SMEs, as done in the tax credit schemes of Denmark and Spain, can increase take up of these incentives and offer opportunities for smaller firms to innovate. Promoting awareness of existing instruments tailored to SMEs, like Innosuisse´s innovation cheques to fund preliminary studies and tests with external experts, should also be considered.
In 2025, Switzerland rejoined Horizon Europe, the EU's framework programme for research and innovation for 2021-2027. Unsuccessful negotiations in 2021 regarding an institutional framework agreement led to Switzerland being unable to access grants and educational opportunities, and as a result less than 2% of all companies applied to the programme during 2021-2022, and mainly as co-applicants. Swiss entities now have access to all parts of the programme again, on similar terms as EU member states, like joining or leading research consortia and receiving funding. Fostering knowledge about how to access Horizon Europe among firms, researchers and students can help increase its reach and increase innovation opportunities.
4.2.3. Supporting novel avenues for innovation
The Swiss innovation system prioritises support for science-based innovation, but firms also draw knowledge from other sources. For instance, customers and suppliers are often the most important external sources of knowledge and innovation for firms (Figure 4.14, Panel A). Software suppliers have gained significant importance in recent years. Incorporating customer insights can lead to shorter development times and more market-oriented innovations. Collaboration with clients as a source of innovation is very important for Swiss service firms, and in some industrial sectors it is more common than in-house R&D (UBS Switzerland, 2023[51]). Knowledge transfers from suppliers improve knowledge quality, and let firms adapt more quickly to technological change, supporting innovation especially in SMEs (Corral de Zubielqui et al., 2019[52]; Liu et al., 2024[53]). Improving workers’ digital skills and fostering adoption of data-driven technologies like AI can help firms to gain insights into market developments to adapt products, services, or processes.
Technology transfers between universities and the private sector underpin the success of the Swiss innovation system. Research-based collaboration is only one of the ways in which firms absorb knowledge (Figure 4.14, Panel B). Companies primarily engage on informal contacts, like attending scientific conferences or reading university publications, and on forms of transfer related to education and mobility, like sabbaticals of employees at universities or joint teaching events (Wörter, Spescha and Rammer, 2024[54]). The success of these collaborations hinges on firms finding scientific institutions with work that is relevant to their business activities, and on having employees with the appropriate skills. Improving capacities in firms, especially SMEs, and easing pathways for qualified foreign professionals to find employment in Switzerland is thus essential.
Note: A: Innovative companies of great importance (score 4 in a 4-point scale). B: Data for 2018. Bars show the share of firms that engage in each form of cooperation, percentages do not add to 100% as firms can engage in several forms. Small companies: less than 50 employees; medium companies: 50 to 250 employees; large companies: more than 250 employees.
Source: A: KOF Innovation Survey 2023. B: (Wörter, Spescha and Rammer, 2024[54]), “Monitoring of knowledge and technology transfer in Switzerland”.
Information about the Swiss innovation system remains fragmented across institutions, making it difficult for firms and non-scientific institutions, especially newcomers, to have an understanding of skills, experience, and research results (Barjak et al., 2026[42]). Farmers, for instance, are not always meaningfully engaged in innovation processes, which reduces the relevance and adoption of new solutions (OECD, 2026[55]). Establishing a nationwide Current Research Information System (CRIS) to centralise information on researchers and research organisations, like those in several OECD countries (Box 4.5), can facilitate making contacts for collaborative work and reduce the administrative burden on researchers.
Intellectual property management is a core element of technology transfer between scientific institutions and firms. The Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property (IPI) offers modular information and training programmes ranging from introductory IP topics to specialised courses; and provides templates for data-sharing agreements and a checklist for key aspects to consider when acting as a licensor (IPI, n.d.[56]). However, negotiations between spin-offs and individual technology transfer offices at scientific institutions can be lengthy, and complex intellectual property (IP) protection agreements in some cases make difficult to find investors. There are also information gaps on intellectual property coverage, particularly regarding licenses for the use of intellectual property from the universities of applied sciences (Wörter, Spescha and Rammer, 2024[54]). Moving towards more general model agreements for the regulation of intellectual property, as done in several OECD countries (Box 4.5), and improving systematisation of data on intellectual property, can reduce uncertainty and complexity in negotiations and boost spin-off creation.
National Research Information Systems
The Norwegian Research Information Repository hosts publications, research projects, and researchers’ profiles across higher education and research institutions, and organisations in the health sector.
The Netherlands Research Portal aggregates publications, research data sets, and research software items from 66 Dutch institutional repositories and research information systems.
The Ministry of Education and Culture of Finland maintains the portal Research.fi, providing information on publications, projects and granted funding, as well as a research-related news service.
In Korea, the National Science and Technology Information Service was launched in 2003 and is managed by the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning.
The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment of New Zealand is developing the Research Information System to host information about research funding and research activity itself.
Model agreements for intellectual property management
The Netherlands have introduced standard deal terms to help knowledge institutions regulate how to share ownership with academic spin-offs after a researcher leaves. The terms aim to speed up the negotiation process between universities and young companies, and were developed by a working group comprising universities, investors, and entrepreneurs, supported by the TechLeap foundation.
In Australia, the Higher Education Research Commercialisation Intellectual Property Framework provides agreement templates, and accompanying plain English guidance documents, for selling or licensing intellectual property (IP), providing services and equipment, and developing IP through collaboration, among other use cases. A practical guide outlines when to use each agreement and the key elements to consider when negotiating and completing the agreement templates.
In 2026 universities in Denmark began implementing national standard contracts for research-based companies, developed in consultation with industry and the entrepreneurship community. A detailed, user‑friendly guideline accompanies the contracts, offering researchers an accessible overview and helping them move through the agreement structures.
Source: Websites of the research information systems of Norway, the Netherlands, Finland, and Korea; New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment; Science to Impact (Netherlands); Department of Education of Australia; Innovation District Copenhagen.
Educational outcomes in Switzerland are better than the OECD mean. Enrolment among children aged 6-14 years is nearly universal, and above the OECD mean for upper secondary education. Swiss students score much higher than the OECD mean in all subjects of the PISA tests (Figure 4.15, Panel A), and the share of 18-24-year-olds not in education nor employment is among the lowest in the OECD. The shares of adults with tertiary education and of people under 35 holding a master’s or equivalent degree exceed the OECD average, and government expenditure per tertiary student more than doubles the OECD average (OECD, 2025[57]). Adults also outperform the OECD mean in literacy, numeracy, and problem-solving (Figure 4.15, Panel B).
Note: B: Adults aged 16 to 65. Higher levels indicate higher proficiency in task completion. Details available in the Survey of Adult Skills Reader’s Companion (OECD, 2024[58]). C: The index ranges from 0 to 10, and higher values mean higher shortages. The index is computed for each occupation as the simple average of indicators for the unemployment rate, the job vacancy rate, the immigration rate, the employment growth, the need for demographic replacement and the qualification requirements. To obtain each indicator in each occupation, a score from 0 to 10 is assigned based on its quantile in the distribution of all occupations, i.e. a value of 10 in an indicator means the maximum across occupations.
Source: A: PISA 2022 Results (OECD, 2023[59]). B: Survey of Adults Skills 2023: Switzerland Country note (OECD, 2024[60]). C: Labor shortages in Switzerland: causes and impacts (Abberger et al., 2026[61]). D: Labour availability: a system of indicators to assess it (SECO, 2023[62]).
But for a skill-intensive economy like Switzerland, further increasing the availability of skills could bring significant benefits for wider diffusion of productivity gains. Labour shortages still affect many sectors, and are particularly acute in less dynamic activities, like manufacturing and construction, where more than a quarter of firms report severe recruiting difficulties (Figure 4.15, Panel C, Figure 4.2). Overall skill shortages have eased in recent years but remain above pre-pandemic levels (Adecco Group Switzerland / UZH, 2025[63]). ICT specialists and scientific technicians are among the hardest-to-find skilled workers (Figure 4.15, Panel D), which could impair technology spillovers to less productive firms. Furthermore, small companies report more hard-to-fill vacancies than large firms (Abberger et al., 2026[61]). Firms unable to find workers with suitable skills might decide to hire workers that are underqualified for their jobs, which may hold back their ability for catching up with stronger performers, or delay the implementation of productivity-enhancing technologies like AI or big data. While top-performing firms in export-oriented sectors may be able to sidestep this issue by paying higher wages, other firms may find it harder to do so, thus hampering productivity diffusion.
Skill mismatches are associated with lower productivity (OECD, 2024[64]), and under-qualification on the job accounts for a significant part of the negative effect that skill and qualification mismatch has on labour productivity (Adalet McGowan and Andrews, 2015[65]). Qualification and skill mismatches are less frequent in Switzerland than the OECD average. Around 37% of workers have their highest qualification in a field that is not the most relevant to their job, which is on par with the OECD average (OECD, 2024[60]). Around 24% of bachelor’s degree students graduate from a STEM field, on par with the OECD mean, but the high presence of technology firms can lead to shortages of skilled workers in fields like health, information and communication, and technical sciences (Figure 4.15, Panel D). Raising the participation of women in technical fields could help reduce skills gaps, as only 10% of women graduate with a STEM bachelor’s degree, compared to 38% of men. Close alignment of vocational education and training (VET) and adult learning with changing labour market needs is essential to reduce skills shortages and mismatches.
4.3.1. The VET system can be even more responsive to the labour market
Switzerland’s upper-secondary education system is underpinned by a robust vocational education and training (VET) system. In 2025, around 58% of upper-secondary students were enrolled in a firm-based dual VET programme, which usually comprises three to four days of workplace training at a host firm with one to two days of classroom instruction at a vocational school. Professional organisations are heavily involved in the VET system, defining the training content of all programmes, developing new training courses, and establishing national qualification procedures for VET programmes (OECD, 2023[66]). Upper-secondary VET covers around 250 different occupations, and professional organisations must prove that there is demand for any new or updated programme they propose. Professional organisations are required to review VET curricula every five years to take into account economic, technological, environmental, and pedagogical developments. This deep involvement of the business sector helps ensure that VET supply matches labour market needs, thus improving school-to-work transitions and easing hiring for firms. Estimates suggest that even during training most VET programmes generate positive net returns for participating Swiss firms (SFUVET, 2025[67]). If the trainee is hired after completing the apprenticeship, firms earn an average benefit of CHF 10 700 per apprentice, 1.5 times the median wage (OECD, 2023[66]).
Increasing permeability in the education system can make the workforce more responsive to labour market requirements. An education system is permeable when different programme types are available up to the highest education levels, and when students can transition between programmes. Research has shown that permeability is a necessary condition for maximising students’ returns to education, and that improving the quality of programmes alone cannot outweigh the drawbacks of low permeability (Caves and McDonald, 2024[68]). A recent study suggests that targeted promotion of horizontal permeability, shifts between fields of study within the same level, has some potential to steer skilled labour to certain areas with skill shortages (Schweri and Aeschlimann, 2025[69]). Permeability between the Swiss VET and general education pathways could improve, as holders of a Federal VET Diploma face obstacles to enter traditional universities, while academic baccalaureate graduates also face hurdles for admission to universities of applied sciences (Bonoli et al., 2022[70]). VET students and graduates can take a top-up course, the federal vocational baccalaureate, but there are different access requirements by canton. Measures that could be considered should be tailored to specific professions, regions, and target groups, to avoid making general secondary schools more attractive than vocational schools. Possible measures include intensive career guidance for high school students, standardised recognition of previous achievements or the expansion of shorter training models for adults returning to education (Schweri and Aeschlimann, 2025[69]).
Digital skills of Swiss VET teachers decrease with age, including skills for communication and collaboration, selection and creation of digital resources, and data protection (Cattaneo, Antonietti and Rauseo, 2022[71]). Limited knowledge of technologies among teachers can significantly hamper the effective use of technologies during lessons and impair students’ development of digital competences demanded by the labour market, even if appropriate technological resources are available (OECD, 2023[66]). Differences in teacher digital skills can thus lead to unequal access to technologies by students. Swiss VET teachers are expected to pursue continuous professional development as a minimum percentage of working time, typically carried out outside of lesson hours and funded by the cantons. Ensuring that relevant, up-to-date digital competences are well represented in the professional development curricula, and offering flexibility in delivery modes and schedules could increase digital skills among VET teachers.
4.3.2. Higher participation in adult learning can help close skill shortages
Participation in adult learning is similar to the OECD mean, with non-formal job-related training being more common. Yet, the overall rate masks gaps in participation for some segments of the population (Figure 4.16). Older employees and employees in elementary occupations participate less in adult learning, which can prevent them from updating their skills and becoming more productive. For older employees, lower participation in upskilling and reskilling can also lower their ability to keep working if they chose to do so.
Source: Trends in Adult Learning (OECD, 2025[72]).
Increasing programme design flexibility and providing appropriate incentives can boost participation and inclusiveness in adult learning. Most non-formal training is conducted in person, in longer single rather than in shorter recurring sessions and usually lasts less than one week (OECD, 2025[72]). Offering more options of delivery mode, frequency and pacing of training to better match workforce preferences and constraints can help engage more workers. Older workers might be less willing to leave declining occupations to new jobs that require reskilling, due in part to having more occupation-specific expertise and shorter remaining working lives to reap the benefits of training. Giving incentives to extend working lives can increase training participation of older workers, as was the case with pension reforms in the Netherlands and Italy (OECD, 2025[73]). Career counselling for older individuals, like the Viamia scheme set by the federal government and the cantons, can help identify skills needed for job change or for extending working lives. Ensuring that employees are well informed about career counselling and training opportunities can raise engagement.
The content of adult learning could be better targeted. Close to 40% of workers with insufficient skills for their current job say this is due to lacking computer or software skills, but those subjects account for only 15% of non-formal job-related learning. Project management or organisational skills and foreign language skills are each mentioned by 26% of workers with insufficient skills, but those activities account each only for 7% of learning activities, lower than compliance-related activities like health and safety training (OECD, 2025[72]). More frequent and comprehensive assessments of skill needs can guide upskilling and reskilling offered by employers. Although short-duration training formats tend to increase participation, over-reliance on them might hamper the quality and breadth of reskilling activities. Organising short training in modular learning pathways and stackable qualifications that offer workers flexibility to choose opportunities to suit their training needs can better align reskilling programmes with labour market needs (OECD, 2025[72]).
4.3.3. Increasing labour market participation of women, older workers, and migrants
While labour force participation is high for women, incidence of part-time work among women is also high, especially for mothers, resulting in one the widest gender gaps in full-time equivalent employment in the OECD (Figure 4.17, Panel A). Part-time work has also risen among men. While part‑time work enables many women to participate in the labour market, it also limits their opportunities for continuing education and career advancement and lowers retirement benefits. Increasing the integration of women into the labour market would help closing skills gaps and boost productivity, provided that appropriate policy measures are taken to avoid a double burden for mothers if they keep the same unpaid care workload. Moreover, firm-level research shows that gender diversity among managers and workers is positively related to firm productivity (Criscuolo et al., 2021[74]). Closing gender participation and working hours gaps would add around 0.25 percentage points to the average annual rate of growth in potential GDP per capita over the coming decades, which is higher than the average increase across the OECD, and higher than in peers like Germany and the Scandinavian countries (OECD, 2024[75]; OECD, 2025[76]). As recommended in the 2024 OECD Economic Survey, expanding the supply of childcare and offering means-tested measures to improve affordability, like fee reductions or tax credits, would raise take-up and allow more mothers to work to their desired extent. Moving to individual-based taxation, as voted in 2026, will reduce disincentives to work for second earners, who are more often women than men (Chapter 1). Given Switzerland’s high per capita incomes, however, labour supply might be comparatively less responsive to tax incentives.
Switzerland has an above-average childcare gap of 4 years between the end of paid leave for parents and the start of free compulsory education. This is reflected in a gap in participation in early childhood education and care (ECEC) between children from families in the top and bottom tertile of the income distribution that more than doubles the OECD mean. Ability gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged children appear at an early age, and interventions early in the life cycle of disadvantaged children have much higher economic returns than interventions at later stages of education (Heckman, 2008[77]). The difference in performance in PISA between the most socio-economically advantaged students and the most disadvantaged students is higher than the average for OECD countries and has widened (OECD, 2023[78]). Investments fostering social competency, planning, and organisation can significantly improve productivity later in life (Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev, 2013[79]). Paid leave for the other parent is two weeks, well below the OECD average of 13.4 weeks (OECD, 2025[80]). Ensuring appropriate provision of affordable childcare and increasing leave for the other parent, can close the ECEC participation gap between lower and higher income families, and increase women labour market participation. Raising ECEC participation of 3-5-year-olds to the OECD median would improve human capital and boost long-run aggregate productivity by 1.9%, more than for any other OECD country (Égert, de la Maisonneuve and Turner, 2023[81]). In 2025, a new scheme was approved to give parents who are either both in employment or studying a monthly childcare allowance of 100 CHF per weekday of childcare for each child up to the age of 8. The maximum allowance is 500 CHF per month. Children with disabilities may be eligible for up to twice the allowance if their care involves additional costs. The date on which this allowance will come into force has yet to be determined.
The rate of hiring older workers is relatively low (Figure 4.17, Panel B). Despite being more educated and participating in training more often than in most OECD economies, the share of 55-64-year-olds unemployed for 1 year or more is higher than the OECD mean. Research has found strong productivity gains from employing older managers, and of combining employees from different age groups (Criscuolo et al., 2021[74]). A workforce spanning different age groups can enhance productivity by tapping into the expertise of older workers while enabling younger employees to build skills through learning‑by‑doing and observing from others. Recent reforms have introduced more flexibility to allow more older workers to combine retirement and work. Programmes to support hiring of managers over 50 years of age, like the successful examples of Level+ platform, initiated by the canton of Geneva with federal support; and focus50+ and Seniors@work, established in Zurich, could be replicated in other cantons. Intergenerational job shadowing and coaching could be promoted within firms, as they are among the most effective tools to boost on-the-job transfer of knowledge (OECD, 2024[82]). On the employer side, providing more flexible work arrangements to reconcile work, family, and caring responsibilities; and training managers in the importance of an age-inclusive work environment, can help business prevent potential loss of skills linked to the retirement of older employees (OECD, 2023[83]).
Source: OECD Family Database; OECD calculations based on OECD Employment by job tenure intervals - persons database
Switzerland stands among the most attractive countries in the OECD for highly qualified migrants, but the number of work permits for migrants from non‑EU/EFTA countries that companies can apply for is currently capped at 8 500 per year. About half of this quota is distributed between cantons, the other half is allocated by the confederation to cantons with higher demand. Cantons can request access to other cantons’ unused allotted quotas. There are marked cantonal differences in the speed of processing and the threshold to determine high skills. Swiss university graduates from non-EU countries have only 6 months after graduation to find a job and remain in Switzerland, a comparatively short period, which is reflected in low retention after graduation (OECD, 2024[33]). The Federal Council is planning to extend the option to remain when finding a job after 6 months to graduates from all tertiary education studies, not only universities. Streamlining administrative processes for highly skilled migrants from non-EU/EFTA countries, lengthening the period for Swiss university graduates from non-EU countries to find a job and extending it to all tertiary education studies, can help bridge persistent skills shortages.
Firms can restrict the relocation of workers through non-compete clauses, which prevent employees from working for a competitor or starting a new company after they leave their job. The prevalence of non-compete clauses in Switzerland is similar to other OECD countries, with around 19% of workers reporting being subject to them, but its use extends beyond high-skill, managerial or sensitive roles (Andrews, Garnero and Holttinen, 2026[84]). Half of workers also report being bound by multiple restrictive clauses, like non-disclosure agreements and non-poaching of coworkers. However, a considerable proportion of non-compete clauses seem to be very broad or incomplete, which calls into question their enforceability under Swiss law. Given their possible effect on worker mobility, the use of non-compete clauses warrants further research and analysis, and the Federal Government is planning to undertake additional studies to assess the effects of non-compete clauses.
The effectiveness of policies to sharpen incentives for firms or to support innovation and entrepreneurship depends critically on appropriate enabling conditions, including physical and digital infrastructure and solid institutions. Switzerland does well on these dimensions, but some areas present scope for further improvements.
4.4.1. Accelerating the deployment of infrastructure for a modern society
The coverage and quality of Switzerland’s infrastructure ranks at the top of OECD members according to the World Bank’s Logistics performance index, while Swiss businesses consider that basic and digital infrastructure meet their needs to a great extent (World Bank, n.d.[85]; IMD, 2025[86]). Still, Switzerland faces infrastructure needs where deployment involves multiple jurisdictions. Coordination across these jurisdictions and streamlining of administrative procedures will be key to avoid delays and additional costs.
Further improvements to digital infrastructure will require overcoming administrative hurdles. Fibre optic penetration, at 35% of total fixed broadband, is low compared to the OECD average of 47% and to leading countries like Spain, Iceland, or Korea, where coverage reaches 90% (OECD, n.d.[87]). Increasing fibre optic connectivity will require large-scale works involving excavation of trenches to lay cables, and installation of infrastructure at the provider’s premises and those of the end users. To improve coordination, the Communications Commission and the Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM) convened telecom companies, electricity providers, cable operators, and landlords to define the conditions for deployment, which resulted in some standardisation agreements (OFCOM, n.d.[88]). Municipalities will approve street works and right‑of‑way usage, while ducts and other works must comply with zoning provisions. These requirements differ between municipalities and can slow deployment when local authorities delay permits. For example, deployment of the 5G Plus network was hit by a 2024 court ruling requiring retrospective planning applications for up to 2 500 sites, compounding a backlog of 2 500 pending building permit applications.
The Federal Council presented a new integrated transportation strategy comprising rail, road and urban mobility, called Transport ’45, to replace a motorway expansion plan that was rejected by voters in 2024 due to environmental and cost-effectiveness concerns. Under the new plan, more than 30 motorway projects have been scrapped, to be replaced by road projects with high benefits and rapid implementation, including lane expansions in a major motorway linking Zurich, Bern, and Geneva, along with operational measures to alleviate congestion in several cities. Financing will come from planned withdrawals from the National Road and Agglomeration Transport Fund (NAF). The plan also foresees the staggered implementation of several rail improvements, including increased service frequency in several major and regional lines by 2035, and construction of several major road infrastructure projects by 2045, including several tunnels and lane expansions in motorways. The government proposes to fund the rail expansion (CHF 24 billion) through an extension of the VAT surcharge. Road and rail projects will be complemented by an Agglomeration Transport programme to support coordinated transport and settlement development in the conurbations. A public consultation is expected to be launched in June 2026.
Planning of transport infrastructure projects involves many institutions and can involve excessive delays until completion. The Federal Office of Transport and the Federal Roads Office must coordinate planning with other federal entities, cantons, and the population, which reinforces a separation of responsibilities that can result in blind spots and lack of synchronisation in decision-making between institutions (Elvarsson and Adey, 2025[89]). Accounting for the needs of diverse stakeholders often requires an iterative discussion and reworking of proposals, leading to long process duration. Several OECD countries have introduced centre of government institutions, in line with the recommendation by the OECD Council on the Governance of Infrastructure on the need to co-ordinate infrastructure policy across levels of government (Ruiz Rivadeneira and Mcmaster, 2023[90]). Establishing a coordinating body to support federal and cantonal offices could help align the many organisations involved at an early stage.
Differing regulations between cantons create difficulties for coordinating cross-cantonal infrastructure, as cantons’ interpretations of environmental or heritage protection rules are not uniform. These types of protections can determine where road expansions or new roads are built, or where pylons, grid lines and other electrical infrastructure can be placed. Hurdles also apply at the municipal level. Permitting rules often vary within short distances, making planning difficult, and some changes made by municipalities, like those to zoning rules, must be approved by cantons, which can cause delays. Transport and electricity infrastructure often must cross no-build zones set by municipalities, which can result in complex approval procedures with the cantons. Limited administrative capacity in some municipalities can add to processing times. Close to a quarter of municipalities have expressed facing difficulty managing spatial and zoning planning, and around 17% managing approval of building applications (Steiner et al., 2021[91]).
Making wider use of time-bound approvals, increasing coordination in planning, engaging communities early in the planning process and further harmonising environmental requirements can reduce processing times and lower infrastructure deployment costs. Several OECD countries have adopted measures to speed up infrastructure projects planning and execution. Time-bound approval for procedures have proved particularly helpful to avoid backlogs. New Zealand has established a fast-track process for environmental permitting of renewable energy projects, and the European Commission has instructed members to reduce permitting time frames for solar facilities from 4 years to 3 months, and wind farms from 6-9 years to 1 year. Several countries have also adopted national mechanisms for coordination of permitting procedures. Australia’s “Corridor Packages” allow the government to manage many projects along a single transport route under a unified planning framework. In Canada, the One Project One Review initiative for major projects introduces a leaner process where federal and provincial governments cooperate to meet their respective environment protection duties and avoid duplications. Engaging communities early in the planning process can avoid late‑stage objections, as Canada aims with the One Project One Review initiative engaging Indigenous populations in the planning of major works. Canada’s Impact Assessment Law also fosters cooperation agreements between jurisdictions to ensure coordinated environmental assessments.
4.4.2. Easing the digital transition for all firms
Access to high-quality digital infrastructure can ease firms’ participation in global markets, generate spillovers through network effects, and boost productivity growth. Switzerland maintains high access to digital connectivity that supports its business sector, with near universal access to the internet, high access to fixed broadband, above-average prevalence of machine-to-machine SIM cards (Figure 4.18), and one of the highest densities of secure servers across the OECD (World Bank, n.d.[92]). Gaps in 5G mobile download speeds between urban and rural are narrow, but speeds considerably lag leading OECD countries (OECD, 2025[93]).
A comprehensive strategy aims to ensure a whole-of-government approach to digital transformation. The updated Digital Switzerland Strategy 2026 is structured around five long-term domains: education and skills, security and trust, framework conditions, infrastructure, and digital public services. The Federal Chancellery’s Digital Transformation and ICT Steering area oversees development, coordination, communication, and monitoring of the Strategy. Each year the Federal Council will choose two or three focus themes to prioritise through an action plan, to be implemented by the appropriate federal departments. Monitoring is central to the Strategy’s implementation, with the 2025 report to be published in 2026. The Strategy is well aligned with OECD recommendations on the scope, governance structure, and implementation of the national digital strategies (OECD, 2020[94]).
Despite having strong fixed broadband access and a robust digital strategy, technology use is persistently lower in smaller firms. Gaps in use have increased in recent years, particularly in data-driven technologies like big data analysis and artificial intelligence (AI) (Figure 4.19). Research based on firm-level data shows that in Switzerland the use of big data is associated with higher productivity, and the presence of ICT specialists and ICT training is associated with higher adoption rates of AI, Internet of Things and big data (Calvino, Costa and Haerle, 2026[95]). A shortage of skilled workers is indeed one of the main reasons behind lagging AI adoption in SMEs (HWZ/Swisscom, 2025[96]). Prevalence of workers with AI skills is lower than in the average OECD country (Filippucci et al., 2024[97]). This is a pressing challenge, as Switzerland is one of the countries that has the most to gain from AI use in terms of per capita real income (Filippucci et al., 2026[98]).
Source: OECD Broadband and telecom databases.
Change in use gaps between companies with 250 employees or more and companies with 10-49 employees
Note: The gaps are the difference between the share of companies using each technology in each group. Reference periods A: 2021-2023, B: 2020-2022, C: 2019-2021, D: 2020-2023.
Source: OECD ICT Access and Usage by Businesses database.
Several initiatives aim to boost the contribution of AI to SMEs’ productivity. The AI Action Plan aims to align public and private efforts into a single agenda to boost AI competitiveness. As part of the Action Plan, digitalswitzerland, a coalition of business, academia, and the public sector, issued a handbook on AI adoption focused on SMEs. The Swiss Academy of Engineering Sciences and several partner organisations set up SAIROP, a platform to help SMEs find research partners and service providers to support their AI initiatives. The Swiss National AI Institute (SNAI) created the Swiss AI Initiative, which has developed Apertus, an open-source large language model. An ecosystem is expected to be built around Apertus to attract initiatives from SMEs and research institutes. The canton of Zurich and the Swiss Data Science Center launched a one-year AI innovation programme to develop an SME AI community, facilitate knowledge transfer, foster low-risk experimentation, and support sector-specific AI adoption. This initiative could be adopted in other cantons. These and further efforts should take into account the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible AI, which includes detailed help to establish internal management systems to identify and respond to risks and recommendations and implementation examples for all actors in the AI value chain (OECD, 2026[99]).
Creating common spaces for data sharing can help to dismantle the fragmented, siloed systems currently used for data storage and management. The Swiss Data Ecosystem aims to promote the multiple use of data by business, government, academia, and the public within a safe framework. The ecosystem comprises a code of conduct for trusted data spaces outlining governance mechanisms and standards to define how data should be used in the future. The Swiss Data Ecosystem Contact Point helps companies, organisations, government, and academia to set up data spaces through common standards and governance models. Two communities of practice work to broad validation of the ecosystem. Increasing awareness of the Contact Point services and fostering participation in the Ecosystem’s Communities of Practice can help SMEs understand the value of big data and learn how to leverage it to grow.
4.4.3. Addressing gaps in corporate integrity regulation
Reducing corruption enhances competition and lowers uncertainty, reducing the costs of doing business (Colonnelli and Mounu, 2022[100]). Switzerland scores high in control of corruption, and the incidence of bribery is very low (Figure 4.20, Panels A and B). The government has adopted two new strategies to further strengthen its anti-corruption framework. The updated Federal Council Strategy against Corruption 2026 to 2029 aims to ensure continuity and further strengthen and consolidate the Swiss public integrity system. The strategy focuses on combating corruption by the Federal Administration in areas with particular exposure to risks, and in reducing the Swiss economy’s vulnerability to corruption abroad. The government has also approved a strategy on combating money laundering and terrorist financing, focusing on introducing and using the transparency register approved by Parliament, developing practical instruments for criminal prosecution and further strengthening supervisory authorities. These strategies are welcome, but addressing regulatory gaps on lobbying, whistleblower protection, and foreign bribery can help to level the playing field for all firms.
Lobbying can improve policies by allowing policymakers to consider firms’ expertise and needs, but adequate regulation is key to avoid undue influence. Lobbying can hinder firm productivity by slowing technology diffusion (Comin and Hobijn, 2009[101]), reducing incentives to invest in R&D and misallocating resources by allowing lobbying firms to become larger (Huneeus and Kim, 2024[102]; Dad and Nguyen, 2025[103]). The Swiss regulatory framework for transparency in lobbying is one of the least robust in the OECD (Figure 4.20, Panel C), as legislation consists of separate legal provisions. Legislative lobbying is bound by the criminal law of bribery, and legislators must disclose some of their ties to interest groups, but only for permanent management or consultancy activities. Lobbying and lobbyists are not clearly defined in legislation and there is no code of conduct to regulate interactions between public officials and lobbyists, which could allow private actors to misinterpret their obligations or to exploit loopholes in safeguards (OECD, 2024[104]). Enacting a code of conduct for lobbying and creating a register of lobbyists that includes information on the name, type of lobbying and legislation targeted can enhance the transparency and quality of policymaking.
Note: Panel A shows the point estimate and the margin of error.
Source: Panels A: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators. Panel B: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Panel C: OECD Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024 – Country Notes: Switzerland. Panels D and E: OECD, Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
Whistleblower protection fosters a culture of accountability, encouraging the reporting of behaviours that might hinder fair competition. Whistleblowing can significantly increase investments in organisational capital like training, internal controls, and communication systems, which enable firms to operate more efficiently (Duong et al., 2025[105]). Switzerland still underperforms in protection for whistleblowers in the justice system (Figure 4.20, Panel D). Since there is no law that explicitly protects whistleblowers from dismissal by their employer, courts must rule on a case-by-case basis, drawing on labour law, criminal law, and data protection law. This lack of legal certainty can discourage whistleblowing. Switzerland should adopt legislative reforms to introduce explicit protections for whistleblowers in the private sector, as the OECD Working Group on Bribery has long recommended (OECD, 2025[106]).
The maximum statutory fine for firms convicted of foreign bribery (CHF 5 million) is low in international comparison, and is not effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Countries like the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom do not set a cap on such fines, and fines usually increase with the gravity of the crime. Increasing the statutory maximum fine, as recommended by the OECD Working Group on Bribery, can advance the implementation of corporate liability and foster a fairer business environment.
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