Tax incentives can be a useful tool to stimulate investment in developing countries.
However, in these countries interest groups often are able to exert considerable influence in its
management, if not its design. From a power-based approach to the political economy of tax
reform we find how interest groups work within the institutional framework to seek outcomes
that best fit their objectives. When unsuccessful, they become powerful advocates of change.
These power dynamics have important implications for the design and management of tax
incentives in developing economies.
The Political Economy of Tax Incentives for Investment in the Dominican Republic
“Doctoring the Ball”
Working paper
OECD Development Centre Working Papers

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Abstract
In the same series
-
4 October 2021
Related publications
-
Country note16 December 2024
-
26 November 2024
-
Policy paper19 November 2024
-
Report16 September 2024