Cartels are seen as the most egregious infringement of competition law and competition authorities act to prevent and enforce their laws against them. A part of an effective framework to achieve this is the enabling and incentivisation of early case resolution tools, as stated in the OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels [OECD/LEGAL/0452].
Most commonly, early case resolution takes the form of settlements or plea negotiation, which often require an admission of guilt and/or the admission of facts and/or a waiver of the right to appeal [OECD/LEGAL/0452]. Early case resolution can also involve commitments if they include legally binding obligations voluntarily submitted to a competition authority by parties in an antitrust investigation with the objective of eliminating the grounds for the enforcement action to continue (OECD, 2016[1]).
Competition authorities may benefit from the early resolution of cartel cases by saving on time and the resources that the case would require in an adversarial procedure, allocating them more efficiently to the detection and prosecution of other cartels, and contributing to a wider impact of their enforcement actions. An additional benefit is the possibility of co-operation from investigated parties1 who can add value to the investigation and enforcement of other cartelists, for instance by providing evidence or clarifying details of the functioning of the wrongdoing. Investigated parties, on the other hand, benefit from reduced financial exposure, certainty and predictability of the outcome of the proceedings and a faster resolution of their cases.
In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), early case resolution is also available in many jurisdictions, although the experience seems limited and could be further developed. The share of settlements over total infringements fluctuated considerably between 2020 and 2024, with the overall trend declining to approximately 32% by 2024 (OECD, 2025[2]). The design of early case resolution contributes to the incentives of investigated parties in applying for the tool, which can have a significant impact on other elements of cartel enforcement such as leniency programmes, private enforcement and deterrence. The legal framework also matters, including the requirements such as admission of guilt and duty to co‑operate with competition authority.
This note builds on past OECD work on the topic and related issues, focussing on LAC jurisdictions. Over the years, the OECD has conducted extensive work on mechanisms for the early resolution of a cartel case, such as the background notes on the Competition Committee Roundtable on “Plea Bargaining/Settlement of Cartel Cases” (OECD, 2008[3]), the WP3 Roundtable on the “Experience with Direct Settlements in Cartel Cases” (OECD, 2009[4]), and the Competition Committee Roundtable on “Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases” (OECD, 2016[1]), which were focussed on a global context.
This note is organised as follows:
Section 2 presents a general overview of early case resolution, including the policy objectives when investigating and prosecuting cartels, as well as the risks and considerations while designing the tools to achieve them.
Section 3 provides an overview of the legal framework of early case resolution in the region, exploring its availability and the forms they take, considering the models of settlements and commitments and looking at the key features that can be seen across the legislation and policies in the region.
Section 4 presents enforcement experiences in the region, showcasing how competition authorities in the region address some of the issues that may affect the implementation of effective early case resolution programmes.
Section 5 sets out the key conclusions.