This chapter looks at the performance of tax administrations in their primary role of collecting taxes. It provides figures on the aggregate net tax revenues collected and other key information related to the activities of the administrations covered in this publication.
Tax Administration 2025
Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging Economies
Abstract
The primary purpose of a tax administration is the collection of tax revenue to fund public services, although over time, as previous editions of this series have highlighted, many tax administrations have also been tasked with other responsibilities. This chapter provides an overview of the revenue related responsibilities given to tax administrations and the net revenues collected. It also looks at the importance of withholding regimes to support overall compliance.
With few exceptions, jurisdictions have unified the collection of direct and (most) indirect taxes within a single body for tax administration, and Table 2.1. summarises for which revenue types the tax administrations covered by this publication have responsibility. More details on institutional set-ups of tax administrations can be found in Chapter 9 in the 2024 edition of this series (OECD, 2024[1]).
Percentage of administrations that have responsibility for the following revenue types
Source: ADB, CIAT, IOTA, IMF, OECD, International Survey on Revenue Administration, Tables A.1 Revenue types for which the administration has responsibility: Income tax and taxes on goods and services, A.2 Revenue types for which the administration has responsibility: Other taxes, A.3 Revenue types for which the administration has responsibility: Other taxes (continued), SSC and non-tax revenue, A.4 Employer withholding taxes and combined tax and customs administrations, http://isoradata.org (accessed on 1 October 2025).
Also, as highlighted in Chapter 2 of the 2024 edition of this series, governments have given tax administrations other areas of responsibility (or shared responsibility with other parts of government in some areas) in addition to their traditional tax roles. Confidence in the proven ability of tax administrations to deliver complex administrative processes on a large scale undoubtedly plays a significant part in such decisions. Typically, these may be to provide financial benefits to taxpayers (for example, welfare-type benefits) or to collect loans or debts owing to the government (for example, student loans or child support). In other situations, the role/function is less directly related to the tax system, for example oversight of certain gambling activities or population registries. (OECD, 2024[1])
The Finnish Tax Administration has established a credit register, with the following aims:
Prevent households from taking on too much debt.
Improve the ability of creditors to assess the creditworthiness of credit applicants.
Help private individuals manage their own finances.
Provide reliable information on the credit market.
Facilitate the monitoring and supervision of credit markets.
In the first phase, which was finalised in 2024, information on consumer credits and other comparable credits was included in the register. Several functionalities were also implemented:
Credit institutions report data on all consumer credits issued to Finnish individuals and on any changes on loan contracts to the register. In 2024, over 15.5 million loans have been reported to the register.
Lenders use data from the register to assess applicants’ creditworthiness. Data on the credit register extract includes information on the applicant’s loan contracts and current income. Income data is derived from the income register and regularly updated. Lenders pay for each credit register extract inquiry from the system, with over 5 million enquiries taking place in 2024.
Specific public authorities can utilise data from the positive credit register for carrying out their legal duties.
Private individuals can view their personal credit information online, and they can also set up a voluntary credit ban free of charge.
In the second phase of the programme, lenders will start reporting loans granted to private individuals other than consumers. This is due to be completed in June 2026.
Source: Finland (2025).
An expansion of responsibilities, while it can bring useful economies of scale and scope, can also potentially increase risks to the core task of raising the tax revenue needed to fund public services and public goods. It therefore requires strong governance, risk management and appropriate resourcing.
Tax crime investigation responsibilities
Finding ways to fight tax crime is a high priority as money laundering, corruption, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes can threaten the strategic, political and economic interests of jurisdictions. Tax administrations, as gatekeepers to a sound financial system, play a critical role in countering these activities as they are in possession of information that could be crucial for a successful criminal tax investigation.
A jurisdiction should have an organisational model with defined responsibilities for fighting tax crime and other financial crime. (OECD, 2021[2]) There is a range of organisational approaches for conducting tax crime investigations, and the ISORA survey continues to look at the role of tax administrations in this process. As can be seen from the data, close to two-thirds of the tax administrations covered in this publication are involved in conducting tax crime investigations (Table A.87). The majority of those administrations have responsibility for both conducting and directing tax crime investigations, while the others have responsibility for solely conducting investigations, under the direction or authority of another agency, such as the police or public prosecutor (see Table 2.2.).
In situations where administrations do not have any responsibility for conducting tax crime investigations, this work is done by another agency, such as the police or public prosecutor. This could also be a specialist agency, established outside the tax administration.
Percentage of administrations
Note: In some jurisdictions, the organisational approach for tax crime investigations may depend on the tax offence or tax-related criminal proceedings. In those cases, an administration may have selected multiple answer options. This is why the percentages add up to more than 100 percent.
Source: ADB, CIAT, IOTA, IMF, OECD, International Survey on Revenue Administration, Table A.87 Tax crime investigations: Role of the administration, http://isoradata.org (accessed on 1 October 2025).
Jurisdictions should have a strategy for addressing tax crimes. (OECD, 2021[2]) Information on the rationale for adopting a national strategy for countering tax crime and on the design of such strategies, is included in the 2024 OECD report Designing a National Strategy against Tax Crime: Core Elements and Considerations (OECD, 2024[3]). The report draws on the practices of members of the OECD’s Task Force on Tax Crimes and other Crimes (TFTC), which includes officials from many tax administrations.
Brazil – Innovation in combatting complex tax fraud schemes
Faced with the growing challenge of combating structured tax fraud schemes, the Federal Revenue Service of Brazil (Receita Federal do Brasil, RFB) has implemented practices to tackle sophisticated illicit operations that can cause significant economic impact.
One of the most significant advances has been the identification of the need for full integration between specialist areas of the RFB, such as those responsible for conducting confidential investigations, performing risk analyses, and executing enforcement actions. It was recognised that the isolated work of these units limited the potential for action in highly complex schemes.
To address this, a methodology was developed to promote institutional and operational synergies between the specialist areas of the RFB. The first measures under this new methodology are already underway, with teams working together on investigations involving large-scale structured frauds. Efforts include identifying and tracking networks of shell companies, atypical financial transactions, and fraudulent operations related to taxes. In this context, collaboration has utilised the skills and knowledge of each unit, creating institutional synergy and maximising the efficiency of the RFB in combating tax fraud.
Another important aspect has been the introduction of a more centralised control that has oversight of all the different units. This makes it easier to prioritise actions and coordinate the distribution of tasks among the units. This robust governance structure ensures the RFB focuses on the most relevant cases, maximising the impact of operations and ensuring the efficient allocation of resources.
Israel – Identifying fraudulent invoices
In recent years, the distribution of fraudulent tax invoices has become a growing issue and causes significant economic impacts in terms of lost revenue. To tackle this, the Israel Tax Authority (ITA) has taken a preventative approach, by developing a model aimed at identifying these invoices. It does this by providing prior approval for tax invoices so that those which have not been approved (by receiving an allocation number) will be prohibited from deducting input tax for VAT purposes. This is an online process done using an application programming interface that connects the trader’s accounting software to the ITA.
The VAT Law was amended to make it mandatory to receive an allocation number for tax invoices that exceed NIS 50 000. It also authorised the ITA to withhold the allocation numbers for invoices in cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the invoice was issued illegally. This NIS 50 000 threshold will be gradually decreased to NIS 5 000 by 2028.
The amendment has had a positive impact. The ITA's computer system automatically adds 50-100 000 allocation numbers to invoices per day, with response times that do not exceed half a second.
In 2024, the ITA identified fraudulent invoices worth approximately NIS 30 billion, and closed hundreds of businesses that were disclosing them. The estimated VAT saved as a result is estimated at approximately NIS 6 billion.
Spain – Preventing fraudulent invoices
Aiming to aid the digitalisation of the business sector and reducing tax fraud, the Spanish Tax Agency (Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria, AEAT) has launched the VERI*FACTU project. This establishes requirements that must be met by the computer invoicing systems used by entrepreneurs and professionals.
The purpose of the VERI*FACTU project is to prevent the prevalence of computer programmes that facilitate the manipulation or concealment of invoice records. For this reason, invoicing systems and computer programmes must guarantee the integrity, accessibility and traceability of invoicing records. This obligation falls on the manufacturers and developers of invoicing software, who must guarantee this by means of a certification for the products they sell.
Taxpayers may voluntarily automatically submit to the tax administration all invoicing records generated in their computer systems or keep the invoicing records in the issuing system. In addition, for small entrepreneurs who do not have a computer invoicing system, the AEAT makes a form available on the AEAT web portal that facilitates the preparation of their invoices.
One of the new features to be included in the invoices is a QR code that allows the recipients of the invoice to check whether it has been sent to the AEAT. Additionally, all invoices must also incorporate a further QR code, which can be used either to validate the content of the invoice received, or to communicate it to the AEAT.
Sweden – Crime script analysis to tackle tax fraud
Understanding how re-occurring types of tax fraud work is essential to formulating appropriate counter measures. The Swedish Tax Agency (STA) innovation team has conducted crime script analysis to identify how the agency can structure the information it has to gain insight on how a particular tax evasion scheme is carried out.
Crime script analysis is a technique used to understand how crimes are committed by breaking them down into a sequence of steps and is based on the idea that crimes follow a structured process. Mapping out the whole process gives a holistic overview of the scheme, and this way of organising information can be used to decide how to prevent tax schemes while they are still in an early phase.
A development process within the STA has started to explore how this approach (which is currently a Proof-of-Concept) can be scaled up to be applied to large datasets. When this has been achieved, the understanding of where the STA can effectively intervene can be used for risk analysts to decide which areas are best to focus on. Selection analysts can use the analysis to understand how current tax evasion schemes work in their case selection to tax investigators and officials. Additionally, intelligence operators can use information on the wider scheme to add additional information on the different actors involved.
Sources: Brazil (2025), Israel (2025), Spain (2025) and Sweden (2025).
This section looks at the net revenue collection of tax administrations, as well as a number of other key figures related to their activities.
Overall, the increase in revenue collections that was noted in previous editions has continued. Between 2022 and 2023, revenue collections increased in the vast majority of jurisdictions covered. The average increase remains significant (+9.7% on average, see Table 2.3.) but has slowed down compared to the previous two years which were marked by the substantial recovery of economic activity following the COVID-19 pandemic during which lockdown measures were introduced by many governments and the forced closure of many businesses negatively affected taxable income and sales.
Note: The table is based on the data from jurisdictions covered in this publication. Data for India was excluded as the Indirect Tax Board information was only available from fiscal year 2021.
Source: ADB, CIAT, IOTA, IMF, OECD, International Survey on Revenue Administration, Table A.5 Net revenue collected by the tax administration: Total, http://isoradata.org (accessed on 1 October 2025).
Net collections by tax administrations averages 22% of jurisdiction GDP
Through its Global Revenue Statistics Database (OECD, 2024[4]), the OECD seeks to publish internationally comparable data on the tax revenues of its members, as well as a number of other jurisdictions for all levels of government. As the information contained in the Global Revenue Statistics Database reports data at a jurisdiction and not an administration level, tax administrations were asked in the ISORA survey to provide a range of information on their revenue collection activity. This information aptly demonstrates the importance of tax administrations to their respective economies.
Net revenue collected by tax administrations participating in this report, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023, ranges from less than 10% to reach more than 40% in the case of Norway, Denmark and Sweden. Average net revenue collected by administrations in this report is 22% of GDP (see Figure 2.1.).
Source: ADB, CIAT, IOTA, IMF, OECD, International Survey on Revenue Administration, Table D.1 Revenue related ratios: Revenue to total government revenue and GDP, http://isoradata.org (accessed on 1 October 2025).
Source: ADB, CIAT, IOTA, IMF, OECD, International Survey on Revenue Administration, Table D.1 Revenue related ratios: Revenue to total government revenue and GDP, http://isoradata.org (accessed on 1 October 2025).
Net collections by tax administrations averages 63% of total jurisdiction revenue
Forty-four tax administrations report net revenue collections exceeding more than 50% of total government revenue in 2023, making tax administrations the principal government revenue collection agency in three-quarters of jurisdictions covered in this report. Average net revenue collected by administrations in this report is 63% of total jurisdiction revenue (see Figure 2.2.)
VAT accounts for 30% of net revenue collections and is the major tax type collected by 47% of the tax administrations covered in this report. This is followed by PIT, which accounts for 26% of net revenue collections, and is the major tax type collected by 33% of administrations. CIT (19%) and social security contributions (SSC, 10%) comprise the other major revenue types as reflected in Figure 2.3. In many jurisdictions, social security contributions are not collected by tax administrations and are therefore underrepresented when looking at average net revenue collections for all jurisdictions covered in this publication. Where collected, they are often one of the major sources of revenue collected by the tax administration (see Table D.4).
Source: ADB, CIAT, IOTA, IMF, OECD, International Survey on Revenue Administration, Tables D.2 Revenue related ratios: Tax to GDP and non-tax revenue to total revenue, D.3 Tax structure and SSC proportions: PIT, CIT and VAT, and D.4 Tax structure and SSC proportions: Excises, Other taxes and SSC, http://isoradata.org (accessed on 1 October 2025).
A comparison of the average net revenue collected in relation to GDP and total government revenue between 2014 and 2023 is presented in Table 2.4. It illustrates the growing importance of tax administrations for collecting government revenues. (It should be noted that the table only takes into account information from jurisdictions for which data was available for both years 2014 and 2023, which explains the differences in 2023 averages mentioned in the previous paragraphs.)
Note: The table is based on the data from jurisdictions that were able to provide the information for the years 2014 and 2023. The number of jurisdictions for which data was available is shown in parentheses.
Source: ADB, CIAT, IOTA, IMF, OECD, International Survey on Revenue Administration, Table D.1 Revenue related ratios: Revenue to total government revenue and GDP, http://isoradata.org (accessed on 1 October 2025), and Tax Administration 2017: Comparative Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Emerging Economies, Table A.1, https://doi.org/10.1787/tax_admin-2017-en.
Streamlining collections: Withholding at source
Withholding regimes can form part of compliance-by-design approaches which support overall compliance while significantly reducing administrative burdens for large numbers of taxpayers depending on the extent of taxpayer involvement in any post-payment adjustments that might be needed (i.e. where withholding results in under-payment or over-payment of tax). In place of self-reporting and paying, withholding taxes are taxes paid directly to the tax administration, usually by a principal who pays the net income to the recipient (for example withholding by an employer on salary paid to an employee), or by an intermediary between the payer and customer.
The most common withholding tax in operation globally is income tax on employment income, so called Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) approaches, and 93% of the jurisdictions covered in this publication operate a PAYE regime (see Table A.4). Other examples include withholding taxes on interest, dividends or royalties. Depending on the underlying tax regime and nature of the payments, withholding can vary from a simple system, at a universal set rate, to a more complex system that is responsive to the customer’s wider circumstances. For further information on the types of income that are generally subject to tax withholding at source, please see Table 2.5 of the 2024 edition of this series (OECD, 2024[1]).
In addition to minimising burdens, withholding regimes can also reduce misreporting and underpayment as the principals or intermediaries responsible for forwarding taxes to the administration have no right over the respective amounts. Of course, there remains scope for failures in such approaches by misapplication of rules or errors by principals or intermediaries where the system relies on them providing information. However, increased automation, greater cross-checking of data and whole of government approaches have the potential to reduce such risks.
To understand the importance of withholding at source for personal income taxes, the ISORA survey asked participating administrations to provide the total value of PIT withheld by third parties and subsequently paid to the administration which was then put in relation to the total value of PAYE and PIT payments received by the administration (see Table D.40). This is a change from previous ISORA surveys which did not ask for the value but directly for the percentage of total PIT withheld. It appears that this change in the ISORA 2024 survey had some unintended consequences as (i) a reduced number of jurisdictions were able to provide the information (for the period 2018 to 2023 there is data for only 27 jurisdictions, compared to 39 jurisdictions for which data is available for 2018 to 2022), and (ii) some jurisdictions show significant and unexpected variations between 2023 and pre-2023 data. As a result, this data needs to be looked at with care. Despite the data issues, Table 2.5. shows that withholding taxes play an important part in revenue collection systems.
Note: The table shows the average percentage of personal income tax withholding for 27 jurisdictions that were able to provide the information for the years 2018 to 2023.
Source: ADB, CIAT, IOTA, IMF, OECD, International Survey on Revenue Administration, Table D.40 Electronic payment proportions and third-party withholding, http://isoradata.org (accessed on 1 October 2025).
References
[3] OECD (2024), Designing a National Strategy against Tax Crime: Core Elements and Considerations, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0e451c90-en.
[4] OECD (2024), Global Revenue Statistics Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/global-revenue-statistics-database.html (accessed on 1 October 2025).
[1] OECD (2024), Tax Administration 2024: Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging Economies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2d5fba9c-en.
[2] OECD (2021), Fighting Tax Crime – The Ten Global Principles, Second Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/006a6512-en.