Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum 2021

Compliance programmes can be helpful complements to public enforcement activity, ideally by preventing competition law violations in the first place. Many competition agencies have implemented changes in their enforcement and sanctioning policies regarding competition compliance programmes. Furthermore, we have also seen the rise of interesting advocacy initiatives to promote compliance.

This session explored if agencies have empirical evidence that compliance programmes lead to a decrease in the probability of violations or their gravity, and what the reasons for policy changes in agencies’ promotion of compliance or recognition of compliance efforts are. 

Background note EN | ES

Call for contributions EN | ES

Speaker

Anne Riley Bio
Independent Ethics and Compliance Consultant, BIAC 

Vertical restraints are competition restrictions in agreements between firms or individuals at different levels of the production and distribution process. Vertical restraints which simply determine the price and quantity for a specific sale and purchase transaction do not normally restrict competition. However, a restriction of competition may occur if the restraint contains restraints on the supplier or the buyer. Examples of such vertical restraints are an obligation on the buyer to charge customers a certain price for the supplier’s product (i.e. resale price maintenance); a restriction on the buyer not to purchase competing brands (i.e. non-compete obligation); or an obligation on the supplier to only supply a particular buyer (i.e. exclusive distribution).

The appropriate treatment of certain vertical restraints under competition law has been widely debated in recent years, in particular due to the rapidly increasing e-commerce and digital economy. This session provided an overview of different vertical restraints and the legal frameworks that exist to access vertical restraints.

Background note EN | ES

Hearing letter EN | ES

Speakers

Priscila Brolio Gonçalves Bio 
Owner, Brolio Gonçalves Advogados  

Javier Coronado  Bio
Chief Economist, Garrigues

Card payment systems are complex and dynamic, and mostly regarded as two-sided markets. There is consensus in literature as to the fundamental elements of the structure of said markets: firstly, the existence of two groups of economic agents, the merchants and cardholders, requiring services from a platform with interdependent demands; secondly, the resulting network externalities from this interdependence; thirdly, the Non-Neutrality present in the price structure, and finally, the role of platforms within the market scheme.

Some of the difficulties that arise in these types of markets are associated with the assessment of the social efficiencies that are generated by the price structure of payment platforms and how to define interchange fees and charges and the potential antitrust issues that may arise, among others. For instance, understanding and assessing price distribution and the impact of externalities on price definition, may be challenging for both competition agencies and regulators, as the price structure in these markets affects the dynamics of the transactions that take place within the market.

The goal of the session was to dive into a series of key questions on the topic and to explore how enforcement and regulatory efforts have evolved. 

Background note EN | ES

Call for contributions EN | ES

Speakers

Esteban Greco, Antitrust, Competition Policy and Regulation Economist Director, Global Economics Group and former president of the National Commission for the Defense of Competition in Argentina (CNDC)

Beatriz Yemail, Director, Global Economics Group

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Practice Co-Leader, Global Antitrust & Competition - Brattle