Chapter 1 analyses the role of transport infrastructure as both a facilitator and target of violence in North and West Africa. Combining conflict and infrastructure data from 2000 to 2024, the chapter examines how the competition for the control of transport infrastructure between state and non-state actors produces various patterns of violence. It shows that violence tends to be highly clustered near transport infrastructure: 70% of violent events and 65% of fatalities occurred within one kilometre of a road. Violence decreases sharply with distance from all categories of roads, suggesting that transport infrastructure is a strong predictor of violence. The chapter also confirms that violence has become less clustered near roads over time. This trend is explained by the ruralisation of violence observed in West Africa. Finally, the chapter suggests that violence against transport infrastructure is very unevenly distributed across North and West Africa. Ambushes, kidnappings, remote violence, blockades and destruction of transport infrastructure are particularly intense in the Central Sahel, the Lake Chad basin, and western Cameroon. The sparsity and poor conditions of the road network make government forces vulnerable to attacks by irregular forces, who can move undetected across rural areas. Rebels’ and jihadists’ agility on the ground is only partially counterbalanced by the increasing use of airpower. Improving security necessarily involves improving transport infrastructures and protecting civilians, who bear the full brunt of armed conflicts.
Roads and Conflicts in North and West Africa
Abstract
Transport infrastructure has become a critical element in the competition for political power in North and West Africa over the last 24 years.
Violent events tend to cluster near transport infrastructure and decrease sharply with the distance from roads.
Violence against transport infrastructure is concentrated along a few road corridors in the Central Sahel, the Lake Chad basin, and western Cameroon.
Government forces are vulnerable to attacks along road corridors and are unable to project military power over long distances.
Improving security necessarily involves improving transport infrastructures, particularly the density and condition of the road network, which remains the dominant mode of transport.
Civilians are highly vulnerable to attacks against road infrastructure.
Control of transport infrastructure has always been a critical issue in armed conflicts. States are naturally inclined to secure air, surface, and maritime systems to control the territory defined by their borders. A dense and extensive infrastructure system promotes national security by allowing the state to deploy troops, provide services to the civilian population, and defeat insurgents in a timely manner. Yet, the benefits of improved infrastructure are double-edged for the government, since transport infrastructure itself can become a major target for rebel groups, militias and other violent non-state actors. Protecting airports, roads, and ports from militant attacks necessitates large, fixed investments that many governments can ill afford. This is particularly true in regions where the population is sparsely distributed, cities are separated by long distances, and transport systems are poorly maintained, as in the West African Sahel today (Map 1.1. Population density and roads in North and West AfricaMap 1.1).
Note: Tertiary and local roads are not represented. Population densities are calculated for 2020. Road data aggregate several years from 2000 to 2018.
Sources: Authors, based on WorldPop (2024[1]) and GRIP (Meijer et al., 2018[2]) data.
The strategic importance of transport infrastructure explains why some of the most violent incidents of the last two decades have occurred along major road corridors in North and West Africa. The Central Sahel is particularly affected by this evolution. On 18 August 2021, militants affiliated with the jihadist group Ansaroul Islam ambushed a civilian convoy traveling between Dori and Arbinda in northeastern Burkina Faso. An estimated 135 people were killed in the attack, including at least 60 civilians who had sought the protection of the gendarmerie and the Defence of the Homeland (VDPs) militia. In the Lake Chad region as well, transport corridors have been the object of violent clashes between government troops and Jihadist militants since the late 2000s. On 24 July 2022, for instance, the Nigerian Defence headquarters claimed to have killed 30 Boko Haram militants who had ambushed soldiers patrolling along Kubwa-Bwari road, north of the federal capital of Abuja.
These examples reflect a larger dynamic where transport infrastructure is being actively disputed between government forces and various militant groups. South of the Sahara, where this evolution is most concerning, states have responded by launching a series of military campaigns that rely more on airstrikes, mobile patrols, and heavily armed convoys than before. At the end of 2023, for example, air and drone strikes conducted by the Malian army were instrumental in reconquering the remote cities of Kidal and Tessalit, located more than
1 500 kilometres from Bamako, from Tuareg separatists. To better control mobility, West African states confronted with insurgencies have also restricted movements between cities, established more checkpoints along major roads, and imposed bans on motorcycles used by militants to conduct attacks. These measures have led to disappointing outcomes in terms of security and often contributed to disrupting local livelihoods and regional trade (Agbiboa, 2022[3]).
Thus far, the role of transport infrastructure as both a facilitator and target of violence has received less attention in North and West Africa than in Central Africa, where state forces, rebel groups and local chiefs compete for the control of transport corridors (Schouten, 2022[4]). The strategies used by state and non-state actors to control transport infrastructure have also been less documented than the potential benefits of road sector initiatives on economic growth, service provision to urban and peripheral regions, and governance (World Bank, 2010[5]). Finally, while numerous incidents of violence related to roads, bridges, pipelines and other transport systems have been documented across North and West Africa, little is known about the factors that explain when, where and by whom transport infrastructure is targeted (Chapter 2).
The critical importance of transport infrastructure calls for a systematic approach that can examine how the control of transport infrastructure shapes armed conflict in North and West Africa. The objective of this report is therefore to analyse the relationships between transport infrastructure and political violence in this vast region. The report documents how the competition for the control of transport infrastructure between state and non-state actors produces various patterns of violence. Using a multi-scalar approach, it also examines how these patterns have affected specific areas and populations differently over the last 24 years.
While the general topic of the report is transport infrastructure, particular attention is paid to the road network, which, in the absence of strong air, rail, or maritime links, is by far the dominant form of transport in the region. Three crucial questions for the future of North and West Africa are addressed: Do armed conflicts tend to cluster near transport infrastructure? Have armed conflicts become increasingly focused on transport infrastructure over time? Where is transport infrastructure most affected by violence?
Violence tends to cluster near roads
First the report examines whether violence is more clustered around transport infrastructure than in the rest of the region. Are regions located near transport corridors more violent than others? The analysis of 70 315 violent events and 233 850 fatalities from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED, 2024[6]) confirms that proximity to transport infrastructure is a strong predictor of violence in the region: from January 2000 to June 2024, 72% of all battles, 77% of remote violence, and 66% of violence against civilians are located within only one kilometre of a road.The analysis of 70 315 violent events and 233 850 fatalities from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED, 2024[6]) confirms that proximity to transport infrastructure is a strong predictor of violence in the region: from January 2000 to June 2024, 72% of all battles, 77% of remote violence, and 66% of violence against civilians are located within only one kilometre of a road.
A consistent relationship is observed between violence and transport infrastructure across all types of events: more battles, remote violence and explosions, and violence against civilians occur near roads than elsewhere in the region. For example, nearly half of the attacks involving Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are located within 100 metres of a road (Figure 1.1). Attacks against civilians occur more frequently at distances greater than one kilometre from a road than battles and explosions, which reflects the fact that human settlements are usually distributed farther from roads in rural areas.
Note: Only events for which the co-ordinates are precisely known are included.
Source: Authors, based on GRIP (Meijer et al., 2018[2]) and ACLED (2024[6]). Data is publicly available.
The report also shows that violence tends to strongly decay with distance from roads: the further from a road, the fewer violent events are observed, both regionally, in North Africa, and in West Africa. Seventy percent of violent events and 65% of the people killed in the region between 2000 and 2024 were located within one kilometre of a road. These numbers reach 91% and 88% respectively, within five kilometres. The clustering of violence near roads is much more consistent than that near borders and cities ( (OECD/SWAC, 2022[7]; 2023[8]), for which variations were found between Sahelian and other countries.
The report also shows that transport infrastructure plays a significant role in shaping spatial patterns of violence irrespective of the nature of the road system itself. Violence decreases with distance from all types of roads and even secondary and tertiary roads attract a significant portion of violent events. Seventy-five percent of the violent events are located within one kilometre of a highway or a primary road, compared to 72% for secondary roads, and 60% for tertiary roads (Figure 1.2). In a region where roads are few and far apart, rebels and jihadist militants tend to rely on lightweight and versatile transport solutions, such as motorcycles, which can easily be used off the main transport routes, while heavily armed government forces are more constrained by the existing road network.
Note: Only events for which the co-ordinates are precisely known are included.
Source: Authors, based on GRIP (Meijer et al., 2018[2]) and ACLED (2024[6]). Data is puwblicly available.
Violence against transport infrastructure is increasing
The report then studies how the geography of violence has changed in the last 24 years in relation to transport infrastructure. Have regions located near transport infrastructure become more violent than less connected regions? The report shows that violence against transport infrastructure has increased tremendously: all forms of transport-related violence have multiplied regionally since the beginning of the Boko Haram insurgency in the late 2000s in West Africa and the First Libyan Civil War in North Africa in 2011.
While the amount of violence targeting transport infrastructure has reached unprecedented levels, the report also highlights that the share of violence associated with roads has demonstrated important regional variations. Since 2011, the proportion of violent events located within one kilometre of roads has remained consistently over 80 % in North Africa, a situation that contrasts with the relative de-concentration of violence observed in West Africa since the mid-2000s. In 2023, 61% of violent events were within one kilometre from West African roads, against 81 % in 2010 and 90% in 2000 (
Figure 1.3). This evolution reflects the ruralisation of conflict in West Africa. As Jihadist insurgents target rural areas and small towns more and more (OECD/SWAC, 2023[8]), an increasing share of violent events also occurs far away from roads.
Source: Authors, based on GRIP (Meijer et al., 2018[2]) and ACLED (2024[6]). Data is publicly available.
More generally, the report highlights that North and West Africa have followed a rather divergent evolution over the last two decades. North of the Sahara, political violence has reached an all-time low since the end of the Second Libyan Civil War (see Box 1.1). If current trends continue, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia will have experienced fewer than 200 violent events resulting in 220 deaths in 2024 in the region, against 1 540 events and 3 650 deaths a decade ago. All types of violence have declined significantly, including explosions and remote violence, which peaked just before the signature of a permanent cease fire between the two governments of Libya in 2020. Violence is mainly concentrated near urban areas and major road corridors in North Africa.
Libya has endured two bloody civil wars since Muammar Gaddafi’s regime was toppled by an Arab Spring revolution in 2011. During the First Libyan Civil War, revolutionaries, led by defected elites who formed a National Transitional Council), generally set aside their differences. After the fall of Tripoli in August 2011, however, the revolution began to fragment, with groups dividing primarily along religious lines and geographic origin.
The lack of coherent leadership at a national level led to a second power vacuum where local and tribal leaders vied for national power, oftentimes accentuating the split between Gaddafi’s clients among the nomadic tribes versus disenfranchised urban tribes. Disputes over election outcomes in 2014 resulted in the formation of a United Nations Security Council-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli, and a House of Representatives (HoR) based in Tobruk. The two sides could be roughly characterised as the more Islamist-friendly Tripoli faction versus the more secular Tobruk faction, the latter of which enjoyed the support of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA).
The two governments became the main factions in the Second Libyan Civil War, which also saw the involvement of extremist militias affiliated with the Islamic State or Al Qaeda. One of the major events of the war was the unsuccessful attempt by the HoR-aligned LNA to capture the GNA-held western region of Libya with its capital, Tripoli. After 14 months of fighting, LNA forces withdrew from western Libya, and a ceasefire was signed between the LNA and the GNA in 2020.
While violence has considerably decreased in the country since 2021, the factors that led to Libya’s Second Civil War have not been resolved. In particular, the institutionalisation of Libyan militias into the state apparatus mixes private with public interests and maintains divisions within the government based on ideology and tribal and geographic origin. These divisions mean that the potential for another outbreak of civil war remains.
Source: David Russell for this publication
The opposite can be seen in West Africa where nearly 195 000 people have been killed since the beginning of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009. West African conflicts are likely to cause 28 000 fatalities and 10 000 violent events in 2024 if the situation continues to deteriorate in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, where 94% of the regional violent events are recorded. Violence against civilians has become the most represented type of violence in West Africa, with more than 5 000 incidents in 2024, against 610 a decade ago. Much of the violence affects rural areas and small isolated towns rather than large cities.
Some roads are much more violent than others
Finally, the report analyses which segments of the transport system are the most affected by violence. Where are the most violent attacks against transport infrastructure located? The report shows that the geography of attacks is very uneven: some regions are particularly prone to infrastructure attacks. The highest levels of transport-related violence are found in northwestern Cameroon, Nigeria, and Central Mali (Map 1.2). In these regions, violence against transport infrastructure takes many related forms: attacks against convoys, kidnappings, landmines and IEDs, blockades of cities, and destruction of the infrastructure itself (Figure 1.4).
Note: To identify the most dangerous roads, the report mapped the location of all battles, remote violence and explosions, and violence against civilians that occurred from 2000-24. Each violent event was then assigned to the nearest road segment. Only the events for which the exact co-ordinates of a violent event are known with great precision are used.
Source: Authors based on GRIP (Meijer et al., 2018[2]) and ACLED (2024[6]). Data is publicly available.
Unsurprisingly, IEDs have the closest relationship with the road network, due to the nature of the remote explosives used in the attacks. A close correspondence is also observed between ambushes against convoys and the proximity to roads in rural areas, due to the opportunity of attacking mobile forces where they are the most vulnerable. As government forces become increasingly exposed to militant attacks, they tend to rely even more on heavily armed convoys to move their troops, protect traders along major transport corridors, and escort civilians who flee conflict regions. Kidnappings have the most complex relationship with mobility. They tend to occur both along transport corridors and in rural areas where Jihadist groups have implemented a predatory economy based on looting and ransoming civilians, as in the north of Cameroon.
Note: *2024 data are estimates based on a doubling of events recorded through June 30.
Source: Authors based on ACLED (2024[6]) data. Data is publicly available.
The study is part of a larger effort conducted by the OECD/SWAC (2014[9]; 2020[10]; 2022[7]; 2023[8]) to identify how geography affects the emergence and spatial diffusion of armed conflicts in 21 North and West Africa countries since the late 1990s (OECD/SWAC (2014[11]).
The complex relationships between political violence and transport infrastructure necessitate to adopt a mixed-method approach that can not only identify temporal trends and regularities in the spatial distribution of violent events but also explain why the infrastructure is being targeted by specific groups in certain regions (Chapter 3).
The OECD’s Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) is used to map recent shifts in the geography of violence at the regional level (Chapter 4). This indicator measures to what extent political violence is more or less intense and spatially clustered in specific regions (Walther et al., 2023[12]). Using a uniform grid of 50 kilometres by 50 kilometres extending from Senegal to Chad, the indicator shows that violence has both intensified and expanded geographically since the mid-2010s. The SCDi has recently been updated with the addition of two new features to aid the identification of local conflict trends (Radil and Walther, 2024[13]). These tools now identify regions that are newly entering into or exiting from conflict and characterise the current security conditions in a location as either worsening or improving, based on past conditions at the same location. Clusters of cells with more than a decade of conflicts are now evident in the Lake Chad region, across Nigeria’s Middle Belt and Delta regions, in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso, and along the Libya and Algeria coasts ().
Note: The map shows how many years in conflict has affected each cell between 2004-23.
Source: Authors based on ACLED (2024[6]) data. Data is publicly available.
The report confirms that Sahelian jihadist organisations have expanded into coastal West African countries in recent years (Chapter 4). This expansion does not take the form of a unified front moving ineluctably from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea but through the gradual isolation of rural areas. This process, observed in multiple regions simultaneously, is highly dependent on local factors that are ruthlessly exploited by Jihadists. For this reason, significant differences can be observed in the intensity and forms of violence that are affecting the north of coastal countries, a region where not all violent events can be attributed to Jihadism. Attacks against civilians, armed clashes, and abductions of civilians are responsible for the largest number of incidents, while remote violence and explosions are extremely uncommon.
The expansion of Jihadist groups across West Africa has led to significant changes in the geography of armed conflicts. One way to represent these shifts is to map the centre of gravity of all the violent events observed in select countries since violent extremist groups started to expand transnationally in the mid-2010s (Map 1.5). A set of events recorded by ACLED can be mapped by a single point, which represents the average location of violence but not necessarily the most violent location in each country. This is a useful approach to summarise the complex spatial patterns of violence over time.
The southward expansion of Jihadist groups is clearly visible in the northward shift of violence in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. Even if not all violence should be attributed to Jihadist groups in these countries, the centre of gravity is moving north, a sure sign that more violence is recorded on their borders with Sahelian countries. In Mali, the centre of gravity has slightly shifted towards the Inner Delta of the Niger River, while it has remained largely centred north of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, where much of the western and eastern regions are now affected by insurgencies. In Cameroon and Niger, the centre of gravity has considerably shifted away from the Lake Chad basin, as violence related to the Ambazonian insurgency and the Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP) surged in northwestern Cameroon and the Liptako-Gourma. Finally, shifts in the Nigerian centre of gravity reflect the increasing importance of banditry in the northwestern part of the country.
Note: The centre of gravity represents the average location of violent events affecting Sahelian and Gulf of Guinea countries on an annual basis. For the sake of clarity, only three years are represented from 2015-2023.
Source: Authors based on ACLED (2024[6]) data. Data is publicly available.
Spatial analysis is then used to study whether violence is clustered along transport infrastructure, is becoming increasingly associated with such infrastructure, and which areas are the most affected by violence (Chapter 5). Conflict data from ACLED (2024[4]) covers the period from January 2000 to June 2024 across the entire region. This long-term approach is necessary to monitor the security changes that have marked the region after the Cold War. It captures the end of the civil wars in the Gulf of Guinea in the early 2000s and the rise of religiously motivated extremism in the Sahel since the late 2000s. The analysis focuses on three different types of ACLED violent events that are particularly likely to affect transport infrastructure: battles between government and violent non-state actors, explosions and remote violence, and violence against civilians.
To study how violence affects transport infrastructure, the report uses the geographical co-ordinates of each violent event recorded by ACLED as indicated on Figure 1.5. The report then uses a harmonised dataset on road infrastructure collected by the Global Roads Inventory Project (GRIP) (Meijer et al., 2018[2]) to match the location of each event to its proximity to the road infrastructure. Several buffer zones are created on both sides of the roads to calculate the distance between different types of violent events and different categories of roads.
Note: each circle represents a violent event recorded by ACLED.
The report also analyses the descriptive notes of each violent event to determine whether it was related to transport infrastructure. Ambushes against travellers and convoys, kidnappings and forced disappearances, city blockades, remote violence, and destruction of the transport infrastructure are included in the analysis. Finally, the spatial analysis of violent events and segments of roads is combined with a historical analysis of a selection of regions where violence against transport infrastructure has proved particularly intense in the last 15 years. While the quantitative analysis describes the background against which state and non-state actors compete for the control of mobility, the qualitative analysis contributes to unveiling their motivations and strategies.
The combination of conflict and road data highlights several important regional specificities, which would not be necessarily apparent if the spatial dimension of violence were not considered (Figure 1.6). Calculating the distance from violent events to the nearest road by latitude shows for example that most of the violence is concentrated near roads in North Africa (30-35 degrees North), where conflicts are mostly urban. This spatial distribution contrasts with the one observed in the Sahara (20-25 degrees North), where events are relatively further from roads due to the sparsity of the infrastructure network. The ruralisation of violence currently operating in the Central Sahel leads violent events to be located away from major roads around 15 degrees North.
Source: Authors based on ACLED data (2024[6]). Data is publicly available.
The patterns of violence analysed in this report strongly suggest that transport infrastructure has become a critical element in the competition for political power in North and West Africa over more than two decades. This is particularly visible south of the Sahara, where violence has not only increased at an unprecedented rate since the early 2010s but also expanded to previously unaffected areas, both in the Central Sahel, the Lake Chad basin, northwestern Cameroon, and the north of coastal countries. In these regions, roads represent a vital component of state’s counterinsurgency strategies and a strategic target for local militants. This combined interest for transport infrastructure is unlikely to decrease in the coming years, as both state and non-state actors embrace even more mobile forms of warfare in their struggle for territorial control.
The duality of the transport infrastructure, as both a facilitator and target of violence, has put government forces in West Africa at a disadvantage, however. Regular forces are heavily constrained by the sparsity and poor conditions of the road network, which makes them vulnerable to attacks without necessarily allowing them to project their military power over long distances. Violent events tend to be strongly associated with roads because regular forces (and civilians) have simply no alternative but to use the few transport corridors available to them. The reverse is true for irregular forces, who use motorbikes and light pick-up trucks in areas that have few roads in the first place and attack regular forces traveling in heavily armoured convoys with relative impunity (Table 1.1).
Rebel and Jihadist agility on the ground is only partially counterbalanced by the increasing use of airpower, notably drones, helicopters, and surveillance planes supplied to Sahelian countries by Türkiye and Russia. While these assets allow the military to strike rebels and violent extremists in remote regions, they have significant limitations given the vast extent of the conflict zones and the difficulty in distinguishing militants from non-combatants. Air strikes may help government forces maintain a certain pressure on terrorist groups, but air power alone is unlikely to bring a lasting solution to the conflicts that are tearing West Africa apart. Northern Nigeria is a good illustration of these difficulties. Despite the recurrent use of air strikes against Jihadist militants and bandits for over a decade, the intensity of the violence has only increased, with dramatic consequences for civilians.
Improving security involves improving transport infrastructuresImproving security involves improving transport infrastructure
The logical conclusion of this report is that improving security necessarily involves improving transport infrastructure. This is particularly true in West Africa, where the transport network is shorter, less dense, and less well maintained than in North Africa (Chapter 2). From this point of view, the results of this report are part of a long line of works that underline the key role played by infrastructure in the integration process. Five years ago, the Sahel and West Africa Club (OECD/SWAC) noted that the absence of a well-developed transport network was jeopardising the cohesion of Sahelian countries (OECD/SWAC, 2019[14]). The lack of public investment in health services, education, and transport infrastructure, noted SWAC, could potentially pose a major problem for national cohesion since “independence or terrorist movements often feed on the marginalisation – actual or perceived – of border areas to spread their ideas among local populations” (OECD/SWAC, 2019, p. 12[14]). This report confirms that this trend has unfortunately been reinforced in recent years.
Sixty years after the independence of many West African countries, accessibility remains elusive in the region. Peripheral cities such as Bardaï, Bilma, Kidal and Timbuktu, where rebel movements have historically developed, are still not connected to the national network by tarmac roads. Furthermore, important markets and vast rural areas are sorely lacking in road infrastructure that would enable them to contribute to the regional economy. This lack of accessibility is both an incentive for secessionist or extremist movements to develop and an impediment for government forces to operate in the peripheries of the state. Border regions have particularly suffered from this marginalisation (OECD/SWAC, 2022[7]). Prevented from playing their role as commercial crossroads, both for petty trade and for major regional trade flows, these regions have experienced some of the highest levels of violence ever recorded in West Africa.
Build a new social contract in the peripheries of the state
More generally, the report suggests that transport infrastructure is largely ignored in discourses that emphasise the “return of the State” as a means of combating insecurity. The return of the state to poorly accessible regions requires that a new social contract be established between central governments and local populations. For this social contract to be productive in the long term, it must be based on real investment in local development on the part of peripheral regions. This has rarely been the case to date in the Sahel where state initiatives have taken on a more sovereigntist than developmentalist form. Rather than rehabilitating border markets, facilitating mobility, or building transport infrastructure, Sahelian states have focused on strengthening security. These aspects have largely taken precedence over developmental support for peripheral communities, who nonetheless withstand the worst of violence.
The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have further reinforced this militarisation of the state peripheries, with the creation of a joint force by the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States in the trinational area of the Liptako-Gourma. In the Lake Chad basin, too, the militarisation of borderlands conducted under the aegis of the Multinational Joint Task Force has yielded limited results in terms of regional co-ordination and has led to a massive increase in civilian casualtie. The primacy given to military action in both the Central Sahel and Lake Chad basin has led to the total collapse of the principles of cross-border co-operation and the idea of pays-frontière developed by former Malian President Alpha Oumar Konaré in the early 2000s to help local communities overcome the obstacles created by colonial partition. For President Konaré and the organisations involved in cross-border co-operation over the past 20 years, developing cross-border infrastructure and strengthening the role of local institutions both served to restore the economic centrality of peripheral regions. Little remains of this generous idea in the Sahel, where violence is particularly intense and clustered in regions that before the mid-2010s were recognised as having the greatest potential for cross-border co-operation (OECD/SWAC, 2017[15]).
The Sahelian trend illustrates the limits of favouring military action to the detriment of cross-border co-operation and development. As Jihadist violence spreads towards the Gulf of Guinea, cross-border co-operation is more important than ever. President Konaré’s vision that the destiny of the people of West Africa is to transcend their divisions remains the most enduring safeguard against religious extremism (Walther, 2024[16]). If the state should return to the peripheries, it should be as a provider of local services, as a facilitator of economic exchanges, and as a guarantor of human rights.
Focus on protecting civilians
This report has highlighted how vulnerable civilian populations are to attacks on transport infrastructure. Civilians are victims of ambushes along the road and kidnapped for loot or ransom when they work in their fields, collect wood, or go to the market. Nearly 1 600 people were abducted in West Africa in 2023 alone, fuelling a booming economy of predation in the regions controlled or under the influence of Jihadist groups. Civilians are also killed in high numbers by IEDs planted along their way, starved when their cities are blockaded, and prevented from doing business or visiting relatives by the destruction of the transport infrastructure.
More generally, this report and previous OECD/SWAC studies (2020[10]; 2022[7]; 2023[8]) confirm that civilians pay an alarming cost in the region. Violence against civilians represents 45% of the events and 35% of the fatalities recorded in North and West Africa since detailed conflict data were available in the late 1990s. The vast majority of the 85 600 civilian deaths and nearly 33 000 incidents listed as “violence against civilians” by ACLED over this period are caused by direct attacks against unarmed populations. The situation is particularly worrying in West Africa, where violence against civilians is the most represented type of violent events since the late 2010s. If the situation continues to deteriorate, more than 5 000 incidents causing the death of more than 10 000 civilians will be reported in this region in 2024.
These catastrophic numbers suggest that civilians are not just caught in the crossfire between belligerents or mistakenly hit by air strikes. Rather, the control of the civilian population has become the major objective of both government forces and their opponents. As Figure 1.7 shows, both state and non-state actors target civilians in a rather systematic manner. In the most affected countries of the Sahel, one third of all fatalities listed under “violence against civilians” by ACLED are associated with government forces, their allied militias and mercenaries, and 46% with Jihadist groups. In Nigeria, civilians are mainly killed by communal, ethnic and self-defence militias (48%) and secondarily by Jihadist groups (28%). The shift towards military regimes, the support provided to militias, and the use of foreign mercenaries have amplified this trend in recent years.
Note: the figures show the number and share of fatalities recorded by ACLED as “violence against civilians” for which the identity of the main perpetrator, listed as actor1, is known. The data is available through 30 June 2024. “Jihadists” include violent extremist organisations affiliated with Al Qaeda or the Islamic State such as Boko Haram. “Government and allies” include military and police forces, pro-government militias such as the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies, and mercenaries such as the Wagner Group. “Militias” include communal, ethnic and self-defence militias like the Burkinabe Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP). “Rebels” include secessionist and autonomist movements, such as the Coordination of Movements of the Azawad.
Source: Authors based on ACLED (2024[6]). Data is publicly available.
Develop an integrated spatial approach to political violence
Strong regularities can be observed in the way political violence is spatially distributed across North and West Africa. Violence is far from random: it is much more intense in certain places, from which it tends to expand following certain rules. Regionally, this report has demonstrated that violence is more intense near road corridors and decreases sharply as one moves away from the road infrastructure. These results echo previous studies that showed that violence also tends to decrease with distance from cities and borders (OECD/SWAC, 2022[7]; 2023[8]). The fact that militants avoid confrontations with military forces in major cities, use borderlands as safe havens, and focus their attacks on transport infrastructure suggests that cities, borders and roads are important predictors of violence in the region. In any given region, the potential of violence is likely to be a function of its combined proximity to these geographical features (Figure 1.8).
These general principles could be used in further research to build a simple model of how violence has diffused across the region over space and through time, without having to integrate numerous indicators that are often difficult to spatialise locally or to build out for the entire region due to data limitations. If the patterns observed in the past continue, violence should theoretically be more intense near international boundaries, urban centres, and major roads, and gradually decline from there.
The development of such a model is a priority for future efforts to better understand the spatial life cycle of violence in places. As noted in previous reports (OECD/SWAC, 2020[10]), violence typically does not persist indefinitely in places. For example, many of the current epicentres of violence in West Africa were peaceful just 15-20 years ago while violence in North Africa continue to recede toward pre-2011 levels. Instead, violence exhibits a cyclic nature: it emerges, intensifies as it matures, and may have a repeated series of spikes or valleys before ultimately ending. The development of a concise model of the diffusion of violence would be an essential contribution to unlock the puzzle of the rise and fall of violence across the region.
References
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