Competition rules governing information sharing must balance two primary risks: permissive rules may facilitate tacit collusion or explicit cartel conduct, while overly restrictive frameworks can chill legitimate collaboration and create market inefficiencies. This paper reviews how different forms of information exchange affect firm incentives and market outcomes, drawing on recent economic literature. It also examines how competition authorities across OECD jurisdictions have approached the issue in practice, including through enforcement, case law and guidance. The paper aims to clarify the main factors that shape competitive risk and how those factors are reflected in current assessment and enforcement.
Information sharing in competition policy
Policy paper
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