This chapter examines Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework. It suggests that Ukraine could make further improvements by broadening the material and personal scope of its whistleblower legislation and clarifying provisions in the law around whistleblower protections. The whistleblower framework would work better in practice if Ukraine improved authorised units’ capacity to receive and act upon disclosures, and strengthened the functionality of the whistleblower portal. The whistleblower framework could also support the prevention and suppression of corruption better if data related to whistleblower reports was collected and fed back into policymaking.
OECD Integrity and Anti‑Corruption Review of Ukraine
Abstract
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity requires OECD countries to support an open organisational culture within the public sector which is responsive to integrity concerns (OECD, 2017[1]). In the context of public integrity, an open organisational culture means that employees, managers and leaders regularly engage in conversations to raise questions, concerns or ideas with the aim of preventing misconduct, fraud or corruption. This kind of informal engagement is complemented by formal reporting mechanisms, such as whistleblowing and other reporting routes, which enable employees to report misconduct through official channels when it occurs (OECD, 2020[2]). The OECD Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (ABR) sets out further requirements on protection of reporting persons, including establishing strong and effective legal and institutional frameworks to protect and/or to provide remedy against any retaliatory action to persons working in the private or public sector who report on reasonable grounds suspected acts of bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and related offences in a work-related context (OECD, 2021[3]).
Whistleblowing is an essential means of detecting and preventing corruption, fraud and other forms of wrongdoing. Unlike witness protection systems, which focus on protecting those testifying and providing information in a criminal trial, effective whistleblowing systems provide protection for reporting related to the workplace and professional activities on a range of wrongdoing, including criminal, civil and administrative. OECD countries are prioritising the development of legal, institutional, and operational measures to enhance and ensure the effectiveness of their whistleblower protections. Ukraine has also taken several steps to enhance its whistleblowing framework. This chapter examines some of these steps and makes suggestions for how Ukraine’s whistleblowing legislation and measures for implementation could be improved. It suggests that, Ukraine’s recent achievements notwithstanding, Ukraine could:
support public integrity more effectively if the material and personal scope of its whistleblowing legislation were extended
ensure the requirement for whistleblowers to believe in the reliability of the information they report provides adequate protections
encourage reporting by clarifying how whistleblowers should apply the public interest test in the external disclosure of sensitive material
improve its culture of openness by reinforcing its legal protections for whistleblowers
improve its whistleblower framework in practice through improving the capacity of authorised units
improve the functionality of the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal
support the prevention and suppression of corruption better if the data in whistleblower reports was collected and fed back into policymaking.
Since 2019, Ukraine has taken meaningful steps to promote a culture of openness, characterised by transparency, accountability, and the encouragement of engagement in public governance. A key aspect of these efforts has been the reform of its framework for whistleblower protection (also referred to as ‘protection of reporting persons). This framework is based on several laws, which taken together provide some protections for whistleblowers against employer retaliation, from civil and criminal liability, allow for anonymity, confidentiality and rewards for raising concerns, and establish reporting channels. The Law on Prevention of Corruption (LPC) is the primary law underpinning Ukraine’s whistleblower framework (explored further below). It provides comprehensive legal protections for whistleblowers who report corruption, corruption-related offences, and several other violations set out in the law. The LPC also provides a legal definition of whistleblowing and establishes channels for reporting, with NACP as the oversight authority. The protections set out in the LPC are supplemented by Article 11 of the Law on Access to Public Information and Article 29 of the Law on Information, which provide exemptions for whistleblowers from legal liability related to their reporting. Additional protections, including sanctions for illegal dismissal of whistleblowers, are also set out in the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine, and the Code of Administrative Court Procedure of Ukraine.
The main platform for whistleblower reporting in Ukraine is the Unified Whistleblower Portal, launched in September 2023 (assessed further below). NACP conceived and developed the Portal and continues to oversee its implementation and functionality, an important part of which is ensuring those entities obliged to establish reporting channels under Ukrainian law are doing so. To this end, the Portal offers a single, unified reporting functionality which enables the approximately 90,000 entities in Ukraine required to establish internal reporting channels to do so. It provides a similar functionality for those authorities designated as regular reporting channels (equivalent to external channels in the EU Whistleblowing Directive). The Portal is also the central repository for all whistleblowers’ reports of corruption, including those submitted by other means in the first instance (for example, by post or in person). It therefore also incorporates functions for storing, organising and accessing whistleblower reports and investigatory and compliance documents.
The reforms in Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework are underpinned by several objectives in Ukraine’s 2021-2025 National Anti‑Corruption Strategy (NACS, analysed further in Chapter 1). The NACS sets out three problem statements to support improvements to the whistleblowing framework (Box 1.1). The Portal and legislative reforms contributed to the mitigation of all of these problems. In addition, Ukraine is aiming to improve the institutional capacity of the bodies responsible for investigating and addressing whistleblowing disclosures by, for instance, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the courts as a mechanism for whistleblower protection (analysed further in Chapter 4 of this report), and developing specific measures for the protection of military disclosures. Ukraine is also seeking to use educational campaigns about legal protections and obligations related to whistleblowing to achieve a culture shift in relation to whistleblowing, most specifically around whistleblowers’ willingness to disclose corruption, the image of whistleblowing in Ukrainian society, and the likelihood of discrimination and workplace retaliation. These educational activities are supported by commitments in the Strategy for Communication in the Sphere of Preventing and Countering Corruption until 2025 adopted in December 2023 by Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 1203.
Ukraine’s 2021-2025 National Anti‑Corruption Strategy identified three problem statements in relation to Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework, and several measures to achieve certain strategic results.
1. The dearth of respect for whistleblowers in society, as well as lack of persons who want to report corruption, the necessary knowledge about the legal guarantees of protection of their violated rights. Expected strategic results:
the respect toward whistleblowers as responsive citizens is formed in society due to awareness raising measures
allegations of corruption become a part of the legal culture of citizens
a significant part of citizens are duly aware of the guarantees for whistleblowers’ protection
the persecution and discrimination of the whistleblowers in the workplace or the violation of their other rights is an exception, not a norm.
2. The dearth of necessary knowledge for properly reporting cases of corruption, identifying the authorities responsible for their review, and ensuring an effective mechanism for handling such reports. Expected strategic results:
The legislative amendments are introduced to ensure convenient allegation of corruption and effective consideration of such allegations.
The unified electronic online portal for whistleblowers to make allegations of corruption is functioning; a significant part of citizens are duly aware of the procedure and channels for allegations of corruption due to effective information and clarification and enlightenment work.
The appropriate internal channels for reporting corruption are established, which contain information related to state secrets, investigative secrets, as well as official information collected in the course of operational and investigative, counterintelligence activities in the sphere of the national defence.
3. Whistleblower protection is not adequate because of insufficient institutional capacity of agencies authorised and the deficiencies in the legislative regulation. Expected strategic results:
The National Agency and other authorised agencies (units) exercise their functions to protect whistleblowers in practice due to:
the monitoring of activities in terms of the work with whistleblowers carried out by the authorised units (persons) on prevention and detection of corruption/anti‑corruption compliance officers
the ensuring proper co‑ordination between agencies authorised to ensure whistleblower protection
the proper legal aid provided for whistleblowers
psychological support is provided for whistleblowers.
The courts and free legal aid centres are a reliable mechanism for protecting the rights of whistleblowers by improving the level of qualification and competence of judges in cases concerning the protection of the rights of whistleblowers, employees and lawyers of free legal aid centres.
The Ukrainian legislation meets international standards for the protection of whistleblowers; effective mechanisms are created for the implementation of legislation on the protection of whistleblowers, including the implementation of security measures against them.
The legislation provides for the peculiarities of the protection of incriminating servicemen.
Source: Adapted from NACP (2021[4]), Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-2025, National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Ukraine.
Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework, therefore, has an established legislative basis, along with several mechanisms and platforms for implementation. The current NACS also sets out clear ambitions to expand the framework in the coming years.
Nevertheless, there is scope for further improvement in Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework, and challenges for future development remain. Among the most important of these challenges is Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. As explored throughout this report, the war is having an ongoing impact on public governance and resources in Ukraine which, as with other aspects of the integrity framework, may limit resource and bandwidth for any future reforms to Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework and culture of openness. More specifically, martial law poses ongoing challenges to the functioning of the whistleblower framework, including the disclosure of potentially sensitive information. The Ukrainian Government also noted in the Strategy for Communication in the Sphere of Preventing and Countering Corruption until 2025 that the war is increasing citizens’ willingness to report corruption, underlining the raising public understanding of reporting channels and ensuring their effectiveness when accessed by citizens and public office holders. In addition, previous reform efforts have stalled due to opposition and fragmentation in the Verkhovna Rada and among civil society organisations, and there has been a lack of consensus on what the whistleblowing framework should be trying to achieve and how (ACREC, 2024[5]). While Ukraine is undertaking awareness-raising activities, there is still work to do to build consensus around the whistleblower framework and to mainstream a culture of openness through the public sector and wider society. Despite Ukraine’s recent progress to develop a culture of openness, these challenges will need to be factored into any future reform efforts.
This chapter assesses Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework, offering recommendations on how to strengthen its legal foundation and how to enhance the implementation of the framework (including the web-based Whistleblower Portal) in practice.
Ukraine has not yet adopted a comprehensive law on whistleblower protection. As set out above, the main legal basis for the whistleblowing framework in Ukraine is the LPC, meaning the existing provisions for whistleblowing in Ukraine in both the public and private sectors relate only to the reporting of corruption or corruption-related offences. Within this narrow focus, however, Ukrainian legislation does provide for a whistleblowing framework which is largely aligned with international standards and practices (Box 1.2).
The LPC establishes:
several conditions that determine what constitutes a protected disclosure and whether a reporting person qualifies for the status and protections of a whistleblower
the channels through which information on corruption offences can be reported, and the methods by which reports should be made, including a digital platform (the Unified Whistleblower Portal)
the rights and protections to which whistleblowers are entitled and the moment at which they are acquired. These rights and protections include free legal aid, guarantees of protection of labour rights, compensation for loss, psychological assistance, and exemption from legal liability
the procedure for authorities considering whistleblower reports, including reports made anonymously
the powers of NACP, in terms of conducting inspections of possible violations of the rights of whistleblowers and participating in court proceedings
the rights and powers of authorised units in public and private sector organisations, in terms of forming a culture of whistleblowing and protecting whistleblowers
the penalties for disclosing information about whistleblowers’ identity and for retaliation against whistleblowers
what constitutes retaliatory action
that in cases of retaliation the burden lies on a manager or employer to prove that the retaliation was not related to the disclosure.
Note: The provisions regarding the burden of proof related to retaliation are set out in the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine.
Source: LPC.
In 2023, in the context of Ukraine’s candidacy for the EU, the European Commission recommended that Ukraine extends its legal framework on whistleblowing protection to align with the EU acquis (European Commission, 2023[6]). Ukraine is taking steps to do so, having included a commitment in its NACS to ensure that ‘Ukrainian legislation meets international standards for the protection of whistleblowers’, and a measure in the State Anti‑Corruption Programme (SACP) to expand the current legislation to align with international standards (NACP, 2021[4]). One such step was taken at the fourth annual Whistleblowers in Ukraine Conference in July 2024, whereat a working group was formed to draft legislation to extend Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework, which will be submitted to NACP for review and ultimately presented to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (ACREC, 2024[7]). This section analyses Ukraine’s legal framework for whistleblowing and makes recommendations for where the legislation could be extended and improved, which could inform Ukraine’s ongoing considerations about how to expand its current framework.
6.2.1. Ukraine could support public integrity more effectively if the material and personal scope of its whistleblowing legislation were extended
The LPC outlines three conditions that determine whether a reporting person qualifies for the status and protections of a whistleblower (Box 1.3). If any of these conditions is not met, the person cannot be considered a whistleblower, they do not qualify for protections, and NACP cannot consider that person’s report. In addition, in line with the EU Whistleblowing Directive, the law rightly excludes knowingly false reports from protection. However, the effectiveness of Ukraine’s whistleblower protections could be improved if the material and personal scope of the legislation was extended.
The LPC defines a whistleblower as “a natural person who, in the presence of conviction that the information is reliable, reported on possible facts of corruption or corruption-related offences, other violations of the Law, committed by another person, if such information became known to them due to their employment, professional, economic, social, scientific activity, service or training, or their participation in procedures prescribed by law, which are mandatory for starting such activity, service or training”.
Source: LPC.
Material scope
The material scope of whistleblower legislation relates to the subject areas a whistleblower can report to qualify for protection and which prompt a response from the authority receiving the disclosure. As noted, with support from a working group, the NACP intends to extend the material scope of its legislative framework beyond reports related only to corruption. Its present focus, however, means the material scope is making it less effective than it could be. It also does not currently align with the EU Whistleblowing Directive or OECD standards, which include a much wider range of wrongdoing in their material scope, nor the practices of many EU and OECD countries.
The current material scope requires potential whistleblowers to have a high level of understanding of which disclosures are in scope and which are not. In addition, although it is not the primary focus of this report, the current scope leaves individuals who report other criminal misconduct, threats to public health and safety, fraud, financial misconduct, and other legal, regulatory, and ethical breaches vulnerable in both the private and public sectors. This narrow material scope is problematic, as it means whistleblowers may be less able to understand whether the misconduct they want to report falls under the law, and they may therefore prefer to stay silent. If they speak up but are not protected, any negative consequences they suffer can lead others to stay silent. The current narrow material scope of Ukraine’s LPC therefore risks dissuading potential whistleblowers who are not clear whether the information they wish to disclose qualifies as a corruption or corruption-related offence, and could mean that cases of corruption could go unreported. OECD countries have sought to mitigate this risk by including a range of misdemeanours, even beyond the scope of the EU Whistleblowing Directive, in the material scope of their whistleblowing legislation (Box 1.4).
Latvia, Law on Raising Alarms
Latvia’s Whistleblowing Law sets out that whistleblowers have the right to report any violation which harms the public interest, especially violations in the areas specified in the Whistleblowing Directive and related to: inaction or negligence of officials, abuse of their official powers or other illegal actions; corruption, as well as violations of the provisions of financing of political parties and restrictions on election campaigning; squandering of financial resources or property of a public entity; tax evasion; occupational safety threat; violation of human rights.
Furthermore, ‘violation’ means “a criminal offense, an administrative offense or another violation of legal norms (action or inaction), including an action that contradicts the purpose of a legal act, as well as a violation of mandatory ethical or professional standards”.
Ireland, Protected Disclosures Act
Ireland’s Protected Disclosures Act, as amended in 2022, establishes that in addition to the material scope set out in the Whistleblowing Directive, areas protected under the act are where: an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed; a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation, other than one arising under the worker’s contract of employment or other contract whereby the worker undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services; that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur; the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered; that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged; that an unlawful or otherwise improper use of funds or resources of a public body, or of other public money, has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur; that an act or omission by or on behalf of a public body is oppressive, discriminatory or grossly negligent or constitutes gross mismanagement, or; information tending to show any matter falling within any of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be concealed or destroyed.
Sources: Latvia, Law on Raising Alarms 2022/24B.1; Ireland, Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022.
Ukraine is seeking to improve understanding of the conditions for protection through a range of awareness-raising materials. Among these, the Guide for Corruption Whistleblowers provides a useful explanation of the material scope of Ukraine’s whistleblowing legislation, and in the short-term Ukraine should continue to promote these materials to improve prospective whistleblowers’ confidence in the system and the likelihood that they make effective disclosures (NACP, 2022[8]). In the longer-term, however, Ukraine should consider extending the material scope of its whistleblowing framework, in line with international standards and good practices, to include a wider range of protected disclosures. The material scope should be extended at least to match the scope set out in the EU Whistleblowing Directive and ABR, and could go further to include all disclosures which are made in the public interest.1
Personal scope
The personal scope of whistleblowing legislation relates to the status which a person must have and the circumstances in which they acquired the information they wish to report to qualify for legal protections. Like with the material scope, a broad personal scope with clear definitions provides protections to people in a greater range of circumstances and better reassures those considering making a disclosure. The personal scope of the LPC is reasonably comprehensive, applying to those reporting persons who obtained information about corruption due to their employment, professional, economic, public, scientific activity, service or training, or their participation in procedures prescribed by law, which are mandatory for starting such activity, service, or training. It also includes whistleblowers’ ‘close persons’. The NACP provided definitions of these terms in its Interpretation Note of 15 June 2023 (NACP, 2023[9]).
However, Ukraine could improve its whistleblowing framework by expanding the personal scope of its legislation to meet the personal scope of the EU Whistleblowing Directive and OECD standards. Many countries’ whistleblower frameworks provide protections not only to employees, contractors, volunteers, past or future employees, interns, and other insiders, but also to those assisting them with making a disclosure (ox 1.5). This breadth of coverage recognises that it is not only the threat of retaliation against the reporting person which can dissuade them from speaking up, but also retaliation against their associates. While Ukraine’s legislation provides protection for whistleblowers’ ‘close persons’, the definition of close persons is limited to the whistleblower’s close family members and relatives, as defined in Paragraph 1 Article 1 of the LPC. Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework could therefore be improved if its personal scope was extended to include those assisting or facilitating whistleblowers’ disclosures.2
Sweden, Act on the Protection of Persons Reporting Irregularities
Sweden’s whistleblowing law contains several prohibitions on obstructive measures and retaliation. In Sweden, an operator (e.g. the subject of the disclosure) must not:
obstruct or attempt to obstruct reporting
retaliate, because of reporting, against:
a reporting person
anyone involved with the operator who assists the reporting person with the reporting, such as an elected representative or a safety representative
anyone involved with the operator who is associated with the reporting person, such as a relative or colleague
a legal person that the reporting person owns, works for or is otherwise associated with.
An operator must not take retaliatory action because someone consults their employee organisation for advice on reporting. The operator must also refrain from obstructing or attempting to obstruct such consultation.
The Netherlands, Whistleblower Protection Act
The Netherlands’ Whistleblower Protection Act offers the same protections from detriment to a facilitator, a concerned third person and an officer (i.e. the designated officer of an internal reporting channel) as it does to the person making the report.
A concerned third person’ means:
a third person who is connected with a reporting person and who could suffer a detriment at the hands of the reporting person’s employer or a person or organisation with which the reporting person is otherwise connected in a work-related context
a legal person that the reporting person owns, works for or is otherwise connected with in a work-related context.
A facilitator means:
a natural or legal person who advises a reporting person in the reporting process in a work-related context and whose advice is confidential.
Sources: Sweden, Act on the Protection of Persons Reporting Irregularities (2021:890); The Netherlands, Whistleblower Protection Act.
6.2.2. Ukraine should ensure the requirement for whistleblowers to believe in the reliability of the information they report provides adequate protection
A principal requirement of most whistleblower protection provisions in multilateral anti‑corruption instruments including the ABR, and corresponding domestic whistleblower protection legislation, is for disclosures to be made on “reasonable grounds” (OECD, 2016[10]). The EU Whistleblowing Directive elaborates on the importance of this requirement. On the one hand, the need to have a reasonable belief that reported information is true is an essential safeguard against malicious, frivolous or abusive reports, as it ensures that those who knowingly report wrong or misleading information do not enjoy protection and can be held accountable for making false claims. On the other hand, it ensures that protection is maintained where the reporting person reported inaccurate information by honest mistake.
The LPC requires whistleblowers at the time of their reporting to hold a belief that the information is reliable. The NACP’s Explanatory Note No. 2 of 12 June 2023 clarifies this definition (Box 1.6). Like the legislation of many OECD countries, Ukraine’s legislation contains a ‘reasonable belief’ test. But unlike these OECD countries, Ukraine’s legislation adds an additional layer to the requirement by including an objective test for assessing whether the report provides factual data indicative of corruption.
The NACP’s Explanatory Note No.2 of 12 June 2023 says that:
“A person's belief that the information is reliable is a person's subjective feeling of confidence in the veracity of the information provided by him or her about the possible facts of another person's commission of a corruption or corruption-related offence, other violation of the Law, based on his or her life or professional experience, an aggregate assessment of the objectivity of the source and content of such information, and other circumstances. Reliability of information is its ability to establish the real availability of factual data confirming the possible commission of corruption or corruption-related offences, other violations of the Law, as well as the subjective perception of information that corresponds to reality and is true.”
Source: NACP (2023[9]), Regarding the Legal Status of a Whistleblower, https://wiki.nazk.gov.ua/category/vykryvachi-koruptsiyi/status_vykruvacha/ (accessed on 7 February 2025).
Ukraine’s Guide for Whistleblowers of Corruption aims to help whistleblowers improve the reliability of their report, and the Civil Code of Ukraine exempts whistleblowers who unintentionally report false information from liability to pay compensation to the party suffering damages. However, the complexity of Ukraine’s reasonable belief test may require reporting persons to have a highly developed understanding of the law to determine which disclosures would qualify for protections. In addition, it is not clear whether people who have reasonable grounds to believe in the reliability of their report but whose report turned out not to be true or adequately detailed to establish the availability of data would qualify for protections under Ukrainian law. Ukraine could therefore improve its whistleblower protections by ensuring that, where people have reasonable grounds to believe the information they are reporting is true, protection is still available where they reported inaccurate or incomplete information by honest mistake.
6.2.3. Ukraine could encourage reporting by clarifying how whistleblowers should apply the public interest test in the external disclosure of sensitive material
Clearly defining channels of disclosure helps facilitate reporting, as otherwise whistleblowers may not understand how to raise concerns and may not be comfortable coming forward. Effective channels for disclosure also allow the designated authorities to receive and act upon reliable and relevant information about wrongdoing, ideally before serious harm has been done. Offering a combination of internal and external channels for disclosure gives whistleblowers more confidence that there is an appropriate reporting option for the circumstances of their case. Internal disclosure is an important part of maintaining an open organisational culture, as it encourages workers to engage in dialogue about integrity in their organisations, provides relevant information to responsible functions about workplace culture and behaviours, and contributes to early and effective resolution (OECD, 2020[2]). External channels provide whistleblowers with an alternative if, for instance, appropriate action has not been taken internally, they have reason to believe that they would be reprimanded by their organisation’s internal mechanism, they think their anonymity or confidentiality cannot be guaranteed, or there is an imminent threat or emergency which internal channels may be unable to address (OECD, 2016[10]).
Ukraine has established three channels of reporting for whistleblowers: internal (within the organisation), regular (to the competent authority), and external (to the public). While the EU Whistleblowing Directive encourages whistleblowers to first use internal reporting channels where they can reasonably be expected to work, the LPC gives whistleblowers the choice of which channel to use and when. Offering this choice makes sense in Ukraine, as trust in public institutions has been volatile, including in those designated by the LPC as regular reporting channels, and whistleblowers may feel discouraged if they are obliged to engage certain channels or authorities which they do not trust (Razumkov Centre, 2024[11]; 2024[12]; 2024[13]).
For public entities in Ukraine, internal reports are made to the head or authorised unit (or person) of the authority or legal entity in which the whistleblower works, serves, or studies or on whose order they perform work. Internal reports can also be made to a superior body whose authorised person supervises compliance with anti‑corruption legislation in subordinate organisations. All state authorities are obliged to establish an internal reporting channel, as are local self-government bodies, all public sector entities and several categories of legal entities in which the state or municipal share exceeds 50 percent. In addition, and unlike countries subject to the EU Whistleblowing Directive which require all organisations with more than 50 employees to establish internal channels, Ukraine requires only private entities engaged in public procurements over UAH 20 million to do so. Ukraine could extend the requirement to establish internal channels to a wider group of entities. Submission of reports (including anonymous ones) through internal channels is carried out through the web-based Whistleblower Portal and special telephone lines open for round-the-clock access.
Regular reporting channels in Ukraine (equivalent to external channels in the EU Whistleblowing Directive) provide protected and anonymous avenues for reporting to the NACP, or another authority competent for handling matters related to the disclosed information. Regular channels must be created by specially authorised entities in the field of combating corruption, pre-trial investigation bodies, bodies responsible for monitoring compliance with laws in the relevant areas, other state bodies, institutions, and organisations. In practice, the Whistleblower Portal provides this regular channel. Relevant bodies include the prosecutor's office, the National Police, NABU, the State Bureau of Investigation, and NACP (NACP, 2024[14]).
Finally, external channels (equivalent to public disclosures in the EU Whistleblowing Directive) are ways of reporting information through external individuals or entities including, for example, the mass media, journalists, public associations, or trade unions (NACP, 2024[14]). In Ukraine, whistleblowers are free to use external channels without having used internal or regular channels beforehand. The only exception to this rule relates to the reporting of information with limited access, which is defined by the LAPI as including confidential information, secret information and official information. In these cases, the LPC says that external channels should only be used if:
Reporting information through internal and regular channels did not produce effective results within the timeframe set for its verification or investigation.
Internal channels are less appropriate, as the information is socially necessary according to the definition in the law on information.
The whistleblower or their relatives were dismissed from work, subjected to disciplinary sanctions, or other retaliation, or discriminatory measures were taken against them in connection with the reporting.
There are no internal or regular channels through which the information can be reported.
The documents or evidence related to the disclosed information could be destroyed.
While several of these conditions are relatively easy to interpret, whistleblowers may struggle to understand when they can disclose information with limited access externally on the basis that it is socially necessary. The Law on Information establishes that information of limited access may be disseminated (i.e. publicly disclosed) if it is a subject of public interest, which means the right of the public to know such information prevails over the potential damage from the dissemination thereof. The public interest may prevail if, for example, the information relates to a threat to the state sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine; it ensures implementation of constitutional rights, freedoms and duties; or it indicates the potential infringement of human rights, that the public have been misled, or hazardous environmental and other adverse effects of the activity (or inaction) of individuals or legal entities.
As the Parliamentary Ombudsman noted in his 2022 report, however, weighing the public interest against the potential damage caused by disclosure has become more complicated in the context of the ongoing war and martial law, as the sensitivity of information and the potential for damage may be far greater in the current circumstances (Ombudsman of Ukraine, 2022[15]). Indeed, several examples documented by the Ombudsman demonstrate public officials struggling to apply the public interest test in the Law on Information in the current context (as explored further in Chapter 3 of this report). In the short term, therefore, Ukraine should offer guidance to potential whistleblowers about how the public interest test works and how assessments against it should be made in the context of the ongoing war and martial law. This guidance should pay particular attention to how a potential whistleblower should weigh the public interest against the potential damage if they are considering making an external disclosure. In the longer term, particularly in a post-war context, Ukraine should build the application of the public interest test into its guidance, awareness raising and training offering to potential whistleblowers and authorised persons.
6.2.4. Ukraine could improve its culture of openness by reinforcing its legal protections for whistleblowers
Effective prohibitions and safeguards against retaliation, including the implementation of effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties for retaliation, along with clear measures of support reassure prospective whistleblowers that they will be protected if they make a report. They also mean those who suffer detriment linked to reporting can receive appropriate redress. Retaliation for whistleblowing can include, inter alia, dismissal, demotion, salary reduction, lack of promotion, transfer to a different position, psychological pressure, mobbing, exclusion, or the stripping of security clearance. A broad range of remedies enable the appropriate response to the kind of retaliation suffered and the damage caused, and ensure relief and compensation for all the whistleblower’s losses. As the ABR makes clear, where possible remedies should compensate direct and indirect consequences of retaliatory action following a report that qualifies for protection, including financial compensation, and interim relief pending the resolution of legal proceedings.
The LPC specifies that whistleblowers’ rights and guarantees arise from the moment of submitting the report, and it sets out several measures to manage retaliation and offer support to whistleblowers and their close persons. Ukraine prohibits various forms of retaliation in its legislative framework in connection with whistleblowers’ labour, professional, economic, social, scientific or other activities, service or study. According to the LPC, whistleblowers must not be (nor be threatened with being) suspended, dismissed or forced to resign, or subjected to disciplinary procedures. Nor can they be subjected to other retaliatory measures, such as transfer, performance appraisal, change of working conditions, denial of promotion, or wage reductions, especially where such actions do not apply to other employees or have not applied to the reporting person before. In addition, it is prohibited for whistleblowers to be refused the conclusion or extension of any form of contract or agreement, or for obstacles or discrimination to a whistleblower’s work-related activities to take place.
Ukraine’s legislative framework also establishes various safeguards against retaliation and possible lasting effects. Whistleblowers are entitled to confidentiality and anonymity, with prohibitions on the disclosure of information about whistleblowers’ identities except in defined and exceptional circumstances. Where retaliation has occurred, the law offers the right to redress, including the whistleblower’s immediate reinstatement to their previous role, payment of earnings for any period of forced absenteeism and monetary compensation for violation of their labour rights. Furthermore, whistleblowers cannot be legally or contractually liable for reporting or disseminating possible facts of corruption. The Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine also contains a presumption of reprisal, meaning in cases of whistleblower retaliation the burden rests with the manager or employer to prove the retaliation was not connected to the person’s report. Finally, whistleblowers may be entitled to remuneration, both as an incentive to make reports and to mitigate any financial losses which a whistleblower might face. The LPC entitles whistleblowers to 10% of the monetary value of the object of the corruption offence or the damage caused to the state, where that value exceeds 5000 times the subsistence minimum for able-bodied persons at the time of the offence.
Ukraine has also established various forms of support to whistleblowers. These include the right to participate in the consideration of their report and to receive information relating to its investigation. It also includes the right to free legal assistance and reimbursement of costs accrued in relation to the protection of their rights through, for instance, legal assistance and court fees. Whistleblowers in Ukraine also have a right to psychological assistance to help mitigate the emotional toll of making reports and incurring retaliations.
Whistleblowers in Ukraine are therefore granted a range of valuable rights and guarantees. However, Ukraine’s framework could be further enhanced in several ways to ensure it provides fuller protections against retaliation and detriment and further aligns with international standards, including the EU Whistleblowing Directive and the ABR.
Firstly, the focus in Ukraine’s legislation on labour rights could leave certain types of whistleblowers exposed to retaliation. At present, Ukraine’s protections relate to whistleblowers’ labour rights in relation to their labour, professional, economic, social, scientific or other activities, service or study, which are defined in the NACP’s Explanatory Note No. 2 of 12 June 2023 (NACP, 2023[9]). While it is appropriate for protections to apply primarily to those who are economically vulnerable to retaliation due to a work-related power imbalance, protections should also apply to all individuals with privileged access to information on breaches and who may suffer retaliation if they report them. This means that although there is no need to extend whistleblower protections to situations where there is no work-related power imbalance (for instance, in the case of ordinary complaints from citizens), protections should also apply to those workers who do not rely on their activities economically. Ukraine should therefore ensure its legislative protections against retaliation also apply to anyone in a work-related context, including volunteers or other unremunerated or uncontracted individuals.
Ukraine could also prohibit a fuller range of possible retaliations. Indeed, Ukraine’s legislation currently covers actions taken by the manager or employer, but it is not clear whether actions encouraged or tolerated within organisations, such as bullying, ostracism, or reputational damage, are also prohibited. Ukraine should ensure that they are.
Likewise, Ukraine could ensure a fuller range of remedies where detriment has occurred. The LPC sets out clear remedies where whistleblowers are dismissed or transferred to lower-paid work. It also guarantees the restoration of whistleblowers’ rights where they have been violated contrary to parts 1-3 of Article 534 of the LPC. However, it is not clear what the restoration of rights would look like in practice in the instance of the ‘discriminatory measures’ referenced in part 3 of that Article, where the harm suffered and any damages may be less tangible than in the case of, for instance, dismissal or loss of earnings. Ukraine should clarify, as several OECD countries have done, what remedies are available in cases of these discriminatory measures, and add further remedies if additional retaliations such as bullying or exclusion are prohibited in the law (Box 1.7).
Austria, Whistleblower Protection Act
Austria’s Whistleblower Protection Act sets out that the legal or natural person who is responsible for any of the following measures in retaliation for a legitimate report shall be obliged to restore the lawful situation, to compensate for the financial loss and to compensate for the personal harm suffered:
1. Coercion, intimidation, bullying or exclusion; 2. Discrimination, disadvantageous or unequal treatment; 3. Non-conversion of a fixed-term employment contract into an employment contract of indefinite duration in cases where an employee could reasonably expect to be offered an employment contract of indefinite duration; 4. Harm, including damage to reputation, particularly on social media, or causing financial loss, including loss of orders or revenue; 5. Blacklisting the whistleblower on the basis of an informal or formal sector- or industry-specific agreement, with the result that the whistleblower can no longer find employment across the sector or industry; 6. Psychiatric or other referral for medical treatment.
Spain, Law regulating the protection of people who report regulatory breaches and the fight against corruption
Spain’s whistleblower protection legislation establishes that administrative acts which are intended to prevent or hinder the submission of communications and disclosures, as well as those that constitute retaliation or cause discrimination after the submission of such communications under this law, shall be null and void and shall give rise, where appropriate, to disciplinary or liability corrective measures, which may include the corresponding compensation for damages to the injured party.
Among other things, retaliation includes damages, including those of a reputational nature, or economic losses, coercion, intimidation, harassment or ostracism
Sources: Austria, Whistleblower Protection Act (HSchG); Spain, Law regulating the protection of people who report regulatory breaches and the fight against corruption (BOE-A-2023-4513).
Lastly, as the ABR makes clear, an effective whistleblower protection system should protect whistleblowers from civil and criminal liability, including relieving whistleblowers from civil liability for defamation or breach of confidentiality and statutory secrecy provisions (OECD, 2016[10]). The LPC exempts whistleblowers from legal liability in the reporting and dissemination of facts related to corruption and corruption-related offences. This includes exemption from liability for the violation of official, civil, labour or other duties or obligations, including confidentiality, and from civil liability for property and/or moral damage (except in cases of knowingly false reports). In addition, the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides that a legally compliant public disclosure of information about the commission of a criminal or other offence does not trigger criminal liability for disclosure of commercial or bank secrecy.
However, Ukraine’s legal framework is less clear in relation to the acquisition or access of information on corruption or corruption-related offences. Whistleblowers should be exempt from liability where accessing information does not constitute a self-standing criminal offence, to fully protect them from the risk that their legal and contractual obligations can be used to dissuade reporting, to deny protection, or as the basis for retaliation. In Ukraine, this exemption exists only partially in the note to Article 231 of the Criminal Code (relating to trade and bank secrets). Ukraine should therefore ensure that its protections against liability also extend to the access of information necessary for revealing corruption or corruption-related offences (Box 6.8).
Denmark, Act on the Protection of Whistleblowers
In Denmark, a whistleblower who fulfils the protection conditions in the relevant sections of the Act on Protection of Whistleblowers is not considered to have breached a statutory duty of confidentiality and does not incur any form of liability for this, provided that the whistleblower had reasonable grounds to believe that the reporting or publication of the information in question was necessary to make an in‑scope disclosure. A whistleblower who fulfils the protection conditions also does not incur responsibility for gaining access to the information that has been reported or published, provided that such an act does not constitute an independent criminal offence.
Source: Denmark, Act on the Protection of Whistleblowers (LAW No 1436 of 29/06/2021).
Even the most well-designed legislative frameworks for whistleblower protection struggle to produce the desired outcomes if they are not supported by proper implementation. Among the key implementation measures are ensuring that oversight bodies have adequate powers and are sufficiently co‑ordinated, enabling officers responsible for receiving disclosures to understand and uphold the rules and correct practice, and ensuring reporting channels are accessible and properly facilitating reporting, and using whistleblowing data to assess trends and improve prevention and the proactive development of cultures of integrity.
The NACP has primary responsibility for implementing the legal framework set out above, including overall responsibility for policy design, implementation and oversight in Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework. Notable responsibilities include the design and maintenance of the Whistleblower Portal and determining the requirements for other protected disclosure channels. The NACP is also required to constantly monitor the implementation of the LPC, including the measures related to the protection of whistleblowers, and for annually analysing and reviewing the state policy in this area. It also undertakes regular training and awareness-raising activities to improve capability among whistleblowers and the authorities handling their reports. The NACP co‑operates with whistleblowers, provides clarifications, consultations, and methodological assistance on the implementation of their rights. Where whistleblowers’ rights have been violated, the NACP has responsibilities for ordering the reversal of those violations and for intervening as a third party in litigation involving whistleblowers. While there have been suggestions that the NACP has not always effectively discharged these latter two responsibilities effectively (Golnik, 2021[16]), data suggests in many instances they are working well. During 2020-2021, the NACP issued seven prescriptions (two on violating the right to confidentiality and five on eliminating violations and restoring the rights of whistleblowers), and in accordance with the five instructions for eliminating the violations official investigations were conducted and the violated rights of whistleblowers were restored. In the same period, the NACP was involved in 98 court cases with the participation of whistleblowers, and filed five applications to intervene in cases in which the proceedings were opened on the statements of whistleblowers (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2023[17]).
As well as the NACP, NABU, the National Police (NP) and the Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) all take a key role in the implementation of the whistleblowing framework. NABU can receive reports on possible facts of corruption that fall under its jurisdiction, and can take measures to ensure whistleblowers’ safety, including preserving the anonymity and confidentiality of reports, taking measures to stop the detected violation, eliminating the violation’s consequences, and bringing the guilty persons to disciplinary liability. NABU can also initiate pre-trial investigations based on whistleblower reports. NABU sent the NACP 19 notifications of the initiation of pre-trial investigations with the participation of a whistleblower in 2023, and five in 2024.
The NP has responsibilities to whistleblowers during administrative offence cases and the pre-trial investigation of criminal corruption cases, related to accepting statements and reports about the violation, granting the legal status of whistleblower, and protecting the rights and guarantees of a whistleblower as set out in the LPC. The NP also has responsibilities relating to the application of security measures to the whistleblower where their or their close persons’ physical safety is in danger, and responsibilities for investigating criminal offences related to the illegal dismissal of a whistleblower from their position.
Finally, PGO has responsibility for receiving statements from whistleblowers and entering information into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations as part of the procedural management of pre-trial investigations of criminal corruption offences. Prosecutors also prove the guilt of the corrupt person in court and ask the court to pay the reward to the whistleblower if there are grounds for doing so. To date, two rewards have been paid to whistleblowers. The first one was made on 4 October 2024 in accordance with the decision of the Appellate Chamber of the High Anti‑Corruption Court of 9 November 2023 in case No. 991/2197/22. The second payment was made on 18 October 2024 based on the decision of the High Anti‑Corruption Court No. 991/2288/21 of 2 October 2023. The total amount of payments is almost UAH 15 million.
As well as these national-level authorities, authorised units (or persons) for the prevention and detection of corruption are another key set of actors in the implementation of Ukraine’s whistleblower framework. These authorised units are, in many cases, on the front line of Ukraine’s whistleblowing system, as it is they which have responsibility for upholding the whistleblowing framework within organisations. The amendments to the LPC relating to whistleblowing gave authorised units several new responsibilities. This section makes suggestions for improving authorised units’ ability to implement Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework. It also makes recommendations for improving the functionality of the Whistleblower Portal, and for utilising whistleblower reports in corruption prevention.
6.3.1. Ukraine could improve its whistleblower framework in practice through improving the capacity of authorised units
The implementation of Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework depends heavily on authorised units or persons. These units are the primary link in the system of whistleblower protection in Ukraine, since it is they which must take appropriate measures within organisations to uphold the rights of whistleblowers, manage and encourage whistleblowers’ engagement with the system, and prevent violations of whistleblowers’ rights and guarantees by the manager or the employer (Box 1.9).
In addition to authorised units’ existing powers, the amendments on whistleblowing to the Law on Prevention of Corruption gave them additional responsibilities including:
1. organising the work of internal channels for reporting possible facts of corruption or corruption-related offences, other violations of [the Law on Prevention of Corruption], receiving and organising the consideration of information reported through such channels
2. co‑operating with whistle-blowers, ensuring compliance with their rights and guarantees of protection provided for by law
3. providing employees of the relevant authority or legal entity or persons who serve or study in them, perform certain work, with methodological assistance and advice on reporting of possible facts of corruption or corruption-related offences, other violations of this Law, and protection of whistle-blowers, conducting internal trainings on these issues.
Source: LPC.
Ukraine has developed the training offering to authorised units in relation to working with whistleblowers. The NACP, together with the High School of Public Governance, has developed a short-term training programme entitled "Organisation of work with whistleblowers in public authorities", which so far has trained 340 employees of authorised units in public authorities and local municipalities. Together with the International Renaissance Foundation and Anti‑Corruption Research and Education Centre, the NACP has also developed a Practical Guide on Working with Whistleblowers for Authorised Units (Authorised Persons) on Corruption Prevention and Detection. Together with the EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine, the NACP has also developed a Practical Guide Regarding on Working with Whistleblowers for Authorised Units (Commission Members) on Corruption Prevention and Detection in the National Police (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2023[17]). These specialised trainings add to the more generalist training offered to authorised persons, such as the general professional (certificate) training programme ‘Prevention of Corruption and Integrity Assurance’ developed by the NACP and High School of Public Governance. Improving authorised units’ abilities to handle reports properly and protect whistleblowers’ rights through training materials such as these is particularly timely in the context of the ongoing rollout of the Whistleblower Portal, as data already shows the number of reports increasing compared to pre-Portal levels (NACP, 2024[18]).
However, the NACP has acknowledged several shortcomings in the current operation of the authorised units and persons regarding the protection of whistleblowers (NACP, 2023[19]). Firstly, there is not enough interaction and co‑ordination between the bodies authorised to ensure the protection of whistleblowers, which in many cases impedes a quick response to violations of whistleblowers’ rights and the proper protection of whistleblowers. Secondly, authorised units do not always take effective measures to prevent the violation of whistleblowers' labour rights and to provide appropriate protection measures in case of their violation. And thirdly, where whistleblowers’ rights are violated, authorised units are not ensuring that whistleblowers are receiving the help to which they are entitled, such as from lawyers of free secondary legal aid centres. Whistleblowers are therefore often going to court independently, and facing difficulties in proving the existence of a connection between any retaliations and their whistleblowing report. Beyond the enhanced training offering, the NACP is taking several steps to address these issues, including developing a network or integrity officers in authorised units, and rolling out a programme of monitoring and evaluation of authorised units’ work. These efforts are in their early stages, but they are positive steps and should be developed.
At present the network of integrity officers is relatively informal, including social media groups and the ad hoc organisation of roundtables, video conferences and seminars to promote knowledge sharing and best practices. Following a recent survey of Portal users, the NACP is considering how the more formal exchange and notification of whistleblower reports could be better facilitated through the Whistleblower Portal, including through a stronger mechanism for Portal users to send letters to other organisations and authorised users (NACP, 2024[18]).
The NACP also monitors and evaluates authorised units’ implementation of the whistleblowing framework as part of its wider work to evaluate the effectiveness of integrity officers. This evaluation programme is new, meaning while over 3,000 authorised units have been registered with the process only three evaluations have been carried out so far (NACP, 2024[20]). The NACP assesses authorised units’ work, inter alia, to build reporting channels and raise awareness of whistleblowing protocols within their organisations, to verify received reports and notify the relevant authorities of offences, and to undertake investigations about the causes of any corrupt acts. The indicators used are largely output level, allowing for a broad assessment of the measures which authorised units have in place and their compliance with the legal requirements for implementing the whistleblower framework.
In addition to auditing compliance with the legal framework through this evaluation process, however, the NACP should assess how far the whistleblowing framework is supporting the fight against corruption. To do so, the NACP could also include some outcome-level indicators in its assessment, including indicators which measure the levels of understanding of the whistleblowing framework within organisations and of the quality of reporting. Such indicators could include the proportion of received reports which qualified for whistleblower status, the proportion which led to an investigation, or the proportion which contributed to successfully addressing the cause of a case of corruption. Including these indicators would help to measure the impact of the steps which the NACP and authorised units are taking to improve the functioning and implementation of Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework, to ensure that in practice the framework is contributing to upholding integrity in Ukraine. In addition, the collection of this information within organisations could be included in the NACP’s maturity model for integrity in organisations, to emphasise at an organisational level that a highly functioning system aims to produce quality disclosures.
6.3.2. Ukraine could improve the functionality of the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal
In September 2023, NACP inaugurated the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal. NACP led the development and launch of the Portal, and now has ongoing responsibility for its governance and oversight of those authorities required to engage with it. The Portal, hosted on the NACP’s website, functions as a unified internal and regular reporting route for every entity required by law to establish such channels, rather than these entities each having to set up their own reporting channels. The Portal has therefore become the main channel for reporting facts about corruption in Ukraine, and while other channels such as dedicated telephone lines and email addresses still exist, authorised units must enter information reported through these other channels into the Portal. In this sense, the Portal’s second function is to be the official repository for registering whistleblower reports. The Portal thus also incorporates elements of Compliance Management Systems Software, such as functions for storing, organising, and accessing compliance-related documents.
The rollout of the Portal is ongoing and gathering pace. The NACP is connecting entities according to a schedule, starting first with authorities working in the field of combatting corruption, then central government authorities and regional military administrations, and then other state institutions including the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat, the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Office of the President, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and state-owned enterprises. Regional, city, village and settlement councils will be connected to the Portal last (NACP, 2023[21]). In July 2024, about 2 000 organisations were connected to the Portal, taking the total number of connected organisations to more than 5 900, including over 1 500 government agencies, over 300 local governments and about 4 000 legal entities of private and public law (for instance, state-owned enterprises, regional structural units of government agencies, or educational institutions) (NACP, 2024[18]).
By the end of 2024, the system had registered more than 3 600 reports. Sixty-three people had been granted whistleblower status and the reports of more than 550 people were under review. The number of reports is increasing too. The NACP recently surveyed 51 organisations, 25% of which said that the number of reports on possible facts of corruption or corruption-related offences in their organisation had increased after the launch of the Portal (NACP, 2024[18]). This is a positive level of engagement with the Portal so far. The NACP should make sure, however, that its future evaluations of the Portal focus on the quality of reporting as well as the quantity, as it is only valid, useful reporting, which can be investigated and acted upon, that enables a whistleblowing system to function as an effective tool for upholding integrity. These qualitative evaluations could include collecting broader data about, for instance, the types of reported breaches, the types of follow-up and investigations, what the results of investigations were, or the types of any cases of retaliation.
Notwithstanding these early successes, the Portal’s functionality could be improved to enhance its effectiveness as an anti‑corruption tool. Firstly, Ukraine should remove the requirement in the Portal for whistleblowers to assess the legal breach which may have occurred relating to the activity they are reporting. This current requirement places an unfair level of expectation on the reporter, as most people do not have a legal background and lack the necessary knowledge to determine the legal status of the offence they are reporting. Furthermore, it is for law enforcement agencies and the courts to determine whether an offence has been committed, rather than civilians who under the LPC must only hold a conviction that the information they are reporting is reliable.
Secondly, Ukraine should introduce a ‘review submission’ feature to the Portal, to allow whistleblowers to verify the accuracy and completeness of the information they are reporting and better protect them against retaliation. As explored above, under the LPC reporters only qualify for whistleblower protections if the information they report can establish the availability of factual data confirming the possible commission of corruption or corruption-related offences. If the information they submit through the Portal does not meet this requirement, reporters are left open to reprisals. Adding a preview function to the Portal would therefore offer an extra buffer against retaliation and could enhance whistleblowers’ user experience and confidence that the Portal is working for them.
And finally, organisational heads are currently able to access reports which have been reviewed in their organisation through an archive function in the Portal (ACREC, 2024[22]). This puts the confidentiality of reports and the protection of whistleblowers at risk. To ensure confidentiality is maintained, reports should therefore only be accessible by designated persons within authorised units. If organisational heads wish to be kept apprised of trends and workplace issues in their organisations, they could receive separate forms of reporting on, for instance, the volumes or subject matter of reports.
6.3.3. Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework could support the prevention and suppression of corruption better if the data related to whistleblower reports was collected and fed back into policymaking
The Recommendation on Public Integrity notes that developing an effective culture of openness means that problems are identified before they develop and become harmful to the organisation, the public sector, or to the public or national interest more broadly (OECD, 2017[1]). An effective system both enables the quick investigation and prosecution of corrupt acts once they occur, and also makes effective use of whistleblowing reports to focus corruption prevention measures.
As mentioned, the number of organisations and reports being registered through Ukraine’s whistleblower portal are increasing. Through their position as ‘insiders’, those registering in the Portal are uniquely placed to offer real-time insights into how the integrity system is performing and where corruption vulnerabilities may lie. Even where reports do not qualify as whistleblowing reports under Ukraine’s current legislation, they may offer insight into other types of vulnerability to wrongdoing within public organisations. Disclosures through the Portal are therefore a valuable source of information about where anti‑corruption authorities should focus their prevention and detection efforts. However, although the NACP uses data from the Portal to conduct an annual analysis in the field of whistleblower protection with a view to improving the whistleblowing framework, at present it is not clear whether the NACP or other Ukrainian public authorities are utilising data related to whistleblowing disclosures as an evidence base for wider public policymaking.
As the Portal matures Ukraine could build on the good progress it has made so far by making greater use of whistleblower reports to understand how its integrity framework is performing and to support policymaking (Box 1.10). At a central level, the NACP could use data on whistleblowing cases to identify recurring issues with how the whistleblowing process and wider integrity framework is working (while respecting whistleblower confidentiality). This kind of insight could be enriched by combining whistleblowing information with data from other sources, such as staff survey results, personal grievance cases, and concerns raised through other routes or staff forums. Over time, time series data could be analysed to spot trends in addition to identifying one-off and more systemic problems. In addition, the NACP could build these activities into its maturity model for public organisations as an example of an advanced framework.
The National Audit Office’s good practice guide on Improving services – systematic improvement identifies what organisations can do to enable learning and improvement across boundaries. It sets out that public organisations can apply the following good practice principles for sharing learning while being mindful of any need to protect whistleblower identity or anonymity.
Source: NAO (2024[23]), Whistleblowing in the Civil Service: Good Practice Guide, https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/whistleblowing-in-the-civil-service.pdf (accessed on 7 February 2025).
The legislative framework for whistleblowing in Ukraine
Ukraine could support public integrity more effectively if the material and personal scope of its whistleblowing legislation were extended.
Ukraine should ensure the requirement for whistleblowers to believe in the reliability of the information they report provides adequate protection.
Ukraine could encourage reporting by clarifying how whistleblowers should apply the public interest test in the external disclosure of sensitive material.
Ukraine could improve its culture of openness by reinforcing its legal protections for whistleblowers.
The whistleblowing framework in practice
Ukraine could improve its whistleblower framework in practice through improving the capacity of authorised units.
Ukraine could improve the functionality of the Unified Whistleblower Reporting Portal.
Ukraine’s whistleblowing framework could support the prevention and suppression of corruption better if the data in whistleblower reports was collected and fed back into policymaking.
References
[22] ACREC (2024), Key Recommendations for Restarting the Work of the NACP in the Field of Whistleblower Protection, Anti-corruption Research and Education Centre, https://acrec.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/brief-web-portal-NN.pdf (accessed on 7 February 2025).
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← 1. The Government of Ukraine has now approved a draft law (to be presented to the Verkhovna Rada) “On ensuring compliance with the legal acts of the European Union and the relevant criteria established by the European Payments Council, with a view to Ukraine’s accession to the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)”, which includes the extension of whistleblower protection to cases of AML/CFT.
← 2. According to Article 5(8) of the EU Whistleblowing Directive, ‘facilitator’ means a natural person who assists a reporting person in the reporting process in a work-related context, and whose assistance should be confidential.