This section provides a snapshot of the tying status of ODA commitments, showing whether ODA is legally (de jure) untied, partially untied or tied based on the procurement rules attached to donor financing. For definitions of these categories, see the methodology.
Untied aid in Development Co-operation
This dashboard presents data on progress made to untie aid, as reported by Adherents to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance (ODA). It includes data by donor and enables comparison between donors.
Tying status of ODA
The type of funding influences the untying of aid
Donors can provide funding in different ways. Targeted project-based funding (e.g. infrastructure projects) is closely linked to procurement and therefore can be untied, partially untied or tied. Flexible funding (e.g. budget support, pooled funds) is not directly linked to procurement activities. Recipients decide how to spend it and it is therefore inherently untied. For this reason, flexible funding represents the most effective means of untying.
The tying status of investment projects over time
Investment projects build infrastructure and capital assets in recipient countries. As this type of aid is closely linked to procurement and typically involves large-scale contracts, it is most relevant to businesses and exporters seeking international opportunities. This also means their tying status is particularly scrutinised.
In this chart, the delivery channel indicates the type of institution implementing the project.
The type of finance influences the untying of aid
Untying practices can differ depending on the financing instrument. Grants are fully donor‑financed, which may give donors more latitude to attach procurement conditions. Loans, on the other hand, must be repaid by the recipient country, which can shift the balance of negotiation, potentially leading to more open procurement arrangements.
Geographical sourcing of untied contract awards
This section examines where the suppliers of contracts financed by untied ODA are based. This reveals whether aid that is de jure untied is also de facto untied.
Contract award data cover only procurement-related untied ODA. Flexible funding (e.g. budget support, contributions to multi-donor trust funds), which is inherently untied and not linked to procurement, and tied aid are both excluded. Given this, these data represent only a small share of bilateral ODA for some donors and should not be used to draw conclusions about overall aid patterns.
The extent to which contracts are untied in practice
Beyond formal untying (de jure), looking at where untied ODA contracts are awarded reveals how open and competitive they are in practice (de facto). A disproportionate share of contracts awarded to suppliers from the donor country may suggest a donor country bias, even when aid is formally untied.
The geographical distribution of suppliers differs across contract types
Commercial procurement contracts (for works, services, and supplies) are typically awarded to private sector firms through competitive tendering, governed by national procurement regulations. Selection is driven primarily by price and technical quality.
Grants are typically awarded to non-profit organisations, community-based actors or public interest entities through open calls for proposals. Selection is not driven by price but by alignment with developmental, social or humanitarian objectives, and the capacity to deliver them effectively.
The geographical distribution of suppliers differs across recipient country income groups
Untying practices are shaped by the development status and capacities of local suppliers in the country where the contract is implemented. In general, the stronger the local market, the more likely it is that contracts are awarded to local suppliers.
