The People’s Republic of China’s (“China”) steel exports to international markets are surging, depressing prices and profitability of steel industries worldwide. China’s steel trade surplus surged well above 100 million metric tonnes in 2024, a massive leap over the past five years that is affecting competition across global steel markets. Chinese exports have more than doubled since 2020 and continued to grow substantially in 2024 to their highest level on record. Consequently, the steel crisis has deepened, giving rise to trade tensions and an increasing number of trade measures. A total of 81 antidumping investigations cases were initiated against 21 countries during 2024 alone, up from 16 cases involving five countries in all of 2023.
OECD Steel Outlook 2025
Abstract
In recent years, close to 20% of steel production (more than 300 million metric tonnes [mmt] valued at approximately USD 300 billion [US dollars]) has been traded internationally (excluding internal EU-27 trade). As many steel products are price-sensitive, trade volumes can and do shift significantly, in line with changing market conditions. When domestic markets weaken, steelmakers often reduce prices and turn to exports to strengthen their order books, flooding the market with low-priced steel. This can lead to the introduction of trade measures to remedy the injury caused by dumped and/or subsidised imports. In some cases, safeguard measures have been introduced to shield industries when increased imports have resulted in or threatened serious injury. In other cases, national security measures have been introduced.
The trade situation in steel is currently tumultuous, as steelmaking capacity is being added in the face of sluggish markets, eventually resulting in significant shifts in trade flows. Global steel exports have risen since 2020, reaching 322 mmt in 2024 – up 9% from 296 mmt in 2020 (Table 5.1). This growth has been largely driven by the People’s Republic of China’s (hereafter “China”) expanding steel trade surplus, which has increased more than seven-fold since 2020. In 2024, Chinese steel exports, driven by a rise in excess capacity, surpassed 118 mmt, marking a 24% year-on-year increase and a dramatic surge over the past five years, disrupting global steel markets.
In thousands of metric tonnes and % change
Note: All values are expressed in thousands of metric tonnes. Notably, “EU27” data specifically pertain to external trade. “World” refers to a global aggregate covering more than 75 countries. “World (excluding EU intra trade)” represents a global aggregate that removes EU intra trade.
Source: OECD calculations based on UN COMTRADE and ISSB data.
While China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies (see Figure 5.1) are leading the global export expansion, Europe, the war-torn Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)/Ukraine and the Middle East have experienced sharp annual declines. Overall, steel exports from OECD countries have contracted by 12%, whereas those from other economies have grown by 18% since 2020. Chinese exports to all regions have shown significant two-digit increases, with significant growth, particularly to ASEAN and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries.
In mmt
Source: OECD calculations based on UN COMTRADE and ISSB data.
At the same time, Asian steel imports have declined over the past four years, driven primarily by the sharp 77% import reduction in China (Table 5.2 and Box 5.1). ASEAN remains the world’s largest steel-importing market (56 mmt in 2024), with imports rising by 19% since 2020 and increasing by 10.6% in 2024 alone. Meanwhile, steel imports into Europe and North America have grown significantly. The European Union (excluding intra-EU trade) and the United Kingdom saw a 12.9% increase in imports from 2020, with a year-on-year rise of 4.5% in 2024. North America has experienced an even stronger surge, with imports rising by approximately 40% since 2020.
In thousands of metric tonnes and % change
Notes: All values are expressed in thousands of metric tonnes. Notably, “EU27” data specifically pertain to external trade. “World” refers to a global aggregate covering more than 75 countries. “World (excluding EU intra trade)” represents a global aggregate that removes EU intra trade.
Source: OECD calculations based on UN COMTRADE and ISSB data.
China dominates world steel markets, accounting for nearly half of steel demand and production. As a result, changes in the country’s situation, even relatively minor changes, equate to millions of tonnes and can have, and have had, significant implications for foreign markets. Recent developments are a case in point. China’s domestic market has experienced a sharp downturn, with demand falling by an estimated 142 mmt from 2020 to 2024. At the same time, the country’s steel producers have reduced their production by less, i.e. 60 mmt, during this period. Some of their production has undoubtedly replaced imports, falling by about 30 mmt during 2020-24. With a large net shortfall in domestic demand, Chinese producers have diverted their production from domestic to international markets. Slightly more than 118 mmt of steel was exported in 2024, an increase of more than 64 mmt from the 2020 level.
The impact of the increased exports has been experienced in many foreign markets. Chinese steel shipments have surged to ASEAN and other East Asian countries, MENA and Latin America. On the other hand, exports to North America and the European Union appear to have been more stable, though the indirect effects have been significant for some countries. For example, exports from China also surge to third markets, some of which are also grappling with growing excess capacity, such as Northern Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which in turn have increased their exports, particularly to the European Union and other OECD countries because their own domestic markets are saturated with surplus steel. While all steel product exports from China showed year-on-year increases during 2024, exports are increasingly concentrated in flat-rolled steel, including plates, metallic-coated sheets and strips, and hot-rolled coils. In addition, China’s indirect exports of steel-containing goods have also been increasing significantly to foreign markets.
Steel prices have also been affected by shifts in supply patterns worldwide, led by China’s export surge. An OECD analysis of unit values of China’s steel exports, which can be used as a very rough proxy for prices, reveals substantial declines in 2024. An examination of the 200 most exported HS-6 products from China reveals widespread declines across regions and products, averaging 25% in the first half of 2024, though the decreases have exceeded 50% in some instances. The dispersion of declines is higher in long products than in flat products and steel tubular products.
Steel has been subject to more trade measures than any other product for many decades. The measures have included safeguard actions, duties to address injury caused by dumping, subsidisation and trade circumvention, and national security actions, among others. Antidumping measures have been the most common and have been used in recent years by a growing number of countries.
Trade policy measures
In 2024, a number of countries introduced or reinforced measures to protect their steel industries from increased excess-capacity-driven imports in recent years. Many of these actions originated from countries within the North American region. This area, along with ASEAN countries, experienced some of the most significant reductions in import unit prices from China, exceeding 30% between 2023 and 2024, particularly in flat steel products.
The United States and Canada took direct action against steel and steel-intensive imports from China. As part of the four-year review of actions taken in the Section 301 investigation of China’s acts, policies and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property and innovation, the United States increased tariffs on products in certain strategic sectors, including steel. Section 301 of the Trade Act may be used to respond to unreasonable or discriminatory foreign government acts, policies and practices that burden or restrict US commerce and allows for action to be taken against any good of the foreign country. The tariff increases on steel products underscore the US government’s commitment to counteracting excess capacity and excess production by Chinese steel producers. The government of Canada introduced similar tariff actions to shield its steel industry from the adverse effects of low-priced Chinese imports.
Brazil, Mexico, and Türkiye have increased tariff rates with the intent to address substantial import surges experienced in recent years. The significant increases in steel imports have raised concerns about the impact on their local industries.
A significant development in 2024 was the application of US Section 232 tariffs on steel imports from Mexico that are not melted and poured in North America. This action underscored the United States’ intent to address the circumvention of Section 232 tariffs. By focusing on the origin of the steel production process, the action aimed to prevent indirect imports from third countries that could undermine existing measures.
A notable development included the introduction by the Korean government of new rules that equip trade defence authorities with the necessary legal framework to investigate the circumvention of antidumping actions. The amendments related to circumvention dumping took effect from 1 January 2025. See Box 5.2 for further information on the challenge of trade circumvention.
South Africa increased import duties on certain steel bars and rods to enhance the competitive position of producers due in part to the significant price disadvantage relative to low-priced imports of similar products from Asia, with exemptions on steel from certain trading partners.
In addition to these measures, border measures to address environmental concerns in the form of fees or tariffs based on the greenhouse gas emissions of a product are receiving increased attention [see Casey, Hite and Ramseur (2024[1])].
Trade remedies in the form of antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) are border measures designed to provide redress for dumped and/or subsidised steel that causes injury to steelmakers in an affected country market. Once implemented, the duties can profoundly affect trade, particularly when the AD and CVD margins are high. Some steel exporters seek to circumvent the trade measures by: 1) minor processing, which changes the classification of a product to one that is not subject to the trade remedies; or 2) redirecting their exports to an intermediary country that is not subject to the trade remedy. By circumventing and evading trade measures, exporters attempt to stay ahead of trade remedy duties, frustrating the industry in the importing country that is injured by the unfair trade practices and significantly undermining the effectiveness of the trade remedy measures. This phenomenon is often likened to the game of “whack a mole” and highlights the importance of enforcing trade rules.
Econometric work carried out at the OECD on circumvention involving intermediary countries has focused on identifying suspicious trade patterns that could be linked to circumvention. The research indicates that in 103 out of 152 trade remedy investigations initiated in steel in 2013-18, trade with intermediary countries increased significantly, suggesting possible trade circumvention. The amount of suspicious trade totalled 21.5 mmt (EUR 13.3 billion [euros]) during 2013-20, which represented 17.6% of the total steel trade. A large share of the apparent circumvention is linked to trade remedy actions initiated in 2015, at the onset of the most recent steel crisis.
Approximately 65% of the apparent circumvention involved minor modification of products subject to trade remedies in an intermediary country prior to export to the country where the trade remedies were in force. The principal source country was China; the principal intermediary country was Viet Nam.
Note: 1. Suspicious behaviour linked to circumvention is presumed when an increase occurs in exports from a country subject to AD/CVD actions, to a third country, and exports from the third country to the country imposing the AD/CVD measures then suddenly increase.
Source: (OECD, Forthcoming[2]).
Antidumping countervailing duty and safeguard measures in 2024
The number of trade remedy actions has risen close to the high levels seen during the last steel crisis of 2016. In 2024, 81 antidumping investigations involving steel products were initiated by governments (Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2). Almost 80% of the cases were filed against Asian producers, with China alone accounting for more than one-third of the total. The cases were initiated by 19 economies against 21 countries, led by Türkiye and the United States, with 10 each. Hot-rolled flat steel, corrosion-resistant steel and tinplate were commonly targeted products in the investigations. The number of initiations was up sharply from 2023 when only sixteen cases were initiated against five countries for the entire year.1
In addition to the antidumping cases, seven countervailing duty cases were initiated during 2024. The United States initiated cases on corrosion-resistant coated steel products from Brazil, Canada, Mexico and Viet Nam, while Australia initiated cases on structural shapes and coil steel from China. Only one case was initiated in 2023; a negative determination was made involving US imports of tin mill products from China. In 2024, the European Union prolonged its safeguard measures on certain steel products and safeguard measures were taken by South Africa, Türkiye and the United Kingdom. Moreover, India initiated a safeguard investigation in 2024.
The number of trade remedy cases initiated does not, it should be noted, reflect their final outcomes, as negative determinations can be made following investigation. If positive findings are made, however, they have enduring effects on markets.
Note: Each defendant country is counted as a separate investigation. For example, if an investigating authority initiates an antidumping investigation concerning a steel product being exported from three different countries, it will be counted as having initiated three separate investigations.
Source: OECD calculations based on Japan Iron and Steel Federation (JISF) data.
Source: OECD calculations based on Japan Iron and Steel Federation (JISF).
The structural imbalances in the global steel market imply that recent steel trade trends, with “too much steel searching for too little demand”, will continue in 2025. In response, the number of trade measures and other policies to ensure a level playing field and mitigate the economic and social impacts of market-distorting steel imports is expected to increase in 2025. An important development has been the national security action taken by the United States in March when it reinstated a 25% ad valorem tariff under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act on steel products imported from all countries. Other recent trade policy developments in early 2025 include the European Union’s adjustments to its safeguard measure to preserve its effectiveness in light of negative market developments, including growing excess capacity and related negative effects. Other developments included new antidumping investigations by Peru against China and Mexico against China and Viet Nam, and safeguard measures on steel by India and South Africa (in the form of tariffs).
With global excess capacity expected to continue climbing, a growing number of economies are likely to resort to trade policy measures this year, particularly as the negative impacts of excess capacity spread more broadly across the globe. These developments highlight the need to tackle the root causes of steel excess capacity, i.e. non-market policies and practices, as well as other factors that distort steel trade as revealed in the in-depth work of the OECD in past years, and to continue working on long-lasting solutions in fora such as the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity.
References
[1] Casey, C., K. Hite and J. Ramseur (2024), Border Carbon Adjustments: Policy Considerations, Legislation, and Developments in the European Union, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R48247.
[2] OECD (Forthcoming), Assessing trade measure circumvention behaviours in global steel trade.
← 1. The OECD methodology is such that each defendant country is counted as a separate investigation. For example, if an investigating authority initiates an AD investigation concerning a steel product being exported from three different countries, it will be counted as having initiated three separate investigations. OECD calculations are based on Japan Iron and Steel Federation (JISF) data.