This chapter analyses the measures implemented by Brazil to foster an open culture of integrity in the public sector. It recommends measures to update the codes of ethics of the federal executive branch through a values-based approach and offering guidance on developing organisational codes to respond to institution-specific corruption risks. Measures could be developed to further strengthen the conflict-of-interest framework, pre- and post- public employment restrictions and monitoring responsibilities. Further efforts are also needed to raise awareness and build capacities on public integrity to effectively promote behavioural change within the public sector. This will enable an open and trusting environment that encourages public officials to raise ethical concerns and report corruption.
OECD Integrity Review of Brazil 2025
Abstract
Public integrity is “the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector” (OECD, 2017[1]). In this sense, cultivating a culture of integrity in the public sector requires going beyond laws and regulations and helping public officials understand, adopt and implement common values and high standards of conduct in their day-to-day activities. Such common understanding can be achieved by setting a clear integrity framework, implementing awareness-raising and capacity building measures on the behaviour public officials are expected to observe, especially when faced with ethical dilemmas or conflict-of-interest situations, and mainstreaming integrity measures into public management policies and practices, such as human resource management. Translating values and standards into effective implementation and changes in behaviour often proves to be the most challenging part of the process of promoting a culture of integrity in the public sector.
The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity sets out the pillars for fostering a culture of integrity in the public sector, which include:
Setting clear integrity standards and procedures to help public officials carrying out their public duties in an adequate ethical manner (i.e., by upholding the public interest over private interests).
Investing in integrity leadership.
Promoting a merit-based professional public sector that is dedicated to the public interest.
Providing sufficient information, training, guidance, and timely advice to public officials to apply integrity standards and values in their day-to-day activities.
Ensuring an open organisational culture where public officials dare to share their ethical concerns, look for ethical advice and speak and report misconduct (OECD, 2017[1]).
The following sections provide recommendations aimed at supporting Brazil in promoting a culture of integrity across the public sector. The chapter examines the current legal and policy framework for public integrity, with particular emphasis on standards for identifying and managing conflict of interest. In addition, this chapter looks at measures implemented by Brazil to promote a merit-based civil service and further raise awareness and build capacities on public integrity. Finally, the chapter reviews current efforts to foster an open culture of integrity in the public sector and proposes specific actions to enhance openness within the public administration.
Standards of conduct are the backbone to ensuring integrity in the public sector. Such standards inform and guide public officials’ behaviour in carrying out their public duties and provide a common framework to ensure accountability (OECD, 2017[1]). Integrity standards can cover several issues including identifying and managing conflict of interest, assets declaration, managing gifts and other benefits, and pre- and post-public employment, for example. These standards can be set out in the Constitution, in criminal, civil and administrative law.
Brazil has put in place a comprehensive institutional and strategic framework for public integrity (see Chapter 1), complemented by a broad legal framework setting integrity standards for Brazilian public officials. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the most relevant laws and regulations. This includes Law 12.813/2013, also known as the Conflict-of-Interest Law, and Decree 10.889/2021, which contains provisions on publication of public commitments and management of gifts and hospitality by public officials of the federal executive branch.
Note: Prior to 1998, the military were referred to as “military public servants (servidores públicos militares)” and civilians as “civilian public servants (servidores públicos civis)”. However, by Constitutional Amendment no. 18 of 1998 these expressions were abolished. Currently, “civilian servants” are referred to as “Public Servants” (Title II, Chapter VII, Section II, articles 39 to 41 of the Federal Constitution of 1988); the military are referred to as “Military of the States, of the Federal District and of the Territories” (Title II, Chapter VII, Section III, article 42 of the Federal Constitution of 1988) and the Federal military were included in the Armed Forces chapter (Title IV , Chapter II, articles 142 and 143 of the Federal Constitution of 1988) (Government of Brazil, 1998[2]).
Moreover, several codes of ethics and conduct complement the legal framework providing further guidance on the principles and standards of conduct that public officials in the three branches of government -executive, legislative and judiciary- are expected to uphold while performing their public duties. The main codes of ethics/conduct are summarised in Table 2.2. Additionally, within the federal executive branch, the normative framework is complemented by the Federal Public Service Values (Valores do Serviço Público Federal), introduced by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) in 2021. These values were developed following an extensive consultation process with public officials of the federal executive branch, as well as representatives from the private sector and civil society. The Federal Public Service Values comprise 7 values: Integrity, Professionalism, Impartiality, Justice, Engagement, Kindness and Public Vocation (Integridade, Profissionalismo, Imparcialidade, Justiça, Engajamento, Gentileza, Vocação Pública). Each value is accompanied by a brief description to help public officials understand the values intended to guide their behaviour, personal development, work routines, skills and organisational climate.
Brazil could unify relevant legislation and standards into one cohesive and overarching legal framework for each branch of government
The current legal framework on public integrity, as laid out in Table 2.1, is scattered across various legal instruments, which creates some challenges. First, it is difficult for public officials to know what measures apply to them and the specific standards they are expected to follow while performing their day-to-day activities, as integrity standards are dispersed across legislation, some dating back to 1990. For example, regarding the acceptance of gifts, article 117 of Law 8.112/1990 explicitly prohibits public officials from accepting any gifts in connection with their official duties, while the Conflict-of-Interest Law (article 5 VI) restricts public officials from the federal executive from accepting gifts from individuals who have an interest in the official's decisions or the decisions of the collegial body in which they participate, subject to limits and conditions established by regulation. This creates ambiguity for federal executive officials and appears to introduce disparities in the obligations between federal executive officials and those in the legislative and judiciary branches. Additionally, the specific limits and conditions were only clarified several years later through Decree 10.889/2021, when they should have been addressed within primary legislation or as complementary legislation to the Conflict-of-Interest Law.
Second, some key areas for public integrity identified by international good practice remain underdeveloped in the existing legal framework, specifically for the legislative and judiciary. For instance, although Article 117 of Law 8.112/1990 prohibits the misuse of public office for personal or others' gain, additional provisions on this issue are only established for the federal executive branch under Law 12.813/2013. A similar gap exists regarding the prohibition of receiving gifts, where detailed provisions and procedures have only been developed for the federal executive under the Conflict-of-Interest Law and Decree 10.889/2021. This situation leaves other branches of government without comprehensive regulations on relevant integrity matters, enabling inconsistencies in the application of integrity standards.
Considering this, Brazil could develop a single, comprehensive legal framework setting integrity standards for public officials within each branch of government. A specific framework in each of these branches could serve several purposes, including improving co-ordination within each branch, strengthening the public integrity system of the country and providing clear and common standards to public officials regarding their expected behaviour and conduct. These frameworks should incorporate common values and principles to guide public officials’ ethical judgement (such as the Federal Public Service Values for the Federal Executive Branch), clear and consistent definitions of key terms, and minimum standards to address the main integrity risks. Additionally, these frameworks could provide for the development of specific sectoral or organisational codes of ethics based on a risk assessment to address specific risks (see following recommendations).
Before developing a single, comprehensive legal framework for each branch of government, Brazil could consider putting in place mechanisms to encourage a co-ordinated approach to public integrity across branches of government, ensuring coherence across the public sector as well as flexibility to specific integrity risks. This may include exploring the possibility of agreeing to a single minimum integrity framework or common public service values that apply to the executive, legislative and judiciary, such as the frameworks currently in place in Argentina, Mexico and the United Kingdom (Box 2.1). Existing collegiate structures involving the three branches of government, such as the National Strategy against Corruption and Money Laundering (Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Corrupção e à Lavagem de Dinheiro, ENCCLA, see Chapter 1), could be leveraged to promote discussions on the coherence with respect to the values and the minimum integrity standards for all those working in the Brazilian public sector.
In Argentina, the legal framework setting the standards of conduct and values expected from public officials is the Public Ethics Law 25.188 (Ley 25.188 de Ética en el Ejercicio de la Función Pública). This law is applied to all the public sector at all levels and hierarchies, either permanently or temporary, by popular election, direct appointment, by competition or by any other legal means, extending its application to all magistrates, officials, and employees of the State (article 1, first paragraph).
Law 25.188 establishes:
(a) a set of duties, prohibitions, and incompatibilities applicable, without exception, to all persons who perform public functions (article 2), establishing compliance with them as a requirement of permanence in office (article 3); (b) a system of financial and interest declarations (Chapters III and IV); (c) rules on incompatibilities and conflicts of interest (Chapter V); (d) a gift scheme for public officials (Chapter VI); (e) ethical norms on the publicity of the acts, programs, works, services, and campaigns of public bodies (which must be educational, informative, or socially oriented, and cannot include names, symbols or images that imply promotion personnel of the authorities or public officials) (article 42).
In 2015, the federal Government of Mexico issued the new Ethics Code and Rules of Integrity (Código de Ética y Reglas de Integridad, DOF 20/08/2015). Even though the new Ethics Code does not explicitly define its scope, it seems clear that, in line with article 108 of the Political Constitution and article 49 of the Federal Law on Administrative Responsibilities (Ley Federal de Responsabilidades Administrativas de los Servidores Públicos), it is applicable to all public officials.
The Ethics Code follows the constitutionally defined principles of legality, honesty, loyalty, impartiality, and efficiency, as well as a set of additional values, which are: public interest, respect, respect for human rights, equality and non-discrimination, gender equity, culture and environment, integrity, co‑operation, leadership, transparency, and accountability. The Integrity Rules in turn, are aimed at complementing the Ethics Code by setting specific desired and undesired conducts in 13 domains:
1. Public behaviour; 2. Public information; 3. Public contracting, licensing, permits, authorisations and concessions; 4. Governmental programmes; 5. Public procedures and services; 6. Human resources; 7. Administration of public properties; 8. Evaluation processes; 9. Internal control; 10. Administrative procedures; 11. Permanent performance with integrity; 12. Co-operation with integrity; 13. Decent behaviour.
In 1995, in the United Kingdom, the Committee on Standards in Public Life proposed the Seven Principles of Public Life (Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty, and Leadership), which outline the ethical standards that anyone working in the public sector is expected to follow while performing their public duties. Additionally, all public bodies are expected to draw up specific codes of conduct or ethics incorporating these Seven Principles of Public Life, including for those public positions considered to be at high-risk, such as ministers (i.e., Ministerial Code) and special advisers (i.e., Code of conduct for Special Advisers).
Sources: OECD (2019[3]), OECD Integrity Review of Argentina: Achieving Systemic and Sustained Change, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g98ec3-en; Government of Argentina (1999[4]), Ley 25.188 de Ética en el Ejercicio de la Función Pública, http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/60000-64999/60847/texact.htm; Government of Mexico (2015[5]), Diario Oficial de la Federación 20/08/2015, https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5404568&fecha=20/08/2015#gsc.tab=0; OECD (2017[6]), OECD Integrity Review of Mexico: Taking a Stronger Stance Against Corruption, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264273207-en; UK Government (1995[7]), The Seven Principles of Public Life, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-7-principles-of-public-life.
The CGU and the Public Ethics Commission could revise the Code of Professional Ethics for Civilian Public Servants of the Federal Executive Branch and the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration to align them with the Federal Public Service Values
Embedding a culture of integrity in the public sector often begins with a code of ethics or conduct designed to promote desired behaviours –-prioritising the public interest-– over corrupt and unethical practices (Bacio Terracino, 2018[8]). Such codes provide public officials with concrete standards to apply in their daily work and guidance for addressing ethical dilemmas they may encounter. Moreover, they serve as benchmarks for assessing public officials’ behaviours against commonly accepted values and may help to restore citizens’ confidence in the public service by setting the boundaries of officials’ expected behaviours. To be effective, codes of ethics or conduct must go beyond serving as regulatory instruments; they should be designed as practical tools that will provide a moral compass for public officials in their daily decisions (Bacio Terracino, 2018[8]).
In Brazil, the existing codes applying to the executive branch have some weaknesses when it comes to providing guidance to orient public officials’ behaviour. First, as already mentioned, both the Code of Professional Ethics for Civilian Public Servants of the Federal Executive Branch –herein “Code of Professional Ethics”– and the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration are drafted as legalistic documents. Rather than offering practical standards and clear guidance for public officials' daily decision-making and expected behaviour, these codes repeat what the law already states. However, codes of ethics and conduct should target the informal level and social aspects shaping human behaviour, complementing the legal framework rather than replicating it (Boehm, 2015[9]). Instead of following an approach aimed at completeness, legal and conceptual rigour, codes should above all be of practical relevance, simple, clear and memorable for public officials, while remaining aligned with the existing legal provisions.
Second, both codes have been in place for several years and no significant revision has been introduced to ensure their cohesion with today’s expectations and challenges. Indeed, codes benefit from being reviewed from time to time to refresh ownership, test the continuous applicability of the rules that they contain, address contemporary integrity risks that were not a previous priority –for instance, derived from the growing use of social media– and align standards of conduct with the increasing expectations of public servants and citizens alike. Efforts to revise and update the codes have been undertaken in recent years in Brazil, but none have yet resulted in actual updates to the codes. For instance, in 2020 a Working Group including the General Secretariat of the Presidency, the former Ministry of the Economy, the CGU and the Advocacy General of the Union was created to update the two codes. However, this Working Group was dissolved in 2021 and no unified proposal to update the current codes was achieved. Moreover, in December 2021, a working group co-ordinated by the Public Ethics Commission (Comissão de Ética Pública, CEP), in collaboration with the CGU, the Advocacy General of the Union and the former Ministry of the Economy, reached a consensus and drafted a new Code of Ethics for Federal Public Servants. Despite undergoing public consultation, the proposed code has yet to be approved.
Considering this, the CGU and the CEP could lead a comprehensive revision of the Code of Professional Ethics and the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration with the aim of aligning these codes with current expectations and challenges, while redesigning them as practical tools for effectively guiding public officials’ behaviour. As part of this effort, Brazil could build on previous initiatives and lessons learned, while also considering a broader participatory process involving public officials and citizens. Such an approach would promote a sense of ownership and would allow to gather valuable input on potential integrity risks and challenges.
This revision also presents an opportunity for Brazil to align the new code(s) with the Federal Public Service Values, which offer a clear and practical foundation for promoting a values-based approach to public integrity (OECD, 2021[10]). To ensure coherence, it is key to avoid a fragmented framework with several documents that repeat themselves and can potentially create inconsistencies. Instead, the focus should be on developing complementary guidelines that provide unified and actionable guidance for public officials as they carry out their duties. Such a revision also provides an opportunity for Brazil to transfer the power to sanction breaches of the Code of Professional Ethics to the CGU’s General Inspectorate for Administrative Discipline (Corregedoria-Geral da União) and, at entity level, to the Federal Inspectorates (Corregedorias Federais), as recommended in Chapter 1. This is key to clearly differentiate between ethics and legal compliance and to strengthen the ethics commissions’ advisory role and transform them into a safe haven where employees can speak up and ask questions without fearing direct repercussions.
Moreover, public officials from the federal executive branch could also benefit from having access to practical guides that translate general values and standards into specific examples that are relevant for their day-to-day work. This can be achieved by providing further guidance in the revised version of the codes or by developing supplementary documents, such as guidelines or a toolkit (Box 2.2). In particular, the 2020 Manual of Conduct for Public Agents of the Federal Executive Branch (Manual de Conduta do Agente Público Civil do Poder Executivo Federal) could be revised to include such guidance and examples in relation to the Federal Public Service Values and integrity standards outlined in the revised codes.
In the Slovak Republic, the Civil Service Council developed guidance on how to interpret the rules contained in the Code of Ethics for Public Servants. The guidance provides details on the various provisions included in the Code and uses examples to illustrate how to deal with situations that civil servants may encounter while conducting their daily activities. For instance, to illustrate how civil servants shall act impartially by not allowing his/her opinions and beliefs to influence his/her performance as civil servant, the guidance includes the following examples:
Example 1: As a civil servant, you are processing the results of a questionnaire relating to environmental protection environment. Because of your inner conviction that much more vigorous protection of nature is needed, you do not include some of the answers in the evaluation. Guidance: Even if the employee has good intentions, as a civil servant he should not transfer his views to the civil service because he would thereby gain some advantage to advance his opinion and interest and would undermine confidence in an impartial performance of the civil service. In practical life it would probably be very difficult to prove that an employee's conduct violated a specific provision of the law, but it can clearly be concluded that he has violated the ethical principles.
Example 2: The Chief civil servant repeatedly refuses to allow a certain group of employees to participate in the trainings with certain religious beliefs or ethnic backgrounds, even though they are qualified and competent staff. He claims that this group of people is only one big problem. Guidance: Such behaviour by the head of a civil servant is unacceptable because it transmits his personal beliefs, or prejudices, into the performance of the civil servant It also violates the rights of the civil servant to education. It may also violate anti-discrimination law. It is appropriate to ask whether my decision would have been different if it was an applicant or employee whose views were similar to mine, or who belongs to the same ethnic group.
In 2018, the Colombian Ministry of Public Administration issued a General Integrity Code for public servants of the executive branch. To help public institutions implement, socialise and internalise the public service values included in the Code of Integrity, the Ministry of Public Administration also created a Toolbox (Caja de Herramientas). This resource provides a series of proposed activities and strategies that public institutions may use to develop training and awareness raising activities, helping public servants internalise the values set forth in the General Integrity Code.
Sources: Government of the Slovak Republic (n.d.[11]), “Unofficial English translation of the Commentary on the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants (original in Slovak)”; Government of Colombia (n.d.[12]), Tool Box of the Colombian Ministry of Public Administration, https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/web/eva/codigo-integridad.
The CGU could enhance coherence of integrity standards across the Federal Public Administration by offering guidance on developing organisational codes to respond to institution-specific integrity risks in alignment with the Federal Public Service Values
Just as different institutions operate in various contexts and perform different activities, they may also face a variety of specific integrity risks, ethical dilemmas and conflict-of-interest situations (OECD, 2018[13]). In this sense, developing sectoral or organisational codes of ethics provides an opportunity to include relevant and concrete examples from the sectors or organisation’s day-to-day business to which public officials can easily relate to and identify with.
In Brazil, several federal executive institutions have developed their own code of ethics and/or conduct to complement the Code of Professional Ethics (OECD, 2021[10]). However, the proposed revision of the overarching public integrity legal framework, along with the proposed revision of the Code of Professional Ethics and the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration, offers an opportunity for federal executive institutions to align their organisational codes with the Federal Public Service Values and updated integrity standards.
To that end, the CGU could encourage further adoption of institution-specific codes of ethics or conduct by including a provision in the revised Code of Professional Ethics stating that federal executive institutions are expected to develop their own organisational codes based on the Federal Public Service Values, the new public integrity legal framework and the revised codes. Examples from other jurisdictions could serve as inspiration for Brazil in its efforts to develop organisational codes that align with the general framework and respond to organisational contexts and risks (Box 2.3).
In Canada, the Values and Ethics Code for the Canadian Public Sector describes the values that guide public servants in all activities related to their professional duties -Respect for Democracy, Respect for People, Integrity, Stewardship and Excellence. It also provides a list of expected behaviours associated to each of these values. In line with the Values and Ethics Code for the Canadian Public Sector, public institutions are expected to develop organisational codes of conduct to reflect their specific contexts. Some organisational codes are:
Code of Conduct of the Employment and Social Development Department
Code of Values and Ethics of the Canadian Transportation Agency
Code of Values and Ethics of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.
The organisational codes of conduct are to be read in conjunction with the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector and other policies (e.g., the Directive on Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment) that govern public servants’ conditions of employment.
In Costa Rica, the Manual of Ethics for Civil Servants (Manual de Ética de la Función Pública) sets ethical norms, principles, duties and prohibitions for the 47 entities of the civil service regime, while the Ethical Principles of Civil Servants (Principios Éticos de los Funcionarios Públicos, established by Decree 33.146 of 2006) provide the shared principles and values of the Costa Rican public sector. Additionally, the Ethics Management Model provides for the development of an organisational Ethics Code or an Ethics Manual to allow public institutions to reflect their specific contexts, risks and challenges. In this sense, public institutions have developed institutional codes of ethics, including:
Code of Ethics and Conduct of the General Directorate of the General Archive of the Nation: it was developed in a participatory manner, which included a perception survey to employees, a diagnosis, and work sessions to present and validate the proposed principles and values.
Code of Ethics and Conduct of the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements: it was led by the members of the Institutional Commission on Ethics and Values.
Sources: Canada: Government of Canada (2011[14]), Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector, https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=25049; Canadian Transportation Agency (2012[15]), Code of Values and Ethics for the Canadian Transportation Agency, https://otc-cta.gc.ca/sites/all/files/altformats/books/Code-VE-en-final_0.pdf; Government of Canada (2016[16]), ESDC Code of Conduct, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/edsc-esdc/Em4-7-2016-eng.pdf; Government of Canada (2014[17]), Values and Ethics Code, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/maecd-dfatd/FR5-67-2014-eng.pdf; Costa Rica: OECD (2022[18]), OECD Integrity Review of Costa Rica: Safeguarding Democratic Achievements, https://doi.org/10.1787/0031e3b3-en.
To maintain consistency among the large number of organisational codes within the Federal Public Administration, the CGU could provide guidance to ministries and public sector institutions to develop or update their codes. This would allow public institutions to respond to their individual needs and specific risks, while ensuring that all organisational codes are aligned with the general public integrity legal framework, the Federal Public Service Values and the updated codes.
Such guidance could include:
A methodology for developing or updating an organisational code, with detailed guidance on how public institutions should manage its design, communication, implementation and periodic revision. This should be carried out based on an integrity risk assessment and by engaging internal and external stakeholders. International experience highlights the value of a bottom-up approach that involves diverse stakeholders, including public sector employees, private sector stakeholders –e.g., suppliers– and civil society representatives –e.g., users of public services. This participatory approach fosters consensus on shared principles of behaviour and expected standards of conduct of public officials, increases officials’ sense of ownership and compliance with the code, and clearly communicates the values of the public organisation to its stakeholders (OECD, 2018[13]).
A blueprint or template for an organisational code with a proposed list of content reflecting recurrent integrity issues (such as gift policy, conflict of interest, external activities, corruption reporting and whistleblowing), as well as standard provisions on these issues.
In addition to the guidance, the CGU could provide advisory services to ministries and federal executive institutions in the process of developing their organisational codes. This could be done via the Integrity Sectoral Units (Unidades Setoriais de Integridade, USI) of the System of Integrity, Transparency and Access to Information of the Federal Public Administration (Sistema de Integridade, Transparência e Acesso à Informação da Administração Pública Federal, SITAI), in co-ordination with the ethics commissions.
Examples from other countries could be used as an inspiration. For instance, the Ethics Unit in the Mexican Ministry of Public Administration (which has been restructured in 2024 and is now called Ministry for Anticorruption and Good Government, Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno) developed a short document outlining the main features that the organisational codes should include to maintain consistency among the various codes and to support the ministries in developing their own codes (OECD, 2019[3]). In addition, the Ethics Unit is responsible for revising each organisational code of ethics to ensure it is in line with the overarching code of ethics (OECD, 2019[3]).
Conflicts of interest are a matter of major public concern worldwide. A public sector that works closely with the business and non-profit sectors gives rise to forms of conflicts between the private interests of public officials and their public duties (OECD, 2004[19]). In this sense, having clear rules and guidelines in place to prevent and manage conflict of interest is essential for public officials to uphold public integrity in their role.
When conflict-of-interest situations are not properly identified and managed, they can seriously endanger the integrity of organisations and may lead to corruption in the public and private sectors alike. Indeed, while it is normal that public officials’ private interests will at times compete with the public interest, it is imperative that private interests do not improperly influence the performance of official duties and responsibilities (OECD, 2004[19]).
Brazil has established standards to prevent conflict of interest across the three branches of government. Laws and regulations referring to conflict of interest include:
Law 8.112/1990. Articles 117, 127, 132 contain a few prohibited behaviours and subsequent disciplinary sanctions (e.g., warning; suspension; dismissal).
Binding Precedent 13/2008 of the Federal Supreme Court prohibits nepotism in public administration by banning the appointment of close relatives (up to the third degree) of appointing authorities or senior officials to positions of trust, commission, or paid functions.
Presidential Decree 7.203/2010 develops the prohibition of nepotism within the federal executive branch.
Law 12.813/2013 (Conflict-of-Interest Law) develops standards to identify and manage conflict of interest in the federal executive branch and defines responsibilities for monitoring, evaluating and preventing such conflicts.
Decree 10.889/2021. Chapters V and VI develop provisions on gifts and hospitality in the federal executive branch.
This section provides a detailed analysis of the conflict-of-interest framework in the executive, legislative and judiciary and proposes key measures to enhance the identification and management of conflict of interest. It begins by addressing the need for a clearer definition of “conflict of interest” in the Conflict-of-Interest Law and a more integrated approach of this matter to reduce fragmentation in the federal executive. It then examines strategies to strengthen co-ordination and coherence between the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) and the Public Ethics Commission (Comissão de Ética Pública, CEP), ensuring more effective oversight, along with initiatives to provide specific, practical guidelines that support understanding and compliance by public officials. Further recommendations focus on reinforcing conflict-of-interest regulations within the judiciary and legislative branches, as well as improving the revolving door system to prevent undue influence and maintain integrity.
Brazil’s normative framework on conflict of interest for the federal executive is fragmented and could be revised to strengthen key definitions and regulations
Brazil could amend articles 5 and 6 of the Conflict-of-Interest Law to ensure a broader coverage of conflict-of-interest situations
To enable public officials to identify and manage conflict-of-interest situations, a “conflict of interest” should be adequately defined (OECD, 2004[19]). This can be done descriptively (i.e., defining a conflict of interest in general terms) or prescriptively (i.e., defining a range of situations considered as conflicting with public duties) (OECD, 2020[20]). The OECD defines a conflict of interest as “a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities” (OECD, 2004[19]).
In Brazil, the Law defines a “conflict of interest” (article 3) as a “situation generated by the confrontation between public and private interests, which may compromise the collective interest or improperly influence the performance of the public function”. Under Article 4, public officials in the federal executive branch are required to act in such a way as to prevent any possible conflict of interest and to protect privileged information (article 4). The Law also lists situations that constitute a conflict of interest in the exercise (article 5) and after the exercise (article 6) of a position or employment in the federal executive branch (Government of Brazil, 2013[21]). Furthermore, the Law stipulates that any public official who commits the acts outlined in Articles 5 and 6 shall be considered to have committed administrative misconduct and may face dismissal as a disciplinary penalty, as stipulated in Articles 127 and 132 of Law 8.112/1990.
The lists outlined in articles 5 and 6 of the Conflict-of-Interest Law suggest a prescriptive and exhaustive approach to the matter while conflict-of-interest situations are regularly changing and evolving and can vary widely across sectors, institutions and jobs.
To address this concern, Brazil could consider:
1. Clarifying the situations listed in articles 5 and 6 of the Conflict-of-Interest Law as examples of real conflict-of-interest situations rather than an exhaustive list. This could be achieved by adding “among others” to indicate that the Law also covers potential and apparent conflict of interest as well as any other real conflict-of-interest situation not explicitly listed in the Law.
2. Moving the list of conflict-of-interest situations from Articles 5 and 6 to complementary guidelines, as part of a non-exhaustive list of examples of situations that lead to a conflict of interest. Such examples could be complemented with examples of potential and apparent conflict-of-interest situations.
Brazil could amend article 3 of the Conflict-of-Interest Law to distinguish between real, potential and apparent conflict of interest
Differentiating between actual, apparent and potential conflict of interest is key to develop targeted policies and responses that uphold ethical standards while avoiding unnecessary restrictions on public officials. Indeed, while a real conflict of interest requires immediate intervention to prevent misconduct and uphold integrity, a potential conflict of interest allows for preventive measures before any actual misconduct occurs. Additionally, distinguishing apparent conflict of interest is relevant for maintaining public trust, as perceptions of bias can undermine institutional credibility even in the absence of wrongdoing.
However, the conflict-of-interest definition in the Brazilian Conflict-of-Interest Law currently does not differentiate between real, potential and apparent conflict of interest. Brazil could therefore establish a definition of conflict of interest that allows to differentiate the different types of conflict of interest, providing a foundation for effectively identifying, managing, and resolving them appropriately (Box 2.4).
The OECD Guidelines on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Sector state that a “conflict of interest” involves a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official’s private-capacity interests could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities.
On this basis, a “conflict of interest” involves a situation or relationship which can be current or may have occurred in the past. Defined in this way, “conflict of interest” has the same meaning as actual conflict of interest.
By contrast, an apparent conflict of interest is said to exist where it appears that an official’s private interests could improperly influence the performance of their duties, but this is not in fact the case.
A potential conflict of interest occurs where a public official holds a private interest which would constitute a conflict of interest if the relevant circumstances were to change in the future.
Public servants in the Government of Canada are required to be as concerned with preventing apparent conflicts of interest as they are with preventing real and potential conflicts of interest. To support public officials in understanding the meaning and significance of apparent conflict of interest, the Government of Canada provided definitions to distinguish between the three types of conflict of interest:
A real conflict of interest denotes a situation in which a public official has knowledge of a private interest that is sufficient to influence the exercise of his or her public duties and responsibilities.
A potential conflict of interest incorporates a concept of foreseeability: when individuals can foresee that a private interest may someday be sufficient to influence the exercise of their duty, but has not yet, they are in a potential conflict of interest.
An apparent conflict of interest exists when there is a reasonable apprehension, which reasonably well-informed persons could properly have, that a conflict of interest exists.
Sources: OECD (2004[19]), “OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service”, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264104938-2-en; Government of Canada (2015[22]), Apparent Conflict of Interest, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/values-ethics/conflict-interest-post-employment/apparent-conflict-interest.html.
Brazil could amend article 3 of the Conflict-of-Interest Law to include a clear definition of “private interest” that covers financial and non-financial interests
The conflict-of-interest framework should make it clear that private interests go beyond economical and financial ones. The impartial performance of duties of public officials can be compromised by financial and economic interests, personal ties or relationships or other personal interests and undertakings (OECD, 2019[3]; 2004[19]).
In Brazil, although the definition of conflict of interest included in article 3 of the Conflict-of-Interest Law refers to “private interests”, it fails to explicitly include different kind of private interests or provide a definition of “private interest” that encompasses financial and non-financial interests. Moreover, by prohibiting public officials to provide services, maintain business relationships, represent, act as consultant or in any other way render services, articles 5 and 6 raise a strong connotation that private interests equal economical and financial ones.
As such, Brazil could amend the Conflict-of-Interest Law to include, in article 3, a clear definition of “private interest”. The definition should specify that private interests go beyond economical and financial interests that lead to a direct personal benefit to a public official, and include personal ties, relationships and private occupational interests that could reasonably be seen as likely to improperly influence the performance of the official’s duties.
Brazil could incorporate nepotism and favouritism into the broader definition of conflict of interest established in the Conflict-of-Interest Law
Nepotism should be understood as one type of potential high-risk area for conflict of interest (World Bank/OECD/UNODOC, 2020[23]) and should thus be covered by the conflict-of-interest framework. This is also the case of favouritism, situations where public officials that exercise decision-making authority that might determine specific public spending (e.g., grants, awards or contracts) benefit their families and friends. Favouritism is another type of conflict-of-interest situation and perhaps an even more salient problem as it is less visible and more socially accepted than nepotism itself.
In Brazil, the issues of nepotism and favouritism remain an area of key concern and relates mainly to political nominations and interference in recruitment procedures, for example in the legislative and the executive (Transparency International, 2022[24]). This situation is also acknowledged by public officials in the 2021 Survey on Ethics and Corruption in the Federal Public Service conducted in partnership between the CGU and the World Bank. Although most Brazilian civil servants believe that their organisation’s promotion and progression system is transparent, 24.5% of civil servants stated that the system was influenced by political connections and 22.4% believed it was influenced by friendships (World Bank, 2021[25]). In this sense, requiring some level of disclosure of personal relationships could reveal red flags indicating potential conflict of interest that should be properly managed by public officials.
Under the current legal framework for the executive branch, nepotism is addressed separately from the conflict-of-interest framework. Specifically, Binding Precedent 13/2008 of the Federal Supreme Court (Súmula Vinculante) and Presidential Decree 7.203/2010 prohibit nepotism. The former applies to the direct and indirect public administration across all branches of government of the Union, states, Federal District and municipalities, while the latter applies to the federal public administration exclusively. Decree 7.203/2010 prohibits public institutions from employing or hiring relatives of the President, the Vice-President, the Minister, highest administrative authority, or individuals occupying a management position of trust in the following cases: to fill a commission or trust position, to address a temporary need of exceptional public interest (unless the selection is preceded by a regular recruitment process), and for internships (unless the selection is preceded by a regular recruitment process).
To avoid fragmentation and ensure that the various typologies of conflict-of-interest situations are properly identified, disclosed and managed, Brazil could incorporate nepotism and favouritism into the broader definition of conflict of interest and into the broader conflict-of-interest framework through a revised Conflict-of-Interest Law. This would provide a more comprehensive approach to conflict of interest and ensure that all forms of undue influence, whether based on family ties or personal favours, are subject to proper scrutiny and management.
Brazil could set additional clear provisions on what is expected of public officials in relation to identifying, declaring and managing conflict-of-interest situations
A comprehensive conflict-of-interest framework should primarily encourage public officials to identify and disclose any private interests that could potentially conflict with their public duties (OECD, 2004[19]). Clear and proportionate provisions and procedures are essential to ensure that public officials fully understand their obligations to identify, declare, and appropriately manage conflict-of-interest situations (OECD, 2004[19]).
In Brazil, the Conflict-of-Interest Law and Decree 10.571/2020 set out rules for identifying, disclosing, and managing conflict of interest by high-level officials in the Federal Public Administration. The Conflict-of-Interest Law mandates that high-level officials –this is, ministers, persons occupying DAS level 5 positions and above (now equivalent to CCE-15 and FCE-15 and above), presidents, vice-presidents and directors of institutions within the indirect Federal Public Administration– submit an annual declaration to the CGU or the Public Ethics Commission (Comissão de Ética Pública, CEP) (article 9). It empowers the CEP to assess and oversee conflict-of-interest situations and to determine measures for their prevention or elimination (article 8). Decree 10.571/2020 further develops these provisions by requiring high-level officials to fill an interest declaration upon taking office, leaving office and on an annual basis. These declarations cover private activities conducted in the previous year, kinship ties, and specific asset situations that may give rise to conflicts of interest and must be submitted via the Electronic System of Asset and Conflict of Interest Information (Sistema Eletrônico de Informações Patrimoniais e de Conflito de Interesses, e-Patri).
However, these provisions could be strengthened by introducing a requirement for high-level officials to submit ad hoc interest declarations at the earliest opportunity when they become aware of a real, potential, or apparent conflict of interest during their term. Such ad hoc interest declarations are critical to capture changes in private interests or circumstances that arise between annual declarations. This ensures transparency and integrity by addressing potential conflicts as they occur, rather than delaying disclosure until the next scheduled submission. Prompt reporting reduces the risk of conflicts going unnoticed or unmanaged and supports public trust by enabling more effective, real-time monitoring and resolution of conflicts.
For other public officials, there are currently no clear provisions outlining their responsibilities for identifying, disclosing, and managing conflict of interest. To address this gap, Brazil could consider amending the Conflict-of-Interest Law to require all other public officials to declare any private interests that might give rise to a real or potential conflict of interest to their institution’s human resources unit (i) upon assuming a new position and (ii) at the earliest opportunity after becoming aware of such a conflict during their tenure. Brazil could also introduce explicit obligation for these officials to manage or resolve a conflict of interest, thereby raising awareness of their ongoing responsibility to prevent and mitigate conflicts throughout their public service.
Brazil could strengthen gifts and hospitality provisions by requesting all other public officials to register gifts and hospitality received with their human resources department and prohibiting family members of public officials to receive any gift or hospitality
Conflict of interest, or the perception of a conflict of interest, can also arise when public officials receive gifts or benefits from third parties. This includes invitations for decisionmakers to participate in events, seminars and conferences, or sponsorship of initiatives without proper transparency (OECD, 2004[19]).
In Brazil, there are specific regulations regarding the receipt of gifts and benefits by public officials in the federal executive branch. First, the Law 8.027/1990 (article 5 VIII) classifies accepting or promising gifts, of any type or value due to their duties as an administrative offense punishable by dismissal. Second, the Law 8.112/1990 (article 117) prohibits public officials from accepting gifts of any kind, due to their public responsibilities. Third, the Conflict-of-Interest Law (article 5 VI) further develops this provision for public officials of the federal executive and states that “receiving a gift from anyone who has an interest in the decision of the public agent or the collegial body in which they participate, beyond the limits and conditions established by regulation” constitutes a conflict of interest and must be avoided.
Decree 10.889/2021 elaborates on these limits and conditions by distinguishing between two categories of gifts:
The first category (brinde) includes low-value items distributed widely as customary courtesy, advertising or publicity. These may be accepted without the need for registration in the e-Agendas platform.
The second category (presente) includes goods, services, or advantages of any kind offered by individuals with an interest in influencing a public decision. These are strictly prohibited. Decree 10.889/2021 states that if it is not possible to refuse or immediately return a presente, the public official must deliver it to the assets unit (setor de patrimônio) of their institution, which will determine its proper disposition. Decree 10.889/2021 also states that high-level public officials must declare and publish the presentes received in the e-Agendas platform. High-level public officials correspond to ministers, holders of positions of special nature (e.g., CCE-18 positions), certain high-level positions in public foundations, public companies and mixed-capital companies (i.e., president, vice-president and director or equivalent), and senior public officials who previously held DAS 5 and 6 positions, now equivalent to CCE-15 and FCE-15, and CCE-17 and FCE-17.
Decree 10.889/2021 also includes provisions on hospitality. Hospitality is defined as “service or expenses offered for transportation, meals, accommodation, courses, seminars, conferences, events, fairs or entertainment activities, provided by a private agent to a public official in the institutional interest of the public institution in which they work” (article 5). Any hospitality offered by a private agent to a public official must be pre-authorised by the relevant institution before acceptance. This authorisation shall consider the institutional interests and the potential integrity and reputational risks for accepting such offer. Any hospitality received by high-level public officials – from a private agent should be registered and published in the e-Agendas platform.
While high-level officials are required to disclose presentes and hospitality received in the e‑Agendas platform, there is a lack of transparency regarding the acceptance of presentes and hospitality by all other public officials, particularly those working in high-risk areas such as public procurement and licensing. This lack of transparency increases the potential for conflict-of-interest situations, as it becomes difficult to identify when presentes or hospitality could influence decisions or create undue influence in sensitive areas. To address this gap, Brazil could consider implementing a provision that mandates all public officials to register any presente and hospitality they receive with the human resources department of their respective institutions. Based on this, the human resources department could also suggest conflict-of-interest mitigation measures when needed or initiate a formal advice request in the Electronic System for Conflict-of-Interest Prevention (see section below).
Moreover, none of these regulations consider that gifts and other benefits provided to the family members of public officials can also create a conflict-of-interest situation. Indeed, gifts or other benefits given to family members may, directly or indirectly, influence public officials in the performance of their duties or reasonably be perceived as doing so. Moreover, discussions with key stakeholders highlighted the growing prevalence of this issue, particularly in the case of hospitality offered to family members. To strengthen the current regulations on gifts and hospitality within the executive federal branch, Brazil could consider implementing a ban on family members of public officials –such as spouses and children– from accepting any form of gift or hospitality.
The CGU and the CEP could strengthen monitoring responsibilities within the conflict-of-interest framework and provide additional tailored guidance for public officials
The Conflict-of-Interest Law contains provisions on how to manage or prevent conflict-of-interest situations. Article 4 requires public officials to act in such a way as to prevent or avoid a possible conflict of interest and to safeguard privileged information. It further mandates that public officials seek guidance from the appropriate authority in case of doubt: high-level officials of the federal executive branch must consult with the CEP, while all other public servants of the federal executive branch must consult with the CGU. Different procedures apply depending on the body responsible for handling conflict-of-interest consultations.
High-level officials of the federal executive branch are expected to seek guidance from the CEP via an Electronic Information System called Sistema Eletrônico de Informações da Presidência da República (SEI-PR). Once registered in the SEI-PR, high-level officials can send their consultation requests, together with relevant documents for the Public Ethics Commission to do the corresponding analysis, as outlined in Figure 2.1. High-level officials can also track their request via a Unique Case Number that they receive after sending their consultation request. Over the last 3 years, the CEP has received over 800 consultations (196 in 2021, 340 in 2022 and 273 in 2023), and has identified 251 cases of conflict of interest (81 in 2021, 121 in 2022 and 49 in 2023) and recommended relevant mitigating actions (CEP, 2024[26]).
Once this process is completed, the CEP's final decision may authorise or not the exercise of private activities, impose a 6-month restriction (cooling-off period) on engaging in private activities, or issue recommendations to prevent conflict of interest, depending on the specifics of each case (Government of Brazil, 2013[21]). Recommended measures from the CEP may include prohibiting individuals from acting before the body or entity where they previously worked, using privileged information, or working for companies that contract with the federal public administration.
Additionally, the CEP monitors high-level officials during cooling-off periods to ensure compliance. However, a designated unit should also be responsible for monitoring the implementation of all recommendations beyond these cooling-off periods to effectively prevent conflict of interest, including those that may arise while high-level officials are still in office. To address this, the CEP could expand its role to oversee and ensure high-level officials comply with all recommendations, not just those related to cooling-off periods. Moreover, according to Article 143 of Law 8.112/1990, authorities that are aware of irregularities in the public service are obliged to promote their immediate investigation. In so far, the CEP could ensure the enforcement of conflict-of-interest regulations by informing the Federal Inspectorates (Corregedorias Federais) –organisational units competent to deal with internal disciplinary cases– within public bodies in case of violations detected by the CEP.
Regarding all other public servants of the federal executive branch, the CGU developed and implemented a procedure by means of Interministerial Ordinance 333/2013, which is detailed in Figure 2.2. All consultation requests by all other public servants of the federal executive branch should be submitted via the Electronic System for Conflict-of-Interest Prevention (Sistema Eletrônico de Prevenção de Conflito de Interesses, SeCI). Over the last 3 years, the CGU has received over 8.800 consultations (2.813 in 2021, 2.974 in 2022 and 3.102 in 2023) via the SeCI (CGU, 2024[27]).
Source: Based on CGU (2013[28]), Portaria Interministerial No 333, de 19 de Setembro de 2013, https://repositorio.cgu.gov.br/bitstream/1/44844/16/PORTARIA%20INTERMINISTERIAL%20N%c2%ba%20333.pdf.
Once this process is completed, in those cases where the CGU concludes that there is a risk of conflict of interest, the SeCI forwards the results of the analysis to the human resources unit of the relevant public institution, along with recommended measures for eliminating or mitigating the conflict of interest. Recommended measures from the CGU may include signing a commitment to refrain from providing services to a specific individual or group or abstaining from participating in processes or matters that could affect a particular person or group. Public officials may appeal CGU's decision within 10 days. The appeal will be reviewed by the decision-making authority within the CGU, who must respond within 5 days. If the decision is upheld, the public official may escalate the appeal to a higher authority within the CGU, which will have 15 days to analyse and resolve the case. Once the decision is finalised, a commitment agreement is established with the public official to ensure proper management of the conflict-of-interest situation.
However, there is currently no designated unit responsible for monitoring the implementation of the commitment agreement by public officials, raising the risk that these agreements may become merely symbolic actions. To address this, the CGU could consider assigning the responsibility of monitoring and overseeing compliance with the agreement to human resources units. These units already handle related tasks, such as receiving consultations on potential conflict of interest and conducting preliminary analysis to determine whether a conflict of interest may exist in the cases submitted to them. As such, assigning this new responsibility to the human resources units would not significantly increase their workload. Human resources units could also be empowered with the responsibility of informing the Federal Inspectorates when public officials fail to uphold the commitment. This would ensure that the Inspectorates are informed about possible disciplinary violations in a timely manner and are able to initiate a disciplinary investigation as needed (see Chapter 5). This, in line with Article 143 of Law 8.112/1990, which requires authorities that are aware of irregularities in the public service to promote their immediate investigation.
Additionally, the CGU could continue current efforts to ensure some degree of coherence and homogeneity when conducting the analysis of the consultations received through the SeCI. This includes continue efforts such as the development of the Handbook for Treatment of Conflict of Interests (Manual Tratamento de Conflcito de Interesses) as well as specific training activities targeting human resources units.
In addition to laws and counselling, guidelines and training should also be employed to provide practical examples and concrete steps for identifying and resolving conflict-of-interest situations, particularly in rapidly changing or “grey” areas, such as the transition of public officials to the private sector. Recognising this need, the CGU has developed a dedicated webpage on conflict of interest, featuring information about the Conflict-of-Interest Law and other regulatory guidelines on this matter. The page provides general guidance and videos from a conference series on conflict of interest to assist both human resources units and public officials in navigating conflict-of-interest procedures. However, further measures are needed to strengthen public officials’ understanding of conflict of interest and empower them to take responsibility for the proper identification and management of conflicting interests.
To that end, the CGU and the CEP could provide complementary guidance for public officials to support them in identifying and managing conflict-of-interest situations. Such guidance could include a non‑exhaustive list of examples of real, potential and apparent conflict-of-interest situations, a non-exhaustive list of examples of financial and non-financial interests that could lead to conflict of interest (including assets, liabilities and debts, business interests, external activities and positions, personal affiliations and associations, and family interests), among others.
Moreover, the CGU and the CEP could issue regular communications and guidelines based on trends observed from advice sought by public officials over a period of time or on recurring systemic or sector-specific issues. Such communications and guidelines must always respect the confidentiality of the exchanges between the CGU and the CEP, and those requesting advice. The CGU and the CEP could develop these communications and guidance independently, in line with their respective mandates, and/or collaboratively within the framework of the Co-operation Agreement No. 1/2023.
Additionally, considering that some public officials operate in sensitive areas with a higher risk for conflict of interest, such as auditors, tax officials, inspectors or procurement officials, the CGU could develop specific and complementary guidelines for preventing and managing conflict-of-interest situations in specific sectors or positions that are most at risk of corruption. Figure 2.3 shows particular categories of public officials that are covered by specific conflict-of interest policy. For example, the CGU could support public procurement officials by providing a manual on conflict-of-interest situations specific to public procurement. The CGU could also continue undergoing efforts to develop tailored guidance responding to the specificities of different sectors jointly with line ministries, such as the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Health. This is the case of the Guide to Understanding Conflict of Interest and other interpretations in the application of the Legal Framework for Science, Technology and Innovation (Guia de entendimentos sobre conflito de interesses e outras interpretações na aplicação do Marco Legal de Ciência Tecnologia e Inovação), developed by the CGU, along with key public institutions.
Source: OECD (2019[3]), OECD Integrity Review of Argentina: Achieving Systemic and Sustained Change, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g98ec3-en.
Brazil could consider enacting specific legislation and providing complementary guidance on identifying and managing conflict of interest in the legislative and judiciary
In both the legislative and judiciary branches, there are currently very limited standards and guidance to help public officials properly identify, disclose and manage conflict of interest, beyond the general provisions of Law 8.112/1990.
In the legislative, the Code of Ethics and Parliamentary Decorum of the Senate provides an obligation for Senators to present a mandatory interest declaration “during the exercise of their mandate, in Committee/Commissioner or Plenary sessions, at the beginning of a consideration of matters that directly and specifically involve their patrimonial interests” (Federal Senate, 1993[29]). Similarly, the Code of Ethics and Parliamentary Decorum of the Chamber of Deputies provides an obligation for Deputies to present a “declaration of impediment to vote at the beginning of a consideration of matters that directly and specifically involve their patrimonial interests” (Câmara dos Deputados, 2015[30]). In the judiciary, various codes of ethics establish obligations to act in defence of the public interest and prevent the interference of public officials’ private interests. These include the Codes Ethics of the Federal Supreme Court, the Superior Labour Court, the Superior Electoral Court, among others.
However, the codes fail to define key terms such as “conflict of interest” and “private interest”, which are essential for ensuring a clear understanding of conflict-of-interest provisions. The codes also fail to acknowledge that private interests are not limited to financial or pecuniary interests but can also include private interests that go beyond economical and financial ones. This gap is particularly evident in the case of the codes of ethics of the legislative, which require Senators and Deputies to submit a declaration where their “patrimonial interests” may present a conflict. Moreover, the codes do not present the obligations of declaring interests and preventing interference with private interests as part of a broader conflict-of-interest framework. A comprehensive approach should include detailed processes for identifying, declaring, and managing conflict of interest. The Senate’s Code of Ethics and Parliamentary Decorum takes an initial step in this direction by requiring Senators to submit mandatory interest declaration in certain situations to the Parliamentary Ethics and Decorum Council. However, this measure is primarily intended for “wide dissemination and publicity” rather than for effectively resolving or managing conflict of interest.
Given these limitations in the legislative and judiciary, Brazil could benefit from enacting legislation to establish specific and well-defined conflict-of-interest frameworks for each of these branches of government. These frameworks should provide an all-encompassing definition of conflict of interest that differentiate between real, potential and apparent conflict-of-interest situations, along with other key definitions such as “private interest”. Moreover, the conflict-of-interest frameworks for the legislative and the judiciary should also address the current vagueness compounded by the absence of detailed processes for identifying, declaring and managing conflict of interest (including when and to/by whom actions should be made). Box 2.5 provides an example of how OECD countries define key terms and obligations to disclose and manage conflict of interest in the judiciary.
In Costa Rica, the judiciary established specific and well-defined conflict-of-interest regulations. The Regulation for the “Prevention, Identification and Management of conflict of interest in the Judiciary” (Regulación para la Prevención, Identificación y la Gestión adecuada de los conflictos de Interés en el Poder Judicial) seeks to allow judicial operators to prevent, identify and manage possible conflict of interest. The Regulation:
Provides a definition of a conflict of interest in the judicial branch and the types of private interests with the ability to generate conflict of interest.
Contains guidance on steps to formally report a possible conflict of interest (to its hierarchical superior) and recusals when handling cases related to their former private practice.
Contains a specific set of measures and obligations directed to managers. For instance, it stresses the key role of management in identifying possible conflict of interest in their offices, sending reminders to staff about the importance of reporting conflict-of-interest situations and the scope of the applicable obligations.
States that providing an appropriate solution to conflict-of-interest situations is key to prevent a bigger negative impact on judicial management, affecting the image and credibility of the Judiciary.
Source: OECD (2022[18]), OECD Integrity Review of Costa Rica: Safeguarding Democratic Achievements, https://doi.org/10.1787/0031e3b3-en.
Additionally, gaps exist in the legislative and judiciary regarding conflict of interest –or the perception thereof– arising from the receipt of gifts or benefits from third parties. These gaps could also be addressed by developing comprehensive conflict-of-interest frameworks tailored to each branch of government.
In the judiciary, codes of ethics currently establish clear and comprehensive rules on the acceptance of gifts and other benefits by public officials. These rules generally prohibit accepting gifts or benefits, except when offered as a courtesy, provided they do not exceed a specified threshold. They also outline procedures for transferring gifts that cannot be returned to a designated authority for proper handling. For example, under the Code of Ethics for Servants of the Federal Supreme Court, employees are prohibited from accepting gifts or benefits, including transportation, accommodation, event tickets, vehicle or housing loans, travel perks, and meal payments, unless their value is below R$100 and they are offered as a courtesy, for advertising purposes, as part of routine distribution, or for special commemorative events. Additionally, if a gift or benefit cannot be refused or returned without incurring costs, public officials are required to deliver it to the Secretariat for Services Administration and Property Management, which oversees donations to philanthropic or cultural organisations. However, transparency could be further strengthened regarding received gifts and benefits.
In the legislative, there are currently very limited standards on the acceptance of gifts and other benefits. Neither the Code of Ethics and Parliamentary Decorum of the Senate nor the Code of Ethics and Parliamentary Decorum of the Chamber of Deputies expand on the general provisions outline in Laws 8.112/1990 and 8.429/1992.
To address these gaps, Brazil could consider incorporating specific provisions on the receipt of gifts or benefits from third parties within the proposed conflict-of-interest frameworks for the judiciary and the legislative:
In the judiciary, Brazil could consider standardising and integrating provisions from the codes of ethics into the proposed conflict-of-interest framework. Moreover, to reinforce existing measures–and in alignment with good practices already implemented in the federal executive branch– Brazil could introduce a requirement for public officials in the judiciary to declare all gifts and benefits received, including those transferred to a designated authority for donation. This measure would enhance transparency and help mitigate concerns regarding officials' impartiality. Additionally, Brazil could consider implementing a ban on family members of judiciary officials –such as spouses and children– from accepting any form of gift or hospitality, as gifts received by family members may also, directly or indirectly, influence public officials in the performance of their duties.
In the legislative, Brazil could consider introducing specific provisions on receiving gifts and other benefits within the proposed conflict-of-interest framework. These provisions should include broad and comprehensive definitions of gifts and other benefits, establish a threshold for the maximum acceptable value of gifts from a single source in a calendar year, outline procedures for transferring gifts that could not be returned to a designated authority, and implement mechanisms for ensuring transparency of gifts received, among others. For specific rules on receiving gifts from interest representatives, see Chapter 6. The frameworks already in place in Brazil’s executive and judiciary branches could serve as inspiration, as well as relevant examples from other counties (see Box 2.6).
In Spain, the Code of Conduct of the Cortes Generales in Spain establishes that the Members shall refrain from accepting, for their own benefit or that of their families, gifts of value, favours, services, invitations or trips that are offered to them for reasons of their position or which could reasonably be perceived as an attempt to influence their conduct as parliamentarians. Gifts with a value greater than EUR 150 are understood as an attempt to influence Members’ conduct as parliamentarians. Gifts and presents received by Members on official trips or when acting on behalf of the Parliament must be delivered to the General Secretariat of the corresponding Chamber, provided that they are offered for reasons of their position and not a personal title and have an estimated value of more than EUR 150. These gifts will be inventoried and published on the website of the corresponding Chamber.
Source: Government of Spain (2015[31]), Ley 3/2015 de 30 de marzo, reguladora del ejercicio del alto cargo de la Administración General del Estado, https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2015-3444#:~:text=La%20presente%20ley%20tiene%20por.
Moreover, Brazil could move beyond legal reforms by offering practical guidance to help public officials in the legislative and judiciary branches identify, disclose, and manage conflict-of-interest situations appropriately. This includes:
Establishing a dedicated advisory function within each branch of government –similar to the roles of the CGU and CEP in the federal executive branch. This is an effective step towards ensuring consistent and informed guidance on conflict-of-interest management within each branch of government as well as fostering an environment of trust, where public officials feel encouraged to seek advice, raise questions, and disclose situations that may present potential conflict of interest.
Developing complementary guidelines for each branch of government, including relevant examples. The purpose of providing examples would be to raise public officials’ awareness. Drawing on examples from other jurisdictions (Box 2.7) may serve as valuable inspiration to Brazil.
In Costa Rica, the judiciary developed a toolbox with various resources to support awareness raising and conflict-of-interest management. The toolbox includes a conflict-of-interest simulator, explanatory videos and infographics on the Regulation for the “Prevention, Identification and Management of conflict of interest in the Judiciary” and examples of conflict-of-interest situations that may arise, and relevant manuals and circulars further developing conflict-of-interest regulations.
In France, the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life Haute (Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique, HATVP) is responsible for controlling the integrity of the highest-ranking French public officials. This includes receiving and verifying the declaration of assets and/or interests by public officials (elected and civil servants), such as members of the government, deputies and senators, advisers to the President of the Republic, ministers, and the presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate, among others. For instance, in 2024, the HATVP received 13,103 declarations of interests and assets and controlled 5,122 declarations of interests and assets. Taking into account the fact that the concepts of “conflict of interest” and illegal taking of interest can be difficult to assess, the HATVP published two comprehensive guides on conflicts of interest for public organisations and public officials. The guides present the High Authority's doctrine on the risks of conflict of interest, particularly between public interests, and offer a summary of the ethical procedures that mark the career of a public official or civil servant.
Note: To access the toolbox of Costa Rica’s judiciary: https://oficinacumplimiento.poder-judicial.go.cr/index.php/conflictos-de-interes; to access France’s Ethics Guide Manual for public officials and ethics referents (Guide déontologique Manuel à l’usage des responsables publics et des référents déontologues): https://www.hatvp.fr/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/HATVP_guidedeontoWEB.pdf and France’s Ethics Guide II Control and prevention of conflicts of interest (Guide déontologique II Contrôle et prévention des conflits d’intérêts): https://www.hatvp.fr/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/HATVP_GuideDeontologie_2021_A-Imprimer.pdf.
Source: French Government (2013[32]), Loi n° 2013-907 du 11 octobre 2013 relative à la transparence de la vie publique, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000028056315/.
Brazil could strengthen the identification and management of conflict-of-interest situations in pre- and post-public employment
Conflict of interest can arise from employment before and after the tenure of public officials. Such situations fall under the so-called “revolving door phenomenon”, this is, the movement between the private and public sectors. Although it is in the interest of the public sector to attract an experienced and skilled workforce, the revolving door phenomenon can provide an undue or unfair opportunity to influence government policies if not properly regulated and managed (OECD, 2021[33]). For instance, public officials coming from the private sector could take decisions that favour the companies (or the sectors) they came from, or companies could offer interesting contracts to public officials as a quid pro quo for a corrupt favour.
To mitigate these risks, governments should establish rules and procedure for joining the public sector from the private sector and vice versa and set proportionate cooling-off periods aimed at preventing apparent, potential and real conflict of interest. When designing these measures, countries should be mindful of identifying the right balance between restrictions and incentives, as revolving door restrictions should protect public processes from abuse but should not be so onerous that the public sector can no longer attract the highly talented individuals needed for certain positions (OECD, 2022[18]).
The CGU and the CEP could revise the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration to harmonize its post-public employment provisions with the current legal framework and enact specific post-public employment legislation for relevant at-risk positions
Currently, Brazil has specific provisions on post-public employment for high-level officials of the federal executive branch. First, the Conflict-of-Interest Law (article 6) includes provisions on what is considered to be a conflict-of-interest situation for high-level officials after leaving office (Box 2.8). High-level officials under the Conflict-of-Interest Law include ministers, positions of special nature (e.g., CCE-18 positions), certain high-level positions in public foundations, public companies and mixed-capital companies (i.e. president, vice-president and director or equivalent), and senior public officials who previously held DAS 5 and 6 positions, now equivalent to CCE-15 and FCE-15, and CCE-17 and FCE-17.
Second, the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration (articles 14 and 15) also establishes cooling-off arrangements for high-level officials of the federal executive branch (Box 2.8). High-level officials under the Code of Conduct include ministers, secretaries of state, holders of positions of a special nature (e.g., CCE-18 positions), executive secretaries or equivalent authorities who previously held DAS 6 positions, now equivalent to CCE-17 and FCE-17, presidents and directors of national agencies, autarchies, foundations maintained by the Government, public companies, and mixed capital companies.
According to the Conflict-of-Interest Law, a conflict of interest may arise following the exercise of a position or employment within the federal executive branch in the following cases:
At any time, by disclosing or using privileged information obtained during the performance of official duties.
Within six (6) months of dismissal, termination, resignation, removal from office, or retirement –unless expressly authorised by the CEP or the CGU– by engaging in any of the following activities:
Directly or indirectly providing services of any kind to an individual or legal entity with whom a significant relationship was established during the term of office or employment.
Accepting a role as an administrator, board member, or establishing any professional relationship with an individual or legal entity conducting activities related to the scope of the former position or employment.
Entering into service, consultancy, advisory, or similar contracts with federal executive branch bodies or entities that are directly or indirectly linked to the institution where the position or employment was held.
Directly or indirectly intervening on behalf of a private interest before a body or entity where the individual previously held a position or with which a significant relationship was established during the period of service.
According to the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration, upon leaving office, high-level officials are prohibited from:
Acting on benefit of or in favour of any individual or legal entity, including trade unions or professional association, in matters or transactions in which they were directly involved during their tenure.
Providing consultancy services to individuals or legal entities, including trade unions or professional associations, by using non-public information about programmes or policies of the Federal Public Administration institution to which they were affiliated or had a direct and significant relationship in the six months prior to leaving office.
Additionally, in the absence of a specific law prescribing a different timeframe, public officials must adhere to the following rules during four months after the end of their public appointment:
Refrain from accepting positions as administrators, board members or establishing a professional relationship with individuals or legal entities with whom they had a direct and significant official relationship in the six months preceding the end of their public appointment.
Avoid intervening on behalf of or in favour of any individual or legal entity before any institution of the Federal Public Administration with which they maintained a direct and significant official relationship within the six months prior to their dismissal.
Source: OECD (2022[34]), Database on Corporate Political Engagement Regulations, https://web-archive.oecd.org/2022-03-22/621995-regulating-corporate-political-engagement.htm.
However, the provisions of the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration are not fully aligned with the requirements of the Conflict-of-Interest Law. For example, the Conflict-of-Interest Law mandates a six-month cooling-off period after leaving public office, during which high-level officials are prohibited from accepting roles as administrators, board members, or engaging in any professional relationship with individuals or legal entities conducting activities related to their former responsibilities. In contrast, the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration sets this period at four months. While the Code clarifies that this period applies only when no law specifies a different timeframe, ensuring full alignment between the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration and existing legal provisions remains essential. To address any discrepancy, the CGU and the CEP should consider revising the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration, particularly to harmonize its post-public employment provisions with the current legal framework.
Additionally, the Conflict-of-Interest Law (article 8) assigns the CEP monitoring and enforcement responsibilities regarding high-level officials. As such, the CEP supervises high-level officials under “cooling-off period” to ensure compliance with its own advice before they take up new positions in the private sector after leaving public office. The Law also requires high-level officials to formally notify in writing to the CEP or the human resources unit of their respective institutions when they receive job offers, contracts or business opportunities they intend to accept in the private sector. This obligation applies even if not prohibited by current regulations and remains in effect for a period of six months following the departure from public office (article 9). The aim of this measure is to help high-level officials identify and timely address potential conflict-of-interest situations derived from the movement from the public to the private sector.
Nevertheless, in addition to cooling-off regulations based on seniority, countries should also consider implementing such regulations according to the level of risk associated with specific public service roles. For example, positions that involve regular contact and interaction with the private sector –such as officials working in public procurement, regulatory policy, inspections, tax and customs, among others– operate in high-risk areas where proportionate and adequate post-public employment restrictions could help mitigate conflict of interest.
Recognising this risk, the sole paragraph of Article 2 of the Conflict-of-Interest Law states that public officials holding positions with access to privileged information that could provide economic or financial advantages to themselves, or a third party are also subject to post-public employment provisions. However, Brazil has yet to issue specific legislation addressing these officials.
As such, Brazil could introduce provisions on post-public employment that cover key high-risk areas based on functions, tasks, and sectors –particularly those involving access to sensitive information– in the updated Conflict-of-Interest Law. For specific rules on cooling-off period on lobbying activities, see Chapter 6. The post-public employment provision for key high-risk areas should include measures such as temporary restrictions on certain activities (cooling-off periods), mandatory disclosing requirements, and the designation of a responsible entity to oversee implementation. For instance, Brazil could empower human resources units within each institution to identify and propose measures to mitigate potential conflict of interest arising from revolving-door situations, as well as to monitor compliance with cooling-off periods. This approach is aligned with current and proposed responsibilities of human resources units within the broader conflict-of-interest framework.
Brazil could strengthen pre-public employment mechanisms to identify potential conflict-of-interest situations in the federal executive branch
Concerning the other sense of revolving doors, this is, restrictions on former private-sector employees hired to occupy public sector positions (pre-employment restrictions), Brazil has put in place some mechanisms to identify conflict-of-interest situations in pre-public employment, which include interest disclosure prior to assuming functions and pre-screening for high-level officials. Regarding interest disclosure, high-level officials –i.e., ministers, persons occupying positions in DAS 5 and above (now equivalent to CCE-15 and FCE-15 and above), presidents, vice-presidents and directors of institutions of the indirect Federal Public Administration– are expected to fill an interest declaration within 10 days of their appointment and submit it to the CEP. The interest declaration includes private activities carried out in the previous year, kinship ties and specific asset situations that may give rise to a conflict of interest (Government of Brazil, 2020[35]). The CEP is empowered to analyse the interest declaration to prevent conflict of interest from occurring.
As for pre-screening, Brazil has established the Integrated Appointments and Consultations System (Sistema Integrado de Nomeações e Consultas, Sinc), an electronic system that facilitates the registration, control and analysis of appointments to high-level positions within the federal public administration. The Sinc forwards appointment requests to the CGU and to the Brazilian Intelligence Agency of the Office of Institutional Security of the Presidency of the Republic, for verification of the candidate's background. Additionally, it automatically consults the database of sanctions applied by ethics commissions maintained by the CEP.
Building on these processes, Brazil could explore further strengthening pre-employment checks for integrity for high-level officials of the federal executive branch. While there is limited consensus on the accuracy or reliability of integrity pre-screening tools, international practices could serve as valuable references. For instance, in Australia, each public entity must conduct vetting to ensure the eligibility and suitability of its personnel who have access to government resources. While checking personal identity and eligibility to work in the country is mandatory, integrity and reliability checks are recommended (Table 2.3). Australia's screening system is built on both data-driven screening and qualitative assessment methods.
Source: Adopted from Australian Government (2022[36]), Protective Security Policy Framework - Policy 12: Eligibility and Suitability of Personnel, Attorney General’s Office.
Additionally, Brazil could consider implementing other practical measures such as bans and restrictions for a limited period and ethical guidance for former private-sector employees and former lobbyists entering high-level positions and relevant at-risk positions in the federal executive branch (see also Chapter 6). When determining which restrictions to apply in the provisions, the Brazilian authorities could adopt a risk-based approach. Not all officials pose the same risk or same magnitude of risk, and standards should therefore be fair, proportionate, and reasonable. Similar measures are implemented in OECD countries, such as France (Box 2.9), which could be valuable examples for Brazil to draw inspiration from.
France
In France, article 432-13 of the Penal Code places restrictions on private-sector employees appointed to fill a post in the public administration. For a period of three years after the termination of their functions in their previous employment, they may not be entrusted with the supervision or control of a private undertaking, with concluding contracts of any kind with a private undertaking or with giving an opinion on such contracts. They are also not permitted to propose decisions on the operations of a private undertaking or to formulate opinions on such decisions. They must not receive advice from or acquire any capital in such an enterprise. Any breach of this provision is punished by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR 200 000.
Source: OECD (2021[33]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
Brazil could consider enacting specific legislation for the identification and management of conflict-of-interest situations in post-public employment for Members of the National Congress
When it comes to the legislative branch, Brazil currently lacks appropriate regulations on post-public employment for Members of the National Congress (Congresso Nacional), leaving the door open to undue or unfair advantage to influence public decision-making. This is particularly relevant considering that Members of the Brazilian National Congress are central in the public decision-making process, set the political agenda and have access to confidential information that could be potentially used in the benefit of selected few once Members of the National Congress have left public office.
Considering this, Brazil could develop legal provisions to regulate post-public employment situations for Members of the National Congress as well as a policy or procedure for detecting and timely addressing such situations. In particular, Brazil could develop a risk-based approach for setting post-employment restrictions and appropriate oversight to ensure implementation of these measures in the legislative branch. For specific rules on cooling-off periods on lobbying activities, see Chapter 6. Several OECD countries have already established cooling-off periods for public officials in their legislative bodies that Brazil could use as inspiration (Table 2.4).
Note: The data was extracted from the OECD Product Market Regulation Indicators (2018) and complemented by the Authors through desk research.
Source: OECD (2021[33]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
Asset declarations are used globally to identify unjustified variations in the assets of public officials, improve integrity, and promote accountability. According to World Bank data, more than 160 countries have introduced a system of asset declaration, interest declaration, or both, for public officials (Kotlyar and Pop, 2021[37]).
Asset declarations cover the disclosure of pecuniary interests, and they are usually verified with specific and predetermined frequency, as their role is mainly to reveal inconsistencies and significant variances when comparing declarations for successive years. As such, asset declarations are not intended as a preventive tool, but rather as a post factum verification of unjustified wealth and illicit enrichment (OECD, 2023[38]).
In Brazil, public officials across the three branches of government are required to submit asset declarations. Laws 8.112/1990 (article 13) and 8.429/1992 (article 13, as amended by Law 14.230/2021) mandate that public officials of the three branches of government must present a declaration of their assets upon appointment, annually, and upon leaving public office. For high-level officials across the three branches of government, additional and more detailed obligations apply. Law 8.730/1993 establishes general rules for asset declarations by political and high-level officials in the three branches of government, including the President and Vice-President, ministers, members of the Congress, members of the federal judiciary, officials of the Office of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Union, and political appointees on the basis of trust.
The CGU could develop a risk-based methodology for prioritising the verification of asset declarations and partially disclose asset declarations of public officials of the federal executive branch
For the federal executive branch, further guidance and tools have been developed to strengthen general asset declarations provisions. First, Decree 10.571/2020 further develops the rules for asset declarations provided by Laws 8.112/1990, 8.429/1992 and 8.730/1993, expanding the information to be declared as well as providing a procedure to verify and monitor declarations. This Decree also develops the obligation provided by the Conflict-of-Interest Law requiring high-level officials to declare their interests in addition to their assets (for more information about this obligation see previous section).
Article 4 of Decree 10.571/2020 states that declarations of assets must be filled and submitted, as follows:
when taking office –or within 10 days of their appointment for officials appointed to DAS 5 or higher positions (now equivalent to CCE-15 and FCE-15 and above)
within 10 days of their return to office –in the case of public officials returning from leave period without remuneration for one year or greater
on the date of leaving public office
on an annual basis.
Second, as mandated by Decree 10.571/2020, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) developed a centralised Electronic System of Asset and Conflict of Interest Information (Sistema Eletrônico de Informações Patrimoniais e de Conflito de Interesses, e-Patri) which allows public officials to fill and submit their asset declarations electronically. Public officials also have the possibility to authorise the CGU to directly request access to their annual declarations of Income Tax and Earnings of Any Nature (declarações anuais de Imposto sobre a Renda e Proventos de Qualquer Natureza) submitted to the Special Secretariat of the Federal Revenue of the Ministry of Finance, instead of filling their information in e-Patri.
The information to be declared in e-Patri is comprehensive. The 2020-2021 e-Patri Manual states that public officials must report (CGU, 2020[39]):
personal information – including if they have spouse or partner; dependents and alimony beneficiaries
their assets and rights and those of their dependents and alimony beneficiaries –including immovable and movable assets, participation in companies, and other 6 categories
revenues –including from rural activity, capital gain, and other 6 categories
their payments and those of their dependents and alimony beneficiaries –this is, payments that are tax deductible such as health, education, retirement funds etc.
their debts and donations and those of their dependents and alimony beneficiaries.
Assets, revenues and payments must be reported when held in Brazil or abroad.
The CGU is empowered to review asset declarations and analyse the evolution of the public officials’ assets. This process follows a three-step procedure:
First, the CGU verifies compliance with the requirement to present the declarations.
Second, the CGU examines changes in public officials’ assets over time. During this step, public officials may be requested to provide clarifications or additional information if inconsistencies are detected in the declaration submitted.
Third, if there is strong evidence of an unjustified increase in public officials’ assets inconsistent with legitimately earned and proven income, a commission initiates an asset investigation (sindicância patrimonial) within 30 days from the date it is opened. An asset investigation is an administrative, confidential and non-punitive procedure aimed at identifying potential illicit enrichment by federal public officials.
Upon completion, a conclusive report is prepared, summarising the findings and providing a recommendation to the investigating authority: either to close the file case or to initiate disciplinary administrative proceedings. If disciplinary proceedings are recommended, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, the Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da União, TCU), the CGU, the Special Secretariat of the Federal Revenue of Brazil, the Financial Activities Control Council and the Federal Attorney General's Office must be notified. Note that illicit enrichment is currently treated as an administrative offense, rather than a criminal one in Brazil. As such and in line with previous recommendations by MESICIC, Brazil could criminalise the conduct of illicit enrichment as described in Article IX of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC, 2025[40]).
Moreover, considering that more than 750.000 civilian public officials in Brazil are expected to submit asset declarations every year via e-Patri, the CGU could develop an automated risk analysis framework to filter declarations and prioritise in depth and manual verifications by ranking declarations according to their risk level, strengthening steps one and two of the current three-step procedure. This would also increase the capacity of the CGU to verify assets of public officials by focusing limited resources on the in depth and manual verification of high-risk declarations. Several guides provide the basis for this preliminary analysis (see Box 2.10). In particular, the CGU could consider using categories of officials as the basis of defining risk (e.g. politically exposed persons, decision-makers, directives or officials involved in public procurement processes, etc.), meaning a more in depth and manual verification would be conducted for at-risk positions.
The automated risk analysis framework limits the number of declarations that undergo the more labour-intensive manual verification and focuses such verification on high-risk declarations. The automated risk analysis is both a prioritisation and detection tool. It helps prioritise the verification of numerous declarations. In addition, it can be used to better detect violations following the risk indicators identified by the analysis. The automated risk analysis helps to remove or limit the discretionary decision-making concerning the targets of verification. General considerations include:
Use of a risk-based approach to trigger and prioritise verification when inherent risks are found in the disclosure form, such as the position/duties of the declarant. Systems which automatically trigger the verification on formal grounds (e.g. late submission) are ineffective as they overburden the verification agency. This is especially relevant for systems where the number of disclosures is substantial and not matched with the resources to verify them.
When the number of mandatory verifications is substantial, the verification agency has to prioritise its work by focusing on high-risk declarations. Such prioritisation should be transparent and based on clear criteria limiting discretionary decision-making. The system may categorise declarations submitted by certain top officials as high-risk by default. This will give credibility to the system and avoid focus on low-level officials or petty inconsistencies.
External signals (e.g. media reports, complaints of citizens or watchdog NGOs, referrals from other authorities) should take priority. The agency should verify them if they give rise to a substantiated suspicion of irregularity. Anonymous reports about verifiable facts should also be included.
The verification should include IT solutions that automate certain operations. Such solutions can perform a risk analysis of each declaration, compare several declarations of the filer or compare with declarations of similar filers. Applying analytical software to the disclosure data can help to find patterns that can be then used to develop red flags for future verifications.
Cross-checking disclosures with other government held registers and databases is an important element of the verification that effectively uses government data. The system can also automate such cross-checks and perform them shortly after the declaration is filed or even at the time of the submission.
Source: Kotlyar, D. and L. Pop (2021[37]), Automated Risk Analysis of Asset and Interest Declarations of Public Officials: A Technical Guide, http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36336.
Finally, according to article 7 of Decree 10.571/2020, the information contained in asset declarations is accessible only to the CGU and the CEP. However, this declaration system could benefit from some level of social control. When public disclosure is ensured, active media, civil society and their reactions can serve as effective disciplining factors (OECD, 2011[41]). Additionally, where legal sanctions are applied, the publicising of these sanctions can itself be considered a dissuasive measure (OECD, 2011[41]). In particular, there are strong reasons to disclose, at least partially, information about high-level public officials, who should be prepared to provide explanations regarding the disclosed data. These include enabling a countless number of external stakeholders, namely media, civil society organisations and individuals, to verify declarations and report inconsistencies to the authorities (OECD, 2017[42]).
In this sense, Brazil could explore the possibility of partially disclosing asset declaration of public officials of the federal executive branch. By amending Decree 10.571/2020, Brazil may strike the right balance between public transparency and privacy protection, allowing the publication of some information contained in the asset declarations of high-level public officials. For instance, certain information such as a public officials’ IDs, contact details and place of residence or information about cash and valuables held outside of bank can be withheld from publication (World Bank/UNODC, 2023[43]). In any case, the scope of the information withheld from disclosure should be explicitly and narrowly determined in law (World Bank/UNODC, 2023[43]).
Brazil could consider expanding the type of information to be declared and strengthening the legal framework to process, verify and audit asset declarations in the legislative and judiciary
Regarding the legislative and judiciary, Law 8.730/1993 establishes the scope and categories of assets to be declared by high-level officials. According to article 2, these officials must declare a “detailed list of real estate, movable property, livestock, titles or securities, rights over motor vehicles, boats or aircraft, and cash or financial investments held in Brazil or abroad, by the declarant and their dependents” (Government of Brazil, 1993[44]). The declaration shall also include details of any executive positions or roles in collegiate bodies that the declarant currently holds or has held in the past two years, whether in private companies, the public sector, or other institutions, both in Brazil and abroad.
Nonetheless, the scope of information required is limited, as it excludes relevant categories such as outside sources and values of income, bank or other debts, government stocks, virtual assets (e.g. cryptocurrencies), among others. Furthermore, the Law does not establish a procedure to systematically verify and monitor the evolution of assets over time.
To address these limitations, Brazil could consider expanding the types of assets that must be declared in the legislative and judiciary. Although the categories of assets, amount of information and level of detail that an official may be required to disclose vary from country to country, most declaration forms require a combination of the following information: movable and non-movable assets, liabilities, financial and business interests, positions outside of office and information on the sources and values of taxable and non-taxable income (see Figure 2.4).
Note: World Bank analysis of 138 countries with disclosures systems. For G20, percentages are calculated only considering those countries that have a disclosure system.
Source: OECD/World Bank (2014[45]), “Good practices in asset disclosure systems in G20 countries”, https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/G20-Anti-Corruption-Resources/Thematic-Areas/Asset-Recovery/Good_practices_in_asset_disclosure_systems_in_G20_countries_prepared_by_the_OECD_and_the_World_Bank_2014.pdf.
Moreover, Brazil could further strengthen the legal framework and institutional capacity to process, verify and audit declarations by political and senior level officials of the legislative and judiciary to ensure the systematic verification and monitoring of declarations with the aim of detecting illicit enrichment. As a first step towards this goal and as in the case of the CGU for the federal executive branch, an institution/unit should be empowered in each branch to ensure compliance with the legal framework as well as verify and audit declarations.
Finally, asset declarations do not only depend solely on the legal obligation to report, but also the quality of the information provided by public officials. Therefore, ensuring forms are understood and filled in correctly, and having access to guidance when needed, is a key part of the success of any system (OECD, 2023[38]). Indeed, the act itself of completing a declaration can strengthen the integrity of public officials as they need to first self-evaluate which assets they have, and the extent to which these could undermine their ability to serve the public interest. As such, providing guidelines to strengthen the awareness and capacity of officials to understand asset declarations and their purpose may have an impact of applying integrity standards in their daily activities.
To that end, Brazil could consider developing clear guidance within the corresponding codes of ethics or thought complementary guidelines on the proper completion of asset declarations by public officials in the legislative and judiciary. The responsibility for issuing and updating this guidance could be assigned to the institution/unit established to ensure compliance with the legal framework within each branch of government. Such guidance could include a range of examples of financial and economic interests, debts and assets that officials should declare, a list of individuals that are considered as “dependants” and as such public officials are obliged to declare their assets, and a syllabus incorporating lessons learned from previous cases involving inaccurate or incorrect declarations.
A public service selected and managed based on merit is a fundamental element of any public sector integrity system and presents many benefits (OECD, 2019[46]; 2020[20]). First, merit-based systems reduce opportunities for clientelism, patronage and nepotism, which take place when jobs are created solely for awarding salaries to friends, family, and political allies or when managers or politicians appoint people to positions based on their personal ties, rather than on skills and merit. Second, hiring people with the right skills for the job generally improves performance and productivity, which translates into better policies and better services for citizens (OECD, 2020[20]). Third, a merit-based systems provides the necessary foundations to develop a culture of integrity by providing the right type of incentives and accountabilities that underpin professionalism and public sector values.
Therefore, to promote integrity in public employment, the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity recommends that adherents “promote a merit-based, professional, public sector dedicated to public service values and good governance, in particular through:
Ensuring human resource management that consistently applies basic principles, such as merit and transparency, to support the professionalism of the public service, prevents favouritism and nepotism, protects against undue political interference and mitigates risks for abuse of position and misconduct.
Ensuring a fair and open system for recruitment, selection and promotion, based on objective criteria and a formalised procedure, and an appraisal system that supports accountability and a public service ethos” (OECD, 2017[1]).
The Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services could implement integrity checks as part of recruitment processes
In a merit-based civil service, three principles should be applied to all personnel decision-making processes: transparency (e.g., open and documented processes), objectivity (e.g., clear criteria and standardised processes), and consensus (e.g., involving multiple people in human resources decision making) (OECD, 2020[20]).
When it comes to recruitment, transparency is a core feature of recruitment processes in the Brazilian Federal public service. For instance, recruitment competitions are advertised publicly, and the list of successful candidates is published. While this transparency is welcome, the recruitment processes should test relevant knowledge and skills as well. Previous OECD reports have noted that most recruitment processes in Brazil do not formally assess skills in a systematic manner (OECD, 2023[47]; 2019[48]). To that end, more appropriate assessment methodologies could be identified (OECD, 2023[47]), including tools aimed at undertaking initial integrity checks. In general, public organisations in OECD countries use a variety of targeted tools to implement integrity checks and assess personal character, which could serve as inspiration to Brazil (Box 2.11).
Use of uniform curriculum vitae formats, allowing to apply integrity filters to ease identification of suitable candidates.
Pre-screening integrity test (e.g., online), personality tests or similar examinations, as a first step to be considered for the position, and/or as input into the final decision.
Interview questions asking candidates to reflect on ethical role models they have had previously in the workplace, and/or to discuss ethical dilemmas they have faced and how they reacted to them.
Situational judgement tests and questions that present candidates with a morally ambiguous situation and have them explain their moral reasoning.
Role-play simulations and gamification to be conducted in an assessment centre.
Reference checks which include questions related to ethical decision making and assessment from peers in previous positions on the ethical nature of the person and their ability to manage others ethically.
Questions that enable the candidate to demonstrate awareness of and capacity to model moral management behaviour.
Source: OECD (2023[49]), “Reforming Integrity Checks and Code of Ethics in Bulgaria: Recommendations for the Anti-Corruption Commission”, https://doi.org/10.1787/d19f60c1-en.
Moreover, Brazil is currently undertaking a Unified National Competition (Concurso Nacional Unificado) for the recruitment and selection of federal public servants in the vacancies authorised in different public bodies and institutions of the Federal Government. This competition is being led by the Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services (Ministério da Gestão e Inovação em Serviços Públicos). As such, Brazil could consider implementing some integrity checks as part of this process. This, in line with the information provided by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) on the Unified National Competition, which aims to recruit candidates with a profile aligned with the values of public service, considering aspects such as public vocation, integrity and professionalism in the selection process and not only the strictly technical criteria endorsed in the traditional selection system.
The Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services could harmonise performance evaluation processes and modalities across different careers
While merit-based systems usually focus on selection, appointment and recruitment, as this is generally the first line of defence against nepotism and patronage, these systems should also cover the whole career of public servants, including performance management, trainings and development opportunities, discipline and dismissal, amongst others (OECD, 2020[20]).
In Brazil, performance evaluation is mandatory during new public servants’ probationary period and for the majority of public servants every 6, 12 or 18 months; general rules on performance evaluation have been developed in different pieces of legislation including Law 8.112/1990, Decree 7.133/2010 and Decree 84.669/1980. However, the performance evaluation framework in Brazil presents some weaknesses that could undermine merit-based selection and promotion of federal public officials.
First, there are some groups that are not evaluated, including public servants who occupy high-level positions. Considering that many senior leaders are directly appointed –as the application of competitive selection processes to fill high-level positions is voluntary– and that senior leaders are currently not covered by the performance evaluations framework (OECD, 2023[50]; 2023[47]), this could raise specific integrity risks that threaten merit-based principles. This challenge is addressed in the OECD report Strengthening Integrity Leadership in Brazil’s Federal Public Administration: Applying Behavioural Insights for Public Integrity (2023[50]).
Second, although performance evaluation is mandatory for most public servants, there are no unified and standardised rules regarding criteria and assessment procedures to conduct performance evaluations across the Federal Administration, as the rules on performance evaluation are provided for in the law for each of the more than 100 existing careers (carreiras). Therefore, when performance evaluations are conducted, there is a heterogeneous level of implementation that varies according to the level of maturity of each public institution and the specific rules developed for each career (OECD, 2023[47]). Moreover, integrity criteria –i.e., criteria aimed at testing for integrity and moral reasoning of public servants– are not systematically used as part of the performance evaluation process of public servants.
Considering this, the Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services could consider harmonising performance processes and modalities across different careers to develop a standard that can be expected by all public servants of the Brazilian Federal Administration (for more information on this recommendation see OECD (2023[47])). When doing this, the Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services could ensure that integrity is incorporated both as a formal performance criterion and in the way the performance is conducted –for instance, performance goals could focus on the means by asking how the public official achieved the goals.
Additionally, special recognition could be given to those public servants that show consistent engagement in exemplary behaviour or contribute to building a culture of integrity in their organisation/department/unit –for example, by identifying new and innovative ways of promoting the Federal Public Service Values or the organisational code of integrity within their corresponding organisation/department/unit. Moreover, as part of the new performance processes, it could also be helpful to provide guidance to ensure discussions of general issues concerning the division of labour, teamwork, communication within the team, integrity concerns, etc., take place. If taken seriously, these regular discussions between managers and employees could help to make integrity one of the priorities of work performance.
Raising awareness and building knowledge and skills in ethics and anti-corruption are fundamental to fostering public integrity (OECD, 2020[20]). Awareness-raising initiatives help public officials identify integrity issues when they occur. Complementing these efforts, well-structure trainings provide public officials with the necessary knowledge and skills to manage integrity issues appropriately and seek expert guidance when needed. Together, awareness-raising and capacity-building activities strengthen public officials’ commitment to public integrity, encouraging them to perform their duties in the public interest (OECD, 2020[20]).
The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity calls on adherents to “provide sufficient information, training, guidance and timely advice for public officials to apply public integrity standards in the workplace, in particular through:
Providing public officials throughout their careers with clear and up-to-date information about the organisation’s policies, rules and administrative procedures relevant to maintaining high standards of public integrity.
Offering induction and on-the-job integrity training to public officials throughout their careers in order to raise awareness and develop essential skills for the analysis of ethical dilemmas, and to make public integrity standards applicable and meaningful in their own personal contexts.
Providing easily accessible formal and informal guidance and consultation mechanisms to help public officials apply public integrity standards in their daily work as well as to manage conflict-of interest situations” (OECD, 2017[1]).
The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity also highlights the key role of responsive and trustworthy leaders in fostering an open culture of integrity within the public sector. Leaders are called to demonstrate a strong commitment to public integrity and promote an open organisational culture by serving as integrity leaders. Such leaders should embody two key qualities: as moral persons, who understand their own values and use them to make the right decision when confronted with ethical dilemmas; and as moral managers, who communicate openly about ethics, encourage employees to seek advice, and provide opportunities for ethical guidance (Treviño, Hartman and Brown, 2000[51]; OECD, 2020[20]).
To strengthen integrity leadership, governments should ensure appointing individuals with strong integrity profiles to leadership positions – not only at the highest political and managerial levels but also at middle and lower management positions. Additionally, governments should support these leaders in their roles as integrity leaders by offering targeted guidance, training and opportunities for peer learning (for more information on how Brazil can strengthen integrity leadership in its Federal Public Administration, see (OECD, 2023[50]).
The CGU and the CEP could collaborate with the Integrity Sectoral Units and other units responsible for integrity functions to develop and implement systematic awareness-raising measures and trainings for public officials on public integrity
In Brazil, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) and the Public Ethics Commission (Comissão de Ética Pública, CEP) have developed and implemented various awareness-raising campaigns aimed at public officials. For example, the CGU launched the “CGU in action and against corruption” campaign (CGU em Ação e Contra Corrupção) to highlight its anti-corruption efforts and the “Integrity in the Federal government” campaign (Integridade no Governo Federal) to assist public institutions in establishing their integrity programmes. These initiatives included the creation of visual materials and detailed guides published online, covering different aspects of anti-corruption and public integrity. Additionally, the CEP carried out orientation campaigns targeting high-level officials of the Federal Public Administration, focusing on their obligations regarding public agenda transparency, conflict-of-interest prevention, and the proper use of the e-Agendas system.
However, evidence suggests the need for additional efforts to systematically raise awareness and enhance skills and capacities related to public integrity across the federal public administration. Previous OECD reports had identified gaps in training and guidance: Only a few Integrity Management Units (Unidades de Gestão de Integridade, UGIs) –units under the Public Integrity System of the Federal Executive Branch (Sistema de Integridade Pública do Poder Executivo Federal, SIPEF) that were previously responsible for raising awareness and developing capacities for integrity within public organisations– had provided guidance or conducted trainings on integrity (OECD, 2021[10]). Furthermore, only a small proportion of public officials, including civil servants and high-level officials, had received integrity trainings in their organisations (OECD, 2021[10]).
Additionally, findings from the CGU-World Bank Survey on Ethics and Corruption in the Federal Public Service reinforced these concerns: it revealed that training on integrity programmes was limited across the federal executive branch, with only 31.3% of respondents indicating they had received training on their organisation’s integrity programme (World Bank, 2021[25]). Similarly, the CGU-OECD Survey on integrity and leadership in the Brazilian Executive Branch showed that nearly half of high-ranked officials surveyed (45%) had not received any ethics-related training in the two years preceding the survey (OECD, 2023[50]). These findings underscore the pressing need for targeted initiatives to strengthen integrity awareness and training across the federal public administration.
The recently launched Public Integrity Maturity Model (Modelo de Maturidade em Integridade Pública, MMIP) offers a valuable framework for addressing these challenges. The MMIP provides comprehensive guidelines for public institutions that make part of the System of Integrity, Transparency and Access to Information of the Federal Public Administration (Sistema de Integridade, Transparência e Acesso à Informação da Administração Pública Federal, SITAI) to achieve a robust and effective integrity management, connected to the institution’s mission (for more information on the MIIP see Chapter 1). The MMIP is structured around three elements, one of which is the “organisational capacity of integrity”. This element includes a series of proposed activities aimed at raising awareness and strengthening capacities across public institutions in public integrity and related areas, such as integrity risk management.
To support public institutions in implementing the “organisational capacity of integrity” element of the MMIP, the CGU could partner with the Integrity Sectoral Units to design and implement an awareness-raising campaign that focuses on promoting a culture of integrity within the federal executive branch. In particular, the CGU could provide general guidance and materials to be used across the Federal Administration, while the Integrity Sectoral Units could customise these materials to the particular risks and challenges of their corresponding sectors and organisations. It is also essential for each Integrity Sectoral Unit to collaborate internally with other organisational units responsible for integrity functions –such as the human resources unit, ethics commission, correctional unit, audit unit, risk management unit, etc., to gather relevant information on specific organisational risks and challenges. Different activities could be considered as part of this awareness-raising campaign, including the development of posters, computer screen savers, employee boards, banners, bookmarks with messages about public integrity, or the design of personalised messages aimed at specific audiences. The examples of Mexico and New Zealand presented in (Box 2.12) can serve as an inspiration.
In Mexico, the Ministry of Public Administration (Secretaría de la Función Pública) diffused posters highlighting the constitutional principles for public officials. The posters explained the meaning of each public service value (legality, honesty, loyalty, impartiality and efficiency) and illustrated how these values translate into specific behaviours.
In New Zealand, the Public Service Commission created a poster outlining the Standards of Integrity and Conduct. This poster is displayed both within public organisations and publicly for citizens, reminding public officials of the meaning of these values and offering concrete examples of how to apply them in daily decision-making.
Sources: OECD (2017[52]), Integrity in Customs: Taking Stock of Good Practices, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/G20-integrity-in-customs-taking-stock-of-good-practices.pdf; OECD (2020[20]), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
When designing awareness-raising activities, Brazil should be aware of sometimes unintended consequences. For instance, reminding people about the scope and costs of corruption could simply reinforce that corruption is the norm and thus facilitate the justification of their own unethical behaviour (“everybody is doing it”). Corruption can then become a self-fulfilling prophecy while the well-intended messages can reinforce existing perceptions of high levels of corruption (Corbacho et al., 2016[53]; Cheeseman and Peiffer, 2021[54]; Peiffer, 2018[55]). In this sense, the CGU should build on recent available research and consider designing and implementing awareness-raising activities that explicitly focus on making visible and salient desired behaviours, thereby contributing to reinforcing such behaviours as the social norm.
To begin, Brazil could focus its communications on promoting public integrity by designing general messages that emphasise the expected behaviours aligned with the public service values and principles, rather than centring on corruption and its negative consequences. For instance, Brazil could introduce a “value of the month” initiative, selecting one value from the Federal Public Service Values each month and sharing a short explanation of its practical implications with all staff at the start of the month. Brazil could also consider using the so-called “moral reminders”, which have proven to be effective tools to change behaviour (OECD, 2018[13]). Moral reminders are specific, short messages aimed at reminding public officials about the moral norms that they are expected to follow in the moment of decision making or when confronted to ethical choices (OECD, 2018[13]). When introduced in a timely manner just before the moment of key decision making, these messages can have striking impact on compliance with integrity standards (Pruckner and Sausgruber, 2013[56]). The CGU could therefore partner with the Integrity Sectoral Units and other organisational units responsible for integrity functions to identify key processes and procedures for inserting timely moral reminders. For example, public procurement officials could be timely reminded of analysing potential conflict-of-interest situations and undertaking relevant mitigating actions before starting a tender procedure.
To refine moral reminders and ensure that they achieve the desired impact without unintended consequences, the CGU could collaborate with the Integrity Sectoral Units and other organisational units responsible for integrity functions to pilot the interventions before scaling them up. Lessons from the pilot could help improve the intervention by fine-tuning the messages and identifying the optimal timing for introducing the reminders. To achieve this, Brazil could adopt the OECD BASIC methodology for systematically applying behavioural insights (BASIC stands for Behaviour, Analysis, Strategy, Intervention, Change). The example of Mexico presented in (Box 2.13) can serve as an inspiration.
In Mexico, the Ministry of Public Administration in co-operation with the research centre CIDE sent out reminder emails to public employees required to register their received gifts. They randomly varied the text of the message. Five different types of reminder messages were sent:
Legal: It is your legal obligation to register received gifts.
Honesty: We recognise your honesty as a public official. You are required to register gifts. Show your honesty.
Impartiality: Receiving gifts can compromise your impartiality. When you receive a gift, register it.
Social: More than 1,000 registrations per year are made by your colleagues. Do the same!
Sanction: If you receive a gift and you do not inform us, someone else might. Don’t get yourself punished. Register your gifts.
Then, the Ministry of Public Administration and CIDE observed the number of gifts registered around the Christmas period (peak season for gifts) and compared this with previous years and against a control group who did not receive any of the reminder messages.
The study demonstrated that receiving a reminder email increased the number of gifts registered. However, some messages were more effective than others: reminding public officials of their legal obligations (legal message) and appealing to their impartiality and honesty (honesty and impartiality messages) encouraged more people to register gifts than referring to sanctions (sanction message) or registrations made by colleagues (social message).
Sources: OECD (2017[52]), Integrity in Customs: Taking Stock of Good Practices, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/G20-integrity-in-customs-taking-stock-of-good-practices.pdf; OECD (2018[57]), Behavioural Insights for Public Integrity: Harnessing the Human Factor to Counter Corruption, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264297067-en; Government of Mexico (n.d.[58]), “Unofficial English translation of the messages of the Mexican Ministry of Public Administration (original in Spanish)”.
Beyond awareness raising, the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity also emphasises the importance of developing essential skills for the analysis of ethical dilemmas and the implementation of integrity standards into day-to-day actions (OECD, 2020[20]). There are several methods available to support delivery of integrity trainings, including lectures, online courses, coaching and mentoring programmes (OECD, 2020[20]). However, evidence suggests that while online courses and lectures are effective for reaching a broader audience and familiarising employees with the relevant rules and laws, interactive training where participants engage with realistic ethical dilemma and conflict-of-interest scenarios are more likely to generate a personal and meaningful commitment to integrity compared to passive presentations (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011[59]; OECD, 2018[57]).
Considering this, the CGU and the CEP could further collaborate with the Integrity Sectoral Units to develop training activities on public integrity for public officials, using different delivery methods tailored to the target audience, the training’s objectives and the available resources. It is also essential for each Integrity Sectoral Unit to collaborate internally with other organisational units responsible for integrity functions –such as the human resources unit, ethics commission, correctional unit, audit unit, and risk management unit. Topics could include values, ethical dilemmas, conflict-of-interest management (including addressing nepotism and favouritism), and dealing with third parties seeking to influence public decision-making. In particular, the CGU and the CEP could take a leading role by providing general guidance and materials, which the Integrity Sectoral Units could then adapt to the particular risks and challenges of their sectors and the needs of the organisation’s public employees. In this sense, while the Integrity Sectoral Units would be responsible for collaborating with other organisational units responsible for integrity functions to adapt and implement the trainings within their organisations, the CGU would offer ongoing support through guidance, materials, and direct advice to the Integrity Sectoral Units. The trainings could be developed using a multilevel approach that includes:
Induction training: The CGU and the Integrity Sectoral Units could consider developing induction lectures and/or online courses to new employees and to old employees starting new positions within their organisation. Induction trainings provide an opportunity to set the tone regarding integrity from the beginning of the working relationship and familiarise public officials with the specific conduct and behaviour that is expected from them in their day-to-day activities (OECD, 2018[57]).
General training: The CGU and the Integrity Sectoral Units could consider developing recurring online courses to reinforce key concepts, expected behaviours and the rules outlined in Brazil’s regulatory framework for public integrity, helping public officials retain and apply this knowledge over time. These online courses could be developed in partnership with the National School of Public Administration (Escola Nacional de Administração Pública, ENAP), or included in specific modules of existing training courses.
Intermediate training: As the next step in building capacities on public integrity, the CGU could collaborate with the Integrity Sectoral Units and other organisational units responsible for integrity functions to develop and implement lectures and practical courses focused on specific areas related to public integrity, such as risk management, ethical dilemma and conflict of interest. These trainings could adopt a more interactive approach, presenting participants with realistic situations and concrete examples of ethical choices and conflict-of-interest situations they may encounter and encouraging discussions in small groups (Box 2.14).
Advanced training: The CGU and the Integrity Sectoral Units and other organisational units responsible for integrity functions could design and implement more in-depth practical trainings for specific in at-risk positions (e.g., Integrity Sectoral Units’ officials, public procurement officials, human resource management officials, high and middle-level managers, internal audit officials, etc.) to help them strengthening their capacities to address and manage integrity challenges.
To encourage peer learning, successful awareness-raising activities and capacity building programmes tailored and implemented within organisations could be shared in the Public Integrity Community (Comunidade de Integridade Pública) platform, created by the CGU in 2023. The Public Integrity Community platform aims to provide a forum where public officials from the Federal Public Administration working in the integrity field can share relevant information, experiences and good practices on public integrity. Despite being a recently developed tool, the Public Integrity Community platform has more than 500 members and gathers together good practices and experiences relevant to the community.
Key considerations for designing and implementing training to guide public officials in handling ethical dilemmas
Drawn from good practices from OECD countries, the following are key considerations for designing and implementing training to guide public officials in handling ethical dilemmas:
Key considerations for designing training to guide public officials in handling ethical dilemmas:
Consider making ethical dilemma situations relevant to different positions and situations public officials could find themselves in.
Consider including examples of the different categories of ethical dilemmas that public officials may encounter.
Consider developing a decision-making model to help public servants address ethical dilemmas.
Key considerations for implementing training to guide public officials in handling ethical dilemmas:
Consider making the training interactive.
Consider having a qualified trainer responsible for guiding the ethical dilemma training.
Consider creating a safe environment where public officials can discuss ethical dilemmas and voice integrity concerns.
Example of a training to guide public officials in handling ethical dilemmas
The Agency for Government Personnel in the Flemish Government has developed practical training to help public officials navigate ethical dilemmas. This training includes a set of examples of ethical dilemma situations tailored to different positions and reflecting real-life situations that public officials might encounter in their daily activities. Throughout the training, a facilitator encourages participant discussions on how to resolve these issues, guiding them through the exploration of different choices and their potential consequences.
Examples of ethical dilemmas situations include the following:
Situation 1: “I am a policy officer. The Minister needs a briefing within the next hour. I have been working on this matter for the last two weeks and should have already been finished. However, the information is not complete. I am still waiting for a contribution from another department to verify the data. My boss asks me to submit the briefing urgently as the Chief of Cabinet has already called. What should I do?
I send the briefing and do not mention the missing information.
I send the briefing but mention that no decisions should be made based on it.
I do not send the briefing. If anyone asks about it, I will blame the other department.
I do not send the information and come up with a pretext and promise to send the briefing tomorrow.”
Situation 2: “I am head of a department. My senior official asks me to carry out an interesting assignment that will help my department score well. We need that after the recent blunders of my department. The content of that assignment actually belongs to another department. What am I doing?
After I have notified the other department of the assignment, my department will carry out the job.
I inform the other department that I have received the assignment and ask them for input.
I refuse the assignment because I don't think I can do it in front of the other department.
I carry out the assignment and do not inform the other department myself: after all, this is the task of my senior official.”
Additionally, the Agency for Government Personnel designed guidelines for integrity actors within organisations to discuss ethical dilemmas and organise ethical dilemma training among employees within their own departments or agencies The rules proposed by the Agency for Government Personnel to organise dilemma training are published in its website, and can be summarised as follows:
The participants receive four “option cards” with the number 1, 2, 3 or 4. A set of “dilemma cards” are then placed on the table. Each dilemma card describes a situation and gives four options for resolving the dilemma. In each round, one of the participants reads out the dilemma card and the options. Each participant decides for him/herself what he/she would do in the dilemma situations, and records this decision with the choice card. Then, participants take turns announcing their choice using their choice cards and explaining the motivation behind their choice. The participants then discuss the different choices. The facilitator remains neutral, encourages the debate and suggests alternative ways to look at the dilemma (e.g., sequence of events, boundaries for unacceptable behaviour). The next participant reads out a new dilemma and the game restarts.
Note: In Flanders, integrity actors include the integrity contact person, confidential advisor, HR manager, anchor point on organisational control, diversity officer, manager
Source: Government of Flanders (n.d.[60]), Dealing with Integrity Dilemmas, https://overheid.vlaanderen.be/personeel/integriteit/omgaan-met-integriteitsdilemmas; (unofficial English translation, original in Dutch).
Finally, the CGU and the Integrity Sectoral Units could implement measures to monitor and evaluate the quality and impact of their training activities. This would allow them to learn from the implementation of the trainings, introduce relevant changes where needed, and focus limited resources in those activities that prove to deliver the best results.
The CGU and the CEP could raise awareness among public officials about the role of ethics commissions as the primary channel for seeking ethical guidance and advice while the ethics commissions could develop an ethical decision-making model and general questions and answers guidance
Beyond awareness raising and training, the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity also emphasises the relevance of providing guidance and making available consultation mechanisms when public officials are faced with specific doubts or ethical dilemmas in their daily work (OECD, 2017[1]). Although integrity is ultimately the responsibility of all organisational members, having dedicated “integrity actors” (a person or a unit) within each organisation can stimulate integrity and shape ethical behaviour (OECD, 2018[57]).
In Brazil, all 210 public institutions within the federal executive branch have designated a Sectoral Unit. These Integrity Sectoral Units are tasked with managing integrity, transparency and access to information within their respective organisation, in co-ordination with other organisational units responsible for integrity functions –such as the human resources unit, ethics commission, correctional unit, audit unit, and risk management unit. The specific responsibilities of the Integrity Sectoral Units are detailed in article 8 of Decree 11.529/2023, which establishes the SITAI. In particular, while the Integrity Sectoral Units are responsible for promoting orientation and training on integrity within their institutions, in collaboration with other integrity-focused units, they are not tasked with providing direct advice to public officials on integrity matters. According to Decree 6.029/2007, which established the Ethics Management System of the Federal Executive Branch (Sistema de Gestão da Ética do Poder Executivo Federal, SGEP), this responsibility lies with the ethics commissions.
The exclusion of advisory responsibilities from the mandate of the Integrity Sectoral Units addresses a previous overlap that existed between the former Public Integrity System of the Federal Executive Branch (Sistema de Integridade Pública do Poder Executivo Federal, SIPEF) and the SGEP. However, challenges remain in terms of the organisation and the power to issue reprimands (censura) (for more information see Chapter 1), as well as the lack of awareness by public officials of the advisory role of the ethics commissions. Indeed, establishing clear procedures for seeking guidance and raising awareness of the advisory function are also critical steps to ensure public officials have access to relevant and timely integrity advice (OECD, 2020[20]).
To this end, the CGU and the CEP could work closely to raise awareness among public officials about the role of ethics commissions as the primary channel for seeking ethical guidance and advice. Clear and accessible information should be provided, including detailed procedures for contacting ethics commissions, such as contact details and expected response times. In addition, specifying the scope of the advice (e.g. clarifying that it is not equivalent to a legal opinion) can protect both the ethics commissions and the public officials from misinterpretations or misuse of the guidance provided. Specific attention should also be given to maintaining confidentiality of exchanges between the ethics commission and the public officials, to create a “safe haven” in the organisation where public officials can go with questions, dilemmas and issues without fear of reprisal (OECD, 2020[20]).
Additionally, ethics commissions could consider developing an ethical decision-making model, using the Federal Public Service Values as a moral compass, to help public officials address ethical doubts and dilemmas. Ethical decision-making models provide steps or instructions on how public officials could make an ethical decision when presented with an ethical dilemma. While the CGU and the CEP could be responsible for ensuring some coherence across the federal executive branch, the ethics commissions should be responsible for reflecting the specificities of their respective public institution and the behavioural challenges faced by their institution. Both Australia and Canada provide relevant examples of how governments can support public officials in making the correct moral choices via designing decision-making models (Box 2.15).
In Australia, to help public servants address ethical dilemmas during the decision-making process, the Australian Public Service (APS) Commission developed a decision-making model in the form of the easy to remember acronym REFLECT. REFLECT provides a series of steps that public servants at all levels can use to recognise, evaluate and respond to a situation involving an actual or potential ethical issue. What this tool is really asking public officials to do is:
1. REcognise a potential issue or problem: Ask yourself: Do I have a gut feeling that something is not right? Do I feel this is a risky situation? Recognise the situation as one that involves tensions between APS Values or the APS values and your personal values.
2. Find relevant information and gather the facts: What was the trigger and circumstances? Identify the relevant legislation, guidance, policies (APS-wide and agency specific); identify the rights and responsibilities of relevant stakeholders; identify any precedent decisions.
3. Linger at the “fork in the road”, pause to consult supervisors, managers, respected colleagues, peers, or support services (remember privacy): Talk it through, use intuition and analysis, listen and reflect.
4. Evaluate the options, identify consequences, look at the processes: Identify the risks; discard unrealistic options; apply the accountability test: would the decision stand up to public scrutiny/independent review?; be prepared to explain the reasons for your decision.
5. Come to a decision, act on it and make a record if necessary.
6. Take time to reflect and review: How did it turn out for all concerned? Learn from your decision. If you had to do it all over again, would you do it differently?
The REFLECT model is an easy to remember tool developed to assist Australian public servants in the decision-making process in situation involving ethical issues. The REFLECT model, together with complementary trainings and guidelines such as the Australian Public Service Values and Code of Conduct in Practice, can support public officials in making the correct moral choices.
In Canada, the Defence Ethics Programme is a comprehensive values-based ethics programme that has been providing ethical guidance to both the Canadian Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, at the individual and organisational level, since it was first implemented in 1997. The Defence Ethics Programme developed general guidelines for ethical decision-making, consisting of a simple model of decision-making, which has proven to be a useful tool to assist in thinking through difficult situations with ethical components. Such model has the following four (five) interrelated stages:
1. Perception: consists in observing everything in a situation –including ethical factors– and interpreting what is observed.
2. Evaluation: consists in analysing the situation to identify all other important and relevant factors, judging a situation by formulating courses of action that resolve to the extent possible all of the competing factors belonging to the situation itself.
3. Decision: consists in analysing a preferred course of action by considering its full impact and potential consequences on the individual and others.
4. Implementation of the decision: consists in implementing the chosen course of action, including dealing with unforeseen and unforeseeable difficulties.
5. Learning: A fifth stage is often added to these four stages.
Sources: APSC (2018[61]), The REFLECT Model: A Decision-making Model for APS Values and Code of Conduct, Australian Public Service Commission, https://legacy.apsc.gov.au/reflect-aps-values-and-code-conduct-decision-making-model; Government of Canada (2002[62]), Fundamentals of Canadian Defence Ethics, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/defence-ethics/policies-publications/fundamentals-dep.html.
Moreover, ethics commissions could develop questions and answers guidance on key integrity issues, including identifying and managing conflict-of-interest situations, and commonly addressed concerns. While respecting the confidentiality of the exchanges with those requesting advice is key, ethics commissions could collaborate with human resources units and other organisational units responsible for integrity functions to identify areas where proactive general recommendations and guidance are needed, drawn from advice requested over a specific period or for recurring systemic or sector-specific issues.
The CGU could collaborate with the Integrity Sectoral Units to consult with staff on improving employees’ well-being, work processes and openness
The culture of integrity in an organisation is greatly determined by the development and promotion of an open organisational culture. Within the context of public integrity, an open organisational culture means employees, managers and leaders feel safe to engage in conversations with the aim of voicing their concerns and discussing integrity issues such as ethical dilemmas, potential conflict-of-interest situations, suspicions of integrity violations and other integrity concerns. Such a culture requires both leaders that are responsive and committed to discussing integrity issues, providing timely advice and resolving relevant integrity concerns, as well as employees that feel comfortable raising integrity concerns and reporting misconduct (OECD, 2017[1]). Building an open organisational culture has several benefits: First, it can help strengthen trust in the organisation; second, it can help cultivate pride of ownership and motivation amongst employees who feel their voice is heard and valued; third, it encourages employees to raise integrity questions and problems before they become damaging to the organisation (OECD, 2020[20]).
On the leaders’ side, the OECD report Strengthening Integrity Leadership in Brazil’s Federal Public Administration: Applying Behavioural Insights for Public Integrity (2023[50]) recommends several actions based on behavioural-informed strategies aimed at enabling an environment more favourable to the development of an open organisational culture. These include developing and providing trainings and workshops for senior public officials and future leaders and promoting a network amongst integrity leaders to facilitate the exchange of experiences, promote peer learning and enable alliances across the federal administration (for more information on the recommendations to strengthen integrity leadership, see OECD (2023[50])).
On the employees’ side, in addition to developing and implementing awareness-raising measures and capacity building activities as described in this section, Brazil could consider designing and implementing a specific initiative to encourage employees’ involvement in achieving organisational change.
In the short term, this initiative could focus on consulting staff on measures to improve work processes, well-being and general openness within public institutions.
In the medium term, the initiative could aim at identifying, testing and moving forward some of the proposed measures by engaging public officials in their design and implementation.
In the long term, some of the measures could be rolled out to other public institutions, according to needs assessments.
To implement this initiative, the CGU and the Integrity Sectoral Units, in collaboration with other organisational units responsible for integrity functions, could design and roll out it across the federal public administration. A key component of this initiative should be the establishment of two-way communication channels, enabling staff to share their ideas and provide inputs while also receiving timely feedback on the implementation and effectiveness of the proposed measures.
Moreover, to demonstrate commitment and encourage employees’ participation, public institutions could also involve integrity leaders engaged in strategies to strengthen integrity leadership, as outlined in the OECD report Strengthening Integrity Leadership in Brazil’s Federal Public Administration: Applying Behavioural Insights for Public Integrity (2023[50]). Given their day-to-day proximity to public employees, their established commitment to public integrity, and their visibility within organisations, the involvement of these leaders would send a strong signal of genuine intent to drive meaningful change. Moreover, by actively encouraging employees to contribute, this initiative not only increased the likeliness of achieving organisational change but also fosters a sense of ownership among public officials, empowers them to feel an important part of the organisation and promoters a culture where they take responsibility for voicing their ideas and concerns. Additionally, the Integrity Sectoral Units from different ministries could exchange good practices and lessons learned, building alliances across the Federal Public Administration and fostering peer learning to enhance the overall impact of the initiative.
The CGU could collaborate with the Ombudsman units within public institutions to develop and implement a communication strategy to raise awareness about the whistle-blower protection framework and encourage staff to raise their integrity concerns
Even in very open organisations, public officials may be faced with situations in which they do not feel confident to report integrity violations for fear of retaliation or because the process to do so is unclear. In this sense, establishing a clear and comprehensive whistle-blower protection framework is a safeguard for an open organisation culture. Effective frameworks for whistle-blower protection have several common characteristics: clear reporting channels, prohibition of formal and informal retaliatory actions, clear and guaranteed types of protection, effective review and investigation of complaints, and awareness-raising measures about the channels and protections available (OECD, 2020[20]).
In Brazil, the country has formalised and implemented several key elements of a whistle-blower protection framework, such as the reporting channel Fala.BR and personal data protection mechanisms for whistle-blowers, including pseudonymisation. However, there remain areas that could be further strengthened to ensure public officials feel confident submitting complaints without fear of retaliation or confusion about the reporting processes in place to do so (for more information on how to strengthen the whistle-blower protection framework see Chapter 5).
This is particularly relevant given that many civil servants do not feel safe enough reporting misconduct, primarily due to insufficient protection mechanisms and fear of conflict with colleagues. The 2021 Survey on Ethics and Corruption in the Federal Public Service conducted by the World Bank and the CGU found that only 12% of civil servants reported corruption in the three years preceding the survey, despite a third of civil servants having witnessed unethical practices (World Bank, 2021[25]). Moreover, the survey revealed that 51,7% of respondents did not feel safe enough to report illegal conduct (World Bank, 2021[25]). Additionally, when asked about the main challenges faced when reporting misconduct, 59.7% of respondents cited lack of protection, while 59% highlighted a preference to avoid conflict with colleagues. This suggests that many civil servants fear negative repercussions for reporting wrongdoing (World Bank, 2021[25]), underscoring the need to enhance protection mechanisms and foster a culture of trust and safety within the public service.
The proposed revision of the whistle-blower protection framework, as presented in Chapter 5, provides an opportunity to clarify key concepts and better inform public officials about their rights and responsibilities when submitting complaints, as well as the resources available to protect them. Indeed, a robust whistle‑blower protection system begins with clear and effective communication about the reporting channels and the safeguards in place for those who report misconduct (OECD, 2020[20]). In parallel, the CGU could collaborate with the Ombudsman units (ouvidorias) within federal public institutions to design and implement a communication strategy that highlights the critical role of whistle-blowers in safeguarding the public interest, raise awareness of the whistle-blower protection framework and encourage staff to voice their integrity concerns.
Considering the resources available, the CGU could leverage on the Ombudsman System of the Federal Executive Branch (Sistema de Ouvidoria do Poder Executivo Federal, SisOuv) to implement this communication strategy across the Federal Administration and more broadly in society. Such communication strategy should not only inform public officials about the whistle-blower protection measures in place but should also aim at helping change the negative perception that “blowing the whistle” is a lack of loyalty to the organisation. In this sense, the strategy’s approach could have two focus areas: first, on raising awareness within the public sector about existing channels and protection mechanisms available for those reporting misconduct, and second, on raising awareness more broadly in society about the importance of reporting misconduct to safeguard the public interest and fight corruption. Good practices from OECD countries on awareness-raising measures on whistle-blower protection could be used as inspiration (Box 2.16).
In Alberta, Canada, the Public Interest Commission of Alberta has led several awareness-raising activities on the benefits of an effective whistle-blower protection policy, including the following:
Created the Whistle-blower Awareness Day to raise public awareness of the role of whistle-blowers in society, as well as the awareness of the staff of government departments and agencies. The aim of Whistle-blower Awareness Day is to highlight whistle-blowers’ courage and the importance of their role in strengthening the integrity of public institutions.
Designed a series of posters and distributed them to public entities to be displayed in employee workspaces. The posters show messages such as ‘Make a change by making a call. Be a hero for Alberta’s public interest’.
Co-ordinated and participated in public events and conferences to employees and management within public entities, as well as professional associations.
Improved the Commission’s website by providing additional content and resources for employees and public entities on whistle-blower protection, including on how whistle-blowers are protected, reports of wrongdoing received and investigated, how to identify a wrongdoing and a reprisal (punishment for reporting wrongdoing), how to report a wrongdoing and a reprisal.
In Ireland, the Integrity at Work (IAW) Initiative is an example of a collaboration between government and civil society to promote whistle-blower reporting and protection. The IAW Initiative, designed by Transparency International Ireland, aims to assist employers to comply with the 2014 Protected Disclosures Act and foster workplaces where people feel safe to speak up about wrongdoing and supported to act with integrity. To date, more than 30 organisations from all sectors: public, private and not-for-profit have joined or signalled their intention to join IAW. IAW members receive a tailored package of support that includes, amongst others:
expert training and guidance for senior staff and board members on the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 and how to foster supportive environments for receiving and dealing with disclosures
free specialist legal advice
exclusive access to Transparency International Ireland resources, including the IAW Self-Assessment Framework, which enables members to evaluate existing whistle-blowing/protected disclosure policies and systems against best practice standards
places at peer-to-peer learning forums, workshops and the annual IAW conference. For instance, two IAW Forums were delivered to over 100 participants between December 2016 and June 2017, focusing on providing expert guidance to employers on issues such as assessments and investigation, complying with the Protected Disclosures Act, and others.
Note: To access Alberta Public Interest Commission’s website: https://www.alberta.ca/public-sector-whistleblower-protection.aspx.
Sources: Alberta’s Public Interest Commissioner (n.d.), Homepage, https://yourvoiceprotected.ca/ (accessed on 20 September 2022); IAW (n.d.[63]), What Is Integrity at Work?, https://integrityatwork.ie/about/what-is-iaw/.
Strengthening the legal and normative framework for public integrity in Brazil
Brazil could unify relevant legislation and standards into one cohesive and overarching legal framework for each branch of government.
The CGU and the CEP could revise the Code of Professional Ethics for the Civilian Public Servants of the federal executive branch and the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration to align them with the Federal Public Service Values.
The CGU could develop supplementary materials, such as guidelines or a toolkit, featuring practical examples to clarify how core values translate into the day-to-day conduct of public officials.
The CGU could enhance coherence of integrity standards across the Federal Public Administration by offering guidance on developing organisational codes to respond to institution-specific integrity risks in alignment with the Federal Public Service Value.
Supporting public officials in preventing and managing conflict of interest
Brazil could amend articles 5 and 6 of the Conflict-of-Interest Law to ensure a broader coverage of conflict-of-interest situations.
Brazil could amend article 3 of the Conflict-of-Interest Law to distinguish between real, potential and apparent conflict of interest and to include a clear definition of “private interest” that covers financial and non-financial interests.
Brazil could incorporate nepotism and favouritism into the broader definition of conflict of interest established in the Conflict-of-Interest Law.
Brazil could set additional clear provisions on what is expected of public officials in relation to identifying, declaring and managing conflict-of-interest situations.
Brazil could strengthen gifts and hospitality provisions by requesting all other public officials to register gifts and hospitality received with their human resources department and prohibiting family members of public officials to receive any gift or hospitality.
The CGU and the CEP could strengthen monitoring responsibilities within the conflict-of-interest framework and provide additional tailored guidance for public officials. In particular, the CGU could consider assigning the responsibility of monitoring and overseeing compliance with the commitment agreements signed by public officials to human resources units as well the responsibility of informing the Federal Inspectorates when public officials fail to uphold the commitments.
Brazil could enact specific legislation and providing complementary guidance on identifying and managing conflict of interest in the legislative and judiciary.
The CGU and the CEP could revise the Code of Conduct for the High Federal Administration to harmonise its post-public employment provisions with the current legal framework and enact specific post-public employment legislation for relevant at-risk positions.
Brazil could strengthen pre-public employment mechanisms to identify potential conflict-of-interest situations in the federal executive branch.
Brazil could enact specific legislation for identifying and managing conflict-of-interest situations in post-public employment for Members of the National Congress.
Strengthening the asset and interest declaration systems in Brazil
Brazil could criminalise the conduct of illicit enrichment as described in Article IX of the Inter‑American Convention against Corruption.
The CGU could develop an automated risk analysis framework to filter declarations and prioritise in depth and manual verifications by ranking declarations according to their risk level.
Brazil could provide some degree of disclosure of asset and interest declarations of high-level officials of the federal executive branch, while striking the right balance between public disclosure and protection of privacy.
Brazil could consider expanding the type of information to be declared and strengthening the legal framework to process, verify and audit asset declarations in the legislative and judiciary.
Mainstreaming integrity in human resources management in Brazil
The Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services could implement integrity checks as part of recruitment processes.
The Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services could harmonise performance evaluation processes and modalities across different careers.
Raising awareness and building capacities for public integrity to promote behavioural change and open organisation cultures in Brazil
The CGU could partner with the Integrity Sectoral Units and other units responsible for integrity functions to design and implement an awareness-raising campaign that focuses on promoting a culture of integrity within the federal executive branch.
The CGU and the CEP could collaborate with the Integrity Sectoral Units and other units responsible for integrity functions to develop training activities on public integrity, using different delivery methods tailored to the target audience, the training’s objectives and the available resources.
The CGU and the CEP could raise awareness among public officials about the available channels for seeking guidance and advice, especially the advisory role of the ethics commissions.
Ethics commissions could develop an ethical decision-making model and general questions and answers guidance to help public officials address ethical doubts and dilemmas.
Ethics commissions could collaborate with human resources units and other organisational units responsible for integrity functions to identify areas where proactive general recommendations and guidance are needed.
The CGU could collaborate with the Integrity Sectoral Units to consult with staff on improving employee’s well-being, work processes and openness.
The CGU could collaborate with the Ombudsman units within public institutions to develop and implement a communication strategy to raise awareness about the whistle-blower protection framework and encourage staff to raise their integrity concerns.
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