While Chile has established sound practices for developing performance information, including clear templates, rules, and processes, the overall quality of this information could be further improved. At the same time, efforts are needed to enhance how performance information is presented and communicated, to strengthen its use in decision making and ensure better alignment with financial allocations. In this context, a set of short- and medium-term actions can be considered.
Programme and performance budgeting in Chile
4.1.1. In the short term, improve the quality of performance objectives and indicators
To ensure that performance information is effectively used in decision-making, it is essential to improve both its quality and presentation. Chile already has a well-established methodology and clearly defined templates for developing performance data, and significant efforts have been made, particularly since 2023, to enhance quality by reducing the number of objectives focused on internal management processes. However, further improvements are necessary.
While performance objectives and indicators are becoming increasingly ambitious and aligned with strategic outcomes, the overall quality and coherence of the information can still be strengthened. Notably, strategic objectives defined by institutions are sometimes overlapping or repetitive, and they are not always sufficiently results-oriented. In many cases, there is a disconnect between high-level strategic goals and the indicators used to measure progress, which are often focused on processes or outputs rather than meaningful outcomes.
A promising solution involves reducing the number of strategic objectives to avoid redundancy and developing SMART objectives (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Robust, and Time-bound). These SMART objectives should act as intermediate steps that clearly link strategic goals to relevant, actionable indicators.
To implement this improvement, updates are needed to both the Formulario H template, which is used to report performance indicators, and the methodological guidance provided by DIPRES.
Table 2 presents a proposed revision of Formulario H to better reflect these improvements.
4.1.2. In the short-term, strengthen quality assurance of performance information
While DIPRES currently conducts quality checks on the performance information submitted by institutions, its ability to carry out a robust quality assurance function is limited by capacity constraints. Strengthening DIPRES’s institutional capacity is therefore essential to improve the monitoring and promotion of performance information quality. With an expanded and better-resourced team, DIPRES would be able to:
Deliver capacity-building workshops for institutional staff.
Hold regular follow-up meetings with institutions to provide feedback and support the continuous improvement of performance reporting.
Invest in advanced data collection and analysis tools, improving the consistency, reliability, and usability of the information provided.
4.1.3. In the short to medium term, develop a consolidated document that presents both financial and non-financial performance information
To ensure that performance information is both useful and used, it must be presented alongside budgetary data. Currently, such integration is largely absent in Chile, limiting the practical use of performance information during budget formulation and, even more significantly, during parliamentary discussions.
To address this, DIPRES could develop a standardised template that presents each institution’s budget allocations together with a summary of key performance information. This template should be:
Used by DIPRES budget teams to support internal discussions during budget preparation.
Be updated and submitted to Congress to inform parliamentary review and oversight.
Follow the example of international good practices (see, for instance, the Irish model for presenting integrated financial and performance data).
A useful starting point may be the recently developed “Variación de las asignaciones presupuestarias en 2024”, which presents line ministry budgets in a more concise and accessible format, including year-over-year changes. Incorporating performance information into this document would offer a practical and scalable way to integrate financial and non-financial data in a single, coherent format. However, two key challenges must be addressed:
The current document presents data at the line ministry level, whereas performance information is often developed at the agency level.
The presentation of financial information varies across institutions and is not currently guided by a standardised methodology.
To improve usability and comparability, a common methodology should be established, and the presentation of information should be aligned at the agency level, allowing for clearer linkages between spending and results.
Note: The table has been adjusted for readability purposes. The full document, which includes relevant summary tables for each programme, can be accessed at: https://assets.gov.ie/207416/1ebb916d-9839-458f-a4df-9fa77be9b7de.pdf.
4.1.4. In the medium term, enhance the visibility and usability of performance objectives and indicators by creating a user-friendly digital platform
Finally, while all performance information in Chile is publicly available, further efforts are needed to improve its accessibility and user-friendliness. Currently, the information is dispersed across multiple documents and formats, limiting its visibility and practical use.
A key step forward would be the creation of a single, centralised digital portal where strategic objectives and performance indicators can be easily accessed, monitored, and compared. Such a platform would significantly enhance transparency, facilitate regular monitoring, and encourage greater use of performance data by both government actors and the public.
International experience offers promising models: for example, the performance dashboards developed in Canada and France present results in a clear, interactive, and intuitive format, allowing users to explore performance information by ministry, policy area, or programme (see Box 12). A similar initiative in Chile could serve as a powerful tool for improving accountability, communication, and data-driven decision-making.
Government of Canada InfoBase (accessible here) allows visualising performance and budgeting information. The results are presented visually allowing to identify the share of targets met or not met. The interactive dashboard allows building tables with relevant information and download it in csv format.
Source: (Government of Canada, 2024[5])
France displays performance information on a dedicated website (accessible here). Users can filter information by mission and see the snapshot of the financial information and share of targets that have or have not been met.
Source: (Direction du budget, 2025[23])
Alongside the information generated through strategic planning, the monitoring and evaluation of public programmes provides valuable insights for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. However, the current influence of evaluations and monitoring on spending decisions remains limited.
4.2.1. In the short term, strengthen collaboration between line ministries and the budget office during budget negotiations to support more informed and co-ordinated decision-making
To maximise their impact, evaluation and monitoring results should be systematically presented and discussed during key decision-making moments within the budget cycle. This includes aligning the use of performance evidence with the timing and structure of budget formulation and negotiation processes.
Evaluation findings should be explicitly incorporated into budget negotiation meetings between line ministries and DIPRES. These discussions should involve both budget and evaluation teams, ensuring that insights from programme performance - such as effectiveness, efficiency, and outcomes - directly inform decisions on resource allocations. This practice would reinforce the role of evaluation in improving spending quality and policy effectiveness, and promote a more integrated, evidence-based budgeting approach.
4.2.2. In the short term, create more structured opportunities to present and discuss evaluation findings with Congress
While DIPRES prepares a comprehensive annual Evaluation Report, which is submitted to the Special Mixed Budget Committee, the uptake and discussion of evaluation findings in Congress remains limited. This represents a missed opportunity to leverage evaluation insights for more evidence-informed budgetary decisions.
To address this gap, DIPRES, in collaboration with other key evaluation stakeholders, could organise an annual public event dedicated to presenting and discussing the year’s evaluation findings. This initiative could follow the example of successful practices in other OECD countries, such as the Netherlands’ Accountability Day and France’s Evaluation Springs, which provide structured forums for dialogue between evaluators, policymakers, and legislators.
Such an event in Chile could serve as a focal point for engaging Congress, ministries, civil society, and the public, and should specifically highlight how evaluation findings inform budget allocations and fiscal decisions. This would not only enhance the visibility and influence of evaluations but also reinforce a culture of transparency and accountability in public finance.
4.2.3. In the medium term, consider restructuring budget and public programmes to enhance their visibility and traceability within the budget process
Currently, not all public programmes are easily identifiable within the budget, which makes it difficult to clearly link evaluation results to budget allocations. While some progress has been made, such as the introduction of Formulario E to help clarify this connection, a more systematic restructuring of budget programmes could be considered. Ideally, each public programme should be associated with a clearly defined budget line.
To enhance transparency and improve the visibility of the government’s programmatic offer, one possible solution would be to distinguish between a budget programme dedicated to administrative and support (operating) costs, and one or more separate budget programmes covering the programmatic expenditure.
4.2.4. In the medium term, conduct a mapping of public programmes to identify opportunities for consolidation, with the aim of reducing fragmentation and enhancing strategic alignment
In the Chilean context, the large number of public programmes contributes to significant fragmentation and inefficiencies in both policy delivery and evaluation efforts. This fragmentation can weaken the overall coherence and effectiveness of public interventions, while also complicating the ability to assess their collective impact.
Having too many small programmes can spread financial and staff resources too thin, requiring time and effort to monitor and evaluate each one, often without producing useful insights or clear evidence about what works.
To address this, a strategic review should be undertaken to map and identify programmes with overlapping objectives, with the aim of:
Integrating or co-ordinating similar initiatives, and
Merging smaller programmes into larger, more coherent structures.
Such consolidation would not only improve the efficiency of public spending, but also enhance the quality, scope, and strategic relevance of evaluations, making it easier to assess outcomes and support evidence-informed decision-making.
The structure and presentation of the budget play a critical role in supporting performance budgeting. When the budget is organised around clearly defined programmes with corresponding strategic objectives, it is easier to link performance information to budget allocations and to make more evidence-informed decisions on public spending. In Chile, although the budget is formally structured by programmes, these programmes often lack clearly articulated performance objectives. Instead, performance information is primarily developed at the level of public institutions (capítulos), which makes it difficult to establish direct connections between spending and results at the programme level. Moreover, the detailed and highly technical nature of the budget, including the extensive use of glosas, results in a document that is dense and challenging to interpret, particularly for non-expert users such as parliamentarians, journalists, and citizens. This complexity limits the accessibility of the budget and reduces its effectiveness as a tool for transparency and accountability.
4.3.1. In the short to medium term, DIPRES could support a collaborative effort with Congress to clarify and standardise the use of glosas, helping to make the budget document more accessible and streamlined
The number and role of glosas are a distinctive feature of Chile’s budget process. While both the executive and legislative branches acknowledge their value – for instance in providing important implementation details - they also recognise that glosas contribute to budgetary complexity and can create challenges for transparency and clarity.
To address these concerns, DIPRES and Congress could work together to clarify the appropriate use of glosas. This could include developing shared guidance on what types of content are suitable and exploring ways to reduce their number without diminishing oversight or accountability. One practical measure could be to establish a maximum number of glosas per programme or institution, helping to streamline the budget document.
A crucial element in strengthening Congress’s role in budget scrutiny is the provision of adequate analytical capacity. In its review of parliamentary oversight in Chile, the OECD recommended considering the replacement of the current Senate Parliamentary Budget Office with a stronger, non-partisan Joint Budget Office serving both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Such a body would enhance the independence and quality of budget analysis, supporting more informed and evidence-based parliamentary debate.
In accordance with Article 50 of the current Budget Law, an initial review will be led by DIPRES and discussed with the Special Joint Budget Committee, providing a foundation for reform.
4.3.2. In the medium to long term, DIPRES could further promote the dissemination and use of performance and results reports during budget discussions in Congress, helping to move from a predominantly technical focus to one that places greater emphasis on performance and results
To enhance the quality and focus of budget discussions, shift the emphasis from glosas toward strategic objectives, evaluation findings, and performance results. This would promote a more outcomes-oriented and evidence-informed dialogue in Congress. The shift can be supported by presenting performance and financial information in a more integrated and accessible format, enabling clearer links between public spending and results.
In parallel, consider organising dedicated "Evaluation Days" in Congress, in collaboration with the National Evaluation and Productivity Commission (CNEP) and other key stakeholders. These events would provide a platform to present evaluation findings, encourage reflection on the effectiveness of public programmes, and support more informed and constructive budget discussions.
4.3.3. In the medium term, budget programmes should be progressively revised to reflect the strategic objectives established in the strategic planning process (Formulario A1), strengthening the link between planning and budgeting
A key step toward enhancing performance-informed budgeting is to restructure existing budget programmes so they align more closely with each institution’s strategic objectives and core missions. For example, if a public institution has two distinct missions, it should define two corresponding strategic objectives and organise its budget into two dedicated programmes, or three, if including a programme for transversal or cross-cutting functions. This approach does not require changes to expenditure classification or budgetary detail, but it would significantly clarify the link between strategic goals and resource allocations.
Given the effort involved, this restructuring should be undertaken after performance information has been improved, and once strategic objectives are well-formulated, results-oriented, and appropriately ambitious.
Initial steps to support this transition could include:
Mapping public services (Capítulos) where alignment between existing budget programmes and strategic objectives is already feasible or promising.
Piloting the new structure in two or three selected institutions, to test the approach, surface operational challenges, and identify best practices for broader implementation.
Developing clear guidelines for structuring budget programmes in newly created public institutions, ensuring their budgets are aligned with strategic objectives from the outset.