The quality of the institutional, legal and regulatory framework is an important foundation for implementing the G20/OECD Principles. Chapter 2 provides insights on the legal and regulatory framework for corporate governance, revealing the frequency of legislative reforms, continued relevance of national corporate governance codes or equivalent instruments, and their monitoring as complementary mechanisms. Legal and regulatory frameworks should be coupled with strong and independent institutional oversight to ensure effective supervision and enforcement that market participants can rely on. The chapter also offers information on the lead regulatory institution for corporate governance of listed companies in each jurisdiction, and on mechanisms to ensure their independence.
OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2025
Abstract
Corporate governance frameworks continue to adapt to a changing environment. During 2023-24, nearly two-thirds of Factbook jurisdictions amended their company law and/or securities law. Over one‑third of Factbook jurisdictions updated their national corporate governance codes or equivalent instruments. The balance between formal regulation and a “comply or explain” approach in the corporate governance framework varies across jurisdictions.
Traditionally, Factbook jurisdictions have used different combinations of laws, regulatory instruments, codes and principles to inform oversight of corporate governance matters. In all jurisdictions, the corporate governance framework is set forth by company laws and securities or capital markets laws. Generally, company laws detail the default option for corporate structures, while securities and capital markets laws detail binding requirements for listed companies, contributing to regulators’ enforceability of shareholder protection. In most jurisdictions, the corporate governance framework is complemented by additional binding regulations, often included in listing rules issued by the stock exchange or specific regulations issued by the main public regulator for corporate governance (Table 2.1).
Almost all Factbook jurisdictions have a national corporate governance code or equivalent instrument for corporate governance principles and recommendations. These complementary mechanisms provide publicly traded companies with the flexibility to develop and improve fit-for-purpose practices, particularly for emerging corporate governance issues.
Over 80% of the Factbook jurisdictions have a corporate governance code that follows a non-binding soft law “comply or explain” or similar approach. Some of these countries, including Argentina, Malaysia and South Africa, have opted for specific variations of the “comply or explain” approach (see Box 2.1 for more examples).
Conversely, 18% of countries have either binding or partly binding instruments, which has remained on par since 2022. Six jurisdictions (Costa Rica, Hong Kong (China), Israel, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye) have opted for a mixed system of binding and voluntary measures (Figure 2.1).
Note: Based on 52 jurisdictions. See Table 2.2 for data. Due to rounding, the total is 101%. Non-binding approaches fall within the “Non-binding (Comply or explain & others)” category, including those named “Apply or explain”, “Apply or explain an alternative”, “Apply and explain” and “Apply or not, and explain”.
Only three countries adopt a legally binding approach. India and the United States rely upon their laws, regulations and listing rules as their legal corporate governance framework. China has adopted a binding corporate governance code.
A few countries have developed systems for promoting implementation of national corporate governance codes that do not strictly follow the “comply or explain” approach but are also categorised as non-binding soft law approaches.
In Argentina, the Corporate Governance Code follows an “apply or not, explain” approach to recognise heterogeneity within industries and across companies. Companies that decide to omit a recommendation may still be in compliance with the Code as long as the justification for the omission is aligned with the principles of the Code.
In Costa Rica, it is mandatory for listed companies to implement the National Council of Supervision of the Financial System (CONASSIF) Corporate Governance Regulation based on a “comply and explain” rule. This has some flexibility, unlike the more common model followed in other countries under which the company may simply choose not to comply but must explain why. While complying with the Code is considered mandatory, companies may also apply the principle of proportionality, meaning that a company may justify not implementing certain provisions due to its circumstances. Listed companies are nevertheless mandated under the Code to establish and disclose their own codes and additional information.
In Saudi Arabia, the Capital Market Authority’s Corporate Governance Regulations are binding by default for all companies listed on the Main Market, except when provisions clarify that they represent guiding provisions. In addition, the regulations specify that there are some mandatory provisions for companies on the Parallel Market.
South Africa’s King IV Report on Corporate Governance (King IV Code) adopted by the Institute of Directors in South Africa represents a set of recommendations and best practices in line with the soft law approach, but it has an application regime named “apply and explain”. While the Code’s principles are described as voluntary, companies are expected to apply the principles and provide an explanation of the practices implemented, explaining how they support the application of the principles.
In Malaysia, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance follows an alternative application method named “apply or explain an alternative”, according to which companies that are not applying the practices prescribed by the Code must provide an explanation for the departure and disclose an alternative practice that meets the intended outcome of the principles of the Code.
National corporate governance codes or equivalent instruments are updated regularly. During 2023-24, one-third of Factbook jurisdictions updated their codes (Table 2.3). More than two-thirds revised their code or equivalent instrument between 2020-24.
In most jurisdictions, national authorities and/or stock exchanges have taken the lead in establishing or revising corporate governance codes. In some of these jurisdictions, codes are devised and updated by a group of institutions representing different market segments, such as the ASX Corporate Governance Council in Australia, or by both public and private actors, such as the Corporate Governance Advisory Board in Latvia, which is managed by the Ministry of Justice and includes corporate governance experts from the public and private sectors.
The most common approach adopted for overseeing corporate governance codes by Factbook jurisdictions is a mixed public-private sector model. This involves either joint oversight exercised by national authorities together with a mix of private sector groups (25%) or of national authorities and stock exchanges (8%). National authorities have played a growing role as the formal and sole custodian of codes and their updates, increasing from 17% to 23% of jurisdictions between 2015-24.
Stock exchanges and private associations also play an important role as the sole custodian in 21% and 23% of Factbook jurisdictions respectively (Figure 2.2). For example, in Hungary, the Corporate Governance Committee is an advisory committee of the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE). Members of the Committee include representatives of issuers, regulatory authorities and the stock exchange, as well as independent market experts and lawyers appointed by the BSE’s board of directors.
Note: Based on 52 jurisdictions. See Table 2.3 for data.
2.1.1. Aggregate reporting on compliance with national codes
To support effective disclosure and implementation of non-binding “comply or explain” corporate governance codes, 73% of Factbook jurisdictions publish a national report on compliance with the code, a notable increase from 2014 when 59% of jurisdictions published such reports.
The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance highlight the importance of clear definitions in terms of coverage, implementation, compliance and sanctions of corporate governance codes to strengthen their effectiveness for companies. Forty-two percent of jurisdictions publish a national report on corporate governance every year. Responsibility for publishing such reports is split between governmental authorities, stock exchanges, and private sector or stakeholder groups.
Note: Based on 47 reporting institutions in 38 jurisdictions. See Table 2.4 for data.
Among Factbook jurisdictions, 47 institutions (in 38 jurisdictions) issue a national report reviewing listed companies’ adherence to the corporate governance code in the domestic market. The report is published by more than one institution in nine countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Portugal, Slovenia). Sixty percent of institutions issue national reports annually (Figure 2.3), which usually cover all listed companies and all code recommendations. Between 2014-24, the number of national reports covering all code provisions increased from 59% in 2014 to 72% in 2024. The number of national reports on corporate governance that cover all listed companies has also increased over the same period, from 48% reports in 2014 to 76% national reports in 2024 (Table 2.4, Figure 2.4).
Note: For 2024, based on 47 reporting institutions in 38 jurisdictions. See Table 2.4 for data. For 2014, based on 29 reporting institutions in 24 jurisdictions.
During 2023-24, in five countries (Bulgaria, Chile, Greece, India, Romania), initiatives were introduced for national reporting on adherence to the corporate governance code.
Note: Based on 47 reporting institutions in 38 jurisdictions. See Table 2.4 for data. Due to rounding, the total is 101%.
Overall, national regulators review listed companies’ adherence to codes and publish reports in one-third of Factbook jurisdictions, while stock exchanges review and publish them in a quarter. In jurisdictions that have started publishing a national report in the past two years, the reports have been developed by differing bodies. These include the national regulator (e.g. Hellenic Capital Market Commission in Greece), stock exchange (e.g. Bucharest Stock Exchange (BVB) in Romania), or private groups (e.g. Institute of Directors of Chile). Exchanges and private groups comprise over half of bodies responsible for publishing reports on listed companies’ adherence to codes, a proportion that has not varied significantly over the past decade (Figure 2.5).
In all Factbook jurisdictions, public regulators have the authority to supervise and enforce the corporate governance practices of listed companies. Securities or financial regulators generally play the key role in most jurisdictions. Sixty percent of these regulators are funded fully by fees from regulated entities or by a combination of fees and fines.
Public regulators have the authority to supervise and enforce corporate governance practices of listed companies in all Factbook jurisdictions. Securities regulators, financial regulators or a combination of the two play the lead or at least a shared role in 83% of all jurisdictions (Figure 2.6). Central banks play the lead role in an additional eight jurisdictions (15%).
A few countries take differing approaches. Korea is the only jurisdiction in which the ministry in charge of corporate governance is the Ministry of Justice. This ministry also has the main responsibility for the supervision and enforcement of corporate governance. In India, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the securities market regulator, are both responsible for enforcing the corporate governance framework. In Switzerland, SIX Exchange Regulation AG (SER), the securities market regulator, issues, supervises and enforces regulation on corporate governance matters. The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) approves and supervises the respective SER regulations. In some countries, such as Czechia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Singapore, and Sweden, the role of the public regulators is limited only to issues related to securities laws, as in principle, civil rules on corporate governance are mainly supervised and enforced privately. Since 2015, the authority of corporate governance regulators has remained stable.
Note: Based on 52 jurisdictions. See Table 2.5 for data.
In some countries, the division of responsibilities for regulatory and supervisory functions involves multiple layers. For example, in South Africa, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) is responsible for company law and corporate governance requirements such as the functioning and composition of the audit committee, while the Johannesburg Stock Exchange enforces stock exchange listing requirements (and in turn is overseen by the Financial Sector Conduct Authority). In the United Kingdom, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) sets codes and standards including for corporate governance, but the FRC’s corporate governance monitoring and third country auditor registration activities are relevant to the work of and may lead to enforcement by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). In the United States, state law is the primary source of corporate governance law, but the federal securities regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and exchanges regulate certain governance matters.
Autonomy over regulators’ budget can reinforce their operational independence. The G20/OECD Principles state that “supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the authority, autonomy, integrity, resources and capacity to fulfil their duties in a professional and objective manner” (Principle I.E.). Most regulators (33 institutions in 29 jurisdictions) are fully self-funded by fees. Other regulators (5 institutions) ensure budgetary autonomy by supplementing their self-funding with fines. Mixed sources of financing from both public funds and fees from regulated entities are also common (14 institutions in 12 jurisdictions). Only 10 regulatory institutions rely exclusively on government funding for their budget (Figure 2.7).
The G20/OECD Principles provide examples of how jurisdictions have achieved autonomy and collected adequate resources, for example, by imposing levies on supervised entities with or as an alternative to government funding. The G20/OECD Principles also underline that fees imposed on regulated entities should not impede independence from market participants and should be imposed transparently and according to objective criteria.
Note: Based on 62 regulatory institutions across 52 jurisdictions. Jurisdictions with more than one main regulator are counted more than once. See Table 2.6 for data.
2.2.1. Governance structure of public regulators
Independence of regulators is addressed through the creation of a formal governing body or governing head. The most common size for governing bodies across Factbook jurisdictions is 5 to 7 members, but it ranges from as low as 2 members (Austria) to as high as 17 (Switzerland).
The G20/OECD Principles note that the creation of a formal governing body, typically a board, council or commission, is the solution adopted by many jurisdictions to address political independence (Principle I.E.).
In line with the recommendations of the G20/OECD Principles, 87% of the regulatory institutions established by Factbook jurisdictions have established a formal governing body (e.g. a board, council or commission) (Table 2.7). Colombia, Korea and Slovenia are the only regulators without a governing body for any of their regulatory institutions responsible for the supervision of corporate governance requirements. Instead, these jurisdictions have assigned responsibility to a governing head (e.g. a Superintendent (Colombia), Minister (Korea) or Director (Slovenia)). Four additional countries (India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa), which have more than one regulator, report a mixed approach with at least one regulatory institution maintaining a governing head instead of a governing body.
The most common size for governing bodies is 5 to 7 members, but it ranges from as low as 2 members (Austria) to as high as 17 (Switzerland) (Figure 2.8). Seats on these governing bodies are sometimes reserved for representatives from specific institutions, such as central banks (in 19 governing bodies across 19 jurisdictions), government (in 18 governing bodies across 16 jurisdictions), other public institutions (in 15 governing bodies across 14 jurisdictions) or from the private sector (in 15 governing bodies across 14 jurisdictions) (Table 2.7).
In the United States, no more than three out of five Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission may belong to the same political party (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commision, 2025[1]). In France, the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) has one of the largest boards with 16 members, including judges from supreme courts (Cour de Cassation and Conseil d’État) (Autorité Des Marchés Financiers, 2025[2]). In Switzerland, SIX Exchange Regulation AG (SER) is overseen by a 17‑member board spanning backgrounds such as banking, law, business and academia (SIX Exchange Regulation AG, 2025[3]).
Note: Based on 60 institutions in 52 jurisdictions. Jurisdictions with more than one main regulator are counted more than once. See Table 2.7 for data.
Members of the governing body of a national regulator are usually given fixed terms of appointment ranging from two to seven years, with all but four regulators allowing re‑appointment.
Members of a governing body or a regulatory head such as a commissioner or superintendent are appointed for fixed terms in 55 out of 60 institutions. Of the 52 Factbook jurisdictions, only 5 do not make fixed term appointments (SFC’s Superintendent in Colombia, SEHK’s Board in Hong Kong (China); FSA’s Commissioner in Japan; the Ministry of Justice governed by a Minister in Korea; and CNBV’s Governing Board in Mexico). When specified, maximum terms generally range from two to seven years, and are most commonly set at five years (for 21 institutions) (Figure 2.9).
The re‑appointment of members is allowed in all countries that set fixed terms except for Brazil, Italy, Peru and Portugal. The re‑appointment of the chairperson is not allowed in France and is allowed once in Hungary for the Governor of the Financial Stability Board. The number of reappointments is limited to one in seven countries (Costa Rica, Czechia, France, Iceland, Ireland, Saudi Arabia, Spain) and to two in one country (the Netherlands).
Note: Based on 60 institutions for 52 jurisdictions reporting data. Jurisdictions with more than one main regulator are counted more than once. See Table 2.8 for data.
Key: “-” = no link to material available. The online version of the publication contains links to websites and reports where available.
Note: Blank cells indicate that no information is available. The same applies to the tables below.
1. Regarding takeover bids, some jurisdictions (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Germany and Slovenia) set out a separate legal framework, while Hong Kong (China) has a non-statutory code.
2. In Malaysia, the Guidelines on Conduct for Capital Market Intermediaries were updated on 1 October 2024 to ensure that capital market intermediaries (CMI) and their representatives cultivate a corporate culture and business conduct.
3. In Romania, the updated consolidated English version of Law 24/2017 will be available shortly on the ASF’s website. Currently, the English version available does not reflect modifications brought to the law.
Key: “-” = no data available. The online version of the publication contains links to websites and reports where available.
1. Jurisdictions have opted for different formulations to specify the application of their corporate governance code(s) or equivalent framework, which range from binding, mixed or non-binding (soft law) approaches. Soft law approaches are generally referred to as “Comply or explain” but also include different formulations such as “Apply or explain”, “Apply or explain an alternative”, and “Apply and explain”.
2. In Argentina, a company may decide not to apply a recommendation and still be in compliance with good practices. This approach looks to recognise heterogeneity among industries and companies and to provide broader means to comply with good practices.
3. In Chile, the CMF issued General Rules No. 461 and 519, amending General Rule No. 30 to incorporate Sustainability and Corporate Governance into corporate annual reports. Disclosure of corporate governance practices will be phased in from 2022 to 2025 based on entity type and size. Until 2025, these requirements will be in the General Rule No. 385 report and the annual report, after which Rule No. 385 will be repealed.
4. In Colombia, the Código País recommendations are adopted on a voluntary basis by issuers; however, disclosure against the code is required by regulation, and once practices are reported as adopted, they become mandatory. Issuers have to include in their internal codes a clause under which the firm, its directors and employees are required to comply with the recommendations that were voluntarily adopted, as well as to submit the Código País Implementation Report to the SFC annually.
5. In Costa Rica, the CONASSIF Corporate Governance Regulation is mandatory to implement but based on a “comply and explain” rule. It is classified as “binding and comply or explain” due to some flexibility provided in implementing some measures according to proportionality considerations.
6. In Hong Kong, updates to the Corporate Governance Code under the Listing Rules issued by The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited on 19 December 2024 came into effect on 1 July 2025 (Appendix C1 to the Main Board Listing Rules / Appendix C1 to the GEM Listing Rules).
7. In Ireland, Irish companies listed on Euronext Dublin are subject to the new Irish Corporate Governance Code 2024 from 1 January 2025. Companies with a dual-listing in both Ireland and the United Kingdom may follow the UK Corporate Governance Code instead. From 2003 until the introduction of the Irish Corporate Governance Code, Irish listed companies were subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code.
8. In Israel, the corporate governance code has both binding and voluntary recommendations embedded in its Companies Law. The implementation of certain corporate governance principles must be reported in the annual report. Additionally, the Israel Securities Authority recommends reporting on certain mandatory and recommended provisions through a corporate governance questionnaire attached to the annual report.
9. In Korea, KOSPI listed companies with total assets of more than KRW 0.5 trillion are required to disclose a stand-alone corporate governance report annually no later than last day of May. All KOSPI-listed companies are required to do so starting in 2026.
10. In Mexico, listed companies must disclose their degree of adherence to the Code to both the stock exchange and investors. The fourth revision of the Code of Principles and Best Practices in Corporate Governance (Corporate Governance Code) came into effect on 1 January 2025.
11. In Switzerland, the Code states that it uses the “comply or explain” principle, but it does not indicate where the company has to explain whether its corporate governance practices deviate from the recommendations.
1. In Austria, the 13th revision to the Austrian Code of Corporate Governance came into effect on 1 January 2025.
2. In Bulgaria, the National Code for Corporate Governance and any update thereof have to be approved by the FSC. The fourth update of the National Code for Corporate Governance of 2024 is currently under review by the FSC. The last update, which was approved by the FSC, is the third revision of the National Code of 2021.
3. In Finland, the sixth revision of the Finnish Corporate Governance Code came into effect on 1 January 2025.
4. In Hong Kong (China), updates to the Corporate Governance Code under the Listing Rules issued by The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited on 19 December 2024 came into effect on 1 July 2025.
5. In Ireland, the Irish Corporate Governance Code 2024 came into effect on 1 January 2025. From 2003 until the introduction of the Irish Corporate Governance Code, Irish listed companies were subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code.
6. In Mexico, the fourth revision of the Code of Principles and Best Practices in Corporate Governance (Corporate Governance Code) came into effect on 1 January 2025.
7. In New Zealand, the NZX Corporate Governance Institute (NZX CGI) assists NZX by providing advice in relation to the development of the NZX Corporate Governance Code and rule settings that apply to the corporate governance practices of issuers on the NZX Main Board.
8. In Romania, the current Code was issued in 2024 and came into effect on 1 January 2025.
9. In South Africa, a public consultation was launched on an updated King V Code in February 2025.
Key: R = Securities/Corporate governance regulator; S = Stock exchange; P = Private institution; M = Mixed.
1. In China, the report on corporate governance of listed companies was first publicly released in 2014. In 2023, it was internally circulated among the members of CAPCO, without being made available in a published format.
2. In Denmark, the joint report prepared by Nasdaq and the Committee on Corporate Governance is more comprehensive than the Nasdaq report, as it collects additional data and includes some focus areas that differ from year to year. The Nasdaq report is published every year, but has included information regarding corporate governance only three times in the last 12 years.
3. In Greece, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission issues every two years a report on the implementation status of the Corporate Governance Framework. It provides an overview of the compliance of the listed companies to the main provisions of law 4706/2020 and law 4449/2017.The first report was issued in April 2024 with reference date 31 December 2023.
4. In Ireland, Euronext Dublin plans to conduct a regular review of adherence to the new 2024 Code and the quality of reporting in respect of the Code. Additionally, it established in 2025 a Corporate Governance Advisory Panel inter alia to oversee the review and make recommendations to amend the Code or the manner in which it is applied.
5. In Luxembourg, the analysis is prepared internally on an annual basis but has not been published.
6. In Mexico, the 2025 report corresponds to 2024 information.
7. In Portugal, the Portuguese Institute of Corporate Governance (IPCG) publishes a monitoring report on how listed companies disclose matters relating to the adoption of the Code. Since 2022, the CMVM publishes an annual report with the main conclusions on the integration of sustainability factors in the activity of Portuguese listed companies, which includes a chapter dedicated to the information disclosed by companies regarding corporate governance.
8. In Romania, the publication in 2024 has reflected compliance with certain provisions of the Code (e.g. the report reflected top 10 most complied provisions in 2022 vs 2023, top 10 least complied provisions in 2022 vs 2023). It is envisaged that the following publications reflect compliance with all provisions of the Code adopted in 2024.
9. In Türkiye, the Monitoring Report has analysed the compliance status and the quality of the explanations provided by the BIST 100 companies for non-mandatory Corporate Governance Principles annexed to the Communiqué on Corporate Governance (II‑17.1), which were disclosed under CRF (Compliance Report Format).
10. In Türkiye, the companies whose shares are traded on the BIST Star Market and BIST Main Market are required to disclose their compliance status and explanations for non-mandatory principles in line with the comply or explain approach. However, for the Report, the companies traded on BIST 100 indices were designated as the sample group.
11. In the United Kingdom, the report covers listed companies in the commercial companies and closed ended investment funds categories regardless of where they are incorporated.
1. In Czechia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Singapore and Sweden, the public regulator is concerned with matters relating to the securities law, while in principle civil rules on corporate governance are mainly supervised and enforced privately.
2. In Korea, the ministry in charge of Commercial Act is also substantially responsible for the enforcement of corporate governance issues.
3. In Saudi Arabia, the Capital Market Authority is responsible for the rules of the offer of securities and continuous obligations, corporate governance regulations, and the implementing regulations of the companies’ law for listed joint stock companies). The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for company law, the Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) is responsible for the Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia 2024, and the Insurance Authority is responsible for the Insurance Corporation Governance Regulation 2025.
4. In Switzerland, SIX Exchange Regulation AG (SER) is independent from the stock exchange (SIX Exchanges). SER issues, supervises and enforces regulation on corporate governance matters. The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) approves and supervises the respective SER regulations.
Key: “●” = presence of funding in the category; “-” = absence of funding in the category.
1. In Bulgaria, the FSC is primarily self-funded, with public funding envisaged only to cover any potential shortfalls.
2. In Chile, per Art. 33 of the CMF’s Organic Law, supervised entities should pay fees for inscriptions and modifications in registries, authorisations, and certificates, excluding entities that, according to Art. 8 of the General Banking Act, should pay supervisory fees Supervisory fees are fully transferred to the Chilean Treasury and yearly budget is endowed by the Chilean Budget Office.
3. In Costa Rica, a 2019 amendment to the Law Regulating the Securities Market and other related laws, enacted in Law 9746, changed SUGEVAL’s funding from an 80%/20% split between the Central Bank and regulated entities to a 50%/50% split. Starting in 2024, compulsory contributions of regulated entities will increase by 7.5% annually until 50% is achieved in 2027.
4. In Croatia, the Ministry of Finance is designated as the competent authority for audit market supervision in accordance with the Audit Act and Regulation (EU) No. 537/2014 as well as for non-financial supervision in accordance with the Accounting Act.
5. In Hungary, according to the Central Bank Act, if the amount of equity capital remains below the subscribed capital for any extended period of time, it shall be supplemented, covered by the central budget and credited to the retained earnings directly, within a reasonable time period to ensure that the equity capital of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank reaches the level of the subscribed capital for the purpose of compliance with the principle of financial independence.
6. In Indonesia, the primary source of funding for IFSA is self-funding. Government Regulation Number 41 of 2024 concerning the Work Plan and Budget of the Financial Services Authority and Levies in the Financial Services Sector stipulates that, if necessary, the Financial Services Authority may propose the use of funding from public sources.
7. In Peru, the SMV´s Organic Law includes the possibility of obtaining funding resources from the Central Government and fines from wrongdoers; nevertheless, the main source of resources of the SMV is the income from the contributions of issuers and authorised entities.
8. In Saudi Arabia, the financial resources of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) shall consist of the following: (1) fees for services and commissions charged by the Authority in accordance with the provisions of this Law and the regulations and instructions issued in pursuance thereof; (2) charges against using its facilities, returns on its funds and proceeds of the sale of its assets; (3) fines and financial penalties imposed on violators of the provisions of this Law; (4) funds provided by the government to the Authority; and (5) any other resources determined by the Board.
9. In the Slovak Republic, the budget of the NBS is separate from the state budget, and the annual profit or loss of the NBS is not included in the general government budget.
10. In Türkiye, when CMB funds are insufficient to meet the expenditures, under the Capital Market Law the deficit can be financed by the Treasury budget, although no deficit has been reported since 1992.
11. In Türkiye, for fines imposed by CMB, 50% is registered as income in the national budget and the remaining 50% is transferred to the Investor Compensation Center (Fund).
12. In the United States, the SEC receives fees from regulated entities but Congress determines the SEC’s funding. The amount of funding received is offset by fees collected.
Key: “●” = presence of representative in the category; “-” = absence of representative in the category.
1. In Canada, the governing body/head and its composition varies across the provinces. In Ontario, the OSC is governed by its Board of Directors. There may be a maximum of 12 board directors and a minimum of 4 (which includes the Chair and CEO).
2. In Chile, although there is no representative of the Government, the Chairperson of the Financial Market Commission (CMF) is directly nominated by the President, whereas the Commissioners are proposed by the President and need the Senate’s ratification (see Table 2.8).
3. In Hungary, the supreme decision-making body of CBH is the Monetary Council. The Monetary Council shall define the strategic framework within which the Financial Stability Council makes its decisions.
4. In Lithuania, the Law on the Bank of Lithuania does not provide any specific requirements on composition (having representatives from specific bodies) of the regulators’ board. The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania (LB) shall be appointed and dismissed by the Parliament on the recommendation of the President of the Republic. Deputy Chairpersons and Members of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall be appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Board of the LB.
5. In Malaysia, the number of board commissioners increased to seven, effective 15 January 2025.
6. In New Zealand, the FMA’s Board comprises five to nine members and up to five associate members. An associate member may be appointed, attend meetings and vote only in relation to a matter or a class of matters to be specified in the member’s notice of appointment.
7. In Norway, the Parliament has adopted a new Financial Supervision Act that will change the function of the Board of the NFSA. The act has not yet entered into force. When it does, the NFSA will still have a board, but it will have a changed area of responsibility and seven members. The members are appointed by the Government for a period of up to 4 years. Members may be reappointed for a total period of up to 12 years. The NFSA will be managed by the director general. The director general is appointed for a period of 6 years. The director general may be reappointed for a period of up to 6 years.
8. In Peru, the SMV’s Board of Directors is made up of the Superintendent of Securities Market acting as the Chair, and four other directors appointed by the government by means of a Supreme Decree signed by the Minister of Economy and Finance. One candidate is proposed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, one by the Central Bank of Peru and one by the Superintendence of Banks, Insurance and Private Pension Fund Management Companies (SBS). In addition, for the remaining seat to be filled by an independent director, the SMV submits a shortlist of candidates to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which after assessment, sends a proposal to the President of the Republic for the appointment of the independent director.
9. In Slovenia, the Director of the ATVP represents and manages the operations and organises the work of the Agency. A Council composed of five members has oversight function and is competent for adopting the Rules of Procedure of the Agency and the implementing of regulations issued by the Agency, as well as deciding on licences, approvals and other individual matters, unless otherwise stipulated by law.
10. In South Africa, the FSCA’s Executive Committee is comprised by the Commissioner and three Deputy Commissioners.
1. In Canada, for Ontario specifically, the Board of Directors governs the affairs of the OSC and is the ruling body in charge of corporate governance.
2. In Hungary, other members of the Financial Stability Board may be appointed until revocation by the President of the Central Bank of Hungary.
3. In India, the Chairperson and every whole-time member shall hold office for such period, not exceeding five years, as may be specified in the order of appointment, and the Chairperson shall be eligible for re-appointment, provided that no person shall hold office as the Chair or a whole-time member after attaining the age of 65 years.
4. In Lithuania, the Chair may be appointed to this position for an unlimited number of terms. The Vice-Chairs and other members of the Board may be appointed to these positions for a maximum of two consecutive terms.
5. In Portugal, the members of the board of directors are appointed by resolution of the Council of Ministers, taking into account the reasoned opinion of the competent committee of the parliament.
References
[2] Autorité Des Marchés Financiers (2025), The AMF Board, https://www.amf-france.org/en/amf/our-organisation/amf-board (accessed on 15 May 2025).
[3] SIX Exchange Regulation AG (2025), About SER, https://www.ser-ag.com/en/about.html (accessed on 16 May 2025).
[1] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commision (2025), SEC Commissioners, https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-commissioners (accessed on 15 May 2025).