Une décennie de tendances, de données et d'analyses OCDE sur la concurrence

Références

[51] Armoogum, K. (2017), « Assessing the comparative performance of competition authorities », UEA, https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/61978/1/Final_thesisV2-_Prishnee_Armoogum.pdf.

[48] Calligaris, S. et al. (2025), « Concentration and business dynamics in product markets », OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, n° 2025/04, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d714066e-en.

[17] Chiriac, I. (2021), « The Impact of Economy on Mergers & Acquisitions in European Markets », Journal of Financial Studies & Research, https://doi.org/10.5171/2021.206635.

[37] Connor, J. (2019), Twilight of Prosecutions of the Global Auto-Parts Cartels, https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Auto-Parts-Cartel-Twilight-of-AAI-WP_7.17.19.pdf.

[35] Davis, S. et P. Ormosi (2017), Quantifying the Deterrent Effect of Anti-Cartel Enforcement, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520014 (consulté le  September 2025).

[45] European Commission (2018), Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google’s search engine, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4581.

[47] European Commission (2017), Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_1784.

[46] European Commission (2016), Antitrust: Commission fines truck producers € 2.93 billion for participating in a cartel, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_16_2582.

[43] ICN (2018), Cartel Settlements: Report to the ICN Annual Conference, https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/CWG_Settlements.pdf.

[44] Koltay, G., S. Lorincz et T. Valletti (2023), « Concentration and Competition: Evidence From Europe and Implications For Policy », Journal of Competition Law & Economics, vol. 19/3, pp. 466-501, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad012.

[16] Lakra, N. (2024), « The Influence of Macroeconomic Factors on Mergers and Acquisitions and Stock Market Performance », International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research, vol. 6/4, https://www.ijfmr.com/papers/2024/4/25615.pdf.

[1] OCDE (2025), Algorithmic pricing and competition in G7 jurisdictions : Emerging trends and responses, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f36dacf8-en.

[2] OCDE (2025), « Concurrence dans l’offre de services d’informatique en nuage », n° 323, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/27798cae-fr.

[49] OCDE (2025), « Évaluer l’impact des activités des autorités de la concurrence », n° 320, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fe8770b1-fr.

[18] OCDE (2025), Perspectives économiques de l’OCDE, Volume 2025 Numéro 1 : S’attaquer à l’incertitude, relancer la croissance, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/15a25f4a-fr.

[8] OCDE (2024), « Pro-competitive industrial policy », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 309, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7c6b4708-en.

[19] OCDE (2024), Tendances de l’OCDE sur la concurrence 2024 (version abrégée), Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/83258053-fr.

[7] OCDE (2024), « The intersection between competition and data privacy », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 310, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0dd065a3-en.

[32] OCDE (2024), The standard and burden of proof in competition law cases, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/20758677.

[3] OCDE (2023), « Algorithmic Competition », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 296, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/cb3b2075-en.

[11] OCDE (2023), « Competition in the Circular Economy », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 298, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4b829cf6-en.

[31] OCDE (2023), « The Future of Effective Leniency Programmes: Advancing Detection and Deterrence of Cartels », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 299, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9bc9dd57-en.

[39] OCDE (2023), « The Optimal Design, Organisation and Powers of Competition Authorities », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 304, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dea26a24-en.

[21] OCDE (2023), « The Role of Innovation in Competition Enforcement », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 301, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6599e020-en.

[4] OCDE (2023), « Theories of Harm for Digital Mergers », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 293, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0099737e-en.

[34] OCDE (2023), Use of Economic evidence in cartel cases - Issues Note by the Secretariat to the break-out sessions, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2023)5/en/pdf.

[38] OCDE (2022), « Remedies and Commitments in Abuse Cases », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 288, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b975b0e3-en.

[9] OCDE (2022), « Subsidies, Competition and Trade », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 289, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/57a34bc6-en.

[24] OCDE (2022), « The Relationship between FDI Screening and Merger Control Reviews », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 287, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8bcc96f0-en.

[50] OCDE (2021), « Abuse of dominance in Digital Markets », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 256, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4c36b455-en.

[33] OCDE (2021), « Economic Analysis and Evidence in Abuse Cases », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 269, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/63e6d5f0-en.

[12] OCDE (2021), « Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 266, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2616c43c-en.

[25] OCDE (2021), OECD Competition Trends 2021, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/308565fd-en.

[15] OCDE (2021), Perspectives économiques de l’OCDE, Volume 2021 Numéro 1, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/631c1b44-fr.

[13] OCDE (2021), « Sustainability and Competition », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 262, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/18e2061c-en.

[22] OCDE (2021), « The Concept of Potential Competition », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 263, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/82caa437-en.

[5] OCDE (2021), « The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Economic Recovery », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 264, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0f9ccd5b-en.

[10] OCDE (2021), « Trade, Development and Competition - Pursuing Development Goals through Trade and Competition Law », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 270, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8440c1b7-en.

[30] OCDE (2021), « Using Market Studies to Tackle Emerging Competition Issues », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 265, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3ff6e671-en.

[14] OCDE (2020), Perspectives économiques de l’OCDE, Volume 2020 Numéro 2, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8dd1f965-fr.

[40] OCDE (2019), « Independent Sector Regulators », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 239, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b8adc68f-en.

[23] OCDE (2018), « Considering Non-Price Effects in Merger Control », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 216, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/cdb19665-en.

[20] OCDE (2018), « Disentangling Consummated Mergers – Experiences and Challenges », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 277, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/617a75e3-en.

[29] OCDE (2018), Guide sur les études de marché à l’intention des autorités de la concurrence, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2ec873ab-fr.

[28] OCDE (2017), « Methodologies for Market Studies », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 205, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8731d5ef-en.

[41] OCDE (2016), « Independence of Competition Authorities - From Design to Practice », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 195, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ea9749e1-en.

[27] OCDE (2016), « The Role of Market Studies as a Tool to Promote Competition », OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, n° 197, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3aaffccf-en.

[26] OCDE (2015), Études de marché : résultats d’une enquête de l’OCDE, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2015)7/fr/pdf.

[42] OCDE (2014), Institutional design of competition authorities, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2014/12/institutional-design-of-competition-authorities_ff81d3e9/cbf487a1-en.pdf.

[6] UNCTAD (2022), Rethinking competition law enforcement: Lessons learned from the pandemic, particularly in socially important markets – Challenges and opportunities for an effective response during the pandemic and economic recovery in the post-pandemic period, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ciclpd63_en.pdf.

[36] US DOJ (2023), Sherman Act Violations Resulting in Criminal Fines & Penalties of $10 Million or More, https://www.justice.gov/atr/sherman-act-violations-yielding-corporate-fine-10-million-or-more.