Lobbying safeguards prevent asymmetric or undue influence over policymaking and help ensure that knowledge and expertise inform policymaking in a way which supports the public interest and stable, competitive markets. Despite wider adoption of lobbying regulations in recent years, however, the quality of these regulations remains among the lowest in OECD Member and partner countries’ integrity systems. One key contributor is declining beneficial ownership transparency. In practice, measures to enhance the transparency of lobbying activities, including lobbying registers, could improve. And while countries with lobbying registers generally maintain appropriate enforcement and compliance mechanisms, measures to monitor lobbying activities could be strengthened.
Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026
Abstract
Lobbying and seeking to influence government decisions are a necessary component of democratic life and an essential part of the public policy process. When carried out within a clear, transparent, and integrity-based framework, it can contribute valuable expertise that helps governments take more informed public decisions, design better public policies, adopt more proportionate and effective regulations, and ultimately deliver more effective, fair and trusted policy outcomes (OECD, 2010[15]).
However, in the absence of adequate safeguards, lobbying can result in unequal access and advantages for certain groups, as well as opportunities for opaque or manipulative practices, resulting in asymmetric or undue influence over public decision making (OECD, 2010[15]). Such influence can lead to biased or poorly informed decisions, weakening prosperity through inefficient resource use, reduced productivity, and increased inequalities, and, in some cases, generating harmful outcomes in critical policy areas such as health and consumer protection (OECD, 2021[16]). Where policymaking is shaped primarily by special interests, necessary regulations to address market failures may be abandoned, while excessive regulation may be adopted to protect incumbents, thereby reducing competition, distorting innovation incentives, dampening economic growth, and limiting job creation (Dellis and Sondermann, 2017[17]).
Ultimately, unchecked lobbying and influence practices can also negatively affect public trust. In OECD Member countries, scepticism about the integrity of high-level political officials and concerns about the presence of undue influence remain high: the 2023 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions showed that on average, 49% of people predict that a high-level political official would grant a political favour in exchange for the offer of a well-paid private sector job, while 43% say it is likely that the national government would accept the demands of a corporation promoting a policy beneficial to their industry but harmful to the society as a whole (OECD, 2024[18]).
This chapter assesses the strengths and areas for improvement in countries’ lobbying frameworks and finds that:
Despite a wider adoption of regulatory frameworks defining lobbying and establishing sanctions for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying, declining beneficial ownership transparency has limited overall progress on regulation, leaving lobbying among the least regulated public integrity areas across the OECD and beyond.
Lobbying registers and other transparency measures continue to provide only limited effective transparency, reflecting persistent implementation challenges.
Countries with lobbying registers generally have enforcement and compliance mechanisms in place, but stronger monitoring remains essential to ensure lobbying frameworks can more effectively contribute to mitigating undue influence risks.
Governments have the primary responsibility to establish a coherent, comprehensive, and enforceable regulatory framework that strengthens transparency and integrity across all stages of the policy cycle (OECD, 2010[15]). When effective, such a framework recognises lobbying and other forms of influence as legitimate forms of political participation and promotes fairness and equity in the exercise of influence, while upholding citizens’ rights to understand the origins and drivers of policy choices that affect them.
In OECD Member countries, what has traditionally been called “lobbying” – communications between lobbyists and public officials to influence public decision-making processes – is generally regulated through dedicated frameworks that define “lobbying” and “lobbyists”, establish the associated transparency and integrity requirements, as well as sanctions proportional to the severity of the offence. National approaches nonetheless vary considerably in both the terminology used (e.g. “interest representation”, “management of interests”, “public relations” or “advocacy”) and the form and scope of regulatory frameworks, reflecting different administrative and political traditions.
Beyond clear definitions of lobbying and lobbyists, a comprehensive regulatory framework on lobbying should also include, inter alia, pre- and post-public employment rules for both lobbyists and public officials, as well as robust beneficial ownership transparency requirements. Indeed, even where lobbyists are clearly defined and subject to transparency requirements, the identity of a legal entity may not reveal its beneficial owner or the ultimate beneficiaries of lobbying activities, underscoring the need for public disclosure of adequate, accurate and up-to-date ownership and beneficial ownership information (OECD, 2010[15]). Similarly, without adequate safeguards, transitions between the public and private sectors may give rise to undue influence, highlighting the need for integrity measures that balance beneficial mobility with the protection of the public interest (OECD, 2003[19]; OECD, 2020[14]).
On average, OECD Member countries meet 43% of the OECD criteria on lobbying regulation, down slightly from 44% in 2022, indicating no overall progress in strengthening lobbying regulatory frameworks, as discussed in the following paragraphs. Only 7 countries (4 OECD Member countries and 3 OECD partner countries) meet at least 80% of OECD criteria on the quality of lobbying regulations, and only 20 (one-third of the countries in the dataset) meet 60% or more (Figure 3.1). Overall, this indicates that coherent and comprehensive frameworks for managing lobbying and influence remain underdeveloped across many OECD Members and partner countries.
Note: Data not provided for Japan and Switzerland.
How to read: In 2025, Canada fulfilled 80% of criteria on regulation and 89% on practice.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
The most notable progress has been in the number of countries adopting regulatory frameworks defining lobbying and establishing sanctions for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying proportional to the severity of the offence. In 2022, about half of OECD Member countries (52%) had formally defined lobbying activities and the actors considered as lobbyists (OECD, 2024[20]). Since then, several countries have made efforts to strengthen transparency and integrity in lobbying by establishing or upgrading their regulatory frameworks. Now, 61% of OECD Member countries and 29% of OECD partner countries have formal definitions of lobbying activities (Figure 3.2). This represents a total of 29 countries where lobbying activities are defined in the regulatory framework, including which actors are considered as lobbyists (48% of countries). In Poland, while lobbying activities are defined in the regulatory framework, the framework does not clearly specify which actors are considered lobbyists. Conversely, in Iceland, while “lobbyists” are defined in the Act on Protection against Conflicts of Interest in Government Offices, the Act does not clearly define what constitutes lobbying. As a result, these countries do not fully meet the criteria regarding lobbying definitions in the regulatory framework, although both operate a lobbying register, as discussed in the following section.
All but 11 of the 29 countries with ‘lobbying’ and ‘lobbyist’ defined in the regulatory framework (except Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Estonia, Finland, Israel, Luxembourg, Latvia, the Netherlands, Peru and Romania), as well as Korea and Poland, representing 47% of OECD Member countries and 13% of OECD partner countries, have defined sanctions for breaches of transparency and integrity standards in lobbying that are proportionate to the severity of the offence. While Korea does not define lobbying activities in its regulatory framework, the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (2016) prohibits certain forms of lobbying that seek to induce the unlawful handling of specific duties, such as obtaining preferential treatment in recruitment or promotion, altering admissions or evaluation outcomes, or influencing investigations or audits, and establishes corresponding sanctions for such conduct.
Countries with a regulatory framework on lobbying establishing definitions of “lobbying” / “lobbyist”
Note: Data is based on country values for criterion “Lobbying activities are defined in the regulatory framework, including which actors are considered as lobbyists”. Countries marked with an * regulate lobbying exclusively through parliamentary rules of procedure, under which lobbyists must register to access one or both houses of Parliament. Countries marked with a (*) limit lobbying regulation to decrees or administrative schemes applying only to the executive branch. All other countries primarily regulate lobbying through primary legislation, either in dedicated lobbying laws or broader integrity and transparency laws. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, as primary legislation is sometimes complemented by branch-specific rules, such as parliamentary codes of conduct or additional access requirements.
Data not provided for Japan and Switzerland.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
In response to the growing volume of lobbying and influence activities carried out on behalf of foreign state interests (including foreign governments, political organisations, and state-affiliated actors), a growing number of countries are also adopting regulatory frameworks that specifically define lobbying and influence activities conducted on behalf of foreign state interests, operating alongside existing lobbying regimes (OECD, 2021[16]; OECD, 2024[21]). Examples include Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 operating alongside the Lobbying Code of Conduct established in 2008; France’s foreign influence transparency scheme established in 2024 complementing the lobbying framework established in 2017; the United Kingdom’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme introduced in 2023 complementing the lobbying regime established in 2024; and the United States’ Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 operating alongside the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995. This evolution reflects a growing recognition of the importance of transparency and accountability in public decision making, regardless of whether influence is exercised by domestic or foreign actors, including foreign state-linked interests.
However, different regions take different approaches. 56% of countries assessed in Europe have defined lobbying activities in their regulatory framework, including 44% through primary legislation. In the LAC region, Chile and Peru are the only countries to regulate lobbying through primary legislation, while others, including Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, have introduced partial frameworks limited to a single branch of government. In other regions adoption of a lobbying framework is patchier, underscoring the need for continued efforts globally to enact and strengthen appropriate legislation.
In addition, progress in this area has been offset by a net decline in rules requiring the public disclosure of beneficial ownership information. In 2022, 48% of OECD Member countries had requirements to disclose company ownership information to identify beneficial owners, establish central registers and make this information publicly accessible; this share has since fallen to 25% (a decline of 23 percentage points), with only 9 OECD Member countries mandating such regimes. The decline has been concentrated in the European Union (from 73% to 28%, representing a decline of 45 percentage points), reflecting the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union annulling the provision of the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5) requiring unrestricted public access to beneficial ownership registers, on the grounds that it did not adequately balance transparency objectives with the protection of fundamental rights to privacy and personal data.1 In accordance with this judgement Article 12 para. 1 of the Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD6) states that access to beneficial ownership information shall be granted to the public only in case of a legitimate interest. Public disclosure requirements nonetheless remain in place in several OECD partner countries: of the 17 countries with such rules, 8 are OECD partner countries (Figure 3.3).
Countries with beneficial ownership rules that make mandatory the disclosure of company data to identify owners of corporations, establish a central register, and make information accessible to the public
Note: Data based on country values from the criteria “Beneficial ownership rules make mandatory the disclosure of company data to identify owners of corporations, establish a central register, and make information accessible to the public”. 2022 data cover OECD Member countries only. Data was not available for Belgium, Colombia, Germany, Hungary, Italy or New Zealand in 2022. Data was not available for OECD partner countries in 2022. Data not provided for Japan and Switzerland in 2025.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
Cooling-off periods for public officials, designed to mitigate conflicts of interest when individuals move from public office to private-sector roles in government-regulated sectors, are in place in 42 countries covered by the PIIs (70%). Cooling off periods apply in 79% of assessed European countries and 46% of assessed LAC countries. Notably, the share of OECD Member countries with cooling-off periods for public officials has increased. For example, in 2025 an Act was passed in the Netherlands that introduced cooling-off periods for Ministers. Similarly, OECD partner countries like Romania strengthened its legislative framework in November 2025 by adopting a unified, detailed and enforceable regime governing pre- and post-employment restrictions for current and former public officials, aimed at preventing conflicts of interest and strengthening public sector integrity. Some countries with long-standing cooling-off regimes have also strengthened their frameworks to explicitly address foreign interference risks when senior public officials transition to the private sector, particularly where prospective employers may have links to foreign powers. In France, for example, the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP) oversees the post-public employment of senior officials, assessing the compatibility of their private activities for three years after leaving office, a period that has been extended in 2024 to five years where foreign influence risks are identified (OECD, 2024[21]). The near absence of cooling-off periods for lobbyists, with Estonia, France and Romania as the sole exceptions, points to a significant regulatory gap in addressing conflicts of interest arising from lobbyists’ entry into public institutions they previously sought to influence.
Note: Data based on country values from the criteria “Cooling off periods for public officials are established in the regulatory framework”. Data not provided for Japan and Switzerland.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
Taken together, these trends confirm that lobbying remains one of the least regulated areas of public integrity across the OECD and beyond. While European countries generally perform well in establishing lobbying regulatory frameworks that define lobbying, progress has been undermined by a sharp decline in rules on beneficial ownership transparency within the European Union. By contrast, OECD partner countries continue to lag behind on lobbying definitions, although some are making advances in beneficial ownership transparency and cooling-off periods. Overall, despite an increase in the number of countries adopting regulatory frameworks that define lobbying, 39% of OECD Member countries and 71% of OECD partner countries still lack a legal definition, and when the broader regulatory ecosystem is considered, including cooling-off periods and beneficial ownership disclosure, progress in strengthening regulatory safeguards against undue influence remains limited.
As lobbying and influence become increasingly digital, complex and global, countries will also need to adapt their legal definitions of lobbying to an evolving influence landscape in which both actors and techniques are rapidly diversifying. Indeed, traditional closed-door interactions are increasingly complemented, and sometimes overtaken, by integrated digital campaigns that shape narratives and information environments. Often powered by artificial intelligence, these campaigns enable messages to be targeted, amplified and adjusted at scale, making online visibility as consequential as connections to decision makers. While this transformation has lowered barriers to participation and allows a more diverse range of interest groups to have their voices heard, it has also heightened risks of deception and the manipulation of public opinion through largely unregulated online networks (OECD, 2021[16]). The growing number of countries adopting targeted regulatory schemes to address lobbying and influence conducted on behalf of foreign state interests, or adapting post-employment rules to explicitly account for such risks, also highlights foreign state-linked influence as a pressing area of reform. When carried out covertly or deceptively, such activities can significantly affect domestic and foreign policy, economic interests, electoral processes and national security, and may lead to foreign interference (OECD, 2024[21]; OECD, 2021[16]).
As such, even jurisdictions with comparatively advanced systems would benefit from regularly reviewing and updating their frameworks to keep pace with evolving influence tactics and ensure that regulatory arrangements are sufficiently robust to address both long-standing and emerging threats, including those posed by foreign state actors and algorithmically amplified lobbying campaigns, thereby sustaining public trust in public decision making (OECD, 2010[15]).
Once a regulatory framework is in place, a critical step in enhancing transparency in lobbying is the establishment of mechanisms and tools that allow public officials, businesses and civil society to understand who has sought to influence public decision making and on what issues. These mechanisms should ensure that relevant and timely information on key aspects of lobbying activities is disclosed, thereby strengthening public oversight of the information, advice and interests shaping policymakers’ decisions (OECD, 2010[15]). Transparency can be achieved through a range of complementary approaches. In most OECD Member countries, the primary responsibility for disclosure lies with lobbyists, who are required to register and report their activities through a lobbying registry. As also explored in the transparency of public information chapter, an alternative or additional model places the disclosure obligation on public officials, requiring them to report meetings with lobbyists, whether through open agendas, dedicated registers, or internal reporting requirements to their superiors. Public decision-making process footprints, which refer to documentation that details the stakeholders who sought to influence the decision or were consulted in its development, and show what inputs into the particular public decision making process were submitted and what steps were taken to ensure inclusiveness of stakeholders in the development of the regulation, are an additional avenue for transparency. When used together, these approaches can contribute to a fuller and more accessible picture of influence on public decision making (OECD, 2021[16]; OECD, 2010[15]).
In 2025, 67% of OECD Member countries (compared with 55% in 2022) and 21% of OECD partner countries (Brazil, Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine) had a publicly available register providing information on lobbying activities. This increase in the number of OECD Member countries with a register reflects the growing number of countries that have introduced regulatory frameworks on lobbying. New or newly reported registers include those in Czechia, operational since 2025; Finland, operational since 2024; Croatia, operational since 2024; and Germany, operational since 2022. Romania made disclosures in its lobbying register mandatory for certain categories of public officials in the executive and legislative branches through key reforms introduced in 2024 and 2025.
Having a lobbying register in place does not, in itself, guarantee adequate transparency, given significant variation in the scope and quality of these registers. A first step towards ensuring that lobbying registers provide meaningful transparency is to establish disclosure requirements that capture how lobbying occurs in practice. However, many existing registers, including those introduced recently, still do not disclose sufficient information. Among the 24 OECD Member countries and 5 OECD partner countries with an operational register, all require the disclosure of the lobbyist’s name and/or organisation. However, only 17 require information on the type of lobbying activities conducted. Even fewer countries require disclosure of the specific legislative or regulatory initiatives targeted, with only 12 including this information, despite its fundamental importance for understanding how public policies are influenced. Similarly, only 7 countries require disclosure of lobbying budgets or related expenditures (Figure 3.5).
Note: Data based on country values from the criteria “Information disclosed by lobbyists in the register includes their name, organisation, domain of intervention, and type of lobbying activities”, “Information disclosed by lobbyists in the register include budget/expenses for lobbying activities, and pieces of legislation and regulation targeted” and “The lobby register is accessible online”. In Czechia, the register is designed to include more detailed information on lobbying activities. However, as the first statements on lobbying activities were submitted in January 2026, the register does not yet contain this information, which is reflected in the table.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
Therefore, notwithstanding the continued increase in the number of countries with lobbying registers since 2022, many registers do not yet deliver meaningful transparency on who is lobbying, on behalf of whom, on what topic, and how. This limits their ability to enable stakeholders, including government authorities, civil society organisations, businesses, the media and the public, to fully grasp the scope and depth of these activities. Insufficient disclosure of the concrete aspects of lobbying, particularly the specific policy or legislative targets, may also create incentives for more opaque or manipulative practices, especially where registrants are required to disclose little more than their identity and, where applicable, that of their client.
This challenge is compounded by weakening transparency on who ultimately benefits from lobbying. As regulatory requirements to disclose beneficial ownership have eroded, implementation has thus declined across the OECD: the share of OECD Member countries operating a beneficial ownership register accessible to the public fell from 42% to 17% in 2025, leaving only 5 EU countries with an operational register, while 25% of OECD partner countries currently operate a publicly accessible beneficial ownership register for corporate entities.
While the limited progress in the scope of information disclosed by long-standing lobbying registers is partly understandable, since expanding disclosure requirements often requires legislative reform, this underscores the importance of regularly reviewing the functioning and impact of existing legal frameworks. Periodic reviews can help identify gaps and support timely improvements to transparency requirements. At the same time, countries that are currently designing their lobbying frameworks have an opportunity to embed more robust disclosure obligations from the outset to ensure that disclosure requirements enable effective transparency regarding who is lobbying and on whose behalf, the objectives and policy decisions targeted, and the nature of communications with public officials or the lobbying techniques used (OECD, 2010[15]).
A second key element of an effective lobbying register is the availability of user-friendly and innovative registration platforms for all actors required to disclose lobbying information. In this respect, all but 5 countries with an operational lobbying register have established registration tools that provide step-by-step guidance to support registrants (with the exception of Belgium, Latvia, Iceland, Poland and Croatia). This represents a total of 56% of OECD Member countries, with an increase of 6 percentage points since 2022, and 17% of OECD partner countries. This increase aligns with the 12% increase in the availability of lobbying registers and suggests a positive trend whereby newly established registers in Czech Republic, Croatia, Finland and Ukraine place particular emphasis on the usability of registration systems, a particularly important consideration, as user-friendly tools reduce compliance burdens for registrants and improve the consistency and quality of the data collected. In turn, better-structured data enhances the ability of registers to deliver meaningful transparency. Experience from countries with operational registers indicates that remaining gaps may be addressed through measures that ease compliance, including linking registration systems to existing databases, automating data entry where possible, and allowing registrants and public officials to select standardised options, for example through the use of drop-down menus, thereby improving both usability and the quality of the data collected.
Third, once disclosure requirements and registration platforms are in place, another key element of an effective lobbying register is the ability to centralise and publish information through a public portal that facilitates the access and interpretation of large volumes of data collected through registration systems. While such portals may take different forms, they should move beyond static lists or large single disclosures that provide limited insight into lobbying dynamics or their impact on public decision making. To be effective, these portals should function as shared information ecosystems for citizens, lobbyists and public officials, with the objective of maximising the usability and value of disclosed data. In practice, this requires enabling users to search, filter and sort information by key criteria, such as the lobbyist’s name, the company or organisation represented, the policy area or domain of intervention, and the specific legislative or regulatory initiatives targeted. At present, only 11 countries offer such functionalities, and several registers still rely on formats that do not meet open data standards, such as downloadable PDF files. There is therefore scope for further improvements in data visualisation, searchability and categorisation across many existing lobbying registers.
In practice, weaknesses in lobbying registers are reflected in persistently low implementation scores across OECD Member countries. On average, OECD Member countries meet 38% of the criteria on lobbying implementation, a level that has remained broadly stable since 2022 (35%), while OECD partner countries only meet 13% of the criteria on lobbying implementation (Figure 3.6). Countries demonstrating strong implementation in practice are typically those with robust lobbying registers. Canada, France, Finland and Ukraine, for example, fulfil nearly 90% of implementation-related criteria, reflecting comparatively high levels of lobbying transparency. By contrast, countries with weak or non-existent registers exhibit the largest implementation gaps. At a regional level, Europe maintains a 7 percentage point implementation gap, while LAC has a 14 percentage point implementation gap.
How to read: As measured against OECD standards on lobbying, OECD Member countries fulfil on average 43% of criteria for regulations and 38% for implementation The implementation gap (i.e. the difference between criteria fulfilled on regulation and on practice), is therefore 5%.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators database (as of 10 March 2026).
Beyond lobbying registers, 12 countries publish open agendas for ministers online, providing information on whom ministers meet and the subject of those meetings. Open agendas can serve as an alternative or complement to lobbying registers. In practice, several countries have adopted both approaches, including Lithuania, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, creating opportunities for cross-checking disclosed lobbying activities with the timeline of meetings held between public officials and interest representatives. As with lobbying registers, open agenda disclosures are most effective when they provide meaningful detail, including information on the issues discussed, the objectives pursued by lobbyists and the policy or legislative matters targeted.
However, when used as an alternative rather than a complement to lobbying registers, open agendas offer only a partial view of lobbying activity, as they capture meetings but no other important channels of influence, such as written communications, grassroots lobbying, social media campaigns or the funding of third-party organisations. This reinforces the importance of establishing a coherent and complementary ecosystem of transparency tools for lobbying and influence, in which data can, to the extent possible, be centralised or cross-checked across different disclosure mechanisms.
Transparency requirements cannot achieve their objective unless regulated actors comply with them and they are properly enforced by oversight entities. They also need to be accompanied by strong integrity standards of behaviour for lobbyists and/or public officials, as lobbying and influence are typically an example where public officials and lobbyists may face ethical dilemmas in cases where there are no clear legal ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers or where there may be conflicts between different values or principles. As such, both integrity rules and effective oversight mechanisms are a core component of a well-functioning lobbying framework (OECD, 2010[15]).
Several countries have established minimum expected standards through lobbying laws, codes of conduct, or guidelines governing interactions between public officials and external parties. However, such standards remain limited in scope and adoption. Currently, only 14 countries, including one partner country (Ukraine), have a code of conduct regulating interactions between public officials and lobbyists that is supported by practical examples illustrating high-risk or undesirable behaviours and situations. For OECD members, this figure has remained stable since 2022, with two additions: Finland, which adopted Recommendations for good lobbying practice in 2024, and Norway, following its 2025 update of the Handbook for Political Leadership, which introduced a definition of lobbying, clarified the responsibilities of political leaders in their interactions with lobbyists, and provided concrete examples to support ethical decision making. In Ukraine, the Lobbying Law was supplemented by Rules of Ethical Conduct for lobbyists, adopted in 2024. Apart from Norway, all other countries that have established a code of conduct setting minimum expected standards for lobbying are countries that have formally defined lobbying in their regulatory frameworks and/or established a lobbying register.
Among countries that have established a lobbying register, all but 7 (Belgium, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands and Latvia) have designated a supervisory function within central government to oversee transparency in lobbying activities. Countries that lack designated supervisory functions typically operate partial lobbying registers limited to the legislative branch, where registration requirements are primarily linked to access to parliamentary premises, disclosure is not systematically verified, and enforcement mechanisms are absent or weak.
However, for lobbying regulatory frameworks to be effective and breaches to be identified, supervisory bodies need adequate powers and resources to verify the completeness and accuracy of disclosed information and to investigate potential breaches. In practice, 13 OECD Member countries (representing 54% of those with a lobbying register in place) and one OECD partner country (Serbia) reported that the supervisory authority had conducted at least one investigation into non-compliance with lobbying rules or incomplete or inaccurate disclosures during the most recent full calendar year. In jurisdictions that did not fulfill the criteria, this may reflect the recent entry into force of the framework or the limited mandate of the supervisory function, which is sometimes confined to administering the lobbying register rather than actively monitoring compliance. In such cases, oversight bodies may lack the authority or resources to verify whether disclosures are submitted on time, whether lobbyists are properly registered, or whether the information provided is accurate and complete.
Operational independence from ministerial control is also a key feature of an effective lobbying regulatory framework, yet it is not consistently ensured in countries that have established supervisory functions. In some jurisdictions, responsibility for administering lobbying registers and investigating potential breaches rests with line ministries, which does not enable effective independence of oversight. As such, strengthening lobbying regulations and registers entails ensuring the existence of an oversight function, whether vested in a single institution or shared across several bodies, that is adequately resourced and operationally independent. Experience across countries suggests that when functions related to investigation and the imposition of sanctions are able to operate with a degree of independence, oversight bodies are better placed to monitor compliance, enforce rules on lobbying and influence activities, and support effective implementation. Independent oversight is also essential to ensure impartial enforcement and to provide credible responses, including corrective measures or redress where appropriate, to breaches of lobbying regulations (OECD, 2010[15]).
Countries that fulfil the above criteria tend to demonstrate stronger implementation and smaller gaps between regulation and practice. Overall, the best-performing countries, with the smallest implementation gaps are those that have adequately defined lobbying in their regulatory frameworks, supported by objective and proportionate sanctions for breaches of transparency and integrity rules and by cooling-off periods, and that have also established comprehensive lobbying registers, clear integrity standards, and supervisory bodies with the capacity to enforce regulations, and monitor and promote effective implementation.
← 1. Judgment of 22 November 2022, WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers, C-37/20 and C-601/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:912.