This section provides a comprehensive review of Ukraine’s competition enforcement framework, focusing on the procedural, investigative, and sanctioning mechanisms of AMCU. It details the main steps in the enforcement process, including case opening, notifications, leniency programs, dawn raids, information requests, bid-rigging detection, and protection of confidential information. The decision-making process, sanctions and monitoring of enforcement outcomes are examined, with attention to alignment with international best practices in transparency, procedural fairness, and analytical rigor. The merger control framework is similarly assessed. The findings provide a basis for strengthening procedural efficiency, enforcement consistency, and alignment with OECD standards, enhancing the overall effectiveness of Ukraine’s competition regime.
OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Ukraine 2025
Abstract
2.1.1. Main procedural steps in Ukrainian competition procedure
General aspects
The Ukrainian legislation establishes, since 2024, clear time limits for AMCU investigations, with a maximum duration of three years, extendable by additional two years, if necessary. This deadline starts with the formal opening of the procedure in the form of an Order of the State Commissioner to open a case. Prior to the reform, investigations could be prolonged indefinitely, leading to uncertainty and potential inefficiencies.
According to Ukrainian competition law, AMCU has the obligation to consider all applications and cases if there are signs of violation of the legislation on protection of economic competition. Currently, the Committee may only refuse to consider a claim if the actions/inactions do not have a (significant) impact on competition.1 Therefore, AMCU only retains discretion in initiating proceedings for competition law infringement if an alleged violation does not significantly restrict competition or cause substantial harm to consumers or society. If corrective measures have been taken, AMCU may choose not to pursue enforcement action or to close an ongoing investigation. This aligns with article 36.3 and 46 of the Competition Law, which allows AMCU to refrain from proceedings where the impact on market competition is negligible.
AMCU may decline to review an application if the applicant fails to demonstrate that the alleged violation has had or continues to have a direct and adverse impact on their rights or business activities. In such cases, AMCU notifies the applicant in writing and issues a reasoned order, which is sent within three working days of its adoption. This decision is subject to appeal.2
Case opening
System of notification
As already mentioned, entities intending to engage in agreements (or “concerted actions”, according to the Competition Law) that could affect competition are required to obtain prior approval from AMCU.
The 2023 amendments brought changes to the procedures for obtaining such approvals, aiming to streamline the process and enhance transparency. After those amendments, article 31 of the Competition Law allows parties that applied for an authorisation to access the case file after AMCU has stablished the grounds for prohibition of the agreements.
Under the general framework established by Ukrainian competition legislation, the review of applications concerning concerted practices follows a two-phase process. The initial review phase (Phase I) is subject to a statutory deadline of 90 calendar days. Where further analysis is required, the procedure may be extended by an additional 90 days (Phase II), during which AMCU assesses whether the requested permission for concerted actions can be granted.3
AMCU can initiate investigations on their own motion or following complaints from private parties or public entities.4 There is no whistle-blower protection under Ukrainian Law.
Source: Based on AMCU information.
AMCU has explained this high number of cases since in the case of cartel investigations, 99% are bid rigging cases investigated by the Regional Offices because in Ukraine the number of digitalised competitive public procurement procedures is very high (more than 200 000 in 2023). In the case of abuses, they confirm that most of them are regional cases investigated by territorial offices based on actions of local monopolies.
Leniency programme in Ukraine
Ukraine first introduced a leniency programme in 2002 through amendments to its competition legislation. However, the absence of clear procedural rules hindered its effective implementation. To address this, AMCU adopted the Leniency Regulation on 25 June 2012, which came into effect on 5 October 2012. More recently, the Order N. 2/41347 and led to significant reforms in the system.
The new leniency programme establishes a detailed procedure for obtaining a marker thereby increasing transparency and offering greater assurances to parties considering leniency applications. When applying for leniency, if the applicant does not have enough information to be granted amnesty right away, but can provide such information later, the applicant may apply to AMCU for a so called “marker” in order to preserve its priority in the application line. This marker confirms the date and time when the application for exemption was submitted. It also provides for anonymous preliminary consultations with AMCU.5
The Programme offers full immunity for the first applicant if it provides to AMCU information that:
discloses an anticompetitive agreement
was not previously available to AMCU at the time of the application
is sufficient to warrant the initiation of proceedings if, as of the date of submission, no such order has yet been issued or
is of critical importance for the resolution of the case if proceedings have already been initiated but AMCU lacks sufficient evidence to conclude the investigation and render a decision
The applicants must submit:
a comprehensive list of all known participants in the anticompetitive concerted actions
the timeframe during which the applicant engaged in such conduct
a detailed account of the anticompetitive practices, supported by corroborating evidence
a self-assessment of its involvement in the infringement, particularly addressing the absence of any disqualifying factors
a catalogue of evidentiary materials appended to the application; any additional information at the applicant’s disposal that may be necessary for the issuance of an order initiating proceedings or that is essential to the final adjudication of the case
a substantiated request for the confidentiality of the applicant’s identity until a final decision is rendered, where applicable, accompanied by a non-confidential version of the relevant materials for submission to the Committee.
There are no restrictions for the ring leaders but there is a restriction for those who have coerced other participants into joining or remaining in the cartel. Subsequent applicants may be subject to reductions in fines enhancing the incentives for multiple entities to come forward.
If after the first applicant others present an application for leniency, they may receive a reduction of up to 50% (second applicant), to 30% (third) and up to 20% (any additional).
The applicant needs to terminate participation in the anticompetitive conduct no later than the day of submitting the leniency application, unless continued involvement is necessary to preserve the integrity of the investigation. The applicant is expected to engage with AMCU efficiently, promptly and transparently, supplying complete and reliable information throughout the investigation.
There is a guarantee of confidentiality of the applicant’s identity and submitted information until the final decision is taken. The identity of the applicant is not made public, but it is disclosed to the parties in order to allow other cartel members to exercise their right to defence.
Leniency programme exempts from the fine but only exempts from debarment for entering in public procurement to the first applicant (and not to subsequent) and not for civil liability.
In December 2024, AMCU applied the updated leniency programme for the first time.
The case involved two undertakings engaged in bid rigging activities that distorted the outcomes of two tenders for construction works procurement.
One of the undertakings voluntarily reported the anticompetitive conduct to AMCU and provided essential evidence that was not previously available to the agency.
After assessing the application, AMCU granted full immunity from fines to the reporting undertaking, as it met all the conditions required by the law. The other undertaking involved was fined 2% of its annual “revenue” for each of the two infringements.
The names of the undertakings are not public, but the case is published on the website of AMCU.
Case investigation
The Ukrainian Constitution (art. 63) establishes that “a person shall not bear responsibility for refusing to testify or to explain anything about himself or herself, members of his or her family or close relatives in the degree determined by law…”. Therefore no one may be compelled to give testimony against himself that may be used as evidence in a prosecution. This is a direct effect provision, that applies to relations arising in the framework of state control over compliance with legislation on the protection of economic competition, in particular, during the consideration of a case, inspected by AMCU.
AMCU investigations can include the use of dawn raids, subpoena powers and hearings to gather evidence of collusion, anti-competitive behaviour, or other illegal concerted conduct.
Dawn raids
The Competition Law provides that in order to detect and terminate violations of competition law, AMCU and its territorial offices may conduct inspections of undertakings, associations, authorities, local self-government bodies, administrative and economic management and control bodies (article 44.1 of the Competition Law). AMCU Law grants broad powers to the institution including unrestricted access to the premises of enterprises, institutions and organisations. AMCU can also inspect all locations where the relevant information is stored, including digital repositories such as computers, servers, electronic communication systems, safes and employee workstations, irrespective of their physical location. This includes remotely stored data, the ability to copy and obtain documents and other forms of data, including originals, the power to seize or remove items, data carriers, and documentation pertinent to the investigation and the authority to seal premises, digital storage facilities, and electronic communications infrastructure to prevent unauthorised access or tampering and the right to conduct on-site inspections of offices and other facilities associated with the investigated entities (art. 7 of AMCU Law). Dawn raids on private domiciles or other premises that don’t belong to a company are considered ultra vires and therefore not accessible.
Inspections may be initiated with regards to any possible violation of competition law and are subject to strict procedural requirements. One of the most relevant is that approval from a commercial court is required to access premises, storage facilities and electronic communication devices. AMCU adopted the “Order No. 21-рп on Approval of the Procedure for Conducting Inspections of Undertakings" (07.12.2023). Prior to this amendment, AMCU could conduct raids without a court warrant, but its powers during these inspections were ambiguous and subject to legal challenges. Also, notification and representation are ensured. Dawn raids are typically unannounced to prevent obstruction, but this is not AMCU's obligation. AMCU has the discretion to announce or not to announce inspections. Companies have the right to request legal representation during the inspection, but officials may proceed in their absence if immediate compliance is required. Confidentiality and data protection requirements imply that AMCU must handle seized documents and digital data in accordance with legal confidentiality obligations, preventing unauthorised disclosure of sensitive business information. Entities subject to dawn raids have the right to challenge the legality of the inspection and AMCU’s actions in court if they believe due process has been violated.
AMCU also has the authority to interview relevant individuals, including company officials. Business owners and senior management are required to co-operate and must not obstruct proceedings.
The Competition Law has empowered AMCU to impose sanctions for:
obstructing employees of AMCU or its territorial office in conducting inspections, examination, seizure or arrest of property, documents, objects or other data carriers (article 50.16)
unsealing premises, electronic communications systems, other possessions or places of storage of information placed under seal by employees of AMCU or its territorial office (article 50.21)
failing to provide information, submitting false or incomplete data (article 50.13-15).
The number of dawn raids conducted by AMCU is contained in Table 2.2
Note: AMCU has declared that the situation of war implied an impossibility to conduct dawn raids for some years, but in 2025, they have restarted this activity.
Source: Based on AMCU information.
Requests for information, interviews and collaboration with other authorities
AMCU can request any information that is relevant to its mandate from businesses, associations, government agencies and other legal entities, including restricted data (Article 7 AMCU Law). According to art. 22 of the same law these entities are obliged to provide the requested information, including confidential information, banking, notarial secrecy, tax, statistical reports, regardless of their location, which are in their possession and/or use or available to them. Requests for information do not suspend the deadline to adopt a decision on the merits. AMCU adopted on 13 June 2019 an “Information Letter No. 70/01 on Requesting Information by AMCU and Application of Liability for Violations Related to Requesting Information”. Thanks to this AMCU can collect evidence and obtain information from other public authorities as well. The Competition Law establishes that AMCU collaborates with law enforcement and regulatory bodies to investigate potential competition law violations (art. 45). The National Police, tax and customs authorities and other agencies are required to provide relevant factual circumstances. Law enforcement agencies may only provide pre-trial investigation data with explicit consent from the investigator or prosecutor (art. 222 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine).
AMCU and its territorial offices must also adhere to professional secrecy obligations when handling classified information (article 22.1 of the Competition Law).
AMCU can interview officials and employees of the inspected entity that are obliged to provide explanations on the issue of the inspection (part seven of Article 44.1 of the Competition Law). In this moment there is no liability for the officials if they refuse to provide explanations. However, the next stage of the reform provides for such liability. The owner, manager and officials, employees of the inspected entity and other persons present are obliged not to interfere with the inspection.
The Competition Law empowers AMCU to impose sanctions for failure to submit information to AMCU or its territorial office within the time limits established by AMCU or by regulatory legal acts (art. 50.13); submission of incomplete information within the time limits (art. 50.14) or for submitting false information (article 50.15).
Karlivskyi Machine-Building Plant – Decision No. 505-r, 17 December 2024
AMCU sanctioned SHOSTKYNSKY ELEVATOR for failing to provide information during an investigation into a merger between Karlivskyi Machine-Building Plant and Variant Agro Bud. This refusal hindered the authority’s ability to assess the anti-competitive effects of the transaction and constituted a violation. The company was fined UAH 64 251 (equivalent to EUR 1 467).
MasterCard Europe SA – Decision No. 517-r, 19 December 2024
As part of an investigation into potential joint practices involving Mastercard Europe, Visa and the National Bank of Ukraine, AMCU requested information from Joint-Stock Bank Pivdenny, which failed to submit the requested documents. The authority rejected the justification that the documents had been lost by a non-authorised courier service. As a result, a fine of UAH 3 000 000 (equivalent to EUR 68 247) was imposed on the bank.
Autologistyka – Decision No. 525-r, 24 December 2024
Autologistyka LLC failed to timely respond to an official information request in case No. 130‑26.13/186‑21. Despite acknowledging the delay and invoking its previous co‑operation, the company obstructed the investigation process and was consequently fined UAH 176 901 (equivalent to EUR 4 053).
Uniper Gas Transportation and Finance BV – Decision No. 470-r, 28 November 2024
In the context of an investigation into possible concerted practices related to the Nord Stream 2 project, Uniper Gas Transportation and Finance BV failed to provide all the information required by AMCU. This omission constituted a violation of Article 50.14 resulting in a fine of UAH 533 184 (equivalent to EUR 12 173).
Kharkiv Tile Plant – Decision No. 469-r, 28 November 2024
Kharkiv Tile Plant was sanctioned for delayed submission of requested information as part of a merger investigation. Although the company cited war-related disruptions, it did not request a deadline extension. AMCU imposed a fine of UAH 158 578 (equivalent to EUR 3 620).
BRSM-Nafta – Decision No. 538-r, 26 December 2024
LLC BRIVAR, was investigated for a potential takeover of SKY service stations by BRSM-Nafta, failed to respond to AMCU’s information request within the required timeframe and only provided a response four months late. A fine of UAH 165 635 (equivalent to EUR 3 806) was imposed.
Source: Based on AMCU website.
Bid rigging detection tools
Ukraine has developed and operates an electronic public procurement system called “Prozorro”, that is an online platform where state and municipal customers announce tenders for the purchase of goods, works and services and companies compete for the opportunity to supply them.
This online platform contains centralised data on all public procurement taking place in Ukraine, which allows AMCU to analyse particular tenders and the participation of companies in tenders over a longer period. Thanks to the access to information on Prozorro, AMCU is able to analyse the documents submitted by the participants, identify similarities in the prepared documents, detect persons/employees who prepared the relevant bids for participation in the tender and establish common unique properties of electronic files uploaded by the participants to their bids. AMCU has cases that involve several tenders. When analysing the possible signs of collusion, AMCU takes into account tenders in which an undertaking participates (or could participate) to detect the anomalous bidding patterns.6 In 2024 AMCU co‑operated with the World Bank on the development of an AI tool to detect tenders with high probability of collusion. The tool is analysing the economic behaviours of the undertakings. The Project is to be finalised in 2025.
Such "monitoring" is used to identify preliminary signs of collusion and initiate investigations. After the investigation is initiated, in order to collect evidence and based on the information collected, AMCU sends requests for information to government authorities, state and municipal institutions, undertakings, including customers and bidders.
Protection of confidential information
AMCU is responsible for the regulation of the use and storage of restricted information (Article 22.1 of AMCU Law). It is also responsible for ensuring a balance between the protection of confidential business information and the need for transparency in competition enforcement. Employees of AMCU and its territorial offices are subject to legal liability in cases of unauthorised disclosure of confidential information. AMCU and its territorial offices may use this confidential information solely for the enforcement of competition law. Such information is generally protected from disclosure and publication, except in specific cases, including:
the provision of information to investigative authorities or courts in accordance with legal requirements
non-compliance with public information access legislation.7
Individuals submitting restricted information must clearly identify the specific documents or sections that contain such information.
In cases where confidentiality is contested under relevant legal provisions, AMCU engages in consultations with the submitting party to determine the legal basis for classification, the possibility of declassification or the provision of a non-confidential version of the information.8
Decision-making process
AMCU does not foresee a procedure with separation between investigation and adjudication and State Commissioners and the head of territorial offices, as members of the collegial body that adjudicates cases and participate in all stages of the case.
An order to initiate the proceedings shall be sent to the defendant within three working days from the date of its adoption (art. 37.2 and 3 of the Competition Law). If the defendant is identified after the commencement of the proceedings, an order to join the case as a defendant is sent to him within three working days, together with the order to initiate proceedings. A notice on initiating the proceedings is sent to the applicant and third parties identified in the process as having interest in the case.
Persons participating or having participated in the case have the right to access the case file, make copies of the case complete file or parts of it. There is restricted access to information whose disclosure may harm the interests of other persons participating or having participated in the case or prevent further consideration of the case.
Copies of the preliminary findings (or extracts that do not contain confidential information) shall be sent to the parties and third parties no later than ten days before the decision in the case is made. If it is not possible to deliver a copy of the preliminary conclusions to the persons involved in the case, the State Commissioner or the head of the territorial office shall ensure that information on preliminary conclusions in the case, including the date, time and place of the case consideration, is posted on the official website of the Committee (http://www.amcu.gov.ua) no later than five days before the day of the case consideration (clause 26 of the Rules for Consideration of Applications and Cases on Violation of Legislation on Protection of Economic Competition, approved by AMCU Order).
According to the AMCU Law (article 23.1) AMCU may hold hearings in the case before deciding on the merits. They are held at the request of the parties or on the initiative of AMCU. The hearing would involve anyone that can provide explanations, arguments and other considerations necessary to establish the actual circumstances of the case. Employees of AMCU and its territorial offices shall participate in the hearing and experts may be involved if necessary. Other persons may be involved in the hearing if the applicant and/or the respondent have not expressed reasonable objections to this. Parties, third parties, can be represented by attorneys-at-law providing professional legal assistance (art. 39 of the Competition Law).
After receiving the preliminary findings, the parties have the right to introduce evidence, submit motions, oral and written explanations or objections within ten business days from the date of receipt of the report (art. 40 of the Competition Law). This term can be extended upon the request of the parties.
AMCU has the authority to impose interim measures while a case is under analysis to prevent irreparable harm, such as prohibiting certain actions by the defendant or requiring specific actions to protect legitimate rights (art. 47 of the Competition Law). AMCU has declared that “most of the cases” where interim measures were taken, dealt with unfair competition.
Sanctions and other consequences of the infringements
Criminal responsibility
In Ukraine there is no criminal liability for competition law infringements. Vertical collusion between contracting authority and participant in the bidding may be a criminal violation. If during an investigation of bid rigging AMCU finds signs of this type of behaviour, there is an obligation to inform relevant law enforcement agencies, particularly the Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Police of Ukraine and the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine.
Administrative sanctions
Administrative violations of competition law can result in monetary fines (art. 52 of the Competition Law).
Serious infringements, such as anticompetitive agreements, abuse of a dominant position, or non-compliance with AMCU decisions, may lead to fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s annual revenue. According to AMCU, in Ukraine the term “revenue” has the same legal meaning as turnover in other jurisdictions: it is the total volume of sales of products (goods, works or services). If the amount of gains improperly made exceed this threshold, fines may reach three times the unlawfully obtained profits, which can be estimated by AMCU. The Regional Offices of AMCU can only impose fines up to a maximum of UAH 68 000 (equivalent to EUR 1 548) (art. 52.6 of the Competition Law).
Lesser infringements, such as engaging in concerted actions that required prior authorisation or failing to comply with conditions set by AMCU during merger procedures, may lead to fines of up to 5% of annual revenue.
Minor violations, including failure to provide complete or accurate information to AMCU, obstructing investigations, or breaking AMCU seals, are subject to fines of up to 1% of annual revenue.
Sanctions on companies can also be imposed if they create obstacles for the employees of AMCU or its territorial department when conducting inspections, examination, seizure of property, documents, items or other information storage devices (art. 50.16 of the Competition Law). Also failing to provide, delayed provision of information or providing false information can result in the imposition of sanctions of up to twenty non-taxable incomes – meaning less than EUR 10 – (administrative sanctions imposed at officials on undertakings) (art. 166.4 of the Code of Administrative Offenses)9. Non-compliance with AMCU decisions and its territorial departments, or delayed execution of their decisions results in the imposition of fines of up to six non-taxable minimum incomes of citizens (less than EUR 3) and on individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activity - up to 16 non-taxable minimum incomes (less than EUR 6).10
The calculation of fines follows the methodology outlined in AMCU’s Order No. 22-рп of 14 December 2023. The Procedure outlines specific criteria considered when imposing fines.
The determination of the basic fine amount is guided by two primary principles: capturing the illicit gain or revenue linked to the violation and ensuring a deterrent effect. The fine is generally calculated as a percentage of the revenue associated with the violation, with the specific rate depending on the type and severity of the infringement.
Fines are typically based on up to 30% of the revenue related to the violation. This includes revenue from both the direct market where the conduct occurred and any related markets affected by the anti-competitive behaviour. For violations in tender manipulation, the basis may be the contract value or expected bid price. Table 2.4 shows different categories of infringements.
Source: Based on information provided by ACMU.
The system foresees general adjustments to the basic fine. Looking for deterrence, the sanction may be increased by 15–25% or adjusted based on the National Bank of Ukraine’s discount rate. Additional multipliers can also apply if the violation continues after the preliminary findings are issued.
To prevent disproportionate sanctions, the basic fine should not exceed two-thirds of the legal maximum and case-specific circumstances (e.g., market effects, actor conduct or duration) are always considered.
The system also includes mitigating circumstances that may result in reduced penalties.
Source: Procedure determining amount of fine 22-rp (2023).
The amount of the fine may also be reduced in cases of:
force majeure (circumstances of insuperable force), including in connection with the introduction of martial law or a state of emergency, confirmed in accordance with the procedure established by law (such as war or natural disasters)
evidence that the imposition of the fine in the proposed amount will lead to its bankruptcy or subsequent liquidation, or to the termination of its sale (purchase) of goods on the market.
The justification for such a reduction must be provided in the decision of AMCU imposing the fine.
The base amount of a fine may also be increased by up to 50% in cases where aggravating circumstances are established. Such circumstances include the initiation or orchestration of actions (or inaction) that constitute a violation, particularly in the context of anticompetitive concerted practices or efforts to obstruct or impede the investigation of a competition law violation.
To ensure effective enforcement and deter corporate misconduct, the reform introduced joint and several liability for fines imposed by AMCU. This means that undertakings found in violation of competition laws can be held collectively responsible for the full amount of the fine, enhancing the likelihood of penalty collection and underscoring the seriousness of compliance obligations.
In general, AMCU may issue cease and desist orders for the cessation of the illegal practices or to prevent its future occurrence.
Other remedies may include the annulment or modification of the relevant agreements and the imposition of behavioural or structural remedies aimed at restoring competition in the market.
According to Ukrainian law, any bid rigging infringement is punished by a three-year ban from bidding with any administration, in addition to a fine.
Settlement
The settlement mechanism (art. 46 of the Competition Law) was introduced in 2023 and allows undertakings involved in anticompetitive conduct, including any type of agreements and abuse of dominance but excluding bid rigging practices as AMCU declares them to be considered the most serious infringements in their system (art. 6.2.4 of the Competition law). The reduction of sanctions is fixed in 15%.
A company may apply for settlement before AMCU issues preliminary findings.
The settlement (so-called “vregulation”) is carried out by signing an agreement between the body of AMCU that will make a decision in the case and the defendant.
The settlement procedure is considered to have started if AMCU has notified the defendant in writing of the consent to the application of the settlement procedure in the case.
AMCU has the power to provide the defendant with some information on the case (evidence) to facilitate the settlement negotiations. The information received by AMCU during the discussion of the settlement procedure can only be disclosed – similarly to the information on the progress and content of negotiations regarding the settlement – with the consent of the defendant.
The essential terms of the settlement agreement are: recognition by the defendant of having committed a violation and its circumstances; termination of the violation, proposals and guarantees regarding the elimination of the causes of such violations and the conditions contributing to their occurrence (if available), as well as regarding the elimination of the consequences of the violation (if available). The settlement agreement may also contain other conditions and obligations.
AMCU terminates the settlement procedure if there is no agreement with the defendant on terms and conditions of the settlement or if the defendant has not sent the signed settlement agreement to AMCU. There needs to be a written notification of this termination. In this case, the explanations provided by the defendant during the negotiations on the settlement procedure in the case cannot be considered as recognition by the defendant of the violation and cannot be used as evidence of the violation.
The process is unavailable to companies that engaged in “the same violation” within the past five years.11 The term same violation (so-called “porushennya”) is crucial. It is not interpreted as the exact repetition of the same acts or participation in the same specific infringement. Rather, it refers to recurrence within the same general legal category of serious violation. That is, if a company was sanctioned for an anticompetitive concerted action (e.g., price fixing) and, within five years, a new case is initiated against it for another anticompetitive concerted action (e.g., bid rigging), this would be considered "the same violation" for the purposes of paragraph 12, even if the specific markets, products or participants differ. The same applies if the recurrence occurs within the category of "abuse of a dominant position." This broad interpretation of "the same violation" significantly strengthens the deterrent scope of the provision, as it penalises the tendency to engage in serious anticompetitive conduct, beyond the identical repetition of a specific act.
Table 2.6 summarises the conditions under which a company cannot benefit from the settlement procedure due to repeated infringements, as established in Article 46.1.12. It may be useful to quickly assess the applicability of the procedure in a specific situation, considering the company's compliance history.
Source: Art. 46.1 Competition Law.
No settlements have been recorded to date.
Monitoring the enforcement of AMCU decisions
The Competition Law provides that in case of non-enforcement of a competition decision, the Chairman shall issue an Order on enforcement of the decision, including the recovery of a fine. This enforcement document must be submitted to the State executive service for enforcement (art. 9 of the AMCU Law).12
During the fact-finding interviews, many stakeholders underlined that it is common for companies to change their legal nature just to avoid payment of sanctions. According to AMCU it is indeed an issue for them to collect fines because companies used to avoid payment by changing its legal nature. However, the amendments in 2023 to the Competition Law introduced joint and several liability that is aimed at reduction of such risks.
2.1.2. Alignment with international best practices in transparency and fairness in competition enforcement
The Recommendation of the Council on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement [OECD/LEGAL/0465] (OECD, 2021[1]) emphasises the importance of a transparent, fair, and effective legal framework for enforcing competition law and is key in this assessment.
Adherents are encouraged to ensure that competition laws, procedures, and enforcement guidelines are clear, publicly available, and respect the rights and obligations of all parties, including third parties.
Transparency should extend to enforcement decisions and priorities, subject to the protection of confidential information. Enforcement must be independent, impartial and professional, with competition authorities operating free from political interference and equipped with adequate resources and expertise. The enforcement process should be non-discriminatory, proportionate and consistent, meaning investigations should be reasonable in scope, decisions should be based on facts and sound legal reasoning and safeguards should be in place to prevent arbitrary actions. Timeliness is a key principle: enforcement procedures should conclude within a reasonable timeframe, with clear internal targets or statutory deadlines and parties must have enough time to respond or prepare. Throughout the process, authorities should keep the parties informed and provide meaningful opportunities to participate, including access to evidence and the ability to present a defence. Confidential and privileged information must be adequately protected, balancing transparency and the rights of the defence. Additionally, parties must have access to an impartial and independent judicial review of both procedural and final decisions, with written and reasoned rulings. Finally, Adherents are encouraged to periodically review and improve their legal and institutional frameworks to stay aligned with international best practices and ensure ongoing effectiveness in enforcing competition law. As we are going to develop, AMCU procedure is in line with these principles.
Source: OECD Recommendation of the Council on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement, OECD/LEGAL/0465, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0465, adopted on 06 October 2021.
AMCU periodically issues guidelines on enforcement tools such as information requests and inspections. Notable Guidelines include the Information Letter No. 70/01 (13.06.2019), Order No. 21-рп (07.12.2023) on inspections and Order No. 22-рп (14.12.2023) on fines.
In recent years, procedural rights for parties subject to dawn raids have been significantly strengthened, marking a positive improvement in ensuring due process and proportionality in enforcement actions. The requirement for a court warrant before conducting a dawn raid serves as a crucial safeguard, ensuring that inspections are justified and not arbitrarily executed. This enhances legal certainty for businesses and aligns AMCU practices with international standards on procedural fairness. However, a notable limitation in the current framework is that dawn raids cannot be conducted in private premises. This restriction may create an opportunity for undertakings to store sensitive documents outside their business locations, potentially undermining the effectiveness of unannounced inspections. Without the ability to search private premises, AMCU may face difficulties in retrieving key evidence, particularly in cases involving digital records or hardcopy files deliberately relocated outside business premised.
There has been a concerning decline in the number of dawn raids conducted by AMCU that the agency attributes primarily to the challenges posed by the Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. Frequent changes in the registered locations of businesses, as companies relocate to safer regions, along with the closure of many firms, have made it significantly more difficult to carry out unannounced inspections. While these extraordinary circumstances explain the temporary decline, it is crucial that AMCU remains prepared to resume proactive enforcement measures when conditions normalise. Ensuring the integrity of dawn raid powers—while balancing them with appropriate safeguards—will be essential for maintaining effective competition enforcement in the future.13
The introduction of a new leniency programme that includes a marker system is a significant step forward in enhancing the effectiveness of competition law enforcement. The marker system, which allows companies to signal their intent to apply for leniency while gathering the necessary evidence, provides greater flexibility and legal certainty for potential applicants. This improvement aligns with international best practices, making it easier for firms to come forward and co-operate with AMCU without fear of losing their place in line to another applicant. This is in line with the Recommendation of the OECD Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels [OECD/LEGAL/0452] adopted on 02 July 2019.
The previous iteration of the leniency programme did not extend the benefits of leniency to initiators and instigators of cartels. Consequently, certain applications for exemption from liability submitted in 2023 were denied on the grounds that the applicant had played an organisational role in the cartel. Additionally, AMCU has reported that the prior procedure lacked provisions enabling the Committee to impose a reduction in fines rather than granting full exemption from liability in cases where the applicant was not the first to come forward. This omission effectively disincentivised undertakings from submitting subsequent leniency applications, as they feared that failing to be the first applicant would render them ineligible for any form of leniency.
AMCU applied the new leniency programme for the first time in December 2024, marking a significant milestone in Ukraine's competition law enforcement. Notably, the fact that this new framework has already been utilised demonstrates its practical value and the willingness of companies to engage with it. By creating clearer procedural safeguards and reducing the risk of unnecessary delays, the programme strengthens incentives for cartel members to break ranks and assist in uncovering anti-competitive practices.
Nevertheless, the limited scope of AMCU’s leniency programme, which in the case of subsequent applicants, exempts only from fines but not from disqualification from public procurement or civil liability, significantly weakens its attractiveness and effectiveness. For many companies, the financial penalty may be a secondary concern compared to the long-term consequences of being barred from lucrative government contracts or facing costly civil lawsuits. These additional sanctions can be far more detrimental, discouraging firms from voluntarily disclosing anti-competitive conduct.
By failing to provide full protection against these severe repercussions, the current framework creates a strong disincentive for potential whistleblowers to co‑operate with AMCU. This, in turn, undermines the core purpose of leniency programmes—encouraging cartel members to self-report and facilitate enforcement actions. A more comprehensive approach, similar to best practices in other jurisdictions, would include broader exemptions like in the case of the first applicant. Without such reforms, the deterrence effect of the programme remains limited, as companies may conclude that the risks of applying outweigh the benefits.
While further refinements may be necessary to maximise its impact, the adoption of a more structured and predictable leniency process is undoubtedly a positive development for competition enforcement in Ukraine.
The ability of parties to object to the intervention of third parties (not accepted in the procedure) in AMCU hearings raises concerns about transparency and the effectiveness of decision-making. While ensuring that hearings remain focused and efficient is important, allowing applicants or respondents to block the participation of relevant third parties—potentially including competitors, consumer representatives, or independent experts—could limit the diversity of perspectives presented. This restriction may ultimately hinder AMCU’s ability to assess the full competitive impact of a case.
Moreover, the phrase “reasonable objections” is vague and could be interpreted in a way that unjustifiably restricts participation. Without clear criteria for what constitutes a valid objection, there is a risk that parties will use this mechanism strategically to exclude voices that may present unfavourable arguments or additional evidence. To strengthen procedural fairness and enhance the robustness of AMCU decisions, this provision should be reconsidered. A more balanced approach would be to allow third-party participation by default, subject only to clearly defined and objective grounds for exclusion, such as confidentiality concerns or demonstrable conflicts of interest. According to AMCU, in practice, all persons that show legitimate interest can be authorised in the case as a third party and hence can request the hearing. Therefore, in practice, unauthorised persons don’t have this right.
The introduction of a settlement procedure in competition cases can have a significant positive impact by promoting efficiency, expediting case resolution and reducing the administrative burden on both AMCU and the parties involved. Settlements allow for quicker enforcement actions, freeing up resources that can be redirected toward more complex investigations. Additionally, they provide businesses with an opportunity to mitigate financial penalties and reputational risks while ensuring compliance with competition law. This mechanism aligns with international best practices and, if proportionally used, enhances legal predictability, encouraging greater co‑operation between companies and regulators.
However, the provision that AMCU can only disclose information about the progress and content of settlement negotiations with the consent of the defendant could raise concerns. While confidentiality is important to ensure constructive negotiations, granting defendants full control over disclosure may undermine transparency and public trust in the process. This could create a perception that settlements are negotiated behind closed doors without adequate oversight, potentially leading to questions about fairness and consistency in enforcement. Furthermore, it may limit AMCU’s ability to communicate broader enforcement priorities and deter future violations. Striking a better balance between confidentiality and transparency could strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of the settlement procedure.
The legal framework for monetary sanctions in Ukraine is in theory well-aligned with international standards, allowing fines for competition law violations to be effective, proportionate and deterrent. Nevertheless, in practice, the current sanctioning regime under the AMCU Law raises concerns regarding its effectiveness as a deterrent. Notably, the sanctions often fail to reflect the economic significance of the infringement and may not provide a sufficient deterrent effect, particularly for large multinational firms whose operations in Ukraine represent only a fraction of their overall business activities (see below Chapter 6). Aligning the methodology for fine calculation with international best practices would enhance both the transparency and credibility of the enforcement system.
A further structural weakness in the AMCU’s sanctioning system lies in the decentralised enforcement by territorial offices, which are limited by law to imposing only minimal fines—not exceeding the equivalent of approx. EUR 1 500. As a result, a significant share of competition law enforcement in Ukraine is carried out through sanctions that are manifestly insufficient to deter anti-competitive conduct. The system determines that relevant cases will be sent to the central offices but in practice the number of cases solved by the territorial bodies is high and can’t be deterrent. This fragmentation and the systematically low level of penalties undermine both the credibility of enforcement actions and the overall effectiveness of the competition regime. Without a meaningful increase in the sanctioning powers of these offices, or a more centralised approach to serious infringements, the system risks being perceived by market participants as symbolic rather than substantive.
Also, when it comes to debarment from public procurement, the current system lacks flexibility, as AMCU does not have the authority to define the scope and duration of such measures. This rigid approach risks imposing excessively harsh penalties in some cases while failing to adequately deter misconduct in others. First, there could be circumvention by the companies: the absence of legal provisions preventing companies from re-entering the market under a different name may unintentionally incentivise formal restructuring to circumvent sanctions, thereby weakening the effectiveness of the measure and undermining the intended deterrent effect. Second, there could be unintended consequences for competition in tenders. Where the competition authority lacks discretion in applying exclusion measures, such provisions—if implemented without regard to market structure or firm-level compliance efforts—may, at least in the short term, reduce the pool of eligible bidders. This could risk limiting competition in future tenders, particularly in markets with high concentration or limited entry barriers, unless robust compliance incentives and effective market-opening measures are also pursued. Granting AMCU the discretion to tailor debarment sanctions based on the severity of the infringement, the level of intent and the potential harm to competition would enhance both fairness and effectiveness. A more nuanced application of these restrictions would ensure that penalties remain proportionate while still serving as a strong deterrent against anti-competitive behaviour. Aligning the system with international best practices would also improve legal certainty for businesses while maintaining a strong enforcement framework.
2.2.1. Main enforcement activities
Analytical framework for assessing anticompetitive agreements
Definition and Scope of Anticompetitive Agreements. The Competition Law provides a comprehensive framework for identifying illicit agreements, adopting a broad interpretation that encompasses various forms of collusion regardless of their legal classification. In particular, it defines “concerted actions” expansively, covering any form of co‑ordination between undertakings that may distort competitive dynamics. Article 5 of the Law establishes that concerted actions include both formal and informal agreements between undertakings, decisions made by associations of undertakings and any other form of co‑ordinated conduct—whether explicit or tacit and whether active or passive in nature. Furthermore, the establishment of a new undertaking or association with the purpose or effect of co‑ordinating competitive behaviour among its founding members, or between them and the new entity, is also regarded as a concerted action.14
While the Competition Law does not provide a standalone definition of “cartels,” it enumerates a set of practices that align closely with those universally recognised as hard-core infringements in OECD standards (see, for example, the OECD Recommendation on Fighting Hard Core Cartels [OECD/LEGAL/0452] (2019[2])). These practices are typically associated with significant reductions in consumer welfare and overall market efficiency. They include:
price-fixing and the establishment of trading conditions for the sale or purchase of goods or services
limiting output, market entry, investment, or technological development, or otherwise exercising control over these parameters
market or supply allocation based on geographic areas, product categories, sales volumes, or customer segments
bid rigging, including collusive arrangements in auctions, tenders and public procurement processes
actions aimed at restricting or excluding competitors from the market
application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, thereby placing certain undertakings at a competitive disadvantage
conditioning agreements to unrelated supplementary obligations that are not justified by market practices or economic efficiency, and
imposing restrictions that significantly lessen competition in the absence of objective justification.
This legal framework ensures a robust basis for addressing a wide range of collusive behaviours, aligning national enforcement priorities with established international norms.
The actual drafting of Competition Law covers the distinction between anticompetitive agreements that are considered harmful by their very nature (“by object”) and those whose impact must be assessed in light of their actual or potential effects on competition (“by effect”). Article 6 of the Law mentions practices that “have led or may lead to” restrictions of competition. The new proposed wording of art. 6 goes in the good direction clearly mentioning practices that “by their object or by their effect have led or may lead to” a prevention or restriction to competition.15
The Competition Law contains some exemptions:
Art. 10 of the Competition Law determines that businesses engaged in agreements may obtain permission from AMCU if they can demonstrate that their actions fulfil one of those requirements:
improvement of production
purchase or sale of goods – enhancing efficiency in manufacturing, distribution, or sales
technical, technological and economic progress –
supporting innovation and advancements in technology and business operations
development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – helping smaller businesses compete and grow, optimisation of exports or imports –
improving trade efficiency and international competitiveness
development and application of unified technical standards – ensuring consistency and compatibility in products; production rationalisation –
reducing waste and improving resource allocation.
AMCU will not permit concerted actions if they result in a significant restriction of competition in the entire market or in a major part of it. This ensures that exemptions are not granted in cases that could lead to significant restriction to market competition.
Art. 8 of the Competition Law provides exceptions to the general prohibition on anticompetitive concerted actions, allowing certain restrictions between participants under specific conditions. A supplier may regulate how a buyer uses its goods, including whether they can use competitors’ products and may also limit the buyer’s ability to purchase or sell goods to certain entities. Additionally, agreements must not involve unrelated goods and suppliers may impose conditions on resale pricing and contractual terms. However, these exceptions do not apply if the concerted actions significantly restrict competition, lead to monopolisation, block market access, or cause unjustified price increases or shortages. In such cases, the actions remain subject to scrutiny and potential prohibition. This article was an attempt to create a safe harbour for vertical agreements in 2001. Considering that this article was not in line with international practices, AMCU decided to adapt the enforcement practice through bylaws.16 In 2017, AMCU adopted the “Typical Requirements for Vertical Concerted Actions of Undertakings Regarding the Supply and Use of Goods” as of 12 October 2017 (No. 10-рп). At the moment, Art. 8 is not applicable and AMCU applies this Order instead. The OECD understands that Art. 8 will be excluded from Competition Law in the next legislation reform.
Agreements on the transfer of intellectual property rights or on the use of an object of intellectual property rights to the extent that they restrict the economic activity of the party to the agreement to which the right is transferred, if such restrictions do not go beyond the legal rights of the subject of intellectual property rights (Art. 9 of the Competition Law).
Other agreements that meet the requirements of categories of exemptions established by AMCU in bylaws.17
The “Typical Requirements for Concerted Actions of Undertakings for General Exemption from Prior Authorisation (approved by AMCU Resolution No. 27-р, 12 February 2002) establishes that agreements between companies offering services/products in the same or different markets, may be undertaken without prior AMCU authorisation, provided that they do not raise significant competition concerns if they fulfil cumulatively these requirements:18
None of the involved undertakings holds a dominant position in any relevant product market or possesses exclusive rights granted by state or local authorities.
The aggregate market share of all participants in horizontal agreements or agreements that include horizontal and vertical constraints (mixed) does not exceed 15% in any relevant market, or
The aggregate market share of participants in different markets does not exceed 20% in any relevant product market.19
This exemption does not extend to horizontal or mixed concerted actions concerning:
setting prices (tariffs) for the sale or purchase of goods
division of market or sources of supply by territorial principle, assortment of goods, volume of their sale or purchase, by the scope of sellers, buyers, or consumers, or by other principle
restriction, including cessation, of the production of goods or the sale or purchase of goods
distortion of the results of bidding, auctions, competitions, tenders.
The prohibitions of the Law are not applied to any agreements of small or medium-sized entrepreneurs regarding the joint purchase of goods that do not lead to a significant restriction of competition and contribute to the competitiveness of small or medium-sized entrepreneurs (Articles 6 and 7 of the Competition Law).
Ukraine defines micro, small and medium enterprises as enterprises who meet at least two of the following criteria:
balance sheet value of assets - up to and including EUR 350 000
net income from sales of products (goods, works, services) - up to and including EUR 700 000
average number of employees - up to and including 10 people.
Small enterprises are enterprises that do not meet the criteria for microenterprises and whose indicators, as of the date of preparation of the annual financial statements for the preceding year, meet at least two of the following criteria:
balance sheet value of assets - up to and including EUR 4 million
net income from sales of products (goods, works or services) - up to and including EUR 8 million
average number of employees - up to and including 50 people.
Medium enterprises are enterprises that do not meet the criteria for small enterprises and who meet at least two of the following criteria:
balance sheet value of assets - up to and including EUR 20 million
net income from sales of products (goods, works or services) - up to and including EUR 40 million
average number of employees - up to and including 250 people.
For the purposes of the Competition Law, the definition from Article 1 of the LPEC is applied, namely: SME - an undertaking whose revenue from the sale of products (goods, works or services) for the last financial year or the value of assets does not exceed the amount equivalent to EUR 500 000, determined at the exchange rate of the National Bank of Ukraine effective on the last day of the financial year, if there are competitors with a significantly larger market share in the markets in which this undertaking operates.
Source: Law of Ukraine on Accounting and Financial Reporting, Law No. 996-XIV dated 16 July 1999.
Certain market participants and types of business structures are also exempt from prior authorisation requirements under specific conditions. This includes:
self-regulatory organisations in the securities market, if they do not restrict competition and operate in compliance with regulatory requirements20
associations of undertakings that do not restrict competition among their members and whose establishment has received prior approval from AMCU.
Modifications to approved concerted actions that do not alter the fundamental competitive dynamics—such as changes in ownership structure, decision-making processes, or financial distributions—are also exempt from additional authorisation requirements. Similarly, the withdrawal of undertakings from associations is exempt from prior authorisation of AMCU authorisation.
In principle, the Ukrainian Competition Law applies uniformly across all sectors of the economy. However, in response to the ongoing full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation, Ukraine has adopted temporary amendments to its Competition Law to address pressing national defence requirements. Two notable amendments have been introduced via changes to the Transitional Provisions of the Law:
1. Exemption for Compulsory Seizure of Property (Law No. 3138 of 30 May 2023): This amendment introduced Clause 4-6 to the Transitional Provisions, stipulating that the provisions of Part Two of Article 22—which define actions qualifying as concentrations—do not apply to procedures involving the compulsory seizure in Ukraine of property rights belonging to the Russian Federation and its residents. These procedures are conducted in accordance with the “Law of Ukraine on the Basic Principles of Compulsory Seizure in Ukraine of Objects of Property Rights of the Russian Federation and its Residents.”
2. Temporary Exemption for Defense-Related Foreign Concentrations (Law No. 3613 of 20 March 2024): Clause 4-7 was added to the Transitional Provisions to support Ukraine’s defence capacity during martial law. Specifically, for the duration of martial law and 90 days thereafter, the provisions of Parts One and Seven of Article 24—which concern the notification and prohibition of concentrations without prior approval of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU)—do not apply to concentrations meeting the following criteria:
The transaction is conducted between undertakings outside Ukraine for the purpose of developing and producing military or dual-use goods and technologies for deployment in Ukraine.
The final recipients and/or purchasers of such goods or technologies are exclusively the Armed Forces of Ukraine, law enforcement agencies, military formations, the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection, military administrations, or other entities involved in national defence or counterterrorism efforts.
The relevant technologies or products are either not produced domestically or are produced in insufficient quantities to meet Ukraine’s defence needs.
The acquiring undertaking is active in markets related to the development, production, sale, or procurement of military products, military services, or dual-use technologies.
These exemptions reflect the Ukrainian government’s efforts to reconcile the enforcement of competition rules with urgent national security imperatives, while ensuring that such measures remain temporary and targeted in nature.
Source: Information by AMCU.
According to information on decisions made by AMCU’s central office in 2024, 26 decisions on permission of concerted action were granted.
Source: Based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire
Horizontal agreements with special reference to bid rigging
AMCU’s bylaws contain a definition of horizontal agreements.21 Until 2020, some cases of horizontal agreements were sanctioned by AMCU.
On 30 March 2021, AMCU adopted a landmark decision imposing a fine of UAH 4.7 billion (equivalent to EUR 143 million) for anticompetitive concerted practices in the retail market for light petroleum products. The infringement involved co‑ordination among fuel suppliers and 169 gas station operators in relation to the pricing of light petroleum products.
The case was based on the "AVIAS" project, a nationwide system facilitating non-cash transactions through scratch cards and fuel cards under the "AVIAS" brand. Approximately 1 625 gas stations—operating under various commercial brands and representing nearly 25% of the Ukrainian fuel retail market—participated in this scheme across all regions of the country.
Following an extensive investigation, AMCU concluded that the "AVIAS" project functioned as a platform for price co‑ordination and alignment of trading practices among its participants. Evidence indicated that identical prices for gasoline and diesel were implemented simultaneously across the entire network, irrespective of brand or geographic location. AMCU further identified the existence of a central co‑ordinating structure (“the Centre”), composed of legal and natural persons occupying managerial and executive roles across multiple participating entities. These individuals frequently interchanged roles and operated from overlapping or identical registered addresses.
Moreover, a significant degree of contractual uniformity was observed among the participants—covering the supply of petroleum products, the lease of fuel stations and other commercial arrangements—suggesting a high level of operational interdependence. The composition of participating legal entities also appeared to change over time, while the underlying personal involvement remained constant, often involving the same liquidators and registered business addresses.
AMCU also determined that fuel station operators within the AVIAS network procured petroleum products from PJSC1 “Ukrtatnafta” at prices exceeding those of comparable imported fuel. This practice further reinforced the co‑ordinated nature of the scheme, resulting in a distortion of competitive conditions in the fuel retail market and restricting effective price competition among fuel retailers.
AMCU concluded that the pricing conduct within the AVIAS network constituted anticompetitive concerted practices, in violation of national competition law.
Since its adoption, the decision has been subject to legal challenge. One of the central issues under judicial review concerns the AMCU's reliance on evidence derived from a pre-trial investigation conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. In addition, ongoing forensic examinations have contributed to delays in reaching a final resolution of the case.
1. PJSC "Ukrnafta" is the largest oil producer in Ukraine. The company's structure includes two business units "Ukrnafta East" and "Ukrnafta West" (which include six oil and gas production divisions and three gas treatment plants), “Oilfield Services Division” (which provides a full range of services to the petroleum industry) and “Ukrnafta Drilling Division” (engaged in exploration and production drilling).
Source: AMCU news item: https://amcu.gov.ua/news/komitet-prijnyav-rishennya-shchodo-antikonkurentnih-uzgodzhenih-dij-na-rinku-palnogo; AMCU decision No. 178-р from 30 March 2021, https://amcu.gov.ua/npas/pro-porushennya-zakonodavstva-pro-zahist-ekonomichnoyi-konkurenciyi-ta-nakladennya-shtrafu-187 and OpenDataBot, Court documents in case No. 910/8100/21 https://court.opendatabot.ua/cause/910%2F8100%2F21.
In recent years, the enforcement efforts of AMCU have concentrated almost exclusively on addressing competition infringements in public procurement. According to AMCU’s 2024 Annual Report, all cases classified as “concerted actions” involved bid rigging. This focus reflects the critical role of public procurement in Ukraine’s economy and the heightened risks of collusion in this sector (AMCU, 2024[3]).
Regional and Central Office
Note: * One case including two types of infringement.
Source: Based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire.
Note: Cases including two types of infringement.
Source: Based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire.
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that more than 90% of the cases are decided by territorial agencies.
As shown in Table 2.10 below, the number of cases open by AMCU is very high. There is no distinction among cases open by Territorial and Central offices.
Source: Based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire.
AMCU reports cases of agreements based on reference to infringements (or tenders affected) as showed in Table 2.11 below.
Source: Based on AMCU annual reports.
As discussed in Chapter 6, tackling public procurement violations has been a key enforcement priority for AMCU in recent years. Ukraine has developed a sophisticated public procurement framework, including the ProZorro e-procurement system, which enhances transparency and facilitates monitoring. This system enables AMCU to access procurement data, allowing for both competition-based analysis—to detect collusion and market distortions—and administrative oversight, given AMCU’s additional role in reviewing public procurement from a regulatory compliance perspective. The number of complaints in this area is exceptionally high, exceeding 14 000 in some years, underscoring the scale of potential irregularities (OECD, 2021[4]). While a significant proportion of cases fall outside the scope of competition law enforcement, a considerable number involve clear competition infringements, justifying AMCU’s strong focus on this sector.
An independent review of AMCU’s central office decisions in 2024 on the website found that all 58 cases involving agreements concerned bid rigging in public procurement. This underscores the agency’s strong focus on tackling collusion in this sector. Notably, the majority of bid rigging decisions are issued by AMCU’s regional offices, reflecting a decentralised enforcement approach. It is relevant to remind that, as explained before, there is a drastic limit of sanctions that those territorial offices can impose. Even when the regional offices can refer cases to the central body if they consider that the relevance of the case requires a higher level of deterrence, it needs to be underlined that more than 90% of the cases of AMCU are in the former years decided by the regional offices.
The 2024 AMCU Annual Report, confirmed this nationwide enforcement trend, highlighting the persistent risks of collusion in public procurement across Ukraine. Most of the cases of big rigging, even solved by the Central AMCU body, involve only two companies.
EUROMEDTECHNIKA (Decision No. 481-r of 5 December 2024)
Conduct: AMCU found that LLC EUROMEDTECHNIKA and LLC MEDGRUP engaged in bid rigging in public procurement tenders for medical equipment. The investigation revealed co‑ordinated behaviour during 15 procurement procedures held between 4 January 2020 and 1 December 2021. Evidence included:
communication during bidding periods
use of the same IP addresses
common suppliers and notary services
price offers with similar margin structures that enabled them to simulate competition
shared economic interests. These practices were found to violate Articles 6.4 and 50.1 of the Competition Law.
Sanctions:
LLC EUROMEDTECHNIKA: fined UAH 4 205 954 (equivalent to EUR 96 237)
LLC MEDGRUP: fined UAH 4 180 288 (equivalent to EUR 95 649)
ALMAZ-2005 (Decision No. 463-r of 21 November 2024)
Conduct: AMCU established that LLC "ALFA SB" and PE "ALMAZ – 2005" engaged in bid rigging during a public tender conducted by JSC "UKRPOSHTA" via the "Prozorro" platform for the procurement of property security services. The two undertakings co‑ordinated their behaviour both before and during the tender process, thereby distorting competition and violating Article 6.4 and 50.1 of the Competition Law. Evidence of co‑ordination included:
use of the same IP addresses for banking operations and tax reporting
use of the same email and telephone numbers for official communication
synchronised submission of tender proposals on the same day
identical metadata in electronic tender documents
direct and indirect financial links, including financial assistance between the companies
business and personal ties through third parties, including mutual service providers and income flows
active communication during the tender process.
Sanctions:
LLC "ALFA SB": fined UAH 932 750 (equivalent to EUR 21 411)
PE "ALMAZ – 2005": fined UAH 294 665 (equivalent to EUR 6 764)
Source. Analysis of AMCU cases for 2024 and Report on the Activities of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine for 2024 https://amcu.gov.ua/pro-nas/zvitnist/richni-zviti/zvit-2024.
Cases of bid rigging where more than two companies were involved
Decision 527 - AMCU established links between defendants (use of same addresses, same ultimate beneficiaries and employees, use of same phones, IP-addresses, etc.) and communication between them.
Decision 91- р/тк – Defendants mostly did not win tenders for certain lots. A defendant won only two lots out of six. One of those wins happened given that AMCU findings state that documents were not in line with the requirements. During the investigation, AMCU discovered that one of the defendants filed as supporting documentation copies of contracts with one of its counterparts. However, upon AMCU inquiry this counterpart stated that it had never had contractual relationship with the defendant and there is no info in books (ledgers) about such transactions with it. The AMCU’s decision doesn’t state if this information on alleged forgery was submitted for investigation to law enforcement authorities.
Decision 542 – Case against 14 defendants affecting different tenders between 2016-2018 where two or three defendants took part in each procurement. There are many cover offers. If there is only one participant in a tender such procurement has to be called off and announced again. To avoid this and ensure being awarded contracts entities agreed that one of them would also apply but would not participate in the bidding process. Hence there were two applicants for public procurement and one of them won. The employee of one of the entities after successful procurement moved to another company and acquired 100 of the shares. They created a company on the day tender was announced.
Source: AMCU website.
AMCU claims that the fines imposed for bid rigging violations by the Central body of AMCU typically range between 6-7% of the infringer’s “revenue” in the year preceding the violation. AMCU has confirmed that the highest fine for one undertaking, namely LLC "ВІЗИТ", was 363 837 557 UAH which does not reach the equivalent to EUR 12 million in the date of the infringement. The majority of fines remain extremely low, especially in the case of those imposed by the regional offices where the legal cap is, as discussed, extremely low.
Vertical restraints
Vertical agreements are defined in AMCU’s Resolution No. 10-рп 12.10.2017 as practices involving two or more economic entities that operate at different levels of the production or supply chain and whose participants may buy, sell or resell individual goods. They include non-compete clauses, resale price maintenance, territorial restrictions and exclusive distribution clauses, and contracts of agency or commercial mediation.
Agency or commercial mediation contracts are not considered vertical agreements if the agent does not bear, or bears only minimal, commercial or financial risks. However, they are classified as vertical agreements if the agent takes on significant risks, such as covering supply costs, paying for advertising, storing goods at their own expense, providing repair or warranty services, investing in equipment or training without full reimbursement, assuming liability for product-related damages or buyer defaults, or covering other market-related costs imposed by the represented business.
Vertical concerted actions are allowed without prior approval by AMCU, provided that the following conditions are met:22
if the supplier's share of the market on which he sells the contract goods does not exceed 30% and the buyer's share of the market on which he purchases the contract goods does not exceed 30%. 23
If a vertical agreement exists between a contractor and a subcontractor when the subcontractor exclusively produces goods for the contractor using technology or equipment provided by the contractor. The only exception is if the subcontractor is restricted from conducting its own research and development or producing goods for others.
The exemption from the requirement to obtain prior AMCU approval shall not apply in cases when:
vertical concerted practices are concluded between competing economic entities: this means that while the agreements may be related to vertical relations, the undertakings both can be represented at the same markets.
vertical concerted practices contain hardcore vertical restraints, which directly or indirectly, independently or in combination with other factors over which the participants in such practices have a decisive influence, have as their object:
restrictions on the buyer's ability to determine the selling price of the contract goods, with the exception of actions by the supplier to determine the maximum or recommended selling price, if this does not lead to the establishment of fixed or minimum selling prices as a result of pressure from one of the participants in the concerted actions or benefits (incentives) offered by such participant
restrictions on the territory or circle of customers within which or to whom the buyer may sell the contract goods, except for restrictions on the location of the buyer24
contain any direct or indirect obligation not to compete, the validity period of which is not specified or exceeds five years
contain direct or indirect obligations for the buyer not to produce, purchase, sell or resell goods after the termination of the agreement (contract)
contain any direct or indirect obligation of a participant in a selective supply system not to sell goods sold under the signs for goods and services (trademarks) of specific economic entities that are competitors of the supplier.
Even not very common or recent, there are some relevant vertical cases solved by AMCU, as seen in Box 2.8.
DECISION, No. 377-r, 2 August 2018
Parties Involved: Roche Ukraine LLC (Kyiv), BaDM LLC (Dnipro), Business Center Pharmacy LLC (Vyshgorod, Kyiv region) and Alba Ukraine PJSC (Boryspil, Kyiv region)
Infringement: AMCU found that Roche Ukraine LLC and its distributors (BaDM LLC, Business Center Pharmacy LLC and Alba Ukraine PJSC) engaged in these anti-competitive concerted actions:
setting inflated prices for medicines manufactured by F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd
manipulating pricing mechanisms through bonuses that were not reflected in the nominal cost of medicines sold through public procurement procedures
establishing non-transparent pricing practices that led to unjustified overpricing of medicines sold through state or public procurement procedures.
Key Characteristics of the restraint:
1. Nature of the relationship: The anti-competitive actions involved agreements between Roche Ukraine LLC (the importer and representative of F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd) and its distributors (BaDM LLC, Business Center Pharmacy LLC and Alba Ukraine PJSC).
2. Mechanism of the violation: Roche Ukraine LLC controlled the pricing mechanisms by providing bonuses to distributors, which were not reflected in the nominal prices of medicines sold through public procurement procedures. This allowed for inflated prices and restricted competition downstream in the distribution and public procurement markets.
3. Impact on competition: The restraint affected the pricing and competition in the distribution and public procurement markets, where distributors were able to sell medicines at inflated prices without actively competing.
Legal Grounds: Art. 6.1.2 and 50.1 of the Competition Law
Sanctions:
1. Roche Ukraine LLC: UAH 5 407 948 (equivalent to EUR 171 491) for actions with BaDM LLC; UAH 3 207 361 (equivalent to EUR 101 708) for actions with Business Center Pharmacy LLC; UAH 500 508 (equivalent to EUR 15 872) for actions with Alba Ukraine PJSC
2. BaDM LLC: UAH 5 407 948 (equivalent to EUR 171 491)
3. Business Center Pharmacy LLC: UAH 3 207 361 (equivalent to EUR 101 708)
Alba Ukraine PJSC: UAH 339 999 (equivalent to EUR 10 782)
Decision No. 697-r, 10 October 2019
Parties involved:
Manufacturers: Philip Morris Sales and Distribution LLC, Philip Morris Ukraine PJSC, JT International Ukraine PJSC, JT International Company Ukraine PRJSC, Imperial Tobacco Production Ukraine PJSC, Imperial Tobacco Ukraine PzII, British American Tobacco Sales and Marketing Ukraine LLC, and A/T Tobacco Company VAT-Pryluky PJSC.
Distributor: TEDIS Ukraine LLC.
Description of the facts: The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine investigated the cigarette distribution market in Ukraine from 2010 to 2016. It found that the Manufacturers engaged in anti-competitive concerted actions by maintaining exclusive contractual relations with TEDIS Ukraine LLC as the sole distributor of cigarettes. This behaviour restricted access to the primary sales market for other business entities by creating artificial barriers, such as inflated requirements for potential distributors. TEDIS Ukraine LLC monopolised the cigarette distribution market, holding over 99% of the market share by 2013. Manufacturers failed to respond to the monopolisation and continued their exclusive co‑operation with TEDIS Ukraine LLC, further solidifying its dominant position.
Infringement: Art. 6.1.5 and 50.1 of the Competition Law. In this case, the Manufacturers (cigarette producers) and TEDIS Ukraine LLC (distributor) engaged in exclusive contractual relations, restricting access to the primary sales market for other distributors.
Sanctions: The Antimonopoly Committee imposed fines totalling UAH 6 523 001 000 (equivalent to EUR 240 486 392) on the parties involved and ordered them to cease the violation.
Decision No. 680-r, 3 November 2020
Parties involved: Novo Nordisk A/S (Denmark), Novo Nordisk Health Care AG (Switzerland), Medfarcom LLC (Ukraine), Medfarcom-Center PrJSC (Ukraine), BaDM LLC (Ukraine), BaDM-B LLC (Ukraine), Pharmacy 3I LLC (Ukraine), Hansa PrJSC (Ukraine), Pharmadis LLC (Ukraine) and Medpharm LLC (Ukraine).
Description of the facts: AMCU investigated anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical market involving Novo Nordisk and its distributors from 2011 to 2017. The investigation revealed:
non-transparent pricing mechanisms, leading to inflated medicine prices
recommended resale prices, providing competitive advantages to certain distributors
selective free supply of medicines to healthcare institutions to ensure future demand
reporting and control mechanisms enabling Novo Nordisk to monitor pricing and market behaviour
currency fluctuation compensation mechanisms, further inflating prices.
Type of infringement: Art. 6.1.5 and 50.1 of the Competition Law.
Sanctions: UAH 188 130 255 (equivalent to 5 650 966 EUR).
Source: Information sent by AMCU.
Abuse of dominance
Definitions
According to Article 12 of the Competition Law, a firm is considered to hold a monopoly if it has no competitors in a market. Alternatively, a firm is dominant when it does not face significant competition due to limited access by other firms on this market to factors of production and distribution, such as raw materials or supplies; or when there are entry barriers for other firms; or when the dominant firm benefits from privileges. The list is not exhaustive and the Law allows for other factors to be taken into account when defining dominance.
The law specifies rebuttable presumptions for dominance.25 A firm with more than 35% of market share is deemed to have a dominant position. This presumption, however, can be rebutted if the firm demonstrates that it is subject to significant competition. And vice versa, a firm can be dominant if its market share is less than 35% if it does not face a significant degree of competition. This situation is deemed to be even more plausible if the market shares of the competitors are relatively small.
The law sets out a rebuttable presumption for collective dominance in Article 12.5. Each of several firms is presumed dominant if the aggregate share of the three largest firms in the same relevant market exceeds 50% (or 70% for five largest firms).
Types of abuses
Abuse of dominance is defined as an action (or failure to act) of a dominant firm leading or having the capability to lead to the prevention, elimination or restriction of competition. Moreover, the law qualifies as abuse of dominance actions and inactions that have led or have the potential to lead to “infringement of the interests of other undertakings or consumers”.
The law sets out a list of practices that are considered abusive. The list is introduced by “namely”, suggesting that it is an exhaustive list, but AMCU has submitted that the list is purely indicative underlying that instead of “namely” the rule should say “in particular”. The practices include the following, among others:
setting prices or other conditions for the acquisition or sale of goods that would not have been possible to set in the presence of significant competition in the market
applying different prices or different other conditions to equivalent transactions with undertakings, sellers, or buyers without objectively justified reasons
making agreements conditional on the undertaking's assumption of additional obligations that are not related to the subject matter of the agreement by their nature or in accordance with trade and other fair economic activities; […]
partial or complete refusal to acquisition or sell goods in the absence of alternative sources of sale or acquisition; […]
AMCU has indicated that it is a list of practices that are presumed harmful and do not require proving anticompetitive effects. It is sufficient for AMCU to show that there is a probability of harm to competition for conduct to be qualified as a violation of competition law.
While there is no concept of economic dependence in the current competition law, an abuse of more favourable bargaining position may be introduced in the context of ongoing reforms of the competition policy framework in Ukraine.26
Practice
Between 2019 and 2023, AMCU issued 114 decisions, out of which 107 were closed with sanctions and the remaining without sanctions because of insufficient evidence of an infringement or because the infringement was brought to an end and there were no damages caused (Art. 46 of the Competition Law).
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of decisions over time. The settlements procedure, which can also be used in abuse of dominance cases, was introduced in 2023 and has not yet been applied in practice.27
Investigations on the right-hand axis and decisions on the left-hand axis
Note: Investigations opened on the right-hand axis, decisions on the left-hand axis.
Source: OECD, based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire.
The sectoral departments are responsible for abuse of dominance cases. The case teams may involve, upon the request, the representatives of the Economic Analysis Division, Legal Department and International Co‑operation Unit.
In its assessment of abuse of dominance cases, AMCU defines the relevant market and then reaches a conclusion on the dominant position of the company or the companies. It finally assesses the conduct to determine if there is an abuse. While it is not required under the current law to analyse effects of the conduct, AMCU analyses them in many decisions.
The AMCU adopted Decision No. 694-р from 21 December 2021 on violations in the form of abuse of a monopoly (dominant) position by a group of undertakings (Interstach Ukraine LLC, Dniprovsky KPC PJSC, Interncorn PJSC) on the national market for the primary sale of corn starch syrup and glucose syrups. The violations consisted of unjustified price increases for molasses and syrups in April-June 2018, February-March 2019 and October 2020. In 2018‑2020, different conditions were imposed on equivalent agreements with buyers of this product without justified reasons. In this decision, AMCU came to the following conclusions regarding the effects of the conduct:
"The Group's behaviour described above, from the perspective of its objectives, can be assessed as anti-competitive and exploitative, as it led to two negative consequences for competition: (i) by setting dumping prices for its products (compared to other contractors), it caused AMILKO LLC to lose orders under the contract with [confidential information]; […] it provided short-term advantages to [confidential information] compared to other confectionery manufacturers by setting significantly lower prices for it. " (paragraph 436 of the decision).
Decision No. 723-р from 29 December 2021 decided on an abuse of dominant position by JSC “Dniproazot” concerning the suspension of liquid chlorine production. During the analysis AMCU concluded that, during 2017-2019, Dniproazot was the only company producing liquid chlorine in Ukraine, with shares of 99%, 78% and 68% respectively. At the same time, importers accounted for only 1% of the market at the time chlorine production was halted (before June 2018). Since the maximum reserves of liquid chlorine in water utilities could not exceed 15-30% of daily demand, some of them found themselves in a crisis situation due to limited chlorine reserves. Water utilities had no alternative sources of supply, as they were unable to quickly change their supplier of liquid chlorine and importers did not supply the domestic market with liquid chlorine in the required volumes.
Source: AMCU.
Market definition
In 2002, AMCU published a methodology on market definition and assessment of dominance.28 The methodology defines a market as products circulating in Ukraine or a part of its territory, which have similar characteristics for sellers and buyers. It provides guidance on defining product, geographic and time boundaries of relevant markets.
For identifying product boundaries, AMCU starts with the product that is the object of the complaint or the investigation and looks for interchangeable products. The assessment of which products are interchangeable involves taking into accounts factors such as product functionalities and quality, its technical and operational characteristics, specific requirements for transportation and installation and lack of significant price differences. The guidance distinguishes between standardised and differentiated products.
The identification of the relevant geographic market is carried out by identifying the smallest territory beyond which a consumer would find it “either impossible or not feasible” (section 6.1 of the methodology) to buy the interchangeable products within the product boundaries. Box 2.10 provides an example of market definition in the Dniproazot case.
The methodology lists the types and sources of information that AMCU can use to define markets and assess dominance. In addition to statistical and administrative data already held by other state entities, AMCU can collect additional information to carry out its investigations, for instance through surveys of consumers and of buyers.
In 2021, AMCU fined Dniproazot for abuse of dominance in the supply of liquid chlorine used for disinfection of drinking water and for wastewater treatment. The conduct consisted in charging excessive prices and in interrupting the supply of liquid chlorine.
To define the relevant market, AMCU analysed the use of the product and the available alternatives for water disinfection, the sales channels and prices, it consulted technical state bodies and investigated in detail the demand side, through a survey of water companies. The latter were asked about the extent of substitutability between liquid chlorine and other chemicals, the costs and the duration of a potential transition away from chlorine. AMCU also conducted a review of the legislation that sets requirements and technical standards for water disinfection.
AMCU requested company information about the volumes of production and sale of chemical reagents that can be used for the disinfection of drinking water and wastewater treatment, sales prices, and information about the production technology of liquid chlorine and potential interchangeable substances.
AMCU defined one relevant market for liquid chlorine. The geographic market was defined as the territory of Ukraine, taking account of the absence of barriers to transportation, price similarities in the different regions and the distribution of buyers across the country. In line with the 2022 methodology, AMCU tested the degree of openness of the market to interregional and international trade, concluding the market coincided with the territory of Ukraine.
Source: Decision of AMCU No. 723-р of 29 December 2021 in the case of abuse of monopoly (dominant) position against JSC Dniproazot, https://amcu.gov.ua/npas/pro-porushennya-zakonodavstva-pro-zahist-ekonomichnoyi-konkurenciyi-ta-nakladennya-shtrafu-298.
Assessment of dominance
The methodology sets out the steps that AMCU can undertake to assess dominance. After defining the relevant product and geographic market, the assessment involves the identification of the volume of goods in the market, the calculation of firms’ market shares on the basis of volume of sales, the compilation of a list of suppliers, consumers and potential competitors, and the identification of barriers to entry and exit.29
In practice, dominant firms usually have more than 35% market share. Despite the presumption of dominance, AMCU still assesses factors such as firms’ market shares and their stability over time, switching costs, the ability of the firm to increase prices without losing profit and regulatory restrictions. Specific factors depend on each individual case and are not limited to those listed in the competition law. For example, in the decision about Interstarch Ukraine, Dnirpovsy and Intercorn in the market for corn starch molasses and glucose syrups, AMCU considered that the presumption of dominance was confirmed by the persistence of high market shares, the ability of the group of companies to set its own terms of sale and to maintain non-transparent prices, the limited access of competing firms to corn grain processing services, high barriers to entry and the significant share of the group in a vertically related market.
There may also be situations in which a firm with more than 35% is not dominant. In a 2023 decision, AMCU concluded that mobile operator Kyivstar was not dominant, despite holding a 35% market share (AMCU, 2024[5]).
In the past AMCU issued decisions of abuse of collective dominance. There are no publicly available versions of those cases.
Findings and sanctions
In 2024, AMCU’s central office issued eight abuse of dominance decisions, in the gas, electricity, water supply, waste management, ports services and rescue services sectors. Between 2019 and 2023, most decisions have concerned network industries, often SOEs, industrial products, such as chemicals and energy. Several of these decisions concern SOEs or companies owned by municipalities, for conduct that often results in exploitative abuses (see Box 2.11).
AMCU has issued several abuse of dominance decisions against SOEs over the years.
In 2023, AMCU issued a decision against a company owned by the municipality of Kyiv (Kyivtransparkservice), which was the sole operator for collecting parking fees and issuing season tickets for parking vehicles in Kyiv. The abuse consisted in charging unreasonable prices that would not have been possible in the presence of effective competition. The fine amounted to UAH 3 300 000 (equivalent to EUR 78 184).
In 2020, Ukrainian Railways (the monopolist state-owned rail network operator) was fined UAH 18 282400 (equivalent to 526 270 EUR) for abusing its dominant position in the freight transportation market by imposing an unjustified service fee for the delivery and removal of railcars at low-activity freight railway stations. The latter was a classification unilaterally introduced by Ukrainian Railways, resulting in almost one third of freight stations to be classified as low-activity and subject to the unjustified fee. The decision was appealed but upheld by the courts, including the Supreme Court.
In 2018, Ukrainian Railways was fined UAH 760 390 (equivalent to 23 976 EUR) for abuse of dominant position in the market of operating railway bridges on a specific portion of the Dnipro river. The conduct consisted in refusal to supply (failure to raise the bridge), which had the potential of harming the interests of other companies and which would not have been possible if there were significant competition and in charging excessive prices that would not have been possible if there were effective competition.
In 2018, AMCU adopted a decision based on the results of the case consideration, which acknowledged that in 2016 and 2017, the State Enterprise "National Information Systems" (NaIS) occupied a monopoly (dominant) position in the national market for the provision of services for access to and use of the Unified and State Registers, which are held by the Ministry of Justice. Inter alia, it was determined that the actions of the NaIS in 2017 regarding the establishment of conditions for granting notaries access to the State Register of Civil Status Acts of Citizens only in case of payment for connection to this register, which has already been paid for connection to the Systems constituted abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the national market of these services.
During the proceedings, the company ceased the violation by amending the agreements offered to users of the registers. At the same time, the company was fined for committing these violations.
Sources: Decision of the Temporary Administrative Board of the Committee of AMCU No. 51-р/тк as of 13.10.2023 in the case of abuse of monopoly (dominant) position against Kyivtransparkservice; Decision of AMCU No. 470-р as of 06.08.2020 in the case of abuse of monopoly (dominant) position against JSC Ukrzaliznytsia; Decision of AMCU No. 31-р/тк as of 19.12.2018 in the case on abuse of monopoly (dominant) position against JSC Ukrainian Railways represented by the regional branch Prydniprovska Railways.
The decisions issued in 2024 sanctioned excessive prices and the setting of abusive contractual requirements, which would not have been possible had the market been effectively competitive. Table 2.12 below provides an overview of abuse of dominance cases and related sanctions in the last year.
Note: The information for one decision is confidential and it is therefore not possible to include in the table. Public version of the decision is available at https://amcu.gov.ua/npas/pro-porushennia-zakonodavstva-pro-zakhyst-ekonomichnoi-konkurentsii-ta-nakladennia-shtrafu-196.
Source: OECD analysis on AMCU website.
The methodology on market definition and assessment of dominance clarifies that public authorities can also be considered dominant to the extent that they engage in the “production, sale and acquisition of goods or other economic activities” (point 3.2).
The concept of commitments will be introduced in the second stage of the reform. AMCU may issue recommendations on the basis of Article 46 of the Competition Law, fulfilment of which may lead to the closure of proceedings. These recommendations can be designed jointly with undertakings involved to the case.
2.2.2. General overview of sanctions for conduct and procedural issues
According to the information sent by AMCU the sanctions imposed for competition and procedural infringements are contained in Table 2.13 below.
Source: Based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire
There is no information on confirmed or collected sanctions apart from the general aggregated information on fines contained in AMCU annual reports.
It has also not been possible to receive from AMCU information of the total number of decisions, sanctions and companies involved on cases by territorial offices (published only on the websites of the regional offices and very difficult to access for this purpose) where, as developed in Chapter 5, the maximum sanction is UAH 68 000 (equivalent to EUR 1 548).30
2.2.3. Critical examination of enforcement of AMCU
The OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels [OECD/LEGAL/0452] from 2 July (2019[2]) contains the main elements to fight cartels, the most serious competition infringements.
Adherents are encouraged to make hard core cartels illegal regardless of whether actual harm to the market is proven, and to establish strong legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms to deter such conduct and enable victims to seek compensation. This involves implementing effective detection systems, particularly through leniency programmes that offer immunity or reduced penalties for self-reporting and co‑operation, while ensuring clear rules, confidentiality and minimal burdens for applicants. Authorities should also use proactive tools like procurement data analysis and create secure channels for whistle-blowers. Competition authorities must be equipped with strong investigative powers, including the ability to conduct unannounced inspections, access digital and remote data, gather witness testimony and impose penalties for obstruction. Collaboration among public bodies such as prosecutors and anti-corruption agencies should be facilitated through evidence-sharing protocols that protect sensitive information. Early case resolution tools like settlements and plea agreements should be supported, often requiring an admission of guilt. Sanctions must be sufficiently severe to deter firms and individuals from engaging in cartel conduct, with a mix of administrative, civil and criminal penalties. Any exemptions from anti-cartel rules should be strictly limited, transparent and regularly reviewed to ensure they are justified by overriding policy objectives.
The following sections analyse how these elements are considered in Ukrainian competition law.
Agreements
Dealing with the main article that defines the infringement, the terminology employed by AMCU Law with regard to anti-competitive agreements would need careful reconsideration. Specifically, the use of the term "concerted actions" as an umbrella concept to encompass all types of agreements, including explicit arrangements and tacit co‑ordination, diverges from international standards. In most jurisdictions, “concerted practices” are understood as a narrower form of co‑ordination that falls short of a formal agreement but still involves a meeting of minds. The broad use of the term in the Ukrainian context can therefore generate confusion among stakeholders and risks misinterpretation in both enforcement and compliance practices, therefore the term agreements or concerted actions could perhaps contribute to a better understanding.
Beyond terminology, substantive concerns arise from the current legal definition and interpretation of agreements under Article 6 of the Competition Law. The provision appears to include the creation of a new company with the intention to influence market conditions within the scope of anti-competitive agreements. However, unless it refers to joint ventures that are not full function which are a form of agreements, such structural transactions are more appropriately assessed under the merger control regime, in line with international best practices. Treating corporate formations as agreements risks conflating distinct areas of competition law and may lead to procedural inefficiencies or inconsistent enforcement outcomes. A clearer delineation between the rules applicable to agreements and those governing concentrations would significantly enhance legal certainty and improve the coherence of competition policy implementation in Ukraine.
An additional peculiarity of the Competition Law is the inclusion, within the scope of anti-competitive actions, of practices conducted by administrative or public bodies (Articles 15-17 of the Competition Law). While the recognition that public entities can, in certain cases (especially when they operate in the market or are facilitators of a conduct of companies), distort competition is noteworthy and aligns with concerns about the role of the state in markets, the practical application of these provision remains unclear. The law does not offer guidance on how such cases are assessed, nor does there appear to be a consistent body of enforcement practice or analytical framework developed by AMCU in this area. As a result, the provisions risks being under-utilised, limiting its potential impact. A more transparent and systematic approach to analysing anti-competitive conduct by administrative bodies would enhance the effectiveness of the legal framework and provide valuable guidance to public authorities and market participants alike.
Accordingly, aligning both the nomenclature and the substantive criteria with international standards would facilitate more effective enforcement and improve the predictability and transparency of the legal framework, thereby supporting stronger compliance by market participants.
Dealing with the exemptions included in the Competition law, in reference to the prohibition of agreements, some improvements could be included.
Starting with the general exemption, it provides a clear and well-structured overview of the conditions to grant an exemption, effectively summarising the types of concerted actions that may be permitted and the overarching goal of preventing significant restrictions on competition. However, AMCU’s discretion in determining what constitutes a "significant restriction of competition" appears too broad, and including market shares and indicators that follow international standards would strengthen enforcement of competition law.
The goal of the exemption provided under Article 8 of the Competition Law is not entirely clear, as it establishes exceptions for certain concerted actions related to the supply and use of goods without explicitly defining the underlying rationale. If the provision aims to regulate vertical restrictions—such as resale price maintenance, exclusivity agreements, or territorial limitations—it should be clearly framed within an internationally recognised analytical framework. Many jurisdictions assess vertical restraints based on their potential to enhance or harm competition, balancing potential efficiency gains with risks of market foreclosure or price manipulation. However, the current provision lacks specific criteria for evaluating these restrictions, leaving broad discretion in enforcement. International best practices, such as those followed by the EU and the US, distinguish between per se illegal vertical restraints (such as resale price maintenance in many cases) and those assessed under a rule-of-reason approach, which considers market context, competitive effects and consumer impact. The Ukrainian law does not make this distinction, creating legal uncertainty for businesses and potentially inconsistent enforcement. Additionally, the provision does not establish clear thresholds or market share criteria to determine when these restrictions could have anticompetitive effects. If the intent is to provide a structured approach to vertical agreements, the law should align with international competition standards by incorporating economic justifications, competitive impact assessments and clear enforcement guidelines. Otherwise, the broad wording may lead to arbitrary interpretations, making it unclear whether the exemption protects legitimate commercial arrangements or allows harmful anticompetitive practices to go unchecked. AMCU confirms that they intend to remove this exemption form the legislation in the second stage of the reform.
The exemption provided in Article 7 of the Competition Law, which allows small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to engage in voluntary concerted actions for joint purchasing without being subject to antitrust prohibitions, raises serious concerns from both an enforcement and advocacy perspective. While supporting SMEs and enhancing their competitiveness is a legitimate objective, the blanket exemption fails to recognise that SMEs may not be inherently incapable of engaging in hard-core anticompetitive conduct, including cartels. Price-fixing, market allocation and bid rigging—among the most harmful forms of competition violations—can be just as damaging when carried out by smaller firms, particularly in concentrated markets or those with high barriers to entry. Moreover, if the provision is intended to address de minimis practices, it fails to acknowledge that large firms can also engage in minor, non-harmful agreements that do not warrant enforcement action. A proper de minimis approach should focus on the actual impact of the conduct rather than the size of the firms involved. Granting SMEs broad leeway to engage in concerted practices risks distorting competition by allowing them to co‑ordinate behaviour that larger firms would be prohibited from engaging in, ultimately harming consumers and other market participants. Beyond the direct market impact, this exemption undermines the development of a strong competition culture in Ukraine. Competition law enforcement should promote compliance and deter all anticompetitive behaviour, rather than creating carve-outs that send the message that smaller firms are entitled to circumvent basic antitrust rules. If SMEs require support to enhance their competitiveness, competition law is not the appropriate tool—targeted policies such as subsidies, training programmes, or access to credit would be far more effective. Allowing unrestricted co‑operation among SMEs under the assumption that they cannot distort markets is a dangerous precedent that weakens the credibility of competition enforcement. Therefore, this provision should be reconsidered to ensure that SME co‑operation is assessed under a competition effects-based framework rather than through a blanket exemption. AMCU confirms that they intend to remove this exemption form the legislation in the second stage of the reform.
Article 10 of the Competition Law provides for a set of conditions under which an enterprise may be granted permission for concerted actions. However, it is unclear if these conditions are applicable individually or cumulatively, if any balancing mechanism is required and if there is any taxonomy (hierarchical and systematic ordering) between these economic interests. AMCU confirms that requirements are alternative, but this could be clarified in the legislation.
The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Intellectual Property Rights and Competition [OECD/LEGAL/0495] from 08 June (2023[6]), implies that Adherents are encouraged to apply general competition law principles to IP rights, treating them similarly to other property rights while recognising their unique features and variations. They should assess IP-related conduct on a case-by-case basis using an effects-based approach and avoid assumptions that IP ownership automatically implies market power. Market definition should consider the IP context without equating IP scope with market boundaries. In licensing, Adherents should weigh anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects, taking into account the legal context, market relationships, potential foreclosure risks and efficiencies. They are also advised to issue public guidance to improve transparency, design remedies that are tailored, effective and proportionate—while considering cross-border impacts—and promote both domestic and international co-operation among competition and IP authorities. In Ukraine, the prohibition of anticompetitive concerted actions is not applicable to agreements on the transfer of intellectual property rights or on the use of intellectual property rights to the extent that they restrict the economic activity of the party to the agreement to which the right is transferred, unless these restrictions go beyond legitimate rights of intellectual property holder. Restrictions on the scope of the transferred intellectual property rights, the term and territory of the permit for the use of an intellectual property but also the type of activity, the scope of use, the minimum production volume and similar requirements are considered to be within the scope of legitimate rights. This formula implies that the rights of IP holders as defined in the relevant legislation are not limited by competition law.
A review of AMCU’s recent enforcement activity suggests a strong emphasis on administrative functions—such as granting authorisations and verifying information on public procurement through the Prozorro system—rather than on pursuing substantive investigations into more complex anti-competitive conduct. While monitoring procurement processes from a competition law perspective is of course of key importance, the near-exclusive focus on bid rigging cases in recent years raises concerns. Notably, there have been virtually no infringement decisions related to other types of anti-competitive agreements, despite the AMCU’s stated prioritisation of cartel detection and enforcement across a range of sectors. AMCU reports that they are investigating seven cases of infringements that do not involve public procurement and six cases on vertical restraints. Even when starting those cases seems to go in the good direction, the results showed in the final decisions implies a lack of co-ordination between strategic objectives and actual enforcement outcomes and suggests a possible misalignment in resource allocation or institutional focus. If AMCU is to fulfil its mandate effectively and contribute meaningfully to a more competitive economy and enhanced consumer welfare, it must strengthen its investigative capacities and actively pursue complex and high-impact infringements beyond the narrow, even relevant, scope of public procurement.
With regards to bid rigging practices, the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement [OECD/LEGAL/0396], adopted on 17 July 2012 and amended 08 June (2023[7]), aims to promote effective competition, reduce the risk of bid rigging and strengthen enforcement against collusive practices in public procurement. It encourages Adherents to adopt proactive measures to prevent bid rigging, including understanding market conditions, conducting market research before launching tenders and designing tenders in ways that maximise competition. This includes promoting broad participation, reducing predictability in specifications, using electronic procurement systems, maintaining reliable procurement databases, and applying safeguards such as bidder attestations and clear warnings about legal consequences. The Recommendation also focuses on detection and enforcement, urging Adherents to raise awareness among procurement and enforcement authorities about the signs of collusion and suspicious bidding patterns. It promotes partnerships between competition authorities and other relevant agencies (such as anti-corruption and audit bodies), training for procurement officials and investigators and the use of digital tools to detect cartels. Procurement authorities are encouraged to report suspicious behaviour and collaborate closely with competition enforcers. To reduce structural risks, Adherents are advised to assess and reform procurement laws and practices, ensuring transparency, minimising exemptions from competitive tendering and involving competition authorities in key reforms. Procurement officials should be incentivised to detect bid rigging, and cross-agency collaboration is emphasised to bolster prevention and enforcement. On the enforcement side, the Recommendation highlights the need for strong sanctions and redress mechanisms. These include imposing effective penalties, considering debarment of offending firms and individuals, maintaining a central debarment register and offering exemptions or leniency incentives to whistle-blowers. Victims of collusion, including public authorities, should have access to compensation and effective challenge mechanisms. Finally, Adherents are encouraged to monitor the impact of procurement rules on competition to ensure ongoing improvement and effectiveness of these measures. It also stated that exemptions are subject to periodic review, with an initial assessment conducted within one to two years after entry into force, followed by regular evaluations every three years.
The analysis of the practice of AMCU on this field shows a clear determination to fight bid rigging practices, considering the number of cases and their nature. Nevertheless, there are some concerns. Considering the possibility to analyse procurement practices, the OECD would like to reiterate findings from of the previous OECD report highlighting that there is no dedicated section on the e-procurement system for AMCU decisions and each decision is only published within the specific procurement file where the complaint was submitted. This limitation hinders access to AMCU decisions, making it challenging for stakeholders to obtain information on previous case law related to specific situations or legal issues. As a result, the published information has limited value and relevance. A comprehensive search engine to ensure wider access to AMCU's case law free of charge would greatly enhance legal continuity, certainty and transparency. Some efforts have already been done by AMCU in this direction with the creation of a register available online that could be updated and include past decisions.31
Considering the volume of claims processed by AMCU and the decisions on violations issued regarding bid rigging, Ukraine should revise its approach to AMCU’s role in the process or provide it with additional resources for performing its key functions. The number of public procurement decisions appears to be disproportionate and potentially diverting resources from the detection and investigation of other types of anticompetitive actions.
A closer examination of AMCU’s enforcement practice reveals that most competition cases pursued—particularly in the area of bid rigging—tend to involve only two companies. As a result, the analytical complexity of these cases is often limited, focusing on straightforward forms of co‑ordination without engaging in more sophisticated assessments of market structure, economic effects, or broader patterns of collusion. While tackling even simple forms of collusion is important, the consistent focus on such narrowly framed cases may indicate a missed opportunity to investigate more complex or systemic anti-competitive conduct.
Furthermore, the bulk of these cases are handled by AMCU’s territorial offices (80-90%), which are constrained by their limited sanctioning powers—typically capped at fines of approximately EUR 1 500. This structural limitation significantly undermines the deterrent effect of enforcement, particularly in sectors where the potential gains from collusion far outweigh the financial risks of being caught. Moreover, the decisions issued by these offices are often difficult to access and when available, they tend to rely on formalistic checklists with minimal substantive analysis. This raises concerns about transparency, accountability and the development of a consistent and robust body of case law.
The methodology currently used by AMCU to report on enforcement activity may leave some aspects of the scope and depth of its interventions less visible. Cases are often reported based on the number of tenders affected rather than the number or nature of distinct infringements. This approach can artificially inflate enforcement statistics while masking a pattern of repetitive and narrowly focused investigations. It may also hinder external assessments of the actual impact and effectiveness of the authority’s actions in addressing anti-competitive behaviour.
Taken together, these elements suggest an enforcement model that prioritises quantity, with a disproportionate focus on low impact, easily prosecuted bid rigging cases. While such efforts contribute to addressing procurement collusion, they fall short of delivering the deterrent effect and comprehensive enforcement coverage required to foster a genuinely competitive market environment. Without a shift towards more strategic, high-impact enforcement—supported by stronger institutional capacities and greater analytical depth—AMCU risks falling short of its objectives to ensure efficient application of competition law and promote economic welfare.
Abuse of dominance
AMCU’s practice seems to rely to a large extent on market shares (even when the authority claims that, in general, it tries to focus on the absence of significant competition perceived by the dominant firm). Several decisions concern situations where dominance is presumed because the firm has a market share larger than 35%, even though there have also been situations where a company with a high market share was found not to be dominant.
The law contains a list of abusive practices. AMCU has informed the OECD that in practice it is possible to identify abuses outside this list. This more flexible approach appears preferable, as it allows for novel types of conduct that may arise in the future and is line with the legal framework in many OECD countries.
According to AMCU, the list of types of abuses in the competition law refers to practices that are abusive per se, without the need to prove harm by the dominant undertaking. This is not clear from the law. If this is indeed the case, this approach appears overly strict. The law lists practices that in other jurisdictions require an analysis of effects by the competition authority, such as pricing abuses and refusal to supply. Moreover, the approach does not require analysis of whether the conduct is or not restricting competition. Overall, a formalistic approach that does not involve analysing the effects of abusive practices does not seem in line with international practice. AMCU affirm that they had cases when after analysis of the effect the proceedings were closed but this could be clearly stated by the law.
As for Ukraine’s enforcement practice, AMCU issues several abuse of dominance decisions, well above the OECD average (see Figure 2.2 below).
Source: Based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire.; OECD (2025[8]), OECD Competition Trends, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c4bd00b-en, for OECD and Europe averages.
Some of the abuse decisions reviewed by the OECD seem to concern exploitative abuses, including excessive prices and unreasonable contract terms applied to consumers. Even cases that could be about refusal to supply, such as the decisions about Farmkhin32 and Dniproazot33, concern customers of the dominant companies and do not seem to have the potential to exclude rival producers. In some cases, the conduct could be more suitable to intervention by a technical body under sector-specific regulation and it appears that AMCU is trying to fill gaps in sector legislation or enforcement by other public bodies. As an alternative, AMCU could use advocacy tools in these situations, for example by leveraging the analysis of the applicable regulatory framework that is summarised in abuse of dominance decisions.
Finally, total fines for abuse of dominance tend to be low compared with annual OECD averages. This is even more pronounced when considering average fines per decisions, considering the high number of abuse decisions in Ukraine. While fines can be up to 10% of a company’s turnover, fines remain very low and this may not provide sufficient deterrence in practice.
Sanctions
Despite the existence of a framework to impose sanctions, the effectiveness of enforcement is significantly undermined by the low level of monetary penalties currently imposed by AMCU and its territorial bodies. Regional agencies are constrained by statutory limits that preclude the imposition of sanctions with any meaningful deterrent effect. As a result, even where violations are clearly identified, the financial consequences for offenders remain minimal, reducing the credibility and perceived legitimacy of the regulatory regime. Moreover, sanctions applied at the central level, while not subject to the same legal caps, are generally modest in scale and frequently fall short of being proportionate to the gravity of the infractions and the broader societal harm caused. This persistent leniency, risks fostering a culture of non-compliance and weakens the incentive structure essential for effective enforcement. In line with international best practices, sanctioning powers should be reviewed and recalibrated to ensure that penalties are both proportionate and sufficiently dissuasive.
A further area of concern relates to the absence of publicly available data on the actual collection of imposed sanctions (apart from the consolidated and general information included on the Annual Reports of AMCU). The lack of transparency in this regard raises questions about the overall accountability and operational efficiency of the enforcement system. Without clear and consistent reporting on the rate of sanctions collection, it is impossible to assess whether penalties are being effectively enforced or merely imposed on paper. If collection levels are low—an inference that cannot be ruled out in the absence of data—then the deterrent function of sanctions is effectively nullified. Non-payment without consequence erodes public trust and emboldens repeat violations, thereby weakening the integrity of the regulatory framework. To align with international standards and foster confidence in the system, competent authorities should systematically monitor, publish and evaluate data on sanctions collection as an integral part of their enforcement strategy.
Effective merger control is an important part of a well-functioning competition regime. It can act to prevent harm from transactions which may reduce competition or foreclose competitors in the markets.
The Recommendation on Merger Review [OECD/LEGAL/0333] (2025[9]) aims to make merger control more effective without imposing unnecessary costs for competition authorities and merging parties, as well as encouraging co-operation among competition authorities.
Merger control in Ukraine is regulated by Section V of the Competition Law. According to the responses the OECD questionnaire, Ukraine has a mandatory ex ante notification system with different economic thresholds based on both the value of assets and sale of products.
AMCU is the sole enforcer of Ukraine’s merger control regime. As shown in Figure 2.3, AMCU received over 4 000 merger notifications from 2017 to 2023. A large proportion of these were withdrawn cases. For example, almost half of the notifications were withdrawn in 2023 (252). Although AMCU does not have data recording the reasons for the withdrawal AMCU has indicated these figures include applications returned by AMCU because of non-compliance with the formal requirements which will inflate the number of notifications and withdrawn cases. Of the accepted applications, most cases have been cleared in Phase 1 and there have been no prohibitions in recent years. However, on average 14 cases a year are subject to an in-depth investigation (Phase 2) and since 2017 there have been 20 merger cases cleared subject to obligations.
Source: Based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire.
Within AMCU there is not a specific division which is focused on merger work, each of the three sectoral departments having their own merger teams.34 In addition, representatives of the economic and legal divisions are required to be involved in the cases.
2.3.1. Description of the system
This section sets out the current law and practices of the Ukrainian merger regime based primarily on the responses submitted by AMCU to the OECD’s questionnaire.
Notification system
Ukraine operates a mandatory ex ante notification system. Mergers, requiring notification are deemed prohibited without a clearance.
Types of transactions covered
Section V article 22 of the Competition Law sets out the circumstances in which a merger is considered subject to control and includes:
a merger of parties that were not connected by relations of control among themselves
the acquisition by one or several parties of direct or indirect control over all or parts of one or more other parties or other assets
creation by two or more parties of an entity that will independently carry out fully functional economic activity for a long period.
It also specifies that the following are not considered as a merger:
The creation by two or more parties of an entity that will not independently carry out fully functional economic activity for a long period - such actions are considered as concerted actions and are discussed separately.
The acquisition of shares of a party by a person whose main activity is conducting financial transactions or transactions with securities, if such acquisition is carried out for the purpose of the subsequent resale of shares, provided that the specified person does not participate in voting in the higher body or other management bodies of undertaking.
Actions carried out between parties related by relations of control (intra-group restructuring), except for cases of acquisition of such control without obtaining the granting permission of AMCU, if the need for such granting permission is stipulated by law.
The acquisition by a bank or other financial institution of assets in the form of a single property complex, shares (stocks, units) of a party in case such acquisition is provided for in the restructuring plan approved in accordance with the “Law of Ukraine on Financial Restructuring” by foreclosing on the subject of pledge (mortgage) or other security encumbrance, provided that they are subsequently alienated to parties not related to the controlling relationship with this bank or this financial institution within two years from the date of such acquisition.
The acquisition by the bank of assets in the form of a single property complex, shares (stocks, units) of an entity as a result of foreclosure on the subject of a pledge (mortgage) or other security encumbrance or as a result of the bank acquiring ownership of the subject of a pledge (mortgage) or other security encumbrance in another way, including within the framework of bankruptcy procedures or executive proceedings, provided that the bank and the undertakings related to it by relations of control will not participate in voting.
Notification thresholds
The Ukrainian merger legislation seeks to capture transactions that are significant in terms of the capitalisation of the national economy. It considers both the value of the parties to the transaction and their turnover. In making these calculations the assessment of asset value is based on balance sheet value as at the previous year end. AMCU publish guidance which describes in detail how the sales and assets of the concentration participants are calculated.
The thresholds for these assessments are set out in Article 24 of the Competition Law as follows:
the aggregate value of all parties to the merger, taking into account control relations, including abroad, exceeds the equivalent of EUR 30 million and at the same time the value in Ukraine of at least two parties to the merger, taking into account control relations, exceeds the equivalent of EUR 4 million each, or
the value in Ukraine of at least one party to the merger, taking into account the control relationship, exceeds the equivalent of EUR 8 million and the volume of sales of goods of at least one other party to the merger, taking into account the control relationship, including abroad, exceeds the equivalent of EUR 150 million.
Review process, phases and timelines
The Ukrainian merger regime as set out in the legislation provides for several stages of consideration of the application, which have clearly defined deadlines.
Source: Based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire.
Notification filing
The first is the procedure for accepting the application, verification of the information provided by the applicants for compliance with the requirements established by the Committee and is limited by the Law to 15 days.35
The Regulation on mergers contains a list of information and documents to be submitted by the applicant, which includes, inter alia:
schemes of control relations of the merger participants before and after the concentration
economic justifications for the merger and calculation of aggregate shares in the involved markets
information on the merger, including information on the relations of control of the parties to the concentration, description of the content of the concentration, financial aspect of the merger
copies of the documents based on which the merger is carried out, as well as other documents that may be necessary for consideration of the application.
If there is insufficient evidence, AMCU can notify the merging parties that their application must be supplemented and resubmitted with the additional information and documents.
Phase 1 – Standard review
Following receipt of an application which meets the required standard, AMCU has 30 days to make an initial assessment of the merger under the standard procedure (Phase 1).
If there are no grounds for prohibiting the merger, AMCU issues a decision granting clearance for the concentration. In addition, if, during the Phase 1 review period, AMCU does not initiate a case on the merger (i.e. proceeds to Phase 2) the decision on granting clearance for the concentration is considered granted. The Committee's decision may only impose obligations upon the merging parties upon completion of a fuller review (Phase 2).
On average 97% of accepted notifications are cleared during Phase 1; in 2023 this represented 299 cases. AMCU publishes its Phase 1 decisions, although these are typically short, only including basic information about the merger, such as the names of the parties to the transaction and the decision.
Phase 2 – Consideration of merger where concerns have been identified
If in Phase 1 AMCU identifies the potential grounds for prohibiting the merger, it can initiate an in‑depth investigation of the case (Phase 2). AMCU will then adopt an order and notify the merging parties in writing. On average, 4% of the cases proceed to Phase 2.
A list of the information that the applicant must provide when notifying a merger to AMCU is included with the notification form. The order to initiate the consideration of the merger case must be published on AMCU’s official website within ten working days from the date the order is issued. At this stage interested parties including suppliers, consumers and competitors may submit to AMCU written substantiated objections to the merger with the supporting evidence.
If grounds for prohibiting the merger are confirmed, AMCU prepares a submission with its preliminary findings and sends it to the merging parties. The merging parties are simultaneously informed of their right to review the case file and submit their considerations and objections to the preliminary findings.
The merging parties have thirty days from the date of receipt of the submission with the preliminary findings to provide AMCU with proposals for commitments they are willing to undertake to mitigate the negative impact of the concentration on competition. The proposals must include the justifications for the proposed commitments and evidence of their intention and ability to fulfil these commitments.
The time taken for consideration of a merger case in Phase 2 should not exceed three months. The term starts from the date when the applicant(s) submitted all information requested by AMCU to when the Phase 2 proceedings were initiated and the expert's opinion has been received (if requested).36 If AMCU does not decide within the period of consideration of the case, it is considered that the merger is permitted. In addition, the legislation specifies that the total period of consideration of the case from the date of receipt of notification of the commencement of the case to the adoption of a decision on the merger case may not exceed 135 days, unless the applicant has filed a written request for an extension of the period for submission of information.
AMCU engaged in an in-depth review of a merger in the market for retail measurement marketing services and individual research services.
The parties submitted that they each served different customer types with little or no demand side or supply side substitutability and that this was an indication that they operated in separate markets, one for non-consumer goods and one for consumer goods. To test this allegation, AMCU conducted a survey of competitors and consumers of marketing services and based on the responses received, it concluded that these were actually separate markets.
AMCU developed a conglomerate theory of harm that the merged entity would be able to restrict competitor’s access to the market for retail measurement marketing services in consumer goods by tying their offering with the acquired complementary service or consumer panel surveys.
They considered that the high concentration and significant barriers to entry for operating consumer panel surveys meant that there was likely a significant restriction of competition from the merger.
For the merger to proceed, GFK agreed to sell its assets in relation to its business operating panel surveys of consumers. This followed market testing where AMCU posted the proposal on its website and did not receive any comments or objections.
Source: Published Merger Decision No. 218-r, machine translation.
Simplified procedure
Ukrainian Competition Law also provides for a simplified notification procedure (article 27 of Section VI) if:
only one participant to the merger carries out activities on the territory of Ukraine, or
the aggregate share of the merger participants in the relevant market does not exceed 15% and at the same time, the shares and aggregate shares of the merger participants do not exceed 20% in the markets at a higher or lower level of the supply chain than the market in which the merger is carried out.
AMCU shall consider the application under the simplified procedure within 25 days from the date of its receipt. However, AMCU may decide to consider the application under the general procedure if the circumstance regarding the merger requires additional study for a decision on whether to grant a merger clearance. This is a safeguard for AMCU to be able to check the case in more detail if needed.
If the applicant submits a request for consideration of the application under the simplified procedure, AMCU shall verify the existence of grounds for such consideration.
In the absence of justifications for considering the notification under the simplified procedure, the State Commissioner shall notify the applicant and start the standard procedure.
Source: Based on responses by AMCU to the OECD questionnaire.
The percentage of applications considered under the simplified procedure in 2022-2023 decreased significantly, primarily due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is because the voluntary provisions require applicants to submit concentration estimates of the market and during martial law most of the registers from which applicants previously took information closed.
Merger test
AMCU grants a clearance for mergers that do not lead the merging parties to gaining (or maintaining) a dominant position (monopolisation) or to a significant restriction of competition on the market.37 The definition of dominance is set out in Chapter 6 Section 6.2.2.The significant restriction of competition test considers a broader range of circumstances such as the potential for the merged entity to unilaterally raise prices above competitive levels (unilateral effects) or to co‑ordinate with other market participants, according to responses received to the OECD questionnaire. The criteria for assessing mergers are described in AMCU's recommendation clarifications.38 Based on the responses received, these clarifications set out several theories of harm which the authority may consider, such as:
For horizontal mergers, whether the transaction strengthens the market power of an economic undertaking by eliminating potential competition; or whether the merged entity would gain the ability to control; sales networks, access to infrastructure, the terms of supply, market promotion, access to patents or other intellectual property, achieving greater financial power.
For a vertical merger, the merged entity is capable of foreclosing third parties from entering the market.
In the case of conglomerate mergers: whether the participant can increase its product range, and is able to leverage its market power in one of the markets in adjacent markets.
In oligopoly markets, whether the probability of co‑ordination of behaviour by oligopoly entities (tacit co‑ordination) increases.
The elements of the study carried out by AMCU during a merger assessment include the identification of the product and geographical markets involved as well as the assessment of the impact of the concentration on competition.
Market definition for merger assessments is undertaken by AMCU in accordance with the methodology for determining the monopoly (dominant) position set out in Chapter 6.
Competitive assessment
AMCU states that they analyse the following factors during horizontal merger assessments:
the market shares of the participants in the merger and concentration levels in the relevant market
the possible anticompetitive effects on the product markets involved
the possibility that buyer power will act as a countervailing factor
the possibility that market entry by new participants will act as a countervailing factor
the risk of bankruptcy.
AMCU states that assessing these factors is not mandatory in every case. The choice of the factors to be analysed depends on the circumstances of a particular merger. A full analysis of these factors is not conducted if the Committee decides to consider the merger application under a simplified procedure, in this case only the market shares and concentration levels are checked.
As part of its assessment, AMCU assesses concentration and market shares. It states that:
The analysis of market shares can be used to assess the market situation. To do so, one should compare the shares before and after the transaction, or the conditions that would have prevailed in the absence of the merger.
Information on aggregate market shares is only one of the general criteria for assessing the impact of a merger on competition. Information on the state of competition - the overall level of concentration before and after the merger - is also used.
The Committee uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") as a measure of the overall level of market concentration. It considers that if the HHI is below 1 000 a significant reduction in competition is unlikely. An increase of more than 200 may indicate a concern and if the HHI is above 2000 indicates a dominant position may have been reached.
The market shares of the parties to the concentration, as well as the levels of concentration in the product markets involved, may not be determined in the case of concentrations that have already taken place if there is direct evidence of anticompetitive effects.
With regards to assessing the effects for vertical mergers AMCU stated that they assess the following potential effects:
exclusionary effects such as the restriction of access to important factors of production or the restriction of access to customers
co‑ordinating effects that may have a significant negative impact on competition.
Remedies and defences
Remedies
If there are grounds for prohibiting a merger, AMCU notifies the parties of such grounds and gives them an opportunity to submit proposals for commitments that would eliminate the relevant negative impact of the merger on competition and allow AMCU to make a decision on granting clearance. AMCU sets a 30-day period for the parties to submit remedy proposals that eliminate the relevant negative impact of the concentration on competition and allow AMCU to clear the merger. This period may be extended at the request of a party (Art 31.2 of the Competition Law). AMCU cannot impose remedies in Phase 1 but only after the completion of a Phase 2 investigation.
In order to agree on the necessary remedies and requirements that will condition the clearance decision, AMCU and the parties hold relevant consultations.
Ukrainian legislation does not distinguish remedies into structural or behavioural. According to Article 31 of the Law, the remedies should be proportionate to the adverse effects of the merger on competition. Remedies may relate to restrictions on the management, use or disposal of property, as well as the obligation of the undertaking to dispose of property. However, typically, AMCU establishes behavioural remedies that relate to: supply volumes, prices, terms of sale (production) of products, access to the market by others and exchange of information that may have an anticompetitive effect.
Structural remedies are used less frequently and are applied only where there is no other effective remedy that is less burdensome for the parties to the mergers. Structural undertakings are mainly used to obtain merger clearance (conglomerate or horizontal) to reduce the negative impact on competition and oblige the undertaking to divest or sell assets/entities.
In 2023, AMCU considered four merger cases, the decisions on which were conditioned to behavioural and structural remedies (two decisions were conditioned to behavioural remedies and two to structural remedies).
Defences
AMCU states that the legislation does not consider statements on efficiency and alternatives to mergers. However, AMCU may decide to grant permission for a merger if one of the participants is an insolvent undertaking threatened with bankruptcy. The basic requirement is that the deterioration of competition after the merger should not be a consequence of the merger. Such conditions arise when competition in the market would have deteriorated at least as much in the absence of the merger.
In addition, part two of Art. 25 of the Law provides that the Cabinet of Ministers may exceptionally clear a concentration if the positive effect for the public interest of the said concentration outweighs the negative effects of the restriction of competition. Even in this case, references to the benefits of the transaction for the public interest may be taken into account only when the concentration leads to the acquisition of a relatively significant level of market power by the undertaking, but such a criterion cannot be used to clear a concentration that leads to the emergence of a de facto monopoly.
Sanctions for non-compliance
In Ukraine, a merger that requires clearance is prohibited until the clearance is granted. While awaiting clearance, the parties to the merger are obliged to refrain from actions that may lead to a restriction of competition and cannot be restored to the pre-merger state.39
Article 52 of the Law sets out the levels of fines for breaching the merger rules. It states that if a merger goes ahead without obtaining an appropriate clearance from the ACMU, so-called “gun jumping”, the parties can be subject to a fine of up to 5% of the undertaking's income (revenue) from the sale of products (goods, works or services) for the last reporting year preceding the year the fine is imposed.
2.3.2. Assessment of merger system
Overall, the Ukrainian merger system has many characteristics that align with international best practices, providing AMCU with the ability to assess transactions and take appropriate actions to prevent a significant lessening of competition. We consider below our assessment of the regime.
Merger test
The legal merger test assesses whether mergers lead to a substantial or significant lessening of competition. It appears in line with the test applied in many other jurisdictions. However, despite the flexibility in the test in the last seven years there has been no merger prohibition and relatively few mergers cleared with remedies.
Based on a review of recently published on Phase 2 merger decisions,40 the focus of AMCU’s assessments appears typically to be on whether the merging parties’ market shares exceeds certain concentration thresholds.
Factors other than market shares should be considered, as they may highlight the risk of a significant reduction in competition. This could include further examining the closeness of competition between the merging parties, as well as the strength of constraint from other participants in the market. For example, some of the recently published decisions included analysis of bidding markets and tenders.41 AMCU used the results to create alternative market share estimates which was informative. However, it could consider going further by exploring the extent to which each merging party was bidding against each other and the extent to which on these occasions there were other bidders present.
It is positive to see guidance produced setting out the different theories of harm for horizontal and vertical mergers. However, these could be reviewed and expanded. For example, consideration could be given to whether the guidance could include discussion and assessment of what the appropriate counterfactual is. That is determining what the likely situation would be absent the merger to make the appropriate comparison with the situation if the merger goes ahead. While AMCU considers the extreme case of bankruptcy, there may be other situations which may increase or reduce the risk of finding a significant restriction of competition for example future expansion plans of the merging parties.
Similarly, having guidance on the approach to market definition provides market participants with clarity on certainty on the approach that AMCU would give, however international practices typically start with the process of defining the market by establishing the closest substitutes for a product using the conceptual hypothetical monopolist test. Especially because AMCU’s analysis appears to often place great weight on market shares and there are thresholds for assessing dominance accurate market definition becomes very important.
Notifications
The Ukrainian merger system currently receives a high number of notifications and has thresholds based on the value of the parties to the concentration as well as the more commonly used turnovers. The current notification regime gives the authority a great deal of flexibility on which cases to examine and is likely to come with benefits in some markets such as technology where the business might accrue very high market share and value before monetising the business.
The last review of the thresholds took place in 2016, almost ten years ago. This has been a period of some significant inflation. Therefore, if thresholds are not revised, more firms will be required to notify. Compared to other countries, Ukraine already appears to have a relatively high number of notifications; therefore, the thresholds should maybe be reviewed. This could reduce the risk of placing unnecessarily administrative burden on reviewing smaller transactions and making it harder for the authority to focus on assessing the most relevant cases.
Source: OECD CompStats.
Review process, phases and timelines
AMCU follows a two-stage merger review process. This recognises that not all notifiable mergers require in-depth analysis and scrutiny. This is the system followed by most jurisdictions with an active merger regime and sets out clearly the timelines involved for each stage. This aligns with the OECD Recommendation on Merger Review [OECD/LEGAL/0333] which states that mergers should be efficient and timely, and decisions should be made within a reasonable and determinable time frame.
Phase 1 decisions
While AMCU does publish non-confidential Phase 1 decisions, these appear to only include limited details such as the names of the merging parties and that the notification did not lead to monopolisation or significant restrictions of competition.
Ukraine could consider including more information on decisions to allow for an understanding of the substantive review. For example, including details such as:
assessment of the relevant market
consideration of the parties’ views
competitive assessment
analysis of market structure and theories of harm
conclusion on the transaction’s competitive effects.
Phase 2 decisions
Phase 2 decisions include further details compared with the Phase 1 decisions, but they are still limited. This makes it difficult to get a full understanding of the substantive issues of the case and analysis undertaken. Consideration could be given to including a fuller assessment of the case.
Remedies and defences
Use of behavioural remedies
Priority is currently given to behavioural remedies rather than structural remedies. Behavioural remedies have several drawbacks versus structural remedies including difficulties in ensuring compliance and monitoring. Consideration could be given to whether the current prioritisation of behavioural remedies is appropriate and to the extent they are used how they are monitored and implemented.
Ex-post reviews
Ex post reviews are an important tool to help authorities assess their practices and, if necessary, make improvements to better protect competition in the future. Ex-post assessments are not without challenges, incurring financial and potential reputational costs for the authority, as well as on stakeholders. Nonetheless, striving for best practice is likely to enhance, rather than harm, an authority’s reputation and experience from some competition authorities demonstrates the value of such studies (OECD, 2025[8]).
AMCU only evaluates ex post mergers only as part of cases on violations in the form of concentrations without obtaining the relevant merger clearance from the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, if such clearance is required, in order to determine the effects on competition of such concentrations. While it is not common for authorities to conduct ex post reviews, establishing a framework for conducting regular ex post reviews of cases, even if not frequently, could help the authority improve its practices and ensure assessments are being made in the best interest of Ukraine. The Competition Law empowers AMCU to promote competition through a variety of activities, including:
providing opinions on laws and regulations (“competition assessment”)
carrying out market studies
issuing guidelines on the implementation of the competition law
conducting training and dissemination activities on competition law.
References
[3] AMCU (2024), Report on the Activities of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine for 2024, https://amcu.gov.ua/pro-nas/zvitnist/richni-zviti/zvit-2024.
[5] AMCU (2024), The Use of Structural Presumptions in Antitrust – Note by Ukraine, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2024)36/en/pdf.
[8] OECD (2025), OECD Competition Trends 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c4bd00b-en.
[9] OECD (2025), Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0333.
[7] OECD (2023), Recommendation of the Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, OECD/LEGAL/0396, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0396.
[6] OECD (2023), Recommendation of the Council on Intellectual Property Rights and Competition, OECD/LEGAL/0495, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0495.
[4] OECD (2021), OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Ukraine, Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9dcc5ed0-en.
[1] OECD (2021), Recommendation of the Council on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement, OECD/LEGAL/0465, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0465.
[2] OECD (2019), Recommendation of the Council concerning effective Action against Hard Core Cartels, OECD/LEGAL/0452, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0452.
← 1. During the interviews AMCU confirmed that those cases are not common but that in practice they take into account, “for instance, the volume of products involved in the infringement, market shares of the undertakings etc.”
← 2. According to part 2 of article 36 of the LPEC "2. The bodies of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine have the right not to consider an application for violation of the legislation on the protection of economic competition, if the person who submitted the application does not prove that actions or inaction containing signs of violation of the legislation on the protection of economic competition had or have a direct and negative impact on its rights and/or activities."
← 3. In cases where a notified merger includes elements of concerted behaviour—such as non-compete clauses or other ancillary restraints—the AMCU has the discretion to assess both aspects jointly. Where the legal conditions are satisfied (see art. 27 of Competition Law and the Chapter 7 of this report), such cases may be reviewed under a simplified merger procedure.
← 4. According to article 36 of the Competition Law, if the applicant submits a petition about the possibility of negative consequences related to the filing of the application and in order to protect its interests, the AMCU makes an analysis of possible infringement.
← 5. The preliminary consultations before applying to the AMCU are anonymous. On a later stage, when an undertaking decides to apply for leniency or marker, AMCU receives information about this undertaking.
← 6. See Decision No. 200-р as of 04.04.2019.
← 7. Part two of Article 6 of the “Law of Ukraine on Access to Public Information” provides that access to information is restricted by certain requirements (for example, in relation to national security interests).
← 8. The full wording of the provision is “to have access to the case file…except to the information with restricted access, disclosure of which may cause harm…”. The harm is not a single test for closing the information, but the fact that the access is restricted. In practice these are very rare cases.
← 9. In 2025, the non-taxable minimum income is fixed at 17 UAH (equivalent to EUR 0.39).
← 10. In 2025 the Draft Law 12441 on amendments to the Code of Administrative offenses was registered in the Parliament to increase the amount for these fines. See https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/55704. For failing to provide, delayed provision of information or providing false information the sanctions are increased from up to twenty non-taxable incomes (less than EUR 10) to from fifty to five hundred non-taxable incomes of citizens (aprx. from 17 EUR to 177 EUR); For non-compliance with AMCU decisions and its territorial departments sanctions are increased form up to six non-taxable minimum incomes of citizens (less than 3 EUR), on individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activity - up to sixteen non-taxable minimum incomes (less than EUR 6) to from five hundred and fifty to one thousand non-taxable incomes (aprx. from 177 EUR to 354 EUR); For obstruction of employees of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine and its regional offices in conducting inspections the sanctions are from two hundred to three hundred and fifty non-taxable incomes of citizens (aprx. from 71 EUR to 124 EUR); For failure of a duly notified individual to appear, without valid reasons, when summoned by a state commissioner of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine or the head of a regional office of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine to provide oral explanations, failure to provide oral explanations, provision of incomplete information, provision of inaccurate information (interviews) sanctions are from one hundred to one thousand and five hundred non-taxable minimum incomes of citizens (aprx. from 35 EUR to 531 EUR); For repeated violations in form of obstruction in conducting inspection or failure to provide information (within a year) the sanction will be increased to from three hundred and fifty to five hundred non-taxable incomes of citizens (aprx. from 124 EUR to 177 EUR); For repeated violation in form of non-compliance with AMCU decisions (within a year) the sanction will be increased to from one thousand to two thousands non-taxable incomes of citizens (aprx. from 354 EUR to 708 EUR).
← 11. According to article 46.1.12. “The settlement procedure shall not be applied to an undertaking if the case on anticompetitive concerted actions or abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the market is initiated within five years from the date of bringing it to liability for the same violation committed earlier.” AMCU declares that this provision was introduced to increase the deterrent effect and prevent abuse of the procedure.
← 12. The State Executive Service is a department of Ministry of Justice of Ukraine which is responsible for compulsory collection of fines, the implementation of decisions of public authorities and courts, etc.
← 13. In 2025 AMCU has restarted the practice of conducting inspections and has conducted one dawn raid.
← 14. Notably, the act of joining such an association is presumed to constitute a concerted action unless explicitly exempted under the “Law of Ukraine on Media.”
← 15. The wording of article 6.1 in the draft law registered in the Parliament No 12 440 as of 26 January 2025 is “1. Anticompetitive concerted actions are concerted practices that, by their object or effect, have led or may lead to the prevention, elimination or restriction of competition”.
← 16. In line with the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement that included "Article 256. Approximation of law and enforcement practice: Ukraine shall approximate its competition laws and enforcement practices to the part of the EU acquis”.
← 17. The typical requirements for exemption from AMCU approval are set out in several AMCU bylaws. These include: Order No. 27-р of 12.02.2002, which covers horizontal, mixed, and conglomerate concerted actions; Order No. 511-р of 30.11.2006, concerning the creation of business associations; Order No. 880-р of 11.12.2008, relating to concerted actions on production specialisation; Order No. 557-р of 15.08.2012, which addresses joint R&D activities; Order No. 21-рп of 09.11.2018, on technology transfer agreements; and Order No. 10-рп of 13.06.2019, which covers joint procurement of goods by SMEs. Each bylaw outlines specific conditions under which AMCU approval is not required.
← 18. Market shares are somewhat higher than in the EU. EU De minimis Notice states: The Commission holds the view that agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which may have as their effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, do not appreciably restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the Treaty: if (a) the aggregate market share held by the parties to the agreement does not exceed 10% on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement, where the agreement is made between undertakings which are actual or potential competitors on any of those markets (agreements between competitors) ; or (b) if the market share held by each of the parties to the agreement does not exceed 15% on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement, where the agreement is made between undertakings which are not actual or potential competitors on any of those markets (agreements between non-competitors).
← 19. If the aggregate market share initially does not exceed 15%, and in the future exceeds this level, but remains less than 20%, or if the aggregate market share initially does not exceed 20%, and in the future exceeds this level, but remains less than 25%, the concerted actions are permitted and do not require the permission of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine for two consecutive years after the year in which the threshold of 15 then 20%, respectively, was exceeded for the first time. If the aggregate market share initially does not exceed 15%, and in the future exceeds 20% or the aggregate market share initially does not exceed 20%, and in the future exceeds 25%, the concerted actions are permitted and do not require the permission of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine for one year after the year in which the threshold of 15 and 20%, respectively, was exceeded for the first time. The total time during which concerted actions are permitted and do not require permission from AMCU cannot exceed two calendar years after the year in which the threshold of 15 then 20%, respectively, was exceeded for the first time.
← 20. Non-profit associations of professional stock market participants that operate on the basis of a special status granted to them by the regulator and perform part of the functions of regulating and controlling the activities of their members.
← 21. AMCU Resolution No. 27-p from 12 February 2002 on Approval of Standard Requirements for Concerted Actions of Business Entities for General Exemption from Prior Permission by the Bodies of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine for Concerted Actions of Business Entities, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0239-02#Text.
← 22. AMCU Resolution No. 10-рп from 12 October 2017 on the Approval of Typical Requirements for Vertical Concerted Actions of Business Entities and Amendments to Typical Requirements for Concerted Actions of Business Entities for General Exemption from Prior Permission of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1364-17#n15.
← 23. With a set of conditions.
← 24. With some additional exemptions.
← 25. Article 12(2) of the Law.
← 26. Draft Law No. 12440 as of 26 January 2025.
← 27. The Procedure for Settlement in Cases of Anticompetitive Concerted Actions and Abuse of Monopoly (Dominant) Position in the Market, approved by the Order of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine No. 18-рп as of 30 November 2023, registered at the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 27 December 2023 under No. 2260/41316.
← 28. The methodology for determining dominant position of undertakings in the market was approved by the Order of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine No. 49-p as of 05 March 2002, registered with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01 April 2002 under No. 317/6605. In October 2023, AMCU published clarifications on defining markets with buyer power, but this methodology has not been applied in practice yet.
← 29. Market definition is contained in the Methodology (8.1): Market volume and shares are defined in the same units (natural or value). Natural indicators are used in cases where it is possible to use a single indicator for all products that make up the product boundaries of the market.
← 30. Draft Law 12 440 will increase the maximum sanction that can be imposed by Regional Offices to 272 000 UAH.
← 31. See the link sent by AMCU, https://reyestr.amcu.gov.ua/.
← 32. Decision of AMCU No. 404-р from 16 August 2018 in the case on abuse of monopoly (dominant) position against Farmkhim LLC.
← 33. Decision of AMCU No. 723-р from 29 December 2021 in the case of abuse of monopoly (dominant) position against JSC Dniproazot, https://amcu.gov.ua/npas/pro-porushennya-zakonodavstva-pro-zahist-ekonomichnoyi-konkurenciyi-ta-nakladennya-shtrafu-298.
← 34. AMCU has three sectoral departments: 1) Department for research and investigation of production markets 2) Department for research and investigation of non-production markets and 3) Department for research and investigation of the Fuel and Energy Complex and Housing and Utilities.
← 35. Regulation on the Procedure for Submission and Consideration of Applications for Preliminary Permit of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine for Concentration of Undertakings, approved by the Order of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine as of 19 February 2002 No. 33-p, registered at the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 21 March 21, 2002 under No. 284/6572 (as amended by the Order of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine as of 21 June 2016 No. 14-рп) (hereinafter - the "Regulation on Concentration").
← 36. Article 30.2 as amended by Law No. 2596-IV as of 31 May 2005.
← 37. Article 25.1 Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition.
← 38. No. 49-рр from 27 December 2016 on Application of Part One of Article 25 of the Law of Ukraine on Protection of Economic Competition (regarding assessment of horizontal concentrations); No. 13-рр from 16 March 2018 on the Procedure for Application of Part One of Article 25 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition (regarding the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Concentrations).
← 39. Article 24.7 Competition Law.
← 40. Including decisions No. 70-r, No. 159-r, No. 213-r, No. 447-r and No. 446-r.
← 41. See for example, Decision No. 213-r and Decision 304-r.