Private finance mobilised through official development finance interventions increased over 2012-2023, reaching a peak of USD 70 billion in 2023. Despite this increase, private finance mobilised remains below opportunities, expectations and needs.
Middle-income countries benefited from more than 50% of total private finance mobilised over 2020-23, in part because they are, on average, perceived as lower risk environments than least developed countries (LDCs).
Comprehensive, transparent data on mobilised private finance for sustainable development are key to building trust in markets and improving the mismatch between real and perceived risks associated with investment in developing countries.
The OECD has developed an international standard for measuring and collecting data on mobilised private finance by official development finance interventions. With data series going back to 2012, these data constitute a key source of information for policy makers and private investors. Work is ongoing to enhance the current measurement and reporting, notably to capture broader types of mobilisation interventions - such as catalytic and balance-sheet optimisation activities – and increase transparency as progress is still needed to improve access to disaggregated data.
Policymakers should collectively commit to the highest standards of transparency to enhance the quality, accessibility and availability of data, through reporting to the OECD statistics and supporting international initiatives.
Tracking private finance mobilisation
Despite commitments to mobilise all sources of finance to implement the SDGs, as well as global climate and biodiversity targets, developing countries’ financing and investment gaps have been increasing and are estimated to widen further (OECD, 2025[1]; Bhattacharya et al., forthcoming[2]). Increasing fiscal constraints and changing spending priorities have put pressure on official sources such as official development assistance (ODA). Coupled with the increasingly compelling investment opportunity of developing countries’ sustainability transitions, private finance mobilisation for development, climate and biodiversity has become increasingly strategic in development co-operation providers’ priorities.
Private finance mobilisation refers to unlocking and channelling commercial finance towards sustainable development objectives in developing countries, through official development finance interventions (OECD, 2021[3]). Development finance providers dispose of several instruments and approaches to strategically use public resources to increase private investment for development, climate and biodiversity in developing countries (Box 1). To help measure progress on private finance mobilisation and understand what’s working, what isn’t working and why, the OECD has developed an international standard for measuring the amounts mobilised from the private sector by official development finance interventions1.
Providers of development co-operation use different instruments to mobilise private finance (OECD, 2025[4]):
Guarantees pertain to legally binding arrangements in which the guarantor commits to cover part, or all, of the obligations – such as loans, equity investments, or other financial instruments – should the borrower default or the investment lose value. These guarantees are typically extended on the assumption that, without such backing, private investors would not have engaged in the financing.
Syndicated loans are defined as loans provided by a group of lenders, or syndicate, who work together to provide funds for a single borrower, with the aim to spread the risk of a borrower default across multiple lenders, and thereby encourage private sector participation.
Shares in collective investment vehicles (CIVs) are those invested in entities that allow investors to pool their money and jointly invest in a portfolio of companies. A CIV can either have a flat structure or have its capital divided in tranches with different risk and return profiles.
Direct investment in companies or Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) includes on-balance sheet investments in corporate entities, and/or SPVs, which are conducted without any intermediary. As such, official investments in companies constitute a key leveraging instrument for private sector development.
Credit lines cover a standing credit amount which can be drawn upon at any time, up to a specific amount and within a given timeframe. Local financial institutions (LFI) decide how much of the agreed funding they wish to draw down and interest is paid only on the borrowed amount. In this view, the main objective of credit lines is to support the private sector through the intermediation of the LFI.
Simple co-financing encompasses various business partnerships, B2B programmes, business surveys, matching programmes, including result-based approaches.
In addition to these traditional financial mechanisms, official providers have been focusing on the potential of innovative capital market instruments to unlock additional sources of finance to bridge the financing gap. These financial innovations include outcome and sustainable bonds, including green, social, sustainability, and sustainability-linked (GSSS) bonds and blue and biodiversity bonds (OECD, 2021[5]).
Mobilisation of private finance through official development finance interventions followed an upward trend over 2012-2023, totalling more than USD 500 billion over the entire period and reaching a peak of annual mobilisation of nearly USD 70 billion in 2023, a 28% increase from 2020 (Figure 1). Direct investment in companies, guarantees, and syndicated loans were the leveraging mechanisms used by providers that mobilised the most, accounting for almost 70% of the total over 2012-2023 (29%, 23% and 19% on average, respectively).
Yet, volumes of private finance mobilised remain below expectations and needs. While financing and investment gaps are increasing, and private finance mobilisation is becoming an increasing priority, DAC countries disbursed USD 10.8 billion2 in 2023 in support of mobilisation activities, through concessional and non-concessional, as well as in the form of contingent liabilities such as guarantees/insurance (OECD, 2025[6]).
Source: OECD DAC Statistics (http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/n2), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/mobilisation-of-private-finance-for-development.html
Who mobilises private finance for sustainable development?
Multilateral organisations are key players, representing 71% of total mobilised private finance on average over 2020-23 (Figure 2). The main provider is the International Financial Corporation (IFC, with USD 16.6 billion), followed by EU institutions, MIGA, IDB Invest, African Development Bank (AfDB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Bilateral providers played an important role too, with the United States having mobilised the largest volumes over 2020-23 (USD 6.5 billion on average), followed by France, United Kingdom, Japan and Germany.
Note: For the purpose of the OECD statistics on amounts mobilised from the private sector, the Dutch development finance institution FMO is considered an official institution in line with the OECD DAC definition of official transactions. However, in the National Accounts System of the Netherlands, FMO is registered as a private, independent bank.Source: OECD DAC Statistics (http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/2b9), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/mobilisation-of-private-finance-for-development.html
Who benefits?
Mobilisation of private finance varies across regions and countries, depending on multiple factors, including income group, perceived risks and opportunities. In this regard, seeking returns from an investment will affect the choice to invest in a specific region, as well as the instrument or mechanism to use.
Middle-income countries (MICs) remain the main beneficiaries, accounting for 50% of total mobilised private finance on average over 2020-233 (Figure 3). Within this category, upper-middle income countries (UMICs) were the main recipients of private finance mobilised over this period, followed by lower middle-income countries (LMICs). By contrast, only 12% of mobilised private finance targeted projects in LDCs. Overall, mobilised private finance has scarcely benefited countries most in needs, including countries in fragile contexts such as small island developing states (SIDS). Combined with the limited track record of investment results, this trend reinforces risk perceptions among private investors, further discouraging them in investing in these contexts (OECD, 2019[7]). In addition, territorial data, at the regional/provincial and municipal levels, is also scarce, hindering understanding of the nuances, concentration and disparities in the distribution of private finance within countries.
Source: OECD DAC Statistics (http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1vs), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/mobilisation-of-private-finance-for-development.html
Brazil and India were the primary beneficiary countries, representing on average 20% of total mobilised private finance over the period, followed by Mozambique4, Türkyie, Morocco and Mexico (Figure 4). Brazil has increasingly mobilised private finance, driven amongst others by country-led efforts on green bonds, increased mobilisation efforts of domestic development banks and a significantly developed financial market (Taskin, Bellesi and Moller, 2020[8]).
Source: OECD DAC Statistics (http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1vs), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/mobilisation-of-private-finance-for-development.html
Over 2020-23, mobilised private finance mainly benefitted economic infrastructure and services sectors – such as banking and business services as well as energy – accounting for almost two-third (66%) of the total mobilisation (Figure 5). Only 6% of the total private finance mobilised targeted social sectors. This discrepancy is driven by different risk profiles, commercial viability and revenue streams associated with projects in these sectors. Additionally, the limited number of transactions and related lack of evidence base for social sector or multisector projects further dissuade private investors, as the risks and opportunities of investing in such high development-impact projects remain unclear (OECD, 2022[9]).
Source: OECD DAC Statistics (http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/2ba), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/mobilisation-of-private-finance-for-development.html
How has mobilised private finance supported climate action?
Private finance mobilisation has become a key cornerstone also of the international climate agenda. Unlocking additional financing from a range of commercial actors in developed and developing countries is critical to closing the financing gap for investments in climate action, notably in energy, agriculture, forestry, land-use, adaptation, and resilience (OECD, 2023[10]). As shown in Figure 6, UMICs remain the main beneficiaries, with 66% of mobilised private finance for these countries also targeting climate objectives over 2020-23. LDCs and LICs were the second beneficiary country group of mobilised private finance for climate, with 33% of the total targeting adaptation-related projects over this last period.5
Note: OECD DAC statistics on mobilisation also constitute the main source of data for the private climate finance mobilised component included in OECD monitoring of progress towards the UNFCCC USD 100 billion goal (OECD, n.d.[11]). However, absolute figures for mobilised private finance used in this context differ from those presented in DAC statistical outputs. The main reason is that figures for private climate finance mobilised by multilateral organisations included for monitoring the USD 100 billion goal only include the share of mobilisation and outflows from multilateral organisations that can be attributed to developed countries. Please refer to the Annex for further detail. Source: OECD DAC Statistics (http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/2bb), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/mobilisation-of-private-finance-for-development.html
Transparent and comprehensive data is critical to inform policymaking for private finance mobilisation
The lack of robust investment data – including on investment opportunities, risks and returns – remains a fundamental obstacle to scale up private investments (OECD, 2025[12]). To drive higher levels of mobilisation in developing countries, the quality, consistency and comparability of available data need to be improved. Better data on investment can promote a better understanding of developments in different regions, technologies, and markets, and how these translate into the need for official development finance to mobilise private finance, as well as on their optimal level of concessionality.
More transparency can provide information on the evolution of the composition of financing sources for investments – concessional and non-concessional development finance as well as commercial finance – in a given sector and geographic context, helping to inform decisions on when development finance can eventually exit to avoid a crowding-out of private finance. More generally, better data on mobilisation can demystify and dissolve some of the perceived risks associated with investments in developing countries, which continue to drive decisions of private investors not to invest – on top of real risks associated with such investments.
The OECD statistics on private finance mobilised by development finance provide the highest standards of data and evidence for policymakers and private sector players, complemented by other relevant data sources6. Enhanced availability, accessibility and quality of disaggregated data at the transaction level enable a sound analysis of the real investment opportunities in developing countries. By allowing to produce the trend analysis shown above, these data play a key role in informing on progress made by development co-operation providers in their private finance mobilisation efforts jointly with reassuring private investors and building trust in the markets (OECD, 2024[13]). Pursuing efforts in enhancing OECD data on mobilised private finance is needed to overcome existing investment information gap. For instance, in the case of biodiversity and nature-related projects, a more comprehensive reporting on the extent to which private finance mobilisation aims to address this challenge would contribute to provide the evidence that private actors need.
The OECD statistics constitute a unique source of comparable data for key international processes, such as the tracking and monitoring of the previous USD 100 billion annual climate finance goal (OECD, 2023[14]) and the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development statistical framework. Looking ahead, there will be continued and expanded needs for transparent and comprehensive data on private finance mobilisation for these processes, for instance in the context of the NCQG agreed at the UNFCCC COP29 for the 2026-2035 period, or the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and its Target 19c which covers private finance overall.
While the OECD statistics includes high-quality data, progress needs to be done on data availability at project level. For instance, bilateral institutions have agreed on new rules on the disclosure of data at the activity level, including through PSI. This represents an important step towards the granularity and transparency objectives of the mobilisation agenda. Nonetheless, there are still several challenges that hinder needed progress towards greater transparency and provision of mobilisation data, which include client confidentiality agreement and the lack of reporting and disclosure in a comparable and harmonised approach.
The OECD is working together with key partners from countries’ development finance institutions (DFIs) and development banks, as well as multilateral development banks (MDBs) to enhance the current measurement and reporting on mobilisation in OECD statistics (OECD DAC, 2024[15]). Beyond working towards more harmonised metrics on mobilisation this includes capturing innovative, broader types of private finance mobilisation approaches (Figure 7), such as:
Portfolio mobilisation, covering risk-transfer activities whereby the official provider transfers the risk to private sector actors, through investment exists (e.g. equity and debt sales) and risk-transfer mechanisms (e.g. securitisation).
Generation, covering balance-sheet operations through which the official provider raises private capital in its balance-sheet: equity investment, hybrid capital and bond issuance (OECD, 2025[16]).
Catalysation, covering the indirect and downstream private investments enabled by public interventions. Catalytic activities are conducted by official development actors with the intent to create an enabling environment conducive to private investment. For such activities, a tangible causal link with the resulting private investments is more difficult to established (OECD, 2025[17]).
Note: In its current exploratory work of the broader types of mobilisation, the OECD does not consider balance-sheet operations and catalysation as covered under the definition of “mobilised private finance”. They would constitute new, complementary, indicators, not to be aggregated with mobilised private finance.
Source: Authors
The workplan also aims to address the need to align on metrics and approaches, including in respect to the differences between the OECD and MDB approaches to report on mobilisation. The OECD and MDB methodologies have initially been conceived for different purposes and should be seen as complementary. While the OECD standard for measuring mobilisation was established to collect comparable and international statistics on mobilisation to inform policies, the joint MDB approach intends to report back to their shareholders on their mobilisation efforts towards the “Billions to Trillions” agenda. However, the differences in the two approaches create confusion and increase the reporting burden for institutions reporting to both frameworks such as the European Development Finance Institutions (EDFIs). The OECD and the MDB Group are exploring options to better aligning these metrics and enhancing data sharing through the joint MDB – OECD DAC working group.
The OECD Secretariat is also engaged in international initiatives aiming to advance data availability on investment in EMDEs, including the Hamburg Data Alliance (HDA). The HDA is a strategic multistakeholder engagement process working towards “improving risk pricing and unlocking investment for the SDGs” through better quality, accessibility, and availability of data. The initiative aims to capitalise on the international momentum around data and transparency to leverage and work through existing initiatives and collectively help shift the perception of risk in EMDEs. The OECD is chairing and working as the Secretariat of the Steering Group of the HDA.
With this work, the OECD is supporting OECD members, as shareholders of the multilateral system and providers of development finance, to:
Uphold the highest data standards and principles to improve data quality, accessibility and availability. This would help reduce data-related barriers that hinder private investment flows to developing countries and social sectors, as well as meet private investors’ needs.
Contribute to ongoing OECD and MDBs’ efforts to better align approaches for measuring mobilisation – including broader “baskets” such as generation, portfolio mobilisation and catalysation – through a more coherent and whole-of-government approach, particularly when sitting in both institutions’ board and council.
Take part in existing and high-level initiatives aimed to foster data granularity and transparency, including through sharing data on mobilisation to the OECD DAC statistics and participating to the Hamburg Data Alliance.
Ensure that efforts to refine existing mobilisation metrics and develop new methodologies for capturing catalysation do not unduly inflate figures. It is essential to consider potential metrics on balance-sheet optimisation and catalysation as new, complementary, indicators, not to be aggregated with mobilised private finance to protect the credibility of mobilisation statistics and not lose focus on the quality and development impact of this financing.
References
[2] Bhattacharya, A. et al. (forthcoming), From aid-driven to investment-driven models of sustainable development.
[18] Convergence (2024), State of Blended Finance 2024, https://www.convergence.finance/resource/state-of-blended-finance-2024/view.
[16] OECD (2025), Finetuning and enhancing the measurement and reporting on mobilisation in DAC statistics, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2025)22/en.
[1] OECD (2025), Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2025: Towards a More Resilient and Inclusive, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/753d5368-en.
[4] OECD (2025), Handbook on measuring and reporting on Mobilised Private Finance in OECD DAC statistics, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2025)25/REV1/en.
[6] OECD (2025), Mobilised private finance for development, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/12p.
[12] OECD (2025), “Mobilising private finance for development, climate and biodiversity in emerging markets and developing economies: Financing our futures”, OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 90, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ada2dfcd-en.
[17] OECD (2025), Update on capturing private finance catalysation in DAC statistics, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2025)23/en.
[13] OECD (2024), Multilateral Development Finance Report 2024, https://doi.org/10.1787/8f1e2b9b-en.
[14] OECD (2023), Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2021: Aggregate Trends and Opportunities for Scaling Up Adaptation and Mobilised Private Finance, Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e20d2bc7-en.
[10] OECD (2023), Scaling up the mobilisation of private finance for climate action in developing countries, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/17a88681-en.
[9] OECD (2022), Making blended finance work for the SDGs, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/76e41059-en.
[3] OECD (2021), OECD DAC Blended Finance Guidance, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ded656b4-en.
[5] OECD (2021), Scaling up green, social, sustainability and sustainability-linked bond issuances in developing countries, https://doi.org/10.1787/8a5c3156-en.
[7] OECD (2019), Blended finance in fragile contexts, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f5e557b2-en.
[11] OECD (n.d.), Climate finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal, https://doi.org/10.1787/5f1f4182-en.
[15] OECD DAC (2024), WP-STAT workplan to improve the measurement and reporting of mobilised private, https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2024)33/en/pdf.
[8] Taskin, Ö., V. Bellesi and L. Moller (2020), The role of domestic DFIs in using blended finance for sustainable development and climate action: the case of Brazil, https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/oecd-working-paper-dfis-and-the-case-of-brazil.pdf.
Contact
← 1. The OECD has developed an international standard for measuring mobilised private finance for sustainable development, including climate action, in consultation with experts from DFIs, MDBs and the climate community. transparency and accuracy purposes, including to ensure no double counting when several providers co-invest, data are collected at the activity level from a wide range of providers (24 bilateral and 16 multilateral institutions in 2024).
← 2. This includes private sector instruments (PSI) activities, whether they are mobilising private finance or not, and non-PSI activities that mobilise private finance.
← 3. Or 65% of country-allocable mobilised private finance.
← 4. Mozambique is the only LDC included in the top 10 recipients of private finance mobilised, over 2020-2023, driven by the gas industry development in the country.
← 5. The relatively large volumes of mobilised private finance for adaptation in LDCs and LICs are driven by a small number of large projects in Mozambique in recent years.
← 6. Several other data sources, including the MDBs, specialised vertical climate and environmental funds and independent research initiatives, contribute valuable insights and complementary information. Among these, the Convergence database represents one of the most detailed sources of information on blended finance transactions (Convergence, 2024[18])