Incubation in Entrepreneurial Ecosystems

9. Specialised incubation

Abstract

Incubators have become more specialised as they have grown in number in recent years. There are now more incubators specialised in serving startups and scaleups in particular sectors as well as more incubators focused on companies at a particular stage of development or on entrepreneurs from specific backgrounds. This chapter examines specialisation within incubation systems, exploring the drivers, trends, and types of specialisation, the benefits and potential drawbacks for incubators’ clients, and the policy implications.

Introduction

In recent years, the landscape of business incubation has evolved significantly, with a growing number of incubators moving away from generalist models and adopting specialised approaches tailored to particular sectors, technologies, social goals, or target groups. This shift towards greater incubator specialisation reflects broader changes in entrepreneurial ecosystems, where the demand for tailored support, sectoral expertise, and mission-driven innovation has intensified. Specialised incubators now play a critical role in supporting startups not only with physical infrastructure and generic services but with domain-specific knowledge, resources, and networks aligned with their development needs.

This chapter examines the growing trend of incubator specialisation and unpacks its implications for startups, incubator performance, and policy design. It explores the key drivers of specialisation and discusses the benefits and drawbacks of sector-focused versus generalist incubation strategies. The chapter also considers the types of specialisation that have emerged internationally. It concludes with recommendations for policymakers and ecosystem stakeholders.

Table 9.1 below outlines the main types of incubator specialisation that will be analysed in more detail in the sections that follow.

Table 9.1. Main types of incubator specialisation

Specialisation	Description	Selected international examples
Sector/industry	Incubators focus on startups within a specific sector (e.g. fintech, healthtech, agri-tech etc.), offering tailored infrastructure, mentorship, and funding.	The GreenUP Accelerator in Denmark (green tech specialisation); DigitalHealth.London in the United Kingdom (Healthtech specialisation); StartLife in the Netherlands (agri-foodtech specialisation), Plug and Play Fintech (fintech specialisation).
Technology-based firms	Target firms with R&D-intensive or cutting-edge technologies, such as deep tech, biotech, or AI, supporting commercialisation and intellectual property transfer.	Umeå Biotech Incubator (Sweden); ETH Zürich Pioneer Fellowship Deeptech Incubation programme (Switzerland, see Box 8.1 for further information); CEBINA (Austria); Entrepreneurs First (UK).
Sustainability	Support startups with products or services addressing environmental challenges...	Katapult Accelerator in Norway (climate and ocean specialisation); ProVeg Incubator in Germany (Specialised in plant-based innovation); Paris Biotech Santé in France (specialised in health with a sustainability angle).
Social Impact	Incubators prioritise ventures addressing societal needs and delivering measurable social value.	Social Impact Labs in Germany; Alter’Incub in France; Impact Hub King’s Cross in the UK; NESsT Romania (focused on civil society enterprise development).
Target Group	Designed to support specific groups such as women, youth, immigrants, or people with disabilities.	MeWe360 in the UK (focused on Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) creatives); Digitalundivided in the United States (focused on black and Latina women); Startup Refugees in Finland (focused on refugees); 2Gether-International in the US (focused on disabled entrepreneurs).
Client Development Stage	Tailored to specific phases of venture development, for example ideation, startup, and scaleup, offering stage-appropriate support models.	IncubAlliance in France; the National Digital Research Centre in Ireland (focused on scaling tech ventures); New Frontiers in Ireland (offers phased support); the Korean Tech Incubator Programme for Startups programme.

Benefits and drawbacks of specialised incubation on incubator clients

One of the main advantages of specialised incubators is the ability to provide access to sector-specific resources, infrastructure, and expertise. As (Schwartz and Hornych, 2008[1]) notes, incubators with a specific sectoral orientation – for example in biotech – can offer tailored physical infrastructure, technical facilities, and services that would be difficult to sustain in a generalist incubator. These include laboratories, specialised equipment, or domain-specific regulatory support that are directly relevant supports for the incubated ventures (Leitão, Pereira and Gonçalves, 2022[2]). Furthermore, increased alignment between the incubator's internal expertise and the needs of incubated firms may lead to better support in areas such as business model development, regulatory compliance, and market positioning, particularly in complex, knowledge-intensive sectors. In this way, specialised incubators can provide startups with greater chances of survival and growth (Stokan, Thompson and Mahu, 2015[3]).

Specialisation can also foster stronger synergies among startups within the incubator. When ventures operate in similar or complementary areas, the opportunity for collaboration, co-development, and knowledge sharing is amplified. This can result in innovation spillovers and co-operative behaviours that might be less likely in a more generalist setting. Thus, clustering startups from the same sector can enhance intra-incubator dynamics and knowledge exchange among tenants (Schwartz and Hornych, 2010[4]; Hansen et al., 2000[5]; Chan and Lau, 2005[6]), which is often cited as one of the key benefits of incubators adopting a sectoral focus (Leitão, Pereira and Gonçalves, 2022[2]).

Specialisation can also result in improved efficiency. (Chan and Lau, 2005[6]) argue that shared use of technical resources and support services yields higher value when tenants operate in the same or closely related sectors. The commonality of needs across firms allows for more targeted and cost-effective deployment of incubator assets, ranging from business development services to networking events (Leitão, Pereira and Gonçalves, 2022[2]).

Finally, specialised incubators may benefit from a stronger identity and market positioning within their focus industry. By cultivating a clear niche and establishing a reputation for excellence in a particular sector, these incubators can attract higher-quality applicants and partners, including startups, investors, and researchers with aligned interests. This reputational capital can reinforce the incubator’s ecosystem role and foster deeper engagement with external stakeholders such as universities and corporate partners, thereby enhancing the incubator’s legitimacy and strategic value for startups and scaleups (Leitão, Pereira and Gonçalves, 2022[2]).

It is important to note that the empirical evidence on the benefits of incubator specialisation is relatively limited at present and needs further development. There are also potential drawbacks, risks, and challenges associated with incubator specialisation:

• Having a high concentration of startups from the same industry can potentially weaken peer learning, knowledge exchange and collaboration within programmes due to perceptions of competition among startups within incubator cohorts and perceived risks of leakage of competitive information (Cao et al., 2024[7]; Stokan, Thompson and Mahu, 2015[3]).

• Specialisation makes incubators more vulnerable to sectoral shocks. If the industry that an incubator specialises in faces disruption or decline, both the incubator and its resident startups could face more serious consequences than would be the case if the incubator had a more general focus (Leitão, Pereira and Gonçalves, 2022[2]).

• The ability of specialised incubators to be effective is highly contingent on external environmental conditions. In ecosystems lacking the critical mass of sector-specific resources and actors, an incubator's specialisation becomes a liability rather than a strength.

• It is difficult to provide sector-specific knowledge and business support for a multitude of different sectors with the same quality, meaning that specialised incubators may struggle to support startups that blend technologies or span multiple sectors.

Drivers of specialisation for incubators

Alignment with regional and economic priorities

Incubator specialisation is often influenced by policy incentives and funding opportunities that align with broader economic and social objectives. Policymakers use incubators as tools to steer technological progress, regional development, and environmental objectives (Klofsten et al., 2020[8]). For example, some governments and funding agencies have targeted funding to social entrepreneurship or firms using innovation to address environmental priorities. Many public support programmes are also regionally focused, offering funding to incubators that prioritise local economic growth and strengthen local entrepreneurial ecosystems (Zedtwitz and Grimaldi, 2006[9]; M’Chirgui et al., 2018[10]).

Enhancing the startup support offer

Strategic positioning is essential for incubators to sustain a competitive advantage. (Porter, 1980[11]) argues that organisations must define their competitive scope, including whether they cater to a niche market or serve a broader audience. Incubators can opt to specialise in a specific industry or a group of related industries to build deeper expertise, develop competencies, and create synergies (Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005[12]). This focused approach helps incubators to better support tenants via improved technical capabilities, networks and strategic insights, developed through continuous experiential learning (Zedtwitz and Grimaldi, 2006[9]). For example, a health tech-focused incubator may connect startups with specialised investors, relevant policymakers and regulators, and other potential partners like hospitals or pharmaceutical companies, creating synergies that would be harder to achieve in a more diversified incubator. Industry-specific incubators also create synergies by clustering startups that share technological expertise and market needs, which can improve knowledge exchange, resource sharing, and access to specialised infrastructure (Schwartz and Hornych, 2012[13]). In the context of business incubators, specialisation in a particular industry can be seen as a focused strategy that helps attract startups operating within the same technological or sectoral domain (Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005[12]).

Main features of specialised incubators, by type

Specialisation by sector

Partly as a response to growing competition for high-potential startups, many incubators have adopted a narrower sectoral focus, concentrating their efforts on a particular industry or a small group of related sectors (Aerts, Matthyssens and Vandenbempt, 2007[14]). In the United Kingdom, for example, 75% of accelerators launched since 2019 are sector-specialised, compared to just 29% prior to 2015 (Centre for Entrepreneurs, 2022[15]). These incubators aim to enhance the value offer to their clients by providing more targeted and relevant expertise, infrastructure, advice, networking, and other resources, enabling startups to navigate specific market challenges more effectively (Schwartz and Hornych, 2008[1]; Gonçalves et al., 2020[16]). They generally will admit only those startups that align with their niche. This allows them to offer deep industry expertise, specialised facilities, and more relevant mentors and investor connections, albeit at the possible expense of cross-disciplinary collaboration and innovation.

Across countries, incubators specialise in a broad range of different sectors, some illustrative examples of which are described below:

• Fintech. Fintech startups often rely on specialised incubators to navigate early-stage challenges, with numerous studies demonstrating the benefits of these dedicated programmes on both the performance of fintech startups and the health of the overall fintech ecosystem (Kowalewski and Pisany, 2023[17]; Harris, 2021[18]; Kaur et al., 2024[19]). Examples of incubators dedicated to the fintech sector are Copenhagen Fintech in Denmark, the Elevator Lab focusing on scalable fintech startups in central and eastern Europe, and Tenity, which operates across a variety of countries. In addition, many larger incubators have fintech specific incubation programmes, such as Plug and Play Fintech, Startup Bootcamp Fintech, and the TechQuarter’s Digital Finance Accelerator in Frankfurt, Germany. These programmes provide specialised support to fintech startups across a range of topics including regulations, sustainable finance, data security, retail and payments, and blockchain.

• Health and biotech. Many incubators specialise in supporting startups and scaleups in the health and biotechnology sectors. These programmes often provide access to the high-end laboratories and facilities needed to develop and test innovative health products and services, as well as specialised mentoring and in-house expertise on topics such as drug discovery and preclinical development. They also provide access to relevant partners, including clinicians and healthcare leaders that can serve as potential customers or collaborators. Some health-focused incubators also provide placements for startups within hospital settings, such as Paris Biotech Santé in France. Other good examples of health and biotech specialised incubators include DigitalHealth.London, which is part-funded by the UK Government, the Umeå Biotech Incubator in northern Sweden, the Central European Biotech Incubator and Accelerator based in Vienna, and Belgium’s VIB Bio-Incubator in Ghent.

Public funding initiatives for incubators have varying degrees of sector agnosticism. Most national funding programmes tend to be relatively agnostic in terms of the sector-specialisation (if any) of the incubators being supported. In these cases, the distribution of public funding de facto aligns with the characteristics of the existing incubation system. There are, however, some public programmes that explicitly target incubators in specific sectors. Box 9.1 presents the case of the United Kingdom’s Catapult programme, which funds highly specialised centres that support businesses in their research and development and commercialisation activities.

Box 9.1. The United Kingdom’s Catapult programme

Objectives and rationale

The United Kingdom’s (UK) Catapult Centres are highly specialised, physical centres with cutting-edge R&D infrastructures and in-house technical expertise. The UK’s nine Catapults are spread across 50 locations throughout the country. Although the catapults are not strictly incubators or accelerators, they serve a closely related function in the UK’s innovation system by supporting businesses in their R&D and commercialisation activities. The Catapults were formed in 2011 as a response to a 2010 report commissioned by the UK government on technical innovation. It recommended the establishment of a number of technology and innovation centres to bridge the gap between fundamental research and commercialisation. The report identified a series of target areas of likely global future advancement where the UK had existing international research strengths and activity.

The Catapults are part funded and overseen by Innovate UK (IUK) – the UK’s innovation agency. IUK has set the following objectives for the Catapults:

• To deliver transformative change and enhanced competitiveness in the relevant sectors, including by stimulating additional private sector funding into R&D.

• To enable UK businesses to access expertise, skills, facilities, and equipment needed for them to grow and scale in the UK and internationally through innovation.

• To provide opportunities for innovative UK businesses to collaborate, contribute to addressing global challenges and attract inward investment.

• To stimulate and facilitate innovation collaboration and partnerships across the UK ecosystem, including between the research base and businesses.

• To work with industry to commercialise and diffuse innovation.

• To drive skills foresighting and development to enable inclusive innovation and promote diversity in the businesses they support.

Description

The four main supports the Catapults provide to SMEs are i). access to equipment and facilities, ii). expert advice, iii). training and advice on workforce development, for example in upskilling companies and providing apprenticeships geared to improving innovation performance, and iv). signposting and support in partnering leading to participation in collaborative projects, often with international partners. In addition, some, such as the Energy Catapult, help facilitate innovating companies by offering opportunities for innovators to engage with potential corporate customers and investors and provide links to international opportunities. Some also offer specific incubation and acceleration programmes, such as the Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult’s national Launch Academy.

The Catapults operate with three main types of funding:

• Core grant funding from IUK to deliver against agreed outputs and outcomes. The funding helps build capacity, provide state-of-the-art equipment, and improve business innovation and growth, providing support which is not available on the open market due to market failure or commercial risk.

• Collaborative R&D funding from the public sector, which is allocated competitively via grant applications. Funding pots are aligned with government strategy to advance the development of a research base or to address a market failure. The projects usually involve collaborative work between at least two organisations, although sometimes SMEs can apply on their own.

• Commercial funding, which entails the Catapults generating income on commercial terms to meet a business need and commercialisation opportunity.

Local authorities and devolved administration governments also invest in local Catapult facilities.

Success factors

The Catapult network is based on bolstering innovation in existing and emerging areas of research expertise, with an emphasis on “helping the good get better”. This approach requires periodic updating of the focus areas, in line with changes in research, policy and commercial priorities. When a new Catapult is being considered, Innovate UK has a robust process for determining whether it would be appropriate, taking into account i). the global market opportunity, ii) the research and capabilities of the UK in this area, iii). the timeliness of investing in this area, iv). the additionality of government support, and v). the extent of the need for co-located expertise and equipment. If there is clear and robust evidence for a new Catapult to be established, IUK will assess the options for supporting such investment and develop the appropriate business case.

Another success factor is the level of integration that the Catapults have established within their respective sectors. This has been achieved by forming relationships with academia, SMEs, government and industry, as well as by generating commercial and collaborative R&D funding streams. Also important to the success of the Catapults is the quality of the internal management teams, with some Catapults having seen positive progress associated with changes to executive teams. In addition, the Catapult Network as a whole has been subject to numerous in-depth and data driven reviews on behalf of and by Government departments. These studies have helped to establish the impacts of the Catapults and ensure they are meeting their objectives.

Challenges

Despite the positive impact overall of the Catapults, the programme has encountered challenges (Ernst & Young, 2017[20]) report that there is limited evidence that Catapults have had effective performance management in place, and Catapults have not all achieved their funding model expectations as per their envisioned operating models. They consequently remain overwhelmingly reliant on public funding. Governance has not always been sufficiently robust, particularly around financial and performance management, with limited evidence of timely intervention when Catapults’ performance targets and wider objectives have not been met. One reported limitation is that IUK cannot sit on the Catapult Boards or recommend appointments. There are also challenges surrounding linkages with other regions and a lack of synergies with other Catapults, although steps are being taken to address this. For example, the Catapults Network hosts events to bring together Catapult Centres and other actors from the entrepreneurial ecosystem, while IUK is fostering the creation of partnerships within the Catapult Network through the launch or expansion of collaborative initiatives.

Conclusions and takeaways

The Catapults programme illustrates how a network of research nodes and their satellites can contribute successfully to an innovation system. It also shows how independent not-for-profit technology and innovation centres can act as co-ordinators for the co-creation of innovation between public and private sectors. The Catapults Network is based on supporting innovation in existing and emerging areas of research expertise. There are parallels for choosing the sectors in which support for incubators and accelerators might be prioritised. Some important takeaways from the UK’s approach are the periodic updating of the focus areas and the use of a robust framework and process to determine the appropriateness of introducing a new Catapult in a particular field.

Technology business incubators

Technology business incubators (TBI) are a type of incubator focused on supporting innovation and technology-oriented entrepreneurship, with the primary objective of facilitating technology transfer and the diffusion of innovation products (European Union, 2010[21]).1 TBIs support high-tech startups that typically rely on proprietary technologies and advanced R&D. By connecting R&D resources to entrepreneurial ventures and fostering university-industry partnerships, TBIs facilitate the commercialisation of research – often developed within universities or public institutions – into market-ready products or services. This positions them as essential catalysts for local business development and regional innovation and competitiveness (Etzkowitz and Klofsten, 2005[22]; Phillips, 2002[23]). Another important function of TBIs is to increase alignment more generally between university and industry by facilitating experiential learning and university-industry collaboration in a way that helps to institutionalise entrepreneurship within academic environments (Lamine et al., 2018[24]). TBIs thus function as bridges that connect technology, know-how, entrepreneurial skills, and capital (Smilor and Gill, 1986[25]).

Originating from standalone science parks that provided research space but with little structured support, TBIs began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s, offering more holistic packages of support to early-stage businesses, with an emphasis on mentorship, networking, and research commercialisation support (Mian, Lamine and Fayolle, 2016[26]). In this way, TBIs do not only provide infrastructure; they also shape the operational capabilities and strategic trajectories of technology-intensive startups, contributing significantly to performance outcomes (Momaya, 2014[27]). TBIs are often established through public-private collaborations involving universities, industries, and government institutions (Etzkowitz, 2002[28]) and are deeply embedded actors within regional entrepreneurial ecosystems (Mian, Lamine and Fayolle, 2016[26]). The strength of these triple-helix linkages with universities, investors and research labs enables TBIs to act as conduits for developing entrepreneurial capital and commercialising research (Audretsch, 2007[29]). Regional characteristics – including industrial legacies, mobility patterns, knowledge assets, and entrepreneurial culture – play a key role in the structure and effectiveness of TBIs, meaning that a diversity of different incubation models and approaches are applied to fit the local context and objectives (Pauwels et al., 2016[30]; Mian, Lamine and Fayolle, 2016[26]; Tang et al., 2021[31]).

Many incubators have emerged in recent years with a specific focus on promoting deeptech startups and scaleups.2 These can cover numerous sectors such as artificial intelligence, cleantech, novel materials, medtech, robotics, and construction technologies. For example, the ETH Zürich Pioneer Fellowship Deep-Tech Incubation Program supports students and researchers to develop their research-based technologies into marketable products and services, with the aim of creating successful spin-off companies. The participants receive funding as well as coaching, entrepreneurial training, support from a host professor, and access to ETH infrastructure. This programme is discussed in more detail in Box 8.1 in Chapter 8 of this publication.

Specialisation by target population

Ensuring that all individuals have opportunities to participate in entrepreneurship is an important policy priority for many countries. However, mainstream incubators can struggle to reach individuals from certain groups, such as women, young people, immigrants, or people with disabilities if they do not have good connections to these communities, are seen by potential clients as not being relevant to them, or do not offer supports adapted to specific challenges faced by the group (OECD/European Commission, 2023[32]; O’Brien, M. Cooney and Blenker, 2019[33]) (Yusuf, 2014[34]). For example:

• Internationally, rates of women’s entrepreneurship remain consistently lower than those of men (OECD/European Commission, 2023[32]; Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2023[35]). One barrier is linked to self-confidence and perceptions, with women more likely to report that they lack the necessary skills to start a business and cite fear of failure as a reason for not pursuing an entrepreneurial opportunity (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2023[35]). Women entrepreneurs also often struggle with more limited access to financing opportunities, underdeveloped entrepreneurial networks, and sociocultural norms that may discourage entrepreneurial activity (European Commission and OECD, 2018[36]). Women founders may also place a greater emphasis on achieving a better work-life balance or circumventing structural barriers in the workplace (OECD/European Union, 2017[37]).

• Immigrant entrepreneurs face particular challenges concerning more limited access to finance or information, discrimination, constrained social networks, and language or administrative hurdles (O’Brien, M. Cooney and Blenker, 2019[33]; Martinelli, Serpente and Bolzani, 2024[38]; Tengeh and Nkem, 2017[39]).

• Similarly, entrepreneurs with disabilities often face systemic challenges that hinder their ability to create and operate businesses (Shaheen, 2016[40]). The dual demands of managing both personal care needs and business operations can constrain the growth potential of enterprises led by individuals with disabilities. Other barriers are concerns over the loss of disability-related benefits, a lack of access to financing, lower educational attainment, and limited social capital.

Many policies provide targeted support to better mobilise the entrepreneurial potential of individuals from all population groups, taking into account their varying entrepreneurship motivations, needs, barriers, goals, and experiences (European Commission and OECD, 2018[36]; Yusuf, 2014[34]). Incubators are one of the key actors in delivery of programmes dedicated to supporting entrepreneurs from groups facing particularly high barriers to business creation (European Commission / OECD, 2019[41]; Baskaran, Chandran and Ng, 2019[42]; Pilková, Jančovičová and Kovačičová, 2016[43]). They offer incubation supports such as training, mentorship, and financing assistance that is tailored to the needs of the relevant group.

Examples are plentiful across OECD countries. In the United States, the Silicon Valley Accelerator for Women’s Tech Startups works with women tech founders through immersive programmes and connections to global investor networks, while EY's Entrepreneurial Winning Women supports high-potential women entrepreneurs through strategic growth guidance. Other examples include the online Women Entrepreneurs for Good programme and Australia’s SheStarts initiative. Meanwhile, 2Gether-International is an international accelerator targeting entrepreneurs with disabilities through cohort-based programmes that offer intensive pitch coaching, business development support, and access to the entrepreneurial community. Box 9.2 presents in more detail the case of the WomenEntrepreneurs4Good programme, which is an online incubation programme available to women entrepreneurs around the world.

Box 9.2. The WomenEntrepreneurs4Good Accelerator Programme

Objectives and rationale

The WomenEntrepreneurs4Good (WE4G) programme was launched in 2021 by the Women’s Forum for the Economy & Society in partnership with the HEC Paris Innovation & Entrepreneurship Center, and with support from a financial institution. WE4G promotes access to entrepreneurial resources, networks, and visibility for women-led startups.

Description

The key supports provided through the six-month programme are:

• Access to a three-day Startup Sprint, which includes intensive coaching on customer research, market validation, and business model development. Over 100 women entrepreneurs participate, with the top ventures progressing to the incubation phase.

• Business coaching and technical support delivered over a three-month online incubation period for the 10 finalists. Participants benefit from guidance by more than 600 HEC Paris experts, including faculty staff, industry professionals, and startup advisors.

• Pitch training and investor exposure, including an opportunity to pitch in front of an international Grand Jury of entrepreneurship experts and stakeholders. Finalists are also invited to present their ventures at the Women’s Forum Global Meeting, enhancing visibility to investors and policymakers.

• Networking and ecosystem integration, with direct access to an international community of entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and corporate partners.

The programme is open to ventures that address a clear social or environmental challenge and have at least two women co-founders and less than EUR 20 000 in annual revenue. The programme is financed through a multi-stakeholder model. Core support and co-ordination are provided by HEC Paris and the Women’s Forum, while operational delivery is backed by a financial institution. Additional exposure and resources are provided through partnerships with global institutions.

Results achieved

Since its inception in 2021, the WE4G programme has demonstrated tangible impact. Over past editions, it has supported more than 200 women entrepreneurs from 46 countries, offering them access to coaching, international exposure, and a global support network. Many of these have gone to achieve notable success, with some examples being My Medic Eye from Spain, Revolty from France, which won the Jury Prize for solar battery innovation in 2023, and Mino Care from Canada. The success of the programme’s participants reflects in part its growing recognition and influence as a platform for supporting women-led ventures.

Specialisation by client development stage

The development needs and bottlenecks of entrepreneurial ventures evolve continuously as the business progresses through different stages of maturity. (Lindelöf and Hellberg, 2023[44]) propose a life cycle model of business development that comprises three incubation stages, which each differ in terms of the needs of the ventures, the nature of available resources, and the level of interaction with other actors in the entrepreneurial ecosystem:

1. Enabling firm creation. At this stage, incubation is primarily about fostering the conditions necessary for new entrepreneurial ideas to emerge and transform into viable ventures. It emphasises the formation of innovative ideas and their initial development, where institutional backing and capability building are crucial for the transition from concept to early-stage firm (Clarysse, Wright and Van de Velde, 2011[45]; Lockett and Wright, 2005[46]; Mustar et al., 2006[47]).

2. Supporting operations. In the second stage, the focus of incubation shifts from creation to the operational development of new firms. Here, incubators act as platforms that help startups to develop and grow by providing operational support and access to critical resources. This includes managerial guidance, financial support, infrastructure, formal networks, and tailored services that correspond with the evolving needs of the venture. At this stage, startups are still vulnerable but have moved beyond the conceptual phase into actual business operations. The incubator’s role is therefore to support the venture’s survival by mitigating operational challenges, assisting with capability development, and fostering strategic growth pathways. The support is often more structured and formalised than in the initial phase and reflects a deeper engagement with the firm’s business model and market readiness. This stage is where the incubator helps the startup to refine its identity, establish legitimacy in the marketplace, and become self-sustaining (McAdam and McAdam, 2008[48]; Yusubova, Andries and Clarysse, 2019[49]; Bruneel et al., 2012[50]).

3. Catalysing growth. The third stage presents the incubator as a catalyst for continuous development, where the primary objective is to accelerate growth and prepare firms for sustainable success in competitive environments. At this point, the ventures are typically established and looking to scale. Incubators support this by offering strategic resources such as access to investor networks, advanced mentorship, export guidance, and market expansion opportunities. The process becomes more selective, fast-paced, and outcome-driven, focusing on helping firms rapidly grow or pivot efficiently. The emphasis here is on extracting and maximising value from accumulated knowledge and capabilities. Unlike in the earlier stages, where formal institutional support is central, this phase relies more upon informal networks, ecosystem embeddedness, and community-driven collaboration. Firms are expected to engage actively with entrepreneurial ecosystems, drawing on their external environments for co-creation, joint learning, and innovation diffusion. This marks the culmination of the incubation process, transitioning the firm from dependence on support structures to self-sustained competitive performance (Del Sarto, Isabelle and Di Minin, 2020[51]; Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2006[52]; Heaton, Siegel and Teece, 2019[53]).

In practice, incubators demonstrate clear patterns of specialisation based on the maturity level of their client ventures, allowing for more effective resource allocation and increasing the relevance and impact of the support services provided. Incubators can either focus exclusively on supporting ventures at a particular stage of development, or they can develop phased programmes that cater to firms at different maturity levels.

The phased programming approach often involves the delivery of “pre-incubation” programmes, which target entrepreneurs at the ideation phase and aim to help them in turning their ideas into viable business projects by offering assistance in areas such as business planning and team building. An example of such a pre-incubation scheme is the first phase of Enterprise Ireland’s New Frontiers programme, which lasts 8-10 weeks part-time and helps founders test market potential, evaluate ideas, and define their value proposition. Similarly, the Tech Incubator Programme for Startups (TIPS) in Korea, the Slovak Republic’s National Business Center and France’s IncubAlliance each deliver pre-incubation programmes to early-stage entrepreneurial ventures. In selecting clients, pre-incubation programmes tend to consider the innovativeness of ideas, team composition, and market potential (Gerlach and Brem, 2015[54]), as well as applicant characteristics such as learning capacity and adaptability that signal their internal readiness to excel in the programme (Lindelöf and Hellberg, 2023[44]).

Entrepreneurs that successfully pass through pre-incubation programmes will often have the opportunity to progress to a larger incubation programme. These generally provide more intensive support than at the pre-incubation phase, often with a financial component. For example, the second phase of the New Frontier’s programme in Ireland provides a EUR 15 000 tax free stipend to the entrepreneurs, in addition to mentoring and workshops. To be admitted onto these main incubation programmes, startups are often required to demonstrate more concrete signs of potential than at the pre-incubation phases, such as validated business models, customer sales, or ownership of proprietary technologies.

Many incubators also deliver programmes dedicated to more developed companies in the scaling or internationalisation phase. These programmes are often described as “acceleration” programmes and tend to emphasise mentorship, investor access, and fast-tracked development within a condensed timeframe. The TIPS programme in Korea, for example, has dedicated support schemes for startups targeting international markets. There are also incubation initiatives that focus exclusively on scaling or internationalising companies, such as the German Accelerator or the Korean K-Startup Centers. Support at this phase is often centered on building networks and market penetration.

Post-incubation support is another important aspect of what incubators do (Gerlach and Brem, 2015[55]). This involves the provision networking opportunities and alumni services for the graduates of incubation programmes. The extent to which incubators provide post-incubation assistance often hinges on the strategic value of maintaining long-term relationships with alumni firms. For example, programme graduates that go on to have success in their entrepreneurial venture can go on to become mentors or investors for future incubator clients.

Sustainability-focused incubators

Delivering support for startups and scaleups that can deliver innovative solutions to environmental challenges has become an important new area of specialisation for incubators (Fichter and Schabel, 2018[56]). This is in part a market-driven response to the emergence of more promising commercial opportunities in fields such as energy and the circular economy. There has also been a significant rise in government initiatives and funding programs that promote such innovations (Fichter and Hurrelmann, 2021[57]; OECD, 2022[58]; OECD, 2013[59]). Sustainability-focused incubators can leverage these policy trends by accessing relevant grants, subsidies, and investment opportunities (European Commission, 2014[60]). It can also help to future-proof their operations by increasing their alignment with emerging market demands and regulatory changes (Klofsten, Bank and Bienkowska, 2016[61]).

Incubators are increasingly taking into account environmental factors in the selection of clients, with many prioritising companies whose business model is based on sustainable products or services (Klofsten, Bank and Bienkowska, 2016[61]). While generic incubators can incorporate sustainability within the advisory services offered to clients, entrepreneurs may prefer incubators that specialise in sustainability to benefit from sector-specific expertise, access to specialised investors, and connections with relevant organisations working in environmental innovation (Fichter and Tiemann, 2018[62]). An example of an incubator with an explicit sustainability orientation is the GreenUP Accelerator, hosted by DTU Science Park in Denmark. GreenUp helps startups to scale innovations that reduce carbon dioxide emissions through highly targeted and tailored support. Unlike sector-specific incubators that focus on a single industry, sustainability incubators can support startups across various industries, as long as they prioritise environmental responsibility. This flexibility in tenant recruitment can help incubators increase their occupancy rates and overall size, as they are not restricted to a single sector (Potts, 2010[63]; Fonseca and Chiappetta Jabbour, 2012[64]).

Social incubators

Social incubators have emerged as a new type of incubator driven by achieving a combination of both social and economic outcomes (Nicolopoulou et al., 2017[65]). They have grown in number steadily and have played an important role in nurturing social entrepreneurship, contributing to the growth and visibility of social enterprises (Nicholls, 2010[66]; Mustar et al., 2006[47]; Dey and Lehner, 2017[67]). Social incubators focus on supporting ventures involved in the development of innovative products and services that address social challenges, or so-called “social innovations”. Social innovations can create efficiencies and value that accrues to society more generally (Phills, Deiglmeier and Miller, 2008[68]). As a result, they have attracted increasing academic and political attention.

The link between social innovation and incubation is based on the view that the development of social innovations can be managed, supported and encouraged (Murray, Caulier-Grice and Mulgan, 2012[69]), and that this process requires experimentation, creativity and a combination of ideas from different fields (Mulgan, 2006[70]). The prominent role of social incubators stems from their unique position within the early stages of social innovation (Miller and Stacey, 2014[71]). Social incubators are often described as “social laboratories” (Nicolopoulou et al., 2017[65]), offering a structured environment for experimentation that enables the transformation of early-stage ideas at the intersection of different sectors into fully operational organisations – most commonly, social enterprises.

Social incubators differ from other types of incubators not only in the type of startups they support but in the services they prioritise (Sansone et al., 2020[72]). Compared to other types of incubators, social incubators place greater importance on social impact measurement, business ethics, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) consulting, highlighting their mission-driven orientation. They also offer core support in the form of training, networking (Nicolopoulou et al., 2017[65]), and access to finance (Steiner and Teasdale, 2016[73]). This helps social entrepreneurs gain legitimacy and overcome early-stage challenges such as a lack of contacts or resources (Messeghem and Sammut, 2011[74]; Chabaud, Messeghem and Sammut, 2011[75]). Beyond providing practical support, incubators also shape public perceptions of social entrepreneurship to position it as an appealing and viable career path (Dey, 2013[76]).

There is some research on the effectiveness of social incubators. For example, (Sansone et al., 2020[72]) find that social incubators are just as efficient as traditional business or mixed incubators in promoting tenants’ growth, indicating that the pursuit of social impact does not necessarily compromise economic viability. However, few studies have focused on social incubators’ internal strategies and how they establish their role within the broader social entrepreneurship ecosystem (Messeghem et al., 2018[77]; Theodoraki and Messeghem, 2017[78]).

Prominent examples of social incubators from OECD countries include:

• Alter’Incub Montpellier (France): Established in 2007 in Montpellier, Alter’Incub emerged from a partnership led by the Languedoc-Roussillon Regional Association of Cooperative Enterprises (URSCOP). This collaboration brought together stakeholders from the public sector, including the Regional Council and the Caisse des Dépôts (the French public development bank), as well as actors from the social economy. At the time, Alter’Incub was the first social innovation incubator in France, created with the objective of contributing to regional development (Richez-Battesti and Emin, 2009[79]). It operates as a non-profit organisation, hosted and staffed by URSCOP.

• Social Impact Lab Berlin (Germany): Founded in 2011 in Berlin, Social Impact operates as a non-profit company and currently oversees a national network of nine incubators under the name Social Impact Labs (SIL). The initiative was launched by a German social entrepreneur. Its first incubation programme, Social Impact Start, was developed in partnership with the Federal Ministry of Brandenburg, the German Federal Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women and Youth, and a corporate partner specialising in business software solutions.

• Impact Hub (United Kingdom): Initially launched as “The Hub” in 2005 in London, this incubator was created by a group of young entrepreneurs who wanted to provide a collaborative physical space for a community of socially minded individuals. The Hub became the “Impact Hub” in 2013, which now has more than 100 locations across the world. Impact Hub combines elements of a business incubator, a learning environment, and a professional membership community (Bachmann, 2014[80]). Impact Hub King’s Cross, founded in 2008, was among the first in the UK and was certified as a B-Corp in 2016. Of the four London-based Hubs, it is the most focused on supporting social entrepreneurs through dedicated incubation programmes such as the Impact Hub Fellowship, which combines a startup award with a year-long incubation phase.

Conclusions and policy lessons

The landscape of business incubation is undergoing a shift toward greater specialisation. There are now more sector-specialised incubators, more incubators targeting entrepreneurs from specific groups or companies at particular development stages, and an increased number of programmes that focus on specific social, market and government priorities. These developments are not only market-driven but also policy-enabled, with governments recognising incubators as vehicles for advancing agendas across a range of different areas.

Specialisation can improve the quality, relevance, and impact of support offered to startups and scaleups by enabling incubators to align their services more closely with the specific needs of different types of ventures, for example through tailored coaching or investor connections. Specialisation also enables incubators to build more useful networks and develop deeper expertise on topics that are relevant to their clients. However, specialisation can also bring challenges such as increased vulnerability to sectoral shocks, limited cross-sector knowledge exchange and collaboration.

Creating or funding specialised incubation programmes is a good way for governments to support startups and scaleups in a more strategic and targeted way that aligns with national or regional innovation and entrepreneurship strategies, as well as with wider government objectives. However, a careful and strategic approach is needed in developing supports for specialised incubation. In particular, governments should:

• Ensure that public supports for specialised incubation programmes are coherent with broader strategies, policies and priorities regarding the promotion of startups and scaleups, for example in terms of the sectors, objectives, or types of companies or entrepreneurs targeted.

• Take into account local contextual factors when deciding which types of specialised incubators should be funded and where they should be based. Sector-specialised incubators situated in a context without a wider network of resources and supporting entrepreneurial ecosystem actors can only have limited effectiveness. This means that local industrial strengths, workforce characteristics and research capabilities are key determinants of whether or not a specialised incubation programme in a particular area has a good chance of success.

• Foster cross-sector synergies and knowledge spillovers by encouraging collaboration across incubators. Programmes that connect incubators focused on different industries or demographics can break down silos and promote interdisciplinary innovation. Such initiatives enhance knowledge exchange, enable co-development of solutions, and create richer support networks for startups navigating complex market, multi-sector environments.

• Monitor and evaluate the impacts of specialised incubation programmes. This is particularly important given the limited evidence base on specialised incubators. Funding new specialised programmes is also a relatively costly policy intervention compared to offering smaller grants to existing incubators, meaning that it is important to demonstrate value for public money and identify policy refinements that could improve future effectiveness.

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Notes

← 1.  TBIs are also sometimes referred to as innovation or technology centres, science, research or technology parks, or indeed simply as business incubators or accelerators (Mian, Lamine and Fayolle, 2016[26]).

← 2.  Deeptech is defined in the in the literature as technology which is emerging, enabling, and embedded (Rotolo, Hicks and Martin, 2015[81]; Kapoor and Teece, 2021[82]). Emerging technologies are ‘discontinuous technologies that have the potential to create a new industry or transform an existing one’, with examples including biotherapeutics, micro-robotics, or quantum dots (see also (Schoemaker, Gunther and Day, 2000[83])). Enabling is a characteristic that builds upon the narrower definition of a General-Purpose Technology (GPT) (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995[84]). GPTs are i). economy-wide in terms of impact, ii). capable of ongoing technical improvement, and iii). enable complementary innovations in applications sectors. Embedded implies that an emerging technology needs complementary technologies to be commercialised.