Intra-regional food trade is, and will increasingly become, a key element of West Africa’s agricultural development. Driven by population growth, urbanisation, and rising incomes, regional food markets are expanding rapidly. By 2030, regional food demand is projected to reach USD 480 billion, significantly surpassing West Africa’s global food export markets. These changes are reshaping the regional food economy, characterised by a growing concentration of food demand in large cities and the rise of commercial farming clusters. Intra-regional food trade is crucial in this transformation, connecting supply and demand across the region, thereby expanding, and multiplying market opportunities. Investment in agriculture is closely tied to the size and stability of demand. Increasing the scale and predictability of market demand through intra-regional trade will drive additional investments, enhance competitiveness, and reduce regional prices. Historically, agricultural policy in the region has focused heavily on global markets, both for exports and imports. However, to fully leverage growing opportunities and complementarities, there needs to be a stronger focus on regional markets. Achieving this requires a better understanding of the role intra-regional food trade plays in agricultural development.
Intra‑regional Food Trade in West Africa
Abstract
Structural shifts in food demand are driving and shaping intra-regional food trade
Driven by population growth and urbanisation, food demand in West Africa has grown spectacularly. In just the past 30 years, the region’s population has doubled from 167 million to 395 million people. Cities have grown even faster, with the people living in urban areas increasing from 54 to 200 million (OECD/SWAC, 2024[1]). Today, more than half of West Africa’s population resides in urban areas (OECD/UN ECA/AfDB, 2022[2]).
As a result of population growth and urbanisation, the number of people relying on markets to source foods has grown from 112 million to 278 million between 2000 and 2020, equal to 4.7% per year. Expanding cities have become the largest commercial opportunity for African farmers (AGRA, 2020[3]).
A correlate of urbanisation and growing cities is the concentration of food demand. The region’s largest cities now require more food than entire countries. Feeding cities like Lagos, Accra, Abidjan, and Dakar is a major economic activity, involving hundreds of thousands of workers storing, transporting and retailing food sourced from domestic, regional and global markets.
In addition, food demand is shifting towards more diversified and higher-value foods, mainly fruits and vegetables, meat, and fish (Hollinger and Staatz, 2015[4]). Urbanisation is also associated with higher average incomes and a greater proportion of the labour force—especially women—employed in paid economic activities away from home (OECD/UN ECA/AfDB, 2022[2]). This increases the opportunity cost of cooking and shopping, leading to greater consumption of processed foods and meals away from home (Adeosun, Greene and Oosterveer, 2022[5]). Moreover, these changes are spreading to rural areas, where a growing proportion of the population participates in off-farm activities, increasingly relying on markets to source their food (Dzanku, Liverpool-Tasie and Reardon, 2024[6]).
These tailwinds are propelling the regional food market to unprecedented heights. In 2010, it was estimated at USD 126 billion—nine times the size of extra-regional food export markets— (Allen and Heinrigs, 2016[7]) and is projected to reach USD 480 billion by 2030. This surge serves as a powerful catalyst for intra-regional food trade, as farmers, traders and agribusinesses across the region respond to market signals and capitalise on the rapidly growing demand.
Food trade is supporting the emergence of a commercial food economy
Growing and more diversified regional demand is drawing both labour and capital into higher-value, market-oriented food sectors, such as commercial fruit and horticulture (Elbehri, 2013[8]; Jayne et al., 2019[9]). The food sector also faces rising consumer expectations for food safety, packaging, and convenience. This is driving further investments and job creation in the ‘’hidden middle’’ and retail segments of the food economy, including transport, processing and distribution (AGRA, 2020[3]).
These developments are reshaping the regional food economy, marked by the emergence of commercial farming clusters, the expansion of small and medium-scale food enterprises, and increased employment in the non-farm food sectors. Intra-regional food trade is pivotal in driving this transformation, connecting supply and demand across the region and thereby expanding and multiplying market opportunities.
Agricultural and food policies need to open up to regional markets
In the ongoing transformation of the regional food economy, food trade will become increasingly important. However, current agricultural and food policies in West Africa largely overlook the importance of regional food markets and trade, despite their significant impact on the region’s producers and consumers. These policies have traditionally been developed with a strong focus on global markets, both for exports and imports.
The current situation highlights a stark contrast between the private sector’s active engagement in intra-regional food trade, with an estimated annual value of USD 10 billion, and the public sector’s lack of attention. A stronger focus on regional markets is necessary to leverage growing opportunities and complementarities in agricultural production, food and nutrition security, and food sovereignty.
A long history of policy focus on extra-regional exports
Agricultural development in West Africa has been inextricably linked to agricultural and trade policies established during the colonial era. The primary goal of colonising governments was to exploit the agricultural capacities of the territories to produce and export raw materials to meet consumer demand in their metropolises (Roessler et al., 2022[10]). Building on the private ventures from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, colonial agricultural policies became formalized around the 1920s. These policies heavily prioritised the production of crops such as groundnuts, cocoa, cotton, and rubber, focusing on large-scale irrigation schemes, input subsidies, price support through marketing boards and extension services, but also involved the coercion of peasants (van Beusekom, 2021[11]; Hollinger and Staatz, 2015[4]).
In the post-independence era, many national governments followed the same policy path of supporting extra-regional export crops, alongside export tax policies. These ‘cash-crops’ provided the tax revenues and foreign exchange needed to finance state-building efforts in newly independent countries and finance the demand for imported goods of the growing urban classes (Jones and Corbridge, 2010[12]; Tanzi, 1990[13]; Corden, 1997[14]). More recently, some governments have sought to support West Africa’s integration into global value chains while promoting export diversification to reduce dependence on raw food exports (AUC/OECD, 2022[15]). However, the focus of these efforts has remained on extra-regional export markets.
The historical focus on extra-regional trade in West Africa’s food policies has significantly influenced the structure of intra-regional food trade. The ‘’cash-crop revolution’’ policies of the colonial and post-independence periods led to West Africa’s food trade specialisation in a few commodities aimed at the global market (Roessler et al., 2022[10]). The most notable of these are cocoa1 and cashew nuts. Cocoa products account for 58% of West Africa’s total food exports2, with almost all of them destined for markets outside the region (Figure 3.1).The value of West Africa’s cocoa product exports, 90% of which comes from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, is nearly four times higher than all its intra-regional food exports combined, highlighting the significant imbalance between intra-regional and global food exports.
Source: Authors’ calculations
The rise of the food sovereignty policy agenda
The policy focus on extra-regional trade also shaped agricultural development on the import side. From the 1990s onwards, the role of extra-regional food imports became increasingly prominent in national policy debates—linked to issues of food sovereignty, balance of payments, and global competition stifling local agricultural development (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate and Paschali, 2011[16]; OECD/SWAC, 2007[17]; Bini, 2016[18]). The global food price crisis of 2007-08 marked a turning point. In response, governments temporarily reduced or removed tariffs on imported cereals to mitigate price increases and quell public discontent, while also initiating agricultural policies aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in the production of imported staples, particularly rice (Pernechele, Balié and Ghins, 2018[19]). For example, Benin (2008), Côte d’Ivoire (2012), Nigeria (2010) and Senegal (2008) launched strategies and programmes to expand domestic rice production and ensure self-sufficiency (Inter-réseaux, 2016[20]).
Governments in the region have implemented rice programmes by directing public investment towards irrigation infrastructure and providing subsidies for fertiliser, seeds, and pesticides, as well as on-farm capital for targeted staple crops. Between 2008 and 2013, the share of improved rice seeds in total cereal seeds in Burkina Faso averaged 44% and 33% of subsidies for improved seeds allocated to rice (FAO, 2014[21]). In Senegal, agricultural policy support shifted to focus on rice after 2012, moving from the traditional emphasis on the export crop of groundnuts (Figure 3.2). This shift was primarily achieved through input subsidies (Baborska, 2021[22]). At the regional level, the ECOWAS Commission launched a regional agricultural policy known as ECOWAP to revitalise the production of rice, roots and tubers, maize, and livestock. From 2015, the ECOWAS Commission further prioritised rice production through the ECOWAS Rice Offensive, a 10-year strategic plan aimed at sustainable rice production in West Africa to achieve self-sufficiency (CEDEAO, 2021[23])
After a period of reduced focus, self-sufficiency policies regained momentum due to disruptions in the global markets caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian Federation’s war in Ukraine. For instance, the Government of Ghana developed a programme in 2023 to boost agricultural growth with the goal of ending food imports (MOFA, 2024[24]).
Source: Baborska (2021[22])
The absence of regional thinking in agricultural policies
Policies focusing on food self-sufficiency and a few global export agricultural products have been implemented at the expense of broader sector-wide support. Food products which are widely produced, consumed, and traded in the region, such as millet, sorghum, livestock, fish, cowpea and vegetables have received little policy attention (Elbehri, 2013[8]; Demont, 2013[25]). This lack of support has paradoxically entrenched dependence on extra-regional food imports by stifling the expansion of non-rice regional value chains and hindering the promotion of intra-regional food trade.
While rice production increased, largely due to the growth of land under cultivation, the output for staples like millet and sorghum declined or stagnated (Figure 3.3). In addition, the rice self-sufficiency objective was met with limited success: the import dependency rate was an average of 45% for the period 2009-19, although it declined to 38% in 2019, from 46% in 2009 (Table 3.1). In 2022, rice and wheat still accounted for 30% of the total regional food imports, and 90% of West Africa’s total food imports still came from outside the region.
Notably, efforts to promote food self-sufficiency in key staples or to stabilise prices have often been accompanied by border closures with neighbouring countries. In August 2019, Nigeria closed its land borders with Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to curb the smuggling of goods, particularly rice, in order to ensure a sufficient domestic supply, with limited efficacy (Matongbada and Kwarkye, 2021[26]). In February 2022, Benin introduced export restrictions and taxes on rice, soya, cotton, processed and unprocessed cassava, shea butter and yams, aiming to maintain domestic prices low for these products (Agence Ecofin, 2022[27]). These measures, taken in violation of existing ECOWAS regulations and treaties, highlight regional governments’ disregard for intra-regional trade as a means to support their domestic economies and increase their food availability.
Source: FAO (2024[28])
Source: Soullier et al. (2020[29]), author’s calculations based on Foreign Agricultural Service, Official USDA Estimates (2024[30])
The dominance of extra-regional food exports and imports in West Africa's policy orientations has fuelled self-reinforcing perceptions, for policymakers, of intra-regional food trade as being of low importance and potential. In West Africa, food imports and exports are often treated as synonymous with extra-regional trade flows.3 Intra-regional trade tends to be dismissed as ‘’small’’ and of little relevance (Bouët et al., 2021[31]; Bouët, Odjo and Zaki, 2020[32]; UNCTAD, 2018[33]).
However, the reality of intra-regional food trade in West Africa is quite different from these perceptions. Excluding cocoa and cashew exports, more than a third of West Africa’s measured food exports are intra-regional, and it is estimated this could go up to 60% if unrecorded food trade were captured. In Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone—nearly half of West African countries—intra-regional food exports (non-cocoa, non-cashew) also surpass extra-regional ones.
This neglect of intra-regional trade is further confirmed, and indeed reinforced, by governments’ under-investment in the statistical measurement of this trade. Where detailed—albeit still incomplete—data is available, it shows that up to 85% of intra-regional food trade may go unrecorded (Figure 3.4).
Source: Authors’ calculations
Importantly, intra-regional trade flows for products of high economic and food and nutrition security value, such as fruits and vegetables, are largely unrecorded—62% and 72% respectively—and remain invisible to policymakers. Structural changes in food demand are likely to further increase the importance of this trade in the coming decades, underscoring the need to update perceptions of its relevance for the region (Reardon et al., 2024[34]).
The regional food market is growing rapidly
Intra-regional food trade has existed for centuries in West Africa, crossing national borders now recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OECD/SWAC, 2013[35]). Trade routes linked kingdoms and provinces that had long developed specialised production patterns and engaged in long-distance food trade. These routes extended from the Atlantic coast of present-day Mauritania, Senegal, and Gambia to the Hausa lands of Nigeria, and southwards to present-day Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. Trans-Saharan caravans connected countries on the Gulf of Guinea to present-day Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt (Bah, Jackson and Potts, 2017[36]; OECD/SWAC, 2014[37]). However, with the onset of the colonial era, the regional food market delineated by these trade routes was overshadowed by the global markets supplied by cash crops. Colonial authorities directed the small commercial agricultural sector towards extra-regional markets instead of the thin domestic and regional food markets: in 1950, West Africa’s population was estimated at 60 million, mostly rural dwellers engaged in subsistence agriculture (OECD/SWAC, 2013[35]).
This is no longer the case. Between 1950 and 2020, West Africa’s population grew fivefold, reaching 395 million. During the same period, the urban population expanded from 5 million to 200 million. As a result, there are now many more people consuming food in the region and far fewer, in relative terms, producing it, while new activities are emerging and altering food supply chains. The ratio of the non-agricultural to agricultural population (NAP/AP) increased nearly tenfold, from 0.11 in 1950 to 1 in 2010, reflecting the decline of self-sufficiency as the primary source of food consumption and the corresponding rise in commercial agriculture opportunities (OECD/SWAC, 2013[35]).
It is estimated that more than two-third of the food in West Africa now passes through markets (Hollinger and Staatz, 2015[4]) . While this market reliance includes extra-regional imports, it applies to regional staple foods as well. For example, in Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal, households purchase approximately 45%, 50%, and 75% of their maize, respectively (Figure 3.5). In the case of millet and sorghum, regional staples which are often mistakenly associated with subsistence consumption, market purchases range from about 20% to 75%, and from one-third to one-half across all three countries (Thériault et al., 2024[38]).
Source: Thériault et al. (2024[38])
This growing market creates a strong demand pull for intra-regional food trade. Moreover, these dynamics will continue to trend upwards. The regional population is projected to double by 2050, driven largely by Nigeria, whose population is expected to increase from 205 million to 353 million (OECD/SWAC, 2024[1]; DESA, 2022[39]).
Cities as a dynamic and high value market
Cities are the largest commercial market for West Africa’s agricultural producers
West Africa’s growing cities present the largest commercial opportunity for the region’s producers. Urban markets account for 67% of the total regional food demand and are expected to experience a rapid increase in the coming decades (OECD et al., 2025[40]). Projections indicate that West Africa’s urban population will grow by 235 million people between 2020 and 2050, an annual increase of 2.6 %. Large cities will grow particularly fast, accounting for 80% of the total projected urban population growth over the next three decades. By 2050, the ten largest cities in West Africa are expected to have a combined population of 305 million, an increase of 188 million from 2020. Additionally, the number of urban areas with more than 10 000 inhabitants is projected to reach 4000 by 2050 (OECD et al., 2025[40]).
The demand for higher value foods is rising
Urban lifestyles and higher incomes are driving demand for higher-value foods. Urban consumers spend, on average, 50% more on food than their rural counterparts (Allen and Heinrigs, 2016[7]). Consumption preferences are shifting from calorie-dense starchy staples to nutrient-dense, higher-value perishable products such as dairy, meat, and horticulture—an illustration of Bennett's Law (Worku et al., 2017[41]). The demand for more expensive and fresher foods in West Africa has rapidly increased over past decades, not just in urban areas. In Nigeria, the share of households in the poorer and more rural north consuming fruits doubled from 32% to 63% in less than 10 years (2010-2019), compared to an increase from 58% to 83% in the richer and more urbanised south (Parkhi et al., 2023[42]). Nationally, vegetable consumption grew by 11.8% per year in Nigeria, 9.9% in Senegal, 6.5% in Benin, 4.3% in Gambia and 4.1% in Niger between 2010 and 2019 (Egyir et al., 2022[43]).
High-value products already account for a significant portion of West African food expenditures and are driving up the cost of healthy diets in the region. Vegetables (29%), animal-source foods (27%), fruits (17%) and legumes, nuts, and seeds (6%), combined, represent 78% of the cost of a healthy diet in the region (Figure 3.6). The average cost of a healthy diet is USD 3.22 per day, ranging from a minimum of USD 2.19 per day in Senegal to a maximum of USD 4.02 per day in Liberia. While these products remain largely unaffordable for poorer households, they also represent a significant and dynamic market opportunity for regional farmers, food processors and traders.
Source: Bai et al. (2023[44])
Regional food demand is concentrating and production is specialising
As food demand expands in both size and value across the region, so does intra-regional trade. A key driver of this is the growing concentration of food demand, notably in large urban areas. As cities expand, the sheer volume of food required necessitates sourcing from larger food ‘sheds.’ In West Africa, these sheds often cross-national borders, leading to intra-regional food trade flows (OECD/SWAC, 2021[45]). Urban areas also express a significant demand for diverse and exotic foods, many of which are sourced from specialised production areas within the region, regardless of distance.
The spatial expansion of food value chains, a component of the rise of modern food production systems, is also evident in the data. A significant portion of intra-regional food trade now occurs beyond immediate neighbours. In Senegal, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, 58%, 48% and 39% of intra-regional food trade, respectively, is with non-bordering countries (Hollinger and Staatz, 2015[4]).
Note: Trade flows between bordering countries in green, non-bordering countries in red, width of the arrow weighted by value of aggregate trade 2014-22.
Source: Authors’ calculations
Food production in the region follows a similar pattern of concentration. A key factor is the distinct production capabilities and specialisations observed among countries. For instance, coastal countries are primary producers and regional exporters of maritime fish, while Sahelian countries specialise in livestock exports. The regional dimensions of intra-regional livestock trade are well documented, showcasing well-developed trade networks spanning several countries across long distances (Map 3.1).
Source: Adapted from Valerio (2020[46])
These trade patterns and complementarities are historically rooted in different endowments and agro-ecological production characteristics. However, new specialised food production hotspots are increasingly emerging, driven by public and private investments. For example, Niger’s onion production area around Birnin Konni has grown massively with private investment and now supplies the entire region, from Niamey to Dakar. Similarly, rice production policies have spurred the development of irrigated rice production hotspots around major river basins (SOFRECO, 2022[47]). These basins are often far from consumption areas, leading to the regional trade of the rice produced.
The intermediation of large volumes of food between production and consumption areas across countries requires substantial private sector capacity. Large investments in transport, storage, and packaging capacities, combined with improvements in the regional transport network and communication systems, have greatly reduced the impact of distance on food trade. If not constrained by unfavorable policy environments, intra-regional trade can serve as a powerful driver of regional economic transformation.
The role of intra-regional trade goes beyond merely transporting food from one place to another. It transmits demand signals, connects producers to increasingly concentrated consumer markets and stimulates investment in market-oriented agriculture. It leverages existing competitive advantages in food production by responding to rapidly growing demand for higher-value foods.
Intra-regional trade is leveraging comparative advantages and demand growth
West Africa’s comparative advantage in regional markets
The ongoing regional transformations in food market growth and demand diversification present a significant market opportunity for the region’s farmers.
Already, a wide range of food products are traded exclusively within the region. This reflects the fact that regional producers, processors, and traders possess a comparative advantage in producing and selling certain foods compared to global exporters (Hussein and Suttie, 2016[48]). These foods can be unique to the region and may include items that are costly or impractical to import from elsewhere, such as plantains, yams, cassava, okra, hibiscus (bissap), bouye, or egusi.
Source: Authors’ calculations
As consumer demand diversifies towards higher-value foods like fruits, vegetables, and processed products, the relevance of new comparative advantages is becoming increasingly evident. Local farmers and traders have an advantage in transporting fresh and perishable products across the borders to meet urban demand and evidence suggests they are increasingly outcompeting extra-regional importers in the regional market (Figure 3.9). Regional actors also have an edge in understanding local taste preferences and consumer expectations. For example, Senegalese brands of flavour cubes effectively compete against global firms in the region due to competitive pricing, targeted advertising, well-grounded distribution networks and alignment with consumer preferences; Senegal has thus become a major regional exporter of flavour cubes.
Source: Author’s calculations
Investments into commercial agriculture are replying to demand signals
Investments in food production targeting growing regional markets are on the rise. Commercial agriculture investors, encompassing a varied spectrum of actors such as rural entrepreneurs, urban professionals and successful smallholder farmers, have expanded their operations by acquiring more land to seize burgeoning market prospects (Omotilewa, Jayne and Muyanga, 2022[49]). These investments are fueling the expansion of medium and large-scale farms4 that are more capitalised and focused on the regional market. These farms are responding to the opportunities arising from regional demand for products such as fruits and vegetables, which necessitate more technology-intensive production, processing, and logistical operations.
In Ghana, for example, the proportion of national land cultivated by medium-scale farms doubled in just five years, from 20% in 2008 to 43% in 2013 (Jayne et al., 2019[9]). This shift has been driven by the increased production of horticulture products, legumes, and oil seeds on medium-scale farms. Similar trends are also evident in Nigeria and other African countries (Figure 3.10).
Source: Jayne et al. (2019[9])
As a result of these private investments, domestic production of fruits and vegetables has surged. Between 2010 and 2022, the regional area harvested for fruits increased by 30%, and for vegetables by 70%. Production volumes increased by nearly half, growing from 41 million tons to 64 million tons during the same period – in twenty years, they have caught up with cotton and cocoa beans production volumes (Figure 3.11). For products that are largely traded regionally, such as onions, production more than tripled from 14 million tons to 47 million tons between 2010 and 2022 (AGRA, 2020[3]).
Note: Index 2010 = 100
Source: FAO (2024[28])
Commercial farming investments spillovers to the agrifood economy
Investments in market-oriented regional production have important spillover effects on the broader production structure and midstream segments of the food economy. On the production side, investments in medium-scale farms promote technology adoption and income generation among smaller adjacent farms. For example, research shows that approximately a third of small-scale farmers in Nigerian states such as Kaduna (North-West) and Ogun (South-West) benefited from training, purchased inputs from, or sold outputs to medium-scale farmers (Omotilewa et al., 2021[50]). Moreover, commercial farms focusing on high-value products like horticulture can encourage nearby smaller farmers to cultivate similar, often more profitable, commodities than grains (IFPRI, 2018[51]). Horticultural production, despite some mechanisation, remains labor-intensive. It involves tasks such as digging wells, ponds, seedling, spraying, and harvesting, which provide rural labour opportunities. The increased income opportunities from these spillover effects are linked to improved welfare and lower poverty incidence among small-scale farmers (Liverpool‐Tasie et al., 2022[52]).
Investments in market-oriented production also contribute to development and off-farm job creation in agrifood services and industry. They are creating demand on the input side, for financial products, fertilisers, seeds, extension and veterinary services and on-farm capital equipment – and on the output side, including wholesaling and warehousing, processing, packaging, and logistics. Many off-farm employment opportunities are particularly relevant for youth and women (Fare et al., 2017[53]). Women play prominent roles in numerous micro and small agri-food enterprises, dominating the non-agricultural sectors of the food economy, comprising 72% of employment in food marketing and 83% in food processing (Allen, Heinrigs and Heo, 2018[54]) (Figure 3.12).
Source: Allen, Heinrigs and Heo (2018[54])
Linking productive agricultural clusters to intra-regional demand
The emergence of competitive agricultural clusters
Urban areas generate significant and stable demand for agricultural products making long-term investments more viable and attractive. As investments in the agrifood sector increase, they stimulate the formation of agricultural clusters. These clusters are spatial concentrations of farms situated in well-connected and favourable agro-ecological zones, complemented by nearby off-farm enterprises that supply upstream and downstream goods and services to farmers. This clustering generates synergies and economies of scale, enhancing productivity and enabling food suppliers to compete effectively against global exporters while meeting regional demand (Endalew, Elias and Yasunobu, 2024[55]; Reardon et al., 2024[34]).
In West Africa, the Niayes region in Senegal exemplifies this trend. Stretching along the coast between Dakar and Saint Louis, this area accounts for nearly 80% of Senegal’s fruit and horticultural production, primarily destined to Dakar, other urban centres in Senegal, and the wider West African market (Egyir et al., 2022[43]). In Nigeria, the budding aquaculture and capture fishery clusters, supported by government investments in highway infrastructure linking major cities wholesale market facilities, provide another example (Reardon et al., 2024[34]).
This phenomenon has also been observed in Ethiopia’s horticultural value chains. According to Minten, Mohammed and Tamru (2020[56]), the central Rift Valley has rapidly evolved into a major commercial vegetable cluster, driven by the urban demand growth, improved public infrastructure (transport, market, electricity), widespread adoption of irrigation using private pumps, and increased use of improved imported seeds, agro-chemicals and fertilisers sourced mainly from private agro-dealers.
Mid-stream food services – “the hidden middle” – are growing
Midstream services are a key component of agricultural clusters and play a crucial role in linking urban demand with agricultural production areas. As regional demand shifts towards fresher, more perishable and more processed foods, the need for more complex supply chains increases, including midstream services such as warehousing, cold storage, food preservation, processing, packaging and logistics (AGRA, 2020[3]). These value chains involve more intermediaries, allowing foods, including fresh products, to travel longer distances across the region (Map 3.2).
Note: Cumulated flows from 2014 to 2022. Flow width proportional to the logarithmic total food trade value for 2014‑22.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
This midstream sector plays a crucial role in connecting farmers to consumers across the region, yet is frequently overlooked, therefore referred to as the ‘’hidden middle’’ (Reardon, 2015[57]). The hidden middle represents a significant portion of value added and costs in food value chains in developing countries, estimated at 30% to 40% (Reardon, 2015[57]). In West Africa, it contributes an estimated 22% to total food economy employment, increasing to 31% when considering non-farm jobs. Food marketing activities such as transport, logistics, retail, and wholesale, constitute the largest segment of non-farm food economy employment (68%), followed by agrifood processing (22%) (Allen, Heinrigs and Heo, 2018[54]).
Intra-regional trade as a driver of agricultural competitiveness
Intra-regional trade will be crucial in supporting agricultural development by linking growing market opportunities with agricultural clusters. By connecting production to larger markets, intra-regional trade will not only bolster market access for farmers, but also attract further investment into agricultural clusters to scale-up operations. They will also be providing more opportunities for revenue generation. These scale and investment effects can improve competitiveness of regional production and reduce prices for consumers.
Increased connectivity through intra-regional trade networks can also strengthen existing regional complementarities in terms of production structure and cycles. These complementarities, particularly in seasonality, already drive significant volumes of intra-regional trade, such as two-way tomato trade between Burkina Faso and Ghana (IFPRI, 2020[58]). Supporting this trade can further improve producers’ market access without requiring costly investments into off-season irrigation and storage, while simultaneously increasing food availability and reducing cost for consumers.
To fully leverage the opportunities for agricultural development offered by regional markets, improvements to the current intra-regional trade environment are necessary. Well-developed trade infrastructure, including roads, railways, ports, and storage facilities, are needed to ensure efficient movement of goods. Improved logistics can also reduce transportation costs, minimise post-harvest losses, and enhance the overall competitiveness of agricultural products.
However, conducive trade policies are as, if not more, important than investments in trade infrastructure. The current policy environment is often characterised by a glaring lack of interest, and in the worst case misunderstanding of the role of intra-regional food trade. A striking example is the frequency of border closures for food products by certain countries. Moreover, countries often use trade policies such as price controls, import restrictions, and tariffs to influence prices and availability. For example, in response to the 2008 price crisis, Burkina Faso implemented protectionist measures on rice prices and imports, resulting in domestic prices that were higher than they would have been in an open market (FAO, 2014[59]).
Nigeria has consistently upheld protectionist policies on essential food items like edible oil and poultry meat, alongside substantial tariffs on milk products and tomato preserves (Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012[60]). Similarly, Senegal has historically enforced stringent trade protection policies on critical agricultural imports such as sugar and rice (Golub and Mbaye, 2009[61]) and has maintained a 42% effective tariff on onion imports since the 2010s (David-Benz and Seck, 2018[62]). These measures not only hurt consumers by increasing prices, but also create an uncertain environment that reduces private sector engagement and investment in intra-regional trade.
Promoting intra-regional food trade will require coherent policies that facilitate trade, reduce costs, and provide a stable environment for private sector investment. This includes trade facilitation measures, harmonisation of food standards and regulations across the region to simplify trade and ensure products meet quality and safety requirements, as well as access to finance and efficient banking services. Additional investments in transport infrastructure, notably connecting regional demand and production areas, will also be needed. Importantly, these policies should be designed with the understanding that a large share of intra-regional trade is currently conducted by informal actors. These actors must be able to benefit from the improvements, enhance their competitiveness and be gradually encouraged towards formalisation.
While policymakers in West Africa have demonstrated the capacity to promote complex global food export value chains, they have shown relatively little interest in intra-regional value chains. This lack of attention is often due to significant biases in perceptions towards this trade. One major bias stems from the high proportion of intra-regional trade being unrecorded, leading to significant underestimation (Chapter 1). This underestimation fosters the misconception that intra-regional trade is a minor aspect of West Africa’s food economy, resulting in insufficient policy support and investment.
Furthermore, the limited information available on intra-regional food trade contributes to the perception that this trade operates in an ad-hoc manner, merely supplying temporary deficits. This view overlooks the private sector's significant investment in a trade that encompasses a wide range of commodities, from staple grains to high-value perishables, reflecting its responsiveness to evolving dietary preferences and the growing purchasing power of the regional population. Treating intra-regional food trade as a haphazard activity rather than a structured market response undermines its true potential.
Recognising and leveraging the important role of intra-regional food trade in agricultural development, food and nutrition security, and food sovereignty is crucial. Achieving this will require more information and debate around its contributions to change perceptions and encourage policymakers to support it accordingly. Only by acknowledging and addressing these biases can West Africa fully harness the benefits of its intra-regional trade networks, fostering economic integration and enhancing regional food and nutrition security.
References
[5] Adeosun, K., M. Greene and P. Oosterveer (2022), “Urban daily lives and out-of-home food consumption among the urban poor in Nigeria: A practice-based approach”, Sustainable Production and Consumption, Vol. 32, pp. 479-491, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2022.04.024.
[27] Agence Ecofin (2022), Bénin : le gouvernement prend des mesures pour limiter la sortie « incontrôlée » des produits agricoles, https://www.agenceecofin.com/marches/0402-94887-benin-le-gouvernement-prend-des-mesures-pour-limiter-la-sortie-incontrolee-des-produits-agricoles.
[3] AGRA (2020), Africa Agriculture Status Report 2020. Feeding Africa’s Cities: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policies for Linking African Farmers with Growing Urban Food Markets, Nairobi, Kenya: Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)., https://agra.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/AASR-2020-Feeding-African-Cities.pdf.
[7] Allen, T. and P. Heinrigs (2016), “Emerging Opportunities in the West African Food Economy”, West African Papers, No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jlvfj4968jb-en.
[54] Allen, T., P. Heinrigs and I. Heo (2018), “Agriculture, Food and Jobs in West Africa”, West African Papers, No. 14, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dc152bc0-en.
[15] AUC/OECD (2022), Africa’s Development Dynamics 2022: Regional Value Chains for a Sustainable Recovery, OECD Publishing, Paris/African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, https://doi.org/10.1787/2e3b97fd-en.
[22] Baborska, R. (2021), Suivi des politiques agricoles et alimentaires au Sénégal 2021, FAO, Rome, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb7078fr.
[36] Bah, E., K. Jackson and D. Potts (2017), “Regional trade institutions in West Africa: Historical reflections”, Journal of International Development, Vol. 30/8, pp. 1255-1272, https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3292.
[44] Bai, Y. et al. (2023), “Healthy diets, costs and food policies in the Sahel and West Africa”, West African Papers, No. 39, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2ac5e663-en.
[60] Benjamin, N. and A. Mbaye (2012), The Informal Sector in Francophone Africa, The World Bank, Washington DC, https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9537-0.
[18] Bini, V. (2016), “Food security and food sovereignty in West Africa”, African Geographical Review, Vol. 37/1, pp. 1-13, https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2016.1140586.
[31] Bouët, A. et al. (2021), The ECO-ICBT database of cross-border trade in agricultural products in ECOWAS, Agbalépédogan, Togo: West African Association for Cross Border Trade, in Agro-forestry-pastoral and Fisheries Products (WACTAF), https://cgspace.cgiar.org/items/5422ad9d-161c-431c-8764-ec75f970f452.
[32] Bouët, A., S. Odjo and C. Zaki (2020), Africa agriculture trade monitor 2020, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, https://doi.org/10.2499/9780896293908.
[23] CEDEAO (2021), Résumé du “Plan d’action régional 2020-2025 pour accélérer l’Offensive riz de la CEDEAO : Vers l’atteinte de l’autosuffisance en riz en Afrique de l’Ouest”, https://ecowap.ecowas.int/media/ecowap/file_document/EN_BREF_-_Plan_daction_r%C3%A9gional_pour_lOffensive_Riz_FR.pdf.
[65] Cervantes-Godoy, D. and J. Brooks (2008), “Smallholder Adjustment in Middle-Income Countries: Issues and Policy Responses”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 12, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/228583166164.
[14] Corden, W. (1997), “Trade Taxes as Sources of Government Revenue”, in Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, Oxford University Press Oxford, https://doi.org/10.1093/0198775342.003.0004.
[62] David-Benz, H. and A. Seck (2018), Améliorer la qualité de l’oignon au Sénégal: contractualisation et autres mesures transversales. Rapport d’analyse de politique, Suivi et Analyse des Politiques Agricoles et Alimentaires (SAPAA), FAO, Rome, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/f31f0043-391b-40c8-b27a-d75cb67fd506/content.
[25] Demont, M. (2013), “Reversing urban bias in African rice markets: A review of 19 National Rice Development Strategies”, Global Food Security, Vol. 2/3, pp. 172-181, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2013.07.001.
[39] DESA, U. (2022), World Population Prospects.
[6] Dzanku, F., L. Liverpool-Tasie and T. Reardon (2024), “The importance and determinants of purchases in rural food consumption in Africa: Implications for food security strategies”, Global Food Security, Vol. 40, p. 100739, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2024.100739.
[43] Egyir, I. et al. (2022), Report on the Horticulture Sector in West Africa., https://horticulture.ucdavis.edu/sites/g/files/dgvnsk1816/files/extension_material_files/THE%20HORTICULTURE%20SECTOR%20IN%20WEST%20AFRICA%20final%20report%20updated.pdf.
[8] Elbehri, A. (2013), Rebuilding West Africa’s food potential: Policies and market incentives for smallholder-inclusive food value chains, FAO, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/d2e51088-ae67-4fcb-9c19-18bc032c5a96/content.
[55] Endalew, B., A. Elias and K. Yasunobu (2024), “Impact of cluster farming on smallholder farmers teff commercialization in Ethiopia”, CABI Agriculture and Bioscience, Vol. 5/1, https://doi.org/10.1186/s43170-024-00220-7.
[28] FAO (2024), FAOSTAT.
[21] FAO (2014), Analyse des incitations par les prix pour riz au Burkina Faso. Série de notes techniques, SAPAA, par Bazié, Y. G., Guissou, S. R., Ilboudo, W. F. A., Mas Aparisi, A. Rome, FAO, Rome, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ccb7ddcb-8ecf-4606-8213-b451705ac22d/content.
[59] FAO (2014), Série de notes techniques, SAPAA, par Bazié, Y. G., Guissou, S. R., Ilboudo, W. F. A., Mas Aparisi, A. Rome.Analyse des incitations par les prix pour riz au Burkina Faso., FAO, Rome, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ccb7ddcb-8ecf-4606-8213-b451705ac22d/content.
[53] Fare, Y. et al. (2017), “Analysis and Diagnosis of the Agrarian System in the Niayes Region, Northwest Senegal (West Africa)”, Agriculture, Vol. 7/7, p. 59, https://doi.org/10.3390/agriculture7070059.
[61] Golub, S. and A. Mbaye (2009), “National Trade Policies and Smuggling in Africa: The Case of The Gambia and Senegal”, World Development, Vol. 37/3, pp. 595-606, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.08.006.
[4] Hollinger, F. and J. Staatz (2015), Agricultural Growth in West Africa: Market and policy drivers, AfDB, FAO, ECOWAS, https://www.fao.org/4/i4337e/i4337e.pdf.
[48] Hussein, K. and D. Suttie (2016), Rural-urban linkages and food systems in sub-Saharan Africa, IFAD Research Series, https://www.ifad.org/fr/web/knowledge/-/publication/rural-urban-linkages-and-food-systems-in-sub-saharan-africa.
[58] IFPRI (2020), Ghana’s tomato market, IFPRI, Washington, DC, https://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.133694.
[51] IFPRI (2018), Performance and adoption factors for open pollinated and hybrid maize varieties: Evidence from farmers’ fields in northern Ghana, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, https://doi.org/10.2499/1024320072.
[20] Inter-réseaux (2016), Promoting rice self-sufficiency in West Africa: achievements, limits and issues for debate, https://www.inter-reseaux.org/wp-content/uploads/bds_no23_riz_en_vf.pdf.
[9] Jayne, T. et al. (2019), “Are medium‐scale farms driving agricultural transformation in sub‐Saharan Africa?”, Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50/S1, pp. 75-95, https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12535.
[12] Jones, G. and S. Corbridge (2010), “The continuing debate about urban bias”, Progress in Development Studies, Vol. 10/1, pp. 1-18, https://doi.org/10.1177/146499340901000101.
[67] LEI International Policy et al. (2021), West African food system resilience, Wageningen Economic Research, Wageningen, https://doi.org/10.18174/543127.
[52] Liverpool‐Tasie, S. et al. (2022), “Can medium‐scale farms support smallholder commercialisation and improve welfare? Evidence from Nigeria”, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 74/1, pp. 48-74, https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-9552.12487.
[26] Matongbada, M. and S. Kwarkye (2021), Nigeria’s border closures haven’t served their purpose, ISS Blog, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/nigerias-border-closures-havent-served-their-purpose.
[56] Minten, B., B. Mohammed and S. Tamru (2020), “Emerging Medium-Scale Tenant Farming, Gig Economies, and the COVID-19 Disruption: The Case of Commercial Vegetable Clusters in Ethiopia”, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 32/5, pp. 1402-1429, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-020-00315-7.
[24] MOFA (2024), Ghana’s efforts towards food self-sufficiency, particularly in chicken production are remarkable, https://mofa.gov.gh/site/index.php/media-centre/latest-news/item/653-ghana-s-efforts-towards-food-self-sufficiency-particularly-in-chicken-production-are-remarkable-dr-bryan-acheampong (accessed on 29 July 2025).
[40] OECD et al. (2025), Africa’s Urbanisation Dynamics 2025: Planning for Urban Expansion, West African Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2a47845c-en.
[1] OECD/SWAC (2024), Africapolis (database).
[45] OECD/SWAC (2021), Food system transformations in the Sahel and West Africa: implications for people and policies, OECD Publishing, Paris.
[37] OECD/SWAC (2014), An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel: Geography, Economics and Security, West African Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264222359-en.
[35] OECD/SWAC (2013), Settlement, Market and Food Security, West African Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264187443-en.
[17] OECD/SWAC (2007), Food sovereignty in West Africa: From Principles to Reality, OECD Publishing, Paris.
[2] OECD/UN ECA/AfDB (2022), Africa’s Urbanisation Dynamics 2022: The Economic Power of Africa’s Cities, West African Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3834ed5b-en.
[49] Omotilewa, O., T. Jayne and M. Muyanga (2022), The Farm Size-Productivity Relationship: Evidence From Panel Data Analysis of Small- and Medium-Scale Farms in Nigeria, APRA, Future Agricultures Consortium, https://doi.org/10.19088/apra.2022.040.
[50] Omotilewa, O. et al. (2021), “A revisit of farm size and productivity: Empirical evidence from a wide range of farm sizes in Nigeria”, World Development, Vol. 146, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105592.
[68] Orr, A. et al. (2020), “Why invest in Research & Development for sorghum and millets? The business case for East and Southern Africa”, Global Food Security, Vol. 26, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2020.100458.
[66] Osabohien, R. et al. (2019), “Agriculture Development, Employment Generation and Poverty Reduction in West Africa”, The Open Agriculture Journal, Vol. 13/1, pp. 82-89, https://doi.org/10.2174/1874331501913010082.
[42] Parkhi, C. et al. (2023), Heterogeneous consumption patterns of fruits and vegetables in Nigeria: A panel data analysis, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics, Michigan State University Justin S. Morrill Hall of Agriculture, 446 West Circle Dr., Room 202, East Lansing, Michigan 48824, https://www.canr.msu.edu/fsg/publications/Nigeria_Policy%20Brief_Fruits_Vegetable%20Consumption%201.pdf.
[19] Pernechele, V., J. Balié and L. Ghins (2018), Agricultural policy incentives in sub-Saharan Africa in the last decade (2005–2016), FAO, Rome, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/8dee93a5-3705-4aae-bfe9-c736f7f38b0c/content.
[16] Rakotoarisoa, M., M. Iafrate and A. Paschali (2011), Why has Africa become a net food importer : explaining Africa agricultural and food trade deficits, FAO, Rome, https://www.fao.org/4/i2497e/i2497e00.pdf.
[57] Reardon, T. (2015), “The hidden middle: the quiet revolution in the midstream of agrifood value chains in developing countries”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 31/1, pp. 45-63, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grv011.
[34] Reardon, T. et al. (2024), “African domestic supply booms in value chains of fruits, vegetables, and animal products fueled by spontaneous clusters of SMEs”, Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.13436.
[10] Roessler, P. et al. (2022), “The cash crop revolution, colonialism and economic reorganization in Africa”, World Development, Vol. 158, p. 105934, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.105934.
[47] SOFRECO (2022), Analyse approfondie de la chaîne de valeur Oignon au Niger 2021-2030, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/L4-Etude%20Oignon.pdf.
[29] Soullier, G. et al. (2020), “The state of rice value chain upgrading in West Africa”, Global Food Security, Vol. 25, p. 100365, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2020.100365.
[13] Tanzi, V. (1990), Fiscal Policy in Open Developing Economies, IMF, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781557751713.071.
[38] Thériault, V. et al. (2024), “Diet transformations and changing food environments in the Sahel and West Africa”, West African Papers, No. 45, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/706a05f1-en.
[63] Thia, J. (2015), “Trade and Urbanisation”, The World Economy, Vol. 39/6, pp. 853-872, https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12312.
[33] UNCTAD (2018), Regional Integration and Non-Tariff Measures in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), United Nations, Geneva, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditctab2018d1_en.pdf.
[30] USDA (2024), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), https://www.usda.gov/about-usda/general-information/staff-offices/office-chief-economist/commodity-markets/wasde-report.
[46] Valerio, V. (2020), “The structure of livestock trade in West Africa”, West African Papers, No. 29, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f8c71341-en.
[11] van Beusekom, M. (2021), Colonial Agricultural Development Schemes, Oxford University Press, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.751.
[64] Vargas, C., L. Liverpool-Tasie and T. Reardon (2024), “Vulnerability of Nigerian maize traders to a confluence of climate, violence, disease and cost shocks”, Journal of Agribusiness in Developing and Emerging Economies, https://doi.org/10.1108/jadee-08-2023-0214.
[41] Worku, I. et al. (2017), “Diet transformation in Africa: the case of Ethiopia”, Agricultural Economics, Vol. 48/S1, pp. 73-86, https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12387.
← 1. Cotton is the second one but is outside the scope of this report, which focuses on food trade.
← 2. Data on West Africa intra-regional food trade in this report refers to the 15 countries that were members of the ECOWAS as of 2024, when the scope for the report was finalised: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.
← 3. For instance, ‘’export crops’’ typically refers to cocoa, cashew, or cotton, rather than livestock, fish, or cassava, although they are heavily exported within the region. Import substitution is centred on decreasing dependence on extra-regional imports of rice and wheat.
← 4. Medium-sized and large-sized farms are defined as. respectively, 5-100 hectares, and over 100 hectares.