The country is divided into nine provinces, home to several major cities, including Pretoria (administrative capital), Johannesburg, Cape Town (legislative capital) and Durban (Figure A B.1). About one quarter of the population lives in Gauteng and close to 20% in KwaZulu-Natal while Western Cape and Mpumalanga host 12% and 8% of the population respectively (Figure A B.2). South Africa is called the “rainbow nation18F1” because it reflects the country’s large cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity. About 81.7% of the population is black, 8.5% coloured, 7.2% white and 2.6% Indian or Asian. South Africa’s constitution recognises 12 official languages: Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Sepedi (Sesotho sa Leboa), Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga and, since 2023, South African Sign Language.
Overcoming Financial and Capacity Barriers to Empower Small‑Scale Enterprises in South Africa
Source: (South Africa Info, 2025[1]).
Source: (Statistics South Africa, 2025[2]).
South Africa’s economy has faced persistently weak growth over the past decade. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has stagnated and remains below that of other emerging economies (Figure A B.3). The economy was strongly affected by the COVID‑19 pandemic and has recovered only gradually to pre‑pandemic levels. GDP growth was initially projected at 1.3% in 2026 and 1.5% in 2027 (OECD, 2025[3]), but the outlook has since been downgraded, with growth now expected to reach just 1% in 2026 (IMF, 2026[4]). This reflects renewed geopolitical spillovers, including high oil prices and trade disruptions, particularly in critical minerals and bullion, amid rising trade tensions, escalating conflicts, heightened market volatility and shifting tariff dynamics weighing on global growth.
Note: In Panel A, real GDP is in national currency at 2015 constant prices. GDP: gross domestic product.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 117 database; and OECD National Accounts database. Extracted from (OECD, 2025[5]).
South Africa’s economy is underpinned by key sectors such as mining, manufacturing, energy, agriculture and financial services. Trade plays a crucial role by linking these sectors to global markets, supporting export revenues, industrial activity and overall economic growth. The country’s current account balance is projected to remain in deficit, at -1.6% of GDP in 2026 and -1.7% in 2027, increasing South Africa’s reliance on external financing and its exposure to shifts in global financial conditions (Nedbank, 2025[6]).
At the same time, general government gross debt is projected to rise from 79.8% of GDP in 2023 to 89.7% in 2027, putting pressure on fiscal space, increasing debt‑servicing costs and limiting the government’s capacity to respond to future economic shocks. Fiscal consolidation planned for 2026 and 2027 is expected to slow further increases in the debt ratio. Strengthening expenditure rules and broadening the currently narrow tax base would provide additional support to debt sustainability. While the inflation target has been lowered to 3%, inflation is projected to increase over 2026, in part due to higher food prices, before easing in 2027 (Global Cleantech Innovation Programme, 2026[7]).
South Africa’s regulatory framework remains highly restrictive (Figure A B.4). Easing regulatory barriers for businesses, ensuring a level-playing field and boosting the efficiency of state-owned enterprises would support job creation, investment and productivity, improve resource allocation and reduce risks to fiscal consolidation. The need to simplify administrative processes and reduce the regulatory burden was consistently highlighted across all stakeholder groups in the OECD survey (Annex D). This finding is aligned with OECD analysis of product market regulation, which suggests that South Africa faces high regulatory restrictiveness when compared with OECD countries (Figure A B.4).
Overall economy-wide Product Market Regulation indicator, 2023/2024
Source: (OECD, 2025[5]).
Under Operation Vulindlela, a joint initiative of the Presidency and National Treasury, the government has fast‑tracked a set of targeted, high‑impact reforms aimed at boosting economic growth and employment (Republic of South Africa, 2026[8]). The initial phase prioritised strengthening electricity supply, improving the efficiency and competitiveness of freight logistics, ensuring reliable and high‑quality water services, reducing costs while improving the quality of digital communications and reforming the visa system to better support skilled migration and tourism. The second phase places greater emphasis on strengthening local government, reducing spatial inequality and advancing digital transformation. These reforms create important opportunities to advance local development objectives in Mpumalanga and elsewhere.
South Africa’s electricity market has traditionally been characterised by a vertically integrated, state‑dominated model, with Eskom, the public electricity utility, playing a central role across the value chain. While significant reforms are under way, the system remains in transition. Key stakeholders include the following:
Eskom remains responsible for most electricity generation, as well as transmission and part of distribution. Its transmission and system operation functions are being separated, with full unbundling targeted by 2030, into an independent state‑owned entity to support market reform and increased competition.
The Department of Electricity and Energy (DEE) is responsible for energy policy and planning, including through the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) and leads ongoing electricity sector reforms (Department of Electricity and Energy, 2025[9]).
The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) oversees the sector by licensing market participants and approving tariffs, with the aim of balancing affordability, financial sustainability and security of supply.
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) play a growing role in electricity generation, particularly in renewables, supplying electricity under long‑term power purchase agreements as well as through private and wheeling arrangements.
Municipalities are key electricity distributors to end‑users and important revenue collectors, although many face significant operational and financial challenges.
Households and businesses increasingly participate as prosumers19F2 through small‑scale embedded generation (SSEG), mainly rooftop solar, generating electricity for own use and, in some cases, feeding surplus power into the grid.
South Africa is by far Africa’s largest coal producer20F3 and ranks among the world’s largest coal producers (Figure A B.5). Coal remains South Africa’s largest mining product by volume, with annual production reaching around 236 million tonnes in 2025 (Mineral Council of South Africa, 2025[10]). Coal production is projected to remain high at around 228 Mt in 2030 (IEA, 2025[11]). About a quarter of South Africa’s coal production is exported, mainly to India and other Asian markets, with export volumes projected to decline slightly from 69 Mt in 2024 to 66 Mt in 2030, mainly due to logistical reasons. South Africa has substantial coal reserves accounting for 9.9 billion tonnes in 2020, compared to 25.6 billion tonnes in Kazakhstan or 34.9 billion tonnes in Indonesia (Our World in Data, 2024[12]).
Measured in million tonnes of cubic meters
Source: (Global Firepower, 2026[13]).
Current estimates and projections indicate that South Africa’s coal consumption reached approximately 164 Mt in 2025 and will remain at a similar level through 2030 despite planned decommissioning, due to plant life extensions, the return of older units and repowering initiatives (IEA, 2025[11]). Eskom used about 108 million tonnes of coal for its power stations in 2024/25, while Sasol consumed a further 30-40 million tonnes. Together, they accounted for nearly two thirds of national coal output in 2025 and remained the main drivers of production (Mineral Council of South Africa, 2025[10]).
Like many coal producing countries in emerging economies, South Africa has not yet set a target for phasing out coal use in the power sector. Indonesia is a notable exception, having committed to phasing out coal fired power by around 2040, motivated by its efforts to expand renewable energy and support its 2050 net-zero target. In South Africa, Eskom operates 14 coal‑fired power stations, many of which were built between the 1960s and 1980s and are now reaching the end of their technical design life (ESKOM, 2026[14]). Eleven of these plants are located in Mpumalanga, accounting for around 70% of Eskom’s operating coal‑fired generation capacity (Bhorat, 2024[15]).
The significant deterioration in generation capacity at Eskom left the country unable to meet demand, triggering worsening shortages and scheduled power outages since 2019 (OECD, 2025[5]). Rotational load-shedding – South Africa’s system of scheduled power cuts used to balance insufficient generation capacity against electricity demand – became a routine part of daily life (IEA, 2024[16]). The situation was particularly severe between 2021 and 2023 but has gradually improved since April 2024. After a peak of 332 days of load-shedding in 2023, load-shedding has remained rare, with only 26 hours of load-shedding recorded during April and May 2025 (ESKOM, 2025[17]). As of early 2026, Eskom’s power system remains stable and continues to meet electricity demand, supported by sustained improvements in generation capacity and operational performance (Eskom, 2026[18]).21F4
Load-shedding, combined with sharply rising electricity prices, has driven a rapid increase in small-scale rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV). However, it also had a major negative economic impact on both households and businesses, especially small-scale enterprises that could not afford alternative backup systems to ensure a continuous power supply. This deepened existing inequalities, as those who could afford it switched to diesel generators or small-scale embedded renewable solutions, while others were left without electricity. The total direct negative impact on annual GDP growth was estimated at between 0.7% and 3.2% in 2022 (South African Reserve Bank, 2023[19]).
Small‑scale enterprises have been particularly vulnerable to the impacts of load-shedding (Figure A B.6). Although their overall electricity consumption is relatively low, energy disruptions still have an outsized effect on their operations. In the OECD survey (Annex D), 41% of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) reported income losses due to service interruptions, and 37% experienced reduced productivity and delays, highlighting the disproportionate impact of even minor outages on small operators. Energy security is therefore a foundational pillar for the sustainable development of MSMEs, as stable and reliable power supply remains essential for safeguarding their productivity, competitiveness and long‑term viability.
Survey results from 112 participating small-scale enterprises, mainly in Mpumalanga
Note: 112 responses were received, including 101 small-scale enterprises in Mpumalanga and 11 from the Western Cape.
Source: OECD (2026). Survey results.
Some initiatives have been launched to mitigate the impact of load-shedding on small businesses. For example, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) established the Township Energy Fund (Box 4.6) or the Nedbank-Indalo Energy Resilience Fund (Box 4.2) to assist MSMEs in energy‑constrained areas. The Funds provide grants for renewable energy installations aimed at reducing operational disruptions.
Providing reliable and affordable electricity for all remains an important policy priority for South Africa. Significant progress has been made over the past decades, raising the level of electrification from 58.1% of households in 1996 to 94.7% in 2025 (South Africa's Department for Mineral Resources & Energy, 2025[20]). In total, approximately 8.4 million households have been connected across South Africa. However, an estimated 1.6 million households remain without electricity, mainly in remote areas and townships. When informal and illegal connections are included, the effective backlog may be closer to 3 million households without a formal metered connection. Remaining gaps are concentrated in rural provinces with low population density, such as Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Eastern Cape, as well as in informal settlements in urban provinces such as Gauteng. Six provincial master electrification plans have been prepared and the remaining three are forthcoming (South Africa's Department for Mineral Resources & Energy, 2025[20]). In 2024-25, over 136 000 new connections were made,22F5 falling short of the 300 000 annual target needed to eliminate the backlog of unelectrified homes by 2030 (Chapter 6) (South Africa's Department for Mineral Resources & Energy, 2025[20]). South Africa’s Integrated National Electrification Programme (INEP) allocated around ZAR 3.9 billion (~USD 236 million) in 2025-26 to advance towards universal access to electricity. This represents a continued decline from allocations of ZAR 5.7 billion (~USD 345 million) in 2023-24 (South Africa's Department of Electricity and Energy, 2025[21]). Importantly, current public spending falls far short of the estimated ZAR 75 billion (USD 4.5 billion) required to eliminate the electrification backlog of 1.6 million households (South Africa's Department for Mineral Resources & Energy, 2025[20]) Mobilising private sector finance is therefore critical to closing the gap and ensuring the long‑term sustainability of electrification efforts. INEP could benefit from innovative financing models that attract development finance and private capital as discussed in Chapter 4.
Implementation challenges have further constrained progress in last-mile electrification. Eskom was unable to spend all allocated funds due to a combination of community unrest, material shortages, delays in environmental approvals, theft and local business participation disputes. Additional bottlenecks include lengthy procurement processes, weak co‑ordination with municipalities, capacity constraints and project management shortcomings (South Africa's Department for Mineral Resources & Energy, 2025[20]).
Closing the remaining electrification gaps is particularly challenging due to the high costs and technical difficulties of extending grid infrastructure to remote and sparsely populated areas. Extending transmission lines and substations to these regions significantly raises the cost per connection, often making conventional grid expansion economically unattractive. By contrast, countries such as Egypt and Morocco have achieved near‑universal electrification largely because of higher urbanisation rates, which reduce connection costs and facilitate integrated grid systems.
Against this background, South Africa is increasingly exploring off‑grid and decentralised solutions. To date, around 200 000 households, or about 2.4%, use non‑grid technologies. However, rollout has been constrained by limited budget allocations and has so far been confined to four provinces (Eastern Cape, KwaZulu‑Natal, Limpopo and Northern Cape) (GTAC, 2021[22]). The South African Renewable Energy Masterplan (SAREM), approved in March 2025, encourages decentralised solutions such as embedded generation and mini‑grids to extend electricity access to underserved communities (Government of South Africa, 2025[23]).
Energy security can be measured not only by the number of connections, but also by how equitably energy is shared and sustained (ISS Africa Futures, 2025[24]). Ensuring universal access therefore requires addressing electricity affordability for low‑income households while maintaining the financial sustainability of INEP.
Since 2003, South Africa applies a Free Basic Electricity Policy. Under the policy, the standard national allocation is 50 kWh per indigent household per month. Funding for this support comes from the National Treasury and is channelled through to municipalities, which implement the policy for eligible households (Project 90 by 2030, 2024[25]). Some municipalities apply tiered allocations to better target support. For example, in the City of Cape Town, free electricity allocations vary by consumption level, with higher support for low‑consumption households and no free units for high‑consumption users.23F6 These differentiated allocations aim to ensure that assistance reaches low‑income households most in need.
In 2007, South Africa also introduced a Free Basic Alternative Energy (FBAE) policy to support households without grid access by providing alternative energy sources such as paraffin, liquefied petroleum gas, gel fuel or renewable options. The policy targets rural and remote areas where grid extension is not feasible and is implemented by municipalities (Department for Mineral Resources & Energy, 2020[26]).
However, the outcomes of these policies have been mixed. While the policies clearly contributed to improving household welfare and encouraged cleaner cooking practices (Tatham, 2025[27]), many households remain energy poor. Institutional and administrative capacity constraints at the municipal level mean that many eligible households do not receive support, and the current allocation of 50 kWh per month is perceived as far below the 350 kWh threshold considered necessary for meaningful socio-economic benefits. Affordability remains a critical issue: over 40% of grid-connected households spend more than 20% of their income on electricity, highlighting the persistent financial burden on energy-poor households (Impact Amplifier, 2026[28]).
Employment growth has lacked behind the growth of the working-age population. While in absolute terms, South Africa has created 680 000 more jobs since 2019, the overall labour participation has fallen from 42.4% in the third quarter of 2019 to 40.7% in 2025 (TIPS, 2025[29]), one of the lowest rates globally (OECD, 2025[5]). This is because the population has been growing faster than new job opportunities. South Africa’s working age population has now reached 46 million (ILO, 2025[30]) and will continue to grow, underscoring the need to create even more jobs.
The informal sector is significant but low compared to many other emerging economies such as Indonesia or India (OECD, 2025[5]) (Figure A B.7). Addressing the challenges related to informality remains essential to improve social protection and open broader business opportunities.
Informal employment, 2020 (% of total employment; International Labour Organization; harmonised series)
Note: South Africa adjusted its definition of informality in 2025, resulting in a slight increase of the share of informal employment.24F7
Source: (World Bank, 2021[31]).
At the same time, not all informal businesses wish to formalise, often because they associate formalisation with higher administrative burdens, compliance costs or limited perceived benefits. Stakeholder consultations emphasised that unfair competition between formal and informal actors is perceived as a key barrier to formalisation. Overcoming this mindset requires reducing the practical and psychological barriers to formalisation and demonstrating clear value for informal operators through simpler procedures, tailored incentives and more visible support services. Further incentives are therefore needed to reduce barriers to formalisation and promote more sustainable business.
Small businesses in South Africa account for roughly 59% of the workforce in 2022, less than the OECD average of 69% in 2020 (OECD, 2025[5]). Around one‑third of small business employment is formal, while two‑thirds are informal. The share is even larger in Mpumalanga, where less than 50 000 small businesses are registered (TIPS, 2024[32]). However, a lack of reliable data on small businesses, due to the absence of official national statistics of MSMEs, remains a central challenge.
The formal small business landscape is dominated by commercial services and trade, while in the informal sector trade is the most significant activity, followed by community services and construction, which includes own‑account artisans such as plumbers and electricians. The median age of formal business owners is 47, around 10 years older than the average waged employee (TIPS, 2024[33]).
Although MSMEs tend to be small employers, they remain essential for diversifying and revitalising local economies. Indeed, the job creation potential of small‑scale enterprises is frequently cited as a key motivation for promoting MSME development. While this potential is real, it is often misunderstood. Many startups and micro‑enterprises operate with very limited capacity to employ, especially in their early stages, where survival and cash‑flow stability take precedence over expansion. In practice, this means that the average micro‑enterprise creates few – if any – jobs beyond the owner, and that job creation does not come from rapid scaling but from the aggregate effect of thousands of enterprises employing one or two people each. This is reflected in the large number of micro‑enterprises with own‑account workers operating without employees, illustrating that much of the employment contribution of the MSME sector emerges from its scale and density, rather than the growth of individual firms.
Tracking how the energy workforce evolves across technologies, skill levels and regions is vital for maintaining competitiveness, anticipating future labour requirements. At the global level, low‑carbon technologies for power generation and modernising electricity grids are exerting a particularly strong influence on workforce dynamics. More specifically, when considering power generation, low‑emissions technologies accounted for around 85% of all new jobs added between 2023 and 2024, with solar PV alone responsible for 40% of power sector job additions (IEA, 2025[34]). Electricity grids were the second‑largest driver of employment growth in the sector. This rapid increase in demand across both generation and grid activities is intensifying competition for skilled trades, particularly grid line workers and electricians, who are now among the most in-demand professionals in the renewable energy sector. These global trends are also visible in South Africa (Figure A B.8), particularly in the Western Cape, where, among others, demand for professionals to support the rollout of embedded solar PV has surged following extended periods of load-shedding over the past couple of years.
Gross jobs, thousands, based on the current project pipeline
Note: BESS: Battery Energy Storage System; NEV: New Energy Vehicles.
Source: (NBI, 2025[35]).
According to current estimates, South Africa has the potential to generate between 400 000 to 600 000 new jobs in the renewable energy sector and related value chains (NBI, 2025[35]). Of these, an estimated 120 000 to 200 000 jobs could materialise by 2030, driven by large‑scale investment in renewable energy, grid upgrades and new industrial value chains. Importantly, in line with global trends, approximately half of all jobs expected by 2030, are concentrated in the solar value chain (Figure 3.1). This illustrates both the scale of economic opportunity ahead and the urgency of preparing the workforce for emerging demand in renewable energy sectors.
However, opportunities vary greatly across provinces and within sectors. For instance, the job creation potential of solar rooftop is generally lower than that of utility‑scale renewable energy projects, reflecting the smaller scale and less intensive nature of rooftop installations (NBI, 2025[35]). Similarly, the largest job creation potential is expected in the three Cape provinces, given the excellent solar irradiation and wind resources (Figure A B.9).
Managing structural labour market changes is essential to provide stronger protection for low-skilled workers and to address the uneven impact of the transition across regions (OECD, 2025[36]). Recent OECD analysis has shown that many OECD countries deploy targeted, place‑based support for regions most affected by structural change (OECD, 2025[36]). Examples from Germany’s Rhenish mining region and Greece’s Western Macedonia show that engaging local stakeholders, linking funding to clear actions, leveraging regional strengths and supporting economic diversification are all crucial to ensure that no region is left behind. Moreover, OECD analysis highlighted that all national strategies place strong emphasis on upskilling, reskilling and lifelong learning, with vocational education and training systems being updated to embed green transition skills (OECD, 2025[36]). South Africa has chosen a similar approach by making Mpumalanga one of its six portfolios of its “Just Energy Transition Partnership” (JETP).
Renewable energy jobs, by province, 2026-2030
Source: (NBI, AfDB, 2025[37]).
A range of initiatives across South Africa has sought to deepen understanding of how energy security will affect employment and future skills needs. For instance, the JET Skills Atlas provides detailed projections of future skills demand across sectors, provinces, municipalities, value chain stages and occupational categories (Box 3.1). In addition, the National Business Initiative (NBI) conducted several mapping studies to improve the understanding of the small business ecosystem in the Gert Sibande and Nkangala Districts of Mpumalanga, highlighting both the disruptions and opportunities created by the region’s shift from coal to cleaner energy. Similarly, GreenCape conducted a market intelligence report for renewable energy in the Western Cape (GreenCape, 2025[38]). These analyses help better understand existing stakeholder networks, identify current skills gaps, economic prospects and support mechanisms needed for MSME growth in a transforming local economy (NBI, 2025[39]; AFD, 2024[40]).
As part of the “Just Energy Transition Skilling for Employment Programme” (JET SEP), led by the National Business Initiative with financial support from the African Development Bank, a JET‑Atlas was developed in 2025 to forecast future skills demand across renewable energy and other emerging green‑economy sectors. The Atlas supports the implementation of the national “Just Energy Transition (JET) Skills Portfolio” and the “JET Skilling Implementation Plan”.
Based on the existing project pipeline, it provides detailed estimates of job demand by sector, province, municipality, value chain stage, job family and occupation across different scenarios. Data can be downloaded and maps can be generated, allowing for a detailed and forward‑looking understanding of labour market needs.
The JET-ATLAS provides a shared platform to:
Capture aggregate employer demand in a structured, accessible and geo-tagged format.
Link skills demand to confirmed JET projects by occupation, location and timeline.
Surface priority occupations and municipalities for grant and programme planning.
Enable Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) colleges and Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) to anticipate demand and adjust intake planning proactively.
Support national JET priorities with data for implementation.
As a publicly accessible tool and dataset, the Atlas offers open access to forecasts and underlying analysis. It is an excellent planning resource that will require strong promotion and uptake at the local level to ensure its insights translate into practical workforce and economic development strategies.
Source: (NBI, AfDB, 2025[37]).
Although the projected impacts differ widely in scale, these studies collectively offer valuable insights into how the country’s labour market may evolve and what will be required to prepare workers for emerging opportunities. It is essential to disseminate this evidence-based information on future job opportunities and required skills widely to inform local development plans and skills training in response to future labour market needs and to guide forward planning in higher education systems.
To harness the full potential of emerging job opportunities in the energy sector, new skills will need to be developed, particularly in areas such as renewable energy technologies, electrical and mechanical maintenance, environmental management and digital competencies. Strengthening technical and vocational training (TVET), expanding industry‑aligned curricula, and improving access to reskilling programmes will be essential to ensure that workers and MSMEs can participate meaningfully in a rapidly evolving energy economy. At the same time, tertiary institutions have a critical role to play in anticipating future skills needs and training the next generation of engineers, technicians and professionals. This will require closer collaboration with industry, forward‑looking curriculum design and increased investment in relevant programmes, to ensure that the pipeline of skilled professionals aligns with the demands of the energy market.
Renewable energy job creation in Mpumalanga is expected to fall short of fully offsetting employment losses from the coal economy. For example, under the rapid transition scenario, the JET-Atlas projects that between 6 400 and 10 800 jobs will be created in the renewable energy sector in the province by 2050, one of the lowest share of all provinces (Figure A B.9). Most of these jobs are expected to be created in the downstream segments, especially operations and maintenance of utility‑scale solar installations, which provide more stable and long‑term employment opportunities compared with the short‑term, construction‑focused phase of renewable energy projects (Figure A B.10).
At the same time, structural labour market challenges may constrain the province’s ability to capture these opportunities. Mpumalanga has a high share of unemployed and low‑skilled workers, many of whom lack the technical and transferable skills required for emerging green sectors. This skills gap risks slowing the pace of transition and limiting local participation in new economic opportunities. Addressing this will require not only scaling up training and skills development programmes but also adopting a phased transition model that can attract skilled professionals from other regions in the short term, while building local capacity over time. Such an approach could support knowledge transfer, strengthen local institutions and ensure that the development of new industries is not constrained by immediate skills shortages. In parallel, local development strategies will need to align more closely with national transition efforts, supported by greater financial and technical resources to manage the scale of structural transformation ahead.
Despite relatively low projected job creation, reflecting its largely rural character and smaller population base, the province retains significant potential. As one of the six priority areas of the JETP, there is a clear opportunity to accelerate and unlock this potential by linking transition efforts with a broader industrial strategy and building on ongoing initiatives in the province.
This potential is further illustrated by more optimistic scenarios. The CoBenefits project under the International Climate Initiative (IKI) estimates that the province could create up to 79 000 renewable energy jobs by 2030, including 25 000 direct, 26 000 indirect and 28 000 induced jobs (IKI et al., 2022[41]). Approximately 80% of these opportunities would be in construction, while operations and maintenance roles would account for the remaining 20%. This suggests that, with the right enabling conditions, renewable energy expansion could become a significant driver of employment during the transition, even if job quality and duration vary across phases.
Annual job creation breakdown by direct and indirect employment, rapid transition scenario, 2026-35
Source: (NBI, AfDB, 2025[37]).
However, these opportunities may be constrained, as domestic solar manufacturing is not currently cost‑competitive and struggles to remain viable in the face of low‑cost imports from China, which continue to shape global pricing. While South Africa uses local content requirements in energy procurement to stimulate domestic industry, these measures alone are unlikely to offset job losses in the fossil fuel sector in Mpumalanga through renewable energy employment (IKI et al., 2022[41]).
In addition, stakeholder consultations revealed that there are important trade‑offs between maximising job creation and maintaining affordable and accessible electricity. Local manufacturing ambitions and strong localisation requirements can generate employment, but they may also raise production and procurement costs. At the same time, keeping electricity prices low is critical for households and energy‑intensive industries, particularly in the context of energy poverty and constrained economic growth. Balancing employment objectives, cost competitiveness and universal energy access will therefore require carefully calibrated policies that support local job creation without undermining affordability or delaying renewable energy deployment.
Geographic and structural factors also affect competitiveness. While Mpumalanga has renewable energy potential, resource quality is weaker than in top‑performing provinces, often requiring tariff premiums. In addition, land‑use complexity, mining legacies and slow permitting processes create delays, while financially constrained municipalities weaken project bankability. Historical grid and investment patterns have also favoured provinces with stronger wind and solar resources (GreenCape, 2023[42]). As a result, Mpumalanga has not been a priority area for renewables, not because it lacks potential, but because other provinces offer lower costs, faster deployment and fewer risks.
Unlocking its potential will require prioritising the province for utility‑scale solar and complementary sectors, such as battery storage and new energy vehicles, building on its infrastructure base. Overall, the planned coal phase out, mainly due to economic reasons, is expected to result in net job losses in the short to medium term province (IKI et al., 2022[41]; NBI, 2025[35]). The number of new jobs is projected to fall well below anticipated losses, estimated at between 48 500 direct jobs by 2030 and up to 120 000 jobs across the broader coal value chain, depending on the pace of decommissioning. Moreover, renewable energy jobs often lack the broader benefits historically associated with coal sector employment, including job security, collective bargaining, pension contributions and long‑term contracts (Tamasiga, 2025[43]). This underscores the need for a broader economic diversification strategy, including sectors such as agriculture and tourism, to complement renewable energy job creation.
Western Cape, alongside the Northern Cape and Eastern Cape, has significantly higher potential for job creation in the renewable energy sector because it offers some of the country’s strongest solar and wind resources and already attracts most utility‑scale renewable energy investments. The three Cape provinces benefit from exceptional solar irradiation and highly favourable wind conditions, which enable large renewable energy projects to be developed at scale. They also host more mature value chains for component supply, construction and operations and maintenance, supported by established procurement ecosystems. In addition, the Western Cape and Northern Cape are positioning themselves as emerging hubs for green hydrogen production due to abundant renewable resources, access to ports, and growing investor interest, which further increases long‑term job creation potential in related manufacturing, logistics and export activities. As a result, the Western Cape alone is projected to generate some between 111 000 and 173 000 renewable energy jobs by 2050, the highest number of all nine provinces. Most of the job creation will occur in the wind power sector, including many low-skilled jobs (Figure A B.11).
Annual job creation breakdown by direct and indirect employment, rapid transition scenario, 2026-35
Source: (NBI, AfDB, 2025[37]).
Country platforms of “Just Energy Transition Partnerships” face significant challenges related to implementation and transparency. In most countries, progress has been much slower than anticipated. While beneficiaries see large commitments on paper, these often still fail to translate into tangible outputs on the ground raising growing frustration among communities negatively affected by the transition. Moreover, the funding available falls far short of what is needed to achieve planned objectives (Table A B.1). Therefore, many countries have thought to develop a second generation of JETPs focusing more strongly on deliverable project pipelines as well as economy-wide, country-led priorities.
Note: By September 2025, about 39% of JETP funds have been allocated. Currency conversion may no longer be accurate. JETP: Just Energy Transition Partnership; JET: just energy transition.
In South Africa, available financial resources currently amount to only around 5% of the estimated USD 250 billion required over the next three decades to transform the energy system, as set out in the JET Framework (PCC, 2022[45]). At the same time, the share of funding explicitly allocated to social objectives remains limited. The JET Framework further estimates that at least USD 10 billion will be needed to support vulnerable communities and regions throughout the transition, including social protection, reskilling, economic diversification in coal-dependent areas and investments to strengthen community resilience (Government of South Africa, 2022[46]).
Electricity
The electricity portfolio prioritises expanding and upgrading transmission and distribution infrastructure to enable large scale integration of renewable energy, alongside interventions under the Accelerated Coal Transition Investment Plan that include repowering, repurposing, community development and the decommissioning of the Camden, Hendrina and Grootvlei power stations. The Independent Transmission Programme began in 2025. In addition, the Credit Guarantee Vehicle developed by the National Treasury and the World Bank Group is expected to begin derisking procurement under the Independent Transmission Programme in 2026.
Mpumalanga
This portfolio aims to support coal‑dependent communities in Mpumalanga through economic diversification, social protection, reskilling, community development and planning for the phased decommissioning of coal plants. As of 30 September 2025, total allocations amounted to USD 181 million across 55 projects, of which 19 had been completed.
New Energy Vehicles (NEVs)
This portfolio supports South Africa’s shift to electric mobility through enabling policies, industrial incentives, skills development and investment aimed at protecting and transforming the automotive value chain. Five of six projects are either under implementation or completed. Projects include Scatec’s Northern Cape three‑electric vehicle pilot, the Eskom–BYD cooperation on charging infrastructure and skills development, and The Green Cab’s women‑led e‑mobility service.
Green hydrogen
This priority focuses on developing South Africa’s emerging green hydrogen economy, including investment in production, storage and export infrastructure, and positioning the country as a competitive global supplier. Sixteen projects have been allocated in the Investment Register, including nine in implementation phase and three completed.
Skills
This portfolio develops the human capital required for the transition by supporting skills development, training programmes and workforce pathways aligned with new green sectors and technologies. It is rolling out demand‑driven training and job‑placement pathways, aligning Sector Education and Training Authority plans with JET priorities and establishing Skills Development Zones. Some 36 of 45 projects are either underway or completed. Work on establishing Skills Development Zones is progressing with provincial partners in Mpumalanga, the Eastern Cape and the Northern Cape.
Municipalities
This priority strengthens municipal capabilities to support the transition, including local energy planning, infrastructure upgrades and improved service delivery functions that underpin a resilient and inclusive transition. In 2025, 28 out of 31 projects are in implementation and completion phases.
Source: (JET PMU, 2026[47])
Small-scale business ecosystem in Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga’s economy remains deeply tied to coal and mining, with limited private sector activity, including MSMEs, operating outside these sectors. Less than 50 000 enterprises are formally registered in Mpumalanga
Source: Extracted from TIPS (2024[32]).
This context highlights the need for a strategic reorientation toward ecosystem building that can foster a pipeline of green start-ups and small businesses, while also mobilising private financing to achieve scale and deliver tangible results for economic diversification, growth and job creation. Achieving this shift also requires complementary investments in green skills development, business incubation and local innovation systems, ensuring that new opportunities can take root in a region historically shaped by coal‑based activity.
The province’s MSME ecosystem support is nascent, with emerging strengths and persistent weaknesses (Table A B.2). Most business support organisations, incubators and accelerators have only recently established a presence and are learning by doing – building trust with communities, adapting to local contexts and forming networks gradually. Development partners also play a significant role: some have longstanding experience in the province, while others are recent entrants navigating its complex institutional and political landscape. These actors contribute resources and expertise, but their efforts are often fragmented or short‑term. Although non‑governmental actors often contribute valuable resources and technical expertise, their interventions are typically project‑based and not sustained over time. Stakeholders consistently emphasised that sustained support mechanisms are more efficient than time‑bound, large‑scale projects that risk ending with limited long‑term impact. Strengthening stable, local and provincial institutions is therefore a key priority for ensuring long‑term MSME support and coherent transition planning.
Source: Compiled by the OECD Secretariat drawing on local consultations.
A stakeholder mapping study of Mpumalanga conducted by Indalo Inclusive (Annex C), a green enterprise incubator and local implementing partner of the OECD, indicates that the province’s MSME ecosystem operates more as a network of loosely connected institutions than as a coherent, co‑ordinated system. Power, resources and responsibilities are unevenly distributed, and outcomes for small enterprises are shaped not only by individual support programmes but also by broader local dynamics, including stakeholder roles, exposure to local developments and the strength of linkages among actors. While many institutions share common objectives, weak alignment across mandates, incentives and control over resources continues to constrain MSME outcomes. The analysis further shows that institutions with the greatest influence over finance, procurement, land and investment decisions are often the furthest removed from the day‑to‑day realities of small businesses, while actors closest to communities and implementation have limited capacity to shape these decisions. As a result, many MSMEs in Mpumalanga remain informal, undercapitalised and excluded from stable markets, despite being central to the objectives of a just and inclusive transition.
Provincial government action
To make headways in the environmentally friendly MSME space, the political leadership of the provincial government is paramount. The provincial government has begun taking active steps to build capacity for a more diversified local economy. The Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Land and Environmental Affairs (DARDLEA) has introduced transition‑related policy frameworks to support a shift to a low‑carbon economy, reflected in the province’s 2022 Climate Change Mitigation Strategy and implemented through the Local Government Climate Change Support Programme. These efforts have enabled DARDLEA, together with the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), to intensify training and awareness‑raising on resilience, rural sustainability and transition pathways. Moreover, all three district municipalities have developed response strategies to weather-related risks. However, based on survey results, only a limited number of municipalities have renewable energy strategies (Annex D).
Established in 2022, the Mpumalanga Green Cluster Agency (MGCA) is an emerging, provincially supported institution that stakeholders and development partners could further leverage to strengthen co‑ordination across the small-scale enterprise ecosystem. Its mandate is to support regional economic diversification and promote job creation in emerging value chains. Through a Memorandum of Understanding with the PCC, the Agency contributes to the implementation of the Mpumalanga portfolio of the “Just Energy Transition Implementation Programme 2023-2027” (JET IP) and supports wider co‑ordination efforts in the province. The Agency notably organises the annual Mpumalanga Green Innovation Challenge (Chapter 2), facilitates enterprise development dialogues and supports a range of other MSME support initiatives, including the Jobs First Project (MGCA, 2026[48]). As a relatively new institution, MGCA is still developing its operational capacity. For the Agency to fully realise its mandate and enhance its support for emerging environmentally friendly MSMEs, it will be essential to strengthen and sustain its resourcing and institutional support over the longer term. Incubator support could play a complementary role in further strengthening the MGCA, helping to reinforce existing institutional arrangements
The province is widely recognised as one of Africa’s leading innovative economy hubs, underpinned by a diversified economic base and a dense concentration of firms active in renewable energy, the circular economy, water, sustainable agriculture, green mobility and emerging green hydrogen value chains (WESGRO, 2025[49]). In 2025, the Western Cape had a population of 7.6 million people (Figure 1.2) and the third‑largest provincial economy, contributing about 14% of national GDP (GreenCape, 2023[50]).
The Western Cape also hosts a diverse and relatively dynamic MSME landscape. With more than 300 000 small‑scale enterprises operating in the province, informal firms account for a slight majority, while formally registered MSMEs represent close to half of all businesses, reflecting a higher degree of formalisation than in many other provinces. Formal small businesses represent about 18% of South Africa’s total, while informal enterprises represent roughly 10%, underlining the province’s significance within the national MSME ecosystem despite the continued persistence of informality (TIPS, 2024[51]).
The provincial economy is anchored in manufacturing, followed by agriculture and construction, with manufacturing activity particularly concentrated in food and beverages and metal products. While the number of formal small businesses declined sharply during the COVID‑19 shock in 2020 and has not returned to its pre-pandemic level, recent trends point to gradual stabilisation across both formal and informal segments (Figure A B.13). These characteristics position the Western Cape as a relatively resilient provincial economy, while ongoing challenges related to informality, access to finance and sustainable MSME growth remain aligned with broader national trends.
Source: Extracted from (TIPS, 2024[51]).
Provincial government action
Over the past two decades the province has developed a coherent set of strategies and institutions aimed at advancing a low‑carbon transition while supporting enterprise development. This includes the Sustainable Energy Strategy (2008) and the Green Economic Strategy Framework (2013), which continue to shape investment priorities, partnerships and regulatory reforms.
The provincial government has progressively strengthened institutional capacity, supported by dedicated “Green Economy Ecosystem Support” (GEES) programmes (water and energy) and the “Green Economy Energy Resilience”(GEER) project, which provides sector intelligence, business support and technical and regulatory expertise. Together with a well‑established ecosystem of agencies such as GreenCape, WESGRO and the Economic Development Partnership among others, these arrangements provide a relatively mature enabling environment for MSME participation in renewable energy.
While the Western Cape’s MSME ecosystem has many strengths, it also faces persistent weaknesses (Table A B.3). Further efforts are needed to sustain these achievements and promote greater inclusiveness, ensuring that underserved communities in townships and rural areas also benefit. Most renewable energy firms and support entities are concentrated in Cape Town, leaving peripheral areas with weaker networks, information gaps and fewer market opportunities.
The City of Cape Town has emerged as a clear leader: Benefiting from strong institutional capacity, a diversified economic base, proactive planning and the active use of green procurement, the City has developed a robust pipeline of investment across energy, transport, water and waste (City of Cape Town, 2026[52]). Flagship initiatives include municipal green bond issuances, which have financed water‑resilience infrastructure, energy‑efficient municipal buildings, electric buses and other low‑carbon transport assets, positioning Cape Town as a pioneer of sustainable municipal finance in Africa. In parallel, the City has enabled renewable energy procurement through wheeling arrangements, allowing power generated off‑site to be transported across the grid to municipal and private users, further supporting green investment and enterprise participation. Cape Town offers a dedicated Business Portal that provides a single point of access to key municipal services (City of Cape Town, 2026[53]). Through the portal, businesses can submit building plans, apply for licences and permits, register as suppliers, access finance opportunities, apply for investment incentives, log red‑tape cases and access free business courses, guidance and advisory support through the Business Hub. MSMEs that participated in the survey called for the creation of one‑stop business portals in Mpumalanga to provide decentralised, hands‑on support to local enterprises (Annex D).
Source: Compiled by the OECD Secretariat drawing on local consultations.
References
[40] AFD (2024), Skills ecosystem mapping in the Nkangala district (South Africa).
[15] Bhorat, H. (2024), Just Transition and the Labour Market in South Africa. Measuring Individual and Household Coal Economy Dependence, University of Cape Town, https://oms-www.files.svdcdn.com/production/downloads/reports/Just-Transition-and-the-Labout-Market-in-South-Africa.pdf.
[52] City of Cape Town (2026), Become a green supplier, https://www.capetown.gov.za/work%20and%20business/greener-business/cape-towns-green-future/become-a-green-supplier (accessed on 18 April 2026).
[53] City of Cape Town (2026), The Busines Portal, https://www.capetown.gov.za/work%20and%20business/doing-business-in-the-city/business-support-and-guidance/the-business-hub (accessed on 5 May 2026).
[26] Department for Mineral Resources & Energy (2020), Free Basic Alternative Energy Policy, https://www.nersa.org.za/files/files/2020/09/Free-Basic-Electricity-Policy.pdf.
[9] Department of Electricity and Energy (2025), Integrated Resource Plan 2025, Republic of South Africa, https://www.dmre.gov.za/Portals/0/Energy%20Resources/IRP/IRP%202025/User-Friendly-IRP-2025.pdf?ver=d278hZ0IzvO7hIWLiwLoaQ%3D%3D.
[14] ESKOM (2026), Coal fired power stations, https://www.eskom.co.za/eskom-divisions/gx/coal-fired-power-stations/ (accessed on 5 March 2026).
[17] ESKOM (2025), Loadshedding remains suspended for over nine months, resulting in year-on-year diesel savings of R16.20 billion, https://www.eskom.co.za/loadshedding-remains-suspended-for-over-nine-months-resulting-in-year-on-year-diesel-savings-of-r16-20-billion/ (accessed on 8 January 2026).
[18] Eskom (2026), Eskom’s power system remains stable, recording year‑on‑year gains with the Energy Availability Factor up 12.57% and unplanned outages down 5 506MW, https://www.eskom.co.za/eskoms-power-system-remains-stable-recording-year-on-year-gains-with-the-energy-availability-factor-up-12-57-and-unplanned-outages-down-5-506mw/ (accessed on 8 January 2026).
[7] Global Cleantech Innovation Programme (2026), https://gcip.tech/, https://gcip.tech/.
[13] Global Firepower (2026), Coal Production by Country, https://www.globalfirepower.com/coal-production-by-country.php (accessed on 25 March 2026).
[23] Government of South Africa (2025), South African Renewable Energy Master Plan (SAREM), https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202506/south-african-renewable-energy-masterplan.pdf.
[46] Government of South Africa (2022), A Framework for a Just Transition in South Africa, Presidential Climate Commission, https://pccommissionflo.imgix.net/uploads/images/22_PAPER_Framework-for-a-Just-Transition_revised_242.pdf.
[38] GreenCape (2025), Market Intelligence Report. Renewable Energy, https://greencape.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Renewable-Energy-MIR-regional-Final.pdf.
[42] GreenCape (2023), Enabling large-scale renewable energy development in Mpumalanga, https://greencape.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Industry-Brief-%E2%80%93-Navigating-large-scale-renewable-energy-development-challenges-in-Mpumalanga.pdf.
[50] GreenCape (2023), Mpumalanga Energy Market Intelligence Report., Mpumalanga Green Cluster Agency., https://greencape.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Mpumalanga_Energy_MIR_2023.pdf.
[22] GTAC (2021), Government Spending Review: 2020 Integrated National Electrification Programme (INEP), https://www.gtac.gov.za/pepa/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/INEP-Spending-Review-Report.pdf.
[11] IEA (2025), Coal 2025. Analysis and forecast to 2030, International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/reports/coal-2025.
[34] IEA (2025), World Energy Employment 2025, International Energy Agency, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/e5b9e908-26fe-4228-8978-e4ee36c555ed/WorldEnergyEmployment2025.pdf.
[16] IEA (2024), Clean Energy Innovation Policies in Emerging and Developing Economies, International Energy Agency, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7cc59a4c-95f1-48e3-bded-b77235dc353e/CleanEnergyInnovationPoliciesinEmergingandDevelopingEconomies.pdf.
[41] IKI et al. (2022), From coal to renewables in Mpumalanga: Employment effects, opportunities for local value creation, skills requirements, and gender- inclusiveness. Assessing the co- benefits of decarbonising South Africa’s power sector, International Climate Initiative, https://www.cobenefits.info/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/COBENEFITS-Study_From-coal-to-renewables-in-Mpumalanga.pdf.
[30] ILO (2025), South Africa country profile, https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/zaf/ (accessed on 20 January 2026).
[4] IMF (2026), South Africa: IMF Country Report No. 26/34, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/view/journals/002/2026/034/002.2026.issue-034-en.pdf.
[28] Impact Amplifier (2026), South Africa’s Energy Schizophrenia: Why Hasn’t the Country Achieved Affordable Power for the Poor?, https://www.impactamplifier.co.za/news/south-africas-energy-schizophrenia-why-hasnt-the-country-achieved-affordable-power-for-the-poor/ (accessed on 29 May 2026).
[47] JET PMU (2026), Implementing South Africa’s Just Energy Transition, https://justenergytransition.co.za/jet-funding-platform (accessed on 20 February 2026).
[48] MGCA (2026), Green economy...stimulating a virbant, sustainable and inclusive green economy for communities in Mpumalanga, https://thegca.co.za/ (accessed on 10 April 2026).
[10] Mineral Council of South Africa (2025), Facts & Figures Pocketbook 2025. Mining matters., https://www.mineralscouncil.org.za/component/jdownloads/?task=download.send&id=2611&catid=17&m=0.
[35] NBI (2025), Power Futures. The Green Skilling Opportunity, The National Business Initiative, https://web-assets.bcg.com/b9/d3/32793bb54b1fba468efdcdea040a/powering-futures-the-green-skilling-opportunity-1.pdf.
[39] NBI (2025), Skills Ecosystem Mapping of the Gert Sibande District Municipality.
[37] NBI, AfDB (2025), JET Atlas. Just Energy Transition – Anticipating Talent, Labour and Skills, https://jet-atlas.io/ (accessed on 4 February 2026).
[6] Nedbank (2025), Nedbank, in partnership with FURTHER, launches The Greenhouse – A bold step towards sustainable innovation and impact, https://group.nedbank.co.za/news-and-insights/press/2025/nedbank-partnership-with-further-impact-launches-the-greenhouse.html.
[36] OECD (2025), Employment and Skills Policies for the Green Transition: Review of International Good Practices, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f0c558fa-en.
[5] OECD (2025), OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7e6a132a-en.
[3] OECD (2025), Scaling Up Public Financial and Non-Financial Support for SME Sustainability: Innovations and Good Practices, OECD Studies on SMEs and Entrepreneurship, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bf835159-en.
[12] Our World in Data (2024), Our World in Data: Fossil Fuels, https://ourworldindata.org/fossil-fuels (accessed on 5 March 2026).
[45] PCC (2022), A Framework for a Just Transition in South Africa, Government of South Africa. Presidential Climate Commission, https://pccommissionflo.imgix.net/uploads/images/22_PAPER_Framework-for-a-Just-Transition_revised_242.pdf.
[25] Project 90 by 2030 (2024), Have you heard about Free Basic Electricity?, https://90by2030.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FACTSHEET-FBE-1.pdf.
[8] Republic of South Africa (2026), State of the Nation: Operation Vulindlela, https://stateofthenation.gov.za/operation-vulindlela (accessed on 9 April 2026).
[1] South Africa Info (2025), The quick guide to South Africa, https://southafrica-info.com/land/south-africa-quick-facts/attachment/map-of-south-africas-geography/ (accessed on 3 March 2026).
[19] South African Reserve Bank (2023), South African Reserve Bank Occasional Bulletin of Economic Notes OBEN/23/01, https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/occasional-bulletin-of-economic-notes/2023/reflections-on-load-shedding-and-potential-gdp-june-2023.pdf.
[20] South Africa’s Department for Mineral Resources & Energy (2025), 2024/25 Annual Report, https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202511/department-mineral-resource-and-energy-annual-report-20242025.pdf.
[21] South Africa’s Department of Electricity and Energy (2025), PCEE Briefing: Integrated National Electrification Programme (INEP).
[2] Statistics South Africa (2025), Mid-year population estimates, 2025, Department: Statistics South Africa. Republic of South Africa, https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022025.pdf.
[43] Tamasiga, P. (2025), Workforce Transition in South Africa’s Just Energy Transition. An Analysis of Needs, Policy Gaps and Socioeconomic Implications, MegaTrends Afrika, https://www.megatrends-afrika.de/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA_PolicyBrief_Tamasiga_Workforce_Transition_v2.pdf.
[27] Tatham, J. (2025), Econ 3x3, https://www.econ3x3.org/article/casting-some-light-how-free-basic-electricity-has-improved-household-welfare (accessed on 8 January 2026).
[44] The Presidency. Republic of South Africa (2022), South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) for the initial period 2023-2027, https://mlgp4climate.com/uploads/MLGP%20Library/Useful%20Documents/English/L-579%20eng.pdf#:~:text=South%20Africa%20presents%20its%20Just,and%20the%20investments%20required%20to.
[29] TIPS (2025), The Real Economy Bulletin - Third Quarter 2025, Employment, https://www.tips.org.za/images/REB_Q3_2025_Employment.pdf.
[51] TIPS (2024), Provincial Review 2024: Western Cape, https://www.tips.org.za/images/The_Real_Economy_Bulletin_Provincial_Review_Western_Cape.pdf.
[32] TIPS (2024), The Real Economy Bulletin Provincial Review 2024. Mpumalanga, https://www.tips.org.za/images/The_Real_Economy_Bulletin_Provincial_Review_2024_Mpumalanga.pdf.
[33] TIPS (2024), The Real Economy Bulletin Special Edition - The State of Small Business in South Africa 2024, https://www.tips.org.za/manufacturing-data/green-economy-bulletin/the-state-of-small-business-in-south-africa/item/download/2687_f4b27b93d1e444f05bb1196fde74031f.
[24] Tshabalala, T. (ed.) (2025), Ending energy poverty in South Africa: the key to a just energy transition, https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2025/Ending-energy-poverty-in-South-Africa-the-key-to-a-just-energy-transition (accessed on 8 January 2026).
[49] WESGRO (2025), Invest in the Green Economy in Cape Town & the Western Cape, https://www.wesgro.co.za/uploads/files/Green-Economy-Pitch-Deck_2025-09-18-075756_mzje.pdf.
[31] World Bank (2021), Informal economy database, https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/37511318c092e6fd4ca3c60f0af0bea3-0350012021/related/informal-economy-database.xlsx (accessed on 26 March 2026).
← 1. The term “rainbow nation” was coined by the late Archbishop and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Desmond Tutu during South Africa’s transition to democracy, to promote the idea of unity in diversity.
← 2. Prosumers are energy consumers who also produce energy, typically for their own use and for sale to the grid.
← 3. Coal production in other African countries is estimated at 30 Mt in 2025, compared to 234 Mt in South Africa.
← 4. According to Eskom’s 2026 assessment, the generation fleet has been significantly strengthened and is now more reliable, enhancing operational resilience. This progress is largely due to the Generation Recovery Plan and the intensive maintenance carried out over the past financial year. It also contributes to saving substantive resources from diesel purchases
← 5. The Department of Mineral Resources and Energy provides two concessional grants through National Electrification Programmes, channelled via municipalities and Eskom. Both programmes exceeded their targets, connecting about 53 000 and 83 000 households respectively, compared to planned targets of 40 000 and 50 000 (South Africa's Department for Mineral Resources & Energy, 2025[20]).
← 6. Households in Cape Town which consume up to 250 kWh per month receive approximately 60 kWh free, those using between 250 kWh and 450 kWh receive about 25 kWh, while households exceeding 450 kWh do not qualify for free units.
← 7. The new definition of informal employment includes workers who do not have a private pension or, where that information is not available, do not receive paid leave or other basic benefits. As a result, in the third quarter of 2025, the Quarterly Labour Force Survey shifted around 400 000 workers from formal to informal employment. Informal workers accounted for 23% of total employment in the third quarter of 2025, compared to 21% in the second quarter (TIPS, 2025[29]). While data series are no longer easily comparable, the change does not alter the overall observation that informality in South Africa remains lower than in many other emerging economies.