Political financing is a key part of functioning democracies. But not maintaining effective safeguards around political financing can produce harmful policy outcomes, biased and burdensome regulation, and the overrepresentation of certain interests in society and markets. While countries’ regulations are generally strong, a significant implementation gap in many political financing systems persists. Political parties in many countries do not uphold reporting and transparency rules, indicating prohibited funding and malign influences over policymaking may remain undetected. Supervisory bodies could make better use of certified auditors to enhance oversight of parties’ financial accounts. And although digitalisation and globalisation are changing the risks around political financing, many countries’ laws are not adapting to the new risks and continue to omit key safeguards.
Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026
Abstract
Many countries have held national-level elections since the publication of the 2024 Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook. In 2024, dubbed a ‘super-year’ for elections, voters headed to the polls in around 70 countries, representing around half the world’s population (OECD, 2024[20]; IDEA, n.d.[23]; Politics UK, 2025[24]). Many OECD Member countries were among this wider group, with several others holding their national elections in 2025. As other countries look forward to national-level elections in 2026, ensuring transparency and integrity in the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns will continue to be crucial for building dignified societies in which citizens feel served by their representatives and protecting market competition (OECD, 2017[11]).
Political financing allows individuals and entities to safeguard and advance their interests by channelling their support to the candidates and parties which best represent them. In turn, political financing is a necessary resource for candidates and parties to run for office and to promote ideas and manifestos, thereby facilitating competition in elections and greater choice for citizens and entities (OECD, 2016[25]).
However, where safeguards around the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns are not adequate money can become an instrument of undue influence and policy capture. In such circumstances, political financing can lead to the overrepresentation of narrow interests rather than those of wider society or markets, can reduce the quality and effectiveness of decision making in legislative and executive bodies, and can lead to biased, less effective or overly burdensome regulations which raise barriers to entry and reduce competition (OECD, 2016[25]; OECD, 2024[26]; Business at OECD, 2024[27]). In short, mismanaging political financing can produce worse democratic and economic outcomes for citizens and businesses.
This chapter explores countries’ systems for upholding integrity in political financing, and finds that:
Many countries have strong regulations in place, but a significant implementation gap persists in countries’ political financing systems.
Most countries have strong political financing reporting and transparency requirements, but political parties could better observe them.
Political financing supervisory bodies could make better use of certified auditors in the oversight of parties’ accounts.
Digitalisation and globalisation are changing and complicating political financing and campaigning faster than regulations are adapting.
A strong regulatory framework is essential for ensuring integrity in the financing of political parties. Clear rules on prohibited and permissible donations can help to ensure a multiplicity of funding sources whilst reducing the risk of individual or undesirable interests gaining undue influence over political parties and candidates. Regulations on reporting, transparency and accountability support effective oversight of political financing and help to reassure citizens and markets that donors and recipients are working within the rules. Clear regulations on proper accounting processes, spending controls and expected conduct offer clarity to donors, parties and candidates on correct practice and lay the foundations for a culture of integrity around political financing (OECD, 2016[25]; OECD, 2020[14]).
However, even the strongest regulatory frameworks must be supported by effective measures for implementation, such as the development of efficient and accessible reporting processes or the establishment of strong, independent oversight bodies with appropriate investigatory and enforcement powers. Without these implementation mechanisms rules around political financing rules can remain theoretical, allowing risks of corruption, bias and undue influence to go unresolved.
A persistent implementation gap continues to undermine the integrity of political financing systems among OECD Member and partner countries. Since 2022, the quality of political financing regulations in OECD Member countries has remained largely stable, with countries fulfilling an average 76% of OECD criteria on political financing regulations in 2025 compared to 73% in 2022 (OECD, 2024[20]). However, as in 2022, the overall quality of countries’ regulations contrasts with their implementation in practice. OECD Member countries fulfil an average 58% of criteria on implementation of political financing regulations in 2025, the same as in 2022 (Figure 5.1). There is, therefore, an 18-percentage point implementation gap in OECD Member countries’ political financing systems, indicating that the safeguards against undue influence over political parties and candidates set out in OECD Member countries’ regulations are not being fully supported by relevant implementation measures. As set out in the following sections, this implementation gap is largely due to political parties in several countries not always observing reporting and transparency rules and submitting financial reports to supervisory authorities late or not at all. In addition, supervisory authorities are taking different approaches to assessing political parties’ financial accounts, but could be using certified auditors more effectively.
This implementation gap and the risks it leaves for competition and decision making is even more pronounced in OECD partner countries. Many partners have strong political financing regulations, more commonly than OECD Member countries banning donations from higher-risk sources such as anonymous donations, foreign states or enterprises, or publicly owned enterprises. However, partners are struggling more than OECD Member countries to support their regulations with implementing measures, especially in relation to reporting and transparency around political financing. As a result, OECD partner countries are carrying a 35-percentage point implementation gap, fulfilling an average 82% of OECD criteria on regulations and 47% on practice (Figure 5.1).
Note: Data for 2025, or latest year available. Data not provided by Japan and Switzerland.
How to read: On average, in 2025 Argentina fulfilled 90% of criteria on regulation and 71% on practice. OECD member countries are represented by dark blue bars. OECD partner countries are represented by light blue bars. OECD member, partner and global averages are represented by red bars.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
A key reason for the implementation gap in countries’ political financing systems is that reporting and transparency is lacking. Such mechanisms are crucial, as they provide citizens and markets with greater reassurance that safeguards are working, that parties and candidates are operating within the rules, and that the risks of undue influence are being mitigated (OECD, 2016[25]). Effective reporting of political financing is essential for proper oversight, as it enables responsible authorities to monitor compliance with the rules and to address wrongdoing. Transparent political financing builds trust in democratic processes by enabling scrutiny of donations and political relationships, and for authorities and public observers to build a picture of potential sources of influence over parties and candidates. This level of scrutiny is particularly important in the context of political donations from organised criminals seeking undue influence and foreign states and agents who may try to hide or disguise donations to undermine target countries’ sovereignty or the stability of their markets (IDEA, 2025[28]).
However, fewer than two-thirds (58%) of criteria on practice are fulfilled on average by OECD countries, and fewer than half (47%) are fulfilled by OECD partner countries. Integrity frameworks supporting the transparency of political parties’ annual financial reports are well established and functioning effectively across OECD Member countries. Almost all countries (94%) legally require political parties to publish annual financial reports, including all contributions above a fixed ceiling. Demonstrating strong compliance in practice, political parties in a large majority of OECD countries (81%) have made their financial reports available to the public. However, integrity frameworks supporting the transparency of election campaigns could be strengthened in practice. Although, 94% of OECD countries require political parties and/or candidates to report their funding and expenses during electoral campaigns, these election campaign financial reports have been submitted within the timelines defined by legislation for the past two election cycles in only 39% of OECD countries (Table 5.1).
This discrepancy between regulations and practice is greater among OECD partner countries, where reporting and transparency remains low in practice. Although 79% of OECD partner countries require political parties to make their annual financial reports public, in practice, these financial reports are publicly available in only 58% of OECD partner countries. And while 92% of OECD partner countries require parties and / or candidates to report their finances during electoral campaigns, in only 33% of OECD partner countries have all political parties submitted accounts related to elections within the designated timelines for the past two electoral cycles (Table 5.1).
Note: Data for 2025 or latest year available
How to read: France fulfilled the criterion “Political parties must make financial reports public, including all contributions exceeding a fixed ceiling” and did not fulfil the criterion “All political parties have submitted annual accounts within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past five years”. France also fulfilled the criterion “Parties and/or candidates must report their finances (funding and expenses) during electoral campaigns” and did not fulfil the criterion “All political parties have submitted accounts related to elections within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past two election cycles”.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
It is difficult to ascertain the reasons for parties not meeting their reporting requirements from supervisory bodies’ annual reports, but there are several possibilities. In both OECD Member and partner countries in many cases it appears that political parties have submitted late due to administrative or organisational error, rather than through trying to evade the rules. In other instances, it could be that the reporting system itself is overly burdensome or that deadlines for reporting are too tight and have led parties to miss deadlines. This possibility is borne out by several countries’ efforts to ease the burden on political parties and improve the effectiveness of financial reporting by introducing electronic reporting systems. One example is Ukraine’s POLITDATA platform which provides easier registration and submission of reports for political parties, and enhances authorities’ verification of reports through better comparison of data in parties’ historical submissions and across databases. Another reason not highlighted in annual reports, however, could be that some political parties feel less obligation to report due to oversight authorities’ perceived lack of authority or capability to oversee reporting. Either way, the late or non-submission of reports impedes oversight authorities’ ability to check that political parties are working within the rules and that the risk of undue influence over political financing is being mitigated.
These low levels of reporting and transparency around political financing in OECD Member and partner countries is compounded by the availability of accessible data on parties’ accounts. In 67% of OECD Members are all financial reports available on a single online platform in a user-friendly format, while this is the case in 42% of OECD partner countries. Where data is not published in an accessible format which can be analysed by both responsible authorities and the public, discrepancies and breaches are harder to identify and to resolve (Transparency International, 2025[29]).
These shortcomings in reporting and transparency around political financing are leaving countries exposed to the risks of undue influence and policy capture and the effects which they can have on decision making and markets. Greater efforts to improve reporting and transparency are therefore needed, including improving oversight bodies’ verification of reporting and accounting, use of sanctions for breaches of reporting and transparency requirements, and better use of digital tools to facilitate transparent, accessible reporting. Doing so would help to ensure that decision making in legislative and executive branches continues to support trust, to maintain citizens’ ability to engage with democratic processes, and to build stronger, more stable economies.
Effective oversight bodies are an important means of translating political financing safeguards into practice as they play a central role in verifying and auditing parties’ and candidates’ accounts, and therefore in ensuring that parties and candidates are working within the rules. This process commonly includes checking that parties and candidates are recording their finances properly, assessing the permissibility of political donations, checking the appropriateness of political expenditure, and taking remedial action (including issuing sanctions) where breaches of the rules have occurred (OECD, 2020[14]; OECD, 2016[25]). To perform this function well, oversight bodies must ensure they have the appropriate skills and expertise to analyse and audit parties’ and candidates’ (often complex) accounts.
75% of OECD Member countries have an independent body with the mandate to oversee political financing, and their approaches to auditing political parties’ accounts vary widely. Some countries (such as Mexico) use qualified administrators to audit parties’ accounts who must fulfil a series of administrative, academic and professional requirements before appointment to such a role. Other countries (such as Czechia) employ accounting experts who verify the statements submitted by parties and candidates, which must have been audited by an auditor prior to submission to the oversight body. And other countries (such as Estonia) use external auditors as part of special audits assigned by the supervisory body’s decision making body. The most common approach to the audit of political parties’ accounts, however, adopted by half of OECD members (50%), is for supervisory bodies to retain certified auditors on their payroll (Figure 5.2).
While countries’ practices have therefore shown there are different solutions to auditing political parties’ accounts, there are several advantages to this most common approach of supervisory bodies retaining certified auditors on their payroll. For example, for auditors to acquire certification they must retain a minimum level of expertise and adhere to a standardised audit methodology, which can improve the standard and consistency of oversight bodies’ examination of political parties’ accounts. In addition, and as explored in the chapter on “Organised crime and corruption”, certification can also reduce auditors’ susceptibility to external influence, as they are part of a professional network and have recourse to reporting and support channels through their professional memberships. Supervisory bodies retaining auditors on their payroll, as opposed to outsourcing audit functions, can also reduce susceptibility to outside influence, as auditors are then also subject to the regulatory safeguards underpinning the body’s independence and to the body’s standards of conduct. In addition, keeping certified auditors on the payroll can improve continuity between audits and institutional memory (OECD, 2024[30]). While it is not necessary for all OECD Member countries to adopt the same methodology, countries whose supervisory bodies do not retain certified auditors on their payroll may be missing out on these benefits as enjoyed by their peers. OECD partner countries could also consider the advantages of this approach, as of the 88% of partners which have an independent body overseeing political financing, in only 38% of countries does the oversight body have certified auditors on its payroll.
Note: Data for 2025, or earliest available data. The USA’s Federal Election Commission is the supervisory body for political financing and election campaigns. However, because legislation does not define dismissal procedures for the head of managing body of the authority, the FEC does not fulfil the requirement on independence in the criterion ‘An independent body has the mandate to oversee the financing of political parties and election campaigns’. The FEC does have certified auditors on its payroll. Data not provided by Japan and Switzerland.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
As the implementation gap in countries’ political financing systems persists, the political finance landscape is evolving and becoming increasingly complex. Key developments related to digitalisation and globalisation are making it more challenging for countries to manage donations to parties and candidates and to ensure that political financing continues to support representative democracies and competitive markets.
In the context of these developments, since 2015 most OECD Member and partner countries have passed new or updated their existing political financing legislation. Despite these reforms, however, many countries’ regulatory frameworks still lack basic safeguards on political financing, impeding reporting and transparency and leaving political actors vulnerable to evolving risks. What is more, newer legislation is not necessarily providing stronger safeguards around political financing, with many more recent regulations fulfilling fewer OECD criteria on the quality of political financing regulations than their older counterparts in other countries. Indeed, comparison shows that regulations passed or amended in 2025 fulfil an average 6.2% fewer OECD criteria than those passed or amended in 2015 (Figure 5.3). It remains the case that only 53% of OECD Member countries ban anonymous donations to political parties or candidates, while 79% of partners do. In addition, 81% of OECD Members ban contributions from foreign states or enterprises, compared to 100% of partners, and 83% of OECD Member countries ban contributions from publicly owned enterprises, compared to 100% of OECD partner countries. Where countries are reforming their political financing regulations but not improving the safeguards they offer, they remain vulnerable to risks of undue influence from undesirable and non-permissible sources of funding.
Note: On average regulations passed or amended in 2025 fulfil around 6.2% fewer criteria than those passed or amended in 2015. Data not provided by Japan and Switzerland. In the case of the United States, the last amendment was in 2002 and they scored 60% for political finance regulations on the OECD PII criteria.
How to read: France’s political financing regulation was last amended in 2019 and fulfils all 10 OECD criteria on the quality of political financing regulations.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
The risks of not introducing basic safeguards into political financing systems are particularly acute as the political financing landscape changes and becomes more complex due to digitalisation and globalisation. For example, political and electoral campaigners are increasingly using digital tools and social media to improve the sophistication and reach of their fundraising efforts. But while these new approaches can make fundraising efforts more effective, they introduce new integrity risks. Advantages include that online fundraising is often cheaper than traditional methods such as printed or broadcast media, and that social media algorithms allow highly targeted messaging to particular voter groups (or ‘microtargeting’). The use of AI and big data analytics amplify these benefits, by enabling campaigners to rapidly generate tailored fundraising materials, based on advanced predictive analytics and behaviour modelling of potential donors’ geographical locations, demographics, donation histories or interests (Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2024[31]; IDEA, 2025[32]; IDEA, 2025[28]). However, online fundraising can also obscure the true source and intermediaries of political donations, including through the use of online payment platforms, fundraising services or small, repeated donations which are difficult to trace individually. This increases vulnerability to exploitation from malign or foreign agents looking to circumvent traditional prohibitions on donations and seeking to covertly influence elections and political debate in the target countries.
Political parties and candidates are also increasingly using social media influencers in their campaigns, reflecting influencers’ growing role as a key source of information and news for citizens. In many Latin American, African and Southeast Asian countries social media provides people’s main source of news (Reuters Institute, 2025[33]). This is particularly the case among young people, with one survey in Latin America finding that social media is the most important channel of information on politics for people aged 16 to 24 (Luminate, 2022[34]). Use of influencers can help political parties and campaigners reach new audiences, tailor their messages to specific groups, and clarify parties’ and candidates’ positions in accessible formats. These new channels, however, also enable politicians to rely more on media channels that often do not have the same financial transparency guidelines, leading to an increasingly obscure and fragmented media landscape. For instance, political financing regulations in some countries do not require parties and campaigners to report their relationships with or expenditure on influencers, impeding transparency around an increasingly important part of their campaigning activity. In other countries, influencers’ activity may fall into grey zones with regulators deciding case-by-case whether influencing activity counts as a natural person’s freedom of expression or an in-kind political donation of a service (IDEA, 2025[32]).
In addition, use of illicit political and campaign funding is among the key tools for international organised criminals seeking to increase their influence, power and revenues. As explored further in the Organised crime and corruption chapter, international organised crime poses a growing threat to OECD Member and partner countries. By directing illicit funds to political parties and candidates, organised criminals try to influence decision makers in legislative and executive bodies, weaken law enforcement efforts, and influence regulatory processes to suit their own interests (IDEA, 2016[35]). These risks are particularly prevalent among parties and candidates with lower access to legitimate sources of funding, such as grassroots movements, or smaller or newer parties (IDEA, 2016[35]).