A healthy ocean is vital for the well-being of the planet and for the billions of people who depend on it for their livelihoods, the majority of whom live in developing countries. However, a range of challenges undermines development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy, which are explored in this chapter. Beginning with the lack of a common understanding of the aims of ocean-related development co-operation, the chapter outlines issues related to fragmented ocean governance, insufficient and ineffective financing, capacity bottlenecks, and a lack of global coherence. In doing so, it sets the stage for the recommendations presented in the following chapters.
Promoting Sustainable Ocean Economies
Guidance for Development Co-operation
Abstract
A healthy ocean holds one of the keys to sustainable development. The ocean covers over 70% of the planet’s surface and is a pillar of the Earth’s life-support system and a key cog in the global economy (e.g., as the facilitator of 90% of global trade) (Miola and Ciuffo, 2011[1]). In other words, global wellbeing is highly dependent on the ocean. In fact, coastal and marine ecosystems services are valued at over USD 20.4 trillion and USD 27 trillion per year respectively (OECD, 2024[2]). Dependency on the ocean is particularly pronounced for the over 3 billion people – mainly in developing countries, including small island developing states (SIDS) – who live near the ocean (UNCTAD, 2021[3]). For them, the ocean is the backbone of the economy and of crucial social and cultural importance. At the same time, emerging sectors that rely on ocean resources (e.g. marine biotechnology, offshore renewable energy) present untapped economic opportunities for structural transformation and long-run development gains (OECD, 2020[4]).
However, the integrity of marine and coastal ecosystems is at risk, with marked impacts on developing countries. Pressures like climate change, pollution, and overfishing have led to habitat degradation, ocean warming and acidification, and species extinction – severely undermining the ocean’s ability to sustain human life. For instance, between 70-90% of coral reefs could disappear by 2050 without urgent and sweeping action to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees (Souter et al., 2021[5]). Driven by the growth in plastics use and production, plastic leakage to the environment (including the ocean) is also projected to grow by 50% by 2040, compared to 2020 levels (OECD, 2024[6]). These pressures impose heavy burdens on developing countries, particularly SIDS, which rely closely on ocean ecosystems (Gordon-Strachan et al., 2025[7]). Climate change disproportionately impacts coastal communities in developing countries, where their resilience is challenged by pre-existing vulnerabilities and lack of sufficient adaptive capacity, despite their marginal contributions to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions historically (OECD, 2020[4]). The cost of taking policy action to reduce plastic pollution is also expected to be the largest in developing countries, with Sub-Saharan Africa estimated to shoulder the largest costs as a share of GDP (OECD, 2024[6]).
Development co-operation has an important role to play in supporting developing countries to tap into the ocean’s opportunities and mitigate risks associated with climate change, ocean degradation, and rapid growth in ocean-based economic activities. Recognising this, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), in its 2021 Declaration on a New Approach to Align Development Co-operation with the Goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, committed to “promoting resilient and sustainable ocean economies” (OECD, 2021[8]). As detailed below, delivering on this commitment requires that providers navigate several challenges affecting development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy, each of which is discussed in the following sections of this chapter:
the lack of a common understanding of a sustainable ocean economy
fragmented ocean governance
limited financing for a sustainable ocean economy
generic capacity constraints exacerbated by the intricacies of the ocean
global incoherence and transnational coordination challenges.
A shared understanding of what a sustainable ocean economy means is critical to ensure that development co-operation works towards the same goals. The ocean can contribute to sustainable development in many ways, ranging from livelihood provision to macroeconomic development and climate action. This makes it a domain where development co-operation can deliver gains across multiple sustainable development goals (SDGs) (Table 1.1), which will require a common framework for the goals of development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy. Simultaneously, the ocean is home to a variety of economic sectors (e.g. fisheries, maritime transport, coastal tourism), which contribute to and detract from sustainable development in different ways. An overarching sense of what a sustainable ocean economy means can guide development co-operation providers efforts across heterogeneous sectors.
Source: UN DESA (2017[9]), Mapping the Linkages Between Oceans and Other Sustainable Development Goals: A preliminary exploration, https://www.un.org/ar/desa/mapping-linkages-between-oceans-and-other-sustainable-development-goals.
As the sections below make apparent, the proliferation of different terms to describe a sustainable ocean economy renders a common understanding elusive. These terms call into question what exactly falls under the umbrella of the “ocean economy” and what makes it “sustainable”. While previous OECD publications have addressed some of these ambiguities, there is still no common framework that details the aims of development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy. Chapter 2 tackles this gap, outlining the four outcomes that define a sustainable ocean economy and reflect the four goals of development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy.
Common terms used to describe the ocean economy convey different objectives
Multiple terms are used interchangeably to describe the ocean’s economic, social, and environmental importance. Commonly used terms include: (sustainable or regenerative) blue economy, sustainable (ocean) economy, maritime economy, blue growth, and ocean positive economy. However, an OECD’s survey of the terminology used by different countries and international organisations reveals that these terms do not always convey the same objectives or scope1.
One key specification is what exactly is included in the ocean economy. Sometimes, the terminology used implies specific economic sectors or industries. For instance, maritime industry may refer to individual sectors like shipbuilding (European Commission, 2025[10]). However, the maritime economy may be used to refer to a “whole range of activities related to the sea” (Kalaydjian, 2014[11]). It is not always clear whether the blue or ocean economy encompasses freshwater resources. The World Bank, for example, defines the blue economy as the “sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and job creation while preserving the health of ocean ecosystems” (World Bank, 2021[12]). Meanwhile, in the Nairobi Statement of Intent on Advancing the Global Sustainable Blue Economy, the blue economy includes not only oceans and seas, but also lakes and rivers (UNECA, 2018[13]).
Another key distinction is whether a blue or ocean economy is, by definition, sustainable. In some cases, sustainability is an intrinsic feature of the blue or ocean economy. For instance, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa defines the blue economy as “a sustainable and equitable model of economic growth” (UNECA, 2016[14]). Elsewhere, sustainability is not made explicit. For example, Park and Kildow (2015[15]) define the ocean economy as “the economic activities that directly or indirectly take place in the ocean and use outputs from the ocean, while incorporating goods and services into the ocean’s economic activities.” Moreover, the type (e.g. strong versus weak) and dimension (e.g. environmental versus social) of sustainability considered tends to vary across the different terms used. The emerging concept of regenerative blue economy, for example, goes beyond the need to “green” ocean-based economy activities and instead calls for “an economic model that combines rigorous and effective regeneration and protection of the Ocean and marine and coastal ecosystems with sustainable, low, or no carbon economic activities, and fair prosperity for people and the planet, now and in the future” (Le Gouvello and Simard, 2024[16]).
Despite efforts, including by the OECD, a common framework for the goals of ocean-related development co-operation is still elusive
The OECD defines the ocean economy “as the sum of the economic activities of ocean-based industries, and the assets, goods and services of marine ecosystems” (OECD, 2016[17]). Ocean-based industries include activities that take place in the ocean, benefit from proximity to the ocean, or use ocean resources. They cover a range of established (e.g. fisheries) and more novel (e.g. offshore renewable energy) sectors (Table 1.2). The ocean economy also encompasses the value of marine ecosystems’ unquantifiable natural stocks and non-market goods and services.
Source: Jolliffe, Jolly and Stevens (2021[18]), “Blueprint for improved measurement of the international ocean economy: An exploration of satellite accounting for ocean economic activity”, https://doi.org/10.1787/aff5375b-en.
The OECD tracks ocean-related official development assistance (ODA) by applying this definition to ODA activities and distinguishing between sustainable ocean economy ODA and all other ocean economy ODA (Figure 1.1). The key variable in this distinction is environmental sustainability. In this framework, a sustainable ocean economy can be broadly defined as the “sustainable use of natural resources2 in the world’s oceans, seas and coastal areas” (OECD, 2020[4]). The tracking also includes an indicator for activities that reduce the negative impacts of land-based activities on the ocean – recognising the crucial nexus between land and sea.
Source: Adapted from OECD (2020[4]), Sustainable Ocean for All: Harnessing the Benefits of Sustainable Ocean Economies for Developing Countries, https://doi.org/10.1787/bede6513-en
Despite providing a good starting point, these efforts do not spell out the precise aims that development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy can pursue. OECD (2016[17]) outlines what economic activities fall under the ocean economy, and OECD (2020[4]) presents an overarching definition of a sustainable ocean economy.3 But neither fleshes out the specific tenets of a sustainable ocean economy, which can help guide the goals of development co-operation in this space. Even the numerous standards and frameworks that have emerged in recent years (see Annex A) do not systematically lay out the role of development co-operation in supporting a sustainable ocean economy. These standards do not always consider the ocean economy its entirety – instead focusing on specific (but not all) sectors or topics – and are not necessarily tailored to development co-operation.
Managing the vastness and diversity of the ocean economy requires a holistic approach to ocean governance. The ocean is subject to multiple uses, spanning many different sectors and objectives (i.e. environmental, economic, social) (Winther et al., 2020[19]). As a result, the authority to manage countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) often lies within several national agencies and a wide range of policy instruments and regulations. Managing conflicts – and harnessing synergies – across these uses, objectives and stakeholders is indispensable for pursuing the different goals of development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy in a coherent manner.
Integrated ocean management (IOM) is a useful principle to guide policies and institutions governing a sustainable ocean economy. IOM can be defined as “a holistic, ecosystem-based and knowledge-based approach that aims to ensure the sustainability and resilience of marine ecosystems while integrating and balancing different ocean uses to optimise the overall ocean economy” (Winther et al., 2020[19]). IOM is a dynamic process building on existing initiatives, whether under the umbrella of area-based management measures such as marine spatial planning (MSP), or ecosystem-based management (Box 1.1). All these mechanisms leverage the best available scientific knowledge, foster inter-sectoral collaboration, implement robust monitoring and evaluation systems and ensure effective and adaptive enforcement.
Integrated ocean management can also improve the efficiency and effectiveness of development co-operation. Developing countries’ policy and institutional frameworks reflect their priorities, meaning that they should be the basis of development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy. If these frameworks are coherent and well-integrated, they can better guide development efforts so that they account for tensions and synergies across ocean uses. Similarly, embedding principles of integrated ocean management in development co-operation policies/strategies and practices can enhance coherence in the ways that providers support the ocean in partner countries. In both cases, IOM can enable the limited resources for development co-operation to be deployed more efficiently and effectively.
However, as explained below, ocean governance is fragmented at both the provider and partner country level, which risks being intensified by the growth of the global ocean economy. Chapter 3 elaborates on the role of development co-operation in tackling this fragmentation. It presents recommendations on how development co-operation providers can promote IOM in partner countries, as well as how they can strengthen their internal coordination.
Integrated ocean management (IOM) uses a variety of mechanisms to ensure the sustainable management of the coastal and marine areas. The following tools are most often associated with IOM:
Integrated coastal management
In coastal areas, where most user conflicts occur and pressures on the ocean are greatest, integrated coastal management (ICM) can be used to govern the sustainable ocean economy. ICM is also known as integrated coastal zone management (ICZM). ICM provides integrated governance to guide coastal area development in an ecologically sustainable fashion (Torrie, 2016[20]). It encompasses the entire ocean governance process, from gathering information to planning, decision making, and implementation. It aims to integrate the objectives and tools required to achieve sustainable ocean management, bridging different policy areas, sectors, and levels of governance, as well as connecting the land and sea components within the target area. This tool has a legal basis in the form of the OECD’s Recommendation of the Council on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (OECD, 1992[21]).
Marine spatial planning
Marine spatial planning (MSP) is a key component of IOM, designed to analyse and allocate the distribution of human activities in marine areas. MSP aims to achieve ecological, economic, and social goals established through a political decision-making process (IOC, 2023[22]). This approach seeks to create an integrated framework that supports both existing and emerging marine uses, minimises conflicts, and safeguards ecosystem integrity and the provision of essential ecosystem services (Arbo and Thuy, 2016[23]). By identifying which ocean spaces are more appropriate for various uses and activities, it aims to balance the demands of development with the need to protect marine ecosystems, while achieving social and economic goals through an open and structured approach.
Ecosystem-based management
MSP is often combined with ecosystem-based management (EBM), also known as an “ecosystem-based approach”. As detailed in Long, Charles and Stephenson (2015[24]), EBM focuses on managing natural resources by prioritising the health, productivity, and resilience of a specific ecosystem, group of ecosystems, or key natural assets as the core of its approach. EBM acknowledges the full range of interactions within an ecosystem, including those involving humans, and promotes integrated planning and implementation across sectoral agencies. By emphasizing interconnectedness and coherence, EBM contrasts with traditional management approaches that concentrate on a single species, sector, activity, or issue, instead addressing the cumulative impacts of various factors.
Area-based management tools
Area-based management tools are critical mechanisms that ocean stakeholders can use as part of IOM. These tools are used to manage activities in a geographically defined area to achieve conservation or sustainable use outcomes (UN, 2023[25]). Marine protected areas (MPAs) are the most common of these tools, defined as “a clearly defined geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values” (IUCN, 2024[26]).
Integrated ocean policies and institutions are nascent in developing countries
Cross-sectoral policy frameworks are an important part of integrated ocean management. In addition to the usual planning instruments (e.g., national development plans, nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans, national biodiversity strategies and action plans), the value of dedicated ocean policies and strategies for integrated ocean management is increasingly recognised (Hu, 2012[27]; da Silva Marques, Santos and Guerreiro, 2022[28]).
However, many developing countries still lack dedicated ocean economy policies. As shown in Figure 1.2, only a small number of African countries and territories, which include the Seychelles and Zanzibar, have advanced to the stage of implementing an official ocean economy policy, despite many being well-positioned to develop such strategies (Wuwung et al., 2022[29]). In South America, the adoption of dedicated ocean policies is also lagging behind the levels reached in more developed countries. Most landlocked countries do not have dedicated ocean policies, even though they could play an important role in integrated approaches to the sustainable ocean economy due to the links between ocean and freshwater systems (e.g. trade through riverways, waste and pollution management, climate action). The lack of holistic ocean policies is also a documented challenge at the subnational level (OECD, 2024[2]).
Note: Western Europe & Other group includes North America, Australia, and New Zealand.
Source: Wuwung et al. (2022[29]), “Global blue economy governance – A methodological approach to investigating blue economy implementation”, https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2022.1043881.
In addition to the establishment of dedicated ocean frameworks, many developing countries face challenges in integrating and implementing existing governance instruments. These challenges apply to most policy areas and therefore permeate down to the sustainable ocean economy as well. In some cases, even when there is a dedicated ocean strategy, or where ocean priorities are somewhat reflected in other cross-sectoral plans, insufficient integration and co-ordination with sector-specific instruments and budget processes hampers implementation (OECD, 2023[30]). In other cases, the lack of cross-ministry coordination can hamper implementation. For instance, in countries like Antigua and Barbuda and Indonesia, the governance of marine protected areas (MPAs) is split across multiple ministries (OECD, 2020[4]). In the absence of coordination, this distribution of responsibilities can lead to confusion and can undermine MPA effectiveness.
The lack of country-owned and integrated ocean policies can hamper effective development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy. Externally driven development initiatives conducted outside of an integrated ocean strategy can undermine local rights and livelihoods. For instance, MPAs with high levels of protection are often implemented in areas with low economic interests for industrial sectors, but which are crucial for local communities (Claudet et al., 2022[31]). Past experience in the Pacific also shows that funding for fisheries development generates limited benefits when not aligned with local socio-cultural values, economic constraints, biodiversity conservation or climate change adaptation needs (Barclay and Kinch, n.d.[32]) – all of which could be reflected in a dedicated ocean policy framework.
Development co-operation providers also face challenges with cross-sector coherence and co-ordination
Struggles in setting up adequate governance arrangements to manage the ocean economy are not exclusive to developing countries. Despite increasing global attention on ocean issues, there is still no shared understanding, common definition, or unified principles to guide development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy. While some development co-operation providers have a long history of supporting marine protection or specific ocean-based sectors like fisheries, few take a holistic view of the ocean economy (OECD, 2020[4]).
Most development co-operation providers lack explicit strategies guiding development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy. Only a few countries have either developed a standalone strategy for development co-operation in support of the ocean or are in the process of developing one. Norway’s Oceans for Development programme, for example, lays out the precise objectives and modalities of co-operation on ocean issues (NORAD, 2020[33]). The Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency, AfD) describes its high-level ocean priorities in its “AfD and the Ocean” document (Agence Française de Développement, 2021[34]). Meanwhile, in countries like Portugal, the ocean is identified as a thematic focus in the overall development co-operation strategy (Republic of Portugal, 2023[35]).
Even when ocean-related support is guided by a provider’s overarching development co-operation strategy or thematic/sectoral frameworks, co-ordination across domains is lacking. Other cross-cutting (e.g. climate, biodiversity) and sectoral strategies (e.g. fisheries) are relevant for development co-operation for a sustainable ocean economy. A common understanding and co-ordination between the different teams carrying out these portfolios is important to ensure coherence across providers’ efforts to promote a sustainable ocean economy. Tools to facilitate this (e.g. a working internal definition of an ocean economy, an internal co-ordination mechanism) are not always available.
The growth of the ocean economy renders ocean governance more complex
A growing ocean economy is likely to lead to additional cross-sector conflicts, making ocean governance increasingly complex. The documented surge in both established and emerging ocean-based economic activities (OECD, 2025[36]) is increasing competition over the use of ocean spaces and resources. This can exacerbate conflicts between sectors (e.g. fisheries versus hydrocarbon or mineral extraction), across different scales of organisations (such as local, municipal, regional) and over time (current versus future uses) (Winther et al., 2020[37]; Klinger et al., 2018[38]). The rise in cross-sector conflicts increases the complexity of ocean governance.
The increased variety of ocean uses (and users) highlights the need to strengthen or develop adequate governance arrangements for a sustainable ocean economy. In the absence of fit-for-purpose policy and institutional settings, and where governance arrangements are fragmented, the growth of the global ocean economy could exacerbate these challenges. For example, offshore oil and gas operations can damage local fisherfolk’s equipment and force them to take detours to access their fishing grounds, increasing operating costs and causing a loss of fishing opportunities (Arbo and Thuy, 2016[23]). The transformation of fishing villages into tourism destinations can generate conflicts between local authorities, hampering the emergence of solid governance structures. This can intensify environmental vulnerabilities and the marginalisation of traditional groups, such as fishing communities, from access to resources (González Velarde, 2019[39]).
Finance is an enabler of the transition to a sustainable ocean economy and of sustainable development generally. The benefits of investing in a sustainable ocean economy are huge, spanning effective climate change mitigation to preventing climate breakdown; strengthened resilience to climate change through the natural coastal defence ecosystem services provided by marine and coastal ecosystems; the provision of sustainable livelihoods for coastal communities including for women and other marginalised populations; improved food security, a source of new scientific and medical breakthroughs; and a rich diverse habitat and source of cultural heritage and identity (Deloitte, 2023[40]).
There is a clear economic case for investing in a sustainable ocean economy. Investments across four key ocean actions (Table 1.3) could yield benefits at least five times greater than the costs (High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, 2020[41]). For marine conservation specifically, estimates suggest that for every USD 1 invested in rebuilding marine life, around USD 10 are generated in economic return (Duarte et al., 2020[42]). This is because investments in one area typically bring co-benefits across multiple other areas: for example, investment in mangrove restoration will help to tackle climate change through mangroves’ carbon sequestration function, help to improve ocean health and restore biodiversity by providing new or enhanced habitats for local wildlife, improve economic resilience through their coastal protection function, and support social inclusion through the provision of new or improved livelihoods opportunities, such as eco-tourism or fisheries. Research also shows that marine ecosystem-based management (EBM; see Box 3.1) is not only ecologically preferable, but also less costly than a business-as-usual scenario (Link and Haugen, 2025[43]).4
Source: Adapted from High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy (2020[41]), A Sustainable Ocean Economy for 2050: Approximating Its benefits and costs, https://oceanpanel.org/publication/a-sustainable-ocean-economy-for-2050-approximating-its-benefits-and-costs/.
Existing estimates, although incomplete, suggest large unmet financing needs for a sustainable ocean economy. For example, SDG 14 (Life below water) is the least funded of the 17 SDGs (Bosmans and de Mariz, 2023[44]). Estimates of the overall size of the ocean financing gap are lacking, partly due to the lack of systematic tracking of domestic public expenditures allocated to a sustainable ocean economy. But one estimate puts the annual financing needs for achieving the SDG14 targets by 2030 at about USD 175 billion (Vestvik, 2020[45]). Only about USD 25 billion is currently invested annually, leaving an annual financing gap of about USD 150 billion (Vestvik, 2020[45]). There is, however, a strong possibility that this figure is a significant underestimate, since many areas of the ocean (e.g. the deep sea) may be in a considerably more degraded state than can be monitored accurately (Deloitte, 2023[40]).
For developing countries, challenges in deploying sufficient funds for the sustainable ocean economy mirror their constraints in mobilising adequate resources for other development priorities. These include macroeconomic challenges, project-level barriers affecting sustainable ocean economy activities, and limited ODA. Each is discussed in more detail below, and the recommendations outlined in Chapter 4 focus on how development co-operation can help overcome these challenges.
Project-level barriers hinder the flow of different types of capital
Different types of capital are suitable for different ocean-related activities (Figure 1.3). Many sustainable ocean economy interventions are unlikely to generate a positive return on investment, and so will not be suitable for private profit-seeking investment. These interventions typically include ocean-related policy support, capacity development, education, research and knowledge creation. In these cases, investments need to be financed through public and/or philanthropic sources of capital. Other sustainable ocean economy investments can generate a positive but below market return or are considered high risk for various reasons. These include investments in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in the sustainable ocean economy, and new ocean technologies or nature-based solutions (NbS) (see section 2.1 for more details).5 These investments can be made attractive to the private sector, but some form of public or philanthropic co-financing or blended finance is often needed, or some form of high-risk, high-reward capital. Finally, some sustainable ocean economy investments can generate competitive market returns and are more likely to be able to attract private finance. Typically, these include investments in established industries and sectors, such as large-scale fisheries, aquaculture, seafood processing, coastal and marine tourism, and international shipping.
The flow of the different types of capital can be hindered by a range of barriers. Often, a variety of financial and non-financial factors will interact to deter the flow of adequate ocean capital from both the private sector and development co-operation providers, as outlined in Table 1.4.
|
Financial barriers |
Non-financial barriers |
|---|---|
|
High project development costs. To become investment-ready, many projects will require grant support, often over several years, especially in their early stages. Reimbursable grants and concessional loans can also play a role in supporting projects. This financing, however, is insufficient relative to the needs, may only be available over short-term cycles and is often highly competitive. This results in a weak investible project pipeline. |
Lack of knowledge/information. Both local communities and finance providers often lack knowledge about investment opportunities linked to a sustainable ocean economy, as well as about the ocean’s economic, social and environmental value, which means they are unaware of the value their investments could have. |
|
Small project scale. Small projects imply higher due diligence costs for investors, and as a result, many have a minimum investment ticket size. This can be especially challenging for smaller countries such as small island developing states due to the small size of their economy. |
Lack of implementation capacity and/or weak local support. Local communities and other relevant stakeholders, like local governments, often lack the time and/or skills to implement projects linked to a sustainable ocean economy. Political power dynamics and cultural acceptability of proposed sustainable ocean economy interventions can also influence investment decisions. If the benefits of sustainable ocean economy projects are not captured equitably, they may meet local resistance and development co-operation providers and investors may also be unwilling to engage. |
|
Uncertain or unproven revenue streams. Many nature-based solutions (NbS) do not have a clear revenue profile or have an uncertain revenue profile due to a lack of performance data. Many SMEs in the ocean space may not be considered creditworthy. Where project revenues are mostly – or all – in domestic currency, external investment in hard currency may not be suitable. |
Enabling environment. Effective, coherent and stable regulatory and policy environments to attract investment and funding are lacking. Policies and regulations that strengthen the sustainable management of marine and coastal natural capital, establish the rights and responsibilities of coastal communities, and facilitate and incentivise sustainable forms of ocean enterprise are insufficient for attracting the quantity and quality of investment needed for the ocean economy. |
|
Long-term nature of investments and financial returns. It can take decades for some ocean health efforts and NbS to mature and deliver investment returns. However, many investors seek returns over a much shorter time horizon. There is a lack of adequate patient capital. |
Lack of information, data and/or scientific evidence. Data are required to establish a baseline against which to measure economic, social and environmental impact, but this is often not available or are of poor quality. In the absence of universally adopted definitions, standards or taxonomy as to what counts as a sustainable ocean investment, expensive bespoke impact measurement frameworks often need to be developed. Risks of “greenwashing” (or “bluewashing”) can pose a reputational risk to investors and deter investment. |
High actual or perceived risk: Financing is either unavailable or unaffordable |
|
Macroeconomic challenges constrain public finance
Many developing countries have extremely limited fiscal space to be able to scale up investments in a sustainable ocean economy. At the macroeconomic level this can be due to high public debt; pressures on domestic budgets due to recent overlapping shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic, extreme weather events, high inflation, and in some cases conflict and instability; and limited availability, affordability, and accessibility of external sources of finance. These all hinder developing countries’ ability to take full advantage of the ocean’s potential. High public debt is a particular challenge in many SIDS and low-income countries, particularly in Africa. In 2023, SIDS and low-income countries spent on average 36.5% and 57.7% respectively of their budget revenues on debt service (Development Finance International, 2023[46]; ODI Global, 2024[47]). At the subnational level, the lack of financial resources is identified as the main bottleneck for a sustainable ocean economy, with 83% of surveyed cities and regions deeming it a significant obstacle (OECD, 2024[2]).
Many developing countries also do not systematically track how much they spend on a sustainable ocean economy, at either the national or sub-national levels. Many have also not set explicit policies or targets for how much they want to spend and what outcomes they would like to achieve. This represents a barrier to mobilising public finance for the sustainable ocean economy. More broadly, in both developing and developed countries, the lack of socio-economic data on the ocean economy (e.g. on gross value added and employment) is a significant barrier to making the business case for, and generating further investment in, ocean-related sectors. For example, insufficient data collection and information sharing rank as the third-highest challenge for cities and regions on ocean economy policy, with 68% of surveyed cities and regions deeming it a significant obstacle (OECD, 2024[2]).
Limited ODA for the ocean economy exacerbates financing shortfalls
Concessional development finance is a vital source of funding for the sustainable ocean economy, especially in the poorest and most vulnerable countries, including SIDS, archipelagic countries, African coastal nations and some least developed countries (LDCs) where domestic sources of finance are more constrained and there is less private investment.
Despite its importance, ODA funding for the sustainable ocean economy remains extremely limited. In 2022, just under 1% of total ODA was committed to supporting sustainable ocean economies, equivalent to about USD 2.4 billion (Figure 1.4)6. In addition, it remains heavily concentrated in a few sectors, particularly maritime transport and fisheries (OECD, 2024[48]). Trends in the sectoral allocation of ocean-related ODA have not changed much over the last decade. The data also show that the vast majority of ODA is channelled via project-related interventions, while relatively little is delivered via sectoral budget support and technical assistance (OECD, 2024[49]). Development co-operation for the ocean also remains highly concentrated in just a handful of countries. Despite the extreme vulnerability of SIDS, and the importance of the ocean to their economies and societies, in 2022 they received just USD 309 million in sustainable ocean economy-related ODA and USD 102 million in other ocean economy-related ODA.
Note: See Figure 1.1 for more details on OECD’s measurement framework for development assistance for the ocean economy
Source: OECD (2024[49]), Data Platform on Development Finance for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean/.
Ocean-related ODA can also be highly unpredictable, fluctuating from one year to the next, due to the dominance of large projects in overall funding (OECD, 2020[4]). The proportion of ODA allocated specifically to sustainable ocean initiatives also varies considerably, further disrupting efforts to establish long-term strategies. Such volatility undermines the continuity and effectiveness of ocean-focused projects, as successful outcomes often depend on steady, multi-year support (Stuchtey, 2020[50]).
Chapter 4 focuses on how development co-operation can adequately and effectively finance a sustainable ocean economy. It presents recommendations for enhancing the use and delivery of ODA, for using ODA to mobilise other sources of capital, and for the role of development co-operation providers in facilitating the use of an increasing number of ocean finance instruments.
Capacity (see Box 1.2 for a definition) is central to the pursuit of a sustainable ocean economy, as it is for other sustainable development areas. The importance of capacity development is widely acknowledged and embedded in global ocean frameworks. For example, SDG 14.a targets marine research capacity development. Moreover, capacity development in the ocean is a core tenet of the BBNJ agreement and is crucial for its effective and equitable implementation (Harden-Davies et al., 2024[51]). The agreement also recognises capacity development as a fundamental contributor to the equitable conservation and sustainable use of marine resources.
Capacity, broadly defined, consists of three interacting levels:
Individual competencies, such as knowledge and skills to perform tasks effectively, efficiency and sustainability. For example, the knowledge and skills of port employees are crucial to handling and working with new zero-carbon fuels (e.g. hydrogen or ammonia) to power ships. Likewise, ocean literacy among policymakers can enable them to judge the impact of policy decisions on ocean issues.
Organisational structures, functions and systems, which bring individual capacities together to achieve an organisation’s objectives. One example is the International Maritime Organization’s Global Maritime Technology Cooperation Centre, which combines five regional centres to enhance the development of new and innovative marine technologies and to develop the necessary capacities.
Policy, legal, regulatory, economic and social support systems, which create an enabling environment to achieve set objectives. Examples are national quota policies for fishing within and around MPAs to ensure sustainable practices.
Source: OECD (2008[52]), The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice, OECD Journal on Development
Capacities influence the ability of countries to develop specific ocean economy sectors, including developing novel sectors. A lack of adequate skills can be a bottleneck for ocean-based economic development and diversification. Equipping people with the necessary knowledge and technical expertise to engage in ocean sectors helps create job opportunities, improve income levels and foster long-term economic resilience in coastal communities (Shackeroff Theisen, 2016[53]). Moreover, a government's capacity to establish the right enabling environment is crucial for unlocking commercial opportunities in ocean economic development. For example, setting up regional and national training centres and support hubs for learning and collaboration across various ocean economy sectors can lead to improved workforce skills, stronger partnerships, and the promotion of sustainable and innovative practices that drive economic growth.
Capacities determine who can participate in and benefit from the ocean economy, meaning that they are one key to promoting equity. The capacities (e.g. knowledge, skills, access to technology) of local communities, women and other marginalised groups are one important factor that dictates whether they are able to benefit from a growing ocean economy (Vierros et al., 2020[54]). For example, in the fisheries sector, women’s participation is heavily skewed towards certain parts of the value chain – e.g. fish processing, cleaning, and selling – and in many cases, this work is informal and unpaid (i.e. domestic labour). Education and training programmes to help women to shift to more entrepreneurial or governance roles can be key for tackling the unequal distribution of opportunities in the sector and overcoming historical gender roles and socio-cultural barriers (IGC, 2023[55]). Similarly, a government’s capacity to collect and integrate disaggregated socioeconomic and sociocultural data can be crucial to ensure that policy processes are inclusive and the needs of all stakeholders, particularly those traditionally marginalised, are accounted for (Harden-Davies et al., 2022[56]).
Without adequate capacities, attempts to preserve ocean health, build climate resilience, and decarbonise ocean sectors risk falling short. For example, ocean observation capacities are vital for protecting ocean’s health (e.g. by monitoring risks of coral bleaching) and building climate resilience (e.g. monitoring the ocean’s ability to store CO2) (Ocean Find Your Blue, 2024[57]). Awareness and literacy, key aspects of capacity development, can also promote ocean protection and climate action. For example, in the coastal tourism sector, awareness of energy management protocols can encourage businesses and organisations to reduce their carbon footprint (World Tourism Organization, 2024[58]).
While many of the capacity bottlenecks impeding the sustainable ocean economy reflect generic constraints, the specificities of the ocean economy do introduce some intricacies. The scarcity of human resources, technology, and data is a common challenge across many policy domains. Labour shortages in the ocean economy, for example, often reflect broader labour market and migration dynamics that affect other economic activities and public sector functioning (OECD, 2023[30]). Similarly, gaps in ocean observation and research in SIDS and LDCs reflect broader limits to their scientific capacity (IOC-UNESCO, 2020[59]). However, the nascency of the sustainable ocean economy as a policy issue and its rapid evolution do introduce complications, shaping the specific capacity constraints and the challenges facing capacity development efforts, as detailed below. Chapter 5 presents recommendations on how development co-operation can develop the capacities required for a sustainable ocean economy.
The intricacies of the ocean economy exacerbate capacity constraints
The relatively recent dedicated focus on the sustainable ocean economy means that skills, institutions and systems at the global level are less mature. In developing countries, this intensifies structural capacity constraints.
A complete picture of the capacity needs for the sustainable ocean economy is difficult to obtain. Part of this is rooted in a policy landscape that is far less universally developed than in other policy areas. For instance, as detailed in Chapter 3, dedicated policy and institutional frameworks for the ocean economy are not yet commonplace, especially compared to other cross-sectoral issues (e.g., climate, biodiversity). This means that at the country level, it is difficult to discern precise capacity needs. More granularly, the skills required for ocean economy (or “blue”) jobs have been less rigorously studied than those needed for the low-carbon economy (or “green” jobs) (Vona et al., 2018[60]); (Tyros, Andrews and de Serres, 2023[61]).
Our knowledge of the ocean is also much more limited than in other areas. The common refrain that “we know more about deep space than deep sea” (McVeigh, 2023[62]) illustrates gaps in our knowledge about the ocean. Lack of knowledge about the deep sea has ramifications for emerging ocean economy sectors, whose sustainable development requires a clear assessment of environmental risks. While there has been an increase in attention to ocean science, biodiversity research has historically exhibited a bias towards terrestrial ecosystems (Hendriks, Duarte and Heip, 2006[63]). Similarly, the contribution of ocean-based industries to the global economy has only started to be quantified in the past decade (OECD, 2016[17]). The lack of knowledge at the global level of our oceans reinforces the capacity constraints in developing countries.
Finally, systems and processes (e.g. for financing) around the ocean economy are only at an early stage. The complex and fragmented climate finance landscape already stretches the ability of developing countries, particularly SIDS, to access the requisite resources. The newer and more ambiguous nature of ocean finance muddles this further, making essential activities such as preparing funding proposals even more challenging and capacity intensive. However, while the specific objectives of climate and ocean finance are different, both finance streams often come from the same resources – for example, financing an off-shore wind farm is both climate and ocean-related (United Nations ESCAP, 2019[64]).
The globally growing and changing ocean economy further complicates ocean-related capacity needs. Economic transformations (e.g. growth of emerging sectors) and policy-induced shifts (e.g. calls to protect 30% of marine biodiversity by 2030) trigger the need for new and reinforced capacities. The fact that these transformations are concurrent also makes assessing individual, institutional and systems-level capacity needs more convoluted. Many of these transformations are longer term (e.g. the target for net-zero emissions by 2050), meaning that future capacity needs to be factored into decision making today.7
These intricacies risk exacerbating recognised challenges in capacity development. In particular, the need to take strategic (rather than one-off) approaches to capacity development – focusing on long-run outcomes, strengthening co-ordination, and including local partners – becomes particularly pronounced in the ocean economy (Table 1.5).
The transboundary nature of the ocean means that coherence and co-ordination at the global level are required. As a provider of essential ecosystem services that benefit all of humanity, the ocean is often considered a global public good (Hernández-Blanco et al., 2024[68]). An example of this is the vital role that the integrity of marine and coastal ecosystems plays in regulating the climate (Hernández-Blanco et al., 2024[68]). Without international co-ordination to protect ocean ecosystems everywhere, delivering on goals like climate action will be difficult at a country level. In addition to pure public goods, the ocean also contains common pool resources (Box 1.3). Fisheries, for example, can be open access8 (Arthur, 2020[69]), which makes them susceptible to overexploitation and the “tragedy of the commons”. Since certain fish species are migratory, the consequences of overexploitation are not confined to national borders (West et al., 2009[70]).
The presence of Areas Beyond National Jurisdictions (ABNJ) reinforces the importance of global coordination and coherence. Areas beyond national jurisdictions account for 64% of the ocean’s surface and about 95% of its volume (GEF, 2024[71]). Yet, no nation-state is vested with jurisdiction for the ABNJ, nor does any single international body have a strong mandate or the effective means to manage it (Pretlove and Blasiak, 2018[72]).
Common pool resources: Consumption by one entity reduces the availability for others (rivalrous), but preventing access by other entities is difficult (non-excludable). Without good governance, this typically leads to the overexploitation of common pool resources.
Public goods: One entity’s use does not reduce the availability for others (non-rivalrous), and no one can be excluded from the benefits of the good/resource (non-excludable). This typically leads to free-riding (where entities benefit from a good without contributing to it) and under-provision.
Source: Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud (2006[73]), The Role of Rivalry, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27638515.
Global coherence and co-ordination are also vital for promoting equity at the international level. The uneven distribution across countries of ocean benefits (e.g. access to marine biotechnology) and exposure to harms (e.g. climate change-related impacts, marine pollution) is well documented (see Chapter 2). International co-ordination is key for addressing these inequalities and the resulting inequities, by making sure developing countries benefit from the ocean’s economic opportunities, are protected from threats to their marine and coastal ecosystems and have a feasible pathway for ocean-based climate action. As shown in Table 1.6, these principles are also enshrined in the targets of SDG14.
Source: UNGARES/70/1 (2015[74]), Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda.
In practice, coherence at the global level can be advanced through cross-border and global arrangements; but there are notable challenges. These arrangements, whether governance frameworks, financial mechanisms, or fora for dialogue, all constitute the “rules of the game” for how the ocean economy operates at the global level. As the paragraphs below illustrate, these “rules of the game” often face issues with effectiveness and implementation, are in their infancy, or do not sufficiently reflect the voice of developing countries. This makes global coherence elusive. How development co-operation providers can address this risk of incoherence is the focus of Chapter 6.
Many existing arrangements face challenges in promoting global coherence
Many frameworks for governing the global ocean economy are not holistic. International agreements largely focus on single-sector objectives — fisheries, pollution, nature protection or transportation — when it comes to governing human use and ocean management. Even the major international ocean governance bodies, such as the International Seabed Authority (ISA) or the various regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs), are not mandated to implement the comprehensive, holistic approach required to secure sustainable management of the ocean. Integration and co-ordination of ocean governance, and of development co-operation supporting this issue, is required to address these challenges (Winther et al., 2020[37]).
Existing arrangements also face issues with implementation. For instance, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a legal framework for ocean management and the distribution of rights, duties, and responsibilities across states However, it does not have a dedicated secretariat that monitors its implementation, unlike the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity. Instead, it consists of three institutions (the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and the International Seabed Authority), whose purview is limited to certain parts of the convention. Implementation of other parts of the convention has been delegated to states or specific regional/global agencies, leading to implementation challenges (Figueres, Manuel and Miliband, 2014[75]).
The landscape of global ocean finance is not entirely coherent. As alluded to earlier, a sustainable ocean economy covers a multitude of sectors (e.g. from shipping to fisheries) and thematic areas (e.g. biodiversity). As such, there is a plethora of actors that finance different elements of a sustainable ocean economy (Table 4.3). The lack of a common understanding of a sustainable ocean economy, means that there is a risk of diverging objectives, requirements, and standards across these actors. Simultaneously, the growing interest in financing the ocean, especially as a global public good, means that new funds, programmes and mechanisms are being considered. While this is promising, care needs to be taken to avoid exacerbating fragmentation and incoherence, which already affect an overstretched global development finance architecture (OECD, 2024[76]).
The difficulty of diverting financing away from activities harmful to a sustainable ocean economy is another shortfall of existing global arrangements. The success of the transition to a sustainable ocean economy relies not only on mobilising support for sustainable ocean-based activities, but also on providing frameworks to channel finance away from unsustainable ones. For example, the role of fisheries subsidies in promoting unsustainable practices is well documented (OECD, 2022[77]). Yet, OECD estimates suggest that between 2020 and 2022, countries and territories representing 69% of capture fisheries production globally spent USD 10.7 billion annually of public money supporting their fisheries and that 65% of this support carries a risk of encouraging unsustainable fishing in the absence of effective management (OECD, 2025[78]).
New global arrangements designed to promote coherence are yet to be implemented
In recognition of the challenges with the current arrangements, new, more holistic frameworks to govern the ocean economy have emerged. The most recent example of this is the Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement (also known as the High Seas Treaty), adopted in 2023. The agreement includes provisions for marine protected areas in the high seas; a mechanism for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from marine genetic resources; capacity building and the transfer of marine technology between the parties; and clear rules to conduct environmental impact assessments, with the right checks and balances, before running activities in the high seas (UN, 2023[25]).
The Agreement also includes provisions for financing, representing an important step forward in recognising the ocean as a global public good. Various proposals have been put forward to generate direct revenue streams for ongoing BBNJ management. These include access fees (similar to those implemented in some MPAs); user fees (e.g. for companies that use BBNJ data infrastructure to support their business operations); royalties on revenues from conservation and restoration activities (such as blue carbon or biodiversity credits); and taxation of activities that take place in ABNJs, such as fisheries and other ocean-based industries. One estimate suggests that a 0.1% global tax on the revenues of major companies in key ocean industries – such as fisheries, cruise tourism, container shipping, and offshore oil and gas – could yield USD 1.1 billion annually for ocean public goods (Virdin et al., 2021[79]).
However, the Agreement has not yet come into force. Its implementation depends on ratification, approval, acceptance or accession by at least 60 countries, the timeline for which is far from certain. Past experience shows that it can take years for multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) to come into force (Figure 1.5). If timelines follow those of previous ocean-related MEAs, then the BBNJ Agreement wouldn’t come into force before 2031 (Blasiak and Jouffray, 2024[80]).
Source: Blasiak and Jouffray (2024[80]), When will the BBNJ Agreement deliver results?, https://doi.org/10.1038/s44183-024-00058-6.
Other tools to promote coherence across the global ocean economy are also emerging, but face barriers to operationalisation. For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted a long-awaited agreement on fisheries subsidies in 2022, which aims to tackle one of the key drivers of overfishing by curtailing harmful subsidies (WTO, 2022[81]). However, while 91 WTO members have formally accepted the agreement, twenty more formal acceptances are needed for it to come into effect. Similarly, while global mechanisms for financing a sustainable ocean economy – such as global solidarity levies (Global Solidarity Levies Task Force, 2024[82]), a Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) scheme for the ocean akin to that for forests, and a fund for responding to loss and damage (FLRD) (UNFCCC, n.d.[83]) – represent notable steps forward, operationalising them requires addressing notable obstacles. For instance, although an institutional structure is in place for the FRLD and financial pledges have been secured, there are several open questions, including whether the pledges will translate into actual financing, whether the criteria for fund allocation will lead to effective targeting, and whether the fund’s administrative processes will respond to the calls from developing countries for more seamless access to climate finance (Panwar, 2025[84]).
Developing countries are not adequately included in international ocean governance
Developing countries and local populations are insufficiently included in global decision-making processes. SIDS, through the voice of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), have played a critical role in international climate and ocean talks, drawing on international partnerships to advocate in favour of SDG 14 and to draw attention to their special vulnerabilities (AOSIS and UNDP, 2017[85]). However, participating in and influencing regional and international ocean-related agreements remains a challenge for many developing countries, leading to questions over representativeness and equity.
Representatives from coastal communities and groups are also often marginalised. These groups are frequently not, or not adequately, included in decision-making processes related to ocean development that will impact them (e.g. site selection of ports, energy and oil development, aquaculture) (Kerr et al., 2015[86]; Flannery, Healy and Luna, 2018[87]). Fisheries agreements have, for instance, been described as primarily commercial deals negotiated by governments behind closed doors, with little consideration of the benefits for local small-scale fisheries or their specific circumstances and needs (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002[88]; Le Manach et al., 2013[89]).
Poor inclusion not only undermines international equity – it also reduces the credibility and representativeness of global tools. True coherence requires including all stakeholders’ perspectives, including those from developing countries. Such inclusion can also strengthen the social license to operate (SLO) of global arrangements. SLO is generally defined as “the ongoing acceptance and approval of an operation by those local communities affected by it and those stakeholders who can affect its profitability” (Voyer and van Leeuwen, 2019[90]). SLO implies that inclusiveness at all stages of decision making is essential to legitimise policies and create buy-in.
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← 1. The OECD carried out a review of 78 definitions - 29 from international and regional organisations, 26 from large developing coastal countries (LDCCs) and 23 from small island developing states (SIDS) – of terminology used to describe the ocean’s economic, social, and environmental importance.
← 2. In theory, natural resources from the ocean are varied, ranging from minerals to marine life to water to energy sources. According to the OECD’s definition of a sustainable ocean economy, the use of these resources should integrate sustainability considerations (i.e. conservation and sustainable use). Henceforth, unless otherwise stated, references to the use of ocean resources/natural resources from the ocean assume this principle of sustainability.
← 3. This guidance adopts the terminology used by previous OECD work, namely “ocean economy” and “sustainable ocean economy”. The only exception is where titles/names of initiatives refer to a “blue economy”.
← 4. Link and Haugen (2025) find that three applications of EBM (multispecies fisheries assessment, mangrove preservation and restoration for coastal protection, and integrated environmental impact assessment for siting offshore renewable energy) are less costly than business-as-usual alternatives (single species stock assessments, building breakwalls to protect coastal developments, and single sector environmental impact assessment respectively). See https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106485.
← 5. In the case of SMEs, for example, fisheries and aquaculture are considered high-risk sectors due to factors such as high capital requirements at the start of a project, vulnerability to disease, and exposure to uncertain environmental conditions. Many SMEs will also lack collateral, while interest rates on borrowing from domestic financial institutions are typically high, which locks them out of formal financial services. When it comes to NbS such as mangrove restoration, projects can take significant lead times to develop, while there can be substantial uncertainty around future revenues from blue carbon due to measurement challenges or potential disruption to projects impacting their ability to sequester carbon.
← 6. Data on other official flows for the ocean economy are not available, meaning that the total of USD 2.4 billion does not represent total official development finance for the ocean economy.
← 7. In many ways, this echoes the call to develop skills for the future as a part of the just climate transition. See https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40ed_emp/%40emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_860617.pdf.
← 8. This is particularly true in developing countries due to the prevalence of small-scale fisheries. However, instances of true open access fisheries are rare. Most “open” access fisheries, while allowing anyone to fish, are typically subject to restrictions (e.g. on fishing methods, seasons, purposes). See https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103867.