This section examines changes in statutory FDI restrictions between end-2024 and end-2025 and the reforms that shaped the results. It distinguishes between the direction of reforms across economies and their effect on aggregate FDIRRI scores.
OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index 2025
Key findings and trends
FDI regulatory frameworks remained broadly stable in 2025. The simple average FDIRRI score across the 106 economies covered increased only marginally, from 0.1192 in 2024 to 0.1194 in 2025, while the median remained unchanged. Ninety-five economies recorded no change in their scores. The marginal score increase therefore reflects developments in a small number of economies rather than a broad shift towards more restrictive FDI policies. Nevertheless, it marks a second consecutive year of slightly higher average restrictiveness, against the longer-term trend towards liberalisation observed over previous decades (Box 1) (OECD, 2025[15]).
Among the 11 economies whose scores changed, seven recorded a net decline in restrictiveness (Algeria, Argentina, India, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, and Viet Nam) and four recorded a net increase (Australia, Botswana, Montenegro, and Zimbabwe). Liberalising reforms were therefore more widespread, but tightening measures were larger: the average score increase among economies that tightened their regimes was 0.051, nearly twice the average decline in score (0.027) observed in those that liberalised. This pattern was similar to 2024, when more economies also liberalised than tightened, but larger tightening measures resulted in a net increase in average restrictiveness (OECD, 2025[15]). The aggregate result is, however, particularly sensitive to individual reforms. Holding Zimbabwe’s score at its 2024 level, the average across the full sample would have declined by about 0.0013 rather than increased.
Regional trajectories have differed considerably over 2018-2025, illustrating how changes in the overall average can mask divergent reform paths (Figure 3, Panel A). Across the comparable series, liberalising changes have been more widespread than tightening changes: 37 economies recorded at least one liberalising change between 2018 and 2025, compared with 29 that recorded at least one tightening change, with most reform activity occurring among non-OECD economies (Figure 3, Panel B). At the same time, reforms have become less frequent in recent years, with the share of economies recording any change in their FDIRRI score falling from 21% in 2021‑2022 to 14% in 2022‑2023, 13% in 2023‑2024 and 10% in 2024‑2025 (Figure 3, Panel C).
Developments in 2025 also differed between OECD and non-OECD economies. Average restrictiveness in the OECD increased to 0.0509, its highest level in the comparable series and, for the first time, above its 2018 level. This increase, however, does not reflect a broader shift towards more restrictive policies across OECD Members, but is attributable to a new horizontal measure introduced in a single economy. By contrast, average restrictiveness among non-OECD economies declined slightly, reflecting the larger number of liberalising reforms in this group.
Note: Regional groupings follow the World Bank classification for the 2027 fiscal year. Abbreviations are: ECA = Europe & Central Asia; LAC = Latin America & Caribbean; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; EAP = East Asia & Pacific; NA = North America; SA = South Asia. Panel C: Percentage of the 106 economies with complete scores over 2018‑2025 recording any non-zero change in their FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index score relative to the previous year; the denominator is identical across intervals. Changes are net of offsetting measures and are not weighted by magnitude or direction.
Source: OECD (2025[11]), OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index – Scores (dataset), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/5bl.
Over the past decades, FDI policies worldwide have generally become less restrictive, albeit with occasional reversals. OECD countries spearheaded liberalisation efforts during the 1970s and early 1980s (OECD, 1987[13]), while many Latin American countries followed in the 1980s and 1990s (Safarian, 1993[16]; Wint, 1992[17]). These early reforms established relatively open investment regimes in both regions, and with many restrictions already lifted, the pace of reform naturally slowed in subsequent decades.
Since the beginning of the FDIRRI time series in 1997, the most pronounced liberalisation has been observed in emerging Asian economies such as Viet Nam, Korea, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”), Malaysia, India and Indonesia, which recorded sharp declines in restrictiveness scores after removing long-standing, high barriers to FDI. More recently, the MENA region has accelerated reform, with Algeria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Libya easing horizontal restrictions that had previously affected FDI across most sectors (Figure 3, Panel A).
Reforms have been driven both by unilateral decisions to attract investment and by external factors such as economic crises, accession to the OECD or WTO, and commitments under regional trade agreements (Mistura and Thomsen, 2017[18]). Yet, since the late 1990s, the overall pace of liberalisation has slowed considerably, as many of the most restrictive measures have already been lifted. The latest FDIRRI series (2018‑2025) confirms this trend, showing only a modest overall decline in restrictiveness across the sample, and, in some cases, reversals, as more economies have adopted stringent FDI regulations than in the previous two decades, when such cases were far less frequent (OECD, 2024[19]).
2.1.1. Several targeted reforms eased foreign ownership and operational restrictions…
Seven economies (Algeria, Argentina, India, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania and Viet Nam) eased at least one statutory restriction on FDI in 2025 (see Annex B). These reforms involved foreign equity limits, nationality requirements for key personnel, economic screening, access to land, capital repatriation and discriminatory minimum capital requirements. Most were narrowly targeted rather than economy-wide and often retained partial conditions or safeguards in sensitive activities.
Several reforms expanded opportunities for foreign ownership or simplified market entry. Algeria raised the maximum foreign participation permitted in coal exploitation from 49% to 80% and opened mineral prospection and exploration directly to foreign investors. Restrictions remain at the exploitation stage, including a minimum 20% participation by the state‑owned mining company, and a majority Algerian ownership requirement in quarry exploitation. In Viet Nam, the general 30% foreign ownership limit in commercial banks remains in place, but foreign participation of up to 49% is now permitted in non-State‑majority banks undergoing mandatory restructuring. Saudi Arabia replaced its economy-wide discretionary foreign investment licensing requirement with a registration procedure, retaining prior approval only for activities included in a list of excluded or restricted activities.
Other reforms eased nationality and operational requirements. Argentina replaced nationality requirements for the management of domestic air transport companies with a legal domicile requirement. India removed requirements that a majority of directors and key management personnel of foreign-invested insurers be resident Indian citizens, while retaining a nationality condition for at least one of the Chief Executive Officer, Managing Director or chairperson. India also removed prior regulatory approval for dividend repatriation by majority foreign-owned insurance intermediaries.
The Philippines extended the maximum lease period for private land by foreign investors to a single term of up to 99 years. Tanzania removed nationality-based minimum capital thresholds affecting foreign investors’ access to statutory guarantees for capital and profit repatriation and access to domestic credit sources. Foreign investors must nevertheless continue to meet higher investment thresholds to qualify for strategic investor status and its associated incentives.
2.1.2. …yet larger tightening measures outweighed their combined effect
New or reinforced restrictions were recorded in Australia, Botswana, Montenegro, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. While fewer economies recorded an overall increase than an overall decline in restrictiveness, the greater magnitude of tightening measures was sufficient to push the average FDIRRI score across economies slightly upwards.
Australia was the only OECD economy to record a change in its FDIRRI score in 2025, introducing a preference for Australian-owned businesses in below-threshold procurement processes. Non-Australian-owned suppliers may generally be considered only when no eligible Australian business submits an offer, the offers received do not provide value for money or another documented reason justifies approaching external suppliers.
Botswana introduced a 24% citizen equity participation requirement for new non-industrial mining concessions where the State does not exercise its participation right, therefore limiting foreign ownership in these activities to 76%. Montenegro introduced a local incorporation requirement for fund-management companies from outside the European Union and European Economic Area, while EU and EEA firms may operate through a branch or on a cross-border basis under their home‑state licence.
Viet Nam introduced additional conditions for foreign investment in offshore wind power, including higher minimum capital contribution requirements and a minimum 5% state‑owned enterprise participation stake requirement. Foreign investment is also now subject to a national-security review involving three ministries. This measure is recorded for transparency only and does not affect Viet Nam’s FDIRRI score.
Zimbabwe introduced the broadest set of new restrictions in 2025. The new framework limits foreign ownership in several reserved activities, including retail and wholesale trade, freight transport and grain milling, generally to 25%. It also reserves activities such as pharmaceutical retailing, passenger road transport, bakeries and tobacco grading and packaging to Zimbabwean citizens, subject in some cases to discretionary exemptions. Additional conditions include minimum investment thresholds, divestment requirements and investment screening based on employment, skills and technology transfer.
2.1.3. Security-related investment measures are expanding beyond the OECD area
Attention to the national security implications of certain foreign investments has expanded rapidly over the past decade, leading to intense policymaking activity (Figure 4). Investment screening mechanisms are the policy of choice in most advanced economies. Over 80% of OECD Members now operate an investment screening mechanism to manage national security implications of investment, up from around 55% at the end of 2020 and just over 42% a decade earlier (OECD, 2025[20]). This expansion has been driven by growing security concerns surrounding foreign investment amid shifts in global economic power, rising geopolitical tensions and vulnerabilities exposed by the COVID‑19 pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, among other crises. These measures are generally intended to address risks to national security or public order, but the scope of national-security screening has widened over time, including to transactions involving critical technologies and other strategic assets (Moran, 2009[21]; Evenett, 2021[22]; OECD, 2024[23]; 2021[24]; 2009[25]).
The expansion of security-related investment screening is also increasingly evident beyond the OECD area. While advanced and major emerging economies accounted for much of the reform activity in this area from 2014 onwards, a growing number of emerging and developing economies have introduced such frameworks since 2020. Examples include Moldova, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Viet Nam (OECD, 2025[20]).
In 2025, three additional non-OECD economies – Albania, Croatia and the Kyrgyz Republic – introduced new cross-sectoral security screening regimes, while Ireland’s new screening mechanism entered into force among OECD Members. Beyond these new frameworks, reform activity continued across a broader range of security-related investment measures. Seven OECD Members – Canada, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Korea, the Slovak Republic and the United States – and three non-OECD economies – Bulgaria, Romania and Viet Nam – revised, clarified or introduced measures in this area.
Security-related screening measures are not considered for the calculation of FDIRRI scores and are only recorded for transparency. The increasing adoption of such measures across economies nevertheless makes their design increasingly important for maintaining open investment regimes. OECD estimates suggest that between 50% and 60% of global FDI now flows into economies applying cross-sectoral security screening, approximately twice the share recorded during the 1990s (OECD, 2021[24]). Poorly targeted screening frameworks can unintentionally discourage investment that poses no genuine security risk and contribute to the fragmentation of global FDI flows and greater geopolitical divisions (IMF, 2023[26]; UNCTAD, 2024[27]), with these risks particularly salient in fast-moving digital and technology sectors (ADB, 2026[14]). The OECD Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies relating to National Security (2009[1]) emphasise transparency, proportionality, accountability, and non-discrimination as key principles for safeguarding legitimate security interests while preserving openness to international investment (OECD, 2009[1]).
Note: Sample includes 98 economies. More than one measure may be counted for a given jurisdiction in a year. Based on information available to the OECD as of May 2026.
Source: OECD (2026[28]),, OECD Review of Investment Policies in ASEAN: Mobilising Investment for the Green and Digital Transitions, https://doi.org/10.1787/baf9c7a4-en.