Remedies in digital markets in Latin America and the Caribbean

3. Authorities’ approaches to remedies in digital markets

This section will focus on overall trends in authorities’ approaches to remedies in digital markets, looking primarily at Latin America and the Caribbean and comparing this to examples from outside the region as relevant, and highlighting opportunities to address particular challenges and enhance enforcement efforts going forward. Specifically, this section will examine the types of remedies applied, the use of interim measures and commitment procedures, and the extent of extraterritorial effects.

3.1. Types of remedies applied

Across the LAC digital markets cases canvassed in section ‎2, behavioural remedies are the most commonly applied by competition authorities, while structural remedies have not been used to address concerns in digital markets thus far, in line with global trends. Structural remedies may not be available to all enforcers in the case of abuse of dominance investigations, or may require a high standard to be used if they are available. However, competition authorities in the US and the EU have sought structural remedies in several high-profile enforcement cases, including relating to Google’s search and ad tech services.1

As such, competition authorities and courts in the region have given more attention to the design of behavioural remedies of varying levels of complexity in digital markets. In this light, remedies relating to contractual provisions, such as exclusivity agreements and MFNs, may be simpler to design and implement. However, the actual remedies implemented in these cases were not necessarily straightforward. For instance, the iFood and Gympass cases in Brazil involved with the setting of multiple different quantitative thresholds for the types of exclusivity agreements which could arise.

Demand-side remedies have also been considered by competition authorities in LAC, such as in Brazil’s Google Shopping case. While CADE ultimately voted to close the case, three Commissioners explicitly considered possible demand-side remedies to address the competition concerns at hand, such as using behavioural insights to inform the design of user choice interfaces between Google Shopping and alternative price comparison services.

As such, increased attention on competition concerns arising in digital markets, and the increasing complexity of these concerns, has been a factor driving competition authorities towards implementing more complex remedies, as opposed to straightforward prohibitions. These trends could be said to be intrinsically linked, due to the presence of bottlenecks or ‘gatekeepers’ platforms, whose conduct cannot always be tackled by means of one-off negative obligations but require ‘the administration of regulatory‑like measures’ (Ibáñez Colomo, 2025[20]). In light of this, Ibáñez Colomo (2025[20]) notes in the EU context that such remedies put competition authorities and courts in the position of acting as regulatory agencies, even in situations where they may not necessarily have the expertise or resources to design, monitor and enforce such solutions.

Also relevant is the prospect of compounding error effects, given that authorities are required to make multiple decisions throughout the course of investigation – including first making a finding about the infringement, and secondly making a decision on the appropriate scope of the response (Lancieri and Pereira Neto, 2022[21]). This could suggest that the more certain authorities (or courts) are about the extent of anti-competitive harm, the stronger the remedies should be (or, the reverse, where there is less certainty about the competitive harm, the intervention should be more restrained). Moreover, any risks of over or under enforcement in remedy design may be heightened in the context of highly dynamic digital markets.

To help mitigate these risks, authorities may be able to look to similar cases or remedies applied in other jurisdictions, to inform the specific design of remedies in their own jurisdictions (discussed further below). Consultation with industry stakeholders or technical experts can also support the design of effective remedies in complex markets. For instance, CADE’s interim measures propose that the precise details of the obligation on Apple to allow apps to be distributed outside of its app store should be confirmed as part of a collaborative and supervised process, overseen by CADE and possibly independent experts.

Further, ongoing monitoring of remedies can not only be used to verify firms’ compliance with the remedies in question, but also consider whether the remedy is having the intended effect of promoting competition. Ex-post assessments of remedies can also be used to evaluate the effectiveness of remedies after the fact, including supporting the identification of any aspects that could be improved or lessons that can be learnt from the experience (see for instance (OECD, 2023[22])).

3.2. Emergence of interim measures

As identified in (OECD, 2024[7]), interim measures are relevant tools used in LAC jurisdictions to prevent anti-competitive harm while abuse of dominance investigations are ongoing.

Looking at the specific cases considered in section ‎2, several involved the use of interim measures. For instance, the iFood and Gympass cases in Brazil both saw CADE impose interim measures, before CADE ultimately reached final settlements with the parties. In Argentina, the CNDC recommended interim measures be applied to WhatsApp, which were later upheld by the Federal Court of Appeals CADE’s recent interim measures targeting Apple’s tying of its in-app payment services were also upheld following several rounds of appeal, both to the courts and to CADE’s Tribunal.

The use of interim measures in fast-moving digital markets may increase the ability of competition authorities to respond in a timely matter to pressing threats in dynamic markets. However, this requires a careful balancing of the need to act quickly with the risks associated with poorly targeted or procedurally unfair interventions. In light of this, judicial review is an essential component of the process, allowing for independent scrutiny of the legality and necessity of interim measures, ensuring that enforcement action is accountable and effective (OECD, 2024[7]).

An additional consideration is that the nature of interim measures, along with the operational constraints inherent in designing such measures while an investigation is ongoing, means that they may function to preserve the status quo rather than pro-actively addressing anti-competitive harm. For instance, the iFood interim measures did not require iFood to terminate any existing exclusivity agreements, only preventing iFood from entering into new exclusivity agreements. In this way, these interim measures may not have succeeded in achieving the stated objectives of ‘preventing future competitive harm’ and ‘ensuring the normal operation of companies in the market for online food ordering and delivery services’ (Kira, 2023[23]).

Looking forward, and consistent with (OECD, 2024[7]), careful navigation of the complexities associated with interim measures by competition authorities will support enforcers to take advantage of a valuable tool to address competition concerns arising in highly dynamic and rapidly evolving markets, such as those in the digital sector. Moreover, interim measures and commitment procedures may complement each other and promote good outcomes, discussed further below. For instance, in the EU context, a report for the European Commission (2025[24]) found that negotiating remedies after the imposition of interim measures can accelerate the finding of an appropriate solution, since the firm has already halted the offending behaviour and may be more interested than otherwise in finding a solution and ending the investigation.

3.3. Prevalence of remedies implemented via commitments

Another relevant part of the enforcement toolkit for competition authorities in LAC is the ability to accept voluntary, negotiated commitments from firms while an investigation is ongoing. The iFood and Gympass cases in Brazil were both ultimately resolved with commitments, following a trend in CADE’s digital market cases towards the use of such agreements to resolve cases quickly and mitigate information asymmetries (Kira, 2023[23]). FNE’s investigation of food delivery platforms Uber Eats, PedidosYa and Rappi was also finalised with commitments.

The acceptance of commitments from firms under investigation can help cases to be resolved in a timely and effective manner (OECD, 2016[25]), bringing the relevant anti-competitive conduct to a close. Notably, the commitment procedures in Brazil’s iFood and Gympass cases allowed for new issues (specifically, concerning the harm arising from MFNs imposed by the platforms) to surface that were not addressed via the original interim measures, but could be resolved in the final commitments decision. In the EU context, a report for the European Commission (2025[24]) found that the use of commitments can also provide the competition authority with wider discretion in the remedy chosen, but which is limited by the pre-requisite condition of co-operation by the firm.

Commitment procedures also provide an opportunity for the firm and competition authority to agree the specific, detailed terms under which a remedy will be implemented, rather than establishing a ‘principles-based approach’ to addressing the conduct and evaluating technical compliance with the remedy at a later stage (Ibáñez Colomo, 2025[20]). This can promote transparency at an earlier stage of the process, including enabling input from third parties about the appropriateness of the remedy prior to its being agreed, in contrast to the opacity that may arise over whether a firm is complying with a principles‑based obligation.

Some of this distinction comes from the fact that, in some jurisdictions, whether a remedy is imposed by the authority or the authority accepts commitments affects the extent to which there is consultation with third parties. For instance, a public consultation process is often required in order to accept commitments (also known as ‘market testing’), while a formal decision imposed by the authority (which may proscribe remedies) is not subject to the same requirement. However, authorities may consider the extent to which they incorporate public consultation into their processes, including when commitment procedures are not undertaken, with the aim of improving the effectiveness of remedies. For instance, connected to Brazil’s Apple case, CADE held a public hearing to discuss competition in digital ecosystems related to Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android operating systems, which provided an opportunity for Apple as well as other stakeholders from the business sector, civil society and academia to present their perspectives to CADE, as well as providing written contributions.

However, the acceptance of commitments leads to a risk of fewer legal precedents developing, in terms of building an enforcement decision record for the competition authority or establishing case law through judicial decision or review (OECD, 2016[25]). Such legal precedents can provide clarity to enforcers and businesses within a jurisdiction, improving understanding of what constitutes anti-competitive behaviour and promoting good outcomes within the sector.

As such, and similar to the use to interim measures, commitment procedures remain a valuable tool for competition authorities to resolve competition concerns in digital markets in an effective and timely manner. In particular, they may promote good outcomes by allowing for detailed consultation with third parties on the precise manner in which remedy obligations will be met. However, care must be taken to balance the longer term risks that may arise from less establishment of legal precedents, through the use of formal prohibition decisions and judicial review.

3.4. Extraterritorial effects

Central to the implementation of remedies in digital markets are complexities arising due the cross-border nature of platforms’ operations and ecosystems. While many large digital platforms operate on a truly global basis, there also exist several large regional players operating across multiple jurisdictions in LAC.

In this context, remedies imposed by a competition authority may have extraterritorial effects, whereby they require platforms to make changes to their operations beyond the boundaries of the applicable jurisdiction. This could occur due to efficiency reasons, depending on the applicable technical limitations or the costs involved in separating out operations in the particular jurisdiction. Alternatively, platforms may implement changes more widely to deter potential regulatory or enforcement action in other jurisdictions (OECD, 2024[2]).

However, it appears that, in practice, it is rare for platforms to voluntarily implement the same measures outside the jurisdiction at hand (OECD, 2024[2]). More commonly, a situation of “de facto” convergence may arise, occurring when multiple authorities have identified the same competition concerns, resulting in platforms incrementally adjusting their behaviour from one jurisdiction to another. These adjustments can occur, either because multiple jurisdictions impose the same or similar remedies, or because the relevant platform proposes similar commitments in each case (OECD, 2024[2]).

Considering the range of remedies in digital markets canvassed in section ‎2, there are limited instances of platforms voluntarily or unilaterally applying remedies on an extraterritorial basis. However, it is more common to find examples where related cases were considered across multiple jurisdictions, both in LAC and outside, and similar remedies consequently applied. For instance, as highlighted in section ‎2, the interim measures imposed by the CNDC in Argentina on WhatsApp were generally in line with those used in other jurisdictions, such as Germany and Turkey, leading to some convergence of WhatsApp’s practices across these jurisdictions.

In some instances, cases outside the jurisdiction can be influential on the remedy design chose by the competition authority or relevant court in LAC. Brazil’s OTA cases followed the same approach adopted by antitrust authorities in Europe, while Brazil’s Apple decision cites the fact Apple had previously been required to make similar adjustments in the EU and the US, as summarised in section ‎2.

Given the limited cases of voluntary extraterritorial application of remedies, competition authorities will not obviously be able to rely on enforcement efforts in other jurisdictions to address competition concerns in their own jurisdiction. This means that authorities will need to give consideration to whether locally specific remedies are required. This also provides a clear opportunity for jurisdictions to build on remedies already implemented elsewhere, which may mean that similarly effective remedies can be applied with less of a resource burden on the implementing authority, and which may be of particular importance in the LAC region (Gawer and Bonina, 2024[26])). It can also provide an opportunity to adapt and improve remedies based on lessons learned in other jurisdictions. In light of the cross-border nature of platform operations, this also points to a need for co‑ordination between competition authorities to minimise divergences, and promote good outcomes for businesses and consumers.

Moreover, some jurisdictions outside the LAC region have moved towards “ex ante” regulations in digital markets. This means that, in these jurisdictions, remedies introduced as part of abuse of dominance or merger review proceedings may operate alongside such regulatory solutions, which may even address the same conduct. Similar proposals are under consideration in the LAC region, most notably in Brazil, where the Ministry of Finance has launched a public consultation and released a report in 2024 recommending new regulatory tools to address competition concerns in digital markets. The study calls for new powers for CADE to designate certain large digital platforms as “systematically relevant” with the aim of promoting contestability, freedom of choice and transparency. The report highlights that traditional antitrust law is limited when confronting challenges related to digital platforms given the nature of the competitive threats, which depart from traditional paradigms, and the analytical tools, which were designed for traditional markets but may be inadequate to handle complex digital dynamics (Brazilian Ministry of Finance, 2024[27]).

These considerations also point to the importance of international co‑operation to mitigate the costs of divergences and to address the risks of increasing fragmentation, as the number of cases and the variety of remedies and regulations increases across multiple jurisdictions. However, this can also be viewed as providing even more opportunities for competition authorities and policymakers to learn from the implementation of antitrust remedies and ex ante rules in other jurisdictions, including observing which changes are most effective at improving competitive outcomes. Closely monitoring solutions agreed to or otherwise imposed in other jurisdictions may also help agencies to more quickly develop and implement effective remedies in their own jurisdiction with less of a resource burden, while retaining the flexibility to tailor remedies to best address harms in their local context.

Note

← 1.  United States v. Google LLC (2020); EC case, AT.40670, Google - Adtech and Data-related practices; United States v. Google LLC (2023).