While there may be intrinsic policy co-benefits between some policies that tackle climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, this Outlook underscores that measures targeting each problem in isolation will not, in and of themselves, be sufficient. There is a need for more coherent responses that fundamentally address the interconnected nature of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, capitalising on policy synergies and minimising unintended trade-offs in a way that also considers social and distributional concerns. This concluding chapter outlines a roadmap to support policymakers in devising such systemic responses. The roadmap is organised around the following six policy levers: (i) address key gaps in research and assessment; (ii) strengthen consideration of interlinkages in national reporting and planning; (iii) align financing and resource allocation; (iv) mitigate unintended impacts of the clean energy transition; (v) transform resource use and (vi) rethink food systems.
Environmental Outlook on the Triple Planetary Crisis
Abstract
Climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution constitute an interconnected global challenge that poses escalating threats to environmental sustainability, human health and well-being. The analysis presented in this Outlook demonstrates that these three environmental issues are linked through complex feedback loops that can amplify (or occasionally dampen) cumulative impacts while creating opportunities for integrated policy solutions.
Global population growth remains a significant underlying driver, with projections indicating an increase from 7.8 billion in 2020 to 9.6 billion by 2050, representing 0.7% annual growth. In addition, global GDP is projected to more than double from USD 126 trillion to USD 283 trillion over the same period, growing at 2.7% annually. In both cases, there is significant heterogeneity in projected growth across regions and countries, with relatively fast growth of both population and income in large parts of Asia, Latin America and Africa. While economic growth clearly helps raise living standards, create employment and achieve a range of development objectives, the composition of the growth and the inputs used to drive it can have significant implications on its overall environmental impact. Different country circumstances, with widely varying economic profiles and socioeconomic growth projections, imply that environmental pressures also vary significantly across countries. Similarly, countries that grow fast often start from a low level and thus a fast increase in environmental pressures does not necessarily translate into high levels of these pressures.
A number of global trends emerge. Sectoral growth patterns reveal critical pressure points requiring targeted policy intervention. At the global level, under current policies, agriculture and land use, as well as chemicals production and use will continue expanding their environmental footprint, though at rates slower than overall economic growth. In addition, global fossil fuel consumption is projected to increase from 466 exajoules in 2020 to 541 exajoules by 2050, directly impacting environmental objectives and contributing to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, air pollution, and indirectly to biodiversity loss. Other economic activities also have significant consequences for environmental pressures, to varying degrees.
Unsustainable resource use patterns present immediate policy challenges. Primary materials use is projected to increase globally by roughly half, from 96 gigatonnes (Gt) in 2020 to 145 Gt by 2050. The growth in resource use highlights the need for faster progress in promoting resource efficiency and circularity.
These unsustainable production and consumption patterns drive climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution. Under current policies,1 the global mean temperature increase is projected to reach 2.1°C above pre-industrial levels by 2050. This will trigger cascading effects across ecosystems, agricultural systems and human settlements. Key biodiversity indicators are projected to decline by 2050, indicating a likely failure to meet the goals of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. For example, the terrestrial mean species abundance index is projected to further decline (from 59.7 to 56.5). This is equivalent to the conversion of pristine habitat of more than 4 million km2 into an area where all the original species have been lost. Population sizes of most threatened mammal species are projected to continue declining, with only 5% of threatened mammal species expected to experience an increase in population size in the coming decades.
Pollution presents a mix of trends requiring nuanced policy approaches. While some air pollutants are projected to continue to decline — sulphur dioxide emissions are projected to decline by 64% between 2020 and 2050 — other pollutants, most notably plastic pollution, presents escalating challenges, with global leakage projected to increase by almost two-thirds over the 2020-2050 period. Agricultural pollution pressures continue rising across most regions, contributing to climate change, biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation. Importantly, complex chemical interactions directly link various emissions. A well-known example is the nitrogen cascade: in its various forms, nitrogen directly and indirectly contributes to climate change, air pollution and water pollution, not least eutrophication.
Climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution also interact in complex ways, as detailed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of this Outlook. For example, climate change and pollution each contribute to around 14% of the measured biodiversity loss (IPBES, 2019[1]). Biodiversity loss, in turn can accelerate climate change through the release of stored carbon in terrestrial and marine ecosystems and can reduce the capacity of ecosystems and societies to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Climate change can also affect pollution episodes and the transfer of pollutants through multiple channels, for example through accelerated chemical reactions leading to increased concentrations of ground-level ozone at higher temperatures and pollutant releases from the melting permafrost. Meanwhile, pollution – most notably air pollution – can compound climate change through warming effects, impacts on cloud properties and precipitation patterns. The sheer number of possible interactions defies an exhaustive analysis, with some interlinkages being more direct than others.
Given the interconnected nature of the underlying drivers, pressures and impacts of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, it may seem intuitive that addressing one issue would contribute towards resolving others. However, the analysis of policy responses presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this Outlook suggests that a myopic focus on one aspect may lead to inadequately managed trade-offs, such as between the expansion of renewables and potential impacts on protected areas and biodiversity, and/or missed opportunities for synergies such as between reducing air pollution and climate change mitigation.
In line with global assessments of climate change (IPCC), biodiversity loss (IPBES) and various aspects of pollution, such as plastics (OECD), air pollution (WHO), chemicals (UNEP), mercury (UNEP), nitrogen (INMS) and the cross-cutting issue of resource use (IRP), this Outlook reinforces the urgency of raising the ambition of a broad suite of policies to address all of these concerns. The suite of policy responses that are needed to tackle these challenges individually are already elaborated elsewhere and are not replicated here.
While there may be intrinsic policy co-benefits, especially for policies that tackle common drivers of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, this Outlook also demonstrates that measures targeting one problem will not, in and of themselves, be sufficient to tackle the systemic challenges posed by the triple planetary crisis. Effective policy responses must also fundamentally address the interconnected nature of these environmental challenges and their drivers through integrated frameworks rather than compartmentalised approaches. These are the focus of the policy roadmap outlined below.
The roadmap outlined here has six core levers, three of which are intended to provide a foundation for more integrated policies. It also includes specific considerations for clean energy, material resources and food systems, while addressing social and distributional concerns such as job and income losses, affordability and access to food and energy. The six levers are as follows: (i) address key gaps in research and assessment; (ii) strengthen consideration of interlinkages in national reporting and planning; (iii) align financing and resource allocation; (iv) mitigate unintended impacts of the clean energy transition; (v) transform resource use; and (vi) rethink food systems.
7.2.1. Address key gaps in research and assessment
Informed and integrated policy action hinges on a strong knowledge base. However, research on the dimensions of the triple planetary crisis has historically been uneven (Figure 7.1). Publications on climate change dominate the literature, followed by air and water pollution. While research on plastic pollution has gained significant traction in recent years, other dimensions of pollution (soil, chemical and nutrient) have received more diffuse attention. Research focusing on the triple planetary crisis is nearly absent.
Note: The number of articles, review articles and conference papers containing the labels as shown in the figure (e.g. triple planetary crisis) in abstracts and/or titles between 2010 and 2024. Given the wide variation in the number of papers the results are presented on a log scale.
Source: Authors' own elaboration based on Scopus.
Likewise, attention to pairwise interlinkages, in line with their treatment in national planning documents (Section 7.2.2), varies substantially across topics. Over the last 15 years, the number of publications investigating (i) climate and biodiversity policies and (ii) climate and (air) pollution control and prevention policies have grown considerably. However, there are markedly fewer publications exploring the linkages between biodiversity and pollution control and prevention policies.
At a fundamental level, research gaps can hinder how we understand the compounding nature of inter-related issues. More broadly, the uneven research landscape amplifies the challenge of evidence-based policymaking. Research bottlenecks may have cascading implications for policymaking, with policy attention focusing on single, more salient and well-studied issues.
Leverage assessments and funding to facilitate solution-oriented research on cross-linkages
Existing and new scientific assessment processes at international and national levels can help establish a foundation of policy-relevant knowledge to foster integrated action on climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. Countries can, for example, consider facilitating more routine investigations on interlinkages via intergovernmental science-policy panels. The inaugural joint IPBES – IPCC co-sponsored workshop on climate change-biodiversity interlinkages held in 2020 is particularly illustrative. The ensuing workshop report provided a first-of-its-kind peer-reviewed evidence synthesis on pairwise interlinkages between the two challenges. This report subsequently fed into the IPBES Nexus Assessment and IPCC Sixth Assessment reports.
The recently established Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste and Pollution likewise provides an opportunity to more systematically advance knowledge on interlinkages among pollution, climate change and biodiversity, including through targeted collaborations with the IPCC, IPBES and national focal points. The recent reports by the Secretariats of Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions and Minamata Convention on Mercury, on the intersections among chemicals and waste with both climate change and biodiversity, also serve as a basis for examining these interlinkages.
Public funding for research is an additional lever available to governments to help address key gaps. To mitigate biases towards funding well-researched topics, governments may wish to conduct rapid evidence syntheses prior to initiating calls for proposals. Such calls can emphasise interdisciplinary and solutions-oriented research as conditions for eligibility, to direct resources away from siloed foci. Finally, despite the integral nature of interdisciplinary research to tackle challenges like the triple planetary crisis, researchers active across different disciplines may receive less funding than their more specialised peers (Bromham, Dinnage and Hua, 2016[2]), disincentivising research across disciplines. Collaborations between governments and research institutions – such as through targeted units or dedicated funding opportunities – can help incubate interdisciplinary work and support the next generation of researchers.
7.2.2. Strengthen consideration of interlinkages in national reporting and planning
Tackling the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution necessitates consideration of policy interlinkages to maximise synergies and manage trade-offs. There are important interlinkages among the planetary processes underpinning the triple planetary crisis, as well as between the policies developed and implemented at multiple levels of government. National reporting under multilateral environmental agreements, in this context on climate change and biodiversity, are particularly important as they reflect “whole of government” perspectives and policy priorities. Beyond national reporting frameworks, policymaking at the national level – including long term visions and strategies, development and sectoral plans, and regulatory frameworks – play a critical role in setting priorities, while guiding regional and local implementation. Given the resource implications of integration including time and costs for co-ordination, it is important to identify the most salient synergies and trade-offs in a given context instead of pursuing exhaustive considerations to ensure that the efforts remain targeted and manageable (OECD, 2021[3]).
Strengthen considerations of cross-linkages in BTRs and NBSAPs
The three components of the triple planetary crisis are not equally reflected in national reporting documents. The analysis of standardised reporting frameworks for climate change [Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) under the Paris Agreement and previously National Communications (NCs) under the UNFCCC] and biodiversity [National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) aligned with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework] across 10 diverse countries2 shows that while countries acknowledge some policy linkages between climate change and biodiversity, these connections are often addressed generically without detailed implementation strategies (see Figure 7.2). Although no equivalent standardised document exists for pollution, BTRs and NBSAPs cover some aspects and components of pollution.
The analysis in this Outlook (see Chapter 5) finds that climate-pollution and biodiversity-pollution linkages receive less attention, and consideration of climate-biodiversity-pollution linkages taken altogether is virtually non-existent. There are relatively extensive and detailed discussions on the interlinkages between climate change and biodiversity in terms of their biophysical impacts, particularly in BTRs.
However, in both BTRs and NBSAPs, the impacts of climate change on biodiversity feature more prominently than the implications of biodiversity loss on climate change. Most countries also consider ways to foster synergies between climate mitigation and adaptation and biodiversity conservation in both BTRs and NBSAPs. Furthermore, even in cases where there is some attention to pairwise synergies, discussion of managing potential trade-offs between objectives to tackle climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution is frequently absent from policy documents.
Notes: 1. In the absence of a BTR, the analysis was completed using the country’s latest NC document. 2. Impacts refer to the biophysical impacts of climate change on biodiversity (loss) and vice versa or to the biophysical impacts of biodiversity (loss) on pollution and vice versa. 3. Government actions refer to policies and projects. 4. Dimensions of biodiversity include species, ecosystems and biota. 5. Dimensions of pollution include subsets of media (e.g. air) as well as types (e.g. nutrients).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents of ten countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, and Uganda (see Chapter 5).
To deepen the integration of potential synergies and trade-offs in national policy documents, countries can use indicators within existing monitoring frameworks – such as those outlined in the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework – to better address the triple planetary crisis (WWF, 2023[4]). Leveraging current tools to report on cross-linkages in BTRs and NBSAPs is an entry point that provides an opportunity to assess synergies and trade-offs across climate, biodiversity and pollution targets. Measuring how the implementation of NBSAPs can support progress in BTRs (and vice versa) can strengthen alignment across climate, biodiversity and pollution targets.
Harvest and scale up existing innovative integrated approaches
Despite the above limitations, BTRs and NBSAPs already offer a wealth of insights on innovative policy tools that countries have developed to address at least some synergies and trade-offs between climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. Highlighting such examples and drawing lessons from their implementation to adapt them to other national contexts is key to scaling-up more integrated responses to the triple planetary crisis.
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 present a range of implemented policies and instruments addressing multiple targets that were highlighted in the analysis of BTRs and NBSAPs in this Outlook. These span the gamut of economic instruments (e.g. targeted carbon credit schemes), regulatory instruments (e.g. enhanced protected areas adapting to climate change and pollution risks) and information policies (e.g. fine-tuned information campaigns aimed at reducing food waste and improving soil health). BTRs and NBSAPs also highlight how government provisions of goods and services can also tackle multiple objectives (e.g. conservation and restoration of blue carbon ecosystems to improve water quality).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents of 10 countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, and Uganda (see Chapter 5).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents of 10 countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, and Uganda (see Chapter 5).
Beyond these policies, many countries have developed integrative and holistic approaches to better anticipate synergies and trade-offs. For example, Canada has developed a “Climate, Nature and Economy Lens” which provides a template requiring consideration of the impacts that proposals might have on climate change, biodiversity loss and various dimensions of pollution as part of a project’s appraisal (Government of Canada, 2024[5]). Similarly, the “Policy Compass” adopted in the Netherlands is a web-based tool to facilitate consideration of policy impacts that may arise “here and now”, “later” and “elsewhere” based on Sustainable Development Goals (Government of the Netherlands, 2025[6]). It is also important to promote these tools and methodologies, as developing them does not automatically lead to their effective or regular use.
Many countries have also adopted local and project-level approaches to address synergies and trade-offs. For example, Uganda has implemented several ecosystem-based conservation plans that embrace ecosystem interconnectedness to tackle biodiversity loss and climate change. Moreover, Argentina carried out the Environmental Sustainability and Insurance Programme to encourage investments in reforestation and enrichment of the native forests as a tool for climate mitigation, while ensuring effective biodiversity conservation. Lastly, Indonesia has implemented integrated watershed management as a core strategy for enhancing synergies between water and terrestrial ecosystem health and community well-being, simultaneously addressing environmental protection, natural resource use, and human needs.
Develop an overarching approach to pollution
While multilateral conventions have led to standardised reporting and planning frameworks for climate change (e.g. BTRs) and biodiversity (NBSAPs), no equivalent exists for pollution. Instead, the national pollution control and management policy landscape is shaped by a set of disparate policies and plans developed in response to different priorities and multilateral environmental agreements targeting various environmental sinks (e.g. air) and pollutants (e.g. hazardous chemicals) across different lifecycle stages (Allan et al., 2025[7]). While the principles of pollution prevention, control and management are typically laid out in broad legislative frameworks, their implementation can treat different aspects of pollution in siloes rather than as a collective unit. In a step towards more integrated approaches, the recently agreed Global Framework on Chemicals - For a Planet Free of Harm from Chemicals and Waste encourages governments to address chemicals throughout their lifecycle and includes work on waste, emissions releases and other forms of pollution. Reporting against the Global Framework on Chemicals has not yet begun, but work is ongoing to develop a set of indicators (ICCM5, 2023[8]).
Developing national plans to tackle pollution comparable to those already available for climate change and biodiversity loss may be conducive to the identification of policy gaps, as well as opportunities for synergies and risks of trade-offs. Bringing together the ways in which different types of pollution are tackled provides the foundation for considering multiple, potentially compounding pressures species and ecosystems face. It can also improve consideration of time-delayed sources of pollution (e.g. PFAS leaching from landfills and plastics accumulating in the environment) and their impacts on biodiversity. Similarly, it can enable the consideration of relatively overlooked GHGs such as nitrous oxide (UNEP/FAO, 2024[9]) as well as the interactions of pollutants with their climate-related properties which may have otherwise been neglected. These plans and frameworks can also serve as a focal document through which different units of environment ministries collaborate and engage in knowledge exchange.
Some jurisdictions are already pursuing comparable strategies in developing an integrated plan for pollution or outlining a comprehensive environmental plan. For example, the European Commission has adopted the EU Action Plan “Towards a Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil”, explicitly establishing the links with climate neutrality, ecosystem health, circular economy and resilience (European Commission, 2021[10]). Its targets for 2030 and the vision for 2050 serve as a compass for considering pollution in all relevant new and existing policy initiatives. A cross-cutting 25 Year Environment Plan developed in the United Kingdom similarly highlights the importance of joining up policies to maximise synergies, and has been complemented by the Outcome Indicator Framework spanning across 10 broad themes including various dimensions of pollution (Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 2025[11]).
While bringing together existing strategies and preparing a comprehensive plan may be a cumbersome and time-intensive exercise, countries can start small by prioritising key issues dictated by national circumstances and by building on existing frameworks and approaches in the interim. For instance, the “multi-pollutant, multi-effect” approach of the Gothenburg Protocol under the UNECE Air Convention – the recent revision of which expanded reduction commitments to black carbon (a short-lived climate pollutant) as a source of fine particulate matter – holds potential global relevance for simultaneously tackling air pollution and climate change. Applying a multi-pollutant, multi-effect approach can help establish policy linkages at an early stage of planning and reinforce existing ones, thereby preventing the types of pollution that do not fit neatly into a single category, such as various forms of nitrogen, from becoming overlooked. If a pollution strategy focussing on a dimension (e.g. air or water quality) already exists, outlining the interlinkages with biodiversity and climate can be an important step. A modular or a stepwise approach can build up towards a more comprehensive plan over time. Considering liaison and co-ordination among existing agreements might offer an additional impetus, as envisioned for instance in the Inter-Convention Nitrogen Coordination Mechanism to consider the cross-domain impacts of nitrogen across multilateral environmental agreements and frameworks.
Reinforce institutional mechanisms and tools for horizontal and vertical integration
Translating ambitious policy planning into action is essential to address the triple planetary crisis. An “implementation gap” implies that while synergies and trade-offs between the various dimensions can be well-covered in policy design, they may be muted in reality. Specific attention is therefore paid to the available tools for effective implementation of synergistic approaches, including through measurement of impacts. There are key cross-cutting mechanisms that can help realise synergies and manage trade-offs in practice. These are: (i) improved mechanisms of intra-ministry and cross-ministerial co-ordination (ii) tools for environmental assessments of policies and projects and (iii) policy alignment. Together, they can help anticipate the impacts that arise at multiple scales at an early stage of planning.
To simultaneously attain multiple objectives, the integration of synergies and trade-offs is essential, both horizontally across sectors and policy domains and vertically across geographical scales, but remains challenging (see Figure 7.3). At the national level, horizontal integration can be achieved through high-level framing provided in documents such as BTRs, NCs, NBSAPs (see Chapter 5) or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Furthermore, institutional arrangements such as intra- and cross-ministerial or inter-agency committees, working groups and taskforces can enhance the integration of climate, biodiversity and pollution reduction objectives. Countries can also establish multi-year plans for sectors (e.g. food and agriculture, mining and natural resources, and energy), within which broader environmental goals can be integrated. Further, countries could consider deepening the environmental expertise of those who advise key committees to help foster integrated action. For instance, this expertise could support spatial planning committees at both national and local levels to mitigate unintended impacts of the clean energy transition through careful siting but also address other forms of unintended environmental impacts from waste management, air pollution and biodiversity.
An integrated policy approach requires better use of existing environmental metrics and their improvements to account for the interlinkages among climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. Burgeoning research (e.g. (Bateman et al., 2024[12])) suggests that cross-targeted policies which acknowledge linkages and spillovers in socio-environmental systems can enhance synergies in contrast to the separately targeted policies. Despite the growing recognition of the importance of nature in tackling climate change and pollution, it can be challenging to integrate in decision-making without quantitative metrics and common units. In this context, considering the contributions of natural capital as an asset that needs to be managed and maintained, the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting Ecosystem Accounting (SEEA EA) can be better utilised to gain an understanding of the ecosystem extent, conditions, ecosystem services, providing an impetus for considering the interlinkages under a standardised statistical framework for natural capital accounting (United Nations, n.d.[13]). From carbon accounts of peatlands in Indonesia to river accounts in water-scarce South Africa, SEEA EA is spatially explicit and can be applied at different scales. It can also inform the design of economic instruments (e.g. computing tax rates), as well as provide an objective baseline for private-sector natural capital accounting (Hein et al., 2020[14]).
While there are several knowledge gaps, including how ecosystem accounting can help gain an understanding of ecosystem resilience and measure ecological thresholds and limits (SEEA, 2024[15]), it can be seen as a continuous process that entails refining data and methodologies as new knowledge develops. Some countries promote its use in policy appraisal and evaluation. The United Kingdom, for instance, has developed and regularly updates “Enabling a Natural Capital Approach (ENCA)” with an assessment template and databooks on services and natural capital assets, as well as tools and case studies (Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 2025[16]). Building on information from national accounts and tools such as environmentally extended multiregional input-output tables, several private companies have also initiated environmental impact valuation. These include Forico (which puts nature on its balance sheet), Holcim, Natura & Co and Dutch Railroads (which have integrated Environmental Profit and Loss Accounts) and Repsol and Knauf Insulation (which use environmental impact valuation for internal business tools). Furthermore, some investors are beginning to use impact accounting to engage with their portfolio companies and assess their impact performance (WBCSD, 2025[17]).
More integrated national and sectoral planning also requires proactive consideration of the different dimensions of the triple planetary crisis at multiple spatial and temporal scales. Such integrated consideration can be aided through improved deployment of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). While SEAs have been implemented in over 100 countries, there are notable gaps in their deployment and design (Dalal-Clayton and Scott-Brown, 2024[18]). For instance, a lens considering climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution across all stages are not consistently applied in SEAs. It is also not yet a common practice to implement SEAs for the energy sector, despite potential implications of renewable expansion on biodiversity loss and pollution.
While high-level co-ordination is essential, it is often at the project level that synergies and trade-offs may manifest. Existing modalities such as environmental impact assessments (EIA) can be leveraged as integrative tools as part of permitting process to facilitate consideration of a broader set of objectives. Complementing EIA, cumulative effects assessments can elucidate the combined impacts of development projects over space and time. Although the lack of a widely accepted methodology hinders cost-effective and consistent application, cumulative effects assessments have been deployed to fill some of the gaps in EIAs, or as a part of EIA to anticipate the impact across temporal scales. Cumulative effects assessments are also a mandatory component of EIA in several countries including Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Panama and EU Member States (OECD, 2024[19]). Particular attention needs to be paid to ensure that these safeguards are appropriate and proportionate to the potential trade-offs, as even well-intended safeguards can impede accelerated deployment of solutions addressing the triple planetary crisis. Risk-based checklists and preliminary screening questions can also help streamline the process by striking a balance between robust consideration and the speed of decision-making.
Ultimately, aligning existing policy frameworks with climate, biodiversity and pollution reduction objectives remains challenging. Diverse policy domains such as finance, taxation, public health, trade and innovation, or sectors such as electricity or urban mobility, may also require examination to ensure alignment between environmental and other policy objectives. For instance, transport policies aimed at reducing urban emissions need to ensure safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all while balancing with an efficient use of land that considers environmental costs (such as air pollution and pressures on biodiversity in urban areas). These alignments need to be tailored to national and local contexts. Low-carbon transport strategies in cities whose infrastructure is already built can encourage more efficient public transport systems, land use planning or consider reducing transport demand. Conversely, cities still in the process of developing transport infrastructure can leverage land use planning to minimise their impacts on land conversion and local biodiversity.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
7.2.3. Align financing and public resource allocation
The interlinkages among climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution can be better addressed through financing and budgets that are designed, tracked and delivered jointly, rather than in separate silos. This is not always the case, as climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution are tracked in different funds and ministries, underscoring the possibility to seek further alignment through existing processes.
Strengthen consideration of interlinkages in existing financing and budgeting processes
Multilateral environmental finance as well as broader development finance can play a key role in supporting countries to tackle the interconnected challenge together by explicitly embedding the consideration of interlinkages in different channels and targets3 established for each domain. The Global Environment Facility and more recently established Green Climate Fund play a key role in multilateral environmental finance for developing countries, including support for implementation of MEAs as well as broader capacity building efforts. As a point of convergence for different environmental commitments and treaties, the “Integrated Program” for multi-purpose projects from the Global Environment Facility offers an avenue for considering synergies in financing, particularly as the forthcoming next four-year cycle (GEF-9, 2026-2030) coincides with the 2030 milestone year for many global targets and commitments. Financing from other sources, including the UNEP Special Programme,4 as well as programmes targeted at the implementation of specific obligations under the Conventions (e.g. Specific International Programme for the Minamata Convention on Mercury) and the recently developed Global Framework on Chemicals Fund can also consider the interlinkages to prevent blind spots.
There is also substantial scope for enhancing synergies in development finance. While the share of biodiversity-related official development finance that also target climate objectives reached 89% in 2021, only 25% of climate-related official development finance also targets biodiversity objectives (OECD, 2023[20]). More explicit targeting, complemented by improved assessments and project monitoring to ensure the anticipated synergies materialise, can contribute towards maximising its impact. This can also enhance cost-effectiveness in the long-term. The publication of common principles to track nature-positive finance by major Multilateral Development Banks is an important step in helping better mainstream nature and biodiversity conservation in these operations.
National budgeting is a fundamental lever for policy prioritisation. Its processes can be improved to better account for interlinkages that extend beyond functional categories and policy domains. The cross-cutting nature of the triple planetary crisis poses a risk of underinvestment in addressing it, because its drivers and pressures do not always neatly fall within the remit of ministries, departments and units. In this context, budgeting processes can provide an incentive for collaboration. For instance, ministries can identify opportunities to pool funds and establish or expand dedicated resources to allocate them to synergistic programmes.
Complementary tools and methodologies such as “green budgeting” can also play a role in facilitating resource allocation towards synergistic policies, while also integrating the objective of tackling the triple planetary crisis within relevant policies and programmes. Green budgeting can be used not just as a transparency tool but as a lever to prioritise investments that deliver cross-sectoral benefits could provide a clear pathway for policymakers to allocate resources more efficiently and strategically.
In France, an inter-ministerial working group assesses the environmental impact of expenditure for six objectives including climate change mitigation and adaptation, air, water and soil pollution as well as biodiversity conservation, allowing for the identification of programmes that deliver benefits across domains. Since its launch in 2020, green budgeting in France has gradually evolved from an additional budgetary document providing greater transparency on public expenditure to a tool that can inform policy planning and support budgetary decision-making. While there is no one-size-fits-all strategy for implementing green budgeting, countries can start small by considering the interlinkages articulated in national plans and strategies on climate change, biodiversity and pollution and identifying relevant policies and programmes (OECD, 2024[21]).
Countries can also consider ways to enhance coherence between existing and new policy instruments to enhance synergies through financing and budgeting mechanisms. For example, Costa Rica’s National Forestry Financing Fund administers payments for ecosystem services (carbon sequestration, water provision, biodiversity protection and natural scenic beauty) through forest conservation and sustainable management using the ring-fenced revenue generated from economic instruments, including taxes on fuels. The case for such earmarking of revenues, of course, needs careful consideration of both potential environmental and/or social benefits, as well as potential constraints on the allocation of public financing.
Another example is overlaying various offset mechanisms across domains to facilitate the consideration of synergies. For example, compliance markets in England (United Kingdom) allow land managers to sell biodiversity units (used to comply with the mandatory Biodiversity Net Gain) and nutrient credits (used for preventing the adverse impacts of housing on water quality and biodiversity) individually or in combination, incentivising land management practices that deliver synergies. Similarly, carbon and biodiversity co-crediting scheme could, for instance, help incentivise the protection of intact ecosystems (which have both greater carbon sink capacity and biodiversity) before restoration, while also reducing the overall administrative costs of implementing the scheme (Tedersoo et al., 2023[22]). These policy designs can also be deployed in voluntary markets. For example, alignment between the two voluntary markets in Australia, the Nature Repair Market Scheme (which issues tradeable biodiversity certificates) and the Australian Carbon Credit Unit Scheme, aims to facilitate the development of synergistic projects that are eligible for both credits.
Align current patterns of public expenditure with environmental objectives
While it is important to consider ways to channel financial resources to synergistic programmes and projects, it is also critical to review public expenditure more widely (including support measures)5 and improve their alignment with environmental objectives. Economic activities such as agriculture, fisheries and forestry, while offering significant benefits to society, can adversely affect the environment, while their productivity and yields simultaneously hinge on planetary health.
Agriculture is a major recipient of public support worldwide, totalling USD 842 billion per year for the 54 countries covered by OECD data over 2022-24 (OECD, 2025[23]). Reorienting agricultural support towards environmentally beneficial measures and key general services and making sustainable management and use of natural resources a core part of agricultural policy is necessary to make this sector more sustainable, productive and resilient (OECD, 2024[24]). OECD Members acknowledged the need to “intensify efforts as appropriate to reform or reorient agricultural policy, and in particular to address those support measures that are harmful to the environment, to move towards more sustainable agriculture and food systems” in 2022 (OECD, 2022[25]).
Certain types of agricultural subsidies linked to production outputs or the unconstrained use of variable inputs create market distortions and can encourage additional production with negative externalities and the excessive use of inputs such as water and fertilisers in some contexts (OECD, 2022[26]; OECD, 2024[24]). Output payments and support for the unconstrained use of variable inputs (e.g. fertilisers) currently average USD 75 billion a year (OECD, 2024[24]). However, it is also important to note that removing subsidies coupled to production can also lead to adverse outcomes such as higher food costs and reduced farmer incomes, particularly affecting food security in developing countries (Guerrero et al., 2022[27]). In this context, reorienting existing support from production to suitable agri-environmental practices, combined with targeted investments into productivity and abatement technologies have the potential to reduce agricultural emissions without compromising food security (Valin, Henderson and Lankoski, 2023[28]).
Similarly, specific support that targets the fisheries sector and directly reduces the costs of fishing with support to fuel, vessel and gear subsidies can incentivise harmful practices including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which can lead to adverse social and environmental impacts including fish stock depletion, damage to ocean ecosystems and increased GHG emissions. As just under two-thirds of fisheries support present a risk of encouraging unsustainable fishing in the absence of effective management, there remains scope for redirecting resources towards investment in stock assessments, management and enforcement alongside more targeted support for sustainable fishing practices (OECD, 2025[29]). These considerations also apply to extraction activities. Shifting away from broad support to fossil fuels towards more targeted measures can allow for more fiscal resources to be retained for the potential investments into the transition to less emission-intensive energy system (OECD, 2024[30]).
7.2.4. Mitigate unintended impacts of the clean energy transition
Renewable energy delivers significant co-benefits beyond GHG emissions reductions. Solar and wind power substantially outperform fossil fuels across multiple environmental parameters, generating significant improvements in air quality through reduced sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter and ground-level ozone. These improvements provide immediate health co-benefits that further strengthen the case for rapid decarbonisation.6
Despite substantial benefits, renewable energy is not entirely without environmental cost. From hydropower infrastructure fragmenting rivers and impeding the movements of species to solar power infrastructure coinciding with the natural habitats, the spatial footprint of renewables can pose a risk for habitat loss and fragmentation. Wind farms, meanwhile, present well-documented mortality risks for birds and bats. The cumulative nature of these impacts extends their reach beyond local sites. Transboundary species migration patterns, particularly for birds and bats, require international co-operation to address collision risks from wind infrastructure effectively.
The challenge becomes more complex when considering “energy sprawl”. Renewable energy's diffuse nature compared to fossil fuels raises concerns about infrastructure expanding into areas that hold value for biodiversity conservation. For example, research has identified over 2 200 existing renewable facilities within protected boundaries, wilderness areas and Key Biodiversity Areas —a trend expected to accelerate (Rehbein et al., 2020[31]).
The environmental effects of water-based renewable systems remain poorly understood compared to terrestrial applications (OECD, 2024[19]). Hydropower presents cascading challenges beyond habitat fragmentation. Meanwhile, ocean energy harvesting technologies, while still emerging, raise concerns about marine ecosystem disruption. Materials extraction for renewable technologies also creates environmental pressures that can undermine protected area effectiveness for biodiversity conservation. Mining and processing activities for solar, wind, and battery components generate various pollution forms harmful to human and environmental health. Solar photovoltaic manufacturing involves releasing chemical compounds including cadmium, arsenic, and lead. Wind turbine blade disposal presents growing challenges due to their weight and material heterogeneity, with limited recycling options currently available. These end-of-life impacts create trade-offs with pollution control and biodiversity objectives that require proactive policy attention.
Bioenergy presents perhaps the most complex environmental trade-offs in the renewable portfolio. While many climate mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C warming include substantial bioenergy expansion, land-use pressures associated with dedicated energy crops create significant sustainability concerns. Bioenergy sourcing from dedicated crops can indirectly intensify agriculture through land competition and increase nitrogen pollution from fertiliser use. When bioenergy expansion comes at the cost of natural carbon sinks that are simultaneously biodiversity hotspots, it can simultaneously undermine climate and conservation objectives. The severity of these impacts varies significantly based on crop type, deployment scale and previous land use. Second-generation bioenergy derived from agricultural and forest residues generally presents fewer environmental concerns than dedicated crop production.
Beyond renewable energy, other clean technologies present their own environmental challenges. Clean hydrogen production, while offering versatile applications across industrial processes and energy storage, carries human safety and ecotoxicity risks due to hydrogen's flammable nature and tendency to corrode containment materials. Water resource implications of hydrogen deployment warrant particular attention. Although water requirements remain substantially lower than fossil fuel alternatives, the water source significantly affects environmental footprint. Desalinating seawater produces harmful brine byproducts, though emerging technologies may enable simultaneous wastewater treatment and hydrogen production.
Negative emission technologies present both opportunities and challenges. Direct air capture using chemical sorbents can generate local water and air pollution. Enhanced weathering, while potentially improving soil fertility and reducing fertiliser needs, involves intensive mining, transport, and application processes that risk habitat destruction and water quality deterioration. Large-scale deployment of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage could create resource competition affecting food prices and exposing smallholders to global market volatility. Underground CO2 storage may adversely affect biodiversity and exacerbate pollution through water releases that risk aquifer acidification.
These technologies vary widely in technical feasibility, scalability and certainty of environmental impact. The Convention on Biological Diversity's Decision X/33 reflects international caution about geoengineering activities affecting biodiversity, though many national carbon neutrality targets implicitly rely on negative emission technologies.
Transport and building electrification offer clear air quality benefits through reduced direct emissions. Electric vehicles eliminate tailpipe emissions, improving local air quality conditions. Heat pumps and electrical heating systems reduce both GHG emissions and improve indoor air quality in residential and commercial buildings.
However, electrification technologies typically require greater material inputs than their fossil fuel counterparts. Electric vehicles weigh more than conventional vehicles due to battery mass, potentially increasing non-exhaust emissions from brake, tire and road surface wear. Critical raw materials for batteries, electrolysers, and other clean technologies create upstream environmental pressures through mining waste, drainage water and slag production.
Inappropriate disposal of electric vehicle batteries releases toxic chemicals, while recycling processes can create pollution through release of chemical components, including PFAS, cadmium or cobalt. Without parallel advances in material recovery and resource efficiency, accelerated clean technology deployment could drive unsustainable extraction from intact natural areas, including controversial deep-sea mining operations.
Core policy recommendations and actions
Procedures relating to the siting of wind and solar infrastructure are fundamental to avoiding adverse impacts on biodiversity – the first step in the “mitigation hierarchy”. Considering their current and alternative use of the siting areas can also help embed pollution control and management objectives in these procedures. As countries seek to accelerate renewables expansion, they can actively identify appropriate sites across terrestrial and marine areas for renewable energy infrastructure or steer them away from areas that are legally established as priority for biodiversity (e.g. protected areas) as well as migratory routes (e.g. of birds) (OECD, 2024[19]). For example, the EU’s 2023 amendment to the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) requires Member States to designate Renewable Acceleration Areas (RAAs) by early 2026 on land where renewable energy development is not expected to pose significant environmental impact. This includes prioritising built and artificial surfaces and degraded land not suitable for agriculture, as well as excluding Natura 2000 sites, other national protected areas and major migratory routes of bird and marine mammal species (European Union, 2023[32]).
Additional considerations of site characteristics, such as the proximity to existing power infrastructure, can also help reduce adverse impacts by obviating the need for extensive new infrastructure. For example, several countries including Australia, Germany, Canada and the United Kingdom have in some cases sited renewable energy sites near decommissioned coal plants to streamline electricity transmission and interconnection while promoting brownfield development (World Bank, 2021[33]). Similarly, various land-sharing arrangements can be considered, including through combining solar photovoltaic (PV) setup and conventional agriculture (“agrivoltaics”) to reduce the spatial footprint while seeking synergies for pollution control and management and agricultural yields (Barron-Gafford et al., 2019[34]), although optimising both energy and agricultural outcomes is not straightforward (Asa’a, 2024[35]).
Spatial planning, aided by tools such as Strategic Environmental Assessments and decision-support planning tools, can streamline the permitting processes for renewables infrastructure while allowing for explicit integration of biodiversity and pollution considerations in siting decisions. As part of these processes, many countries require proponents of renewables projects above a certain threshold (e.g. in terms of size or capacity) to conduct an EIA. While the rigour of these processes may seem to come at the cost of the speed and the scale of renewables expansion, considering the risks at an early stage and developing plans to mitigate them also helps expedite permitting, reduce the risk of delays and cancellation of projects by improving legal and administrative certainty for the project proponents as well as authorities (OECD, 2024[19]). In addition, licensing and permitting processes can be designed in a way that ensures their proportionality to help balance the costs against the benefits (OECD, 2025[36]).
Beyond the siting of renewables infrastructure, additional safeguards might be needed at the operational level, as well as both upstream and downstream to minimise potential impacts of renewables on biodiversity and pollution. These include, for example, physical (e.g. bird flight diverters on power lines), operational (e.g. shut down of turbines during migration), curtailment (e.g. blade feathering that prevents turbines from turning at low wind speeds) and abatement controls (e.g. technologies to reduce pile driving noise for offshore wind). For example, operational curtailment with a change in cut-in wind speed or blade feathering is mandated during summer months for wind farms with over 10 bat fatalities per turbine per year in Ontario, Canada. Wind turbines, however, are becoming larger and more efficient at generating energy at low wind speeds which may make curtailment less economically viable. Technological developments, however, can facilitate the implementation of “smart curtailment”, which uses real time data to reduce mortality impacts while minimising losses in energy. More research is needed in this area to understand and improve the effectiveness of safeguard measures.
The risks associated with PV farms such as land degradation and use of herbicides to reduce panel shading and fire risks can also be managed using safeguard measures, such as creating microhabitats to protect pollinator diversity. For example, well designed solar parks within intensely managed agricultural land could provide refuge for pollinators and enhance landscape connectivity. Biodiversity sensitive routing and mitigation measures are also critical for both solar and wind power generation, for example through the use of bird diverters, insulation and/or underground cabling. Specification of such safeguards early on can provide legal certainty to developers and simplify and potentially speed up the project appraisal. For example, most German Lander (federal states) have established upstream framing documents as a tool to reconcile renewables expansion with biodiversity conservation (OFB, 2023[37]).
Due to limited reusability and recyclability, some components of solar and wind installations can result in pollution downstream. The concept of “waste hierarchy” which ranks options from most to least preferred (prevention, reuse, repurposing, recycling, recovery and disposal) can be applied to identify and manage these risks. For example, for wind turbine blades, such a hierarchy could include blade life extension, developing second hand markets for repurposed blades, and recycling, including downcycling. Several countries including Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland have made an explicit reference to composite waste in their legislation that prohibits disposal, landfilling and incineration of wind turbine blades (Majewski et al., 2022[38]). France has set progressively stringent recycling targets, with a requirement that from 2025, 55% of rotors of wind turbines must be reused or recycled (Tyurkay, Kirkelund and Lima, 2024[39]). Similarly, countries have set regulations to encourage recycling and prohibit landfilling of solar panels. India issued a draft blueprint in 2019 to make recycling mandatory (Sharma, Mahajan and Garg, 2024[40]), while Japan has revised a guideline on promoting recycling and other environmentally sound management of end-of-life solar PV in 2024 (Ministry of the Environment, 2024[41]) .
Social and distributional considerations
While consideration of biodiversity loss and pollution concerns are important when devising policies to facilitate clean energy transition, social considerations are equally essential to limit regressive effects. Wind farms, solar PV installations and bioenergy crops can compete with farming or Indigenous lands. Communities may also be opposed to renewables projects that alter landscapes and cultural heritage sites, or on account of new risks such as noise pollution from wind turbines and safety issues with large battery storage. The potential high installation costs of technologies like rooftop solar, electric vehicles or home battery storage could also widen inequality in terms of access in terms of income or location (e.g. between urban versus rural areas). Further, while renewables might create new jobs in manufacturing, installation and maintenance, they may not sufficiently overlap in terms of skills or location with lost fossil fuel dependent jobs.
Adequate safeguards and mitigation measures for such social and distributional effects are an integral part of the clean energy transition, in addition to the safeguards mentioned earlier to avoid trade-offs with biodiversity and pollution. For instance, lack of adequate participation in decision-making and project development – such as during an EIA – can drive public opposition to renewable energy infrastructure. Public participation prior to siting decisions can help ensure that EIA procedures are followed correctly; that project plans follow local zoning regulations; and that companies adequately research impacts of proposed projects on the triple planetary crisis. Engaging stakeholders before there is a prescribed need can avoid unintended disruptions to project planning, siting and implementation, while assuaging the public’s potential fears. Care should be taken to involve project beneficiaries, including Indigenous, disenfranchised and vulnerable communities. Beyond public participation, co-ownership and benefit sharing schemes such as royalties with the impacted communities can also help address community concerns. Meanwhile measures like subsidies and financing schemes for low-income households and ensuring grid integration for rural communities can help ensure more equitable access to renewables. Establishing safety standards and monitoring systems can help reduce local environmental impacts, while just transition policies, including reskilling programs and social protection measures can help address some of the employment effects of the clean energy transition.
7.2.5. Transform resource use
Resources are the bedrock of economies and are used in countless sectors, from construction to energy and manufacturing. Yet, current consumption patterns are unsustainable. In the past 50 years, global materials use has increased more than threefold. The materials lifecycle – from extraction to processing, use and end-of-life disposal – is linked to a range of negative impacts. The extraction and processing of materials, fuels, and food alone is responsible for over 60% of global GHG emissions, more than 90% of land use-related biodiversity loss, and 40% of particulate matter health-related impacts (UNEP, 2024[42]).
Furthermore, demand for primary material resources shows no signs of slowing down. In the coming decades, a growing population and higher incomes will increase global demand for goods and services, which will require more material resources. Gains in efficiency will only partially offset these pressures. Despite a projected relative decoupling between economic activity and materials use between 2020 and 2050, the latter is on track to increase by roughly half (from 96 Gt in 2020 to 145 Gt in 2050, Chapter 2), with cascading environmental consequences for land degradation, greenhouse gas emissions and pollutants.
The opportunity for a more resource-efficient and circular economy
Circularity can optimise energy usage, reduce waste and emissions and limit land degradation associated with biodiversity loss. In this context, accelerating the transition to a more circular economy is critical to addressing the triple planetary crisis, improving the security of resource supply and creating jobs. Such a transition involves several interlinked components, namely 1) closing resource loops to substitute virgin materials and new products with secondary raw materials and second-hand, repaired or remanufactured products; 2) slowing resource loops that seek to slow down consumption and demand for primary raw (virgin) materials by extending the life of existing goods usually thanks to more durable product design; and finally 3) narrowing resource loops to decrease the total amount of resources used per unit of output and to more efficiently use natural resources, materials, and products.
Implicit in this transition are two interlinked components: more environmentally sustainable inputs and more sustainable resource use practices among firms and households. For instance, the increased use of secondary materials (which typically have lower environmental impacts compared to their primary equivalents) hinges on changes in practices, including an uptake of recycling within industries and households. Governments can leverage a range of instruments to meet circular economy goals (Figure 7.4) such as virgin material taxes, pay-as-you-throw household waste charges and Extended Producer Responsibility schemes.
Source: (Livingstone et al., 2022[43]).
Policy efforts to support a circular economy transition abound
Resource efficiency and circular economy initiatives have grown in prominence in policy agendas in recent years. 75 countries have adopted a national circular economy roadmap, strategy, or call to action, 71 of which have been introduced since 2016 (Barrie et al., 2024[44]). While many initiatives are concentrated in European countries, roadmaps are increasingly being published throughout Latin America, Africa and Asia. These have been complemented by regional strategies and communities of practice, such as the European Union’s Circular Economy Action Plan, the African Circular Economy Roadmap, the ASEAN Framework for a Circular Economy and the Global Alliance for Circular Economy and Resource Efficiency (Barrie et al., 2024[44]). In the same vein, dialogues on resource efficiency exist within the G7 and G20. More recently, circular economy goals have been discussed in the context of ongoing international negotiations to secure a global plastics treaty.
Despite public aspiration and national policy action, progress on key circular economy metrics has been uneven and slow. As noted by the IRP, despite remaining relatively constant since 2000, the material footprint per capita of high-income countries (24 tonnes in 2020) is six times greater than that in low-income countries (4 tonnes). While upper middle-income countries continue to use fewer materials per capita (19 tonnes), this value has more than doubled since 2000 (UNEP, 2024[42]).
Similarly, per capita domestic material consumption in OECD Member countries has decreased by roughly half since 2000, though remains higher relative to other world regions. On the heels of efficiency gains, material productivity has improved across OECD Member countries, from USD 2 per kg in 2000 to USD 2.9 per kg in 2023. However, waste generation continues to grow in most OECD Member countries. Only a few – Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain – have relatively decoupled waste generation from population and economic growth. Since 2015 alone, per capita waste generation rates have increased by over 7%. Further, despite increasing recycling and composting rates, landfilling – 40% in 2023 – remains the primary disposal method for municipal waste in many OECD Member countries (OECD, 2025[45]).
In turn, global efforts to achieve an absolute decoupling of materials use and environmental degradation from GDP growth currently fall short, as global resource use has failed to decrease in absolute terms.
Core policy recommendations and actions
While some progress has been made in terms of a relative decoupling of materials use and GDP, policy action has traditionally focused on end-of-life recycling and waste management, leaving considerable scope for policies upstream to curb production and demand and promote eco-design. Complementary actions to promote greater resource efficiency and circular economy goals are therefore needed to better address climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. These include: actions to mainstream the circular economy within other policy objectives; exploit synergies with sectors with a disproportionately high resource footprint; strengthen and realign incentives and; leverage demand-side interventions. In addition, monitoring progress towards a circular economy through a wide range of indicators is essential (OECD, 2024[46]).
Circular economy policies are embedded within broader environmental, economic and social policy frameworks. However, the governance of circular economy strategies commonly sits within the remit of environmental ministries and is often considered as a separate policy objective, offering significant potential to mainstream such considerations into existing policy areas to enhance alignment. This includes mainstreaming circular economy considerations into cross-cutting policies that themselves impact the triple planetary crisis, such as in innovation and trade. Inter-ministerial coalitions could help bridge gaps in how circular economy priorities are addressed with the objective to tackle the triple planetary crisis. Jointly, initiatives like the African Development Bank’s African Circular Economy Facility fund provides a targeted opportunity to support developing countries’ ambitions in designing circular economy policies and programmes in ways that jointly address climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution.
With respect to innovation, aligning circular economy with innovation policies can stimulate research and development and accelerate the deployment of advanced technologies like digital twins and automated recycling systems. For instance, circular economy policies could promote circularity by setting minimum reuse or recycling targets for plastic products, or by modulating fees based on environmental impacts. Such policies could encourage innovation in product design to reduce waste generation, improve product recyclability and reusability and encourage innovation in waste recycling. Innovations such as material substitution and digitalisation can improve resource efficiency but must be carefully deployed to avoid generating new environmental pressures. For example, substituting mineral resources with bio-based inputs can increase demand for land and biomass, possibly leading to nutrient pollution. Risks of “regrettable substitution” could be anticipated and managed through improving ex-ante assessments that consider hazard, exposure and functionality of chemicals and materials throughout their lifecycles.
Additionally, trade offers the potential to improve the economic viability of circular practices through economies of scale. Despite the domestic nature of circular economy strategies, value chains are inherently global. Trade has an important implication, for instance, for mitigating the criticality of materials required for the energy transition. Trade also plays a crucial role in supporting international markets for end-of-life products and supporting markets for secondary materials. To maximise the potential of trade to unlock circular economy goals, greater alignment of standards and regulations is key. This could entail clarifying and aligning different definitions and classification systems of waste, secondary materials and end-of-life products. For instance, there are different definitions of “secondary materials” and their relation to the codes used in the customs for classifying products at borders (Harmonised System) are unclear. Considering the potential trade implications of upstream measures targeting choices from resource extraction to production processes (e.g. eco-design) can also help enhance the role of trade in scaling up circular economy solutions.
Food and energy systems together with the built environment and transport jointly account for about 90% of global material demand (UNEP, 2024[42]). With respect to the energy sector, the large-scale deployment of wind and solar energy generation drives demand for materials, with around 82% of global mining areas targeting materials needed for renewable energy production (Sonter et al., 2020[47]), which can reduce, fragment and degrade natural habitats, increase pollution and release GHG emissions. The quantity of minerals per megawatt used for wind power and solar PV 1.2 to 14 times larger than for other power generation technologies (IEA, 2021[48]) place additional pressures on the environment.
The circular economy therefore has significant potential to reduce the environmental impacts of the energy sector. Investments in improving the efficiency of renewable energy generation can reduce the spatial footprint of the infrastructure per unit, thereby reducing pressures on biodiversity and ecosystems. Likewise, circular economy indicators could be incorporated into lifecycle analysis methodologies for renewable energy technologies to more clearly map potential implications for climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution.
Enhanced transparency about the material composition and environmental impacts of products may also facilitate efforts towards improving upstream pollution risks of renewables as well as the downstream management of end-of-life solar panels and wind turbine blades. For instance, the European Union is introducing a Digital Product Passport as part of Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation, which establishes a framework for specifying eco-design requirements on virtually all products placed on the market (European Union, 2024[49]). Improving end-of-life management of renewables can likewise support more circular economies. Several countries including Germany and France have adopted the EU Waste regulations from Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment directives for management of end-of-life solar PV, making manufacturers responsible for the cost, collection and recycling of PVs. Importantly, concomitant considerations of material recovery and resource efficiency are needed. Investments in infrastructure supporting circular business models, beyond waste management, are therefore important. For instance, the Dutch government has supported large-scale production of circular solar cells and panels through the SolarNL project.
There is likewise significant potential for more circular food systems to tackle the triple planetary crisis. For instance, optimising farming techniques, including a shift towards regenerative agriculture techniques – such as silvopasture – can minimise external inputs including fertiliser use while improving carbon sequestration. Additionally, ensuring that food packaging is recyclable and compostable can alleviate GHG emissions and waste associated with the production of single-use packaging and landfilling, while mitigating the risk of biodiversity harms once in the environment.
Switching from a linear economy towards more circular economies in the food sector can also be extended to phosphor-based products. Phosphorus reuse involves using phosphorus-containing waste directly without significant processing, for example by applying phosphorus-rich manure and compost to land as fertilisers. Phosphorus recycling focuses on recovery from waste materials and transformation into a form that can be used again, often in agriculture, for example through chemical extraction of phosphorus from sewage sludge or phosphorus recovery from sewage sludge ash after mono-incineration.
Furthermore, a more circular approach to food systems can mitigate the amount of food that goes unconsumed. Voluntary collaborations among governments, farmers, suppliers and retailers can create holistic strategies to tackle food loss and waste from farm to fork. Since 2005, the United Kingdom’s UK Food and Drink Pact (formerly, the Courtauld Commitment) has provided guidance to help businesses set food waste reduction targets, measure food surpluses and waste and act to reduce food waste across the supply chain (WRAP, 2022[50]). Governments can track progress in meeting targets via food loss and waste indices. Such measures necessarily require complementary initiatives that incentivise sustainable non-food consumption.
There is also an opportunity to strengthen incentives to better manage environmental impacts along the lifecycle of materials from extraction, transport, processing, use and disposal. Realigning incentives with the aim to strengthen efforts to curb production and demand and enhance eco-design are particularly important. For instance, primary materials remain more price-competitive than secondary materials, in part due to support measures such as reduced corporate income tax and concessional investment financing for the extraction of metals. To make circular economy approaches more economically viable, revenues from primary materials taxes could be redistributed in the form of recycling subsidies on the input price of feedstock for recycling processes or on the selling price of recycled commodities. In turn, greater uptake of recycling can significantly offset land use requirements, energy demand, as well as soil, water and air pollution associated with primary materials production. Subsidies could likewise enable firms to increase their spending on research and development, thus improving the likelihood of unlocking key innovations and their future production capacity. Crucially, it is important to align such incentives with addressing rebound effects.
Furthermore, such actions must be considered in the context of whole-of-lifecycle impacts, to avoid burden shifting between end points. For example, while secondary materials tend to be considerably less polluting, hazardous chemicals can become concentrated in recycled products. For recycling to become more viable, there is a complementary need to accelerate the transition to a cleaner energy system and incentivise more sustainable product design.
Changing consumption patterns is at the heart of a circular economy transition in line with the objective of tackling the triple planetary crisis. In turn, the prevailing approach of focusing on supply-side (production) measures must be supplemented with a much stronger focus on demand-side (consumption) measures to help avoid wasteful consumption and shift towards less harmful alternatives. Demand-side measures that focus on reducing structural, financial and psychological barriers while improving choice architecture and the development of markets for recycled products can therefore contribute towards reducing environmental pressures. Availability, affordability and convenience are fundamental to enabling more sustainable household decisions. For example, individuals are unlikely to repair their garments if such services are difficult to find or if repair is not price competitive vis a vis the purchase of new clothing. Similarly, households are more likely to recycle and compost their waste if they have access to convenient curb-side collection services. Other demand-side strategies, such as tax credits for purchasing refurbished and repaired items or volume-based fees for residual and food waste, can incentivise residents to minimise their waste footprint. These instruments are typically implemented at the sub-national level. It is therefore important to anticipate the potential challenges municipalities may face due to resources and capacity limitations to ensure policy effectiveness. Cultural and structural shifts also need to be considered together with individual choices.
Social and distributional considerations
The transition to a more resource-efficient and circular economy – while supporting the objective of tackling the triple planetary crisis – must ensure that no one is left behind. Yet, this focus is not always prominent in circular economy strategies (Barrie et al., 2024[44]). Availability, affordability and convenience are also fundamental to the uptake of circular economy models. If circular economy policies lead to higher product costs upfront (for example for more durable, repairable goods) then low-income households may face affordability concerns. On the other hand, sharing models such as rental and leasing, that are also part of the circular economy, can help improve affordability by reducing costs.
While circular economy might imply a net increase in jobs through a transition from material intensive sectors such as extractives to more service-oriented sectors that tend to be more labour intensive, there may be job dislocations across occupations and regions, creating winners and losers. In some cases, there may also be concerns about the quality of the jobs that are created. Social protection measures like retraining programs may be deployed to help workers displaced by circular economy policies while redirecting revenues from primary materials taxes to reduce distortionary labour taxes can contribute to social outcomes. At a regional level, channelling circular economy investments into regions that were previously reliant on extractive industries can also help reduce the dislocations that might result from a transition to a more circular economy.
As secondary production tends to be more labour-intensive than primary production, reducing labour taxes could be a way to enhance cost advantages of secondary production. Environmental health and safety may also need particular attention, for example in the case of workers employed in recycling, repair and refurbishment. In many developing and emerging economies these tasks are often conducted by informal workers that are underpaid and under conditions that lack appropriate environmental safeguards. Integrating informal workers within more formalised waste management systems can help improve occupational health and safety and raise incomes.
7.2.6. Rethink food systems
Food systems, which comprise the elements and activities related to producing and consuming food (including land use change), account for around one-third of global GHG emissions (Crippa et al., 2021[51]). Agriculture and related land use change make up about 65% of such emissions, with the remainder arising from both downstream (e.g. transport, processing, retail, packaging, waste) and upstream (fuel production) activities (OECD, 2023[52]).
Food systems are also the most significant driver of terrestrial biodiversity loss (Dasgupta, 2021[53]). Agriculture stands out as the main driver of habitat loss, accounting for a large share of global land use changes, primarily through the conversion of natural ecosystems for crop production and pastures. The expansion of agriculture also harms freshwater and marine ecosystems, including through pesticide use.
While options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the food system are plentiful, and in many cases they also have co-benefits in terms of reduced biodiversity loss and lower pollution, their implementation is fragmented and uncoordinated. Such measures also risk trade-offs with other key outcomes such as food security or impact on livelihoods. In general, improvements in environmental outcomes can be achieved through switching to lower-impact food categories and/or lower-impact production methods. The significant heterogeneity within food categories, however, adds further complexity, underscoring the critical importance of evidence in weighing the possible synergies and trade-offs (OECD, 2021[3]). Agriculture has been so far largely exempted from legally binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions reduction and is often not integrated into national net-zero strategies. For instance, while most countries mention agriculture among sectors considered in their NDCs; only 16 of 54 countries surveyed by the OECD have any form of specific mitigation target for the agricultural sector (OECD, 2022[26]). Another important policy area concerns integration of food systems into other economy-wide climate policies. For example, agricultural emissions tend to be excluded from most national carbon pricing schemes.
While actions on biodiversity loss are better linked to food systems, synergies and trade-offs between biodiversity and climate actions are not fully accounted for in designing the actions (OECD, 2023[52]). Increasing intensive land use reduces deforestation but has higher demands on fertiliser and water while increasing extensive land use results in more deforestation. Evaluating these trade-offs requires an integrated approach to policy across the three areas of climate, biodiversity and pollution, which is not fully in place.
Transformation of the food system is essential to address the triple planetary crisis. On climate change, meeting the net zero target will require mitigation in all sectors including food systems, which have been making slower progress relative to other sectors. On biodiversity, continued losses and degradation of ecosystems are closely tied to the current food systems. Pollution related to food systems also accounts for most of the habitat loss and land use changes resulting in deforestation. In terms of pollution, the costs of nitrogen used in agriculture to health and ecosystems are significant. Estimates of the global hidden costs of nitrogen use are around USD 1.5 trillion (or around 1.46% of global GDP) (Lord, 2023[54]). While the application of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus are important to maintain yields, a large share of these inputs is not taken up by plants. For example, there is considerable global surplus application of nitrogen (around 50% is lost), which can be reduced in surplus regions without endangering food security while improving nitrogen use efficiency (Lassaletta et al., 2014[55]).
Core policy recommendations and actions
Actions need to be taken to reduce the negative impacts of food systems across climate, biodiversity and pollution in a way that takes account of synergies and addresses trade-offs. For instance, governance issues are present at the global and national levels. The Global Stocktake does not provide targets or guidance for integrating food systems measures in national policies. While the former addresses the vulnerabilities of food production systems to climate change, the role of food systems to mitigate climate change is not included in the Agreement. There has been some progress in including agriculture within the UNFCCC framework through the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture, which was designed to advance discussions on how agriculture can contribute to both increased food security and climate change adaptation. It was followed up by a decision at the 2022 COP in Sharm el-Sheikh to develop comprehensive strategies for addressing food security in the face of these challenges. Results from this initiative, however, are yet to be achieved. The Global Stocktake at COP28 in 2023, for the first time, mentions food systems but fails to incorporate a systems approach to address climate change in such systems (WWF, 2024[56]).
The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework sets clear targets related to agriculture and food systems, but much remains to be done to implement them. Through multistakeholder and collaborative approaches under NDCs, NAPs and NBSAPs, governments can ensure that sectoral policies for climate, biodiversity, and food are aligned and geared towards contributing to the global goals for climate and nature (OECD, 2023[52]).
At the national level, a food systems approach that recognises the challenges but also sees the opportunities is needed. This requires integrating food systems measures in NBSAPs and NDCs. While most (94%) of 146 updated NDCs mention food, only 3% (5 NDCs) consider measures across several intervention areas in agriculture and food systems (WWF, 2024[56]).7
With respect to regulations and safeguards, concerted action to address food systems emissions requires a focus on both supply and demand (OECD, 2022[26]). On the supply side, three areas of action stand out: first, reducing direct emissions from agricultural production and elsewhere along food systems value chains, including through enhancing productivity and efficiency of input use; second, reducing emissions from land use change and enhancing carbon sequestration potential; and third, reducing food loss. On the demand side, shifting dietary preferences towards less emissions-intensive products and processes and reducing food loss and waste is paramount.
Another measure that would be effective is pricing emissions from sources in agriculture, which are presently exempt. One recent development is the announcement by Denmark in 2024 (pending parliamentary approval) to impose a tax on livestock related GHG emissions from agriculture from 2030 onwards (The Copenhagen Post, 2024[57]).
Further opportunities exist to improve land-based area payments to better align with a transition to low-emissions food systems, including through linking such payments to the provision of environmental and ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration through afforestation or land rehabilitation. Such schemes can play an important role but difficulties can arise when they are driven more by government aims and objectives and less by local needs (Pagiola, Agostini and Gobbi, 2004[58]). This can be avoided by making sure that schemes are based on the participation of all relevant parties and account is taken of how providers will respond to the incentives offered (Wunder et al., 2020[59]).
On the demand side, reducing food loss and waste is critical. The amount of food lost or wasted is around one-third of all food produced (FAO, 2023[60]) and generates 8-10% of global GHG emissions (UNEP, 2024[61]). Policy measures include targeted investments in equipment, training of operators, educational programs for consumers (FAO, 2019[62]). While these technical solutions have made some impact and are found to be cost-effective, others that focus on changing behaviour have not been evaluated in detail but remain important. 12% of food is wasted in retail and 60% by households (UNEP, 2024[61]). Promoting/directing behavioural changes and consumer awareness can significantly reduce food waste, including through incentivising changes in retailer and business practices such as reporting and consumer targeting, introducing longer-lasting products or regulating commercial practices that lead to overbuying (OECD, 2022[26]).
The other demand side measure is dietary change. A transition to plant-based diets is projected to cost USD 30 billion, but the predicted economic benefits of this transition, totalling around USD 1.3 trillion, eclipse these costs (Nature Editorial, 2019[63]). However, as diets are an integral part of social habits and cultures, changing them is very difficult. Current policies often entail information provision and nudge strategies. There are some signs of a general move to healthier and more sustainable diets but also a global increase in the consumption of meat and dairy is anticipated (OECD/FAO, 2025[64]).
Research and development may play a potentially sizeable role. In recent decades, large productivity gains have helped to meet increasing global food demand while limiting environmental impacts. There is potential for further gains in productivity that would reduce the demand for land expansion, while also reducing the environmental footprint of agriculture. New genetic technologies offer additional opportunities to advance crop resilience and productivity and could play an important role in reducing food systems emissions (von Braun et al., 2021[65]). Viable options also exist for reducing livestock emissions. As most emissions come from enteric fermentation, herd genetics and feed and pasture quality are key (OECD, 2022[26]).
Investments in research and development in agrifood systems are found to have a high return in terms of productivity as well as environmental benefits, higher in some studies than restrictions on land use (Fuglie et al., 2022[66]). Yet, public investments in agricultural innovation currently remain marginal – equivalent to only 0.54% of the value of agricultural production in 2022-2024 (OECD, 2025[23]). This will need to be complemented by the adoption of improved practices where significant potential exists and by measures to ensure that access to technologies and professional training is available to vulnerable groups.
Social and distributional considerations
Reforming the food system can result in both positive and negative social and distributional consequences. On the positive side, for example, dietary shifts and reduced pollution can lead to health co-benefits. Reducing food loss and waste, meanwhile, can help reduce hunger and malnutrition by increasing food availability. Further, by optimising fertiliser and pesticide use, policymakers can improve soil and water quality, and lower the costs of water treatment. It is, however, the potential negative side effects that need to be carefully evaluated and managed as part of any food system reform process. Stricter environmental regulations or taxes on high emission foods like meat and dairy can raise retail prices and disproportionately impact low-income households who spend a higher share of their budget on food. If more sustainable and healthier alternatives remain more expensive and/or less available, then it may widen health inequities and have disproportionate impacts on lower income households. Other reforms, such as reduction of agricultural inputs or meat production could cause income loss or job insecurity among farmers, especially smallholders, employed in input or livestock heavy agriculture. Dietary shifts and measures like border carbon adjustments in high-income countries could also have international distributional effects on farmers in low- and middle-income countries dependent on emissions intensive agricultural exports.
Governments have at their disposal a wide range of tools to help mitigate these adverse social and distributional effects and prevent these issues from becoming an impediment to improving environmental sustainability of food systems. These could include income transfers or food vouchers for low-income groups. Targeted subsidies for healthy, low emission foods are another option while ensuring that these subsidies themselves are not socially regressive if the consumption of such foods is initially concentrated in high income groups. Public procurement policies could also be considered to provide affordable more environmentally friendly meals in establishments like schools and hospitals. Just transition programmes that support retraining of farm workers as diversification of rural economies (e.g. renewables and ecosystem services) can help offset potential income and job losses. Making input subsidies conditional on the adoption of practices like climate and biodiversity smart agriculture – can help reduce nutrient pollution while supporting farmer livelihoods. At the international level, meanwhile, support for trade diversification to reduce reliance on export of single food commodities, use of development assistance and/or climate finance can help support sustainable transition in the food system.
Beyond specific policy instruments, any reforms of the food system must take into consideration the close connection between food and culture, religious beliefs and values. Multi-stakeholder collaboration is key with particular attention to those who are traditionally excluded from decision-making. Given these intertwined interests, the adoption of a “food systems approach” is needed to move forward with coherent and ambitious reform. A food systems approach opens the possibility of using different policy instruments to balance competing interests and values. This entails considering the impacts of all policies affecting food systems on farmer livelihoods, the environment, food security as well as the economy more widely, to foster synergies and avoid or mitigate unintended consequences.
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← 1. The scope of the policies considered are detailed in Annex 2.A. The cut-off date used in the modelling analysis means that the changes in policies and ambition within the updated (2025) nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are not considered under current policies.
← 2. The ten countries included in the analysis are Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, and Uganda (see Chapter 5).
← 3. Developed countries provided and mobilised USD 115.9 billion in climate finance (supporting developing countries) in 2022, exceeding the annual goal of mobilising USD 100 billion for the first time (OECD, 2024[68]). Similarly, Target 19 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework sets out the goal of mobilising USD 200 billion a year by 2030, including USD 30 billion in international finance from developed countries to developing countries. In 2021, biodiversity-related official development finance is estimated to have reached USD 18.5 billion (OECD, 2023[20]).
← 4. Also known as the Chemicals and Waste Management Programme, the Special Programme provides funding for strengthening institutions for the sound management of chemicals and waste to support the implementation of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Convention, the Minamata Convention and the Global Framework on Chemicals.
← 5. Support measures can include direct budgetary transfer, tax expenditure as well as the foregone revenue (e.g. underpricing of a good or a service). Certain types of support measures such as market price support (e.g. minimum price guarantee) for agriculture are foregone revenue rather than a budgetary transfer; these measures therefore cannot be repurposed or redirected but options exist for their reforms and elimination (Matthews and Karousakis, 2022[67]).
← 6. Furthermore, the cost of producing renewable electricity have declined rapidly in recent years.
← 7. While there may be limited cases of food systems measures in national reporting, these measures may be included in countries’ implementation plans.