Strong digital foundations – shared digital public infrastructure (DPI), well-governed data and connected systems – enable governments to deliver services reliably, reduce duplication and keep pace with changing needs. OECD evidence confirms real and accelerating progress: data-sharing systems, digital notifications, digital identity and single digital gateways are in place across most OECD countries. Yet availability has not automatically translated into impact. Many services still cannot be delivered fully digitally from start to finish, because key components are missing or not yet consistently used across policy functions and levels of government. Extending adoption of (widely available) digital identity, particularly among users who face barriers of trust, usability and access, remains a challenge. Strategies and standards for data governance are common, but data quality management, reuse at scale, and impact measurement still lag. And even where the right foundations exist, they only deliver when systems can connect and exchange information reliably across organisations, levels of government and (increasingly) borders. This chapter reviews progress and gaps across the foundations: shared digital infrastructure, digital identity and data governance, interoperability, and the resilience and sustainability of government systems.
Digital Government Outlook 2026
From Foundations to Transformational Impact
2. Strengthening digital public infrastructure and data governance
Copy link to 2. Strengthening digital public infrastructure and data governanceAbstract
Key messages
Copy link to Key messagesRollout of digital public infrastructure (DPI) is accelerating, while gaps in end-to-end delivery remains. The core shared systems - data-sharing platforms, digital notifications and single digital gateways - are now in place across OECD countries, and three quarters of countries also have digital post and digital payment platforms. However, gaps remain: where these components are absent, services cannot be delivered fully digitally, and users must move between digital and non-digital channels, limiting seamless service journeys.
Digital identity governance is largely established, and the priority now is extending adoption. Most countries have strategies and clear institutional responsibilities, and nearly seven in ten allow the majority of online services to be accessed using a secure digital identity. Reaching the remaining countries – and deepening uptake among users – require sustained attention to trust, usability and inclusive design.
Data governance is advancing, but translating high-level commitments into operational practice remains the main challenge. All OECD countries have data strategies and clear objectives, yet implementation and impact measurement lag. Strengthening data-quality standards, enabling reuse across and beyond the public sector, and measuring outcomes are the next priorities – and are also preconditions for trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI) and effective data-driven government.
DPI and data policies only deliver results when systems can connect and work reliably. Systems need to work together across organisations and levels of government so that data can flow and services can be joined-up – yet, on average, only 63% of public institutions are connected to their national data interoperability system across OECD countries. Cloud technologies have become standard government infrastructure, and open-source software, when backed by clear rules, active stewardship and sustained funding, can reduce dependence on single suppliers, increase transparency, and make it easier to share digital solutions across governments and borders.
2.1. Introduction
Copy link to 2.1. IntroductionDigital public infrastructure (DPI) and data are the foundations on which modern government is built. DPI refers to the shared systems - such as digital identity, notification services, and data sharing platforms – that public institutions use in common to deliver services, exchange information and carry out their functions (OECD, 2024[1]). When these systems are well designed and well governed, they can enable government to work as a single coherent system rather than a collection of disconnected organisations. They reduce duplication, cut costs, and make it easier for government institutions to share information and co-ordinate their work. They also help governments adapt as needs change, keep services running reliably under pressure, and maintain operations when things go wrong.
Data flows through this infrastructure and creates public value. When data are governed responsibly – with clear rules about how it is collected, secured, shared and used – they can improve decision-making, simplify administrative processes and make services more responsive. For people and businesses, this can mean fewer requests to provide the same information repeatedly to different authorities (OECD, 2025[2]). For governments, effective data use supports better-targeted policies, stronger oversight of what is working (and what is not), and more efficient use of resources – with potential positive implications for cost savings.
Realising the full benefits of DPI and data requires treating them as shared public assets for all of government – not one-off technology projects. In practice, this means designing and managing them for reuse across the public sector and uptake by users if applicable; setting clear rules about who is responsible for what; and funding them as long‑term national capabilities. These foundations are also critical for the trustworthy use of artificial intelligence (AI) in government where the quality, availability and governance of data determine whether AI can be trusted and scaled.
Governments build digital foundations to achieve four outcomes: 1) improving and sustaining reliable service delivery; 2) driving efficiency by reducing duplication and enabling shared use; 3) strengthening trust through secure identity systems and responsible data practices; and 4) enabling innovation while maintaining appropriate safeguards. These outcomes depend on four building blocks that this chapter examines in sequence:
The availability of core shared systems such as digital identity, data sharing platforms, payment systems, notifications and service gateways that form the basic toolkit of digital government.
Governance arrangements refer to the rules, responsibilities and accountability mechanisms that turn policy intentions into reliable practice. This covers both digital identify governance and data governance.
Interoperability is the ability of systems to connect and exchange information across organisations, levels of government, and borders, so that data flows where it is needed.
Resilience and sustainability refer to the choices that determine whether digital infrastructure can be maintained, adapted and kept secure over time, including the use of cloud technologies and open-source software.
This chapter follows these four building blocks in sequence, highlighting where progress is strongest and where gaps in adoption, governance, standards and evaluation still limit what digital infrastructure and data can deliver.
To support governments in building these foundations and achieving broader goals, the OECD Recommendations on Digital Government Strategies (2014), Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data (2021), Governance of Digital Identity (2023) and on Human-centred Public Administrative Services (2024) highlight how secure and scalable digital infrastructure must be combined with robust data governance to deliver modern government (OECD, 2014[3]; OECD, 2021[4]; OECD, 2023[5]; OECD, 2024[6]). These Recommendations offer core guiding principles that inform this report.
2.2. Rollout of digital public infrastructure has accelerated across OECD countries
Copy link to 2.2. Rollout of digital public infrastructure has accelerated across OECD countries2.2.1. What counts as DPI and why it matters for outcomes
DPI refers to a set of shared, secure, and interoperable digital systems designed to support access to public and private services at scale. Rather than each government agency building its own separate tools, DPI provides common building blocks that any institution can use, reducing duplication lowering costs and making it easier for services to work together (OECD, 2024[1]; OECD, 2024[6]). DPI systems include:
Digital identity systems allow people and organisations to prove who they are when accessing services online – securely, efficiently and increasingly across borders. They include ways of logging in, signing documents digitally and, in more advanced cases, storing and sharing verified digital credentials through a digital wallet.
Digital payment systems enable governments to send and receive payments with people and businesses – for example, paying benefits faster, collecting fees more easily or tracking transactions more reliably.
Core registries are authoritative, official records that serve as the single trusted source for key information – such as population records, business registers, address and land ownership data. They underpin many government processes by ensuring that all government institutions work from the same reliable information.
Data sharing systems enable governments organisations to exchange information with each other, and in some cases with the private sector and civil society, under appropriate safeguards. They make it possible to apply the once-only principle – collecting information from a person or business once and reusing it across services, rather than different providers/government institutions asking users for the same details repeatedly.
Digital post systems provide a secure channel through which official communication can be sent and received digitally, replacing physical mail for important or sensitive correspondence.
Digital notifications are systems that allow public institutions to send messages – by emails, text or post – to keep people and business informed about their interactions with government.
Single digital gateways facilitate the discovery and access of government services, reducing the need for individual solutions and platforms.
Individual institutions have long maintained their own digital systems operating in siloes, with limited incentives to transit towards more integrated approaches. The concept of DPI reflects a shift in ambition and scope: these components are designed to be used across ministries, levels of government, and in certain domains across the wider economy. This shared approach reduces fragmentation, lowers the cost of transactions and makes it possible to deliver genuinely joined-up services. For example, when someone experience a major life event – the birth of a child, starting a business or moving home – DPI can allow their information to flow automatically across relevant government institutions, so they interact with government once rather than many times. What in the past to require multiple separate transactions can become a single, joined‑up process.
2.2.2. Progress and gaps: most building blocks are in place, but end-to-end delivery remains incomplete
OECD countries have made significant progress in deploying shared digital building blocks, particularly data-sharing systems and digital notifications. However, gaps in some components – notably digital post and digital payments – still prevent many services from being delivered fully digital from start to finish.
Evidence from the Government as a platform dimension of the OECD Digital Government Index (DGI) shows that, on average, 74% of core DPI components are now in place across OECD countries (Figure 2.1). Whole-of-government data-sharing and digital notification systems are now a standard, with over 80% of OECD countries having implemented both. Digital notifications are increasingly used to communicate proactively and reliably with people and businesses, supporting faster and more efficient service delivery.
Figure 2.1. The adoption of DPI systems has grown across OECD countries, particularly in the areas of digital notifications and digital post
Copy link to Figure 2.1. The adoption of DPI systems has grown across OECD countries, particularly in the areas of digital notifications and digital postPercentage of OECD countries adopting digital public infrastructure systems, 2023 and 2025
Note: Data not available for Germany or the United States. Single digital gateway: availability of a catalogue of services accessible to users. Data sharing: availability of a data interoperability system. Digital identity: at least 50% of national online public services can be accessed through a digital identity solution with two-factor authentication. Refer to Annex Table 2.A.1 for comprehensive OECD and Accession country data.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Progress is also noticeable, though more varied, for other components. Digital post and digital payment platforms are available in 27 out of 36 OECD countries (75%), reflecting steady expansion of the digital service toolkit. Where they exist, digital post solutions provide a secure channel for official communications and are often integrated into broader service platforms (OECD, 2024[1]) (Chapter 5). In many countries, digital post and notification services functionalities are built into single digital gateways – unified entry points where people can receive official communications, complete transactions and track their interactions with government in one place. This integration makes services simpler and more consistent for users, reduces administrative burdens and strengthen trust (Box 2.1). However, the fact that around one in four OECD countries still lacks digital post or payment capability points to an ongoing gap in the completeness of digital public infrastructure, and limits how far service delivery can be transformed in those countries.
Box 2.1. Digital public infrastructure in practice
Copy link to Box 2.1. Digital public infrastructure in practiceDigital public infrastructure can enhance governments in several ways: by reducing duplication and cost; by enabling government institutions to work together more seamlessly; by making services more accessible and inclusive; and by supporting reliable and continuous delivery even when demand surges or disruptions occur.
Digital notifications - Canada and Italy
Canada’s GCNotify allows federal public servants to send emails and text messages to individuals, free of charge. It connects easily to other services through a standard interface and its underlying code is publicly available for others to reuse – an approach modelled on the United Kingdom’s GOV.UK Notify.
Italy’s SEND platform is the national system for issuing and receiving legally valid notifications from public administrations. It centralises official communications, allows institutions to connect through standard interfaces, and lets people choose how they receive notifications. By maintaining up‑to‑date contact details and managing the full delivery process, SEND reduces uncertainty, lowers costs and simplifies workflows.
Single digital gateways - Belgium
Belgium’s MyGov.be mobile app brings together access to official documents and certificates from federal, regional and local authorities in one place. It includes a unified digital post service, a secure digital wallet for storing government‑issued documents, and a digital identity function for logging in to public services. The app consolidates multiple channels into a single, consistent experience and aligns with EU initiatives on European digital identity wallets.
Digital post - Sweden
In Sweden, people and businesses receive official communications from public authorities through a secure digital mailbox, using electronic identification to log in. The Mina meddelanden messaging service is operated by the Agency for Digital Government (DIGG), while the mailboxes themselves are offered by a range of public and private providers. People receive messages only from the public authorities they interact with, keeping the service manageable and relevant.
Digital payments – United Kingdom
GOV.UK Pay is a free payment service available for use by? public-sector organisations in the United Kingdom. It has no set-up fees or monthly charges and require no procurement process, making it straightforward for service teams to adopt. It allows organisations to replace offline payment methods quickly, providing a secure and accessible payment experience hosted on GOV.UK.
Source: (OECD, 2024[7])
2.3. Governance of digital identity is not yet leading to wider uptake
Copy link to 2.3. Governance of digital identity is not yet leading to wider uptakeMost OECD countries have established governance arrangements for digital identity, but the integration of digital identity across services and its uptake by users remain uneven. The evidence shows that technology is not the bottleneck: trust, usability and inclusive design are what determine whether digital identity systems are adopted at scale.
A well-designed digital identity system delivers clear benefits. For individuals, it provides a simpler and more secure way to access services. For businesses, it reduces the cost and complexity of verifying who they are dealing with. Beyond these immediate advantages, digital identity is central to making digital government work reliably over time. By providing a trusted, consistent way for users to authenticate across institutions, it allows services to work steadily as processes evolve, new channels emerge, or technologies change. Where digital identity is not widely adopted, it becomes much harder to introduce new service models securely and at scale.
As set out in the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Digital Identity, trusted and interoperable digital identity systems rely on solid governance arrangements (Box 2.2). Clear mandates, shared standards, robust security requirements and clear accountability ensure that digital identity protects users while remaining flexible enough to support new service models and adapt to future changes.
Box 2.2. Key principles for governing digital identity
Copy link to Box 2.2. Key principles for governing digital identityThe OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Digital Identity provides a framework for building identity systems that are effective, usable, secure and trusted. Its key provisions ask governments to:
Design and implement digital identity systems that respond to the needs of users and service providers.
Prioritise access for all and minimise barriers
Take a strategic approach and define clear roles and responsibilities across the digital identity system.
Protect privacy and prioritise security to ensure trust in digital identity systems.
Align legal and regulatory frameworks, and invest in interoperability.
Source: (OECD, 2023[5])
2.3.1. Digital identity strategies are in place but their reach varies
OECD countries have made significant progress in strengthening the governance and strategic direction of digital identity. Nearly all (except Slovak Republic) have a designated government body responsible for setting the strategic direction for digital identity. This near‑universal assignment of responsibility marks an important shift away from fragmented, project‑based efforts toward more coherent, long‑term stewardship.
However, the scope of these mandates varies considerably. Nine out of 36 OECD countries (25%) limit the mandate of this body to the public sector, treating digital identity primarily as a tool for accessing government services. In contrast, 26 out of 36 OECD countries (72%) extend the mandate to the broader digital economy, positioning digital identity as an enabler of secure interactions across public and private sectors. This broader approach treats digital identity not just as an administrative infrastructure but as a driver of digital trust, economic participation and innovation.
Strategic planning has also advanced: 33 out of 36 OECD countries (92%) have a government digital identity strategy, up from 82% in 2023. Almost all include provisions for use by central or federal government institutions, providing a common baseline across service portfolios.
The reach of these strategies beyond central government is more uneven. 27 out of 36 OECD countries (75%) include subnational governments in their strategic frameworks, and 23 out of 36 countries (64%) explicitly address sectors with strong identify verification requirements, such as banking and the financial sector. This reflects growing recognition that shared identity infrastructure can reduce fraud, ease compliance and simplify how people access regulated services.
Figure 2.2. Actors included as service providers by the National Digital Identity Strategy
Copy link to Figure 2.2. Actors included as service providers by the National Digital Identity StrategyPercentage of OECD countries reporting types of actors included in national digital identify strategy as service providers, 2023 and 2025
Note: Data not available for Germany or the United States. Refer to Annex Table 2.A.3 for comprehensive OECD and Accession country data. Know-your-customer (KYC) refers to the process by which organisations verify the identity of individuals before providing them with a service — such as opening a bank account, accessing a government benefit, or signing a contract.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Extension into the broader private sector – retail, e-commerce and other sectors without specific regulatory requirements – remains limited, with only 16 out of 36 OECD countries (44%) including such provisions. This partly reflects legitimate caution: regulatory uncertainty, privacy concerns, questions about liability and uncertainty about whether systems are mature enough for wider use are all reasonable considerations. Addressing them will require sustained efforts to improve interoperability, foster trust, clarify liability frameworks, and ensure systems are robust enough to support a wider range of service models (Box 2.3).
Box 2.3. How OECD countries are governing digital identity
Copy link to Box 2.3. How OECD countries are governing digital identityDenmark manages its digital identity solution (MitID) through a public-private partnership between government entities and the financial sector. The partnership behind MitID consists of the Agency for Digital Government, representing the state, the Danish regions and municipalities, and the country’s financial institutions, represented by their industry association, Finance Denmark. This shared governance model has enabled MitID to function as a common national digital identity solution across both the public and private sectors. The solution is a central part of the country’s digital infrastructure, supporting secure access to government services, banking, and a wide range of digital services on private platforms in Denmark.
Estonia provides a state-issued digital identity to every citizen, co-managed by the Information System Authority (RIA) and the Police and Border Guard Board (PPA). Since 2001, uptake has been driven significantly by private sector adoption for business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions. The Estonian experience shows the value of building a shared identity model with the private sector to encourage widespread use by citizens.
Italy has developed several complementary digital identity tools, all managed by public bodies. SPID is a federated system allowing people to access public and private services using credentials issued by approved providers. The electronic identity card (CIE) is a mandatory government-issued card with both physical and digital authentication capabilities. In 2024, Italy launched the IT-Wallet, its implementation of the EU Digital Identity Wallet, fully integrated into the government’s IO app.
2.3.2. Digital identity coverage is growing, though adoption varies across countries and users
Progress in digital identity strategies and governance has translated into broad availability of digital identity systems across OECD countries (Figure 2.1), and this is increasingly reflected in service coverage. Nearly seven in ten OECD countries (25 out 36, 69%) report that more than half of their online public services can be accessed using digital identity – a significant achievement that reflects sustained investment in digital identity infrastructure. Many of these countries have reached this level through widely adopted national solutions that covers a broad range of services. Among OECD accession candidate countries, Brazil and Croatia have made particular progress in implementing such solutions at scale. Sustaining this momentum and extending it to the remaining countries will require continued attention to incentives for service providers to integrate digital identity, clearer governance frameworks and more consistent adoption across service portfolios.
User uptake – meaning the share of the population that actually uses digital identity – varies widely. In nine countries (Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) more than 90% of the population uses digital identity. In fifteen countries, uptake varies between 90% and 50% of eligible population, and in the other twelve countries, fewer than half use it. These disparities show that making digital identity available across services is necessary but not sufficient. Sustained effort is also needed to build user trust, design and develop systems that are easy to use, address barriers for people who struggle with digital services, and ensure that high-quality non-digital channels remain available, so no one is left behind.
OECD countries use a range of methods to verify users’ identity, rather than relying on a single approach (Annex Table 2.A.2). Username and password (without an additional verification step) remain the most widely available solution, used in 27 out of 36 OECD countries (75%). It continues to play a role as a low-cost, familiar entry point for services that require a lower level of security.
More secured methods requiring a second verification step are increasingly common. Text-message-based verification is available in only 17 out of 36 OECD countries (47%) and email-based verification in 12 out of 36 countries (33%), though concerns about their vulnerability to fraud and phishing have led several more advanced countries to move beyond these in favour of app-based or other stronger methods. App-based verification is now available in 26 out of 36 OECD countries (72%), and smartcard-based verification in 24 out of 36 countries (67%). Australia’s myGov, for instance, now supports passkeys – a newer more secure method that replaces password by using a unique digital key stored on the user’s device, which cannot be stolen through phishing.
Overall, OECD countries are strengthening their identity verification systems, but many are still in transition period, balancing the need for security against the importance of keeping systems accessible, affordable and easy to use.
2.4. Data governance continues to see a gap between strong strategies and weaker delivery
Copy link to 2.4. Data governance continues to see a gap between strong strategies and weaker deliveryNearly all OECD countries recognise data as a strategic asset and have put strategies and objectives in place. The remaining challenge is operational: strengthening data quality, removing barriers to data sharing and re-use, and measuring how data use is delivering impact.
Data governance covers the rules and responsibilities that determine how data are collected, managed, accessed, shared and used across government. It provides the stable foundation that allows systems to work reliably as technologies, organisations and requirements change. When data governance is coherent, institutions can share and re-use data consistently, adapt processes without disrupting services, and maintain continuity when regulations or service models evolve.
This matters across all government functions. In public procurement, consistent and well-managed data supports performance monitoring, oversight and the detection of irregularities. In justice and integrity systems, well-governed data can help prioritise intervention, support protective decisions, identify corruption risks and support accountability (OECD, 2025[12]; Hlacs and Wells, 2025[13]; OECD, 2024[14]; Byrom, Piccinin-Barbieri and Wells, 2024[15]; OECD, 2025[16]). Across all functions, the OECD evidence is clear: data alone does not create value. Value comes from governing data strategically and responsibly – establishing the shared rules, safeguards and collaborative arrangements that make data sharing and re-use possible. Without these conditions, data tends to remain fragmented or under‑used, and governments lose the ability to anticipate needs, co-ordinate action, and deliver outcomes that serve the public interest.
The OECD Recommendation on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data sets out principles for maximising the benefits of data while protecting the rights and legitimate interests of individuals and businesses (see Box 2.4 and (OECD, 2021[4])). Evidence from the Data-driven public sector (DDPS) dimension of the 2025 DGI shows strong governance frameworks on paper – strategies, mandates and standards are widespread – but systematic data use, quality management and routine monitoring still lag. Bridging this gap means moving from having frameworks to applying them in daily practice: enforcing common standards, improving data quality, building skills for responsible data use, and embedding evaluation so governments can measure the impact of data practices.
Box 2.4. What a truly data-driven public sector looks like
Copy link to Box 2.4. What a truly data-driven public sector looks likeA data-driven public sector uses data consistently to improve decisions, design and deliver better services, measure outcomes and strengthen accountability. The central challenge is not only technical; governments also need the right governance, skills, incentives, and ways of working that make data use effective across the whole-of-government.
A truly data-driven public sector:
treats data as a strategic asset, understands its value and measures its impact;
reduces barriers to managing, sharing and re-using data across the public sector;
uses data to improve policies and services, from design and delivery to monitoring and evaluation;
enables re-use and openness, supporting publication of open data and data use across the public sector and beyond, where appropriate.
The OECD Recommendation on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data aims to maximise the benefits of data access and sharing while protecting rights and other legitimate interests. It frames data access and sharing as a foundation for addressing societal challenges; improving evidence-informed policymaking and service delivery; strengthening transparency and trust, and enabling people and businesses to create value.
The Recommendation has three practical pillars:
1. Reinforce trust. Strengthen stakeholder engagement, adopt a strategic, whole-of-government approach, improve transparency and ensure responsible governance throughout the data value cycle.
2. Stimulate investment and incentives. Establish sustainable models and the conditions needed to support data access and sharing.
3. Foster effective and responsible sharing and use. Enable trusted cross-border data flows; improve data findability, accessibility, interoperability and re-usability; and build capacity for responsible data use.
Source: (OECD, 2019[17]; OECD, 2021[4]).
2.4.1. Public-sector data strategies are common and implementation is strengthening
A strategic approach to data governance in the public sector is well-established across OECD countries, and implementation is progressively catching up with ambition. Evidence from the 2025 DGI shows that 34 of 36 countries (94%) have a public-sector data strategy, indicating widespread recognition of data as a strategic asset. Strategic framing is generally strong: 97% set an overall vision and all include explicit goals (see Box 2.5 for some examples). Implementation-oriented elements are also solid: most strategies identify responsible actors (88%) and outline how goals should be achieved (94%). More than six in ten countries (62%) have also put in place mechanisms to monitor results - reflecting growing recognition that strategies need to be tracked to deliver impact. Strengthening monitoring across the remaining countries, and deepening how results are measured and acted upon more broadly, represents the next step in maturing data governance from policy commitment to sustained operational practice. Furthermore, evaluation mechanisms to assess if data strategies are delivering intended results would contribute to closing feedback loops and adjusting future priorities, resource allocation, and implementation approaches based on evidence of what works.
Box 2.5. Dedicated public-sector data strategies: Chile and Poland
Copy link to Box 2.5. Dedicated public-sector data strategies: Chile and PolandChile’s Data Strategy for State Administration sets out a vision for a data-driven public sector that delivers proactive and efficient services. It establishes a coherent governance framework, including a Strategic Data Council, designated data leads, and a shared data inventory. It prioritises staff training across central and local government, and sets out a detailed action plan tracked through 2030. Technological priorities include a new open-data portal, a data interoperability network, consent management tools and broader integration of data across services.
Poland’s Open Data Programme 2021-2027, led by the Ministry of Digital Affairs, aims to expand the supply and quality of re-usable open data via the national dane.gov.pl portal. Governance is led by an interministerial task force and a network of data openness officers. The programme mandates open data publication with an application programme interface (API)-first approach, in line with EU legislation and technical standards. Metadata interoperability is ensured through the adoption the DCAT Application Profile for data portals in Europe (DCAT-AP), based on the Data Catalogue Vocabulary (DCAT) developed by W3C. Progress is tracked through data-sharing schedules and annual reports, and stakeholders training is provided through the Open Data Academy.
The gap between ambition and execution suggests that in many countries, data strategies risk functioning more as policy statements than as operational tools. A group of countries – Canada, Chile, Estonia, France, Korea, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United Kingdom – stand out for integrating all core components, including monitoring. Other countries have formal strategies but show gaps in implementation, accountability or performance tracking. Consistent execution remains the next frontier for maturing data governance.
OECD countries’ public-sector data strategies are primarily focused on improving internal performance and service delivery, and less toward systemic objectives such as cross border interoperability or long-term evaluation. Every government with a data strategy includes objectives to increase public-sector productivity and efficiency, and 94% explicitly aim to design more user-driven services (Figure 2.3). A similarly high share (91%) prioritises ethical and trustworthy data sharing and use, reflecting growing concerns for privacy.
However, more forward-looking goals are less common: around 68% of countries include goals related to cross-border services, and 74% address strengthening policy evaluation and monitoring. This suggests that, while data strategies are increasingly focused on internal reform, their potential to support longer-term planning, cross-border interoperability and evidence-based governance is not yet fully realised.
Figure 2.3. Government productivity and efficiency as well as user-driven services are the most prevalent goals underpinning public-sector data strategies
Copy link to Figure 2.3. Government productivity and efficiency as well as user-driven services are the most prevalent goals underpinning public-sector data strategiesPercentage of OECD countries reporting selected goals in their public-sector data strategy, 2023 and 2025
Note: Does not include data for Germany and the United States.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
2.4.2. Most countries have the basic tools for data management, but quality and coverage vary
Most OECD countries have put core data management tools in place, but their coverage varies across different areas. Standards for metadata (i.e., data describing other data), inventories, quality management and data sharing are crucial for turning high-level ambitions into consistent, scalable practice. They create a common language and set of repeatable processes: metadata standards make datasets findable and shareable; inventories show what data exists and where; quality standards ensure it can be reliably re-used; and sharing standards clarify how data can be accessed and protected. Without these tools, public sector organisations tend to rebuild the same solutions in parallel and collect the same data more than once – adding costs, effort and time, and reducing the reliability of information across government.
The 2025 DGI shows strong uptake of foundational standards, but with significant variation (Figure 2.4). Metadata management standards are the most widely adopted (33 of 36 countries, 92%), followed by data inventories (28 of 36, 78%) and standards for anonymising data to protect privacy (26 of 36, 72%). Standards supporting data sharing are also relatively widespread: 30 of 36 countries (83%) provide guidance for data sharing within the public sector and 27 of 36 (75%) for sharing with external entities. However, formal standards for assessing data quality are less common, with only 23 of 36 OECD countries (64%) reporting them in place. This pattern suggests that countries have prioritised the structural and legal enablers for data re-use – such as documentation, inventories and sharing arrangements – while more systematic approaches to assessing and improving data quality are still maturing. This matters because poor data quality limits how reliably data can be reused across institutions.
Formal data quality frameworks set criteria for assessing and comparing the quality of data across public bodies – a prerequisite for systematic, high-quality re-use of data across government. 2025 DGI evidence shows that such frameworks exist in countries including Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Japan, and most Nordic and Western European countries. Among accession candidate countries, Peru reports having such a framework. Where they are absent, the cause may reflect limited capacity, decentralised approaches to data management, or reliance on sector-specific practices rather than government-wide guidance.
Privacy and security requirements are widely recognized, while the development of more detailed operational data management practices take longer to develop. According to the DGI, 34 of 36 countries (94%) have standards for privacy compliance and 31 of 36 (86%) have information security standards – areas in which legal obligations and risk considerations drive adoption. Several countries, including Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom stand out for achieving comprehensive coverage across nearly all data management domains. Other countries have privacy and security standards in place but more limited guidance on data quality, inventories or sharing. Overall, the pattern shows that governments tend to address compliance-driven areas first, while the more operational, practice-oriented tools take longer to mature - limiting how fully data can be used for service integration, policy analysis and long-term operational reliability.
Figure 2.4. Privacy compliance and security are the most adopted data-management standards across OECD countries
Copy link to Figure 2.4. Privacy compliance and security are the most adopted data-management standards across OECD countriesShare of OECD countries with noted data management standards or guidelines for public servants, 2023 and 2025
Note: Covers only central/federal government level. Data not available for Germany or the United States. Refer to Annex Table 2.A.4 for comprehensive OECD and Accession country data.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
2.4.3. Government are increasingly building ethical data management principles
Public trust in how government handles data are not guaranteed – and once lost, it takes considerable time to rebuild. Guidance on ethical data use governance helps governments set clear boundaries, make decisions transparently, and use data in ways that are lawful, fair and safe. The OECD Trust Survey shows that around 52% of people are confident that public institutions use their personal data for legitimate purposes only. Against this backdrop, an increasing number of governments are adopting a “trust by design” approach – building safeguards into their data systems from the outset.
All OECD countries have a national data-protection authority responsible for enforcing privacy and personal data protection rules, and 30 of 36 (83%) report policy initiatives to promote ethical data management, in line with the OECD Good Practice Principles for Data Ethics in the Public Sector (OECD, 2021[20]). As shown in Figure 2.5, the most commonly implemented principle is managing data with integrity, reported by 29 of 36 OECD countries (80%). Incorporation of ethical data considerations into decision-making processes - such as procurement rules or how third parties handle personal data beyond the requirements of applicable data protection law - is less common, reported by 19 of 36 of OECD countries (53%). This suggests that ethical commitments are broadly established at the level of policy, but embedding them into day-to-day operational practice remains a work in progress.
Figure 2.5. Adoption of ethical data management principles is on the rise across OECD countries
Copy link to Figure 2.5. Adoption of ethical data management principles is on the rise across OECD countriesShare of countries adopting selected ethical data management principles by public sector institutions across OECD countries, 2023 and 2025
Note: The figure presents the aggregated responses for OECD countries to the question “Which of the following principles are covered by the [available policy initiative(s) at the central/federal government level to promote ethical management of data across the public sector]?”. Data not available for Germany or the United States.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
2.4.4. Improving open government data availability, but value creation lags
Open government data – government data made freely available for anyone to access, use and share – continues to be a priority across OECD countries, in line with the OECD Recommendation on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data, which promotes making data as open as possible and as closed as necessary to protect legitimate interests (OECD, 2021[4]). When governed well, open data can, enable better data sharing across government and beyond, enhance transparency and drive innovation in the provision of public and private sectors based on open datasets. However, these benefits only materialise when open data are easy to find, access and re-use. Without these conditions, open data initiatives risk remaining symbolic – technically available but practically unused (Box 2.6).
OECD countries are improving availability and accessibility of open data, but support for re-use continues to lag. Evidence from the OECD OURdata Index shows progress in legal requirements and publication practices, but stakeholder engagement and impact monitoring remain weak. Almost all OECD countries, require public institutions to make data available as open data, and more than 80% mandate key accessibility conditions including the data to be available free of charge, under an open licence, in a machine-readable format, with standardised metadata, and updated in a timely manner. However, more advanced features that enable data to be used and integrated at scale – such as disaggregated data, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and publication through a central portal – are significantly less common. This gap limits how effectively governments, civil society, and businesses can make use of open data.
Box 2.6. Making open data accessible: Examples from Czechia and France
Copy link to Box 2.6. Making open data accessible: Examples from Czechia and FranceCzechia’s National Open Data Catalogue provides a range of ways to explore and download geographic data, in alignment with the EU INSPIRE directive. Many datasets ca be accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs) that allow them to be integrated directly into applications and services to consult maps in a browser, alongside bulk download feeds for full extracts – making the data available for a wide range of purposes.
France makes it straightforward to access open government data through programmable interfaces. For tabular datasets published on data.gouv.fr, a built-in API is available to query a table, filter and preview the results directly on the portal without downloading files. The service code is publicly available under an open-source license to encourage reuse.
Availability of high-value datasets is improving, but overall coverage remains incomplete. According to the 2025 OURdata Index, an average of 57% of high-value datasets across OECD countries are available as open data, up from 47% in the 2023 edition (see Figure 2.6). Availability of high‑value datasets varies widely across domains, with persistent gaps in data related to government integrity (see Figure 2.7). OECD countries perform best for geospatial (73% in 2025, up from 67% in 2023) and statistical (74%, up from 67%) data. In contrast, data on companies (34%, up from 31%), government finances and accountability (38%, up from 27%), and health and social welfare (53%, up from 42%) remain significantly under-published. The least commonly published datasets in open data format include hospitality and gifts records (17%), declarations of assets (14%) and interests (9%) by senior public officials, and company ownership information (9%) – areas where stronger transparency could support accountability and public trust. Furthermore, these results are consistent with the limited availability of datasets on declaration of interests and assets, regardless of format, as presented in the OECD Integrity and Anti-Corruption Outlook - with both available in fewer than 33% of OECD countries (OECD, 2026[23]).
Figure 2.6. Availability of open high-value datasets has improved across OECD countries
Copy link to Figure 2.6. Availability of open high-value datasets has improved across OECD countriesAverage availability of 10 types of high-value datasets as open data per country, 2023 and 2025
Note: The categories of high-value datasets are determined by the OECD primarily based on the G8 Open Data Charter. Data are considered available if it is machine-readable, free of charge and provided with an open license. 2025 data not available for Denmark, Hungary and the United States. 2023 data not available for Hungary and the United States, while for Denmark it is not included in this chart. 2025 data cover 01 January 2023 to 31 December 2024. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023. Refer to Chapter 1 Annex for the full list of datasets.
Source: OECD Survey on Open Government Data 6.0 (2025) and (OECD, 2023[24]).
Figure 2.7. High-value open datasets are more available and equally accessible in 2025
Copy link to Figure 2.7. High-value open datasets are more available and equally accessible in 2025OECD average, 2023 and 2025
Note: The categories of high-value datasets are determined by the OECD primarily based on the G8 Open Data Charter. Data are considered available if they are machine-readable, free of charge and provided with an open license. 2025 data not available for Denmark, Hungary or the United States. 2023 data not available for Hungary or the United States, while for Denmark it is not included in this chart. 2025 data cover 01 January 2023 to 31 December 2024. Refer to Chapter 1 Annex for the full list of datasets.
Source: OECD Survey on Open Government Data 6.0 (2025) and (OECD, 2023[24]).
Accessibility is also improving, though important gaps remain. In 2025, an average of 67% of available high-value datasets were accessible through a central/federal open-data portal - a slight increase from 66% in 2023. Access from a central portal, made possible through harvesting mechanisms, improves discoverability and avoids duplication. Metadata quality has also improved, showing broader alignment with standards such as DCAT or DCAT-AP in Europe, which enables harvesting between portals. However, access through APIs – which allow systems and applications to retrieve data automatically – remains limited, with an OECD average of 49% of high-value datasets offering this capability. This restricts more sophisticated or automated forms of data use. Publication in open, non-proprietary formats also declined slightly, which needs to be addressed to ensure data interoperability.
2.4.5. Stakeholder engagement and impact assessment remain underdeveloped
Stakeholder engagement is a common feature of data governance across OECD members, but practices are more limited and less mature when it comes to open data specifically. According to the DGI, 92% of OECD countries have consulted at least one stakeholder group in developing their public sector data strategy, most commonly civil servants. This reflects growing recognition that incorporating people's views often produces better, more trusted outcomes. However, this engagement does not extend consistently to open data, where involvement of external users remains limited.
To make open data genuinely useful, governments need to understand what different users — businesses, civil society organisations, researchers, journalists and citizens, actually need and which datasets would create the most value. Yet only 8 of 35 OECD countries (23%) require regular consultation on open data plans. When engagement does occur, it tends to prioritise internal actors, leaving the people most likely to use the data with limited influence over what gets published and how.
Measuring the impact of open data also remains limited. The average score for impact monitoring in the OURdata Index increased from 0.29 in 2023 to 0.37 in 2025 – a positive trend but from a low base. Only a minority of OECD countries evaluate the economic (11 of 35 countries, 31%), public sector (9 of 35, 26%), or social (4 of 35, 11%) impact of open government data. Without this information it is difficult to prioritise investment in open data, demonstrate its value to decision-makers or identify where efforts are falling short.
These gaps point to a broader pattern: governance structures for data are in place, but the operational practices that turn data into value - systematic engagement with users, targeted release of high-priority datasets and regular measurement of outcomes - are still developing.
2.4.6. Data are used more for oversight than for service improvement, and this matters for AI
Government-wide initiatives on data use are widespread across OECD governments, but its depth varies significantly depending on the function. Data are most consistently used in strategic oversight and planning. According to the DGI, 34 of 36 (94%) OECD countries report having government-wide initiatives to use data for policy monitoring and evaluation, and 33 of 36 (92%) use data to anticipate and plan government interventions. These high levels reflect long-standing administrative routines and well‑institutionalised processes in areas such as budgeting, performance management and regulatory oversight, where using data to track results and demonstrate compliance has long been standard practice.
Data use is especially pronounced in public procurement and financial management, where governments have strong incentives – and often legal obligations – to monitor spending, detect irregularities and optimise resource allocation. These are also areas where data tends to be more standardised and easier to analyse (see Section 5.5.2 in Chapter 5).
By contrast, system-wide initiatives to use data to improve how services are designed and delivered are prevalent. While 29 of 36 (80%) OECD countries report having government-wide initiatives to use data for service design and delivery, only 16 of them (44%) analyse how people actually use services. This reflects several practical challenges: service delivery responsibilities are often fragmented across institutions; data standards are inconsistent; feedback loops that capture how people experience services are frequently absent; legacy systems lack capacity to collect or share usage data; service teams often lack dedicated analytical capacity. As a result, the potential for data to improve user experience, enable more proactive service delivery or support workforce planning remains largely untapped.
These patterns matter directly for the use of AI in government (Chapter 4). The OECD (2025[25]) Governing with AI report finds that most public-sector AI initiatives remain in exploratory or pilot phases, and that difficulties accessing, sharing and using high-quality data are a common barrier. In areas where data are already well structured, consistently governed and routinely collected, such as tax administration and financial management, AI applications are more likely to be scaled successfully. In areas where data are fragmented, incomplete or unevenly managed, such as service design and delivery, AI deployment tends to be slower. Readiness for AI also depends on whether data can be accessed and used lawfully and are protected by appropriate safeguards. AI development requires balancing the need for large and wide-ranging datasets with compliance with privacy, data protection and intellectual property rules, alongside ensuring traceability and accountability in data use (OECD, 2025[26]). This reinforces a central point: improving data quality, enabling data sharing and supporting reuse are not just good governance practices - they are the precondition for AI to be used reliably and at scale across government.
2.5. Interoperability of data and digital infrastructure is expanding but is still unevenly embedded
Copy link to 2.5. Interoperability of data and digital infrastructure is expanding but is still unevenly embeddedInteroperability allows different digital systems to connect, communicate and exchange information with one another. It is what makes it possible for data held by one government agency to be used securely by another, without demanding people provide the same information again. For governments, interoperability determines whether digital infrastructure can actually deliver joined-up services, reduce administrative burdens and enable data to flow where it is needed.
Interoperability requires agreed governance arrangements between actors, clear rules for data sharing, semantic standards, and appropriate technical tools. Without these arrangements, even well-designed systems tend to operate in isolation, and the potential benefits of shared digital infrastructure go unrealised.
2.5.1. Domestic interoperability: Progress is real, but use of shared systems remains uneven
Interoperability is increasingly underpinning the delivery of essential public services and the day-to-day operation of government. When public services are built on interoperable digital systems (Chapter 5), people and businesses do not have to repeatedly provide the same information, can navigate integrated platforms and engage with multiple authorities for what is effectively a single service journey. For governments, high interoperability reduces operational costs, speeds processes and enhances the ability to use data strategically across the public sector. Yet interoperability and linking data to improve benefit and service delivery remain the exception, not the rule, in areas such as social protection (see, for example, Chapter 3 in (OECD, 2024[27]).
As digital government matures, interoperability is shifting from a narrow technical concern to a core governance issue that shapes how policies are executed and how value is created through data reuse. DPI components only generate value when they are connected and usable across institutions and levels of government. Likewise, data policies that promote access, sharing and re-use depend on common standards, clear interfaces and aligned legal and organisational arrangements. Interoperability is therefore best understood as a system property – something that has to be actively maintained through governance, not achieved once through a technical integration effort.
Building interoperability across government requires moving beyond one-off connections between individual institutions toward shared, reusable building blocks. These include authoritative reference data and registers, shared standards, and interfaces that make data and services accessible across organisational boundaries. Equally important are the governance arrangements that clarify responsibilities for stewardship, verify compliance with standards, and assign operational accountability when multiple institutions rely on shared capabilities. Strengthening these enablers is essential for governments to reduce fragmentation, scale integrated services and support more advanced uses of data such as proactive service delivery, risk‑based regulation or AI‑driven analytics.
Interoperability systems – the shared technical platforms that allow data to be exchanged across government - are now in place in 30 out of 36 OECD countries (83%) (Figure 2.8). Out of those 30 countries, 23 report widespread usage of the data interoperability system across over 50% of public sector institutions at central government level (63%), while the seven remaining countries report lower usage figures. At subnational government level, the adoption rates of data interoperability systems are even lower.
This shows that the existence of a system is not sufficient to deliver impact, and governments need to put in place incentives for adoption, require compliance with shared standards and ensure sustained investment in maintaining shared components over time. Without these elements, data sharing risks remaining formal rather than functional – technically possible but rarely used, difficult to scale and insufficient to deliver integrated services or reduce administrative burdens. Ensuring that cross‑government data sharing is consistent and resilient requires a strategic, long‑term governance approach rather than isolated technical solutions.
Furthermore, organisational silos can be one of the most persistent barriers to interoperability and data sharing, and dismantling them requires solid governance and co-ordination arrangements (OECD, 2025[28]; OECD, 2020[29]). Regulatory fragmentation can also hinder data sharing, as governments must navigate overlapping and sometimes conflicting requirements across data protection, cybersecurity, competition and sector-specific frameworks, making cross-regulatory cooperation mechanisms, such as joint sandboxes or digital regulation forums, increasingly important. The efficiency gains that integration promises can also mean the loss institutional relevance or roles, creating incentives to resist the very changes that would make government work better.
Figure 2.8. Eight in ten OECD countries have government-wide data interoperability systems in place
Copy link to Figure 2.8. Eight in ten OECD countries have government-wide data interoperability systems in placeAvailability of a data interoperability system, 2025
Note: Data not available for Germany and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Box 2.7. Implementing data interoperability in Italy and Japan
Copy link to Box 2.7. Implementing data interoperability in Italy and JapanItaly’s National Digital Data Platform (PDND) enables the interoperability of information systems among public and private bodies, implementing the once-only principle. Institutions publish application programming interfaces (APIs) on the api.gov.it catalogue and authorise use based on tokens that create a traceable record of data exchanges. The platform currently connects over 9 000 entities, including central government bodies, subnational governments, universities and private actors. In practice, this means people can have personal pre-filled in forms and eligibility for benefits checked automatically, without needing to submit documents repeatedly.
Figure 2.9. Interoperability of Italian Public Administration
Copy link to Figure 2.9. Interoperability of Italian Public AdministrationJapan’s Digital Agency manages the Co-operation Network System (NWS) for Personal Information, which allows government institutions to exchange personal data associated with individual identification numbers. This means users can avoid submitting multiple documents – such as certificates of residence or tax records - when completing various administrative procedures. To protect privacy, access to the system is limited to public sector bodies. The system does not store personal information itself; it transmits specific data held separately by individual public organisations, keeping information decentralised.
2.5.2. Cross-border interoperability: Building the foundations for services that work across borders
Making digital systems work across national borders is significantly more complex than making them work within a single country. Within a country, government institutions typically operate under the same legal framework, follow the same governance rules and share institutional arrangements. Across borders, governments must align across different legal systems, regulatory requirements, and trust models even when they use similar technical standards or digital infrastructure. Technical interoperability alone is not sufficient without legal interoperability, making it essential to align data governance frameworks and engage in international regulatory cooperation to ensure data can flow securely across jurisdictions (OECD, 2023[33]). This makes cross-border interoperability harder to achieve and more sensitive to gaps in governance.
Common technical standards and protocols are a necessary starting point as they make systems technically compatible. But cross‑border interoperability ultimately depends on building a shared foundation of institutional trust, mutual recognition of each other’s systems, clear liability frameworks, and harmonised protections for privacy, security and personal data.
Digital identity is central to this effort. A trusted, reliable way of identifying and authenticating people and businesses across borders allows governments to exchange data in controlled, verifiable ways, supports the delivery of cross‑border services, and underpins emerging policy efforts such as the portability of entitlements, smoother cross-border mobility and international transactions.
Figure 2.10 illustrates the extent to which OECD Members and accession candidate countries have moved from domestic digital identity arrangements toward mechanisms that support cross-border recognition and use. These developments mark early but important steps, largely driven by EU policies to strengthen the cross-border operation of digital identity systems and wallets (Box 2.8). Countries with more mature domestic digital identity systems and clearer governance foundations tend to advance more rapidly, while those with more fragmented identity ecosystems face greater challenges in extending their systems beyond national boundaries. As digital identity matures, its cross‑border functionality will increasingly determine governments’ ability to deliver seamless services to people who live, work or move across borders.
Figure 2.10. Almost six out of ten OECD countries are providing cross-border digital identity, mostly in OECD-EU countries
Copy link to Figure 2.10. Almost six out of ten OECD countries are providing cross-border digital identity, mostly in OECD-EU countriesAvailability of access to public services using foreign digital identity solutions, 2023 and 2025
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Box 2.8. The EU's eIDAS 2.0 and the European Digital Identity Wallet
Copy link to Box 2.8. The EU's eIDAS 2.0 and the European Digital Identity WalletIn May 2024, the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/1183, known as eIDAS 2.0, establishing the most ambitious cross-border digital identity framework among OECD countries. The regulation requires all 27 EU member states to provide citizens, residents, and businesses with at least one European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet) by the end of 2026. The wallet will create a harmonised system where credentials issued in one country = such as driving license or professional qualification - are recognised and usable across all others. The regulation also addresses governance and accountability: member states bear responsibility for failure to comply with their obligations.
The EUDI Wallet goes beyond basic identity verification. It enables users to store and selectively share verified credentials, such as national identity data, driving licences, professional qualifications, health records, and educational diplomas, with both public and private service providers. Built on privacy-by-design principles, the wallet gives individuals control over what information they share and with whom.
Cross-border interoperability is central to the framework. The Architecture and Reference Framework (ARF) establishes common protocols, data formats, and security requirements to ensure wallets function seamlessly across member states. Between 2023 and 2025, four large scale pilots tested real-world cross-border use cases involving over 250 organisations across nearly every EU Member state plus Norway, Iceland, and Ukraine. In December 2025, the first large-scale compatibility testing between national wallet implementations confirmed that cross-border interoperability is technically achievable when common standards are rigorously applied.
Source: (OECD, 2024[8]; OECD, 2025[34]).
As interoperability scales and reliance on shared components grows, the choices governments make about resilience and sustainability – including how they use cloud technologies and open-source software – become increasingly important for continuity, security and the ability to maintain shared infrastructure over time.
2.6. Resilience and sustainability: Cloud technologies and open-source software
Copy link to 2.6. Resilience and sustainability: Cloud technologies and open-source softwareAs governments rely more heavily on shared digital systems, the choices they make about how those systems are developed, hosted, maintained and updated become increasingly important. Two enablers stand out: cloud technologies and open-source software. Both can strengthen the reliability, flexibility and long-term sustainability of digital government, The value they create depends on the governance choices that surround them: clear rules, sustained funding, the right skills and well-defined responsibilities for maintenance and security.
2.6.1. Cloud technologies: A foundation for reliable and adaptable government
Cloud technologies refer to the delivery of computing resources – such as storage, processing power and software – over a network, on demand. Rathen than owning and running all the underlying infrastructure themselves, organisations can access what they need when they need it, and scale up or down as requirements change.
For governments, cloud technologies have become important tools for making digital services more reliable and adaptable. They provide the capacity to handle surges in demand – for example when large numbers of people access a service at the same time – and support fast recovery when systems go down. Cloud technologies also make it easier to introduce new capabilities, update services and maintain consistent security standards across a complex landscape of government systems. These benefits apply in normal operations as much as in exceptional circumstances: a government that can scale services quickly, recover from failures efficiently and update systems with fit-for-purpose procurement processes is better placed to serve people reliably day to day, not only in crisis.
As of 2024, all OECD countries surveyed except Sweden report a strategy to promote cloud technologies adoption in the public sector. The objectives behind these strategies show strong convergence (Figure 2.11). Ensuring robust, secure and continuously available digital infrastructure is the most consistently cited priority, reflecting the central role of cloud technologies in strengthening operational continuity and secure data storage. Governments also highlight the importance of secure data sharing, as cloud environments can support shared platforms and reusable components – foundations for scaling public infrastructure across government institutions.
Cloud technologies’ contribution to reliable service delivery is visible across a range of situations. During the COVID‑19 pandemic, digital government proved crucial to maintaining continuity of public sector operations and the provision of essential services to individuals and businesses. Similarly, cloud‑based back-up and recovery environment allow governments to restore services more quickly after outages or cyber incidents, reducing disruption for users and public servants alike.
Countries also increasingly use cloud computing to modernise ageing IT systems and reduce fragmentation. This includes developing approaches that allow governments to balance scalability of cloud technologies with requirements around data storage location, security and strategic autonomy – sometimes referred to as sovereign cloud models. At the same time, cloud strategies aimed to improve efficiency: reducing operational costs, enabling reuse of common components, and supporting more responsive services. Cloud technologies are therefore no longer treated as a purely technical upgrade but as a strategic instrument to prepare public administrations for more data‑intensive, AI‑enabled and integrated service delivery.
Figure 2.11. Security and resilience are the most prevalent reasons OECD countries are adopting cloud technologies in government
Copy link to Figure 2.11. Security and resilience are the most prevalent reasons OECD countries are adopting cloud technologies in governmentPercentage of OECD countries reporting selected objectives for public cloud infrastructure strategies, 2023 and 2025
Note: Data not included for Germany, Sweden or the United States.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Most OECD countries provide shared cloud infrastructure that can be reused across the public sector, signalling a shift toward more centralised and scalable digital foundations. Data from the 2025 DGI shows extensive coverage: 83% of OECD countries (30 out of 36) have shared cloud storage initiatives, 86% (31 countries) provide shared cloud computing environments and hosting services. Around two‑thirds of OECD accession candidate countries report similar capabilities. This marks a clear movement away from agency‑specific cloud projects and toward common, reusable services that can support government‑wide modernisation, bring greater consistency to security and operations, and form a more resilient digital public infrastructure.
However, countries vary in how far cloud strategies drive deeper structural change. While many governments use cloud computing to modernise and stabilise existing systems – improving availability, performance and cost‑efficiency – fewer explicitly use it to address the fragmentation of legacy technology or to open up markets to a wider range of suppliers, including smaller technology companies. These more ambitious objectives require technical migration and changes to governance, procurement models, workforce capabilities and budgeting practices. The uneven emphasis on these goals suggests that many governments view cloud adoption primarily as an incremental improvement rather than an opportunity to fundamentally redesign the architecture and long-term sustainability of their digital systems.
This reinforces the need to treat security, risk management and operational continuity as core elements of cloud governance, not as separate concerns to be manged elsewhere. As more services depend on shared cloud infrastructure, governments face new risks from concentration – too many critical functions depending on too few systems or suppliers. They need clear accountability for security, incident response and continuity across all participating organisations. Many governments are currently running a mixture of cloud and traditional on-site systems - a common transitional state that can introduce uneven security standards and complex dependencies if not actively managed. Gradually reducing reliance on outdated systems while maintaining operational stability is essential to ensure that cloud adoption strengthens rather than inadvertently weakens overall digital resilience.
2.6.2. Open-source software: Growing adoption, but governance determines the benefits
Open-source software (OSS) refers to software whose underlying code is publicly available for anyone to inspect, use, modify and share, subject to certain conditions. Unlike proprietary software, open-source software can be distributed, adapted, re-used and built upon by anyone with the skills to do so.
For governments, OSS offers several potential advantages. It can reduce dependence on single suppliers, making it easier to switch providers or bring capabilities in-house. It supports interoperability by enabling systems to be built on shared, openly documented standards. It improves the ability to verify the security and reliability of critical systems, since the underlying code can be independently inspected. It also enables reuse of software components across sectors and across borders, reducing duplications and lowering costs (see Box 2.9).
However, realising these benefits requires sound governance. Adopting open-source software without a plan for maintaining it, funding it sustainably and assigning clear responsibility for security can create as many problems as it solves. Governments need clear procurement guidance, staff with the right technical skills, reliable funding for ongoing maintenance, defined responsibilities for keeping code secure and policies that encourage collaboration across organisations. Without these enablers, OSS risks being adopted as a cost-cutting measure without the long-term stewardship needed to make it a genuine strength.
Box 2.9. Cross-border collaboration through open-source software
Copy link to Box 2.9. Cross-border collaboration through open-source softwareOpen‑source software can lower barriers to cross‑border collaboration by making code transparent, in line with standards, openly documented and free from dependency on closed platforms.
France, Germany, and the Netherlands are co‑developing a digital workplace for civil servants, implemented nationally as LaSuite (France), openDesk (Germany) and Mijn Bureau (The Netherlands). The three countries share development roadmaps, reuse each other’s code and use open communication protocols to ensure secure, compatible tools across all three implementations.
Governance is distributed: in France, the Interministerial Digital Directorate (DINUM) steers development; in Germany, the Centre for Digital Sovereignty (ZenDiS) manages the program under a federal sovereign workplace initiative; in the Netherlands, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (MinBZK) co-ordinates with local authorities including the City of Amsterdam.
This collaboration demonstrates how open-source approaches can support both national digital sovereignty and cross-border reuse, reducing costs and increasing transparency without requiring countries to adopt identical systems.
Figure 2.12. Initiatives to promote the adoption of use of open-source technologies in government have expanded significantly across OECD countries
Copy link to Figure 2.12. Initiatives to promote the adoption of use of open-source technologies in government have expanded significantly across OECD countriesPercentage of OECD countries reporting selected policies and practices related to open source, 2023 and 2025
Note: Covers only central/federal government level. Data not available for Germany or the United States.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Data from the 2025 DGI shows increased prioritisation of OSS across OECD governments. In 2025, 28 out of 36 (78%) OECD countries reported a national or federal government policy to promote the use of open-source software, an increase from 67% in 2023. These policies are often complemented by guidance for public bodies on using open-source to develop their own systems and services: 31 out of 36 (86%) OECD countries reported such guidelines in 2025, up from 67% in 2023. Other measures are also becoming more common, including central repositories of open-source software available for government use, formal arrangements for government teams to contribute to OSS projects, and requirements to publish code publicly (Figure 2.12).
Box 2.10. Open-Source Programme Offices in the Netherlands and Czechia
Copy link to Box 2.10. Open-Source Programme Offices in the Netherlands and CzechiaOpen-Source Programme Offices (OSPO) are teams involved in the co-ordination of efforts around open-source software. Setting up OSPOs in governments can steer governance, development of software, stakeholder engagement and international co-operation.
The Netherlands established an OSPO at the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations in 2023, with a mandate to advance the government’s “open, unless” policy and improve transparency, security and efficiency. The office curates and publishes major government open-source projects including the NL Wallet, the public Algorithm Register, and the Mijn Bureau office suite developed jointly with France and Germany. It also works to remove internal barriers to open-source adoption and engages with the wider community through a dedicated platform and public online presence.
Czechia launched its national OSPO in 2024 to organise and co-ordinate open-source use across public administration and foster collaboration between the public sector and academia. Its secretariat, hosted by the Open Cities association, provides technical, legal and methodological support for open and modular digital solutions at the local government levels. The national Open Code Portal code.gov.cz aggregates and shares public-sector projects. Security guidance is provided jointly by the National Cyber and Information Security Office and the Ministry of the Interior through non‑binding recommendations for secure, open-source development in public administration.
Annex 2.A. Additional tables with country data
Copy link to Annex 2.A. Additional tables with country dataAnnex Table 2.A.1. Availability of digital public infrastructure
Copy link to Annex Table 2.A.1. Availability of digital public infrastructure|
Country |
Digital post1 |
Digital Notifications |
Digital payments |
Data sharing |
Single digital gateway |
Digital identity providing access to +50% of services |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
|
|
Australia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
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|
Austria |
● |
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|
Belgium |
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|
Canada |
○ |
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○ |
○ |
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○ |
● |
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|
Chile |
○ |
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Colombia |
○ |
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Costa Rica |
○ |
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|
Czechia |
● |
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Denmark |
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Estonia |
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○ |
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Finland |
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France |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
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●2 |
● |
● |
● |
● |
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Greece |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
|
Hungary |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
|
Iceland |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Ireland |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
|
Israel |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Italy |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
|
Japan |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
|
Korea |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Latvia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Lithuania |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Luxembourg |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Mexico |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Netherlands |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
|
New Zealand |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|
Norway |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Poland |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
|
Portugal |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Slovak Republic |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
|
Slovenia |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Spain |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
●2 |
|
Sweden |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
|
Switzerland |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
|
Türkiye |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
United Kingdom |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
●2 |
● |
● |
|
OECD Total |
||||||||||||
|
● Yes |
19 |
27 |
18 |
29 |
18 |
24 |
28 |
30 |
28 |
31 |
24 |
25 |
|
○ No |
14 |
9 |
15 |
7 |
15 |
12 |
5 |
6 |
5 |
5 |
9 |
11 |
|
No Information |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
||||||
|
Argentina |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
|
Brazil |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Bulgaria |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
|
Croatia |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Indonesia |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
|
Peru |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Romania |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Thailand |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
Note: Single digital gateway: availability of a catalogue of services accessible to users. Data sharing: availability of a data interoperability system. Digital identity: at least 50% of national online public services can be accessed through a digital identity solution with two-factor authentication. 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
1. Some countries, including France, offer digital post through multiple different systems.
2. Data were updated following a request from the country after the publication of the 2025 DGI; therefore, these changes are not reflected in the 2025 DGI results.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Annex Table 2.A.2. Authentication methods for digital identity solutions
Copy link to Annex Table 2.A.2. Authentication methods for digital identity solutionsAvailability for methods for authentication exist among the current digital identity solutions to access public services
|
Country |
Username and password |
Smartcard |
Digital certificate file |
SMS 2FA |
Email 2FA |
App 2FA |
Other |
||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
||||||
|
Australia |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
|||||
|
Austria |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Belgium |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Canada |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Chile |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
|||||
|
Colombia |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Costa Rica |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
|||||
|
Czechia |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|||||
|
Denmark |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|||||
|
Estonia |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
|||||
|
Finland |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|||||
|
France |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
|||||
|
Greece |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
|||||
|
Hungary |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|||||
|
Iceland |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Ireland |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
|||||
|
Israel |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Italy |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Japan |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Korea |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Latvia |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Lithuania |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Luxembourg |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
|||||
|
Mexico |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
|||||
|
Netherlands |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
|||||
|
New Zealand |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Norway |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Poland |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Portugal |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Slovak Republic |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
|||||
|
Slovenia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Spain |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Sweden |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Switzerland |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
|||||
|
Türkiye |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
|||||
|
United Kingdom |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
OECD Total |
|||||||||||||||||||
|
● Yes |
22 |
27 |
18 |
24 |
18 |
23 |
15 |
17 |
11 |
12 |
22 |
26 |
10 |
14 |
|||||
|
○ No |
11 |
9 |
15 |
12 |
15 |
13 |
18 |
19 |
22 |
24 |
11 |
10 |
23 |
22 |
|||||
|
No Information |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
|||||
|
Argentina |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
|||||
|
Brazil |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Bulgaria |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
|||||
|
Croatia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Indonesia |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
|||||
|
Peru |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Romania |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|||||
|
Thailand |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
|||||
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Annex Table 2.A.3. Actors covered as service providers by the National Digital Identity Strategy
Copy link to Annex Table 2.A.3. Actors covered as service providers by the National Digital Identity StrategyTypes of actors covered in the [National Digital Identity Strategy or equivalent] following their role as service providers (i.e. actors in need of verifying the identity of natural and legal persons claiming access to their service)
|
Country |
Central/federal government |
Subnational government |
Know-your-customer-regulated actors |
Private sector organisations with no regulated obligations |
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
|
|
Australia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Austria |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Belgium |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|
Canada |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
|
Chile |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
|
Colombia |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
|
Costa Rica |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|
Czechia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Denmark |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Estonia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Finland |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
France |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Greece |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
|
Hungary |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
|
Iceland |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Ireland |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
|
Israel |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
|
Italy |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Japan |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Korea |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Latvia |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
|
Lithuania |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Luxembourg |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Mexico |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
|
Netherlands |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|
New Zealand |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
|
Norway |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Poland |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Portugal |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
|
Slovak Republic |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
|
Slovenia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|
Spain |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
|
Sweden |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
|
Switzerland |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
|
Türkiye |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
|
United Kingdom |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
OECD Total |
||||||||
|
● Yes |
27 |
32 |
21 |
27 |
18 |
23 |
9 |
16 |
|
○ No |
0 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
9 |
10 |
18 |
18 |
|
No Information |
9 |
3 |
9 |
3 |
9 |
3 |
9 |
2 |
|
Argentina |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
|
Brazil |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|
Bulgaria |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Croatia |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
|
Indonesia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
|
Peru |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Romania |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Thailand |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. In 2025, Bulgaria, Canada, Luxembourg, Peru, Romania and Türkiye did not report the existence of a National Digital Identity Strategy or equivalent. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. In 2023, Canada, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru, Portugal and Romania did not report the existence of a National Digital Identity Strategy or equivalent. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
Annex Table 2.A.4. Data management standards or guidelines for public servants
Copy link to Annex Table 2.A.4. Data management standards or guidelines for public servantsAvailability of types of data management standards or guidelines exist at the central/federal government level
|
Country |
Metadata management |
Data quality assessments |
Data inventories |
Data anonymisation |
Data access and sharing arrangements between institutions |
Sharing arrangements with external data providers |
Compliance with data protection regulations |
Compliance with security regulations |
||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
2023 |
2025 |
|||
|
Australia |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Austria |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
||
|
Belgium |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Canada |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
●1 |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Chile |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Colombia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Costa Rica |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
||
|
Czechia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Denmark |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Estonia |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Finland |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
France |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Greece |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
||
|
Hungary |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Iceland |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Ireland |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Israel |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Italy |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Japan |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Korea |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Latvia |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
||
|
Lithuania |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Luxembourg |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Mexico |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Netherlands |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
New Zealand |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Norway |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Poland |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
||
|
Portugal |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
||
|
Slovak Republic |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
||
|
Slovenia |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Spain |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Sweden |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Switzerland |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
||
|
Türkiye |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
United Kingdom |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
OECD Total |
||||||||||||||||||
|
● Yes |
23 |
33 |
15 |
23 |
21 |
28 |
16 |
26 |
22 |
30 |
14 |
27 |
26 |
34 |
19 |
31 |
||
|
○ No |
10 |
3 |
18 |
13 |
12 |
8 |
17 |
10 |
11 |
6 |
19 |
9 |
7 |
2 |
14 |
5 |
||
|
No Information |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
||
|
Argentina |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Brazil |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Bulgaria |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
○ |
○ |
● |
○ |
● |
||
|
Croatia |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
||
|
Indonesia |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
||
|
Peru |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
● |
○ |
○ |
● |
● |
● |
● |
||
|
Romania |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
||
|
Thailand |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
○ |
N/A |
● |
N/A |
● |
||
Note: 2025 data not available for Germany and the United States. 2023 data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States. 2025 data for Indonesia and Thailand cover the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023. Data anonymisation does not consider broader de-identification guidance or standards.
1. Data were updated following a request from the country after the publication of the 2025 DGI; therefore, these changes are not reflected in the 2025 DGI results. TBS (Canada) Privacy Implementation Notices provide federal guidance related to privacy-preserving treatment of data and identifiability reduction, including de-identification, disclosure-risk mitigation, and re-identification risk management.
Source: OECD (2025) Survey on Digital Government 3.0.
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