This chapter examines Ukraine’s mechanisms for retaining accountability in policymaking. It recommends that the new legislation for managing lobbying and influence should come into effect as soon as possible, and that transparency of public information is improved by clarifying legal provisions around the public interest test, publishing government session and ministerial agendas, and improving oversight and enforcement. It also suggests improving accountability in political financing by obliging recipients of political donations to check their permissibility, and by ensuring that private donations are registered.
OECD Integrity and Anti‑Corruption Review of Ukraine
Abstract
Public policies are at the centre of the relationship between people and governments, as they influence citizens’ standard of living and the quality of people’s daily lives. In democratic governments, people expect policy makers to pursue the public interest. The Recommendation on Public Integrity recommends that to uphold the public interest countries should seek to promote accountability and to encourage transparency and stakeholders’ engagement at all stages of the political process and policy cycle (OECD, 2017[1]). To do so, countries should promote transparency and an open government, including ensuring access to information and open data, along with timely responses to requests for information. They should also grant all stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, access to the development and implementation of public policies. And they should avert the capture of public policies by narrow interest groups, including through instilling transparency in lobbying activities and in the financing of political parties and election campaigns (OECD, 2017[1]).
In Ukraine, the war has required policy makers to focus on national security concerns. In several instances, Martial Law has suspended or reinterpreted aspects of Ukraine’s integrity framework due to the increased security risks during wartime. This chapter considers these sensitivities as it explores key aspects of Ukraine’s framework for ensuring accountability in public policymaking, namely mechanisms relating to lobbying and influence, transparency and public information, and political financing. As well as making recommendations for improvements in these areas it also suggests how reforms could be sequenced in the wartime context and under Martial Law.
In addition, reforms to Ukraine’s accountability framework are currently made in the context of deoligarchisation. Ukraine has recognised that preventing non-transparent, undue influence of individuals in political, economic and public life is a priority for any state wishing to achieve a democratic system governed by the rule of law and respect for human rights (Venice Commission, 2023[2]). Oligarchs, with their influence over political power and the pillars of state, without any mandate to exercise such influence, combined with their control of the media and key sectors of the economy, are a clear threat to democracy and the public interest. Ukraine attempted deoligarchisation through the Law on Prevention of Threats to National Security Related to Excessive Influence of Persons Who Have Significant Economic and Political Weight in Public Life (Oligarchs) (Law № 1780-IX). Following recommendations from the Venice Commission, however, Ukraine has changed track, instead adopting what the Venice Commission has called a ‘system’ approach to deoligarchisation. Rather than focusing measures on oligarchs as a category of individuals, this system approach includes adopting measures for, inter alia, an effective competition policy, anti‑corruption and anti‑money-laundering measures, measures to ensure media pluralism, or rules on the financing of political parties and election campaigns (Venice Commission, 2023[2]). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to make recommendations which directly contribute to deoligarchisation, but several suggestions in the following sections relating to political financing, lobbying and public information could contribute to Ukraine’s development of a ‘system’ approach to address this wider problem.
Since the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukraine has made good progress in improving its integrity framework. In several respects, regulations for access to public information and political financing are performing well and compare favourably to other countries included in the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (Figure 3.1). The regulations for lobbying are well-defined in the law (though yet to come into force).
Ukraine’s recent achievements notwithstanding, there is still room for improvement. This chapter suggests that Ukraine could:
ensure that the new lobbying framework comes into effect as soon as possible, to begin benefitting from the transparency and equality of access to policymaking which the new framework could introduce
undertake a comprehensive ex post review of the Law on Lobbying to ensure its provisions adequately safeguard policymaking against undue influence and provide a level playing field for lobbyists to represent their interests
adopt clear rules on conduct for those offering expert support to the policymaking process
improve the transparency of public policymaking by clarifying how the public interest test should be applied under martial law
publish government session and ministers’ agendas
improve the transparency of public policymaking by, in the long term, strengthening oversight and enforcement of public information regulations
improve safeguards against undue influence by obliging recipients of political donations to check their permissibility
enhance the effectiveness and credibility of political finance reporting by ensuring that private donations are registered.
How to read: Ukraine fulfils 100% of OECD criteria on the strength of political financing regulations.
Note: Indicator values reflect Ukraine’s lobbying framework before the new lobbying legislation and register come into force.
Source: OECD (2024[3]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
Lobbying and other forms of influence are key aspects of a functioning democracy. For policymakers, they are important sources of views, data and insights to improve the whole policy cycle and ensure policy and legislation continue to serve the public interest. For external stakeholders, lobbying and influence activities are legitimate ways in which to represent their interests and to participate in public decision-making processes. Many countries have therefore made significant efforts in recent years to ensure that a wide range of stakeholders have fair and equitable opportunity to contribute to public decision making (OECD, 2021[4]; 2024[5]).
However, if the proper safeguards are not in place, lobbying and influence activities can create advantages for certain groups that lead to asymmetric or undue influence over policymaking, in turn leading to policies that are inefficient, ineffective, and which do not safeguard the public interest and national security. Lobbying is an increasingly complex activity, and across the OECD the methods used and the risks they pose are evolving (OECD, 2021[4]; 2024[6]). In addition, changing public perceptions of the interests in which policies are made and who should be involved in policymaking are leading to calls for stricter rules on lobbying (OECD, 2021[4]; 2022[7]). The rapidly evolving lobbying and influence landscapes and the increasing risks connected with lobbying and influence, including covert foreign influence, on public decision-making processes make it crucial for governments to set up strong, effective, resilient and proportionate frameworks to tackle undue influence that is consistent with the broader public integrity framework (OECD, 2024[6]).
In Ukraine, the stakes around managing lobbying and influence are high. In the context of deoligarchisation, management of lobbying and influence activity offers opportunities to increase the fairness and security of the policy cycle by ensuring a plurality of views and greater equality of access to policy and decision making. It can also reduce the threat of foreign interference, by ensuring that the representation of interests is done within the bounds of transparency and integrity and as part of a framework in which lobbying and influence activities are properly defined so that the government continues to serve the public interest and safeguard national security. This section explores Ukraine’s current and planned lobbying framework and suggests that the new framework should come into force as soon as possible, that once in force it should be subject to a comprehensive ex-post evaluation process to ensure it is working effectively, and that Ukraine could adopt clear rules on conduct for those offering expert support to the policymaking process.
3.1.1. Ukraine should ensure that the new lobbying framework comes into effect as soon as possible, to begin benefitting from the transparency and equality of access to policymaking which the new framework could introduce
Until recently, there has been no specific regulation to strengthen the transparency and integrity of lobbying activities in Ukraine. In February 2024, however, Ukraine published a new Law on Lobbying (LL), which was due to come into effect two months from the day of the launch of the Transparency Register, but not later than 1 January 2025 (Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada, 2024, No. 18, p.77). This date was recently postponed, however, and the LL will now come into effect no later than 1 September 2025, with the Register now due to be established and operational by May 2025 (NACP, 2024[8]).
The LL includes definitions of what constitutes “lobbying”, relevant transparency requirements and the establishment of a “Transparency Register”, integrity standards for the conduct of lobbying activities, and mechanisms to ensure effective compliance and enforcement. Among the LL’s key strengths is the large scope of communications activities that are considered as “lobbying methods”, including indirect forms of lobbying, influence through mass media and information campaigns, and the preparation and distribution of position documents and other analytical materials (Box 3.1). Of OECD countries, only Canada’s legislation is similarly broad in scope and regulates indirect forms of lobbying. The LL entrusts the NACP with oversight of the new framework.
Article 7 of the LL sets out that:
1. Lobbying methods are actions performed by lobbying entities during lobbying.
2. Lobbying methods include:
a. any direct or indirect communication with the object of lobbying on issues related to the subject of lobbying
b. preparation and distribution of advertising, proposals, program and position documents, analytical materials, results of sociological and other research on issues related to the subject of lobbying, including the use of the media or the Internet
c. participation in events on issues related to the subject of lobbying, in order to influence (attempt to influence) the object of lobbying
d. inviting the object of lobbying to participate in meetings, conferences, events, etc.
e. organization of public events, information campaigns, other events not prohibited by law, related to the subject of lobbying
f. other methods not prohibited by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, which consist in the lobbying entity exerting influence (attempts to influence) on the lobbying object in relation to the subject of lobbying.
Source: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2024[9]), Law of Ukraine on Lobbying, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3606-20/print.
In early October 2024, the LL was supplemented by Rules of Ethical Conduct for lobbyists, developed by the NACP with inputs from civil society. The Cabinet of Ministers Resolution approving the Rules will come into force simultaneously with the entry into effect of the LL. The Rules introduce mandatory standards of behaviour for lobbying entities. They stipulate that lobbying entities are obliged to respect democratic values and public goods, be honest and uphold integrity in their activities, act transparently and openly, provide reliable information about their activities, comply with the legislation on information and personal data protection, avoid manifestations of unfair influence, and prevent conflicts of interest (NACP, 2024[10]). As explored further in Chapter 1, the introduction of ethical standards to support legislation is a welcome development in Ukraine, and the focus should now be on implementation and making them actionable through, for instance, drawing on behavioural insights methodologies.
Finally, the LL requires the NACP to establish and oversee a Transparency Register for lobbying activity. The Register is planned to offer free public access to up-to-date information about lobbying entities, including lobbyists’ names, sources of funding and how it has been spent, the field of lobbying activity, and who was targeted by the lobbying activity. Lobbying entities will be required to make an initial registration and regular subsequent disclosures every six months.
In many respects, therefore, as also noted by the European Commission (European Commission, 2024[11]), the new lobbying framework has the potential to provide a solid basis for managing lobbying and influence activities in Ukraine. However, to benefit from the transparency and greater equality of access to policymaking which the new framework could introduce, Ukraine should ensure that the new framework comes into force as soon as possible, with a minimum delay between the law’s entry into effect and the Transparency Register being operational, and that the revised timelines do not slip any further.
3.1.2. Ukraine could undertake a comprehensive ex-post review of the Law on Lobbying to ensure its provisions adequately safeguard policymaking against undue influence and provide a level playing field for lobbyists to represent their interests
The Recommendations on Public Integrity and on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and Influence make clear that provisions for lobbying and lobbyists in relevant regulations should be robust, comprehensive, and sufficiently explicit to avoid misinterpretation, to prevent loopholes, and to cover the influences over policymaking in all their forms (OECD, 2020[12]; 2021[4]). Setting a strong regulatory framework in which lobbying is clearly defined is particularly important since the actors involved in lobbying and the context in which they operate are evolving. Those seeking to influence policymaking now include trade and industry associations, NGOs, advisory and expert groups, parliamentary liaison groups, academic institutions, and think-tanks (OECD, 2024[6]; 2021[4]; Benamouzig and Cortinas Muñoz, 2019[13]; Mialon, Swinburn and Sacks, 2015[14]). In addition, developments in lobbying methods, such as social media and instant messaging, mean policymakers are subject to increased scrutiny, political polarisation and mis- and dis-information, making it harder to determine legitimate representation and make informed decisions that ensure policy is made in the public interest (OECD, 2021[4]).
Ukraine’s LL contains definitions of lobbying and lobbyists, which at present compares favourably to many OECD countries with lobbying legislation (Figure 3.2). However, in some important respects, these provisions are too narrow, increasing the risk that certain lobbying and influencing activities will not be captured under the new lobbying framework.
Note: The chart shows the OECD countries fulfilling the Public Integrity Indicators criterion "Lobbying activities are defined in the regulatory framework, including which actors are considered as lobbyists".
1. Poland has a definition for lobbying but not for lobbyists.
Source: OECD (2024[3]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
Definition of lobbyists
According to the Recommendation on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and Influence, lobbying and influence actors are legal persons, domestic or foreign, that engage in lobbying and influence activities on their own behalf, as well as natural or legal persons, domestic or foreign, who engage in lobbying and influence activities on behalf of or under the direction or control of other natural or legal persons, or foreign state interest actors. Lobbying and influencing does not cover diplomatic and consular officials, natural persons acting in a strictly personal capacity and not in association with others, journalists or contributors publishing content under the editor-in-chief’s responsibility of any print or digital publication, public officials acting in their official capacity, as well as political parties acting within the framework of political party regulations (OECD, 2024[6]). What determines whether a specific actor should be bound by transparency requirements on lobbying activities is not therefore the status of the actor, whether for-profit or not-for-profit, but whether the actor conducts activities to influence public decision-making processes including advocacy. In this sense, countries should promote mechanisms to improve transparency around the influences over public policymaking, rather than trying to regulate or control the conduct of specific actors.
Ukraine’s LL establishes a narrow definition of lobbyists. According to the LL, lobbying includes the paid representation of “commercial interests”, meaning “an activity carried out with the aim of influencing (attempting to influence) the object of lobbying in the commercial interests of the beneficiary (for remuneration received directly or indirectly and / or with payment of actual expenses necessary for its implementation) or in the person's own commercial interests and relating to the subject of lobbying”. The term “commercial interests” refers to “money or other property, personal advantages, privileges, other benefits of a material or intangible nature, which a person will receive or may receive within the framework of economic activity”. As a result, Ukraine’s provisions exclude all those seeking to influence policy making not for specific commercial interests, including civil society, academia or religious organisations. The removal of ‘advocacy’ activities from the provisions was the subject of much debate in Ukraine. But limiting the provisions solely to the representation of commercial interests means Ukraine’s new regulations do not require the registration of a range of important influences over the policy cycle, and therefore do not provide transparency on who is seeking to influence the decisions of public office holders as well as they could.
Definition of lobbying
Lobbying and influence activities are actions targeted at public officials involved in the decision-making process, its stakeholders, the media or a wider audience, and aimed at promoting the interests of lobbying and influence actors with reference to public decision-making and electoral processes. Public decision-making refers to the development, implementation, evaluation or modification of any public policy or programme at all levels of government. It also relates to the preparation or amendment of any law or regulation. It includes the award, modification or withdrawal of any grant, loan or other financial support, contract or other agreement, or of any licence or other authorisation involving public funds. And it relates to the nomination of key public officials (OECD, 2024[6]). In addition, strong lobbying regulations should cover a diverse range of mechanisms and channels of influence, such as social media and artificial intelligence tools.
While the LL includes in its definition of lobbying activity a broad range of media, only influencing activity undertaken in relation to a normative legal act (including changes, suspension, or issuance thereof) is in scope of the legislation and eligible for registration in the Transparency Register. However, it is not only during the legislative process that influence can be brought to bear on decision making. Influencing activity can be directed at the whole policy cycle, including the setting of policy agendas, the development and adoption of policies, or in the implementation or evaluation phases of policies and regulations. While rules for transparency and integrity in lobbying and influencing do not need to cover all the risks set out in Table 3.1 (as other policies and regulations can contribute to a culture of transparency and integrity in public policymaking processes), a comprehensive legislative framework mitigates the risk of undue influence at all stages of the policy cycle.
The LL represents, then, a first and, in many respects, vital step towards the regulation of lobbying and influence in Ukraine. But the narrowness of its provisions could mean it does not effectively illuminate the full range of influences being brought to bear on public decision making throughout the policy cycle, and therefore does not effectively mitigate the risks of undue influence and policy capture. There is therefore scope to review and improve the provisions.
Part of the reason for the narrow provisions in the LL is that lawmakers accounted for civil society’s legitimate concerns about advocacy being included in the definition of lobbying. The original draft of the law was elaborated by the NACP and included both professional, paid lobbying and advocacy in its provisions. However, civil society contended that the draft law contained several provisions that may have negatively affected civil society and the activities of the civic sector in Ukraine. CSOs’ primary concern was that requiring all those seeking to influence public policymaking to register in the Transparency Register would enable public authorities to identify and “put pressure on any "inconvenient" citizens or civil society organisations that will criticize the government, demand reforms or changes in public policy” (ZMINA et al., 2024[15]).
Note: One square is left blank because the legislature is not involved in policy implementation.
Source: OECD (2017[16]), Preventing Policy Capture: Integrity in Public Decision Making, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264065239-en.
Ukraine should, therefore, conduct an ex-post review of the functioning and impact of the new legal framework to ensure the law provides appropriate levels of transparency around the policy cycle, whilst safeguarding the rights of external stakeholders to represent their legitimate interests to decision makers. Such reviews in other countries take different forms, in some cases being required within the lobbying legislation itself, and in others being undertaken as required (Box 3.2). At the time of drafting this report, Ukraine is considering amending its forthcoming lobbying legislation ahead of it coming into effect, which could present an opportunity to update the law’s provisions as set out above. In any event, however, any future review of the lobbying provisions should involve all relevant stakeholders and must account for the concerns raised by civil society related to their ability to participate in policymaking and to receive legitimate funding to do so. The review should involve analysis of evolving lobbying and influence practices, how level the playing field is for lobbying, and produce meaningful recommendations for necessary improvements.
Review of the Lobbying Act in Ireland
The Lobbying Act provides (in Section 2) for regular reviews of the operations of the Act. The first review of the Act took place in 2016. The report takes into account input received by key stakeholders, including those carrying out lobbying activities and the bodies representing them. No recommendations were made by the government for amendments of the Lobbying Act. Subsequent reviews must be conducted every three years. The first report found a high level of compliance with legislative requirements. Lobbyists highlighted the need for further education, guidance and assistance, which prompted the commission to review its communication activities and guidance to lobbyists. In its submission to the first review of the operation of the Act, the commission recommended that any breaches of the cooling‑off statutory provisions should be made an offence under the Act. It also noted the lack of power to enforce the Act’s post-employment provisions or to impose sanctions for persons who fail to comply with these provisions. The Code of Conduct for persons carrying out lobbying activities, which came into effect on 1 January 2019, will also be reviewed every three years.
Parliamentary review of the limitations of France’s legal framework for lobbying
Following the French Government’s assessment that improvements were needed in France’s lobbying framework, in 2018 the French National Assembly established a parliamentary review of the lobbying legislative framework. The review concluded that the “promising legislative framework has, in fact, been implemented in a limited way, and has not been able to achieve the objectives of the legislator”. The findings revealed that many actors and actions aiming to influence the legislative process were not accounted for in the legislative framework. For example, hearings made at the request of a member of Parliament were not included in the definition of lobbying, even if the practice is frequent. These communications may take the form of briefing notes or proposed amendments sent by a company or organisation at the request of a parliamentarian or a hearing one might organise as part of legislative work. They might also include a phone call at the initiative of an employee of a public official covered by the lobbying legislative framework, asking for clarification after a meeting with the representative of a company or organisation. In the event of a potential breach, this exclusion made it difficult to trace who initiated a meeting or phone exchange, especially when relations between a parliamentarian and an interest representative are well established. It also created distortions between lobbyists. Those who have built close, regular contacts with decision makers may have fewer reporting obligations than interest groups with more limited contacts, who are almost always the initiators of such exchanges.
Sources: HATVP (2019[17]), Rapport d’activités 2018, https://www.hatvp.fr/rapports_activite/rapport_2018/ (accessed on 20 January 2025); Standards in Public Office Commission (2019[18]), Regulation of Lobbying in 2018: Annual Report, https://www.lobbying.ie/media/6218/annual-report-2018.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2025).
3.1.3. Ukraine could adopt clear rules on conduct for those offering expert support to the policymaking process
Many governments use expert groups for informing the design and implementation of public policy. Such groups include any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force or similar group or subgroup thereof, that provides advice, expertise or recommendations to public sector bodies. They can be composed of public and private sector members and representatives from civil society, and may be set up by the executive, legislative or judicial branches of government. As well as helping to strengthen policy design and implementation, expert groups provide a channel through which external parties can represent their interests and directly influence policy and decision making (OECD, 2021[4]). However, without sufficient transparency and integrity safeguards, there is a risk that the legitimacy of expert groups’ advice is undermined. External representatives participating in these groups have direct access to policy-making processes, often without being subject to lobbying or broader integrity rules, and may, whether unconsciously or not, favour their own interests as they participate in policymaking.
Since the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukraine has integrated civil society into government decision making and as a source of expert advice to policy makers. Ukrainian CSOs’ responsibilities often extend to conceiving and drafting the most significant legislation and government programmes, to developing implementation mechanisms, and to monitoring and evaluation processes to ensure initiatives and the responsible agencies are working effectively (Andrieieva et al., 2023[19]). And yet, this form of participation is exempt from registration in the LL. Also, while the Standard Regulations on Public Councils regulate, inter alia, the main tasks, powers, composition and recruitment processes of Public Councils, which are a common mechanism for the provision of public and expert input into Ukraine’s policy cycle, they do not elaborate any rules of conduct for Public Council members.
Ukraine could more effectively mitigate the risks of undue influence over public policymaking related to participation in expert advice and control groups, by adopting rules of procedure for such groups which set out standards of conduct and procedures for preventing and managing conflicts of interest (Box 3.3). Such rules should be developed in collaboration with civil society and other external organisations, and should be designed to provide reasonable safeguards against special interest groups capturing or imparting biased advice to government, whilst upholding external parties’ right to represent their interests and preserving the value which such participation can bring to policymaking.
In Ireland, any working group set up by a minister or public service body that includes at least one designated public official and at least one person from outside the public service, and which reviews, assesses or analyses any issue of public policy with a view to reporting on it to the Minister of the Government or the public service body, must comply with a Transparency Code.
The following information must be published on the website of the public body on its establishment:
names of chairperson and members, with details of their employing organisation (if they are representing a group of stakeholders, this should be stated)
whether any members who are not public servants were formerly public officials
terms of reference of the group
expected timeframe for the group to conclude its work
reporting arrangements.
In addition, the agenda and minutes of each meeting must be published and updated at least every four months. The chairperson must include with the final or annual report of the group a statement confirming its compliance with the Transparency Code. If the requirements of the Code are not adhered to, interactions within the group are considered a lobbying activity under the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015.
Source: Government of Ireland (n.d.[20]), Transparency Code Prepared in Accordance with Section 5 (7) of the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015, https://www.lobbying.ie/media/5986/2015-08-06-transparency-code-eng.pdf.
Transparency is a core element of a functioning democracy and is underpinned by the right to access information, understood as the ability of an individual to seek, receive, impart and use information (OECD, 2022[21]). The OECD Recommendation on Open Government promotes the disclosure of “clear, complete, timely, reliable and relevant public sector data and information” (OECD, 2017[22]). Likewise, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity encourages transparency at all stages of the political process and policy cycle to promote accountability and the public interest, including through promoting transparency and an open government via access to information and open data, along with timely responses to requests for information (OECD, 2017[1]). The OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity also emphasises that increasing transparency and establishing clear government guidelines regarding interactions with online information platforms and other actors in the information environment is vital for maintaining public trust and ensuring accountability of democratic institutions (OECD, 2024[23]).
Providing access to public information strengthens public integrity in several respects. Fostering transparency allows citizens insight into their governments’ activities, and helps oversight bodies and watchdog organisations to detect possible corruption and to take appropriate action. This greater accountability in policymaking and public governance in turn incentivises public office holders to behave with integrity (OECD, 2020[12]). Countries in which public information is more available also benefit from enhanced public trust and satisfaction with public services. Indeed, there is a positive and significant correlation between the transparency of public information and higher levels of trust in countries that experience a trust deficit, meaning those countries where less than half of the population trust the government or are neutral (Figure 3.3). Therefore, countries, though especially those with lower levels of trust in public institutions such as Ukraine, should continue to improve access to public information.
How to read: In countries where trust in government is below the median of OECD countries, there is a positive correlation between greater levels of transparency of public information and higher trust in government. The blue dots represent OECD countries, and the yellow one Ukraine. The dotted line is the overall trendline. An upward slope indicates positive correlation.
Sources: Gallup (n.d.[24]), Gallup World Trust Survey, https://www.gallup.com/home.aspx; OECD (2024[3]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
In Ukraine the right to access information is a constitutional right (OECD, 2022[21]). This right is then operationalised by Ukraine’s 2011 Law on Access to Public Information (LAPI), which compares well with other countries included in the OECD PIIs (Figure 3.4). The provisions relating to proactive transparency have been highlighted elsewhere as particularly strong (OECD, 2024[25]; RTI Rating, n.d.[26]). The LAPI provides that all public institutions and private persons carrying out public duties are holders of public information, and that everyone, including non-citizens and legal persons, has the right to access information in all the forms available. It also lists restrictions to access to information, sets deadlines for processing requests for information, and establishes the right to appeal to an independent body or the court against refusal or inactivity of an administrative body in response to an information request. In terms of the proactive publication of data, the LAPI outlines a list of information that public authorities must make public, and the Annex of Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 835/2015 establishes a list of datasets that must be published as open data. The LAPI also stipulates that government data are ‘open by default’.
Note: The chart shows the percentage of criteria fulfilled by OECD countries in the OECD Public Integrity Indicators relating to “Regulatory framework for access to information and open data”.
Source: OECD (2024[3]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
While Ukraine has no institution explicitly tasked with public information issues, the LAPI grants the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (the Ombudsperson) certain responsibilities in this area. The Ombudsperson supervises public authorities’ compliance with transparency requirements, processes individual complaints, offers advice to public authorities on public information issues, and provides training and capability-building materials to public authorities about public information. The Ombudsperson also submits protocols to the courts for imposing sanctions for public institutions’ violations of the right to access information. The Ombudsperson is appointed for a term of five years and a list of grounds for termination of their powers and dismissal from office is set out in primary legislation. However, it should be noted that the previous Ombudsperson was removed early from office through a vote of no confidence in the Verkhovna Rada, a process which the OECD has recently noted falls short of international standards of independence of oversight bodies (OECD, 2024[25]).
Proactive transparency and open data in Ukraine are supported by the Unified State Web Portal of Open Data (the Portal), which contains around 30,000 datasets. The Portal is designed to allow any person to freely copy, publish, distribute, use, including for commercial purposes, in combination with other information or through inclusion in their own product, public information in the form of open data with a mandatory reference to the source of such information. The structure of the open data set includes a description of the composition or elements of the data set, their format, parameters and purpose.
However, there is scope for Ukraine to improve access to public information further. In the short term, Ukraine could improve the transparency of public policymaking by clarifying how the public interest test should be applied under martial law. Ukraine should also improve transparency around influencing activity directed at ministers by publishing ministers’ agendas. And in the longer term, Ukraine could reinforce the transparency of public policymaking by strengthening oversight and enforcement of public information regulations.
3.2.1. Ukraine could improve the transparency of public policymaking by clarifying how the public interest test should be applied under martial law
The LAPI and the Constitution of Ukraine set the circumstances in which public authorities can impose restrictions on access to public information. To withhold information, information administrators in public authorities must apply a three-fold public interest test, which involves weighing up citizens’ constitutional right to access public information against the legitimate right of authorities to restrict information where its release could cause harm (Box 3.4). Moreover, the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law prescribed that public authorities and local self-government bodies take actions necessary to repel the threat posed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, deter the armed aggression and, above all, to ensure national security (Bulletin of the VRU, 2015, No. 28, Article 9.10).1 The restrictions in the LAPI are in line with the Tromsø Convention, ratified by the Verkhovna Rada in May 2020, and the further restrictions imposed by Martial Law are necessary and justified to ensure Ukrainian national security.
The LAPI states that “Restrictions on access to information are carried out in accordance with the law, subject to the combination of the following requirements:
1. solely in the interests of the national security, territorial integrity or public order, for the purpose of preventing riots or criminal offences, for the protection of public health, for the protection of the reputation or rights of other people, for preventing the disclosure of information received confidentially, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of justice
2. disclosure of information may cause significant harm to these interests
3. the harm from the disclosure of such information outweighs the public interest in obtaining it.”
In addition, the Constitution of Ukraine states that the rights of access to public information “may be restricted by law in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public order in order to prevent disorder or crime, to protect public health, to protect the reputation or rights of others, to prevent the disclosure of information received confidentially, or to maintain the authority and impartiality of justice.”
Sources: Art. 6.2, Law on Access to Public Information; Art.34, Constitution of Ukraine.
However, there have been several instances in which public authorities have not applied the restrictions appropriately in practice, which has stifled citizens’ constitutional right to access public information (OECD, 2024[25]; Ombudsman of Ukraine, 2022[27]). In relation to the proactive disclosure of datasets, at the beginning of the war several public authorities switched off access to various public registers. These closures were justified as a precautionary measure, but no government-wide policy was developed on criteria for the closures and the limitation of information. Public authorities were therefore given discretion to decide which registers to restrict. While access to these registers has gradually been restored, many restrictions are still in place (Table 3.2).
Note: Several other datasets remain inaccessible, such as the State Geocadastre, tax debt, and some other information from the State Tax Service (the Service also does not provide tax debt information upon request anymore), and the Registry of Damaged and Ruined Property. Various ecological datasets are also missing, although by law access to environmental data should not be restricted (Part 3 of Article 13, Law of Ukraine "On Information").
Source: Data provided by Civil Society Organisations in the preparation of this report.
There have also been several instances in which information access requests have been unduly restricted. In his 2022 annual report, the Ombudsperson noted several cases in which public authorities had temporarily stopped responding to citizens’ requests for information which were not associated with, for instance, martial law, military operations, medical assistance, or evacuation of the population (Ombudsman of Ukraine, 2022[27]). The Ombudsman further noted this problem of the misapplication of the three-part public interest test in a special report on the observance of the constitutional right to information under the legal regime of martial law in late 2023 (Ombudsman of Ukraine, 2023[28]). In addition, several court cases have also shown information being wrongly withheld on the basis of the restrictions applied under martial law.2 While the legal framework has not changed, the ongoing war and martial law has clearly therefore affected how public authorities are interpreting restrictions aiming to protect national security.
The Ombudsperson issued guidelines on application of the grounds for postponement of processing of public information requests, and also provides information holders with assistance on this matter in individual cases. However, no such guidance has been produced with regard to the even more important issue of interpretation of the restrictions on access to public information under war conditions. Ukraine should therefore take steps to address the over-observance of these rules in public authorities. One option could be for the Ombudsman to issue guidance on how to apply the public interest test in the current context. However, since the issue here is one of national policy (i.e. the interpretation of martial law in day-to-day government) it may be more constructive for Ukraine to establish a working group, involving relevant stakeholders from across the branches of state and representatives from civil society, to develop meaningful recommendations on how access to public information should be upheld under martial law.
3.2.2. Ukraine could publish government sessions and ministers’ agendas
An important means of ensuring the transparency of government business is the publication of government sessions and ministerial agendas. Publishing such agendas can enhance public perceptions of the fairness and security of government business and safeguard against foreign interference, by making clear which decisions are being made and the influences being brought to bear upon them (OECD, 2020[12]). 33% of OECD countries are enhancing government transparency by publishing ministers’ agendas and 48% by publishing government sessions agendas (Figure 3.5).
Source: OECD (2024[3]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
In Ukraine, however, the publication of government sessions agendas has been suspended due to the ongoing war. And although some details of individual ministers’ meetings are published in the “news” section of each ministry’s website, ministerial agendas are not routinely published at all. There is a clear national security case in the current context for withholding some information about who ministers are meeting and what they are talking about. However, there is still scope to enhance transparency around ministerial and government decision making in terms of information which is not caught by the safeguards set out in the LAPI and the Constitution of Ukraine. Doing so may help to improve levels of public trust in ministers, which has been lagging behind trust in other public office holders (Razumkov Centre, 2024[29]; 2024[30]), and could help to counteract foreign interference.
One option for publishing ministers’ agendas is including such information in the forthcoming lobbying register. Whether or not the lobbying register is selected for publishing ministers’ agendas, as in other OECD countries, the published information should specify at a minimum who the minister met, in which capacity people met ministers, and the topic that was discussed during the meeting (Box 3.5). If Ukraine undertakes a more sustained analysis of how public information rules should work in the current context, as suggested above, this examination could also consider how to balance transparency whilst mitigating the possible sensitivities related to the ongoing war and martial law.
OECD countries take different approaches to the publication of ministerial agendas, with some publishing them in a central online repository and others publishing agendas on the separate websites of government departments.
Publication on a central online repository
Spain’s Transparency Portal acts a single platform on which Spanish citizens can consult all the information that the General State Administration Services are legally required to publish. The portal is also where the right to access information can be exercised via a direct online administrative procedure. The Portal has been used to publish over 530,000 accessible records, with complete databases that were not previously public and that formed part of ministerial intranets or internal filing systems.
Ministerial agendas are published on the platform every day and then archived. Entries are made for each calendar date which list the ministers who have meetings that day, and for each minister is included the time of each meeting, the location, who the minister will meet, in what capacity that person will meet the minister (if it is a meeting rather than e.g. a conference or event), and the topic of their meeting.
Departmental publication
The Netherlands’ Open Government Act establishes a list of datasets to be proactively disclosed and establishes that each administrative body shall of its own accord make public a list of datasets specified in the legislation. Ministerial agendas are among these datasets.
In practice, therefore, in the Netherlands each minister’s weekly agenda is published and then archived on their particular ministry’s website. Entries are listed for each calendar date, and include each type of engagement the minister has (e.g. conversations with external parties, parliamentary meetings, ministerial consultations, Council of Ministers meetings, etc). Details of the meeting are given for each entry. For conversations with external parties, for instance, the person the minister will meet is listed, along with the capacity in which that person will meet the minister and the topic of their meeting.
Note: Information is drawn from the Spanish Transparency Portal, and from examples of ministries in the Netherlands, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Economic Affairs.
3.2.3. In the long term, Ukraine could improve the transparency of public policymaking by strengthening oversight and enforcement of public information regulations
External scrutiny and oversight are essential parts of an integrity system, as they ensure public organisations and officials are accountable for their decisions, actions and expenditures. Oversight bodies contribute to effective integrity frameworks by auditing the system and making recommendations for improvement, handling complaints and allegations, and through the independent exercise of enforcement measures such as sanctions. Oversight bodies can also foster learning through evaluation and highlighting good and bad public sector practices (OECD, 2020[12]).
In many OECD countries such oversight institutions play an important role in ensuring public bodies’ compliance with access to information and transparency regulations. Twenty-eight OECD countries have established a body responsible for monitoring the implementation of these rules. These bodies are often independent information commissions, agencies, or ombudsman bodies with a specific mandate for access to information; an ombudsman with a mandate on access to information as part of a wide range of other topics (e.g. human rights, discrimination, gender); or a central government authority. But whatever the chosen model, to be effective these bodies must have a clear regulatory mandate, adequate and sustained resources, a monitoring and analysis function, and a capacity for enforcement and sanctions (OECD, 2022[21]).
As set out above, although in Ukraine there is no dedicated body for supervising public information issues, the Ombudsperson has some relevant responsibilities, supported through a series of relevant powers, through its broader mandate to protect human rights in Ukraine. However, while the Ombudsperson has enjoyed higher levels of public confidence in recent years, there remain notable shortcomings in its powers which mean it is not able to oversee Ukraine’s public information framework as well as it could (OECD, 2024[25]).
Firstly, although the Ombudsperson can issue protocols to the courts for imposing sanctions for public institutions’ violations of the right to access information, it is not able to issue sanctions itself. In 2022, the Ombudsperson opened 258 proceedings to take measures to respond and restore the rights of citizens to access information, and 34 reports on administrative offences were drawn up and sent to local courts. At the same time, the Ombudsperson drew up and sent to the court 44 protocols on administrative offences in connection with the violation of the requirements of the LAPI. Despite these efforts, however, the Ombudsperson has noted that due to the short timeframe for bringing a person to administrative responsibility (3 months from the moment of committing the offense) and lengthy consideration in courts, most of the 44 protocols drawn up in 2022 were closed due to the expiration of the term for imposing an administrative penalty specified in Article 38 of the Code of Administrative Offences (Ombudsman of Ukraine, 2023[28]). These delays in the enforcement process for the provisions in the LAPI make it harder for the Ombudsperson to protect and uphold citizens’ right to access public information. Many legal regimes for access to information globally are weakened by a lack of enforcement power of the overseeing institutions (OECD, 2022[21]). Systems which empower the body responsible for supervising public information with relevant sanctioning powers are therefore more responsive to breaches of access to information rules, and do not clog up the courts with requests relating to public information issues.
And secondly, the Ombudsperson does not monitor and aggregate data on access to public information. In its annual reports the Ombudsperson presents statistics on citizens’ reports of violations of the right to access public information and makes high-level observations about the reasons for these violations (for example, (Ombudsman of Ukraine, 2022[27]). However, there are no statistics available on, for instance, the average time to process requests and share decisions refusing access to information, or the most common grounds for restricting access to information. This lack of aggregated information makes it difficult for the Ombudsperson, or wider society, to assess the actual level of responsiveness of the administration to public information requests, both generally and in the current wartime context, and to assess how well the public information framework is working in practice.
Whether it follows the model adopted by other countries and establishes an independent information commissioner-type organisation or whether it amends its existing institutional set-up, Ukraine should therefore ensure its oversight bodies are properly equipped to oversee its public information framework through improvements to monitoring and enforcement capabilities.
Ensuring transparency and integrity in the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns is crucial to effective policymaking and strong democracies. Financial contributions allow individuals and entities to channel their support to candidates, political parties and particular issues of interest to them. They are also a necessary resource for candidates and parties to run for elections and diffuse ideas and manifestos, facilitating competition and choice in elections and campaigning (OECD, 2020[12]). However, the financing of political parties and election campaigns can also pose significant risks to the integrity of decision making if it is not adequately regulated, as money may become an instrument of undue influence and policy capture.
Until the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, powerful private and business interests’ use of political financing to influence the political class and capture public decision-making challenged democracy in Ukraine. International organisations have previously noted resignation and a sense among Ukrainians that political parties had been established and used for private gain, that politicians had not always served the public well, and that democracy had failed to deliver on its promises (GRECO, 2011[31]). These perceptions have not necessarily changed, with recent data suggesting that the percentage of Ukrainians who believe a political party represents their interests has declined from 38% in 2020 to 16% in 2024, and that only 12% of Ukrainians now say they trust political parties (Razumkov Centre, 2024[32]).
To address perceptions like these, and to solve the problems in the political financing framework which underpins them, Ukraine has taken several steps to improve transparency and integrity in the financing of political parties. These include improvements to the procedure for verifying political parties’ statements of assets, income, expenses, and financial liabilities and the methodology for calculating the value of donations in the form of works, goods, or services. In addition, responsible authorities’ abilities to inspect political parties’ finances and detect violations have improved. Measures have been established to ensure the publication of findings arising from the verification of financial statements of political parties on official websites and within time limits established in law. Assistance for political parties on the application of the law has been provided, including the dissemination of explanatory materials on compliance with the rules of state and private financing of political parties and the submission of their financial statements (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2023[33]).
While the requirement has now been reinstated, between March 2020 and August 2023 political parties were exempted from their legal obligation to submit quarterly financial reports due to COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. In addition, parliamentary elections have been halted under Martial Law, for good reasons including not dividing society, the difficulty in ensuring electoral infrastructure is ready, and updating voter lists during wartime. Even so, there is scope for Ukraine to reflect on and build on its recent improvements to the political financing framework before elections are resumed.
This section explores Ukraine’s political financing legislation and implementing measures. It suggests there is scope to better emphasise the responsibility of those receiving political donations to check their permissibility upon receipt. And it suggests Ukraine should investigate how far current transparency measures are capturing the true sources of political financing and enabling implementation of the political financing rules.
3.3.1. Ukraine could improve safeguards against undue influence by obliging recipients of political donations to check their permissibility
Ukraine has a comprehensive legislative framework for regulating political financing which compares well with OECD countries (Figure 3.6). In Ukraine, the main law regulating the financing of political parties is the Law on Political Parties (LPP), which is supplemented by the Election Code. The LPP prohibits donations from anonymous sources, publicly owned enterprises and contributions from foreign states or enterprises, and sets a limit for personal contributions to candidates’ personal campaigns. In addition, it bans the use of public funds and resources in favour of or against a political party. The Election Code also limits campaign expenses for parties, candidates and third parties to a fixed ceiling. To ensure compliance with these restrictions and the transparency of parties' activities, regular reporting and annual internal audits for all parties and external audits for those receiving state funding are required. Parties must submit reports to the NACP each quarter with information on, inter alia, funds available on all accounts, securities, and property; donations and other funds received; payments and expenses; and financial liabilities. Political parties’ reports are published in the POLITDATA register and verified by the NACP. The Criminal Code of Ukraine and Code on Administrative Offences (CAO) establish that a candidate can be held personally responsible for breaches of political finance regulations, and set out corresponding sanctions. In addition, the Election Code obliges the manager of the relevant account of the election fund, which may be the candidates themselves in the elections of people's deputies and local elections, to submit a financial report.
Note: The chart shows the percentage of OECD criteria fulfilled by each OECD country on the strength of political finance regulations and the measures to implement regulations in practice.
Source: OECD (2024[3]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
However, provisions related to responsibility for the giving and receipt of impermissible donations to political parties could be improved. The LPP sets out that by making a contribution in support of a political party a person confirms that the contribution is not from or on behalf of:
a body of state power or of local self-government
a legal entity in which at least 10 percent of the authorised capital or voting rights directly or indirectly belong to the state, local self-government bodies
legal entities, the ultimate beneficial owners of which are the [public office holders] specified in subparagraphs "a", "c"-"i" of paragraph 1 and in subparagraph "a" of paragraph 2 of part one of Article 3 of the LPC
foreign states, foreign legal entities, legal entities in which at least 10 percent of the authorised capital or voting rights are directly or indirectly owned by non-residents, as well as legal entities whose ultimate beneficial owners are foreigners or stateless persons.
In addition to these restrictions, if an individual or legal entity exercises or may exercise a decisive influence on the activities of one or more legal entities, the contributions of such an individual or legal entity and legal entities controlled by it are considered to be the contribution of one person and are limited to the maximum donations permissible by a single natural or legal person. If the authorised person of a political party becomes “reliably aware” that a prohibited donation has been made, they are obliged within 30 days from the receipt of the donation to apply to refuse it, whereupon the bank holding the political party’s account must return the donation to the person who made it.
While the authorised person of a political party must take steps to return a donation if they become aware it is impermissible, the requirement for political parties to return impermissible donations therefore remains somewhat passive, as there is no requirement in Ukrainian law for those receiving political donations to actively check a donation’s permissibility. Indeed, according to the LPP, responsibility for non-compliance with restrictions on donations is borne by the person making the contribution. A party and its authorised persons bear no legal responsibility for violation of the restrictions set out above.
As per the LPP, the document generated through making a monetary contribution must contain information which can identify the donor. But in the absence of a requirement for recipients of donations to proactively check the source of donations at the point of receipt, such identifying information is only useful when a political party’s accounts are audited. There is therefore an intolerable risk that parties could (even unknowingly) use impermissible donations until the point an audit establishes their impermissibility, by which time funds may have been used to influence political debate or the course and outcome of a campaign. As other OECD countries have done, therefore, Ukraine should introduce a statutory responsibility for political parties to take reasonable steps to check the source of donations before they accept and use the funds (Box 3.6).
The United Kingdom, Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000
In the UK, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) states that:
“Where:
- a donation is received by a registered party, and
- it is not immediately decided that the party should (for whatever reason) refuse the donation.
all reasonable steps must be taken forthwith by or on behalf of the party to verify (or, so far as any of the following is not apparent, ascertain) the identity of the donor, whether he is a permissible donor, and (if that appears to be the case) all such details in respect of him as are required by [Schedule 6 of the PPERA, relating to Details to be Given in Donations Reports] to be given in respect of the donor of a recordable donation.”
Source: UK Government (2000[34]), Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/section/56.
3.3.2. Ukraine could enhance the effectiveness and credibility of political finance reporting by ensuring that private donations are registered
Responsibility for oversight and implementation of Ukraine’s political financing rules rests with the NACP and the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). The CEC and NACP control the receipt, accounting and use of election funds of political parties during presidential and parliamentary elections. For local elections, these powers are exercised by the Territorial Election Commission. Political parties are required to submit interim and final financial reports during election campaigns. At national (presidential and parliamentary) elections, responsible administrators must submit to the NACP and CEC in paper and electronic form an interim financial report on the receipt and use of election funds for the period from the day the election fund savings account was opened to the twelfth day before the election day. Then, no later than 15 days after the election, responsible administrators must submit a final financial report on the receipt and use of election funds (on paper and in electronic form). The NACP also receives and checks political parties’ quarterly reports on property, income, expenses and obligations of a financial nature.
The NACP publishes details of its oversight of political financing in its annual report, including information on the number of detected violations of the LPP, the number of protocols on administrative offences drawn up by the NACP and the results of their review, and the number of protocols sent to law enforcement bodies and the results of their review. According to its 2023 annual report, in 2023 the NACP filed eight protocols about administrative offences, five of which were regarding violations in the contributions to political parties, and three of which referred to not providing necessary information about political finance. Based on these protocols, three were closed as no offence was proven, in four cases an administrative penalty was imposed in the form of a fine, in three of those four cases the provided contributions were confiscated, and one case was closed due to the expiry of the term to impose a fine (NACP, 2023[35]). In 2023, reporting exemptions were granted to political parties due to the continued application of COVID‑19 quarantine measures and the martial law introduced by the Presidential Decree of 24 February 2022. In 2024, the NACP drew up 609 protocols on administrative offences, including 13 protocols under Article 188-46 of the Code of Administrative Offences for failure to provide required information or documents, or for missing statutory deadlines; 10 protocols under Article 212-15 for violations in making or receiving political contributions, 269 protocols under Article 212-21 for breaches in submitting political party reports and 317 protocols under Article 212-21 for the failure to submit political party reports.
To facilitate financial reporting, in 2021 Ukraine established the POLITDATA platform, an electronic reporting system for political parties maintained by the NACP. Since its launch, POLITDATA has increased the transparency of political financing, by improving the efficiency of reporting for political parties and enabling better external scrutiny of their reports by providing data in a central, searchable platform in open data format. In addition, POLITDATA automatically verifies all the submitted information by using specific parameters in 14 state registers. NACP analysts can see the verification results and any abnormalities in the data in a special electronic office and can compare reports from different years to obtain information about new assets acquired by political parties. According to POLITDATA as of January 2025, 290 political parties and 7,966 local branches of these parties were registered.
However, the extent to which reporting and transparency requirements are illuminating the true sources of political financing in Ukraine should be verified. Journalists, civil society and international organisations have identified a range of schemes used to circumvent Ukraine’s political financing rules. In addition, according to the POLITDATA registry, the share of private funding received by political parties is currently very low compared to the amount of public funding which eligible parties received. These schemes, examples of which are in Box 3.7, have often made it difficult to understand who is financing Ukrainian political parties and to what extent, and therefore what the potential influences over public policy and decision making could be.
Use of fictitious donors
A person who is interested in financing a political party hands cash to another person (known as the fictitious donor), who for a reward transfers the money to the party’s bank and identifies themselves as the donor. It is not necessary to involve many fictitious donors to transfer a lot of money. These schemes have in the past involved rich fictitious donors who can more easily explain the legality of their funds. For example, one party received funds directly from the top management of large Ukrainian companies owned by an oligarch.
Use of fictitious legal entities
This scheme is similar to the one above, but legal entities are used instead of individuals. For example, in 2019, one of the largest political parties in Ukraine received approximately EUR 90 000 from two companies that were registered by one person a month before the transfer. This scheme can also be used by foreign citizens to finance political parties, as they can invest in a legal entity registered in Ukraine which can in turn legally finance the party.
Use of public organisations with the same name as a political party
This scheme is used to help finance activities to support a party’s election campaign. An NGO is registered with the same name as a political party. The NGO then finances political advertising and pays salaries to employees, advertisers, and the political party's staff. The political party does not report on these expenses, as they were carried out by a separate legal entity. Such schemes were used in the 2020 local elections and the 2019 parliamentary elections.
Sources: Institute of Legislative Ideas (2024[36]), Civil Society Report on the implementation of Chapter II (Prevention) & Chapter V (Asset Recovery) of the UN Convention Against Corruption in Ukraine, https://uncaccoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-%E2%80%93-Civil-Society-Parallel-Report-on-UNCAC-Implementation-in-Ukraine-%E2%80%93-Institute-of-Legislative-Ideas-%E2%80%93-UNCAC-Coalition-%E2%80%93-12-June-2024.pdf (accessed on 14 February 2025); Chesno (2020[37]), ““Batkivshchyna” was financed by companies with signs of fictitiousness for 3 million”, https://www.chesno.org/post/3843/ (accessed on 14 February 2025); Chesno (2020[38]), “Non-profit NGOs financed parties for 25.6 million hryvnias. Unofficially, much more”, https://www.chesno.org/post/3923/ (accessed on 14 February 2025).
In addition, addition, according to the POLITDATA registry, the share of private funding received by political parties is currently very low compared to the amount of public funding which eligible parties received. According to information on the POLITDATA platform, political parties’ total income in 2023 was UAH 730 750 000. Of this total, around UAH 703 million (96%) was state funding, while around UAH 27.5 million (4%) was private financing, including about UAH 15 million in monetary and around UAH 12.5 million in non-monetary contributions (Figure 3.7). In 2024 political parties eligible for public funding received around UAH 782 million, while private funding of all political parties in 2024 was around UAH 11 million. In preparations for this report, the NACP noted that several factors may account for this discrepancy between the levels of public and private funding, including quarantine restrictions in 2020, followed by the war, immigration of citizens to other countries, a decrease in the population's income, and a shift in the focus of most citizens from political life to social activities and support for the Armed Forces. In addition, the NACP noted that the absence of elections and plans to hold them has led to a decrease in the activities of parties towards fulfilling their statutory activities. As elections resume in Ukraine and the POLITDATA system matures, however, the NACP may wish to review its assumptions about the discrepancies between private and public donations, whether the political finance reporting system is capturing in-scope donations of all kinds, and particularly whether the risks around schemes to circumvent reporting requirements have been mitigated.
This kind of assessment, and the audit of political parties’ finances more broadly, could be improved if the NACP employed certified auditors to oversee the financing of political parties and election campaigns. While the NACP requires employees in the political party reporting unit to have a university degree in economics or law, given the complexity and technicality of the information in political parties’ financial reporting, verification and audit should be conducted by auditors and specialised experts (OECD, 2016[39]). Indeed, half of OECD countries employ certified auditors in their bodies mandated to oversee the financing of political parties and election campaigns (OECD Public Integrity Indicators, 2024). However, such auditors are not currently employed by the NACP as there is no legal requirement to do so. Like OECD countries, Ukraine could therefore improve its capacity to verify and audit the financial reports of political parties and to spot irregularities in the financial flows in politics by employing certified auditors (Box 3.8).
Note: In Canada, Switzerland and the United States, political parties receive no public funding.
Source: OECD (2024[3]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
Norway
In Norway, the Partilovnemnda (the Party Law Committee) is an independent administrative body responsible for, among other things, checking that the funding provisions in the Parties Act are complied with. The Party Law Committee may demand that a party or a party branch present all documentation of importance for checking compliance with financial duties within the Act. If the Committee deems it necessary, it may order control activities to be carried out by a specially appointed control body, the Party Audit Committee. The Party Audit Committee can demand that the party or party branch present any documentation to support the control activity. To ensure the effectiveness of this audit work, the Party Law Committee employs auditors as part of its Partirevisjonsutvalget (Committee for the Revision of Parties).
Canada
In Canada, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada is the institution responsible for overseeing political financing of political parties and election campaigns. Based in the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada is responsible for electoral administration and political financing oversight, according to the powers it receives from the Canada Elections Act. To ensure specialised expertise of personnel and methodologies to discover illegal funding of political parties and candidates, Elections Canada’s Political Financing branch employs auditors in the course of its activities.
Source: Based on OECD (2024[3]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
Lobbying and influence
Ukraine should ensure that the new lobbying framework comes into effect as soon as possible, to begin benefitting from the transparency and equality of access to policymaking which the new framework could introduce.
Ukraine could undertake a comprehensive ex post review of the Law on Lobbying to ensure its provisions adequately safeguard policymaking against undue influence and provide a level playing field for lobbyists to represent their interests.
Ukraine could adopt clear rules on conduct for those offering expert support to the policymaking process.
Public information
Ukraine could improve the transparency of public policymaking by clarifying how the public interest test should be applied under martial law.
Ukraine could publish government sessions and ministers’ agendas.
In the long term, Ukraine could improve the transparency of public policymaking by strengthening oversight and enforcement of public information regulations.
Political financing
Ukraine could improve safeguards against undue influence by obliging recipients of political donations to check their permissibility.
Ukraine could enhance the effectiveness and credibility of political finance reporting by ensuring that private donations are registered.
References
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[2] Venice Commission (2023), Opinion on the Law “On the Prevention of Threats to National Security Related to the Excessive Influence of Persons with Significant Economic and Political Weight in Public Life (Oligarchs)”, European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Strasbourg, France, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2023)018-e (accessed on 14 February 2025).
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← 1. Draft law no. 7033-d also proposes to bar access for the duration of martial law and one year thereafter to all entries in several registers (including the land cadastre, register of immovable property, register of legal entities).
← 2. See the report by the Dejure Foundation entitled Access to Public Information and Challenges for the Judiciary in Wartime. Specific court cases illustrating this point include the State Judicial Administration’s refusal to provide Register of Court Decisions (texts) as open dataset upon request of 25 May 2023 (Case No. 380/11989/23, Appellate court decision – https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/116240545); or Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv’s refusal (on 24 April 2022) to provide copies of all the decisions and protocols of meetings of judges that were related to the election of the President of the Court – Case No. 380/7189/22 (https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/104833382).