Cash forecasting requires a timely flow of information and an effective coordination mechanism among relevant parties, including line ministries, the central bank, budget offices and the fiscal authority. The information supplied and its frequency can be defined formally or informally, depending on whether it is based on a binding legal or administrative mechanism, or an alternative non-binding arrangement, such as a memorandum of understanding (MOU) or service-level agreement (SLA).
Formal obligations are rare, and in such cases, informal mechanisms become essential. Building strong relationships between organisations and counterparties is also crucial in these instances, regardless of the formality of the mechanism.
Approximately half of countries do not rely on legal or quasi-legal provisions for data sharing. As a result, cash management teams are, in many countries, responsible for gathering information without any legal requirement or incentives to ensure timely, accurate and reliable reporting. In some cases, the absence of legal enforcement is due to the centralisation of information by the MoF (e.g. Austria). In other cases, without formal obligations, the frequency and quality of data can vary, largely depending on the cash management team’s initiative and the willingness of other entities to co-operate. This challenge is particularly pronounced for entities outside the central government (e.g. state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and subnational governments).
Some countries with legal or quasi-legal frameworks stipulating the frequency and type of data to be shared are Brazil, Hungary, New Zealand, and the United States. For example, Brazil’s "responsibility matrix", established by the Budget Execution Board and created by a presidential decree, determines which government bodies are responsible for providing forecasts of revenues and expenditures. These updates are submitted bi-monthly, in line with the Fiscal Responsibility Law. Similarly, in Hungary, budgetary entities face penalties for failing to provide timely or accurate forecasts to the State Treasury. In New Zealand, the treasury is empowered under the Public Finance Act to require information, including cash flow forecasts, from government entities. In the United States, the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-11 and the treasury financial manual require agencies to submit reports on federal outlays, with the Cash Reporting Branch using a scorecard system to incentivise compliance through reputational risks (see Box 2.2 for details).
Belgium, Ireland and Switzerland are examples of countries without legal provisions; however, they have formal agreements, administrative guidelines, or MOUs. Belgium, for example applies a similar approach, where public entities benefiting from a credit line with the Belgian Debt Agency must report expected cash flows under their credit agreements. In general, public entities do not have a legal obligation to report expected cashflows to the treasury department, but are advised to do so through informal means of communication. Ireland uses an MOU between the treasury and the MoF’s Budget Office to ensure the timely exchange of fiscal estimates. Similarly, in Switzerland line ministries are not legally obligated to report forecasts, but the Swiss Financial Budget Act and Financial Budget Ordinance require administrative units to collaborate on recurring budget estimates, providing a framework for data sharing. These units also collaborate with the cash management team by routing all payments through a centralised system, allowing real-time updates in cash planning tools.
However, in other countries without legal obligations, such as Iceland, Luxembourg and Portugal, there are no formal obligations, instead data sharing relies on informal channels and well-established relationships between the cash management team and other government entities. In Iceland, cash managers have access to historical data, but future inflows and outflows are often unreported by line ministries, with no legal consequences for non-compliance. In Luxembourg and Portugal, the budget cycle is key in providing information for cash planning, supported by line ministries on an ad hoc basis in case of significant expected divergences from the budget.
It is worth noting that data collection from the DMO by the cash management team is generally seamless, as both often operate within the same institution. The need for formal institutional frameworks primarily arises when coordinating with other bodies, such as the budget office and line ministries.