OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Italy 2019

1. Italy’s global efforts for sustainable development

Abstract

This chapter examines Italy’s approach to global sustainable development, including its response to global challenges, action to ensure coherence between domestic policies and global sustainable development objectives, and efforts to raise awareness of global development issues at home.

Italy actively supports global sustainable development, in particular where it links international engagement with domestic expertise, such as on cultural heritage and agriculture. Yet, there is potential to do more in other areas. Mechanisms for policy coherence for sustainable development are not fully effective and coherence issues in migration policy remain unresolved. However, Italy’s performance on climate change, environment, security, finance and trade is good overall. On development awareness, Italy shows good practice in enabling multi-stakeholder efforts and mobilising the migrant diaspora. Government action to implement the strategy for global citizenship education will be important for reaching and sensitising all citizens.

Efforts to support global sustainable development

Peer review indicator:

The member plays an active role in contributing to global norms, frameworks and public goods that benefit developing countries

Italy is a reliable contributor to international fora on sustainable development. It is a driving force where it links international engagement with its domestic expertise, such as in cultural heritage and agriculture. This underlines its potential to do more in other fields where its co-operation is strong, such as its leading contributions to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.

Italy links convening power with co-operation expertise to lead on issues such as agriculture and cultural heritage

Italy is a global player, actively contributing to the most important frameworks for sustainable development. It has developed a national strategy to implement the 2030 Agenda (Chapter 2), submitted a voluntary national review of SDG progress in 2017, and shared its experience on introducing well-being indicators to guide national budgeting with UN member states. Italy is also contributing to the follow-up of the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.1 In addition to its membership of the G7 and the G20, Italy served on the UN Security Council in 2017 (sharing the term with the Netherlands), and it is a member of the UN Human Rights Council. It participates in the governing bodies of numerous multilateral agencies. It also stands at the forefront of the global fight against tax crime and illicit financial flows (Chapter 3).

Italy’s international leadership is strongest when it links its domestic and development co-operation priorities, illustrated by its action on cultural heritage, and agriculture and food security. Having successfully led efforts to place the protection of cultural heritage in conflict settings on the international agenda, Italy also offered its expertise to formulate the international response (Box 1.1). On agriculture and food security, Italy combines close collaboration with the Rome-based multilateral agencies with a significant bilateral co-operation portfolio and international diplomacy. Following the 2009 G8 L’Aquila initiative, Italy chose “Feeding the planet, energy for life” as the theme for the Milan Expo 2015. Under its 2017 G7 presidency, Italy placed a particular focus on agricultural risk management, and exploring links between migration and rural development.

Box 1.1. Italy’s action for protecting cultural heritage during armed conflict

The international community expressed outrage when the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant destroyed cultural heritage sites in Iraq in 2015. The incident highlighted how armed conflict endangers the world’s cultural heritage, as did the previous destruction of mausoleums and scripts in Mali. Both episodes also illustrated that parties to conflict target cultural heritage to demoralise the community and illustrate their supremacy. Conversely, preserving and restoring cultural heritage can be a factor in reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Italy was a leading actor in placing the issue on the international agenda, supporting UNESCO’s Unite4Heritage Campaign (Foradori, Giusti and Lamonica, 2018[1]). As part of Expo 2015, Ministers of Culture and representatives of 83 countries adopted a declaration condemning the use of violence against cultural heritage. In 2017, as part of its strategy for UN Security Council membership, Italy co-drafted with France the first Security Council resolution dedicated to the issue (United Nations Security Council, 2017[2]). Only one week later, Italy organised the first G7 meeting of ministers of culture on the need to ensure the protection of cultural heritage in crises. Later that year, Italy promoted the adoption of a UNESCO General Conference statement on “Protecting Culture and Promoting Cultural Pluralism: The Key to Lasting Peace”.

Italy also helped move from agenda setting to action, drawing on its comparative advantage. The Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale (Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage) combines military, policing and cultural expertise and has been deployed in Kosovo and Iraq (Foradori, 2017[3]). Italy provides financial support for protecting cultural heritage as well as creative industries in Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Cuba and elsewhere, and hosts the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM). After successfully putting forward a UNESCO resolution on a cultural component in peacekeeping missions (UNESCO, 2015[4]), Italy also signed a memorandum of understanding with UNESCO on establishing an Italian Unite4Heritage Task Force, as well as a specialised training centre in Turin.

Italy’s efforts, in conjunction with other states, are bearing fruit: the first report to the Security Council illustrates that many states have launched initiatives to protect cultural heritage in conflict situations (United Nations Secretary-General, 2017[5]).

Italy could take the lead on other global goods and risks

Setting priorities that match its national expertise would enable Italy to link its global policy and country programmes, bring Italian learning and expertise to the table and more easily build coalitions across developing and donor countries. However, Italy’s international engagement does not always match those areas where its co-operation is strong. For example, while Italy plays leadership roles in fora such as the Global Island Partnership and Mountain Partnership, its own co-operation with island and mountain states is limited. On the other hand, for many years Italy has been a leading international donor to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, especially to its innovative financing mechanisms, the “Advance Market Commitments” and the “International Finance Facility for Immunisation”. It could draw more on this role in international fora, as it began to do in 2019, taking steps to discuss the question of vaccine pricing at the global level.2 Italy’s intention to focus on the rights of people with disabilities in its membership of the Human Rights Council provides an opportunity to link this with Italy’s co-operation experience.

Policy coherence for development

Peer review indicator:

Domestic policies support or do not harm developing countries

Although mechanisms for policy coherence are not fully functional, Italy’s performance on climate change, environment, security, finance and trade is good overall. However, it has not resolved coherence conflicts in its priority area of migration.

Institutions have a clear policy coherence for development mandate, but monitoring, analysis and policy feedback are slow to evolve

Although Law 125/2014 established high-level mechanisms to ensure policy coherence for sustainable development (Republic of Italy, 2014[6]), these are not yet fully functional. The Deputy Minister of Development Co-operation has the power to raise any issue of policy coherence in ministerial council meetings, and the Inter-Ministerial Council for Development Co-operation (CICS), bringing together the prime minister and ministers, is mandated to arbitrate such conflicts. In practice, external oversight through parliament, civil society and the media plays an important role, while internal government co-ordination can help address less controversial issues.3 In future, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co‑operation (MFAIC) intends to consider policy coherence for sustainable development in the annual co‑operation report, which could help sensitise line ministries.

On the other hand, Italy’s reporting to the European Union (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 2018[7]) shows clear awareness of how policies impact developing countries. In January 2018, the first tri-annual National Conference for Development Co-operation requested the multi‑stakeholder National Council for Development Co-operation (CNCS) to identify the most critical policy coherence issues. However, their report will only be prepared in time for the next conference, in 2021 (Conferenza Nazionale della Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, 2018[8]). While this analysis will be helpful in dialogue and policy arbitration, there is no information that Italy can use today.

Italy does not systematically identify, analyse and monitor the transboundary and long-term impacts of policies, including how they might negatively affect developing countries. One of the four CNCS working groups covers “Follow up of the 2030 Agenda, policy coherence, effectiveness and evaluation”. However, issues of policy coherence for sustainable development have not been brought to the attention of policy makers. A report by a CNCS working group, on migration and development and civil society organisations, did raise issues of coherence.4 However, the corresponding CICS working group has never convened, and the government has not responded.

Italy performs well overall on a number of policy coherence issues

Italy’s policies and actions on climate change, environment; peace and security; and finance, trade, and technology are broadly coherent with the sustainable development of partner countries:

• Climate change and the environment: European institutions report that Italy is on track to achieve 2020 EU targets for greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy and energy efficiency5 (European Commission, 2019[9]), (European Environment Agency, 2018[10]). However, Italy risks missing EU targets set for 2030 (though to a lesser extent than most other EU Member States). It is therefore currently preparing a new Italian National Energy and Climate Plan to meet these targets. Italy has also launched the Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform for discussing and exchanging good practice to implement its strategy for a circular economy (Ministry of the Environment, Land and Sea Protection, 2017[11]).

• Peace and security: Italy is the largest European contributor to peacekeeping interventions and currently has more than 1 000 troops deployed in Lebanon (United Nations, 2019[12]). Although Italy is the world’s ninth largest arms exporter (Wezeman, 2019[13]), it exports less arms to sensitive regions (Center for Global Development, 2018[14]). Nevertheless, despite existing safeguards,6 parliament and media highlighted the possible impacts of Italian arms exports on the Yemen crisis. In response, Prime Minister Conte announced that the government was suspending these exports. A proposal to revise underlying legislation was put to the Senate, but has not yet been adopted (Reuters, 2018[15]) (Senato della Repubblica, 2019[16]) (Save the Children Italy, 2019[17]).

• Finance, trade and technology: The Centre for Global Development applauds Italy’s performance on financial transparency and commitment to investment frameworks, but criticises its low investment in research as well as restrictive provisions for intellectual property rights (Center for Global Development, 2018[14]). Italy was the largest “green field” investor in Africa in 20177 (and sixth largest for its foreign direct investment stock) (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2018[18]). As investments in developing countries relate mostly to the energy sector, Italy’s 2018 multi-stakeholder guidelines for energy and development could help ensure these investments have a development focus. The OECD peer review of the National Contact Point for Multinational Enterprises confirmed that Italy respects the core criteria of visibility, transparency, accessibility and impartiality (OECD, 2017[19]). Italy has also made progress in implementing the Anti-bribery Convention by extending the statute of limitations (OECD, 2017[20]).

Italy could strengthen coherence in migration policy

Italy recognises the link between migration and development at the highest policy level. In fact, the co‑operation law commits Italy to “[contribute] to developing shared migration policies with Partner Countries, inspired by the safeguard of human rights and compliance with European and international legislation” (Republic of Italy, 2014[6]). Furthermore, the Three-Year Programming and Policy Planning Document 2017-2019 (PPPD 2017-19) underlines the development opportunities of well-managed migration (Government of Italy, 2017[21]).

In practice, ensuring coherence between migration and development policy objectives presents challenges for Italy:

• At home, Italy fosters engagement with the migrant diaspora and supports their financial inclusion in Italy (see Box 1.2 and Chapter 1). It also hosts numerous refugees and asylum seekers.8 As a main arrival territory, is in dialogue with EU member states to improve European migration management. At the same time, a 2018 law criminalises assistance to migrants at sea (Senato della Repubblica, 2018[22]), and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) expressed concern about obstacles to disembarkation in Italy and the tightening of reception conditions (FRA, 2018[23]).9

• Internationally, Italy organised high-level conferences to foster international dialogue and co-operation between African and European states in 2017 and 2018. Nevertheless, unlike most DAC members, Italy abstained from the vote on the Global Compact for Migration, a major framework for global migration governance.

• Italy made migration a development co-operation priority and increased development spending for migration, including through instruments such as the Africa Fund [Fondo Africa], managed by a different division in MFAIC, plus separate funding by the Ministry of Interior. This requires close co-ordination to ensure that Italian development co-operation expertise is drawn upon at each stage of the programme cycle (Chapter 4). Quality assurance is made challenging by the fact that Italy does not yet have guidelines on migration and development (Chapter 2).

• Through its development co-operation, Italy focuses on assisting vulnerable migrants and creating jobs in areas of origin. In Libya, Italy provides humanitarian and development assistance to UN organisations and Italian CSOs to improve access to basic services and protection. It also co-operates with security and border management institutions, including with ODA. In this very challenging context, international bodies have stressed the paramount importance of safeguards for Italy’s co-operation with Libya, to ensure the protection of migrants’ human rights.10

In order to help address policy coherence for development challenges, Italy is considering the development of a strategy for migration and development, like other DAC members.11 Translating the objectives of law 125/2014, these guidelines could analyse intervention approaches and objectives, and clarify roles of all actors, including within the Italian co-operation system. They could also guide Italy’s engagement in European and international fora. As both government and civil society recognise this as a priority issue, Italy could emulate the multi-stakeholder approach it used to develop its energy guidelines.

Global awareness

Peer review indicator:

The member promotes whole-of-society contributions to sustainable development

Italy shows very good practice in enabling multi-stakeholder efforts and mobilising the diaspora to support sustainable development. Government action under the new citizenship education strategy will be important for reaching all citizens.

Whole-of-society involvement is a strong and growing feature of Italian co‑operation

Law 125/2014 sets the government on a path to mobilise all parts of society for sustainable development, creating various mechanisms for multi-stakeholder consultation. A tri-annual national conference on development co-operation, organised for the first time in January 2018, allows for broad exchange on the overall direction of Italian co-operation.12 The conference made recommendations for Italian co-operation, and the next PPPD might include follow-up to these recommendations. The CNCS and its working groups provide a space for stakeholder exchange on political and operational aspects, for instance on the new programming document.

The government also invests in reaching out to actors who have been less involved in development co‑operation to date. Specific initiatives to engage the private sector include a roadshow in 2018, the exhibition ExCo 2019 (organised by other stakeholders) and the calls for proposals for initiatives in developing countries (Chapter 5). Two national summits and technical support to diaspora organisations deserve particular mention (Box 1.2). Active collaboration, not just consultation, is an important feature in the development of new guidance on energy and development, on disabilities, and the strategy for citizenship education. On all of these, civil society and other stakeholders were fully involved in co‑ordinating or drafting committees.

Box 1.2. Enabling migrants in Italy to contribute to development

Italy recognises that the migrant diaspora from developing countries and their organisations can make an important contribution to development co-operation: they can promote links between countries and populations, foster mutual understanding, make the case for development co-operation, or raise awareness of particular challenges. In many instances, their remittances constitute an important source of income and investment in the country of origin. Furthermore, they can share their experiences and transfer knowledge acquired.

Capitalising on this potential often means creating an enabling environment in host and home countries, as well as building capacities. Italy has taken action to mobilise the contribution of migrants in Italy to development co-operation (Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2017[24]):

• Law 125/2014, the new co-operation law, explicitly recognises the role, of diaspora as part of civil society and in “developing shared migration policies”. A diaspora representative participates in the CNCS and chairs the working group on migration and development.

• More than 2 100 diaspora organisations are registered in Italy. Since 2011, Italy has been supporting International Organization for Migration (IOM) training courses for the Empowerment of Migrant Associations for Co-development (A.MI.CO) to build their capacities and help establish networks (International Organization for Migration, n.d.[25]).

• In 2017 and 2018, local and national diaspora summits enabled exchange of migrants associations to enhance their role in the Italian development co-operation system and promote a positive narrative on migration (AICS, 2017[26]). A more structured Italian Diaspora Forum co-ordinates and serve as the main interlocutor with the government.

• Under the G20 remittances agenda, Italy helped lower the cost of sending remittances and promoted the financial inclusion of migrants in Italy. Two new projects that involve CDP aim to facilitate the transfer of savings between Italy and Tunisia and promote investment of the diaspora in Italy in African micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs).

• Italy actively includes the diaspora in co-operation programmes in Albania, Egypt, Senegal and Tunisia to support investments and employment generation in those countries. A Senegal diaspora network has grown to include Senegalese diaspora in other European countries.

Discussions in Senegal showed there might be further potential in making the case for aid and linking the diaspora with private sector mobilisation through more substantial, long-term and investment-oriented support or start-up financing. The participation of diaspora organisations in the November 2019 Italy-Africa Business Week is an opportunity for this.

Implementing the citizen education strategy could boost Italians’ support for development

Civil society plays an important role in informing all citizens about the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their contribution to sustainable development. Since its creation in 2016, the civil society network ASviS has organised an annual 17-day Sustainable Development Festival across Italy, reaching a broad audience. It also co‑operates with universities and contributes to citizenship education, collaborating with the Ministry of Education’s plan on education for sustainability. The European Commission recognised these efforts as a policy highlight under SDG 17 (European Commission, 2019[27]).

Nevertheless, development awareness requires attention. While Italians across political lines are supportive of development co-operation, fewer Italians than the EU average consider it very important (23%; EU average: 42%) or get personally involved (32%; EU average: 42%) (European Commission, 2018[28]). The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EU FRA) also notes a rising number of racially motivated attacks (FRA, 2018[23]) and Italians show a more negative attitude towards immigrants than other Europeans do (European Commission, 2018[29]). Reflecting the challenges of public opinion, notably linked to migration, the 2018 National Conference for Development Co-operation stressed the need for more effective communication and global citizenship education, dedicating the first three recommendations of its final manifesto to the issue (Conferenza Nazionale della Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, 2018[8]).

Implementing Italy’s 2018 strategy for global citizenship education (Surian et al., 2018[30])is an opportunity to push for greater development awareness. This would be an important complement to high-level events, such as Italy’s creative action on World Food Day (Bencini, 2019[31]), which often only reach a limited group of people. AICS already organises specific calls for CSOs to raise awareness of international co-operation and sustainable development. The government is working on, but has not yet finalised, an action plan under this strategy to address the challenges it has identified: low awareness of the SDGs, the perception of aid as charity rather than also being in Italy’s interest, intense competition with other topics, interest focused on migration,13 and need for co-ordination. This could build on Italian’s growing conviction that tackling poverty and development co-operation are also in their interest (European Commission, 2018[28]). Furthermore, despite recent increases, Italy’s per capita spending on development awareness is much lower than that of many other DAC members.14 As Italy continues stepping up its efforts, it could continue to draw on exchanges with members of the OECD Development Communication Network, including on monitoring and evaluating the results of public engagement.

References

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[9] European Commission (2019), The Environmental Implementation Review 2019: Country Report - Italy, European Commission, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eir/pdf/report_it_en.pdf (accessed on 3 June 2019).

[27] European Commission (2019), Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030: Reflection Paper, European Commission, Brussels, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/rp_sustainable_europe_30-01_en_web.pdf (accessed on 29 April 2019).

[29] European Commission (2018), Special Eurobarometer 469: Integration of immigrants in the European Union, European Commission, Brussels, Integration of immigrants in the European Union.

[28] European Commission (2018), Special Eurobarometer 476: EU citizens and development cooperation, European Union, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/ebs-476-fact.zip.

[10] European Environment Agency (2018), Trends and projections in Europe 2018 Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets, http://dx.doi.org/10.2800/931891.

[3] Foradori, P. (2017), “Protecting cultural heritage during armed conflict: the Italian contribution to ‘cultural peacekeeping’”, Modern Italy, Vol. 22/1, pp. 1-17, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mit.2016.57.

[1] Foradori, P., S. Giusti and A. Lamonica (2018), “Reshaping cultural heritage protection policies at a time of securitisation: France, Italy, and the United Kingdom”, International Spectator, Vol. 53/3, pp. 86-101, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1467161.

[23] FRA (2018), Beyond the peak: challenges remain, but migration numbers drop, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2019/migration-2018-review, http://dx.doi.org/10.2811/069603.

[42] Government of France (2018), Plan d’action Migrations internationales et développement 2018-2022 (in French), Government of France, Paris, https://www.afd.fr/fr/plan-daction-migrations-internationales-et-developpement-2018-2022 (accessed on 6 May 2019).

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[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (2018), Joint EU questionnaire to Member States: Part II - Information on Policy Coherence for Development: Reply by Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Italy, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/it_0.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2019).

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[2] United Nations Security Council (2017), UN Security Council Resolution 2347 (2017), http://dx.doi.org/S/RES/2347(2017).

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Notes

← 1.  For instance, Italy hosted the 2018 European Forum for Disaster Risk Reduction.

← 2.  Italy recently proposed a World Health Assembly resolution on “Improving the transparency of markets for drugs, vaccines and other health-related technologies” (Ministry of Health, 2019[32]).

← 3.  As an example, the Ministry of Economy and Finance highlighted how it adjusted a proposed measure when experts noted it could impede remittance flows.

← 4.  Such as those surrounding Italian engagement in Libya (AOI, 2018[33]) and overall migration policies (Link 2007, 2017[34]).

← 5.  For instance, Italy has a higher share of tax revenue from environmentally related taxes than most DAC members (OECD, n.d.[35]) and has also introduced tax penalties and incentives for cars linked to their emissions (Borgomeo, 2019[36])

← 6.  Since 2014, Italy has been party to the Arms Trade Treaty.

← 7.  According to announcements (which can differ significantly from actual investments). “Greenfield investment” refers to creating a company or new production capacities rather than acquiring or merging with existing companies.

← 8.  On 30 June 2018, Italy was hosting 180 829 refugees and 131 937 asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2019[37]). In other words 5.2 in every 1 000 people in Italy was a refugee or an asylum seeker (authors’ calculations based on 2017 population data, (The World Bank, 2019[38]). By comparison, France hosted 355 222 refugees and 67 350 asylum-seekers, i.e. 6.3 in 1 000 people; and Greece hosted 55 565 refugees, 15 461 people in refugee-like situations and 56 652 asylum seekers, i.e. 11.9 in 1 000 people.

← 9.  This led the Danish Immigration Council to stop transfers of asylum seekers to Italy (FRA, 2018[23]).

← 10.  Regarding a 2017 Memorandum of Understanding between the Italian and Libyan governments, the United Nations Committee against Torture under the Convention against Torture warned that “[…] the agreement […] does not contain any particular provision that may render cooperation and support conditional on the respect of human rights, including the absolute prohibition of torture. Furthermore, the Committee is deeply concerned at the lack of assurances that cooperation for the purpose of enhancing the operational capabilities of the Libyan Coast Guard or other Libyan security actors would be reviewed in light of possible serious human rights violations.” (Committee against Torture, 2017[39]). The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights had similarly requested Italy to clarify which safeguards it has put in place (Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017[40]). UNSMIL and OHCHR report that the memorandum was declared void by the Libyan Supreme Court (UNSMIL and OHCHR, 2018[41]). This would raise questions as to ownership and alignment of the Italian engagement.

← 11.  In 2018, France adopted an action plan on migration and development after consulting with local authorities and civil society (Government of France, 2018[42]); Germany adopted a strategy on migration and development in 2016 (Government of Germany, 2016[43]).

← 12.  The conference brought together more than 3 000 participants: co-operation practitioners as well as students. Five working groups discussed issues such as youth and migration, and communication. Conference documents are available at https://www.conferenzacoopera.it/category/gruppi-di-lavoro/.

← 13.  Italians are more convinced than other Europeans are that co-operation is an effective way to address irregular migration (75% compared to the EU average of 69%) (European Commission, 2018[28]).

← 14.  Italy’s spending on development awareness increased from USD 1.1 million in 2016 to USD 3.8 million in 2017.