This chapter analyses Peru’s fisheries management policies and practices and how scientific data is integrated in policymaking. Peru assesses 30 fish stocks, the vast majority of which (97%) are above limits for biological sustainability and are at levels that allow for productivity to be maximised (73%), well above the OECD average (64% healthy stocks and 32% productive). Anchoveta—the country’s most important species—is managed through an advanced, adaptive system combining near real‑time ecological monitoring, dynamic closures, total allowable catch limits, and individual vessel quotas. Peru also has large and complicated small-scale and artisanal fisheries where it implements science-based management, with regular stock assessments underpinning total allowable catch limits to ensure the stocks remain at maximum sustainable yield. That said, challenges remain for the management of artisanal and small‑scale fisheries including informal vessel construction, limited monitoring, and broad artisanal fishing rights that can contribute to overcapacity and potential overexploitation in some fisheries.
Policies for the Future of Fisheries and Aquaculture in Peru
Abstract
Peru assesses 30 fish stocks, the vast majority of which (97%) are above limits for biological sustainability and are at levels that allow for productivity to be maximised (73%), which is well above the OECD average (64% healthy stocks and 32% productive). Further, the top five species by volume, together accounting for 91.5% of landings by volume, are all sustainable and at levels that allow for maximising productivity.
Of the 30 assessed stocks, nine are considered commercially important enough to be covered by fisheries management plans. Of the 21 stocks that are not covered by ROPs, seven are not meeting productivity targets.
The Peruvian anchoveta, the main species harvested by the Peruvian fleet (accounting for 77% of volume), is largely managed by a sophisticated and adaptive science-based system, which allows the authorities to respond rapidly to short-term variability in the stock biomass and, in extreme cases, suspend fishing entirely. Since 2009, the management of anchoveta also integrates a system of individual vessel quotas, which has increased the economic efficiency of the fishery.
Peru has large and complicated small-scale and artisanal fisheries. The artisanal sector exploits a broad range of commercially important species and, in some cases, such as the jumbo flying squid, these species are an important driver of exports.
Generally, Peru implements science-based management of its small-scale and artisanal sector, with regular stock assessments underpinning total allowable catch limits to ensure the stocks remain at maximum sustainable yield. However, artisanal fishing licences grant fishers the right to harvest all species within five nautical miles of the coast (except species covered by fisheries management regulations or otherwise protected), meaning many of these species are unmanaged, which could allow unmonitored overexploitation to occur in some cases.
The artisanal sector is characterised by a significant degree of informality (e.g. fishers operating without a valid right to fish) and overcapacity, driven by informal and illegal construction of fishing vessels. As these vessels are not registered in PRODUCE’s official records, they are not subject to same oversight as legitimate fishers, leading to unfair competition and reduced opportunity, which undermine the social and economic sustainability of the sector.
Recommendations
Expand investments in stock assessments and data collection for artisanal fisheries, in particular by extending efforts to species currently not covered by fisheries management plans and, where required, implement new management plans to close regulatory gaps and ensure these species are not overexploited.
Enhance the management of the artisanal sector by addressing overcapacity and informality through:
Continuing and enhancing the formalisation processes for informal fishers to ensure that all active artisanal fishers are registered with PRODUCE and have a right to fish. In particular, promoting the benefits of formalisation (e.g. access to government support, education and training, and improved on-vessel safety) can help incentivise fishers to formalise.
In parallel, expand efforts to address the illegal construction and alteration of fishing vessels in informal shipyards, in collaboration with the relevant ministries and law enforcement institutions.
Put in place measures to ensure that efforts to reduce overcapacity do not have negative socio‑economic impacts on affected fishers.
Peru is one of the largest and most important capture fisheries producers in the world (see Chapter 1) and as such has a complicated and well-developed fisheries management system. Broadly, there is a two-tier management system for fisheries in Peru: one for the management of the industrial fleet targeting anchoveta and one for the management of the small-scale and artisanal fleet, which mainly targets other species in near-shore areas. This division is understandable given the large differences between the nature of the anchoveta fisheries and all other fisheries in Peru. This chapter discusses this division, covering the management of anchoveta fisheries and that of other fisheries, after a discussion of the status of fish stocks in Peru.
3.1.1. Generally Peru’s fishing resources are healthy and productive
Peru assesses 30 fish stocks, the vast majority of which (97%) are above limits for biological sustainability and are at levels that allow for productivity to be maximised (73%) (Figure 3.1), well above the OECD average (64% healthy stocks and 32% productive). Further, the top five species by volume, which account for 91.5% of landings by volume, are all at levels that allow for maximising productivity.1 Therefore, the vast majority of production in Peru’s marine fisheries comes from healthy and productive stocks and, overall, Peruvian fisheries resources have a more favourable status than those assessed by OECD Members.
Of these 30 assessed stocks, nine are considered commercially important enough to be covered by an ROP (see below for more information) and have set management targets. All of these stocks are healthy and at levels that allow for maximising productivity (e.g. MSY). Of the 21 stocks that are not covered by an ROP, seven are not meeting productivity targets, and their biomass is below levels that would allow for harvesting at MSY.
3.1.2. Most stocks are fully exploited, limiting the scope for production growth
Fish stock assessments in Peru are usually conducted annually by IMARPE. These assessments determine the exploitation status of the stocks based on fishing activity (catch per unit of effort and total catch per fleet), biological performance indicators (biomass and spawning biomass) and environmental variability. Fisheries can be classified into six different categories – unexploited, underexploited, fully exploited and overexploited, in addition to in recovery and unregulated. The category defines the management strategy to be applied in broad terms. The majority (76%) of assessed fish stocks are classified as fully exploited (Table 3.1).
Note: BMSY: biomass at maximum sustainable yield; FMSY: fishing mortality at maximum sustainable yield.
When a stock is fully exploited, Peru mandates that no further expansion of effort is allowed. Consequently, any new capacity in the industrial and small-scale fishing fleets must replace existing capacity that is being retired. However, several of the fully exploited species are extensively harvested by the artisanal fleet, where there is weak control over capacity growth (see Chapter 3.3 for more details). Consequently, several of these species may be close to overexploitation and the artisanal fleet may be out of balance with fishing opportunities. This calls for stronger oversight and active policies to discourage vessel construction and modernisation. Crucially, the jumbo flying squid is both fully exploited and the most important fishery for the artisanal sector. Any overexploitation of this stock is likely to have significant negative consequences for artisanal fishers.
The anchoveta fishery is one of the largest single species fisheries in the world in terms of volume and is of critical importance to the sector in Peru. Anchoveta are a small (an average length of 12 cm) pelagic fish that are endemic to the Northern Humbolt Current ecosystem. They are fast growing, reaching sexual maturity after three years, and feed mainly on zooplankton. Their population is highly sensitive to environmental conditions that impact the availability of food and growing conditions. As such, their population is highly variable and strongly influenced by the ENSO. In strong ENSO years, production of the fishery can decrease by up to 30%. This sensitivity also means the fishery is particularly vulnerable to climate change.
There are two distinct stocks of anchoveta, which are managed separately. The north-central stock, which is responsible for the vast majority (~90%) of landings, and the southern stock, which is shared with Chile.2 The north-central stock is significantly larger, with a biomass 6-11 Mt. Biomass of the southern stock has fluctuated between 250 000 and 2 Mt in recent years. A large-scale industrial fishery has operated on the stocks of Peruvian anchoveta since the 1950s. Landings peaked at 13 Mt in 1971. However, the stock subsequently collapsed before recovering in the late 1990s.
Currently, the fishery operates in two distinct segments: the industrial fishery, which fishes between 5 nautical miles and 15 nautical miles offshore, and the artisanal fishery, which operates up to 5 nautical miles offshore. The artisanal fishery is permitted to harvest anchoveta for direct human consumption while the industrial fleet is only permitted to fish for indirect human consumption, meaning that the fish are used to produce fishmeal and fish oil.
3.2.1. Near real-time monitoring and dynamic spatial temporal closures are used to manage the most important anchoveta stock
The management of the north-central stock is based on two core principles: first, the biomass of the stock must remain over 5 Mt; second, the exploitation rate should remain below 0.35.3 In principle, the fishing season in the north-central region runs from April to June and November to January, with the closures occurring during the main spawning seasons. However, the sensitivity of the stock to both fishing pressure and environmental variables means an adaptive management system that responds to changes in stock abundance, location and other key characteristics as they occur is required to prevent overexploitation. For example, juvenile fish tend to be distributed closer to the coast than adults, but during warming events, the overlap in their distribution increases, raising the risks that juvenile fish are accidentally harvested (Bahri et al., 2021[1]).
To address this issue, Peru has implemented a near real-time monitoring system that is used to inform decisions around TAC sizes and the dynamic temporal and spatial closures of the fishing season. This system integrates data from several sources, including hydroacoustic surveys carried out by IMARPE, regular at-sea research surveys, remote sensing data and other data directly from the fishers. These data are then used to estimate the size, structure, reproductive fitness and productivity of the anchoveta population, which, in turn, informs decisions around the fishing season and TAC size. IMARPE also conducts an environmental scenario analysis to try and understand how the future conditions (favourable, neutral or unfavourable) will affect the model assumptions and pre-empt what management measures might be required in each case for the proceeding season.
Once the season is declared, two weeks of exploratory fishing are conducted before the official opening, which allows IMARPE to assess the accuracy of the model’s results on which the management decisions were based. During this exploratory phase, adjustments can be made to the fishing season and, in extreme circumstances, the season can be cancelled. A cancellation of the fishing season happened in June 2023 after a higher than expected proportion of juveniles was detected during the exploratory fishing phase. In addition to the regular monitoring, IMARPE also has the option to conduct special surveys if environmental conditions are anomalous and likely to be impacting the stock in unpredictable ways. Finally, data from on-board observers, landing sites and the vessel monitoring systems can be used to implement dynamic spatial closures if an excess of juvenile fish are detected in a specific area.
The systems developed to manage the north-central anchoveta stock are unusual for several reasons: first, a short time horizon is used for model projections (generally less than six months); second, the systems rely on the integration of near real-time observations into management decisions; third, environmental scenario analysis is used to understand the sensitivity of the decisions to the underlying conditions (Bahri et al., 2021[1]). These features allow for a dynamic and adaptive system that is well suited to managing this stock, which has been referred to as a dynamic ocean management approach (Maxwell et al., 2015[2]). Furthermore, this kind of management system is deemed to function well under climate change as it allows for long-term adaptation and short-term responsiveness to extreme climate events.
Managing the north-central anchoveta stock in this way is, however, resource-intensive and viable only because of the size and commercial importance of the stocks. Implementing this kind of management is likely not possible for other stocks of lower commercial importance and, indeed, the smaller southern stock is not managed in the same way. Instead, the southern stock is managed using a more traditional assessment and TAC-based approach, which is understandable given its significantly lower production and therefore importance to the sector.
3.2.2. Total allowable catch limits and individual vessel quotas constrain fishing to sustainable levels and increase the economic efficiency of the fishery
Stocks of the Peruvian anchoveta have been subject to TACs since the GFL (Government of Peru, 1992[3]) was passed in 1992. The law also included a cap of 200 000 m3 of vessel hold capacity and a requirement that no new capacity could enter the fleet without the retirement of existing capacity. The TACs are set based on stock assessments conducted by IMARPE. The biomass of anchoveta are highly sensitive to climatic conditions and consequently the TAC can vary considerably between years, and in particular in ENSO years (Figure 3.2). While IMARPE provides the scientific evidence for setting the TAC limit, the limit itself is set by PRODUCE, taking into account both the scientific evidence and the socio-economic context of the fishery. The process of setting the TACs generally functions effectively; however, in 2019 there was some controversy over how decisions were taken, which resulted in a review of the governance structures in IMARPE (see Chapter 2).
Note: *Data available up to May 2025
Source: Ministry of Production (PRODUCE).
Since 2009, the TAC has been further subdivided into individual vessel quotas (Decree No. 1084). Two equations are used for allocating initial quota shares to vessels: one covers the steel-hulled industrial fleet; the second covers the small-scale wooden-hulled, the so-called “Viking fleet”. The formula for the steel-hulled fleet allocates quota shares on the basis of historic landings and the hull capacity while the formula for the wooden-hulled fleet only takes into account historic landings (Tveteras, Paredes and Peña-Torres, 2011[4]). Allocations are made separately for the two fishing seasons in the north-central and southern stocks. Finally, three key parameters define how the quota can be used:
1. a vessel can lose its quota allocation if it does not fish the quota once every two years, or if it does not catch at least 20% of the quota for four consecutive years
2. carry-over of unused quota from one season to the next is not permitted
3. each quota share will be renewed every ten years.
Theoretically, individual transferable quotas allow for the efficient allocation of capacity and effort within the fishery and have been shown to lead to reduced emissions (Kristofersson, Gunnlaugsson and Valtysson, 2021[5]), fleet consolidation (Hoshino et al., 2020[6]; Merayo et al., 2018[7]), and increased environmental sustainability and profitability (Costello, Gaines and Lynham, 2008[8]). The individual vessel quotas used to manage the Peruvian anchoveta differ from individual transferable quotas because they only have limited transferability between vessels. The right to fish the quota is allocated to the vessel permanently and can only be transferred through the sale of the vessel. However, the annual quota allocation can be transferred between vessels with the same owner (Tveteras, Paredes and Peña-Torres, 2011[4]) or between vessels that are part of an “association”. There is also an option to rent the quota allocation to a vessel with a different owner for a maximum of three years.
Importantly, the steel hulled fleet is largely owned by vertically integrated companies that operate several vessels, which allows them to optimise their capacity usage within their fleets. Consequently, there has been fleet consolidation within the fisheries since the introduction of the individual vessel quotas. For example, the number of active vessels in the steel hulled fleet of the north-central fishery decreased by 40% (128 vessels) between 2009 and 2013, while the size of vessels increased (Kroetz et al., 2019[9]). The introduction of individual quotas has also allowed the optimisation of effort within the fishery, resulting in an increase in the number of active days and a lengthening of the anchoveta season occurring immediately after their introduction (Kroetz et al., 2019[9]; Tveteras, Paredes and Peña-Torres, 2011[4]).
The fleet consolidation has also been accompanied by a corresponding improvement in the economic conditions for anchovy fishers, with increases in profitability for fishers and downstream processes. For fishers, there have been significant increases in price per tonne, ranging from 37% to 200%, depending on the calculation methodology used (Natividad, 2015[10]; Kroetz et al., 2019[9]). For processors, the share of prime and super-prime fishmeal production increased by 7% and 5% respectively (at the expense of standard quality which decreased by 12%) (Kroetz et al., 2019[9]). The reasons for these price increases are unclear, but they could be related to an increase in the quality of fish being landed, due to changing fishing practices (e.g. lower fishing intensity and better conditions in transport and storage), an increase in the bargaining power of the quota holders during price negotiations with processors, and improved processing time due to the longer fishing season and more predicable supply of fish (Tveteras, Paredes and Peña-Torres, 2011[4]). However, the price of fishmeal is also sensitive to international markets, so at least some of the changes in fish price post-introduction of the individual vessel quotas was unrelated to Peruvian fisheries management policy.
Despite these positive developments, the fact that the quotas themselves are only partially transferable likely constrains the extent to which the system can optimise the fishery. Introducing more transferability into the systems may lead to greater gains in terms of economic efficiency, fleet capacity optimisation, GHG emissions reductions and environmental sustainability (for a review of impacts from the introduction of individual transferable quotas see Hoshino et al. (2020[6])). However, it is important for fisheries managers to balance the efficiency of management on the one hand with the socio-economic goals of the sector on the other. So, while more transferability could have positive impacts on some aspects of the fishery, whether or not it will help Peru to achieve its policy goals is less clear.
There are also some areas where more information would be beneficial to fisheries managers. For example, some of the broader socio-economic impacts of the system are unclear, including how the nature of employment has changed in both the fishing fleet and the processing industry. Improving the understanding of these broader socio-economic impacts and what they mean for coastal communities in general would benefit policymakers looking to improve the social and economic sustainability of the sector.
3.3.1. Peru implements science-based fisheries management for many of the main commercially exploited fish stocks
The management of the fisheries resources in Peru other than anchoveta aims to maintain stocks at levels that allow for production to be maximised within sustainability constraints, i.e. MSY. In general, fisheries are managed using a mix of input and output controls, which are set by PRODUCE though ROPs. There are currently 13 active ROPs:
Eight ROPs focus on individual commercial species: Tuna and tuna-like species, anchoveta for direct human consumption, jack mackerel, chub mackerel, Peruvian hake, punctuated snake eel, jumbo flying squid, mahi-mahi and deep-sea cod.
The remaining five ROPs are spatially designed and/or encompass multi-species fisheries: Peruvian Amazon fishes, Tumbes region, Lake Titicaca basin, macroalgae and benthic marine invertebrates.
The ROPs are used to define a broad number of management variables, including the biological reference points, TAC limits, details of spatial and temporal closures, and the maximum incidental catch (e.g. catch of juveniles). Moreover, they also define the ecosystem indicators for each fishery that underpin the precautionary approach to management adopted by Peru. These indicators generally include a maximum bycatch percentage tolerance for other commercial and non-commercial species in fisheries that use non-selective gear such as nets and longlines, and regulations on the capture of protected species such as turtles, seabirds and marine mammals (Box 3.1). If the percentage tolerance (incidental and bycatch) is exceeded, PRODUCE will apply regulatory measures, such as temporary or total fishery closures (Table 3.2).
The main instruments used to manage fishing effort in Peru are TACs or individual catch quotas (in the jack mackerel fishery). The TACs are established for the following fishing season by PRODUCE, considering IMARPE’s recommendation based on its annual stock assessment. The TACs can be further divided within each fishery by fleet segment (e.g. artisanal and small scale) and fishing gear. Accordingly, for each fishing season, PRODUCE publishes the allocation of TAC per fleet segment. For example, in 2024, in the jack mackerel fishery, the artisanal purse seine fleet was limited to 188 tonnes in 12 fishing trips per month, and the longline fleet was limited to 60 kg per daily fishing trip with a maximum of 30 per month (Supreme Decree No. 396-2024-PRODUCE). IMARPE monitors the fulfilment of the quota for each fishery segment and fishing seasons are closed once 90% of the quota has been caught.
Note: BMSY: biomass at maximum sustainable yield; TAC: total allowable catch under maximum sustainable yield; TL: total length.
Of the 29 stocks IMAPRE assesses regularly, 76% (22 stocks) are classified as fully exploited (see above for more details) and no fishing effort increase is permitted. In cases where the stock assessment indicates that the resource is healthy (~MSY), IMARPE recommends sustainable TAC limits (YMSY or FMSY)4 to PRODUCE. However, when the resource is below MSY (i.e. overexploited or in recovery), IMARPE’s recommendation is to establish a catch regime based on precautionary principles, where the TAC is defined based on more conservative fishing criteria, such as 2/3YMSY or F0.1.
Once the TACs are set, different modalities are used to ensure they are met in an efficient way. Notably, Peru has implemented co-management schemes for stocks of benthic invertebrates (Supreme Decree No. 018-2021-PROCUDE), which are exclusively exploited by artisanal fishers. Accordingly, community groups work with IMARPE and PRODUCE to create and implement management plans. Under this regime, communities that exploit this fishery are required to create an extraction plan for benthic resources, where they determine, among other things, the exploitation rates based on the limits established in the fishing law and regulations (i.e. BMSY). The extraction plans result in the creation of exclusive fishing reserve zones, which prevent artisanal fishers who are not part of the community group from harvesting benthic invertebrates. These zones function similarly to territorial use rights for fishing. However, they do not exclude other fisheries, such as commercial fish species.
The capture of non-target species, or bycatch, is a challenge for fisheries management globally as it can negatively impact marine ecosystems and have economic impacts on fishers (Pérez Roda et al., 2019[11]). In Peru, bycatch is regulated through the management regulations for each fishery (ROP), which indicate bycatch limits for each vessel (both domestic and foreign flagged). The limits for each vessel vary according to the fish stock and are stated in the fishing permits of the vessels. Bycatch limits are determined for each independent fish stock through the publication of the ROP of the said stock (enacted through a ministerial resolution). For example, the bycatch limit in anchoveta fisheries is limited to 5% of total discharge.
There is no overall assessment of bycatch in Peruvian fisheries. However, data on bycatch have been evaluated in the context of research on specific fishing techniques, specific geographic zones, specific stocks/fisheries or specific species. Notably, Alfaro-Shigueto et al. (2018[12]) studied marine turtle bycatch in the southeastern pacific, estimating total annual bycatch in Peru to be 5 828 turtles in 2018 with a mortality rate of 50.8%. Bouchon, Limache and Ulloa (2018[13]) estimated that bycatch of jumbo flying squid in anchoveta and jack and chub mackerel purse seine fisheries reached about 6 247 tonnes between 2000 and 2015, with higher bycatch being reported in the north-central region than in the southern region. Several studies have also examined bycatch in mahi-mahi, shark, langostino and tuna fisheries. Ayala and Sánchez-Scaglioni (2014[14]) measured bycatch in longline mahi-mahi and shark fisheries, finding that turtle bycatch was reported in 26% of cases (with a ratio of 0.21 turtles/1 000 hooks), with the green turtle (Chelonia mydas agassizii; 65.6%) and the loggerhead turtle (Caretta caretta; 21.9%) being the most frequently caught. A different study of bycatch in longline and driftnet fisheries estimated around 5 000 birds per year were impacted between 2005 and 2011 (Mangel, 2012[15]).
In anchoveta fisheries, studies have evaluated the impact of industrial purse seine fisheries. Regarding overall bycatch values, Torrejón Magallanes (2014[16]), estimated bycatch in industrial purse seine fisheries in the north-central Peruvian averaged 44 823 tonnes a year between 2005 and 2011. Saldarriaga Mendoza (2015[17]) estimated bycatch in the same fishery involved over 35 species (2003‑2011), including fish, mollusks and crustaceans, but mackerel presented the highest volume of bycatch during the period. A different study conducted between 2017 and 2021 found that bycatch in the northern industrial anchoveta fishery involved 21 different species, with the common sea lion (Otaria flavescens), the black shearwater (Ardenna grisea) and the guanay cormorant (Phalacrocorax bouganvilli) accounting for 95% of the captures (IFOP, 2022[18]).
Addressing bycatch
The problems of bycatch are not unique to Peru, with an estimated 11% of global catches on average annually being classified as bycatch between 2010 and 2014 (Pérez Roda et al., 2019[11]). Furthermore, globally, at least 20 million individual animals from endangered, threatened or protected species are estimated to interact with fishers every year (1 million seabirds, 8.5 million turtles, 225 000 sea snakes, 650 000 marine mammals and 10 million sharks) (Pérez Roda et al., 2019[11]). Interventions to address bycatch include temporal and spatial closure, bycatch utilisation, bycatch quotas and more selective fishing gear, many of which Peru already implements in a number of fisheries. Making temporal and spatial closures more dynamic and responsive to real-time data flows and ecological models (similar to the systems in place to manage anchoveta), can help address bycatch while reducing the impacts on fishers (Hazen et al., 2018[19]). But for fisheries that use non-specific gears – for example, gillnets which are still widespread in Peruvian artisanal fisheries – more innovative solutions such as acoustic or illuminating deterrent devices may be able to reduce the bycatch of threatened species such as turtles or cetaceans (Mangel et al., 2013[20]; Bielli et al., 2020[21]).
3.3.2. Regulatory gaps around artisanal fishing could undermine the management of some species
Peru implements science-based management for most of the main commercial fish species, with a focus on fin fish and the jumbo flying squid. This is an understandable prioritisation, given limited resources and the costs (human, financial and technical capital) involved in conducting regular stock assessments. However, while IMARPE regularly assesses 13 ROPs and 30 stocks (covering 28 species), 207 different species have been identified in marine landings and 127 in inland fisheries in recent years. This means that a substantial number of the species exploited (which together make a relatively modest contribution to landings) are not subject to science-based management measures nor fish stock status monitoring.
Importantly, artisanal fishing licences grant the artisanal fleet segment an exclusive right to fish all species within five nautical miles of the shore, with the exception of species covered by ROPs and those that are otherwise protected. This means, at least in theory, that some of these species could be overexploited and the fisheries management regimes are unable to respond. In reality, IMARPE and PRODUCE do collect data on the landings of all species from artisanal fisheries, and these data can be used for at least a basic understanding of the impact of fishing on the stocks, even in the absence of a more thorough assessment. However, the complexity and size of the artisanal sector combined with resource constraints pose challenges to the timely collection of data on all species. Finally, in some cases, this lack of regulation, combined with the weaknesses in the oversight of artisanal fleet capacity (see below) has resulted in an overcapitalisation of the fleet, with negative environmental and economic consequences that could also spill over into other fisheries.
3.3.3. Overcapacity and informality in the artisanal fleet is widespread due to limited enforcement and illegal shipyards
Peru has a large and complicated artisanal fishing sector. Balancing fleet capacity with fishing opportunities is one of the key challenges facing policymakers, especially given that the vast majority of Peru’s fishing resources are fully exploited (see above). In general, artisanal fishing effort management is based on controlling the issuing of fishing permits. Once a vessel is in possession of the required fisher carnets, an onboard preservation system and sanitary certificate (i.e. avoiding poor post-harvest handling practices), port authorities will also grant permission to set sail.
However, regulations have been ineffective at controlling fleet capacity increases and the artisanal fishing fleet in Peru has been growing for many decades, with much of this growth taking place outside government oversight (De la Puente et al., 2020[22]; Sueiro and De la Puente, 2015[23]; IMARPE, 2024[24]). In 2022, a structural survey on marine artisanal fisheries (ENEPA IV) estimated 23 138 artisanal fishing vessels were operating in Peru, almost 5 000 (27%) more vessels than are officially registered. Additionally, the survey found the fishing fleet had increased 29% since the previous survey in 2015, when there were an estimated 17 920 artisanal vessels. This was itself an increase of 130% since 2004 when total fleet was estimated to be 9 667 vessels. The survey also found a 112% increase in fleet capacity (measured as hold storage capacity)5 between 2015 and 2022 (IMARPE, 2024[24]). Importantly, many new vessels were built by illegal shipyards and were not registered in the National Registry of Fishing Vessels, despite PRODUCE’s many formalisation efforts. The off-the-books increase in fleet size can be linked to the proliferation of clandestine shipyards, which illegally build, modify or repurpose artisanal vessels.
In response, the construction of new small-scale vessels was banned in 2012 (Supreme Decree 005-2012 and Supreme Decree 006-2015).6 Since 2018, the prohibition on building new vessels has been coupled with new penalties, which empower government authorities to intervene and confiscate vessels built illegally in clandestine shipyards7 and prosecute the illegal building and modification of fishing vessels as a crime against natural resources.8 Equally, in 2018, new regulations9 were adopted empowering the state to seize assets and resources linked in any way or derived from illicit activities. These new regulations make an explicit reference to infractions in the area of fisheries, allowing government authorities to confiscate illegally fished resources and assets like fishing vessels.
In theory, these measures should have prevented the fleet from growing significantly; nevertheless, the fleet has continued to increase (SPDA, 2023[25]; IMARPE, 2024[24]). Weak MCS measures, in particular from regional governments, and a system of penalties and fines prone to legal loopholes have not acted as a real deterrent and the illegal production or enhancing of fishing vessels has continued (Mendo et al., 2023[26]).
The uncontrolled development of the artisanal fishing fleet has led to an overcapitalisation in some areas, leading to economic inefficiency and reduced profitability in the sector, potentially undermining the welfare of the fishers themselves (PRODUCE, 2024[27]). Furthermore, the existence of a significant informal fleet can undermine fisheries management and stock assessments as it means the actual fishing effort may be higher than observed. This not only places pressure on the resources but also undermines the assumptions that underpin stock assessment and science-based management. As these vessels are not registered in PRODUCE’s official records, they are not subject to the same oversight as legitimate fishers, leading to unfair competition and reduced opportunity, which undermine the social and economic sustainability of the sector.
There is limited information on the number and location of these clandestine shipyards, and official data of legal shipyards are from 2012. Co-ordinated efforts across all relevant institutions (including PRODUCE) are needed to update the national census of shipyards, which is the first step towards better understanding the situation and identifying potential avenues to tackle the problem. Finally, to ensure management systems remain effective, continued and strengthened formalisation efforts are needed to ensure all active fishers are registered with the relevant authorities.
3.3.4. Inland fisheries
The regulatory framework for inland fishing activities is contained in the GFL and the General Law for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, and is developed through the ROP for the Peruvian Amazon Basin and the ROP for Fishing and Aquaculture Activities in the Titicaca Basin. As is the case with marine fishing activities, competences for implementation and enforcement are shared between the national government (PRODUCE) and regional governments. The Amazon River ROP was adopted through Supreme Decree 015-2009 in April 2009 and creates a general framework for the sustainable use of aquatic resources and for fishing activities in the Peruvian Amazon Basin. The ROP defines input and output management measures, like fishing seasons, minimum sizes, and allowed and prohibited fishing gear and methods, among others. It also defines the framework for scientific research and data collection in the basin.
The ROP for the Titicaca Basin was adopted through Supreme Decree 023 of 2008. It is one of the main management instruments for inland fisheries and a comprehensive tool that seeks to balance the conservation of aquatic biodiversity, the regulation fisheries activities and the promotion of sustainable aquaculture in the lake area. The ROP mandates the implementation of co-operative actions with Bolivian authorities, given the shared nature of this basin, to promote the rational use of cross-border fishery resources and provide assistance to the communities. These ROPs were developed over 15 years ago and have not been revised or updated. is currently in the process of updating the Amazon ROP in consultation with indigenous communities along the basin.
The lack of scientific information on the status of the main inland fisheries is one of most significant barriers to their sustainable management (Duponchelle et al., 2021[28]; Paredes et al., 2024[29]). Estimates indicate that in some areas, overfishing has already impacted the level of catches and the variety of species harvested (e.g. reduced catches of long-lived species and increased catches of short-lived species) (FAO, 2023[30]; Heilpern et al., 2022[31]). This is coupled with weak MCS of inland fishing and a lack of co‑ordination with the authorities from neighbouring countries, in particular with Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, in the Amazon, notably for the management and scientific assessment for conservation of migratory species in the basin (Duponchelle et al., 2021[28]). This has resulted in higher fishing pressure and declining catches, affecting migratory species.
Peruvian inland fisheries face many additional challenges, including the impacts of deforestation, in particular in the Amazon region; the expansion of the agricultural frontier; and the effects of illegal mining. All these phenomena negatively impact migratory species, degrade the ecosystem and reduce water availability (FAO, 2023[30]), leading to a decline in total fish production from river basins. Additionally, in other regions, like the Lake Titicaca area, overfishing is compounded by severe issues such as the introduction of foreign species for aquaculture, like pejerey or rainbow trout, that have negative impacts on the local ecosystem (Sueiro and De la Puente, 2015[23]).
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← 1. Anchoveta, jumbo flying squid, Chilean jack mackerel, Pacific chub mackerel and Eastern Pacific bonito.
← 2. The north-central stock occurs between 2°S and 16°S while the southern stock is defined as fish south of 16°S.
← 3. The exploitation rate is the mortality due of exploitation expressed as a proportion of the mortality due to natural causes when the stock is unexploited (e.g. virgin biomass).
← 4. YMSY refers to the level of catch that corresponds to maximum sustainable yield; this differs from FMSY, which refers to all mortality in the stock and will include the impacts of natural processes such as predation.
← 5. In addition to the vessel length and gross tonnage, Peru also measures the total hold capacity of vessels. An artisanal vessel is defined to have up to 32.6 m3 of hold capacity, up to 15 metres in LOA and 6.48 in GT (Government of Peru, 2001[32]).
← 6. PRODUCE suspended the construction of new vessels whose hull capacity exceeded 10 m3 in 2006 (Supreme Decree 020‑2006; Supreme Decree 018‑2008; Supreme Decree 015-2010). The scope of this ban was expanded to include vessels between 5 m3 and 10 m3 in 2010 (Supreme Decree 018‑2010) and finally, the construction of all new small-scale vessels regardless of their size was prohibited in 2012 (Supreme Decree 005‑2012 and Supreme Decree 006‑2015). This prohibition was still in effect in 2025.
← 7. Legislative Decree N.1393 (2018).
← 8. Law 31622 of 2022 and Law 31982 of 2024.
← 9. Legislative Decree 1373.