This chapter examines Brazil’s current framework for promoting integrity and transparency in public decision-making. It evaluates the country’s resilience to risks of policy capture and undue influence by special interest groups. The analysis identifies potential reforms to strengthen the legislative framework on lobbying and political finance, and highlights opportunities to enhance awareness of integrity standards adapted to the risks related to lobbying and influence activities among both government officials and lobbyists. In addition, the chapter explores ways to improve access to information for all stakeholders and to foster more inclusive and transparent stakeholder engagement in the policymaking process.
OECD Integrity Review of Brazil 2025
Consolidating Progress on Public Integrity
Abstract
Public policies are the main ‘product’ people receive, observe and evaluate from their governments. When designing and implementing these policies, governments need to acknowledge the existence of diverse interest groups and consider the costs and benefits for these groups. As such, a wide range of stakeholders should have a fair and equitable opportunity to contribute to public decision-making. By sharing their expertise, legitimate needs and evidence about policy problems and how to address them, interest groups and their representatives can provide governments with valuable information on which to base their decisions. It is this variety of interests that allows policy makers to learn about options and trade-offs, better understand citizens and stakeholders’ evolving needs and ultimately decide on the best course of action on any given policy issue (OECD, 2010[1]; 2021[2]).
However, lobbying and influence activities, understood as all actions aimed at promoting the interests of specific groups with reference to public decision-making and electoral processes, can have a profound impact on the outcome of public policies. Depending on how they are conducted, lobbying and influence activities can bring about either positive change or detrimental consequences. On the one hand, an inclusive policy-making process can lead to more informed and ultimately better policies and increase the legitimacy of public decisions. In some cases, however, public decision-makers may pursue policies that further their private interests. They may also act in favour of the commercial or political interests of certain groups, whether domestic or foreign, who seek to influence them. When this occurs, there is a risk that decisions concerning essential public policies, such as health or consumer protection policies, may have harmful impacts instead of promoting the economic and social well-being of individuals.
Experience shows that policy making is not always inclusive and at times may only consider the interests of a few, usually those that are more financially and politically powerful. Experience also shows that lobbying and other practices to influence governments may be abused through the provision of biased or deceitful evidence or data, and the manipulation of public opinion (OECD, 2021[2]). The challenges seem to increase in today’s environment of information overload, with new and more diverse mechanisms and channels of influence, such as social media and artificial intelligence tools, which may be used to manipulate public opinion. There is also a risk that some parties and candidates, once in office, will be more responsive to the interests of a particular group of donors rather than to the wider public interest. Donors may expect a form of reciprocity for donations made during an election campaign, for example getting privileged access to information or to overpriced public contracts, receiving favourable conditions in public loans or other forms of illegal benefits from the respective public administration (OECD, 2017[3]).
The consequences of this undue influence on the economy and society are widespread. Studies increasingly show that situations of undue influence and inequity in influence power has led to the misallocation of public resources, reduced productivity, perpetuated social inequalities and sometimes led to detrimental policy outcomes (OECD, 2017[3]). They may also negatively affect the appetite of (foreign) investors and lower the country's trustworthiness at the international level. Ultimately, public policies that are misinformed and respond only to the needs of a specific interest group can negatively affect trust in the government, possibly resulting in the dissatisfaction of the public as a whole towards public institutions and democratic processes (OECD, 2024[4]).
Brazil is likewise confronted with these challenges. Recent years have seen the emergence of negative trends related to the promotion and protection of fundamental democratic rights, such as freedom of expression and assembly (OECD, 2022[5]).Conflicts over land and resources sparked concerns regarding the influence of the farm sector over decisions to open indigenous reservations to commercial activity (Reuters, 2019[6]). A September 2023 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) report highlighted the heightened risks faced by journalists in the Amazon region, particularly when reporting on sensitive issues like Indigenous land rights and environmental degradation (RSF, 2023[7]; Freedom House, 2024[8]). Several journalists in Brazil reported facing a chilling environment due to the threat of criminal defamation and civil lawsuits, which can lead to self-censorship, especially among smaller outlets with limited resources (Freedom House, 2024[8]).
The evolving lobbying and influence landscape, with new and more diverse mechanisms and channels of influence, such as through social media has also increased the risks connected with undue influence on democratic processes. As in other countries, campaigns for recent national elections in Brazil were marked by high polarisation, and the spread of false material or misleading information circulated through social media has emerged as a key challenge for the integrity of elections (Magenta, Gragnani and Souza, 2018[9]; Freedom House, 2024[8]; OECD, 2022[5]). Brazil has seen intensely debated efforts in recent years to regulate the online information space. These have included, among others, the 2014 Marco Civil da Internet (Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet), which focuses on protecting internet users’ civil rights; the Supreme Court’s August 2024 decision to block access to X in Brazil, which was triggered by the platform’s failure to designate a legal representative; and the Supreme Court’s June 2025 decision to increase platforms’ liability for content that they host (STF, 2025[10]). In particular, the judiciary’s efforts to restrict and investigate certain content prompted some commentators to argue that the authorities were attempting to suppress legitimate criticism of their actions in violation of standards of free expression. Some journalists and press freedom organisations have also raised concerns that the Supreme Court’s August ruling could impose excessively broad restrictions on freedom of expression and the dissemination of information online (Freedom House, 2024[8]).
Along these lines, the OECD defines information integrity as the result of an information environment that promotes access to accurate, reliable, evidence-based and plural information sources, and that enables individuals to be exposed to plural and diverse ideas, make informed choices and better exercise their rights (OECD, 2024[11]). The 2024 OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity, to which Brazil adhered in December 2024, lays out a wide-ranging framework that identifies policies that seek to strengthen societal resilience; enhance the transparency, accountability and plurality of information sources; and upgrade institutional architecture. Moving forward, and in line with the importance of transparency to mitigate risks posed by undue influence, Brazil’s focus should be on building the public’s understanding of how online information platforms operate through enhancing transparency and information sharing and co-operation between governments, the private sector and society at large (OECD, 2024[11]).
As highlighted in Chapter 1, several governance indicators and survey results point to Brazilians’ perception that public policies may be unduly influenced by vested interests, and/or that powerful groups exert too much influence on the outcomes of public decision-making processes. The OECD Survey on the Drivers of Public Trust in Brazil found that only two out of ten people say that a high-level political official would refuse a well-paid job in return for a political favour (19.7%), compared to around three out of ten respondents across OECD countries (30.4%) (OECD, 2023[12]). Results from the OECD Trust Survey also echo findings from other similar surveys implemented in the country. For example, the Latinobarómetro found that in 2023, 54% of citizens in Brazil perceived that a few powerful groups govern their country, although this proportion has fallen significantly (17 points) since 2021 (Figure 6.1). These fluctuations are consistent with similar changes in levels of trust in the federal government in Brazil, which have varied significantly over the past 30 years, mainly following economic and electoral cycles. In 2020, when asked who they think has most power in Brazil, 19.1% of respondents put big companies first, while 18.6% put Government and 12.6% political parties (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2021[13]).
A survey on ethics and corruption in the Brazilian federal public service also reveals that, during the Covid-19 crisis, public managers perceived an increase of the following problematic practices: procurement and contracting decisions made with little transparency and accountability (22.4%), conflict of interest situations between public and private sectors (25.9%), lobbying activities involving the public and private sectors (22.2%) and political interference in the decisions of their organisations (26.3%) (Figure 6.2).
Respondents were asked the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that your country is governed for a few powerful groups in their own interest? Or is it governed for the good of all?”
Note: This survey has been conducted in 18 countries in the region (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela).
Source: Corporación Latinobarómetro (2024[14]), Homepage, https://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp (accessed on 14 February 2025).
Respondents were asked the following question: “From the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020, how do you rate the change in each of the following practices”
Source: Ortega Nieto, D. et al. (2021[15]), Ethics and Corruption in the Federal Public Service: Civil Servants’ Perspectives (English), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/559381639027580056/Ethics-and-Corruption-inthe-Federal-Public-Service-Civil-Servants-Perspectives.
These concerns show that integrity, transparency, openness and equity in public decision-making are necessary for both the creation of optimal policies, and for citizens’ trust in government. The OECD Public Integrity Indicator for Principle 13 of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity shows that Brazil has regulations on transparency of policy influence and open government in place but that functions to implement and enforce these policies present several shortcomings (Figure 6.3). For example, Brazil provides some level of transparency on efforts by interest groups to influence public decision-making processes through the publication of the agendas of certain executive branch public officials (through the e-Agendas platform). However, Brazil currently scores zero in the sub indicator measuring “Lobbying safeguards in practice” due to the absence of a legal framework that specifically defines lobbying and corresponding transparency requirements for these. Furthermore, while post-employment integrity is strong for ministers, of 31 top-tier officials that departed from the ministries in the past 2 years, 10 (32.26%) were employed within two years by a private sector organisation that operates within the scope of their ministry’s area of competence, above the OECD average of 15%.
Note: The OECD Public Integrity Indicators measure, amongst others the quality of frameworks for accountability of public policymaking (Principle 13 of the OECD Public Integrity Recommendation). The criteria for each indicator were established by the OECD Working Party of Senior Public Integrity Officials (SPIO).
Source: OECD (n.d.[16]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators (database), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/ (accessed on 6 August 2025).
These shortcomings and the need for reform have been recognised in Brazil’s Anti-Corruption Plan 2020-2025, launched in 2020 by the Federal Government, under the key theme “Public ethics” (CGU, 2020[17]). The Plan recognised that lobbying is a legitimate activity, but that it requires safeguards to promote equality, transparency and ethics on the relationship between private groups and the government and clearly separate the legitimate practice of interest representation from opaque, manipulative or corrupt activities. Although the new Anti-Corruption Plan 2025–2027 (Plano de Integridade e Combate à Corrupção), adopted in December 2024, does not explicitly call for the adoption of lobbying regulation, it includes dedicated pillars aimed at strengthening integrity in State–private sector interactions (Axis 2), enhancing transparency and open government (Axis 3), as well as various measures promoting transparency and integrity in public decision-making. For example, the Plan contains measures to improve the implementation of the open agenda platform (e-Agendas) and to expand the list of public entities and officials publishing their agendas on the platform.
In addition, the Plan includes a range of measures aimed at improving access to information, enhancing stakeholder participation in the formulation and implementation of public and regulatory policies, and increasing transparency in decision-making processes. These include, for example, greater transparency in the granting of licenses and permits, and safeguards to ensure that decisions within regulatory agencies are not dominated by a single director, particularly in areas under their direct oversight. Such measures preserve the agency’s full administrative autonomy, such as in the case of the National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels. Other measures include enhanced disclosure of partnerships between the Ministry of Defence and public or private entities; promotion of integrity in the agribusiness sector; prevention of conflict of interest in food and nutrition security policies; promotion of integrity measures in public–private interactions; increased transparency in infrastructure investments; broader publication of public policy information on the Transparency Portal; and strengthened oversight of amendments by Congress.
To maximise the benefits of inputs into decision-making, while overcoming the concentration of economic resources in the hands of the few and safeguarding democratic processes from undue influence, Brazil is encouraged to move in this direction and set up a strong, effective and resilient framework for lobbying and influence activities. This requires building or strengthening a coherent, comprehensive, effective and enforceable regulatory framework, consistent with other integrity policies and regulations and ensuring proper implementation, compliance and review. Reforms could be implemented along the following five priorities:
Providing an adequate level of transparency on activities aimed at or capable of influencing government decision-making processes.
Strengthening transparency and integrity in election processes.
Establishing transparency and integrity frameworks for all bodies providing advice to government.
Establishing an integrity framework adapted to the risks of lobbying and influence activities for both public officials and non-governmental actors.
Ensuring effective information, consultation and engagement of stakeholders.
Lobbying enables public officials to better understand and respond to citizens and stakeholders’ evolving needs, to leverage knowledge and resources from beyond the public administration, develop innovative solutions to policy problems and their implementation, as well as achieve greater acceptance and better compliance with decisions reached (OECD, 2021[2]). In Brazil, lobbying is performed on the grounds of article 5, XXXIV, subparagraph (a) of the Constitution, which grants every citizen the right to petition and to advocate against illegal acts or abuse of power. Lobbying was also recognised in February 2018 by the Ministry of Labour under the title of “institutional and government relations professionals”. While this recognition did not aim to define or regulate the activity, it featured the profession in the list of recognised professional activities of the Ministry (Lexology, 2019[18]).
Nonetheless, interviews conducted with various stakeholders for this review confirmed that the term “lobbying” is associated with opaque activities and corruption in Brazil. A series of corruption allegations, which began to surface in 2014, associated to the term “Operação Lava Jato” (Operation Car Wash), played an important role in raising awareness about lobbying malpractice in the country. In the recent survey on ethics and corruption in the Brazilian federal public service, only 19% of respondents agreed that the role played by private companies in influencing the opinion of public managers through lobbying efforts had the necessary level of transparency, and 51.3% partially or totally agreed that lobbying harms competitiveness (Figure 6.4).
Opinions regarding transparency, integrity, and lobbying in one's organisation
Source: Ortega Nieto, D. et al. (2021[15]), Ethics and Corruption in the Federal Public Service: Civil Servants’ Perspectives, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/559381639027580056/Ethics-and-Corruption-inthe-Federal-Public-Service-Civil-Servants-Perspectives.
To ensure societies and economies are more inclusive and cohesive, and institutions more trusted, governments need to provide the framework for lobbying and influence actors to engage with the various policy challenges of our time in a responsible, trustworthy, and problem-solving manner. Strengthening transparency over lobbying and influence activities is the first step towards that objective, as it not only allows for greater public scrutiny of the decision-making processes, it also helps to mitigate risks of abuse or misuse of lobbying and influence practices. An effective transparency framework for lobbying and influence activities should aim to make publicly available online and easily accessible, in an open data format that is reusable for public scrutiny, timely, comprehensive and detailed information on who, and/or on whose behalf, is lobbying or influencing undertaken, who is the target of such activities, the policy issue or regulatory act concerned, and the objectives of the activities (OECD, 2010[1]).
As such, Brazil could provide an adequate level of transparency on lobbying activities by: (i) adopting a dedicated legislative framework on lobbying; (ii) clearly defining the terms “lobbying” and “lobbyist”; (iii) making relevant information available; and (iv) implementing a coherent spectrum of strategies and mechanisms to ensure compliance with transparency measures; (v) clarifying criteria for withholding the disclosure of information related to national security and secrecy provided in specific laws; (vi) promoting stakeholder participation in the discussion, implementation and revision of lobbying-related regulations.
The Government of Brazil could adopt a dedicated law ensuring transparency of lobbying activities
Article 37 of the Federal Constitution of Brazil establishes the principles of lawfulness, impersonality, morality and publicity as part of the government's work. However, Brazil currently lacks a specific framework that defines lobbying and lobbying activities and that could provide for transparency in lobbying. Estimates indicate that there are more than 90,000 professional lobbyists in Brazil (Transparency International, 2019[19]). Several legislative sources also touch upon the principles of integrity and transparency in decision-making processes, including:
The Values of the Federal Public Service (Valores do Serviço Público Federal), which include seven core values, which are: Integrity, Professionalism, Impartiality, Justice, Engagement, Kindness and Public Vocation.
The Code of Professional Ethics of the Public Servant of the Federal Executive Branch (Decree 1.171/1994) defines deontological rules, duties, and prohibitions for public officials. The Code requires establishing Ethics Commission (Comissões de Ética) in every entity of the Federal executive to support its mainstreaming and implementation. The Ethics Commissions are responsible to guide and advise public officials on professional ethics, to build awareness of consequences of ethical breaches and to receive notice of possible breaches.
The Code of Conduct of the High Federal Administration (2000) establishes rules on public-private relations with regard to dispensing gifts, financing events, lunches and trips. Since 1999, the Public Ethics Commission (Comissão de Ética Pública, CEP) has been responsible for implementing and enforcing the Code and providing advice on conflict of interest.
Law 8.112/1990 regulates the civil service regime for all public officials. The Law includes a list of duties and prohibitions. In case of infringements, public officials will be subject to a disciplinary procedure defined by the law, on top of the civil, criminal and administrative liability that may cumulatively apply.
Law 8.429/1992 on Administrative Improbity provides for the punishment and sanctions applicable to public officials in case of unlawful behaviour in the exercise of their role.
Law 12.813/2013 defines Brazil’s legal and policy framework concerning conflict of interests in the federal executive. The Law applies to all public officials within the federal executive. Its scope covers the divulgation or use of privileged information to pursuing private external activities that are incompatible with the current public position and functions.
Law 12.846/2013, known as the Anti-corruption Law or the Clean Company Law, specifies civil and administrative legal obligations for wrongful acts committed by Brazilian or foreign legal entities with branches or headquarters located in Brazil against the national or foreign public administration.
Law 14.365/2022, which amended the Brazilian Bar Association Act to establish that lawyers may contribute to the legislative process and to the drafting of norms for executive, judicial and legislative branches of government.
The Internal rules of procedures of each house of Congress include procedures related to the legislative process.
Several bills to regulate lobbying were introduced in the lower house of Parliament in the last twenty years. Recognising the challenges to integrity in decision-making posed by the lack of transparency in public-private relations, the Government of Brazil has taken steps towards introducing a regulation. For example, Decree 10.889/2021 (regulating the item VI of art. 5 and art. 11 of the Law 12.813/2013 on conflict of interest), adopted in 2021, makes mandatory the disclosure of certain executive branch public officials' public appointments, their participation in hearings with private sector representatives and in political-electoral events, as well as the receipt of gifts, hospitalities and other benefits from persons outside government (CGU, n.d.[20]). The Decree includes definitions of “private representation of interests” and “interest representative” (Box 6.1) and provides for the establishment of the Electronic System of Agendas of the Federal Executive Branch (e-Agendas), a single transparency platform where information on the public agendas of these public officials is published on a daily basis.
Interest representative
A natural or legal person who is dedicated, on a regular or circumstantial manner, in a professional capacity or not, with or without remuneration, to the representation of their own private interests or those of third parties, with or without an employment relationship with the party represented.
Private representation of interests
An interaction between a private representative and a public official intended to influence the decision-making process of the federal public administration, in accordance with their own private interests or that of third parties, within the scope of:
The formulation, implementation or evaluation of a government strategy, public policy or related activities.
Editing, revoking or amending normative acts.
Planning tenders and contracts.
Editing, altering or revoking an administrative act.
Public commitment
Activity in which the public agent participates due to the position, function or employment he/she occupies, including:
Public hearing: a face-to-face or online public session, open to any interested party, in which any participant can provide input, with the objective of contributing to public decision-making at the state level.
Meeting: working meeting between a public official and one or more persons external to the public entity in which he/she is employed, and during which there is no representation of interests.
Hearing: face-to-face or online appointment in which there is a private representation of interests.
Internal Dispatch: meeting between public officials of the same body or the same entity.
Source: Government of Brazil (2021[21]), Decreto No 10.889 de 9 de Dezembro de 2021, https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2021/decreto/d10889.htm.
The introduction of the e-Agendas framework was a positive step forward in the provision of greater transparency on the interactions between public officials in the federal executive branch and representatives from business, civil society and other organisations. It also strengthens equity in public decision-making, by enabling greater public scrutiny on various interest groups’ capacities to access public decision-makers. To further strengthen the framework, and in line with Action 25 of the Anti-Corruption Plan 2020-2025, in December 2021, the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) introduced an executive Bill 4.391/21 establishing rules for “the private representation of interests carried out by natural or legal persons with public agents”, informed by international good practice. The proposal was drafted in collaboration with the Ministry of Economy, and then processed by the Chamber of Deputies, including in the Committee on Work, Administration and Public Service of the Chamber of Deputies (Chamber of Deputies, 2022[22]).
The Bill received support from government representatives, members of Parliament, and lobbying associations such as the Brazilian Association of Institutional and Governmental Relations (Abrig) and the Institute of Government Relations (Irelgov). The Bill was also criticised for potential loopholes and grey areas. In response, the rapporteur of the Bill announced in June 2022 that a new proposal would be made in the coming months, taking into account previous bills proposed by deputies, such as Bill 1.535/22 and Bill 1.202/07 (Chamber of Deputies, 2022[23]).
A new legislative proposal was approved by the Chamber of Deputies and is being processed in the Federal Senate as Bill 2.914/2022 (Dispõe sobre a representação de interesse realizada por pessoas naturais ou jurídicas perante agentes públicos com o fim de efetivar as garantias constitucionais, a transparência e o acesso a informações) at the time of writing of this report. In particular, the Bill was under review by the Senate’s Committee on Transparency, Governance, Oversight and Control and Consumer Protection (CFTC), as well as the Committee on Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship (CCJ) (Federal Senate, 2024[24]). At the time of writing of this report, several amendments to the Bill discussed in the Senate had been proposed. The analysis in this report is therefore based on the most recent version of this Bill made available by the Brazilian authorities.
The objective of this new Bill is to provide a framework for the representation of interests by natural or legal persons before public officials of the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government (Article 1). The Bill also enshrines the legitimate and free nature of interest representation activities before public authorities (Article 2), and states that the exercise of interest representation activities is not tied to any specific professional title. Interest representatives may self-identify using terms such as 'institutional relations,' 'government relations,' or similar designations, without this affecting their obligation to register as interest representatives. Article 3 of the Bill enumerates the 16 principles that should guide interest representation activities (Article 3, I-XVI), including: transparency, access to information, legality, ethics, probity, integrity, good faith, free manifestation of thought and participation, access and equal treatment of interest representatives in state decision-making processes, respecting differences of opinion, freedom of association for lawful purposes and collective representation, fostering the development of a culture of transparency in the public administration, developing social control of and participation in the public administration, guaranteeing the autonomy and freedom to exercise trade union activities in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Federal Constitution, morality, accountability, access to government premises and to public authorities.
Furthermore, Article 6 of the Bill assures individuals and legal entities the right to request participation in public hearings that deal with a topic related to the interest they represent, and stipulates that public hearings, whenever possible, will include the participation of guests with positions in favour and against the matter under discussion. Article 7 also specifies that interest representatives may offer input to decision-makers in the form of: (i) legislative, regulatory or administrative decision impact analyses; (ii) studies, technical notes and opinions that inform decision-making processes; (iii) suggestions for projects, amendments, requests and other documents as part of administrative decision-making processes; and (iv) suggestions for requests to hold or participate in public hearings.
While the content of the Bill could be improved, as discussed in the following sections, the proposal to regulate lobbying through a dedicated law is a positive step forward. Currently, around half of OECD countries have defined lobbying activities and which actors are considered lobbyists in their regulatory framework, and 17 OECD countries have a publicly available lobbying register (OECD, 2024[25]). The provisions of the Bill are currently debated in the Senate and have also been subject to several public hearings attended by representatives of various organisations and relevant experts. This will help ensure that the Law itself, when passed, has undergone proper scrutiny and benefitted from public debate. The following sections reviews the provisions of the Bill on matters related to transparency and provides tailored recommendations to strengthen where necessary. Independently from the fate of the current Bill, these recommendations can guide future proposals or revisions, in case the Bill would be adopted in its current version.
The definitions of “interest representation” and “interest representative” in the Bill could be strengthened to include any kind of lobbying activities that may take place in practice
Clearly defining the scope of the law is critical for ensuring effective lobbying regulation. The definitions should be tailored to the specific context and sufficiently robust, comprehensive and explicit to avoid misinterpretation and to prevent loopholes (OECD, 2010[1]). This includes clarifying: (i) who is considered a lobbyist / interest representative; (ii) what types of activities are considered as lobbying/interest representation; (iii) the types of decisions that are targeted by lobbying; and (iv) the categories of public officials that are targeted by lobbying. In line with this good practice, the Bill includes definitions of “lobbying” (“interest representation” in the Bill) and “lobbyist” (“interest representative” in the Bill).
The definitions proposed in the Bill are described in Box 6.2. In particular, the proposed definition specifies “WHO” is lobbying (i.e. actors considered as interest representatives), on “WHAT” (i.e. what public decisions targeted by lobbying activities, public officials targeted by lobbying activities,) and “HOW” (i.e. types of communication considered as private representation of interests).
Branches of government and public officials covered
The law provides for the representation of interests before public authorities, which are defined as bodies and entities of the direct and indirect Public Administration of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, including the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the courts of auditors and the public defenders’ offices (Article 1).
The law defines a public official as a natural person who holds a public office, position, function or employment by election, appointment, designation, contract or any other form of investiture, even on a temporary basis or without remuneration, in the bodies and entities of the public authorities (Article 4‑V).
Public decisions covered
The law would apply to the following public decisions: (i) the formulation, implementation and evaluation of a government strategy, public policy, administrative act, regulatory decision or related activities; (ii) public tenders and contracts; and (iii) the drafting, amendment or repeal of laws and other normative acts (Article 4-I).
Definition of “interest representation”
“Representation of interests” means an interaction between a natural or legal person and a public authority with the aim of influencing a process or decision making within the scope of public decisions mentioned above (Article 4-I).
“Professional representation of interests” is defined as interest representation carried out:
on a regular basis (Article IV-II-a)
involves an interaction between public officials and one of them is representing the interests of the branches of government, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the courts of auditors, the public defence services and indirect public administrations, or is on leave to carry out a class mandate and represents the interests of a confederation, federation, class association, trade union or professional representation body, or a cooperative society set up by public servants to provide services to their members (Article IV-II-b)
on behalf of a professional/trade organisation, national and state civil society institution, trade union organisation and legally constituted association (Article IV-II-c)
by professional self-declaration (Article IV-II-d).
Interest representation acquires a professional character through the regular exercise of the activity by the natural or legal person. For the purpose of the law, a regular exercise of the activity means that the same individual or legal entity conducts any act of interest representation (whether identical or not): (i) with different public officials, more than once, within a period of 15 days; or (ii) with the same public official, within a period of 30 days.
Definition of “interest representative”
“Interest representative” means: (i) a natural person who represents his or her interest or that of a third party, whether individual, collective, diffuse, private or public, whether remunerated or not, with or without a labour relationship with the represented party; (ii) a legal entity, incorporated in fact or in law, which represents its own interests or those of a third party, whether individual, collective, diffuse, private or public, whether remunerated or not, even if the corporate purpose, statute, instrument of incorporation or document setting out the institutional aims does not expressly include the activity of representing interests, and even if there is no express mandate or contract for the provision of services with the represented party (Article 4-III).
Definition of “hearing”
A face to face or online interaction held inside or outside the workplace, with or without prior scheduling, in national or foreign territory and in which there is a representation of interests and participation of a public official (Article 4-VI).
Definition of “gifts” and legitimate hospitalities
Gifts are defined as goods or services with no economic value or which are distributed as courtesy, advertisement or customary publicity, provided that they do not exceed the unit value of one minimum wage and that their distribution frequency to the same public official is not less than six months. (Article 14 §1).
Legitimate hospitalities are defined as transparent, food and lodging for the participation of public officials in courses, seminars, congresses and similar events, provided that, cumulatively: (i) the amount paid by the interest representative does not exceed 20% of the public official’s monthly remuneration; (ii) the frequency with which it is offered to the same public official is not less than one year; (iii) the public official’s participation is directly related to the duties of their position or function; and (iv) the cost is paid directly by the private agent to the product supplier or service provider.
Sources: Bill 2.914/2022; Chamber of Deputies (2025[26]), Projeto de Lei n° 2914, de 2022, https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/155324; Chamber of Deputies (2022[27]), Dispõe sobre a representação de interesse realizada por pessoas naturais ou jurídicas perante agentes públicos com o fim de efetivar as garantias constitucionais, a transparência e o acesso a informações, https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=9219164&ts=1710770371264&disposition=inline.
In terms of terminology, if the law is adopted, particular attention should be paid to aligning the definitions of “interest representation” and “interest representative” in implementing Decree 10.889/2021 (on the Transparency of Agendas in the Federal Executive Branch) with the definition in draft Law 2.914/22. Indeed, if two different definitions were proposed, which is currently the case, this could lead to confusion and create legal uncertainty for all those subject to transparency obligations, making compliance more difficult for stakeholders and complicating implementation and enforcement. A coherent and harmonised legal framework would enhance legal certainty, improve transparency and prevent potential loopholes or contradictions that could be exploited.
In terms of actors, the proposed definition in the Bill imposes transparency measures comprehensively and equally on all the actors who aim to influence decision-making processes, whether for-profit or not-for-profit. This proposal enables coverage of a broad range of actors, including those that have not traditionally been viewed as “lobbyists” (e.g. think tanks, research institutions, foundations, non-governmental organisations, etc.). The definition also covers both remunerated and non-remunerated activities, which aligns with good practice.
However, it is not clear from the Bill which specific organisations would be considered as interest representatives, for example religious groups, who are also active in Brazil in influencing government decisions (Sotelo and Arocena, 2021[28]; Zilla, 2020[29]). Among the OECD countries with transparency mechanisms in place for lobbying activities as of 2022, 10 include religious organisations in the list of actors who are subject to transparency requirements in their lobbying activities (Table 6.1).
OECD countries with transparency mechanisms in place for lobbying practices
Note: In Netherlands, the lobbying transparency framework is voluntary. Peru is an Adherent to the OECD Recommendation on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and Influence.
Source: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
In terms of public decisions targeted by lobbying activities, the proposed list aligns with good practice. They include normative and administrative acts, government strategies, policies or related activities, as well as public contracts. The definition ensures that all decisions concerning legislative, regulatory or strategic orientations, regardless of the institutional level, are included in the scope of the regulation, and that the entire policy cycle is covered from design to evaluation phases. Within each of these stages, there are specific risks of influence, and a number of actors that could be targeted by those intending to sway decisions towards their private interests (Table 6.2).
The Bill could further specify which phases of the public tendering and contracting process are targeted, such as the needs assessment phase, and clarify whether it includes all stages already governed by specific rules and transparency requirements, typically set out in public procurement law. The Bill could also include individualised decisions such as financial contributions, grants, licences, permits or other authorisations, in addition to government contracts. To that end, the scope of application for these decisions could be modulated according to various institutional levels, whether federal, state or municipal. For example, activities relating to individualised decisions (grants, permits, licences, certificates or other authorisations) could be excluded in small municipalities in favour of decisions of general application (normative acts, standards, guidelines, programmes and action plans). In a less restrictive approach, consideration could be given to establishing thresholds for contracts, financial contributions, permits or other authorisations granted by a municipal body, such as representations made as part of an administrative process established under a defined programme for obtaining a grant, financial assistance, loan, loan guarantee or bond in an amount below a pre-determined threshold. Such thresholds are, for example, applied for certain financial contributions in the cities of New York or Austin (OECD, 2022[30]).
Lastly, covering the appointment of certain persons to a key position within the State is good international practice and could also be included in the Bill. Indeed, decisions on the appointment of certain public officials can be a key area of interest for lobbyists, allowing them to advance their interests if a person in line with their specific interests is placed in the position concerned. In France, the appointment of certain public officials is considered a type of decision covered by lobbying activities and is therefore covered by transparency requirements (Box 6.3).
Source: OECD (2017[3]), Preventing Policy Capture: Integrity in Public Decision Making, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264065239-en.
In France, the decisions covered by lobbying activities were specified in Law 2.016/1691 for the promotion of transparency, combating corruption and the modernisation of the economy (Article 25). Under the heading of "other public decisions", the contours of which are not specified, the High Authority for the Transparency of Public Life considers that these cover "individual appointment decisions".
Source: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
In terms of public officials targeted, the definition provides a coherent approach to transparency at all levels of government, as it covers the three branches of government and the regional level. To promote transparency and accountability, it is recommended that the list of public officials targeted by lobbying activities be publicly available and kept up to date by each public institution. In Ireland, each public body must publish and keep up to date a list of designated public officials under the law; the Standards in Public Office Commission also publishes a list of public bodies with designated public officials (Box 6.4).
In Ireland, Section 6(4) of the Lobbying Act of 2015 requires each public body to publish a list showing the name, grade and brief details of the role and responsibilities of each “designated public official” of the body. The list must be kept up to date. The purpose of the list is twofold:
to allow members of the public identify those persons who are designated public officials according to the lobbying act
as a resource for lobbyists filing a return to the register who may need to source a designated public official’s details.
The list of designated public officials must be prominently displayed and easily found on the homepage of each organisation’s website. The page should also contain a link to the Register of Lobbying.
Source: Standards in Public Office Commission (n.d.[31]), Requirements for Public Bodies, https://www.lobbying.ie/help-resources/information-for-public-bodies/requirements-for-public-bodies/.
In terms of communications considered as lobbying activities, while the proposed definition of “interest representation” in the Bill is quite broad, it does not sufficiently clarify which communications are included in the definition. Moreover, the disclosure regime only covers face-to-face or online meetings, as discussed in the following section. Article 10 of the Bill requires public bodies and entities in which certain categories of public officials (specified in article 11) are employed to publish information on hearings, defined as a “face to face or online interaction held inside or outside the workplace, with or without prior scheduling, in national or foreign territory and in which there is a representation of interests and participation of a public official” (Article 4). This leaves out other and newer forms of communication, such as the use of social media as a lobbying tool.
Experience from other countries found that providing an effective definition of what constitutes a lobbying activity remains a challenge, in particular as today’s 21st century of information overload has made the lobbying phenomenon more complex than ever before. The avenues by which stakeholders engage with governments encompass a wide range of practices and actors (OECD, 2021[2]) (Table 6.3). For example, interest groups are increasingly using social media to shape policy debates or to inform or persuade members of the public to put pressure on policy makers and indirectly influence the government decision-making process. In Brazil, regular reviews of arguments, practices and strategies used by firms in the agricultural industry found that hiring experts, sponsoring research, funding organisations and the dissemination of messages in the mass media and in schools were common practices that can have a profound impact in shaping policy decisions (Le Monde, 2022[32]).
Sources: Adapted from OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en; PRI (2018[33]), Converging on Climate Lobbying: Aligning Corporate Practice with Investor Expectations, https://www.unpri.org/climate-change/converging-on-climate-lobbying-aligning-corporate-practice-with-investor-expectations-/3174.article; OECD (2022[34]), “Regulating Corporate Political Engagement: Trends, challenges and the role for investors”, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c5615fe-en.
To address this challenge, lobbying activities should not be narrowed to a communication between a lobbyist and a public official. When setting up lobbying regulation, it is critical to ensure that the definition of lobbying activities is considered more broadly and inclusively to provide a level playing field for interest groups, whether business or not-for-profit entities, which aim to influence public decision-making. During debates and consultations on the previous Bill, several civil society organisations, such as the Brazilian Collaborative Advocacy Network, defended the inclusion of indirect forms of lobbying such as the use of social media campaigns in the definition of lobbying (Chamber of Deputies, 2022[23]). Any subsequent draft law(s) could therefore be revised to ensure to ensure the transparency of any kind of lobbying activity that may take place, going beyond direct written or oral communications. Box 6.5 provides an overview of OECD member experience in setting out clear, comprehensive and broad definitions on lobbying.
Canada
Communications considered as lobbying include direct communications with a federal public office holder (i.e., either in writing or orally) and grass-roots communications. The Lobbying Act defines grassroots communications as “any appeals to members of the public through the mass media or by direct communication that seek to persuade those members of the public to communicate directly with a public office holder in an attempt to place pressure on the public office holder to endorse a particular opinion”. For consultant lobbyists (those who lobby on behalf of clients), arranging a meeting between a public office holder and any other person is also considered as a lobbying activity.
In its August 2017 Interpretation Bulletin, the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada clarified the means used for the purpose of appealing to the general public, which may include letter and electronic messaging campaigns, advertisements, websites, social media posts and platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Snapchat, YouTube, etc. The Commissioner also indicated that participation in the strategic and operational activities of an appeal to the general public (approving items, providing advice, conducting research and analysis, writing messages, preparing content, disseminating content, and interacting with members of the public) also requires registration.
Ireland
Relevant communications means communications (whether oral or written and however made), other than excepted communications, made personally (directly or indirectly) to a designated public official in relation to a relevant matter.
The website of the Irish lobbying register indicates that “relevant communications” can include informal communications such as casual encounters, social gatherings, social media messages directed to public officials, or “grassroots” communication, defined as an activity where an organisation instructs its members or supporters to contact public officials on a particular matter.
European Union
In the European Union, the Inter-institutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register defines “covered activities” as: (a) organising or participating in meetings, conferences or events, as well as engaging in any similar contacts with Union institutions; (b) contributing to or participating in consultations, hearings or other similar initiatives; (c) organising communication campaigns, platforms, networks and grassroots initiatives; (d) preparing or commissioning policy and position papers, amendments, opinion polls and surveys, open letters and other communication or information material, and commissioning and carrying out research.
Sources: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en; OCL (2017[35]), Applicability of the Lobbying Act to Grass-roots Communications, https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/en/rules/the-lobbying-act/advice-and-interpretation-lobbying-act/applicability-of-the-lobbying-act-to-grass-roots-communications/.
Lastly, definitions should also clearly specify the type of communications with public officials that are not considered 'lobbying'. Some activities are relevant to exclude, for example information provided during a meeting of a public nature and for which information is already made available (for example, public hearings of committees in Parliament). The Bill 2.914/22 foresees several exclusions in Article 8, as specified in Table 6.4.
The following activities would not constitute private representation of interests:
Sources: Bill 4.391/21; Chamber of Deputies (2021[36]), Dispõe sobre a representação privada de interesses realizada por pessoas naturais ou jurídicas junto a agentes públicos, https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=2122896.
There are certain exclusions that are foreseen in the Bill that merit particular attention, as they may create important loopholes. First, the Bill proposes to exclude the performance of activities related to the commercialisation of products or services by state-owned company, companies with partial government ownership or their subsidiaries (Article 9-II). This exclusion could be clarified to make explicit the specific types of commercialisation activities that would be excluded, especially those that would include the promotion of a specific product to a public official or that would take place during a procurement planning stage. As specified in Article 4 of the Bill, it seems essential to cover the needs definition and procurement planning stage, which is particularly vulnerable to undue influence and corruption, notably because of the degree of government discretion over investment decisions and the size of the sums involved (OECD, 2017[37]). The influence of political interests, particularly at the stages of defining investment needs and programming projects, can lead to waste and the creation of 'white elephants' in the case of large infrastructure projects (i.e. infrastructure that does not meet needs and whose costs are not justified by its utility). In France, for example, some communications in the needs definition stage are covered by the lobbying regime, and some communications are then excluded once the call for tender has been completed, as is currently proposed in the Bill (Box 6.6).
In France, certain communications relating to competitive tendering procedures on the basis of Article 42 of Order No 2015-899 of 23 July 2015 on public contracts or Article 36 of Order No 2016-65 of 29 January 2016 on concession contracts are not covered by the framework regime.
Thus, the head of a company specialising in IT security, who approaches the office of the Minister of Defence to convince him of the need to launch a public procurement contract for the acquisition of data encryption technology with a view to reinforcing the security of the ministry's information systems, is carrying out an action of representation of interests. On the other hand, once the Ministry launches the competitive tendering procedure, its relations with this company and with the other candidates, until the contract is signed, are excluded from the scope of representation of interests, as are the relations that will be established with the selected candidate for the execution of the contract.
Source: HATVP (2021[38]), L’encadrement de la représentation d’intérêts. Bilan, enjeux de l’extension du répertoire à l’échelon local et propositions, https://www.hatvp.fr/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/HATVP_Rapport_lobbying_web_2021-VF.pdf.
Second, the Bill would exclude activities to express a technical opinion or provide clarifications requested by a public official (provided that the person expressing an opinion or insight does not participate in decision-making process as a representative of interests), as well as the sending of information or documents in response to or in compliance with a request or determination by public agents. Technical opinions and documents can be sent by interest representatives to influence a public official. Thus, the second exclusion (in Article 8-V) could be narrowed to communications by lobbyists made in response to a request from a public official concerning factual information or for the sole purpose of answering technical questions from a public agent, and provided that the response does not otherwise seek to influence such a decision or cannot be considered as seeking to influence such a decision, as already specified in Article 9-IV. In the United Kingdom for example, if a designated public official initiates communication with an organisation and in the subsequent course of the exchange, the criteria for lobbying are met, then the organisation is required to register the activity.
Lastly, the Bill would exclude preparatory activities – such as monitoring processes, gathering information and preparing studies – from the definition of “interest representation” (Article 8-IX). However, these activities represent strategic steps designed to shape policy decisions by, for example, identifying key public officials and crafting arguments that will later be used to influence them. While interactions with decision-makers are the visible part of lobbying, the extensive groundwork that enables effective influence is an integral part of lobbying strategies. Moreover, the entities that invest the most resources in this preparatory work are typically the most financially powerful interest groups, giving them a disproportionate advantage in influencing public policy. By excluding these activities from the definition of “interest representation”, the Bill would keep these efforts in the dark, preventing effective transparency on the reality of influence power and the disparities in resources among various interest groups, further undermining efforts to shed light on unequal access to decision-makers and the policymaking process. To ensure a comprehensive regulatory framework, it is thus recommended to remove this exclusion from the Bill to include the full spectrum of lobbying activities – from essential preparatory work to direct interactions with policymakers – within the Bill’s definition.
In addition to the exclusions already foreseen in Table 6.4, the Bill could also consider excluding communications by a natural person concerning his or her own private affairs, including opinions expressed in a strictly personal capacity. This should however not exempt the activities of individuals associating with others to represent interests together. Examples are provided in Box 6.7.
European Union
In the European Union, the purpose of the Register is to show organised and/or collective interests, not personal interests of individuals acting in a strictly personal capacity and not in association with others. As such, activities carried out by natural persons acting in a strictly personal capacity and not in association with others, are not considered as lobbying activities. However, activities of individuals associating with others to represent interests together (e.g. through grassroots and other civil society movements engaging in covered activities) do qualify as interest representation activities and are covered by the Register.
Germany
In Germany, the Act Introducing a Lobbying Register for the Representation of Special Interests vis-à vis the German Bundestag and the Federal Government (Lobbying Register Act, Lobbyregistergesetz), excludes the activities of natural persons who, in their submissions, formulate exclusively personal interests, regardless of whether these coincide with business or other interests.
Ireland
In Ireland, the Regulation of Lobbying Act exempts “private affairs”, which refer to communications by or on behalf of an individual relating to his or her private affairs, unless they relate to the development or zoning of land. For example, communications in relation to a person’s eligibility for, or entitlement to, a social welfare payment, a local authority house, or a medical card are not relevant communications.
Lithuania
In Lithuania, Law VIII-1749 on Lobbying Activities exempts individual opinions expressed by a natural person with regards to legislation.
Source: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
The provisions in the Bill could ensure that the disclosure regime provides sufficient and pertinent information on who is lobbying, on what issues, and how
A critical element for enhancing transparency in public decision making are mechanisms through which public officials, business and society can obtain sufficient information regarding who has had access and on what issues (OECD, 2010[1]). Such mechanisms should ensure that sufficient, pertinent information on key aspects of lobbying activities is disclosed in a timely manner and open data format, with the ultimate aim of enabling public scrutiny (OECD, 2010[1]).
Transparency can be ensured by various means which can be complementary (Table 6.5). The transparency measures introduced by OECD countries generally assign the burden of disclosure to lobbyists through a lobbying registry. An alternative approach is to assign this responsibility to public officials targeted by lobbying activities, requiring them to disclose information about their meetings with lobbyists, through a registry (Chile, Peru and Slovenia), open agendas (Spain, the United Kingdom and the European Union) and/or by requiring public officials to inform their superiors of their meetings with lobbyists (Latvia and Slovenia). In addition to lobbying registers and open agendas, several countries provide transparency on lobbying activities based on ex post disclosure of information on how decisions were made (Poland, Latvia).
Sources: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en; OECD (2010[1]), Recommendation of the Council on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and Influence, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0379.
In Brazil, article 11 of Law 12.813/13 provides that directors of public organisations must publish their daily agenda, indicating who attended all the meetings held on a given day. In addition, the CGU published in 2021 the Decree 10.889/2021 on the Transparency of Agendas in the Federal Executive Branch providing for the publication of public commitments and meetings of federal public agents (CGU Action 15 of the Anti-Corruption Plan 2020-2025). This also includes receipt of gifts and hospitality. The Decree provided for the establishment of an Electronic System of Agendas of the Federal Executive Branch (e-Agendas), which allows for the simplified registration and publication of the agendas of public officials on a single platform (CGU Action 16 of the Anti-Corruption Plan 2020-2025). The Decree entered into force on 9 October 2022 and the platform is available at www.eagendas.cgu.gov.br.
In addition, Chapter IV of the Bill on interest representation sets out the mechanisms through which interest representation activities would be made transparent. In particular, hearings are defined in the Bill as face to face or online interactions held inside or outside the workplace, with or without prior scheduling, in national or foreign territory and in which there is a representation of interests and participation of a public official (Article 4-VI). Article 11 specifies that information on hearings with the following high-ranking public officials and civil servants should be made transparent by federal bodies and entities: Head of the Executive Branch (Article 11-§2-I); Minister of State, Secretary of State and of the Federal District, municipal secretary (Article 11-§2-II); Commanders of the Navy, Army, Air Force and of the General Staff (Article 11-§2-III); occupants of Executive Commissioner Positions (CCE) at levels 15 to 18 or equivalent in the federal executive branch, and corresponding positions in the state, district and municipal spheres (Article 11-§2-IV); president, vice-president and director or equivalent positions in public bodies, public foundations, state-owned companies and mixed-capital companies directly or indirectly controlled by public authorities (Article 11-§2-V); members of the Legislative Branch (Article 11-§2-VI); positions in the bodies of the Legislative Branch whose functions are executive in nature (Article 11-§2-VII); members of a court of auditors (Article 11-§2-VIII); persons holding a position in a court of auditors whose functions are executive in nature (Article 11-§2-IX); members of the Judiciary in an executive or legislative capacity (Article 11-§2-X); persons occupying a position in the Judiciary whose duties are of an executive nature (Article 11-§2-XI); a member of the Public Prosecutor’s Office or of a body that performs a function essential to justice, exercising a function of an executive nature (Article 11-§2-XII); a person occupying a position in the Public Prosecutor’s Office or in a body that performs a function essential to justice, whose functions are of an executive nature (Article 11-§2-XIII).
The process to register information is specified in the Bill. Under the provisions of the Bill, interest representatives would be required to provide certain information to the public officials they meet within four working days of the meeting (Article 10-I). Public officials, in turn, would be required to forward this information to the public body or entity to which they belong within eight working days of the meeting (Article 10-II), and correct any inaccuracies in the information provided by the interest representatives if it does not reflect the facts (Article 10-III). The public bodies or entities would then be responsible for publishing this information within four days of receiving it from the public official and ensuring it remains available in open format for a minimum of five years (Article 10-III). The required information includes:
the date and duration of the hearing
the name and position of the public official
the name of the interest representative
the identity of the client represented by the interest representative during the meeting
any documents exchanged between the interest representatives and public officials.
Expenses incurred by the interest representatives for each meeting, listed individually, including legitimate gifts and hospitality offered. Public bodies and entities would have to promote the accreditation of interest representatives, at the request of the interest party (Article 11). The accreditation would be intended to record and publicise, in addition to the information enumerated in the previous paragraph:
the identification and qualifications of the interest representatives, including their name, address, telephone number and email address
the interest representatives’ areas of activity and objectives
the immediate beneficiaries of the interest representatives’ activity
an indication of all the sources of funding for their work as interest representatives
information on all current and past employment affiliations.
The public bodies and authorities enumerated in Article 11-§2 would be responsible for the completeness and timely recording of the information on the hearings the public officials in their respective entities attend.
One commendable aspect of the proposed lobbying law would be the publication of supporting documentation received from interest representatives during hearings, a provision that was added through amendments to the Bill while under discussion. Such a requirement is currently in place in Germany, where the Lobbying Register includes a dedicated section where expert opinions and reports sent by lobbyists to public officials must be disclosed and remain available online for eight years after their initial publication. To date, only Germany has such a requirement. However, the disclosure regime would only cover hearings between public officials and lobbyists, leaving an important part of lobbying in the shadows. As a result, not all activities covered by the definition of “representation of interests” provided in the Bill would be covered by transparency requirements (Table 6.6). The disclosures specified in Article 11 on each hearing could also be expanded to include the specific objectives pursued by interest representatives (and not just when requiring their accreditation) as well as the specific public decision targeted. It is also unclear from the Bill whether interest representatives would have to request each hearing they wish to have with public officials, what minimum access or rights the accreditation would entail, and how long would the accreditation be valid at what intervals it would have to be renewed.
Source: OECD, based on Bill 4.391/21.
As such, the proposed regulation could be strengthened by establishing a Register of Lobbyists, requiring all actors covered by the law to record activities falling under the definition of “representation of interests,” beyond just disclosing information related to hearings. For instance, interest representatives could be required to report any documents submitted to public officials in the course of their advocacy efforts, not only those shared during meetings. In addition, written communications and grassroots lobbying initiatives (e.g., social media campaigns or funding of organisations) could also be made subject to transparency requirements. Registration could be made as a pre-requisite for engaging in lobbying activities (this would be the equivalent of the current accreditation process), while lobbyists could be required to submit information regularly on the lobbying activities they conducted in practice, an element that is currently not foreseen by the Bill. By providing an additional avenue for transparency through a separate mechanism to report all influence efforts, this register would be a complementary tool to the e-Agendas, and also address the inherent weakness of the Bill, which will only cover hearings. Several OECD countries have adopted this approach. Examples are provided in Box 6.8.
Law on Lobbying activities of Lithuania
Under the Law on Lobbying Activities of Lithuania, lobbyists must register on the “Transparent Legislative Process Information System”, through an initial registration, and subsequent registrations for lobbying activities targeting a specific draft legal act, no later than within seven days from the commencement of lobbying activities. When a specific piece of legislation involves continuous lobbying, the lobbyist is only required to declare the start of the lobbying activity.
In addition, the following public officials must report on lobbying activities targeting them within seven days from the commencement of activities for a specific draft legal act, on an online platform called “Transparent Legislative Process Information System”: the President of the Republic, members of Parliament, government ministers, vice-ministers, chancellors of ministries, heads of parliamentary political parties, mayors, members of municipal councils, directors of municipal administrations and their deputies. Disclosures must be made within seven days from the commencement of lobbying activities for a specific draft legal act.
Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act of Slovenia
In Slovenia, lobbyists and interest groups must register in a “Register of Lobbyists”, through an initial registration, and an annual disclosure of their lobbying activities. In addition, certain public officials contacted by lobbyists (deputies of the National Assembly, members of the National Council, President of the Republic, Prime Minister, ministers, states secretaries, judges of the Constitutional Court, state attorneys, officials in local communities, officials of the Bank of Slovenia) are required to check that they are duly registered in the Register of Lobbyists, must advise their superiors and report on their meetings with lobbyists to the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, within eight days, in the form of a signed declaration. The declaration must specify the date, time and place of the meeting, as well as the intent (matters discussed) and goals (which decision did the lobbyist try to influence and with what aim) of the lobbying activity. The information is incorporated in the lobbyist registry.
Source: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
Good practice from other countries has found that requiring regular disclosures by lobbyists on their lobbying activities can strengthen transparency. To that end, the proposed Register of Lobbyists could require lobbyists to disclose their activities on a quarterly or semestrial basis, as in Ireland (Table 6.7).
Source: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
Brazil could ensure adequate institutional responsibilities are in place for overseeing the implementation of the lobbying Bill and consider re-introducing a sanctions regime for public officials in the Bill
Transparency requirements cannot achieve their objective unless the regulated actors comply with them and oversight entities effectively enforce them (OECD, 2021[2]). To that end, oversight mechanisms are an essential feature to ensure an effective lobbying regulation. All countries with a mandatory register on lobbying activities have an institution or function responsible for monitoring compliance. While the responsibilities of such bodies vary widely among OECD Member and partner countries, three broad functions exist: 1) enforcement; 2) monitoring; and 3) promotion of the law.
In Brazil, the Bill specifies that each public entity covered by the Bill must set up auditing rules, as well as integrity rules on transparency, conflict of interest and whistleblowing and the effective application of rules of ethics and conduct (Article 13).
Each authority referred to in Article 11 would be responsible for the completeness and timely recording of the information on hearings. Investigations and sanctions would be limited to administrative proceedings within each entity, the initiation of which would be the responsibility of the highest authority of the bodies and entities covered by the Bill, observing the principles of adversarial proceedings and respecting the attributions contained in the disciplinary normative acts of each body or entity (Article 18). Within the scope of the federal executive branch, the CGU would be responsible for implementing the requirements of the law. Within each body and entity covered by the law, the administrative process for investigating infractions would be conducted and judged by a permanent commission appointed by the body, composed of at least three permanent civil servants for a term of two years. The administrative process would have a maximum length of 180 days, with a period of 30 days for defence once the public official and/or interest representative is notified of a potential offence. The commission would then report on its findings, including on the liability of the interest representative, the sanction applied and its duration and/or amount (Article 19).
The Bill, however, does not specify which type of monitoring would take place in practice, and how infractions would be identified. Verification activities include for example verifying compliance with disclosure obligations (i.e. existence of declarations, delays, unregistered lobbyists), as well as verifying the accuracy and completeness of the information declared in the declarations. Investigative processes and tools include:
random review of registrations and information disclosed or review of all registrations and information disclosed
verification of public complaints and reports of misconducts
inspections (off-side and/or on-site controls may be performed)
inquiries (requests for further information)
hearings with other stakeholders.
The Bill could also specify responsibilities for raising awareness of the regulations, as well as cross-checking of information with the agendas published under Decree 10.889. In countries that combine lobbying registers and open agendas, cross-checking agendas and lobbying registers may also provide an opportunity to cross-check information and analyse who tried to influence public officials and how. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists cross-checks lobbyists registered with ministerial open agendas, to monitor and enforce compliance with the requirements set out by the Transparency of Lobbying Act. Regarding sanctions, Articles 15 and 16 introduce a sanction regime for interest representatives (Table 6.8). The Bill also specifies that the liability of the natural and legal persons representing the interests does not exclude the possibility of individual liability of the managers or administrators of the legal entity, its directors or managers, as well as any co-participant in the unlawful act (Article 16, §6‑7).
Lastly, Article 17 specifies that the commission of an infraction by an interest representative does not necessarily imply the responsibility of the interest represented, except when there is abuse of law, abuse of power, violation of bylaws or articles of association, or it is proven that:
The legal entity holding the interest has been used in such a way as to facilitate the commission of offences specified in Article 19 of the law.
The legal entity holding the interest has been set up to conceal or disguise illicit interests or the identity of the beneficiaries of the activities carried out.
A National Register of Representatives of Suspended Interests would be created at the federal level, in which interest representatives facing a suspension would be registered no later than 15 working days after the application of the sanction.
The sanctions regime for interest representatives is broadly aligned with OECD best practices, in countries with similar regulations. Indeed, the practice has shown that a graduated system of sanctions appears to be preferable as countries that have established lobbying rules and guidelines provide for a range of graduated disciplinary or administrative sanctions, such as warnings or reprimands, fines, debarment and temporary or permanent suspension from the Register and prohibition to exercise lobbying activities. Sanctions can also be applied to legal entities, not just individuals, which aligns with good practice. The further strengthen the framework, the Act could also introduce criminal provisions so as to include two levels of sanctions – administrative sanctions and criminal penalties imposed by courts. A few countries have criminal provisions leading to imprisonment, such as Canada, France, Ireland, Peru and the United Kingdom. The provisions in the Bill could contain clear criteria for withholding the disclosure of information related to national security and secrecy provided in specific laws
Source: Bill 2.914/2022 on interest representation.
However, the previous version of the Bill included administrative penalties for both public officials and lobbyists who violated transparency rules. However, the latest version of the Bill has removed the liability of public officials. This development is concerning, as it creates a significant loophole: while the law outlines clear obligations for public officials, it would fail to establish any consequences for non-compliance. As such, the absence of sanctions for public officials risks undermining the credibility and enforceability of the transparency framework. It is thus recommended to re-introduce the sanctions regime for public officials that was foreseen in the previous version of the Bill.
The current Bill also specifies in its Article 11 paragraph 5 that lobbying information would not have to be disclosed if the secrecy of the information is indispensable to safeguard the security of the State, including cyber security and defence activities (Article 11, §5, I), as well as information for which secrecy is provided for in specific laws (Article 11, §5, II). While the reasoning behind exempting this type of information is sound, and a similar provision can be found in many lobbying regulations, such an exemption could create a potential loophole in the regulation.
To improve this provision, the Bill could further specify the list of information that would not have to be disclosed, as the current provision on the “secrecy provided for in specific laws” is insufficiently clear. Second, the Bill could provide for the disclosure of such information but give public entities the possibility of withholding from the public any information that falls into the specified categories. CGU could also be given the power to assess the information and withhold from public disclosure if it considers that it is necessary to do so to prevent the information from being misused or protect the security of the state.
In addition, Article 12 of the Bill specifies that interest representatives can make a specific request for certain sensitive information to be withheld from publication. This concerns, in paragraph 1, the disclosure of private information involving market or commercial data whose publicity could jeopardise the direct attraction of investments, economic development, industrial activity, freedom of enterprise, innovation, job creation and competition should require the prior and express consent of the interest representative supplying the information to a public agent. Paragraph 2 of Article 12 also specifies that the disclosure of private information that exposes a strategy or sensitive data of a representative whose interest is a social cause or whose purpose of a non-profit nature can also be withheld from publication at the request of an interest representative. The Bill could further specify that the decision to withhold information would be the responsibility of the highest authority of the bodies and entities covered by the Bill based on clear criteria, to avoid any abuse of this provision.
To improve compliance and the perception of lobbying among citizens, the government of Brazil could further promote stakeholder participation in the discussion, implementation and revision of lobbying-related regulations and standards of conduct
Government decision-making processes should be inclusive and balance various perspectives. Allowing all stakeholders, from the private sector and the public at large, fair and equitable access to participate in the development of public policies is crucial to counterbalance vocal vested interests (OECD, 2010[1]).
As such, the government of Brazil could further work with stakeholders and citizens to communicate and involve them not only throughout the drafting process, but also in its implementation and revision. Following the example of Ireland and Canada, this could include education and awareness raising campaigns through information material and social media, as well as consultations on the content of regulations. In Brazil, in addition to consultation on the online portal, discussions on a potential lobbying regulation could be conducted through a Public Council bringing together a diverse group of experts, citizens, businesses and civil society organisations (Box 6.9).
Supporting a cultural shift towards the regulation of lobbying in Ireland through public consultation
In Ireland, the Standards in Public Office Commission established an advisory group of stakeholders in both the public and private sectors to help ensure effective planning and implementation of the Regulation of Lobbying Act. This forum has served to inform communications, information products and the development of the online registry itself.
The Commission also developed a communications and outreach strategy to raise awareness and understanding of the regime. It developed and published guidelines and information resources on the website to make sure the system is understood. These materials include an information leaflet, general guidelines on the Act and guidelines specific to designated public officials and elected officials.
The Commission launched a more targeted outreach campaign through letter mail, and issued a letter and information leaflet to over 2 000 bodies identified as potentially carrying out lobbying activities.
The website was developed to contain helpful information on how to determine whether an activity constitutes lobbying for the purposes of the Act (Three Step Test: www.lobbying.ie/help-resources/information-for-lobbyists/am-i-lobbying/). Instructional videos were added to the site as well (www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLZ7nwTI5rM).
Consultation on future changes to the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct in Canada
In Canada, the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying launched a series of consultations in 2021 and 2022 to collect views on improving and clarifying the standards of conduct for lobbyists to update the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct.
An initial consultation was held in late 2020 to obtain the views and perspectives of stakeholders in relation to the existing Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct. A second consultation (Dec. 15, 2021 to Feb. 18, 2022) aimed to collect views on a preliminary draft of the revised Code. A final and third consultation on changes to the Code was conducted in May- June 2022. The new Code was published in the Canada Gazette and came into force on July 1, 2023.
Source: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
Governments across the OECD make wide use of advisory and expert groups to inform the design and implementation of public policy. An advisory or expert group refers to any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force or similar group, delegation to an international forum, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof, that provides governments with advice, expertise or recommendations, and in which non-governmental actors take part. These may be put in place by the executive, legislative or judicial branches of government or at different levels of government, either on an ad hoc or standing basis (OECD, 2010[1]). These groups can be permanent or set up on an ad hoc basis to respond to specific needs in a specific period of time. During the COVID-19 crisis, for example, many governments have established ad hoc institutional arrangements to provide scientific advice and technical expertise to guide their immediate responses and recovery plans.
Chairpersons and members of advisory or expert groups can help strengthen evidence-based decision making. In Brazil, advisory groups are widely used as a mechanism to include civil society and private sector representatives in decision-making processes and have demonstrated concrete and tangible impact in shaping policymaking and service delivery (OECD, 2022[5]). These groups include collegial bodies (colegiados), whose role can vary from binding opinion, regulation, and advice to government.
However, without sufficient transparency and safeguards against conflict of interest, these groups may risk undermining the legitimacy of their advice by allowing individual representatives participating in these groups to favour private interests, whether done unconsciously or not. For example, members of advisory groups can produce biased evidence to decision makers on behalf of companies or industries. Certain interest groups selected to participate in advisory groups can also allow corporate executives or lobbyists to advise governments as members of an advisory group, and lobby “from within” while being exempt from lobbying disclosure obligations.
To instil more transparency and integrity over the composition and functioning of advisory and expert groups, the government of Brazil could adopt the following measures: (i) adopt binding rules for the selection process of advisory and expert groups; (ii) strengthen transparency for government advisory or expert groups, including on what the outcomes are, how inputs have been dealt with and how they are incorporated in the resulting decision.
Brazil could adopt binding rules for the establishment and selection process of advisory or expert groups, including collegial bodies, to strengthen the integrity and inclusiveness of its participants
Advisory and expert groups allow for the inclusion of a diverse range of voices and expertise to enrich discussions on policy problems and how to address them. But transparency over the establishment and composition of advisory and expert groups remains a challenge across OECD countries.
In Brazil, collegial bodies (colegiados) are participatory instances established by normative text at the Federal and subnational levels. These bodies bring together governmental (public officials, elected members, etc.) and non-governmental stakeholders (civil society organisations, union representatives, etc.). Their mandate includes contributing to the prioritisation of topics in the policy agenda, the design of public services, the definition of priorities, the formulation and evaluation of public policies, and the monitoring of government action (Box 6.10 and Table 6.9). In 2019, collegial bodies amounted to close to 1,300 active instances, with health and social policies being the most regular topics (OECD, 2012[39]).
Collegial bodies can include several forms and methodologies to involve civil society and private sector stakeholders, under the premise of ensuring a diversity of organisational forms and representation of society (including NGOs, social movements, unions):
Public Policy Councils are permanent thematic collegial bodies created by a normative act (law, decree, regulation), at the Federal and subnational levels, with both public authorities and non-public stakeholders with the mandate to participate in the prioritisation of topics in the policy agenda, as well as in the formulation and evaluation of public policies. The Councils are usually involved in the organisation of the National Conferences and can issue normative texts such as opinions or guidelines.
Public Policy Commissions are ad-hoc thematic collegial bodies created by a normative act to create a space for dialogue between non-public stakeholders and public authorities around a specific objective, whose existence is linked to the accomplishment of its purpose.
National Policy Conferences are national participatory process organised periodically, with the participation of government and non-public stakeholders to evaluate discuss a specific theme of public interest and propose guidelines for policy formulation in the dedicated policy area. Conferences are multi-level processes with stages at the Municipal, State and Federal level and are usually framed around a specific question or policy question.
Roundtables are mechanisms for debate and negotiation with the participation of non-public stakeholders and government in order to identify, prevent and solve social, cultural and environmental conflicts focusing on solutions that guarantee human rights, economic development, social justice and environmental sustainability.
Inter-councils forums are mechanisms for dialogue between representatives of public policy councils and commissions, with the purpose of monitoring public policies and government programmes, formulating recommendations to improve their intersectionality and transversally.
Source: OECD (2022[5]), Open Government Review of Brazil : Towards an Integrated Open Government Agenda, https://doi.org/10.1787/3f9009d4-en.
Source: OECD (2022[5]), Open Government Review of Brazil : Towards an Integrated Open Government Agenda, https://doi.org/10.1787/3f9009d4-en.
A normative act usually details the temporality (which can be permanent, or ad-hoc), the composition, the rules and the role played by the collegial body. For example:
Law 8.142 from 1990 on participatory mechanisms in the Unified Health System established within the Unified Health System two collegial bodies: the Health Conferences and the Health Councils. This law regulates the National Health Council (Conselho Nacional de Saúde), a permanent body with binding powers, composed of 10 representatives of the government, 12 representatives of unions and the scientific community, 2 representatives from the private sector, and 24 users. Its mandate includes the evaluation and monitoring of the National Health Plan, issuing guidelines for the formulation of health policies, monitoring financial resources and cash transfers, issuing opinions and ethical considerations on normative texts and scientific developments. Their decisions, in the form of resolutions, are ratified by the Ministry of Health.
The Transparency, Integrity and Anti-Corruption Council (Conselho de Transparência, Integridade e Combate à Corrupção, CTICC), established by Decree 11.528/2023, includes eleven members from public organisations, and thirty members from civil society organisations. The CTICC acts as an advisory body within the CGU and its mandate includes suggesting measures for the improvement and promotion of policies and strategies in the areas of transparency, access to information, open government, public and private integrity and fighting corruption. The National Council for Human Rights (Conselho Nacional de Direitos Humanos), established by Law 4.319/1964 and Law 12.986/2014, includes 11 representatives from civil society and 11 from public authorities. It promotes and defends human rights in Brazil, among others by monitoring public human rights policies and the national human rights program.
The National Council of Justice (CNJ), established by Constitutional Amendment No. 45 from 2004, brings together 9 judges, 2 members of the Public Ministry, 2 lawyers and 2 citizens. Among other missions, it monitors the transparency of the judiciary and the conduct of its members, as well as its effectiveness more broadly.
The National Education Council created by Law 9.131 of 1995, is responsible for formulating and evaluating the national educational policy and advising the Ministers in the diagnosis of challenges and measures to improve the education system.
The Civil Society Working Group for Advice on Open Government (Grupo de Trabalho da Sociedade Civil para Assessoramento em Governo Aberto), established by Normative Act nº1, of July 2023, coordinates civil society involvement in the OGP process. The group is currently made up of nine non-public stakeholders, namely three civil society organisations selected by the temporary working group set up within the scope of the Interministerial Open Government Committee, by Ordinance nº 732/2022 and six civil society entities that make up the CTICC.
Dialogue Tables (Mesas de Diálogos), established by Government Ordinance No. 154/2023 of the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, organises seminars, field visits, listening sessions and dialogues, thematic meetings, public hearings and publications around specific topics defined by the demands of civil society (e.g. Mining and Energy Transition). Their objective is to forward the assessment of proposals arising in the Dialogue Table process with government bodies and entities, as well as maintaining dialogue and information on progress with society.
These mechanisms have delivered concrete results, including in the field of integrity and corruption prevention. A recent study on municipal health management in Brazil shows that the Health Councils had a positive impact on the reduction of corrupted practices at the local level. The analysis concludes that the municipalities that integrated a Council in their governance structure witnessed a 21% decrease in corruption practices over 10 years (Avelino, Barberia and Biderman, 2014[40]). The impact on the reduction in corruption is proportional to the time of existence, meaning that for each additional year of existence of the Council, the percentage of federal health grants to municipalities that were subject to corrupt practices fell by 2.1% (Avelino, Barberia and Biderman, 2014[40]).
In terms of impact and influence on public decision-making processes, a study found that about 26% of all proposals coming from the Conferences were incorporated into some sort of policy proposal (Pogrebinschi and Chaves, 2021[41]). Besides their normative impact, Pogrebinschi (2021[42]) also notes that the Conferences are an important source of information for the legislative power. Between 2003 and 2010, Congress proposed 1477 bills, enacted 125 laws and six constitutional amendments on the same policy issues recommended by the Conferences. However, the impact of these processes is hindered by several factors, including the absence of general rules on the establishment and selection process of these advisory and expert groups. While certain Conferences have put in place quotas to ensure that certain underrepresented groups can have a voice, research from the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a government-led think tank, found that the diversity of the Council’s members could be strengthened. When it comes to the Conferences, the OECD found that there is a lack of evidence of who participates at the initial stage (municipal level), where participation often reflects the views of a certain category of already politicised and informed population (OECD, 2022[5]).
These challenges had further been exacerbated by the adoption of Decree 9.759/2019 – which has since been revoked – which established rules, guidelines and limitations on collegial bodies of the Federal Administration that were created by decree or ordinance prior to 2019. In application of the Decree, several collegial bodies were extinct or had their mandate and composition modified. The modifications impacted the representation of non-public stakeholders in the collegial bodies, by reducing the number of seats, limiting their participation to one mandate, changing their selection process, and appointing the presidency to a public authority. According to civil society organisations and members of the academia interviewed by the OECD in 2021, the Decree affected the diversity of voices in the Councils, becoming a threat to representation and participation in Brazil (OECD, 2022[5]).For example, the National Environment Council (CONAMA), saw a drop from 22 seats for civil society to four, with none for indigenous and traditional peoples, and a new method for selecting representatives – from election to a draw. Another example is the National Commission for Biodiversity (CONABIO) which membership was reduced to 2 seats instead of 8 for civil society (OECD, 2022[5]).
To help ensure equity and diversity in the advisory groups, and in line with the Recommendations set forth in the Open Government Review of Brazil (OECD, 2022[5]), the government of Brazil could first consider undertaking a mapping exercise of all existing collegial bodies, including their membership, mandate, outcomes, costs, etc. This data should be public to enhance transparency and generate opportunities for collaboration. Second, general rules and guidelines for the selection process and functioning of all bodies providing advice to the government could be introduced. These rules could include recruitment criteria and methodology for setting up Councils and Conferences, so as to reduce the level of discretion on the institutional set up of these groups and ensure a balanced representation of interests in terms of private sector and civil society representatives (when relevant), as well as expertise from a variety of backgrounds. By defining appropriate qualifications and conditions for appointment, the rules can also guarantee that the selection process is inclusive, so that every potential expert and/or interest groups has a real chance to participate, and transparent, so that the public can effectively scrutinise the selection of members of advisory groups.
For example, the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation in Norway published guidelines on the use of independent advisory committees, which specify that the composition of such groups should reflect different interests, experiences and perspective. While the guidelines are not legally binding, they provide an example for Brazil on the selection process and managing conflict of interest within these groups (Box 6.11).
In 2019, the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation adopted guidelines entitled “Committee Work in the State. A guide for leaders, members and secretaries in government study committees”. Regarding the composition of these committees, the document specifies that there needs to be a balanced composition of interests:
“If the committee is to help clarify issues that are subject to academic disagreement, it is important that the composition is not skewed from an academic standpoint”.
“If the goal of the committee, in addition to acquiring knowledge, is to agree on common goals and values, it is important that the composition reflects different interests, experiences and standpoints”.
Regarding conflict of interest, the document warns that the work method and the effectiveness of the committee can be weakened by members who cannot comment on an independent basis and constantly need to clarify the assessments with the business or organisation to which they belong. As a result, the guidelines specifies that members should “explain any commitments that may involve conflicts of interests”.
Source: Government of Norway (2019[43]), Committee Work in the State. A Guide for Leaders, Members and Secretaries in Government Study Committees, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/793636d2e55a4236b82e632897f96d50/utvalgsarb.
Brazil could strengthen transparency for collegial bodies and other advisory groups, including on what the outcomes are, how inputs have been dealt with and how they are incorporated in the resulting decision
Along with the composition of advisory or expert groups, a key challenge within OECD countries is the lack of transparency and accountability in the functioning of these bodies, as well as the opacity of their outcomes. This can limit the wider public’s ability to understand their workings and support their deliberations. Yet, as of today, Brazil does not have a centralised platform or database with all the existing Councils and Conferences, their members, their normative act, their agendas, deliberation and decisions (OECD, 2022[5]). Every Council and every Conference has a specific set of rules in terms of agenda, organisation, participants, type of outcomes, as well as the scope and scale of the process.
The participatory platform Participa Mais Brasil currently includes data on a limited amount of bodies, and the information is still fragmented across institutional websites (as of September 2022). A good example is the Panel of Collegial Bodies published by the Ministry of Environment, which includes information about all the Councils where the Ministry is represented. The Panel provides information about each body, as well as aggregated information such as the share of bodies with non-public representation (36.7%).
As such, the rules and guidelines for the selection process of advisory and expert groups could also provide for mandatory transparency on the structure, mandate, composition and criteria for selection for all advisory groups and committees. In addition, and provided that confidential information is protected and without delaying the work of these groups, the agendas, records of decisions and evidence gathered could also be published to enhance transparency and encourage better public scrutiny. The Transparency Code for working groups in Ireland may serve as an example for Brazil (Box 6.12).
In Ireland, any working group set up by a minister or public service body that includes at least one designated public official and at least one person from outside the public service, and which reviews, assesses or analyses any issue of public policy with a view to reporting on it to the Minister of the Government or the public service body, must comply with a Transparency Code.
The following information must be published on the website of the public body on its establishment:
names of chairperson and members, with details of their employing organisation (if they are representing a group of stakeholders, this should be stated)
whether any members who are not public servants were formerly public officials
terms of reference of the group
expected timeframe for the group to conclude its work
reporting arrangements.
In addition, the agenda and minutes of each meeting must be published and updated at least every four months. The chairperson must include with the final or annual report of the group a statement confirming its compliance with the Transparency Code. If the requirements of the Code are not adhered to, interactions within the group are considered to be a lobbying activity under the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015.
Source: Irish Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (2015[44]), Transparency Code, Prepared in Accordance with Section 5 (7) of the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015, https://www.lobbying.ie/media/5986/2015-08-06-transparency-code-eng.pdf.
Such transparency effort could also support the publication of centralised information and data on all collegial bodies, in a federal one-stop-shop portal, to allow for better monitoring and evaluation of these practices and their impact (OECD, 2022[5]).
One of the ways in which private interests influence public-decision making process is to exert control over the election of representatives who will vote for or against certain policies, or who are able to pressure the public administration to take certain decisions. Specific interest groups can help politicians get elected into office and later ask for favours in return. This can be achieved by providing financial contributions to candidates or political parties and their campaigns, by providing services such as opposition research or access to private media, funding online advertisement campaigns, as well as by helping politicians gain votes through vote-buying or by organising and mobilising voters.
Similar to lobbying practices covered in section 1, political finance is a necessary component of the democratic process: it enables the expression of political support and competition in elections. However, without the necessary guardrails, efforts to influence election processes present risks to endanger the integrity and legitimacy of democratic systems. In addition to the widespread perception of citizens in Brazil that those who govern them are doing so to favour of small, powerful groups and not the public interest (Figure 6.5), evidence indicates growing distrust with political parties. According to the 2023 Latinobarómetro, 81% of Brazilian respondents have little or no trust in political parties (Figure 6.5). Also, in 2023 and according to the same survey, 59% of respondents in Brazil had little or no trust in the national electoral institution.
Source: Based on answers to the question “How much trust you have in political parties. Would you say you have a lot, some, a little or no trust” from Corporación Latinobarómetro (1995-2023), www.latinobarometro.org.
One of the most widespread reasons for the decline of trust levels in political parties in Brazil since 2015 is that citizens see them as promoters of private interests. Recent corruption scandals were found to involve a wide system of opaque corporate donations to political parties and candidates in exchange for contracts for large infrastructure projects. These scandals also created a window of opportunity to reform political finance rules. Far-reaching reforms have been enacted over the past eight years in Brazil. The Electoral Code (Law 4.737/1965), the Political Parties Act (Law 9.096/1995) and Law 9,504/1997 establishing rules for electoral campaigns and last amended in 2018, form the framework for political parties, campaigning and elections. As measured against OECD standards on political finance, Brazil fulfils 100% of criteria for regulations and 29% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 73% and 58%, respectively (Table 6.10).
Source: OECD (n.d.[45]), Principle 13: Accountability of Public Policy Making, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/indicators/1000097?country1=BRA.
Despite a strong regulatory framework, challenges remain. In particular, recent elections in Brazil brought to light the risk of elections being influenced beyond the provision of direct or in-kind contributions, for example through the spread of disinformation on social media platforms, a challenge also faced in other OECD countries (OECD, 2024[46]). As a result, Brazil has stepped up efforts to regulate online content related to the spread of electoral disinformation in recent years (Freedom House, 2024[8]).
Taken together, these challenges underscore the importance of integrity and transparency in election processes. To enhance transparency and integrity in election processes, Brazil could therefore: (i) reduce the scope for informal campaign financing by prohibiting contributions in cash, requiring the identification of the political contributor’s employer in political parties’ returns and introducing a nominal ceiling for individual donations; (ii) improve the transparency of the distribution of public funds and subsidies for campaign financing; (iii) strengthen transparency of political finance data in order to enable better enforcement; (iv) better protect election processes from the impact of mis- and dis-information, the legal framework could be amended to include regulations on third party spending and online political advertisements.
Brazil could reduce the scope for informal campaign financing by prohibiting contributions in cash and introducing a nominal ceiling for individual donations
Political parties and candidates need money to compete and finance election campaigns, and to communicate their proposals to citizens. In this sense, private funding from citizens and interest groups allows for support from society-at-large for a political party or candidate. It is widely recognised as a fundamental right of citizens. Yet, if private funding is not adequately regulated, it can be easily exploited by private interests to influence the result of elections, or push elected public officials to represent the interests of their funders and not of those who elected them (OECD, 2016[47]).
Another key challenge with respect to private funding is to address the high level of informality that endangers accountability. In the worst case, informality facilitates funds from illicit origins flowing into political parties and campaigns that may lead to organised crime purchasing political influence, corrupting democratic institutions, and ultimately undermining public confidence in elections (Box 6.13). In Brazil, unregistered donations (known as “caixa 2” – a slush fund – in the local parlance), have been suspected to play a significant part of corruption, money laundering and tax evasion schemes. Recent investigations also showed that public officials helping companies to win favourable contracts or adopt favourable regulations were paid in the form of a bribe reported as a campaign donation (Transparency International, 2019[19]; BBC, 2017[48]).
Although it is a global problem, Latin America is particularly vulnerable to the building of nexus between organised crime and the State. According to Burchner (2014) this happens because in countries in the region there is a strong presence of illicit networks that engage in activities such as “illegal mining, trafficking in exotic species and arms, counterfeiting and smuggling of medicines and the production and sale of illegal drugs”. The latter brings massive amounts of illicit money at the same time that there are rising costs of political activity and the complexity to monitor political spending, which is fertile ground for electoral corruption.
For her part, Rose-Ackerman (2016) argues that there is a symbiotic relationship between corruption and organised crime. These organisations may dominate legal or illegal businesses and have a “corrupting influence on government, especially law enforcement and border control”. Criminal organisations make payments to government representatives and undermine state institutions and, as they mature, they intertwine with civil society and the state, which may lead to manipulating the law in their favour.
In these terms, Rose-Ackerman (2016) identifies at least five possible ways in which criminal organisations engage in corrupt activities. The first is extortion, in which if the police are “bought off or unreliable”, the groups demand protection money from businesses to avoid attacking them. The second is by engaging in legitimate business activity and discouraging competition by the threat of violence and by bribing public officials so they do not act. The third uses a similar strategy to sell pirate goods and avoid paying taxes. The fourth is by becoming government contractors and winning tenders using their “criminal muscle”. This may include extortion or funding campaigns. The last, and most extreme is by transforming the regime in which they are so integrated that it is hard to distinguish it from the state (e.g. some parts of the Soviet Union after its collapse or some drug producing countries).
Sources: Burchner, U. (2014[49]), “Introduction”, https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/illicit-networks-and-politics-latin-america; Rose-Ackerman, S. and B. Palifka (2016[50]), “Corruption, organized crime, and money laundering”, World Bank Roundtable on Institutions, Governance and Corruption, Montevideo, May 26-27, 2016.
There are no easy solutions to limit the problem of illicit or undeclared funding. More than merely prohibiting informal contributions, incentives have to be provided in a way that private donations are channelled as much as possible through formal means. This can be achieved by adequately framing the rules of the game for private funding, by establishing clear limits on private donations, prohibiting donations in cash and from certain sources, and allowing contributions by legal entities up to a certain amount (OECD, 2016[47])
Most OECD countries have introduced monetary regulations to prevent uncontrolled, undisclosed and opaque political finance. In Brazil, resources for political parties originate from various public and private sources, but political contributions are highly regulated. In 2019, the Superior Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral – TSE) issued the Resolution 23.607 (TSE, 2019[51]), which provides for the collection and expenditure of resources by political parties and candidates, and the rules for accountability during the election period. Article 15 clarifies funding sources for political parties and candidates.
These include:
financial or estimated cash donations from individuals
donations from other political parties and candidates
sales of goods and services, as well as the promotion of fundraising events held directly by the candidate or the political party
candidates' own resources
political parties' own resources, provided that their origin is adequately identified, and they come from:
public funding (public funding is covered in the following section)
donations from individuals made to political parties
contribution from its affiliates
sale of goods, services or promotion of fundraising events
income arising from the leasing of assets owned by political parties
income generated by the application of their availabilities.
Regarding private donations, any individual voter can support political parties and candidates individuals by making a contribution of up to 10% of their total gross income of the year preceding the election (Article 27). In addition, changes to the Electoral Code carried out by Law 13.878 of October 2019 established that contributions from candidates to their own campaigns must not exceed 10% of the total campaign expenditure, to avoid multimillionaire candidates having an unfair advantage over other candidates (Article 27 §1). Foreign individuals are allowed to contribute to electoral campaigns as long as the funds are originated in Brazil.
Also, in line with OECD standards and good practices from OECD countries, Brazil bans anonymous private contributions above a certain limit. Financial donations equivalent to or greater than the amount of BRL 1,064.10 can only be made through electronic transfer or crossed and nominal checked (Article 21). The idea behind requiring the identity of private donors to be unveiled is to foster social accountability through transparency: if citizens know about the links between private interests and politicians, they are able to detect situations in which politicians are in a conflict-of-interest situation and are acting in the interests of their electoral campaign contributors. Under BRL 1,064.10, however, donations can be made personally in cash and are not subject to accounting. In addition, the 10% limit does not apply to estimated cash donations related to the use of movable or immovable property owned by the donor or to the provision of services, provided that the estimated value does not exceed BRL 40,000 (Article 27, §3). In-kind donations have been limited to BRL 1,064.10 per individual on the same day, according to §§ 1 and 2 of art. 21 of Resolution No. 23,607/2019 of the Superior Electoral Court. In addition, digitalisation has enabled other forms of donation, such as crowdfunding, which can be promoted by candidates on platforms pre‑enabled by the TSE for this purpose. A list of approved crowdfunding platforms is available on a dedicated webpage of TSE’s website. This new form of financing led to an increase in the number of donors – some of them donating for the first time – and helped political forces that are generally not favoured by traditional forms of financing (WEF, 2016[52]). To ensure transparency, the political party or candidate who receives the donation must identify the names and the CPFs (Individual Taxpayer Registration Number) of the donors, with the respective amounts received through the crowdfunding platform. Irregular donations must be returned and, if used, may lead to the campaign accounts' disapproval. In all cases, the deadline for making campaign donations is the election day itself.
Rules on electoral campaigns previously allowed corporate donations to political parties and candidates, with a contribution limit equal to 2% of gross revenues earned in the year preceding the election. As a result, the share of corporate donations accounted for more than 75% of the funding of state and national campaigns in the general elections of 2010 (Andía and Hamada, 2019[53]). In 2015, the Supreme Court of Brazil, called upon by the Brazilian Bar Association, ruled on the unconstitutionality of contributions from legal entities, on the basis of their distortion of electoral fairness and generation of undue influence over elected officials (ADI 4.650). The ruling went into effect immediately and was approved by Congress on 29 September 2015. As such, parties are not allowed to directly or indirectly receive funds from foreign entities or governments, government entities and bodies (except for public funding), corporate entities, class entities or unions, and individuals holding public positions freely appointed (except for persons affiliated to political parties), under Act 9.096/1995, article 31 (TSE, 2022[54]). When evidence of an indirect donation from a legal entity (donations from employees of the same company) is found, it is forwarded to the Electoral Public Prosecutor's Office, under the terms of art. 91 of Resolution no. 23.607/2019 of the Superior Electoral Court, so that the legitimacy of the donations can be investigated.
This change significantly altered fundraising dynamics in Brazilian politics. Data from elections that followed the ban on corporate donations saw private donations falling by half.
However, evidence also showed that the prohibition on corporate donations has been found to incentivise informal ways of circumventing financing rules, and that private corporate money is still being channelled through individual donations (owners, partners, directors of large companies), with even less transparency about the economic interest behind donations. Data from the 2018 elections analysed by the Brazilian NGO Parlametria showed that 90% of elected deputies received donations from individuals linked to private companies (OECD, 2022[34]; UOL, 2018[55]; Parlametria, 2019[56]). Another study on Rio de Janeiro’s municipal elections in 2016 showed that almost all major donors (donations in excess of US$7,500) had ties to companies with interests in doing business with the city’s government. The conclusion was that “economic might had migrated from the companies to the people [in charge of them]” (Transparency International, 2019[19]). There is also evidence that, despite being prohibited, donations were made (in cash or services and goods), via 'Caixa 2', by legal entities in the 2016 and 2018 elections.
To close these existing loopholes, there are several measures that could be adopted to strengthen the legal and regulatory framework. First, Brazil could introduce a fixed ceiling for individual donations, instead of a percentage of annual income. Within the OECD, a total of 19 out of 38 countries consider a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party over a time period (not election specific). Table 6.11 provides an overview of OECD Members with limits on the amount a private donor can contribute to a political party over a time period that is not specifically related to elections, and during elections. The permitted value varies considerably, though. Careful attention should be paid to the limits for natural persons and legal entities: if the limits are too low, it may provide incentives to channel funds informally to the political parties, and if they are too high, it may have no impact on levelling the playing field.
Note: * The Australian Parliament passed the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Reform) Act 2025 on 13 February 2025. This Act establishes annual caps on gifts for a federal purpose made by the same donor to the same registered political party, State branch of a registered political party, candidate, member of the House of Representatives, Senator, associated entity, significant third party, nominated entity or third party, from 1 July 2026.
Source: IDEA (n.d.[57]), Political Finance Database, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/political-finance-database (accessed on 9 September 2022).
Further to this, Brazil could consider prohibiting contributions in cash altogether and establishing a system based only on the use of bank accounts, that is using credit and debit cards as well as electronic transfers. This would allow to track the money and to check the contributions according to the law.
Finally, if adequate safeguards are in place to monitor and enforce the political finance regulations, Brazil could consider allowing again contributions by legal persons that were banned through the reform introduced in 2015. To combat informality, it might be better to provide rules allowing for contributions for private companies during campaigns, to be able to regulate their limits and formally control them. This could imply also to require that all money contributed to political parties should be registered and trackable. In turn, it could be considered to not only allow donations by private companies but also by other legal persons, such as labour unions. In Brazil, bans on donations from trade unions are used to counterbalance bans on corporate contributions. This could assure a balance between different interests, multiplying access to actors who want to contribute to financing politics, and promoting pluralism. Most OECD countries allow such donations from labour unions following the rationale of levelling the playing field between influence by employers and employees (Figure 6.6). Again, the maximum amount should be chosen carefully to avoid donations being given informally to elude too-low thresholds.
Is there a ban on donations from trade unions to political parties?
Source: IDEA (n.d.[58]), Political Finance Database, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/political-finance-database.
Brazil could improve the transparency of the distribution of public funds and subsidies for campaign financing
Public funds give guarantees to political parties that they will have the minimum resources needed to develop political and representative activities, pay ordinary expenses, maintain representative and participation bodies and organise electoral campaigns. They play an even more important role in countries where legal entities are banned from making political contributions, as is the case in Brazil. Most OECD countries have provisions for direct public funding to political parties, for their ordinary activities as well as their election campaigns. The eligibility criteria for receiving these funds can be based on the share of votes in elections (as in France, Australia or Mexico) or their representation in elected bodies (as in the United Kingdom, Austria or Japan). These criteria assure the allocation of public funds to legitimate political contenders and avoid incentivising the creation of parties and candidatures with the sole objective of receiving state resources.
In Brazil, Article 17, paragraph 3 of the Constitution determines that political parties are entitled to monies from the party fund and to free-of-charge access to radio and television, as established by law. These rules were changed in October 2017 by Constitutional Amendment 97 establishing a minimum threshold for political parties to benefit from public funding. The rules came into force for the first time in the 2018 general elections and will be phased in gradually until full implementation in 2030.
Political parties have at their disposal two sources of direct public funding to finance the campaigns of their candidates in elections. This includes the Special Fund for Campaign Financing (Fundo Especial de Financiamento de Campanha), also known as the Campaign Fund (Fundo Eleitoral), and the Special Fund for Financial Assistance to Political Parties (Fundo Especial de Assistência Financeira aos Partidos Políticos), also known as the Partisan Fund (Fundo Partidário):
The Partisan Fund was established in 1995 by Law 9.096 (Political Parties Law). For a long time, it was the only source of public funds shared between the parties. In addition to being used to finance electoral campaigns, the Party Fund's resources are used to pay for the parties' routine activities, such as paying water bills, electricity, rent and airline tickets, among others. In 2021 more than BRL 872 million were allocated to the parties through the Partisan Fund.
The Campaign Fund was established by Law 13.487 and 13.488 in 2017 in the context of the ban on donations from legal entities decided following a Supreme Court (STF) decision in 2015. The Campaign Fund now composes one of the primary sources of funding for carrying out electoral campaigns. The Campaign Fund reached BRL 4.9 billion in 2022.
The eligibility criteria and allocation calculation presented in Table 6.12 eliminates incentives for the creation of parties with the only objective of receiving resources and can be considered as an international best practice to prevent the multiplication of the electoral offer and the dilution of public funds.
Note:
1. This rule, however, will only apply from the 2030 General Election. Until then, the required electoral performance of political parties will gradually increase.
Source: Author’s contribution, based on data from IDEA’s political finance database, and information from TSE (2020[59]), “Conheça as diferenças entre Fundo Partidário e Fundo Eleitoral”, https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2020/Outubro/conheca-as-diferencas-entre-fundo-partidario-e-fundo-eleitoral.
In addition, the 1988 Constitution determines in article 17 that public funding for campaigns includes the benefit of free electoral time on television and radio telecommunications networks (financed through tax waivers granted to broadcasting companies). Political party broadcasts, which were suspended in 2017, were reinstated through Law 14.291/2022, provided that they comply with TSE Resolution 23/679/2022 regulating the way contents can be broadcast. The minutes allocated to each party are related to the number of elected representatives in Congress. Parties that have elected more than 20 Federal Representatives in the last General Elections of 2018 were entitled to 20 minutes per semester for 30‑second insertions in national networks, and the same time in state networks. Parties with between 10 and 20 elected deputies may use ten minutes each semester for 30-second insertions, both in national and state networks. Parties with up to nine elected representatives have five minutes per semester for federal and state network broadcast of party contents. The political party broadcastings are aired in the first and second semesters of non-electoral years and just in the first semesters of electoral years.
In addition, Law 13.165/2015, which amended Law 9.504/1997, reduced the advertising period from 45 to 35 days. According to TSE Resolution 23.610/2019, election advertising is allowed as of August 16 of the election year, after the registration of candidates. A candidate or third party starting any kind of propaganda before this period, explicitly asking for votes, may be punished with a fine for “anticipated propaganda” (TSE, 2022[54]). The propaganda must always mention the name of the party and candidate and is allocated following the division of 90% distributed proportionally to the number of representatives that the party has in the Chamber of Deputies, and the other 10% distributed equally.
In 2020, the TSE Plenary established that the distribution of the Campaign Fund resources and free electoral propaganda time on radio and television must be proportional to the total number of black candidates that the party presents for the electoral contest (TSE, 2020[60]). In 2021, the National Congress also proposed fundamental changes in political funding by favouring political parties that invest in the candidacies of minority groups, which are also underrepresented in the Federal Legislative. In this sense, the Federal Senate approved the Constitution Amendment Proposal (PEC) 18, binding parties to reserve at least 30% of the total amount received from the Campaign Fund for financing women's campaigns. In the same year, this House also enacted the Constitutional Amendment N. 111, which establishes that votes obtained by black and women candidates count twice in the distribution of Campaign and Partisan Funds resources (art. 2). In addition, the Chamber of Deputies also approved the new Electoral Code, including indigenous candidates in the double count to distribute Partisan Fund resources.
Despite these strengths, challenges remain. The allocation calculation currently in place means that the political party in power has better access to state resources and can abuse them for gaining unfair advantages and unbalance political competition. According to the latest data from the OECD Public Integrity Indicators, public funding accounted for 62.65% of the revenues of political parties in Brazil. An analysis by digital outlet Poder360 found that six parties lost their entitlement to the partisan fund and free airtime on television and radio in 2022 (Poder360, 2022[61]). In 2022, controversies arose on the value of the Campaign fund, which was increased by Congress by nearly 200% from its 2017 value, reaching R$ 4.9 billion.
Lastly, major concerns remained until recently on the use of so-called “secret budgets” to distribute amendments to the federal budget to parliamentarians in an opaque and unofficial way, in exchange for political support. Worth around BRL 19 billion a year, the fund amounts to around one-fifth of the government’s entire discretionary spending. Yet, there was no transparency and no oversight, as the names of parliamentarians who benefited from public funds were often withheld, and the scheme has been compared to embezzlement and vote-buying. The constitutionality of these funds was recently examined by the Supreme Court, which rules that the practice was incompatible with the Brazilian Constitution (The Guardian, 2022[62]; Brazil Reports, 2022[63]; STF, 2022[64]).
To prevent abuse on the use of public funds for electoral purposes and avoid bias, more transparency in the allocation of public funds is needed. Therefore, requests for funds from the national budget from legislators, as well as the inauguration of public works, launching or promoting plans, projects or programmes with the purpose of getting votes should be strictly regulated and banned during all campaign periods. Transparency and accountability mechanisms could also be introduced on the allocation and use of public funds for electoral purposes.
The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) could strengthen transparency of political finance data to enable better enforcement
Even with strong regulations on paper, weak monitoring and enforcement can open the door for interest groups or individuals to seek informal ways to exert influence. Also, if sanctions are too low, political parties may just factor them in as a cost and continue with the practices that are breaching the law, as the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs. Enforcing regulations has two components; on the one hand, breaches must be effectively detected, on the other hand, detected breaches must be effectively sanctioned (OECD, 2016[47]). In addition, to enable effective enforcement of political finance regulations, transparency is essential: it ensures that citizens and the media can serve as watchdogs to effectively scrutinise political actors. That is why in most OECD countries, parties have to report income and expenses, as well as on their finances in relation to election campaigns (OECD, 2021[2]).
In Brazil, elections are overseen by the Electoral Court System, created by Decree 21.076/1932, a specialised branch of the Judiciary that deals with the organisation of representative electoral processes, as well as other processes involving citizen political decision, such as referenda. It is composed of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), which exercises jurisdiction throughout the country, 27 Regional Electoral Courts (TREs), as well as electoral judges and electoral boards, who have jurisdiction in a polling district. All these bodies are established under the Federal Constitution, with duties and competences provided for in the Electoral Code (Act 4.737/1965). The Superior Electoral Court can issue guidelines to regulate electoral processes (normative competence) and respond to inquiries formulated by federal authorities or a national party (advisory competence).
The Electoral Court System has a broad responsibility to protect the integrity of election processes, including supervising the correctness of electoral propaganda, fighting mis- and disinformation, and inspecting political parties’ and candidates’ accounts. To support oversight, TSE launched in 2016 a smartphone app – Pardal System – enabling voters to report electoral propaganda irregularities and violations to the Electoral Court System. During the 2020 elections, the Electoral Court System received 105,543 reports of irregularities through the app.
According to the Political Parties Act (Article 32), political parties are required to annually submit to the Electoral Courts accounting statements for the last fiscal year no later than June 30 of the following year. Under the Elections Act (Article 28), political parties and candidates must disclose between 9-13 September during each election campaign, reports detailing resources in cash or estimated cash amounts that they earned to fund the electoral campaign, as well as campaign expenditures. The final accounting report for election campaigns includes the names of campaign donors as well as the amounts respectively donated by them. Accounting must include the breakdown of amounts received from the fund, the source and the amount of the contributions and donations, electoral expenses specifying and evidencing the expenses with radio and television programs, committees, propaganda, publications, rallies and other campaign activities, and breakdown of income and expenses. Different levels of sanctions may be applied for breaches of the legal framework, including fines, loss of public funding, deregistration of the party, loss of nominations of the candidate, loss of elected office. Electoral candidates can be held personally liable for breaches and be sanctioned, which is considered as a good practice among OECD countries to address the issue of candidates’ impunity.
In practice, however, not all parties have submitted annual accounts and accounts related to elections within the timelines defined by national legislation. According to information provided by Brazil for the OECD Public Integrity Indicators, only 47.15% of political parties have submitted annual accounts, and the percentage of timely delivery of accounts related to elections was of 67.78% for the past two election cycles. As a result, not all financial reports from political parties are publicly available on the platform https://divulgacandcontas.tse.jus.br/divulga/#/, and information on political financing is not available in a timely and accessible manner. In addition, results from the OECD Public Integrity Indicators found that information could also be improved on the number of cases related to breaches of political finance regulations, the number of investigations conducted, and a breakdown of the different sanctions applied published through the Campaign Finance Information System (Sistema de Informações de Contas) on the platform https://sico-consulta-web.tse.jus.br/sico-consulta-web/home.jsf.
To address this, and in order to promote citizen education actions and strengthen transparency and social control of political financing, the TSE is encouraged to continue strengthening its centralised system to control the execution of judgements. The TSE could also facilitate the presentation of reports online, including a list of contributors and political parties and/or candidates that are subject to sanctions. Datasets that are available online enable more scrutiny by the media and the public as seen in Estonia, even more if this information is presented timely (Box 6.14). Lastly, to ensure a timely reporting of the accounts of political parties and make them accountable to citizens, the legal framework could promote stronger penalties for parties that do not send their financial reports of campaigns in the established deadline (i.e. freezing their accounts).
The Estonian Party Funding Supervision Committee (EPFSC) oversees the public funding system, financial reporting, investigation, audit and compliance. It is also in charge of sanctioning campaign finance violations. The EPFSC is able to accomplish its work with a staff of nine committee members, a legal advisor and an office manager. This is due in part to its high level of integration of technology. The EPFSC requires all financial reports to be completed in an online electronic spreadsheet, allowing the staff to easily organise, access and review financial documents in a consistent form. In addition, the financial information can be published quickly in an online database and is easily accessed and searched by the public and media, improving transparency and oversight.
Source: OECD (2016[47]), Financing Democracy: Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns and the Risk of Policy Capture, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264249455-en.
Recent reforms to better protect election processes from the impact of mis- and dis-information, could be complemented by the introduction of regulations on third party spending. As in other countries, Brazilians are increasingly moving their activities onto social media and the Internet and are using these channels as a source of news and information (Figure 6.7), leading to both opportunities and challenges for the integrity of election processes. Elections in Brazil have been particularly affected by the spread of false material, including through videos, photos and information about candidates, parties and the electoral system (OECD, 2022[5]), with WhatsApp being the main channel for spreading fabricated facts. In 2019, a study from the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate conducted among 2 400 Brazilians found 45% of respondents said they had cast their past election vote taking into account information seen on social media (OECD, 2022[5]). According to the 2024 edition of the Reuters Institute’s Digital News Report, 38% of Brazilian respondents said they use WhatsApp to access news, an equal share reported using YouTube for the same purpose. Instagram (36%), Facebook (29%), and various news websites also ranked among the more commonly used sources of online news (Freedom House, 2024[8]).
An emerging issue is the rapid digitalisation of political campaigns and increasing use of social media, which have transformed how parties market their campaigns and influence voters, and ushered as a result a ‘new paradigm’ within political finance systems (Andía and Hamada, 2019[53]). The 2018 presidential elections saw a significant shift in the way candidates use tools for political communication, with social media being prioritised over traditional public funding and free broadcasting. There were also allegations of undue interference by private companies in social media campaigning (Lexology, 2019[18]). In recent years, political parties and candidates across Brazil have heavily invested in online campaigns, including social media and digital platforms, in addition to traditional mediums of communication. Since then, the use of digital-marketing technologies has become the norm rather than the exception. Several stakeholders in Brazil interviewed for this report raised the challenges posed by social media, the risk of mis- and dis-information during elections and the need to raise awareness on responsible online practices (IDEA, 2024[65]).
Media consumption for news in Brazil by type of channel
Note: Reflects what people identify as their main source of news. Data are from more urban areas, rather than a fully nationally representative sample. These will tend to represent richer and more connected users.
Source: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2020[66]), Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020: Brazil, https://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2020/brazil-2020/.
Brazil has undertaken significant efforts to monitor the circulation of false and inaccurate information related to elections on social media, WhatsApp, emails and telephones. In 2020, TSE developed a Programme on Countering Disinformation, focused on the 2020 elections. The Program, widely acclaimed by civil society, was made permanent in 2021, to “respond to the challenges that disinformation imposes on the integrity of elections and on democracy itself”, through a systemic, multidisciplinary and multisectoral approach (TSE, 2022[67]).The Programme operates as a network and follows a systematic multidisciplinary and multi-sector approach, based on the mobilisation of the entire electoral court system, as well as the creation of partnership with other governmental bodies, press and fact-checking organisations, internet service providers, civil society organisations, academia and political parties (Box 6.15).
The Electoral Justice Permanent Programme on Countering Disinformation was established by Ordinance TSE 510/2021 to mitigate the harmful effects of disinformation targeting the Electoral Court and its members, the electronic voting system, the electoral process in its different phases and the participants involved. Disinformation content aimed at pre-candidates, candidates, political parties, coalitions and federations is excluded from its scope, except when the information conveyed has the ability to negatively affect the integrity, credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process.
The Programme is organised around three pillars:
To inform: oriented towards the dissemination of official, reliable and quality information.
To build capacity: oriented towards media literacy and training the whole of society to understand the disinformation phenomenon and the electoral process operation. This axis includes continuous dialog with political parties to make them aware of their responsibility in the fight against disinformation, as well as training for internal and external audiences on disinformation, on the integrity of Brazilian elections and on the fundamentality of the Electoral Justice as an institution that guarantees democracy.
To respond: related to the identification of disinformation events and strategy adoption, both preventive and repressive, to restrain its negative impacts.
The Programme is coordinated by Management Group, a Strategic Committee to Confront Disinformation and an Analysis and Monitoring Group. In addition to online resources and guides, the program includes a number of initiatives, sometimes conducted in partnership with press and fact-checking organisations, internet providers, tech and social media companies, private messaging services, political parties, public entities, civil society organisations, foundations, universities and research institutes. These initiatives include:
Disinformation Alert System Against Elections (Sistema de Alerta de Desinformação Contra as Eleições), an online channel where citizens can send reports of violations of the terms of use of digital platforms, specifically related to misinformation.
National Front for Fighting Disinformation (FRENTE), a group composed of civil servants, and collaborators of the Electoral Justice System, with the objective of designing and conducting actions and events all around the country with the purpose of defending and reinforcing the credibility of the electoral institutions before Brazilian society, decreasing the negative impacts of misinformation.
“Fact or Rumor” webpage (“Fato ou Boato”), which centralises short videos and articles verifying and fact-checking false information related to the electoral system.
Fact-checking Coalition (Coalizão para Checagem), a network composed of nine verification institutions to fact-check fake news related to the electoral process (Lupa, AFP, Aos Fatos, Boatos.org, Uol Confere, Estadão Verifies, Fato or Fake, Comprova, E-Farsas).
PAUSE, a weekly newsletter that includes tips and news about the fight against disinformation. The newsletters also gives visibility to initiatives and good practices developed by FRENTE.
A Whatsapp chatbot, from which citizen can receive relevant information and clarifications about the electoral process. This is the first partnership of its kind for WhatsApp with an electoral authority in the world.
“30 Pills Against Misinformation” (“Pílulas contra a desinformação”), which aims to raise awareness of citizens about the importance of fighting fake news.
As part of the program, TSE adopted a national Strategic Plan for the 2022 elections, which includes the Regional Electoral Courts (TSE, 2022[67]).
Sources: PPED (n.d.[68]), Desinformação, https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/desinformacao/#desinformacao-videos; TSE (2020[69]), “Conheça o ‘Tira-Dúvidas Eleitoral no WhatsApp’, assistente virtual da Justiça Eleitoral”, https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2020/Setembro/conheca-o-2018tira-duvidas-no-whatsapp2019-assistente-virtual-da-justica-eleitoral.
In 2021, the rules regulating electoral propaganda, political party broadcastings and illicit conduct in electoral campaigns were updated. In the context of Brazil’s 2022 presidential elections and the January 2023 riots in Brasília, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) took an increasingly assertive role in regulating online content. In addition to the prohibition over broadcasting propaganda aiming at degrading or mocking candidates, the TSE Resolution now also forbids the dissemination or sharing of facts known to be untrue or seriously decontextualized, damaging the integrity of the electoral process. This means that fake news intentionally spread to jeopardize the voting and tallying process may be punished based on criminal liability, abuse of power and undue use of mass media (TSE, 2022[54]). The rules also allowed expedited removal of content deemed false or harmful to electoral integrity, with fines for noncompliance. Content moderation powers were further strengthened ahead of the October 2024 municipal elections, with new TSE regulations imposing stricter intermediary liability rules on platforms, Some digital platforms have adjusted their policies in response to the TSE’s 2024 electoral content regulations by restricting political advertising. In addition, nine platforms signed cooperation agreements with the TSE’s newly created Center for Combating Disinformation (CIEDDE), a cooperative initiative involving the Justice Ministry, Anatel, the Brazilian Bar Association, and the AGU. Its goal is to foster collaboration between judicial authorities, public institutions, and private companies to support compliance with electoral rules. While broader efforts to combat disinformation fall outside the scope of this section, careful attention should be paid by Brazilian authorities to ensure maximum transparency over content regulation measures, particularly in light of ongoing debates surrounding PL 2630/2020, the so-called “Fake News Bill,” currently under review by Parliament. Critics, including civil society groups, digital rights advocates and press organisations, continue to warn that a lack of transparency and broad regulatory powers could lead to censorship and the suppression of legitimate political discourse (Freedom House, 2024[8]).
Regarding online activities conducted and paid for by political parties and candidates, Content boosting on the Internet is allowed starting in the pre-campaign period, as long as there is no mass posting – that is, sending, sharing or forwarding of the same content, or variations thereof – to a large volume of users via instant messaging applications. In this case, explicit call for votes is also forbidden, and the spending limit must be observed. This restriction does not apply for official campaigns, in which a Brazilian Internet supplier can be paid to boost campaign contents to promote a candidate or party, but never to undermine other candidates. Paid electoral advertising on the Internet must be identified as such where it is disseminated. The Electoral Accounts Submission System (SPCE) provides for the recording of expenses related to the promotion of digital content in a specific account, called “Expenses for the promotion of content”, allowing the financial resources applied to this type of expense to be known by all interested parties. Fines will be applied in cases of non-compliance. The rule also prohibits the hiring of individuals or legal entities that publish political-electoral publications on their Internet pages or social networks (TSE, 2022[70]). TSE Resolution No. 23,607/2019, which provides for the collection and expenditure of resources by political parties and candidates and for the rendering of accounts in elections, also specifies that expenses with digital content promotion must be disclosed in a specific account, called “Expenses with content promotion”, allowing the financial resources applied in this type of expense to be separated from other expenses.
To complement these efforts, regulating third-party spending is also a pressing issue for political finance because it has a direct influence on election results. Indeed, private contributions can be rechannelled through supposedly independent committees and interest groups such as charities, faith groups, trade associations, individuals or private firms that campaign in the run-up to elections, but do not stand as political parties or candidates and are not always required to disclose their donors. In Brazil, religious groups and other groups have engaged in intensive campaigns on key political issues in recent years, including to support or oppose a candidate or political party. While this type of indirect campaigning could fall within the category of “forbidden benefits” of the Superior Electoral Court, the legal framework remains vague on this issue and there is currently no explicit regulation on third-party involvement in political campaigns. As such, there are no limits on the amount that third parties can spend on election campaign activities, and third parties do not have to report on election campaign finance. As such, specific definitions and rules could be introduced to increase transparency of third-party spending. Several examples are provided in (Table 6.13).
Source: OECD (2022[34]), “Regulating Corporate Political Engagement: Trends, challenges and the role for investors”, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c5615fe-en.
In addition to increasing the transparency of the policy-making process, the strength and effectiveness of this process also depends on the integrity of both public officials and those who seek to influence them (OECD, 2021[2]). Public officials should conduct their communication with lobbyists in line with relevant rules, standards and guidelines in a way that bears the closest public scrutiny. They should cast no doubt on their impartiality to promote the public interest, share only authorised information and not misuse ‘confidential information’, disclose relevant private interests and avoid conflict of interest. Decision makers should also set an example by their personal conduct in their relationship with lobbyists (OECD, 2010[1]).
Lobbying and influence are typically an example where public officials may face ethical dilemmas in cases where there are no clear legal “right” “wrong” answers or where there may be conflicts between different values or principles. As such, lobbying-related ethical dilemmas are a key challenge for integrity policies. This is particularly true in an age of social media and information overload, where back and forth between the private and public sectors is commonplace, and where public officials are constantly exposed to public scrutiny and criticism, risking the collapse of their reputations every time an intervention is misperceived or misinterpreted.
Public officials therefore need more than ever an integrity framework adapted to the specific risks of lobbying and other influence practices, beyond rules on the conflict-of-interest management, gifts, and benefits. In Brazil, public officials who are lobbied are subject to various integrity standards and transparency requirements, but these measures are limited to revolving door regulations for public officials, rules on incompatibilities, and procedures for identifying, managing and resolving conflict-of-interest situations.
One of the objectives of the lobbying bill is to establish integrity-related standards on lobbying, including:
The requirement that the hearing, in which private interests are represented, be attended by at least two public officials or be held in such a way that, in accordance with the rules of the federal entity, it is possible to verify whether it was held in accordance with the established principles of the law.
The obligation for public authorities to establish relevant integrity mechanisms and procedures, including the adoption of rules on auditing, transparency, conflict of interest, whistleblowing and the effective application of rules of ethics and conduct.
The establishment of standards on the provision of gifts and hospitalities, such as transport, accommodation and meals, by a private agent.
The provision of prohibitions and sanctions applicable to public officials and private agents, as well as administrative accountability for interest representatives.
According to the survey conducted in 2021 in Brazil previously cited, 58.7% of Brazilian public servants surveyed said they witnessed some unethical practice; among the group that responded having witnessed unethical practices (Figure 6.8), reported practices included prioritising specific interests in the organisation’s strategies and projects (39.2%), accepting money or gifts from private individuals (19.9%), and giving in to lobbying pressure (19.7%). In addition, some public officials reported having suffered some type of pressure to share restricted information. A deeper analysis focusing on political appointees revealed that officials holding senior management and advisory positions reported having suffered greater pressure from politicians and companies.
To foster a culture of integrity in decision making, the government of Brazil could therefore provide standards to give public officials clear directions on how they are permitted to engage with lobbyists, including by: (i) introducing lobbying-related integrity standards and guidelines for public officials; (ii) designing and implementing legislation that adequately manages the revolving-door phenomenon; (iii) providing tailored advice and councils to public officials on their interactions with lobbyists; (iv) including lobbying-related risks in risk assessments.
Respondents were asked the following question: “In your organisation, which of the following practices have you observed in employees in the performance of their duties?”
Note: The survey was conducted as a census at the federal public service level, with a total sample of 22,130 respondents. Data collection took place online from April 28 to May 28, 2021.
Source: Ortega Nieto, D. et al. (2021[15]), Ethics and Corruption in the Federal Public Service: Civil Servants’ Perspectives (English), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/559381639027580056/Ethics-and-Corruption-inthe-Federal-Public-Service-Civil-Servants-Perspectives.
Integrity standards for public officials included in the lobbying Bill could be accompanied by guidelines on applying these standards
Lobbying integrity standards may be included in a specific lobbying law, a lobbying code of conduct and guidelines specific to interactions with external parties, or general standards applicable to public officials, such as laws, codes of ethics or codes of conduct. Depending on the type of document in which the standards are included, standards for public officials and their interactions with lobbyists may include, for example (OECD, 2021[2]):
the duty to treat lobbyists equally by granting them fair and equal access
the obligation to report violations of existing lobbying standards to the competent authorities
the duty to publish information on their meetings with lobbyists (through a lobbying registry or open agendas)
the obligation to refuse to accept gifts (in whole or beyond a certain value) from lobbyists, or to declare gifts and benefits received, among others.
Article 10-II of the Bill includes several obligations for public officials from entities specified in article 11 §2 of the Bill, including duties to:
Seek to understand the diversity of opinions.
Enable different ways to receive contributions from interest representatives.
Offer equal access and interaction conditions to interest representatives.
Provide the public body or entity to which he/she belongs, for the purpose of transparency and access to information, within eight working days of the date of the hearing, with the following information provided by the representative of interest (i) the date and duration of the hearing; (ii) the name and position of the public official; (iii) the name of the interest representative; (iv) the identification of the client represented by the interest representative at the respective hearing; (v) the documents shared between interest representatives and the public officials; (vi) the expenses incurred by the interest representatives, on an individual basis, for each hearing they attend, including legitimate gifts and hospitalities offered.:
Rectify the information provided by interest representatives, so that the information made available by the public body or entity about the hearing coincides with the facts.
To encourage compliance, the expected behaviours specified in the Bill could be accompanied by specific guidelines. Indeed, it might not be immediately clear for public officials what is meant by “seek to understand the diversity of opinions”, “enable different ways to receive contributions from interest representatives”, “offer equal access and interaction conditions to interest representatives”. Article 13 of the Bill specifies that bodies and entities must establish internal integrity mechanisms and procedures, with the adoption of effective rules on auditing, transparency, conflict of interest and incentives for reporting irregularities and the effective application of rules on ethics and conduct. The development of implementation guidelines could be developed under this responsibility.
In addition, these standards can be adapted to sectors or functions of the executive and legislative branches, as well as to higher and more politically exposed positions, which are defined in Chapter VIII/ Article 20 of the Bill. For example, it may be necessary to set higher expectations for politically exposed positions (Members of Congress, Ministers and policy advisors) in order to effectively address the risks of lobbying and other influencing activities affecting them.
Guidance and training on lobbying-related risks could be provided through the Integrity Management Units and the Electronic System for Prevention of Conflict of Interest
Having clear principles, rules, standards and procedures for public officials on their interactions with lobbyists is key, but it is not sufficient to mitigate the integrity risks of lobbying and other influence activities. Raising awareness of the expected rules and standards as well as enhancing skills and understanding of how to apply them are also essential elements to foster integrity in lobbying. Likewise, well-designed guidance, advice and counselling serve to provide clarity and practical examples, facilitate compliance and help avoid the risk of misinterpreting rules and standards (OECD, 2021[2]).
Most countries with lobbying transparency frameworks do provide guidance, build capacity and raise awareness of integrity standards and values for public officials. This may include induction or on-the-job training, disseminating the code of conduct and issuing posters, computer screen-savers, employee boards, banners, bookmarks and printed calendars (OECD, 2021[2]). Training offered by public authorities commonly include guidelines on values and standards, expected behaviour, and concrete examples of good practices, ethical dilemmas and descriptions of potentially problematic situations. Countries where public authorities offer training on interactions with lobbyists include Canada, France, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.
In Brazil, the Integrity Sectoral Units (Unidade Setorial de Integridade, USI) established within federal entities play a crucial role in co-ordinating and supporting integrity risk management, as a “second line of defence”. The USIs are responsible for promoting guidance and training related to public integrity and for supporting integrity risk management. Yet, previous OECD assessments found that only a small part of the work of USIs is focused on advising and training staff on integrity issues, while there is a significant need to intensify training on these topics (OECD, 2021[71]).
In line with the recommendations set in the OECD report on Mainstreaming Integrity Policies in the Federal Executive Branch to transfer the preventive functions related to ethics and conflict-of-interest management from the Ethics Commissions to the USI, the revised guidance to the USI could include core competence, including providing guidance and training on lobbying and ethical dilemmas, as well as providing guidance and support on integrity risk management, including management of lobbying-related risks (see also Chapter 2).
In addition, the CGU has developed the Electronic System for Prevention of Conflict of Interest (Sistema Eletrônico de Prevenção de Conflito de Interesses, SeCI). The electronic system allows federal public servants or employees to submit formal consultations to find out if they are likely to fall within a situation of conflict of interest, or to request authorisation to exercise private activity. It also enables the applicant to monitor its consultation and lodge appeals (see also Chapter 2). When a draft lobbying bill is approved, the Electronic System for Prevention of Conflict of Interest could be made available for public servants facing lobbying-related ethical dilemmas to submit formal consultations.
Brazil could ensure that the envisioned restrictions on lobbying activities for public officials leaving the public sector in the lobbying Bill are consistent with the general framework on post-employment
Another issue of particular importance to consider in the Brazilian context is the “revolving door” between the public and private sectors. The revolving door phenomenon can be characterised as the movement of personnel between the public and private sectors in related fields, and can produce many positive outcomes, including the transfer of knowledge and experience. Nevertheless, it can pose several problems, including conflict of interest and the misuse of inside information. For example, individuals who work in a relevant area of the public sector and then move on to the private sector (or vice versa) may use inside information gained in their role in a way that gives them an unfair advantage (OECD, 2021[2]).
Restrictions and prohibitions on post-public service employment are useful tools to avoid the use of insider information and to discourage influence peddling, or to avoid being suspected of having previously made decisions that might be favourable to a potential employer, as emphasised in Chapter 2. Some OECD countries have introduced a "cooling-off period" between public and private sector employment. They can take various forms, such as restrictions on certain activities for a certain period of time, for example agreeing to become a member of a board of directors or to be employed in private entities with which the public official has had official relations, or to participate in consultancy activities. Brazil’s framework to effectively regulated post-public employment is described in detail in Chapter 2.
To strengthen these existing provisions, Article 9 of the Bill specifies that the professional representation of private interests by public officials is prohibited in the 12 months following their departure from public office, employment or function. Should the Bill be adopted, it will be crucial that any cooling-off periods introduced in the lobbying legal framework are coherent and consistent with general rules on post-public employment restrictions in other regulations, and in particular the recommendations included in Chapter 2.
Integrity standards for lobbyists included in the lobbying Bill could be accompanied by guidelines and a code of good practice for lobbyists
The strength and effectiveness of the policy-making process depends not only on the integrity of public officials but also on the integrity of those who try to influence them. Indeed, companies and lobbyists are critical actors in the policy-making process, providing government with insights, evidence and data to help them make informed decisions. However, they can also at times undermine the policy-making process by abusing legitimate means of influence, such as lobbying, political financing and other activities (OECD, 2021[2]). To ensure integrity in the policy-making process, lobbyists (whether in-house or as part of a lobbying association) require clear standards and guidelines that clarify the expected rules and behaviour for engaging with public officials. In particular, those who engage in public decision-making processes should comply with standards of professionalism and transparency in their relations with public officials (OECD, 2010[1]).
Lobbyists need standards of professionalism and transparency that specify the rules and behaviour expected for engaging with public officials, as they share responsibility for fostering a culture of transparency and integrity in lobbying (OECD, 2021[2]). In some OECD countries, lobbyists self-regulate through codes of conduct published by employers of lobbyists or lobbying associations. However, the experience of OECD member countries has shown that self-regulation remains insufficient to mitigate real or perceived problems of inappropriate influence by lobbyists. For this reason, countries with a lobbying regulation also have standards in place for those who influence government.
The Bill on interest representation includes in its Article 10-I a list of obligations that apply to “interest representatives”. This includes:
Guarantee the veracity, integrity and contemporaneity of the information made available to public officials and other participants in interest representation processes.
Inform, prior to the interaction with the public official, even verbally, the identity of all participants in a hearing, the identity of those represented, the description of the subject matter of the interest representation activity, as well as the nature of the representation, by contract, delegation, designation or any other form permitted by law.
Provide the public official, in writing with the following information within four working days of the date of the hearing: (i) the date and duration of the hearing; (ii) the name and position of the public official; (iii) the name of the representative of interest; (iv) the identification of the client represented by the representative of interest at the respective hearing; (v) the documents shared between the representatives of interest and the public agents; (vi) the expenses incurred by the representatives of interest, on an individual basis, for each hearing they attend, including legitimate gifts and hospitality offered (these items are specified in Article 11 §1 Item II).
Only represent those they legitimately represent.
Preserve the right of expression of those who disagree.
In addition, Article 14 specifies that the offering of goods, services or undue advantage by a private agent who has an interest in a decision by a public agent or a collegiate body in which he or she participates is prohibited, except in relation to gifts, published literary works or legitimate hospitality (Article 14).
To strengthen these provisions, the Bill could be accompanied by guidelines and/or a code of good practice providing concrete examples (Box 6.16).
Duties of lobbyists (as specified in the Law)
(i) Duty to inform: to request a hearing with a lobbied person, the request must be made on a form including information on the persons who will attend the meeting and the organisation they represent. The form must also contain information on whether lobbyists receive remuneration for the activity they carry out, as well as matters to be dealt with during the meeting, with specific reference to the decision to be obtained.
(ii) Duty to provide additional information if required. The public body takes a decision on granting a hearing within three working days. They may request additional information. After the hearing, public officials may also request clarifying information within 10 working days of the meeting. The lobbyist then has 5 working days to respond in writing.
Code of Good Practice for Lobbyists
Lobbyists must abide by the principles of honesty and integrity, transparency, professionalism, and compatibility of private and public interests.
They must comply with regulations applicable to lobbying activities, regulations on political participation (financing of political parties and election campaigns, and all regulations applicable to political participation), refrain from unlawful conduct or provoking unlawful conduct.
In their relations with clients, (…) lobbyists should not accept any demand that would pose a risk to his/her ethical obligations or professional duties towards a client. A client has the right to report violations of the law by a lobbyist.
When interacting with public authorities, lobbyists shall provide the information required by law. They must inform precisely the issue or matter on which they engage in lobbying activities. They ensure the truthfulness and accuracy of the information they give to public authorities. Lobbyists must refrain from employing intermediaries to hide the link with their client. They must report misconduct to the competent authority. They must refrain from offering any payment, commission, compensation or benefit to gain access to information or person, or to influence a decision.
Lobbyists maintain their independence; they refrain from representing a particular interest of a client in conflict with that of another client. (…) Lobbyists must refrain from influencing public authorities or civil servants with which he/she has or had a contractual or family relationship. They must not hire former public officials for two years after leaving office. Lobbyists must refrain from any political activity, or investing in the securities of the client without his/her permission.
Source: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
Brazil could consider amending the appropriate legislation to ensure whistleblower protection benefits those disclosing violations of lobbying and influence related rules
Safeguarding those that scrutinise and/or report violations of the policies and rules on lobbying and influence activities, such as media, civil society organisations and whistleblowers, is essential to expose undue influence in public decision-making, but also improve the framework on transparency and integrity in decision-making, thus reducing lobbying and influence-related risks in the public sector. In particular, investigative journalism is a critical tool in detecting and reporting cases of undue influence or violation, as it brings to light cases of fraud and abuse of power which may otherwise remain hidden. As such, journalists are amongst the most important “whistle-blowers”. In turn, several elements must be in place to ensure access to information and freedom of expression, the protection of journalists’ sources and the plurality of media options, as well as the protection of public officials who report violations. An in-depth analysis on these challenges is included in the OECD Open Government Review of Brazil (OECD, 2022[5]).
To strengthen the framework for whistleblower protection, covered in Chapter 5, the legal framework could be amended to cover any violation of the lobbying and influence-related rules and standards. In doing so, public officials, lobbyists and any other individual who witness or are aware of lobbying and influence-related rules and standards, could feel free to come forward to the relevant authorities to disclose the wrongdoing. Taken together, this would encourage the prevention of undue influence in general, not just corruption, in the public service.
In Brazil, a recent survey on ethics and corruption in the Brazilian federal public service reveals that in the cases of respondents who witnessed unethical practices, the proportion of those who reported them was higher when the act was “requesting money or gifts to fulfil one’s duties” (34.1%) (Figure 6.9) (Ortega Nieto et al., 2021[15]). In this context, organisational ombudsmen are particularly well placed to receive such complaints. In addition to receiving complaints from citizens, they also handle reports from civil servants, public employees, and other contractual workers who are in a better position to identify irregularities—such as undue influence from private interests—since they operate within public administration. Therefore, the ombudsman offices could be promoted internally, along with whistleblower protection measures, to strengthen its role as a reliable channel for receiving reports from internal public officials.
Percentage of civil servants who reported an unethical practice in the past three years (horizontal axis) by acts of corruption witnessed in the public service (vertical axis)
Source: Ortega Nieto, D. et al. (2021[15]), Ethics and Corruption in the Federal Public Service: Civil Servants’ Perspectives, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/559381639027580056/Ethics-and-Corruption-inthe-Federal-Public-Service-Civil-Servants-Perspectives.
Ensuring that all stakeholders are enabled to see, understand, contribute to, monitor and evaluate public decisions is key to achieving better policies. It implies that policy makers will be better informed to legislate and that most interests – including those usually underrepresented – will be included and represented in policy outcomes. In the longer term, it can help foster trust in government and reinforce democracy.
Transparency provides citizens with the information they need to oversee and evaluate government decision making and public policies. Increasingly, OECD member countries are adopting proactive transparency measures to ensure that citizens get immediate access to public information and avoid the cost of engaging in administrative procedures to access the information. Citizen engagement can also create a shared responsibility for service delivery and a shared role for enhancing integrity. There are several ways to allow for stakeholders’ participation, where information is considered by the OECD as the first level of participation, whereas consultation and engagement provide for more advanced levels of participation (Box 6.17).
Stakeholder participation, as defined by the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government, refers to all the ways in which stakeholders can be involved in the policy cycle as well as in service design and delivery, including information, consultation and engagement.
Information: an initial level of participation characterised by a one-way relationship in which the government produces and delivers information to stakeholders. It covers both on-demand provision of information and “proactive” measures by the government to disseminate information.
Consultation: a more advanced level of participation that entails a two-way relationship in which stakeholders provide feedback to the government and vice-versa. It is based on the prior definition of the issue for which views are being sought and requires the provision of relevant information, in addition to feedback on the outcomes of the process.
Engagement: when stakeholders are given the opportunity and the necessary resources (e.g. information, data and digital tools) to collaborate during all phases of the policy-cycle and in the service design and delivery.
Source: OECD (2017[72]), Recommendation of the Council on Open Government, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438.
Together with transparency and integrity in influence, citizen participation can facilitate: (i) better policy outcomes; (ii) greater acceptance and higher compliance with decisions reached; (iii) equity in access to policymaking and service delivery. It can also help governments better understand and respond to citizens’ evolving needs and expectations, as well as develop innovative solutions to policy problems and their implementation.
Stakeholder participation in policymaking and delivery has been a core feature of Brazil’s legal and institutional architecture since its democratisation process. Brazil has also long been a regional leader on transparent public governance and is one of the founding members of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), committed to promoting transparent, participatory, inclusive and accountable governance.
Citizen and stakeholder participation is enshrined in Article 37 of the Federal Constitution, which states that “the law shall regulate the forms of participation of users in governmental entities and in entities owned by the Government”, especially as regards to “the access of users to administrative records and to information about Government initiatives”.
Brazil’s legal framework for citizen and stakeholder participation is relatively strong. Both the Federal and subnational levels of government have implemented ambitious and innovative mechanisms for citizens and stakeholders to participate in various points of their respective policy cycles, whether in the design and delivery of public services or in drafting or implementation of a policy. The implementation and co‑ordination of these policies is ensured by three main public institutions: the Special Secretariat of Social Articulation in the Secretariat of Government of the Presidency of the Republic, the Casa Civil and the CGU. The main participatory mechanisms implemented by the Federal government in Brazil in all three branches of government are described in Table 6.14.
Improving participation is also included in the Anti-Corruption Plan 2020-2025, under the theme “transparency and social control”. This includes active and passive transparency, allowing citizens to monitor the implementation of public policies and the expenditure of state resources, as well as open data, citizen participation, and the protection of information requesters.
Source: OECD (2022[5]), Open Government Review of Brazil : Towards an Integrated Open Government Agenda, https://doi.org/10.1787/3f9009d4-en; complemented by author’s own collaboration.
However, despite these initiatives and tools, government support for participation had previously decreased in both quantity and quality, as noted in the recent OECD Open Government Review of Brazil (OECD, 2022[5]). Furthermore, past actions of the Federal government had aimed to dismantle certain practices such as the Councils, the Conferences, and the National System of Social Participation, which was subsequently reinstated by Decree 11.407/2023. The OECD Trust Survey finds that people have low expectations about the openness of public institutions. Only around one-third of surveyed respondents in Brazil (34.9%) believe that it would be easy to find information about administrative procedures – and 44.3% believe it would be difficult – compared to 65.1% on average across OECD countries (OECD, 2023[12]).
In addition, most Brazilians did not consider they would have the opportunity to participate in political decision making. Less than one-third of respondents (27.2%) believe they would have the opportunity to voice their views on decisions made by local government, while only one in five (21.5%) believe the government would listen to opinions provided in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area. Only one in ten believe they have a say in what government does. Most Brazilians (66.7%) perceive that freedom of political participation is little or not guaranteed (+20 points since 2007) (Figure 6.10).
These results suggest people perceive a gap between Brazil’s stated ambitions on government transparency and its results. The first OECD Integrity Review of Brazil provided detailed proposals for promoting transparency and citizen engagement with reference to freedom of information, proactive transparency and creating a basis for direct social control (OECD, 2012[39]). To continue reversing past negative trends and ensure the effective information, consultation and engagement of stakeholders, Brazil could therefore (i) ensure public entities across branches and levels of government need to ensure a more effective implementation and enforcement of the Access to Information Law, (ii) strengthen standardisation of and access to online transparency portals and (iii) ensure that feedback and follow-up to public consultations are provided. More detailed recommendations on strengthening open government initiatives at the federal level, including in the areas of transparency and open data, citizen and stakeholder participation, social accountability and the protection of the civic space, are provided in the recently published OECD Open Government Review of Brazil (OECD, 2022[5]).
Respondents were asked the following question: “To what extent do you think freedom of political participation is guaranteed in Brazil?
Note: This survey has been conducted in 18 countries in the region (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela).
Source: Corporación Latinobarómetro (2024[14]), Homepage, https://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp (accessed on 14 February 2025).
All public entities across branches and levels of government need to ensure a more effective implementation and enforcement of the Access to Information Law
Access to information (ATI) is a necessary precondition for democracy and a necessary legal foundation for transparency and accountability in policy-making (OECD, 2014[73]; 2016[74]). ATI is understood as the ability for an individual to seek, receive, impart and use information effectively. It enables citizens and stakeholders to obtain information on the decisions that affect their everyday lives and fulfil their role as watchdogs over the proper functioning of government institutions. For these reasons, effectively implementing citizens' right to know and the legal provisions to access information are significant instruments for combating corruption and undue influence in public decision-making.
In Brazil, there is a strong recognition of the right to information at the highest level in the 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (Article 5 XIV and XXXIII, Item II of § 3 of Article 37, § 2 of Article 216). The right to access public information is further anchored in Law 12.527/2011 (Lei de Acesso à Informação – LAI, hereafter “the LAI”), which establishes the provisions to enforce the right to access information as provided by the Constitution. The law was adopted in the framework of Brazil’s adherence to the OGP in 2011 and specifies the procedures to be allowed across national and subnational levels in all branches of government in order to guarantee access to information (OECD, 2022[5]). The LAI also imposes sanctions on those who violate procedures for processing information requests. Like many other countries, Brazil provisionally suspended the deadlines for responding to LAI requests made to public bodies that were under teleworking or quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic, making it harder for citizens to stay informed during the health crisis
Since 2016, the country has enforced a time limit for government agencies to respond to requests for information. In parallel, Brazil has introduced a range of digital tools, such as the Federal Access to Information System, allowing the implementation of the Access to Information System and Open Data Portal.
The law itself is robust and its provisions fall, in general, within OECD standards. According to the Global Right to Information (RTI) rating, Brazil’s LAI is ranked as the 29th strongest in the world, in terms of the quality of its legal provisions. With a total of 108 points out of 150 possible, it ranks significantly higher than the OECD average of 81 and above the average of Latin American countries of 93 (Figure 6.11).
Right to Information Rating 2020
Note: The maximum achievable composite score is 150 and reflects a strong RTI legal framework. The global rating of RTI laws is composed of 61 indicators measuring seven dimensions: Right of access; Scope; Requesting procedures; Exceptions and refusals; Appeals; Sanctions and protection; and Promotional measures.
Source: AIE/CLD (n.d.[75]), Right to Information Rating, https://www.rti-rating.org/ (accessed on 6 August 2025).
Diving deeper into the indicators of the RTI rating, the legal framework is strong in scope but exhibits weaknesses in the dimensions of exceptions, sanctions and protections (Figure 6.12).
In terms of scope, the LAI has a wide scope of application covering all branches and levels of government, as well as private entities managing public funds, state-owned enterprises, independent institutions and other entities performing public functions (Articles 1-2). Each level of government and each branch of government is then supposed to define specific rules in their own legislations for implementing the general provisions stressed in the LAI.
In terms of requesting procedures, the LAI requires all public institutions to create a Citizen Information Service (Serviço de Informação ao Cidadão - SIC). The SIC is an office or person that assists and guides the public regarding access to information, and that helps citizens and stakeholders to report on the processing of documents in their respective units and to file documents and requests for ATI (Article 9). States, the Federal District and the municipalities have to elaborate rules in their respective legislations to create a SIC (Article 45). However, the LAI does not provide sufficient levels of clarify on means for filing a request, which amplifies the risk of different interpretations in other levels and branches of government, and thus, of contradictory implementation.
Concerning exceptions and refusals, public institutions in all branches and levels of government may deny access to information that fall under a list of exceptions, including national security, international relations, personal data, public health and safety, among others (Article 23). While the list follows international best practices, it lacks clear public interest and harms tests that could help guide public officials in applying exceptions. The LAI also has an entire “classification” scheme that can place information held by public bodies and entities beyond the reach of the public. This includes information classified as top-secret (25 years), secret (15 years) or reserved (5 years). The classification of any information must be formalised with a decision clearly indicating the subject, basis and period. Decisions pertaining to information at the federal level are then reviewed by the Mixed Information Reassessment Commission (Comissão Mista de Reavaliação de Informações - CMRI). The CMRI is a collegiate body that is composed of nine key ministries, including the CGU, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, and the Civil House of the Presidency of the Republic, which presides over it.
In terms of appeals, requesters have the right to appeal in case of a denial of information or a failure to provide the justification for denial within 10 days according to the LAI. Requesters can file an appeal to the hierarchical authority in the public institution to which they requested the information, online or in person in the SIC office. A third appeal can be made to a specific secretariat (National Secretariat for Access to Information, SNAI) within the CGU, and a fourth to the CMRI, which acts as the last administrative appeal body. From the appeals that are filed, on average 67% get solved in the first level, 20% in the second, 10% in the external appeal to the CGU, and only 3% reach the CMRI.
Lastly, in terms of sanctions, individual public officials or private entities subject to the law that fail to comply with the provisions can lead to the following sanctions: warning, fine, termination of the relationship with the government, temporary suspension from participating in bidding and impediment to contract with the public administration for a period not exceeding 2 years, and declaration of unfitness to bid or contract with the public administration, until rehabilitation is promoted before the authority that applied the penalty (Article 33 of the LAI). However, the LAI currently does not grant legal immunity to the staff for acts undertaken in good faith in the exercise or performance of any power, duty or function under the Access to Public Information Law. While similar immunity is also provided for those who, in good faith, release information which discloses wrongdoings to their superior (Article 44), there are no legal protection against imposing sanctions against those who, in good faith, release information to the public that discloses wrongdoing.
Despite the overall strength of the legal framework, the RTI Rating only examines the quality of the legal provisions for reactive disclosure and does not account for their implementation nor for proactive disclosure provisions. In these areas, several major points of concern remain. While the LAI has a wide scope, uptake of LAI provisions remains unequal and relatively weak in some branches of government and at subnational levels.
At the federal level, Decree 7.724, adopted in 2012, specifies the procedure to provide access to information in 321 federal bodies, and assigned oversight responsibility of the LAI to the CGU. Article 7 of the Decree adds requirements for proactive disclosure by federal bodies, such as remunerations and subsidies received by public officials. The Decree also provides detailed information on means for filing a request. The process for reactive requests is well established and centralised through the Fala.br platform, an integrated Ombudsman and Access to Information platform created in 2020 by the CGU that allows citizens and stakeholders to file online information requests, get information on the treatment of their request, monitor deadlines, as well as to store and appeal requests’ outcomes. Fala.BR replaced the previous Electronic Citizen Information Service system (Sistema Eletrônico do Serviço de Informação ao Cidadão, e-SIC).
Note: The percentages are calculated based on the maximum possible scores by dimension and the actual RTI score obtained by Brazil.
Source: AIE/CLD (n.d.[75]), Right to Information Rating, https://www.rti-rating.org/ (accessed on 6 August 2025).
To monitor implementation of the LAI in the federal executive branch, the CGU uses the Access to Information Panel (Painel da Lei de Acesso a Informação). This tool presents an overview of the implementation of the LAI in the federal executive branch. It includes data and information on the number of requests, compliance with deadlines, applicants' profiles, omissions, types of responses, user satisfaction with the responses received, number of requests per institutions, proactive disclosure, among other aspects. The data are extracted from the Fala-BR platform. Since the federal ATI decree came into effect in 2012, the average time for response by federal bodies is of 15 days, below the maximum deadline of 20 days, and the response rate is 99.5% for the more than 1.1 million requests received between 2012 and February 2022. The implementation of the Fala.BR platform further enabled a higher response rate and an increase of user satisfaction with requests. In addition, the federal government implemented a measure to provide identity neutrality to requesters. The CGU, as oversight body, limits the personal information to a small number of trained public servants and forwards the request to the relevant ministry or body without personal data, protecting de facto their identity.
Data from the ATI Panel reveals that between January 1, 2012 and June 30, 2024, average transparency index reached 82,6% of legal obligations to be fulfilled by federal agencies proactively, 5% are partially complied with and 14% are not complied with. There are advances in the compliance rate, which was once relatively low, which can be partially explained by the different technical capacities of the more than 320 federal agencies. In addition, the federal ATI decree establishes additional conditions for denying a request, particularly, for those considered “disproportionate or unreasonable” or requiring “additional work” (Article 13). An analysis by the CSO Article 19 found that these federal exceptions can be used by bodies to justify a denial, which would force requesters to file appeals to justify their request for information. And, despite the creation of an “ATI Decision Search” function to increase the transparency of decisions of external appeals instances (the CGU and the CMRI), civil society organisations regularly raise concerns about the limited information that exists regarding the internal appeals (i.e. first and second level), and the illegitimate use of exceptions. Lastly, a major challenge, remains the lack of sanctions applied in practice to public officials by the CGU, creating incentives for non-compliance.
Other branches of government have also adopted legal provisions to comply with the LAI and made efforts to proactively disclose information and data on their official websites, as required by the LAI. In particular, the Federal Senate enacted the Executive Committee Act N° 9 in 2012 to regulate access to data, information and documents. The Senate has its own transparency portal. The portal allows stakeholders to track legislative activity, file ATI requests, access open data, participate in debates and provide opinions on projects and proposals, among other actions. The Chamber of Deputies enacted Act N° 45 in 2012, specifying the provisions for the application of the LAI. The transparency portal of the Chamber of Deputies has relevant information on legislative results, parliamentary income and expenses, as well an ATI web page. Through the Resolution N° 215 from 2015, the judicial branch also regulated the application of the LAI. The highest bodies of the judicial branch also have transparency portals that include the publication of proactive information (i.e. the Supreme Federal Court, Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF and the Superior Court of Justice, Superior Tribunal de Justiça – STJ). Some independent institutions, such as the Court of Accounts (TCU) and the Federal Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público Federal - MPF), have also established their own procedures for granting ATI within their institutions in accordance to the LAI provisions. Yet, the multiplicity of platforms created and the lack of a centralised webpage mapping these portals and panels, despite technical requirements specified in the national LAI, can be difficult to navigate for citizens and stakeholders. In addition, a study from Transparency International Brazil, analysing public entities from the three branches of Government, the Court of Auditors and the Public Prosecution Office of the 27 federative units, found that compliance with the LAI was still uneven across at the state level, even eight years after the entry into force of the law (Transparency International, 2020[76]).
For subnational governments, however, compliance remains relatively weak, despite substantial advances on the application of LAI at the state level, including a high-level of compliance across State Prosecutors’ Office, according to recent data from the National Council of Public Prosecutors published on Transparentômetro (https://www.cnmp.mp.br/portaldatransparencia/transparentometro). The challenge of non-compliance is even more relevant at the subnational level, where the regulations elaborated by some local governments omit sanctions for public officials that violate their ATI obligations. The complex federative structure, local disparities, limited staff and/or financial resources, and a lack of oversight and enforcement are the main challenges to implement ATI provisions at the local level. For example, the development and maintenance of ATI platforms represents an administrative burden, especially for municipalities with limited resources and a lack of necessary IT skills and/or connectivity. According to data from the Regulamentação LAI project, an initiative from a coalition of civil society organisations and the Brazilian Institute of Technology and Society, in November 2020, 4,806 Brazilian municipalities (more than 80% of the country) had not yet implemented the provisions of the Access to Information Law (Transparency International, 2021[77]). In addition, research from Transparency International Brazil revealed that issues already identified since 2012 (when the LAI came into force) persist and have been significantly compromising the consolidation of public transparency. The most frequent problems encountered include: (i) a high proportion of omission of responses to requests for information (especially by the Legislative Assemblies); (ii) non-compliance with the maximum legal deadline for responding to requests; (iii) low quality of responses to requests; (iv) availability of data in closed format (e.g. PDF).
These various implementation challenges encountered at different levels of government have been exacerbated during the COVID19 pandemic years, which have seen multiple setbacks on access to information. Civil society groups have warned the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) about the Federal Government’s violation of access to information and transparency during the pandemic and a coalition led by Open Knowledge Foundation published evidence pointing to inconsistencies in the published information and an inadequate handling of access to information requests related to the vaccination campaign (OECD, 2022[5]).
Transparency International Brazil identified regular breaches to the LAI at the time, including inadequately justified refusals to requests, repeated government attempts to curtail guarantees of the Law, imposed secrecy of over 100 years over sensitive government data. The report also identifies an opaque system of procedural distortions to distribute excessive amounts of public resources to parliamentarians in exchange for political support, known as “the secret budget”. The funds received were found to fund campaigns for re-election or irrigate corruption schemes (Transparency International, 2022[78]). In addition, another report published in 2020 by Transparency International Brazil, analysing data from requests for access to information submitted to the Executive Branch via LAI procedures (and the respective responses available on the federal government's e-SIC portal, between Jan/2016 and Jun/2020), found that denials of access to information requests worsened under the administration in place between 2019 and 2022 (Transparency International, 2020[79]). In recent years, several civil society organisations have raised concerns about the misuse of the General Data Protection Law (LGPD), adopted in 2020, to restrict access to information with the National Data Protection Authority. In response, the Federal Comptroller General (CGU) issued a technical opinion in February 2023 clarifying that the LGPD does not override the Access to Information Law. Further guidance to reconcile the two laws is expected and foreseen in measure 144 of the new Anti-Corruption Plan 2025–2027 (Plano de Integridade e Combate à Corrupção), as well as the provision of training to public servants responsible for implementing the LAI on the guide's recommendations for the coordinated and consistent application of both the LAI and the LGPD.
To address the above-mentioned challenges in branches and levels of government, the CGU, in partnership with other institutions, organises since 2014 annual trainings for public officials focused on the implementation of the Access to Information Law. These trainings aim to promote cooperation and exchange of knowledge and experiences among Citizen Information Services (SICs) of the Federal Executive Branch, States, Municipalities and Autonomous Social Services. Since the LAI was enacted, the Courts of Auditors have also played an important pedagogical and supervisory role in terms of compliance, carrying out surveys on the data actually made available on the portals by the public authorities, bodies and entities and testing the Citizen Information Services (SIC). The initiative is part of the National Public Transparency Programme of the Court of Auditors.
In addition, to counter the weak compliance by Brazilian municipalities, the CGU developed the Brazil Transparency Programme (Programa Brasil Transparente, PBT) initiative. The PBT aims to motivate states and municipalities to adopt and implement the national ATI law. Established in 2013, the PBT is a voluntary programme that encourages subnational governments in committing to regulate the national ATI law, by providing implementation support through capacity building activities, technical materials, among other measures. In November 2019, 1,542 out of the existing 5,570 (28%) municipalities had adhered to the PBT, as well as other subnational entities (such as judicial and legislative branches at both the state and municipal level. Despite these efforts, studies have found that adhering to the PBT has not always lead to the actual implementation of ATI provisions (OECD, 2022[5]). The PBT was recently replaced by the new National Transparency and Access to Information Network (Rede Nacional de Transparência e Acesso à Informação, RedeLAI). The RedeLAI has two requirements for membership 1) the entity must have implemented the Access to Information Law and 2) the body or entity must have the competence of oversight authority enshrined in Law or Decree. RedeLAI has already been joined by 18 (of the 26) states. In addition to the 18 states, 11 capitals' oversight bodies and the Federal District's oversight body have seen their membership approved.
Through these initiatives, the CGU offers the software of Fala.Br to any interested government body along with a manual detailing the necessary specifications for implementation. The Federal Senate has for example adopted the Fala.Br System. An independent study conducted by FGV analysing 3,550 requests for information confirmed the lower response rate for states (53%) and municipalities (44%), compared to 91%, for federal bodies. The study also found a lower response rate in the judiciary (78%), compared to other federal branches, including the legislative (95%), the executive (93%) and autonomous bodies (89%) (Michener, Contreras and Niskier, 2018[80]). As such, further efforts are needed to consolidate reactive disclosure across branches and levels of government.
Lastly, the CGU created the Transparent Brazil Scale (Escala Brasil Transparente, EBT) to monitor the compliance of Brazilian states and municipalities with reactive disclosure requirements. Based on the information gathered through these mechanisms, the CGU prepares weekly statistical reports on the LAI.
Lastly, the Anti-Corruption Plan 2025–2027 includes a comprehensive set of measures to strengthen access to information (ATI) in Brazil, while ensuring responsible handling of personal data. Regulatory improvements to the LAI and its implementing decree are foreseen, including the elimination of the 100‑year confidentiality clause, the restriction of abusive confidentiality claims based on personal data, and the mandatory labelling of personal information to allow requesters access to non-restricted parts of documents. To improve efficiency and legal compliance, a technological solution will be implemented in the Fala.BR platform, enabling automatic labelling of personal information and enhancing the compatibility of ATI with personal data protection. The plan also includes initiatives to promote responsible access to information, such as guidance materials for public bodies on conducting interest assessments when processing ATI requests and appeals. Several structural actions will be rolled out, including QualiLAI, a project evaluating the quality of responses to ATI requests; AI-supported tools in the Fala.BR system; and a new LAI Panel to expand public data availability. The standardisation of CGU decisions in third-instance LAI appeals will further support consistency across government entities. At the subnational level, the “Brazil for Transparency” initiative aims to boost ATI implementation in federated entities through the expansion of the RedeLAI network, regulatory support, training, guidance for states and municipalities, a new edition of the Transparent Brazil Scale (EBT), and the adoption of a self-assessment methodology for municipalities, all to be completed by the end of 2027.
To further these efforts and ensure that all public entities across branches and levels of government ensure a more effective implementation and enforcement of the LAI, there are several measures that could be implemented on short-term:
First, the CGU could create a centralised and unique web page mapping all the existing portals and panels where proactive information is disclosed, hosted within the Transparency Portal.
Second, the CGU could continue to foster compliance with the national LAI through initiatives such as the RedeLAI and incentives for adopting the Fala.Br system. The CGU could also continue providing implementation support to increase capacities across subnational entities and ensure adequate resources to prepare guidance materials for federal public organisations to consider when formulating their own policies and operating procedures regarding ATI.
Third, the identity neutrality could be extended to the subnational levels of government. To that end, CGU could provide the necessary awareness-raising and training via the RedeLAI to implement such measures through entities’ respective online platforms.
Fourth, the rules and procedures that govern classification of information could be subject to the process of an open consultation, and second, broadly disseminated. A manual focusing on simple language as well as trainings for public officials working on the SIC could help guide the application of exceptions.
Fifth, more transparency about the internal appeals is needed. The government could continue making efforts to limit the response time at all levels of the appeals process and changing the composition of the CMRI beyond the executive branch to include stakeholders from other state institutions including autonomous bodies.
Lastly, the capacities of the CGU could be strengthened, first, by increasing the human and financial resources of all of the areas involved in transparency and access to information compliance, as well as the CRG, to effectively conduct their compliance and enforcement activities.
In the longer term, and as envisioned in the Anti-Corruption Plan 2020-2025 and the Anti-Corruption Plan 2025–2027, the GGU could amend to Law 12.527/2011 to protect the identity of information requesters (clause of anonymity) and preserve the impersonality of requests. This is a good practice and the CGU is therefore encouraged to pursue this regulatory change to ensure the protection of requesters at all levels and branches of government. International best practices are provided in the following Box 6.18.
Finland
In Finland, the person requesting information does not need to identify him/herself nor provide reasons for the request, unless this is necessary for the exercise of the authority’s discretion or for determining if the person requesting information has the right to access the document.
Canada
In Canada, the Access to Information Act gives Canadian citizens, permanent residents and any person or corporation present in Canada a right to access records of government institutions that are subject to the Act. Article 2.1 on the responsibility of government institutions, protects the identity of the applicant. Moreover, the same article obliges institutions to provide applicants with a record of the request procedure
Source: OECD (2016[81]), Open Government in Costa Rica, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264265424-en.
If the law is reformed, Brazil could further clarify areas that remain vague, for example provide further clarity and details to the legal ATI obligations for other levels and branches of government. The Law could also specify clear public interest and harms tests to help guide public officials in applying exceptions. Lastly, stronger sanctions for non-compliance could stir federal government institutions to systematically provide information that is of higher quality.
Brazil could standardise transparency pages of federal public organisations and transform the Transparency portal into a one-stop repository of key information relating to accountability of individual public organisations
In Brazil, the CGU is the institution in charge of co-ordinating the transparency agenda and ensuring the correct implementation of the ATI law. Beyond its responsibilities regarding the open government agenda, the CGU is responsible for implementing the Federal Open Data Policy and monitor the implementation of the National Open Government Policy. As part of its attributions, the CGU is responsible for increasing awareness, providing training, promoting a culture of transparency, and submitting an annual report to the National Congress. In particular, the CGU has been instrumental in promoting public transparency in a broad sense, that is, not only making available a high volume of data but also making them accessible and actionable. As a result, Brazil is recognised as a regional leader in the area of transparency.
The overarching aim of the Transparency portal is to serve as an anti-corruption and control tool to monitor the use of public resources. For instance, stakeholders can track and verify whether federal transfers to municipalities have been used to provide the public services they were intended to. Importantly, in case any wrongdoing is identified, the portal provides the necessary information for citizens to make complaints or claims against any federal body through Fala.BR. Within the portal, the CGU created a web page called the Transparency Network, which provides access to projects and actions relevant to social control. It includes links to some of the tools for social control developed by federal bodies in sectoral areas, such as education (e.g. scholarships paid to individuals), social benefits (e.g. continuous cash benefits), urban development (e.g. National System for Survey of Civil Construction Costs and Indexes (SINAPI), among others. In practice, the Transparency Portal benefits from wide popularity among citizens and stakeholders and has also been used by journalists to identify wrongdoings.
Transparency and social control are also key themes in the Anti-Corruption Plan 2020-2025. In line with the reforms envisioned in the Anti-Corruption Plan 2020-2025, CGU carried out a number of actions to increase the active transparency of public information, including:
The publication of electronic invoices for purchases by the federal government on the Transparency Portal (CGU Action 2). This measure was implemented jointly by the CGU and the Federal Revenue Service of Brazil in 2021 (CGU Action 2).
The implementation of a computerised system to ensure that the information provided in the Politically Exposed Persons (PEP) register are provided in a standardised way on the Transparency Portal (CGU Action 4).
The development of new transparency rules for publication of information on the implementation of policies involving tax benefits, allowing greater control and visibility over waivers and incentives, which represent BRL 250 billion annually. This measure was implemented jointly by the CGU and the Federal Revenue Service of Brazil on January 2024 (CGU Action 6).
The implementation of a query on the Transparency Portal regarding the remuneration of retired public servants, pensioners and military personnel. This measure was implemented in June 2021 (CGU Action 7).
The restructuration of the Open Data Portal, including the implementation of functionalities that allow better management of the Open Data Policy, encourage data reuse and strengthen user communities. This measure was implemented in November 2022 (CGU Action 9).
In 2022-2023, the following measures were foreseen, but without definitive results:
The active publication of the goals, indicators and results of public policies, programs and services, in an open data format (CGU Action 3).
The definition of new transparency rules on the final beneficiaries of public funds (CGU Action 5).
The implementation of a query on the Transparency Portal that could make it possible to monitor public purchases and their correlation with the budget execution of expenditures (CGU Action 8).
In line with the recommendations set forth in the Open Government Review of Brazil [Ref], and to simplify the current complex architecture of websites and portals and provide better accessibility, the government of Brazil could consider creating a one-stop-shop portal to create synergies between different existing portals and move towards an open government ecosystem.
To increase the impact of consultation and participation, Brazilian public institutions could ensure that feedback and follow-up are provided
Participatory processes such as consultations, participatory budgets or deliberative assemblies do not replace formal rules and principles of a representative democracy – such as free and fair elections, but they provide opportunities for citizens and interest groups to engage in public life and contribute to the policy cycle. These types of participation are nowadays considered essential ingredients of a healthy democracy, for they pursue the same goals: strengthening trust in democratic institutions and improving the decision-making processes to allow for better outcomes (i.e. efficient services and policies that answer citizen real needs).
Apart from its commitment to the transparency agenda, Brazil is well known for its use of innovative tools to promote political participation both at the federal and subnational levels. At the Federal level, almost all public institutions involve citizens and stakeholders at some point in their decision-making process, whether in the design and delivery of public services or in drafting or implementation of a policy. Public consultations are institutionalised by Decree 12.002/2024 which contains a chapter providing guidelines for their organisation and mandating the Casa Civil as entity responsible at the Federal level. Public consultations are used by the executive branches at the Federal and subnational levels, as well as by other branches such as the legislative. According to data from the OECD Survey on open government in Brazil, in the past three years, 62% of surveyed public institutions have involved citizens and stakeholders at some point in their policy cycle, 59% in the design of public services and 50% in the delivery of those services. This participation is embedded in different moments of the policy cycle, with 62% of public institutions involving citizens in the drafting stage and 56% at the identification stage. This number slightly decreases for the latest stages of the policy cycle, with 50% in the implementation stage and 44% during the evaluation of policies.
To that end, Brazil has both a centralised government-wide portal (Participa Mais Brasil) as well as institution-specific portals. The platform allows the public to directly provide inputs to online participatory processes (consultations and polls) and get information from other in-person opportunities (public hearings and Councils). Since its creation, public institutions (Ministries and Agencies) have published 172 consultations and 44 opinion polls gathering 34 063 contributions from 25 154 users registered. An interesting, good practice integrated in Participa Mais Brasil portal is the possibility for public authorities to provide feedback for each consultation published in the platform. Once the consultation is closed, the platform allows public authorities to answer each contribution, and publicly approve or reject the input received.
Government-wide participatory portals, such as Participa Mais Brasil, are a good practice among OECD countries. To ensure the Participa Mais Brasil platform is used across the Federal government, Brazil should pursue the dissemination of the platform and provide support to both clusters of users: organisers (public institutions) and participants (citizens and stakeholders).
Despite these strengths, both the OECD Open Government Review of Brazil and the OECD Public Integrity Indicators found that public institutions could increase the opportunities for consultations as well as their impact and follow up. Indeed, public authorities do not systematically provide feedback to participants or communicate the results of the process. This is also true when looking at the public consultations published in the Participa Mais Brasil platform, where public authorities have a specific feature to provide feedback to participants, but do not always do it. Perceptions of effective engagement are especially low among the most vulnerable. In general, women and people with lower levels of education feel less heard. For example, while only 21.5% of respondents with lower levels of education believe the government would adopt opinions expressed in public consultations, more educated respondents are more positive (26.7%). This suggests that Brazil needs to enhance its feedback mechanisms and communicate better to people how their views were considered
Looking ahead, and in line with previous recommendations made in the OECD Open Government Review of Brazil, the CGU could consider issuing guidelines for all public institutions with practical support to organise consultations, and ensure they provide feedback to participants and communicate the results of the process. This principle applies more broadly to any form of participation. It is one of the Good Practice Principles for Deliberative Processes for Public Decision Making (OECD, n.d.[82]), which public authorities commit to responding to or acting on recommendations at the outset of the process and follow up later with a progress report on implementation.
Providing an adequate level of transparency on lobbying activities aimed at influencing government decision-making processes
The Government of Brazil could adopt a dedicated law ensuring transparency of lobbying activities.
The definitions of “interest representation” and “interest representative” in the lobbying Bill currently under discussion could be strengthened to include any kind of lobbying activities that may take place in practice.
The provisions in the Bill could ensure that the disclosure regime provides sufficient and pertinent information on who is lobbying, on what issues, and how.
Brazil could ensure adequate institutional responsibilities are in place for overseeing the implementation of the lobbying Bill and consider re-introducing a sanctions regime for public officials in the Bill.
To improve compliance and the perception of lobbying among citizens, the government of Brazil could further promote stakeholder participation in the discussion, implementation and revision of lobbying-related regulations and standards of conduct
Establishing transparency and integrity frameworks for all persons and bodies providing advice to government
Brazil could adopt binding rules for the establishment and selection process of advisory or expert groups, including collegial bodies, to strengthen the integrity and inclusiveness of its participants.
Brazil could strengthen transparency for collegial bodies and other advisory groups, including on what the outcomes are, how inputs have been dealt with and how they are incorporated in the resulting decision.
Enhancing transparency and integrity in election processes
Brazil could reduce the scope for informal campaign financing by prohibiting contributions in cash and introducing a nominal ceiling for individual donations.
Brazil could improve the transparency of the distribution of public funds and subsidies for campaign financing.
The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) could strengthen transparency of political finance data to enable better enforcement.
Recent reforms to better protect election processes from the impact of mis- and dis-information, could be complemented by the introduction of regulations on third party spending.
Establishing a public integrity framework adapted to the risks of lobbying and influence activities for public officials and lobbyists
Integrity standards for public officials included in the lobbying Bill could be accompanied by guidelines on applying these standards.
Guidance and training on lobbying-related risks could be provided through the Integrity Management Units and the Electronic System for Prevention of Conflict of Interest.
Brazil could ensure that the envisioned restrictions on lobbying activities for public officials leaving the public sector in the lobbying Bill are consistent with the general framework on post-employment.
Integrity standards for lobbyists included in the lobbying Bill could be accompanied by guidelines and a code of good practice for lobbyists.
Brazil could consider amending the appropriate legislation to ensure whistleblowing protection benefits those disclosing violations of lobbying and influence related rules.
Ensuring effective information, consultation and engagement of stakeholders
All public entities across branches and levels of government need to ensure a more effective implementation and enforcement of the Access to Information Law.
Brazil could standardise transparency pages of federal public organisations and transform the Transparency portal into a one-stop repository of key information relating to accountability of individual public organisations.
To increase the impact of consultation and participation, Brazilian public institutions could ensure that feedback and follow-up are provided.
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