Building More Resilient Cross‑border Regions

2. Architecture of cross-border governance bodies

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the first dimension of the OECD Cross-border Governance Framework: Cross-border governance architecture.

It starts by exploring the benefits of institutionalising cross-border co-operation and analyses the different purposes for which cross-border governance bodies can be established. Then, the chapter examines differences in the architecture of cross-border governance bodies, focusing for example on their membership bases, internal governing bodies and the ways in which non-governmental actors can support cross-border decision making. Finally, this chapter provides considerations for regional, national and international policy makers on how to design and reinforce the architecture of cross-border governance bodies so they can deliver on shared needs.

Introduction

Cross-border regions in the European Union (EU) often face a range of barriers (e.g. legal, administrative, cultural, linguistic) to their development, which can require cross-border actors, such as subnational governments, to establish formal governance arrangements.

While establishing formal governance structures is not essential for cross-border co-operation, it can have significant advantages. It enables actors on both sides of a border to align objectives and co-ordinate activities more effectively, facilitating the achievement of shared goals. Additionally, a formal structure can streamline decision-making procedures and clearly define roles, responsibilities, and operational processes. Such arrangements can foster trust and stability in co-operation, even in times of political change. The creation of a formal governance architecture can also provide a framework for mobilising financial resources.

Cross-border governance arrangements can support a variety of objectives, from fostering a shared cross-border identity and contributing to holistic cross-border development, to delivering essential public services. They can also help build trust between public bodies and non-governmental actors by increasing exchange, enhancing social capital, and fostering a sense of belonging.

The architecture of cross-border governance bodies can vary significantly, including in terms of the type of internal governing bodies established and decision-making processes; this flexibility enables them to adapt to very specific circumstances. For instance, in some cases, EU cross-border partners simply establish the decision-making bodies, such as a General Assembly, that are required under relevant EU regulations. In others, a wide range of deliberative and decision-making bodies have been created, including technical working groups, to facilitate the co-development of cross-border initiatives by public and non-governmental actors.

For cross-border governance bodies to deliver on their objectives, policy makers need to be able to navigate a series of common challenges related to the institutional architecture. These include securing the participation of the public actors with the necessary competences and resources to help address cross-border challenges, and establishing a fair distribution of voting rights among founding members. Other common challenges include ensuring spaces for structured dialogue with non-governmental actors, and designing the cross-border governance architecture in a manner that permits adaptability as needs or circumstances shift.

This chapter focuses on the first dimension of the OECD Cross-Border Governance Framework: Establishing and reinforcing a cross-border governance architecture. It consists of two sections. The first section analyses the variety of purposes for which cross-border governance bodies can be established, building on the experiences of cross-border governance bodies established by the five pilot regions. The second section looks at how cross-border governance bodies can differ, focusing on issues such as internal governing bodies, membership base, and decision-making mechanisms. Both sections include a range of recommendations for national and subnational policy makers interested in establishing or reinforcing robust and adaptable cross-border governance bodies.

Box 2.1. Recommendations for establishing or reinforcing effective cross-border governance bodies

To enable cross-border governance bodies to fully achieve their goals, it is essential that they:

• Secure the formal participation of relevant public institutions (at the local, regional, and/or national levels) who have the competencies and resources (e.g. human and financial) necessary to accomplish the body’s objectives.

To fully operationalise the internal governing structures (e.g. General Assembly, Advisory Council) of cross-border governance bodies, founding partners should ensure that:

• The body has the necessary human and financial resources to support these structures (e.g. to organise meetings, prepare agendas, support follow-up actions).

• Each internal component in the governance structure has a clear, well-defined purpose and set of responsibilities that are linked with the governance body’s strategic objectives (e.g. draft, review or approve activity plans, budgets, project proposals).

To achieve a functional balance between political direction and operational autonomy necessary for sustaining member engagement and operational stability, cross-border governance bodies should:

• Consider adopting guidelines requiring newly-elected Presidents to set priorities—aligned with the body’s strategic objectives—and propose actions for cross-border initiatives during their term. This can help shore up political commitment to cross-border action.

• Ensure that the body’s technical team is adequately staffed and equipped with the necessary skills and expertise to manage day-to-day operations and support key functions (e.g. budget preparation, strategic planning, co-ordination with diverse public institutions).

• Arrange for core staff (e.g. Director) to be employed and funded by the cross-border governance body itself, and not by individual members, to avoid dependence on the financial circumstances and decisions of members.

To ensure a balanced and inclusive rotation of the presidency in cross-border governance bodies, such bodies could consider:

• Adopting guidelines that call for rotation between and within national delegations—especially when the governance bodies include government entities positioned in different territorial-administrative tiers (e.g. municipality vs. region). Such arrangements can bolster the interest of a broad group of formal members in the work and strategic direction of the cross-border body.

To ensure that the work of cross-border governance bodies meets the needs of local communities and builds their ownership for cross-border action, such bodies should:

• Consider establishing formal spaces for non-governmental actors to participate in cross-border decision making. For example, bodies could pilot a multi-actor working group that tracks engagement levels and outcomes over time to guide future initiatives for broader non-governmental participation.

To promote fair, balanced, and transparent decision-making processes in cross-border governance bodies, these bodies should:

• Carefully manage the distribution of votes and seats among formal members—across and within national delegations—to account for asymmetries in delegation composition, population, and territory size.

• Periodically review vote and seat distribution to allow for adjustments as necessary (e.g. when new members join).

To ensure that cross-border governance bodies can continue to meet cross-border needs and provide value to their members over time, they should periodically review their:

• Objectives, to confirm they remain relevant and aligned with the needs and priorities of members;

• Membership base, to assess whether changes are necessary, for instance, due to shifts in the multi-level governance arrangements of co-operating countries;

• Internal governance structures, to identify and address any areas that may not be performing effectively.

Source: Author’s elaboration.

Why establish a cross-border governance body?

Cross-border regions grapple with multiple challenges such as limited socio-economic development and competitiveness, limited access to specific public services, and a need for shared management of natural resources (e.g. rivers). To help address these challenges, various governance mechanisms can be employed to foster more effective co-ordination and co-operation across borders. For example, neighbouring countries can adopt formal agreements to address challenges in specific sectors. In 2007, the governments of France and Belgium signed a co-operation agreement to allow emergency medical services from one country to respond in the other when their intervention is the quickest solution to providing patient care (France-Belgian Health Observatory, n.d.[1]).

Another approach is to organise periodic meetings among relevant stakeholders at national, regional, and local levels, which facilitates structured dialogue and exchange on specific cross-border challenges and priorities. However, such meetings may face limitations. For instance, gatherings may lack the mechanisms needed to implement and monitor concrete actions, which can impede the sustained impact of cross-border dialogue and resulting initiatives. Furthermore, they are vulnerable to political changes, particularly when they are not based on formal agreements.

Setting up formal cross-border governance bodies is another option to address shared needs. Establishing such bodies brings numerous benefits (Box 2.2). For instance, cross-border governance bodies can provide a shared framework for aligning goals and co-ordinating actions, streamlining decision-making processes, and pooling human and financial resources for cross-border action. These benefits illustrate why, over the past two decades, many cross-border regions in the EU have established formal cross-border governance bodies, such as European Groupings of Territorial Co-operation (EGTC)1.

Box 2.2. The potential benefits of establishing formal cross-border governance bodies

Formalising cross-border co-operation by establishing a dedicated governance body can have a series of benefits, including:

• Providing a shared framework to help actors on both sides of a border align their goals and priorities, and co-ordinate implementation efforts, thus enhancing the likelihood of meeting common objectives.

• Enabling more streamlined, transparent, and efficient resolution to cross-border challenges by establishing protocols for decision making. This clarity can help reduce potential conflicts or delays in decision making and implementation.

• Mobilising or pooling resources (e.g. funding, staff, expertise) dedicated to cross-border action.

• Ensuring consistent, reliable co-operation across borders and continuity in partnerships, even amidst political changes, by delineating roles and responsibilities among actors.

• Helping build trust among stakeholders and enabling the transparent assessment of cross-border initiatives through accountability and clear reporting procedures.

Source: Author’s elaboration.

Decisions on whether and how to establish cross-border governance bodies depend, to a large extent, on the cross-border co-operation objectives of all partners. This will influence which governmental actors to involve and which internal governing bodies to set up. The pilot regions studied clearly reveal that there are many good reasons for setting up a cross-border governance body.

A cross-border governance body’s scope and purpose directly influences decisions made regarding its architecture. For instance, while a body with a broad, multi-sectoral focus may require a more elaborate governance structure, involving a range of public and non-governmental actors, an entity focused on one specific issue may be leaner in its decision-making apparatus.

Different motivations for formalising cross-border co-operation

Different reasons for establishing cross-border governance bodies can be identified. These include formalising and strengthening existing co-operation initiatives within a cross-border region; mobilising financial support for cross-border initiatives; and addressing specific cross-border needs such as access to essential public services by cross-border residents. The first reason identified above appears to be the most common motivation for establishing a cross-border body.

Many cross-border governance bodies are established to strengthen existing co-operation initiatives among public and non-governmental actors within a cross-border region. Rather than forming around a single pressing issue, these bodies emerge from longstanding collaborations and shared experiences among founding partners, such as local governments and civil society organisations. This history of collaboration can make partners more amenable to exploring a wide range of potential areas for cross-border action. As a result, these governance bodies are often established with deliberately broad objectives, such as promoting socio-economic development. Moreover, these objectives typically identify a wide range of focus areas for cross-border co-operation, including culture, housing, mobility, education, and healthcare. The Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, EGTC Alzette Belval, and EGTC Rio Minho are particularly salient examples of successful collaboration initiatives (Box 2.3).

Box 2.3. Examples of cross-border governance bodies with a broad mandate

The three following cross-border governance bodies were created to deepen existing co-operation efforts. Each pursues broad objectives, such as fostering territorial cohesion in the cross-border region.

Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai

The EGTC, established in 2008, builds on cross-border co-operation in the Franco-Belgian border region dating back to 1991, when local actors from Belgium and France began collaborating on the Blue Park project. This initiative was launched to promote a shared, cross-border space defined by the region’s many waterways, to connect communities and to offer opportunities for leisure, culture, tourism and sustainable economic development. To deepen the existing collaboration, public actors on both sides of the border created the Eurometropole.

EGTC Rio Minho

The EGTC was established in 2018 by subnational governments in Portugal and Spain to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of cross-border initiatives led by different Eurocities. The Eurocities support the promotion of cross-border cultural and social exchanges among border municipalities located on the Minho river. The EGTC has several objectives, which include supporting the socio-economic development and cohesion of the Rio Minho region, promoting and protecting its cultural and natural heritage, and promoting the Rio Minho cross-border tourism brand.

EGTC Alzette Belval

The creation of the EGTC Alzette Belval in 2013, brought together subnational and national governments from France and Luxembourg, following a decade-long co-operation among cross-border communities through municipal cross-border committees. The creation of the EGTC was spurred by urban development projects initiated on the French and Luxembourgian sides of the border. The establishment of the EGTC provided a single body with legal personality and the financial autonomy necessary to support the joint efforts. The EGTC seeks to enhance the territory’s economic cohesion and attractiveness, and support co-operation in numerous sectors, including culture, mobility, employment, housing, environment, education, and healthcare.

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai: (Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, 2021[2]; OECD, 2023[3]); EGTC Rio Minho: (OECD, 2023[3]); EGTC Alzette Belval: (La MOT, n.d.[4]; OECD, 2023[3]).

The broad objectives and sectoral focus of the Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, EGTC Rio Minho and EGTC Alzette Belval provides them with the flexibility to pursue a range of opportunities to support cross-border development, subject to various local and regional needs. However, their broad mandate also presents a number of challenges. For instance, it can require co-ordinating with a wide range of stakeholders across multiple sectors, which can slow decision making and implementation. It can also potentially dilute the cross-border focus. It is also difficult to sustain political commitment and ensure the continuous flow of the resources necessary to deliver results across a range of sectors. For instance, in recent years, the Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai has struggled to maintain political interest in its work (see Chapter 5) and avoid a fragmentation of efforts across a wide range of sectors (e.g. education, water management, language, culture) (OECD, 2023[5]).

In some cases there are more specific reasons for establishing a cross-border governance body with a broad focus. For instance, in 2023, Polish and Lithuanian local governments created the EGTC Nemunas-Niemen (Box 2.4). Although its overarching mission is to enhance socio-economic cohesion and resilience, its functional purpose is to provide local and regional actors with a mechanism for mobilising and managing funding for cross-border projects (EGTC Nemunas-Niemen, 2023[6]; OECD, 2023[3]).

Such a funding-focused approach, however, carries several risks. For instance, it can encourage ‘fund-chasing’, where efforts are directed towards applying to funding calls whose focus and scope may not always be aligned with actual needs of the border region. Additionally, a sharp focus on external funding may lead partners to overlook opportunities for enhanced co-operation—such as promoting joint tourism initiatives or facilitating exchange and dialogue on disaster-risk management—that do not require mobilising such resources.

Box 2.4. Establishment of the EGTC Nemunas-Niemen

Co-operation along the Lithuanian-Polish border dates back to 1997, when local actors from Belarus, Lithuania and Poland established the Cross-Border Union Euroregion Niemen-Nemunas-Hemah. Local actors from the Russian Kaliningrad region later joined. Polish and Lithuanian counterparts suspended their participation in the organisation in March 2022, in response to Russia’s large-scale war of aggression against Ukraine. In 2023, Polish and Lithuanian local governments revived their collaboration by creating the EGTC Nemunas-Niemen.

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on (La MOT, 2018[7]; EGTC Nemunas-Niemen, 2023[6]; OECD, 2023[3]).

Finally, there are also examples of cross-border governance bodies created to address a very specific issue, such as improving access to a particular public service. These bodies often have narrowly defined objectives, focusing on just one sector. A highly specific mandate can offer cross-border governance clear benefits. For instance, it allows for targeted resource allocation and streamlined governance, tailored to meet specific local needs. Furthermore, it can facilitate quicker decision-making processes by concentrating on a single set of priorities. The focused structure can also help build specialised expertise within the governance body, which ultimately enhances the overall quality of service delivery.

One case that exemplifies this approach is the EGTC Cerdanya Hospital, whose creation was driven by the need to improve healthcare access in the Cerdanya and Capcir cross-border region along the French-Spanish border (EGTC Cerdanya Hospital, 2014[8]). Healthcare centre closures had put the region at risk of becoming a healthcare "desert", particularly on the French side, and reducing its appeal as a place to live (OECD, 2023[5]). In response, the Catalan, Spanish, and French administrations formally agreed to establish a hospital to be governed under the EGTC framework, enabling the co-ordination of healthcare services across both countries and pooling of financial resources.

The breadth of co-operation objectives influences the architecture of cross-border governance bodies

Establishing a clear, shared understanding among founding partners about the need to formalise cross-border co-operation is essential, whether the aim is to foster socio-economic development or deliver a specific service across the entire region. How broad or specific the overall objective of a cross-border governance body is and the number of policy sectors it should focus on influences core decisions on the design of its architecture. For instance, its focus can:

• Help determine which levels of government and which specific public bodies need to be involved, for example because they have the relevant competences and resources to help address critical cross-border challenges;

• Guide decisions on the engagement with non-governmental actors, assessing how their participation can add value;

• Help define the territorial scope of co-operation, whether limited to a few border communities or encompassing a larger border area;

• Inform the establishment of internal governance mechanisms, such as dedicated technical teams to co-ordinate cross-border initiatives effectively;

• Help identify the type of actions that are needed to carry out the mandate and, in so doing, highlight which resources (e.g. political support, funding, and skills) are needed to ensure sustained operational success.

Establishing and reinforcing the architecture of cross-border governance bodies

Once the purpose for institutionalising cross-border governance has been defined, policy makers need to design an appropriate governance architecture. This involves selecting the type of cross-border governance body to establish, determining which public bodies and non-governmental actors to involve, organising decision-making structures, and setting up essential internal governing bodies.

Almost regardless of the governance structure selected, cross-border bodies will need to navigate a set of potential imbalances. These imbalances may arise from differences in: government or administrative structures; cultural norms linked to community engagement and participation; as well as organisation and operations of technical support teams. Cross-border governance bodies will always—or almost always—face two core challenges:

1. Ensuring the participation of relevant public actors. This entails involving actors with the competences and financial resources needed to help accomplish the body’s overall objective. It also requires balancing the representation of public bodies from co-operating countries to foster an equitable distribution of resources and potential benefits of co-operation.

2. Establishing and operationalising internal governing bodies and decision-making processes. This includes, for example, achieving balanced representation of members through fair vote distribution, and creating formal spaces for engagement with non-governmental actors. It also involves striking the right balance between high-level political guidance and operational autonomy, as well as conducting periodic reviews of internal structures to maintain their effectiveness over time.

Ensuring the participation of relevant public actors

The effectiveness of cross-border co-operation in any transboundary area depends, to a large extent, on the government actors involved, their respective tasks, and the resources (e.g. financial and human) they can mobilise to address shared priorities. In some cases, cross-border governance bodies involve both national and subnational governments, others include only subnational governments as members. This will affect how they operate, how internal governance bodies communicate, and in the end, the scope of action that can be carried out to meet overall objectives. The resulting dynamic brings a set of specific benefits and challenges.

The participation of different levels of government can present cross-border governance bodies with challenges and opportunities

Determining which government bodies to involve in a cross-border governance body is relatively straightforward when the overall objective is specific and limited to a single sector. This is because the entities with the relevant competencies and resources to implement cross-border actions within that sector are typically more limited and clearly defined. For example, the EGTC Cerdanya Hospital was founded by French and Catalan public health institutions, including the French Ministry of Health and the Catalan Department of Health (Annex Table 2.A.1) (EGTC Cerdanya Hospital, 2014[8]). The inclusion of only those authorities with a mandate in public healthcare planning streamlines decision making (OECD, 2023[5]).

The question of which actor to involve and at which levels of government is much harder when the cross-border governance body is striving for broader objectives that link to a wide range of sectors. Such bodies typically include representatives from various levels of government—local, regional, and national—as founding members. The EGTC Alzette Belval (Annex Table 2.A.2.) and Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai (Annex Table 2.A.3.) provide examples of cross-border governance bodies involving multiple levels of government. Both organisations bring together national government representatives, as well as representatives from all levels of subnational government in the co-operating countries.

Cross-border governance bodies with a broad membership base are, generally speaking, easier to co-ordinate in terms of economic development, infrastructure and cultural exchange, which is particularly important as sectoral responsibilities in these areas often vary between co-operating countries. For instance, while implementing a cross-border initiative related to tourism is the exclusive competence of regional-level governments in Belgium, the same decision may require input from multiple levels of government (e.g. departments and municipalities) in France (OECD/UCLG, 2022[9]; OECD/UCLG, 2022[10]).

Second, the participation of multiple levels of government can bring together public stakeholders with a wide range of competences when it comes time to design and deliver cross-border action. Incorporating diverse perspectives during the design and implementation phases can help avoid overlap with existing national and subnational policies and programmes, and improve the well-being of residents in the region (OECD, 2023[5]).

Third, a wide range of national and subnational governments involved can lobby and network within their level of government to support cross-border initiatives from their inception. Such efforts could, for example, help encourage national and regional governments to develop and adopt supportive laws, legislation, or regulations, or mobilise resources for specific projects.

Fourth, the involvement of different levels of government can help cross-border governance bodies bring local issues to the attention of higher-level authorities (OECD, 2023[5]). This can be particularly important when local border challenges can only be resolved with the input of higher levels of government with the relevant competences and financial resources to do so. This is the case in the border region between France and Luxembourg, where congestion, pollution and funding for essential public services are among the region’s top cross-border challenges (Box 2.5). These challenges often cannot be addressed by local governments alone and require support (e.g. regulatory, financial) from regional and national levels of government. Fifth and finally, the participation of different levels of government from co-operating countries can also help regional and national government bodies identify local initiatives that may be adapted to serve other border regions of the co-operating countries.

Box 2.5. Economic trends driving co-operation in the France-Luxembourg cross-border region

For most of the 20^th century, economic development in the Luxembourg and French border region was largely driven by steel production. However, in response to the decline of the steel and iron producing industries, starting in the 1970s, Luxembourg pushed to diversify its economy by creating a fiscally advantageous environment, among other developments. This resulted in sharp economic gains, particularly compared to the French border region. While GDP in Lorraine (TL2), France increased by 44% between 2000 and 2022 (from EUR 45.7 to 65.8 billion), that of Luxembourg rose by 237% (from EUR 23 to 77.5 billion). By 2021, the average GDP per capita (PPS) in Luxemburg was 3.5 times higher than in Lorraine (90 900 vs. 25 900, respectively).

Luxembourg’s strong economic growth, relatively high wages and labour demand resulted in many jobs being performed by cross-border workers. In 2024, 44% of people working in Luxembourg resided in neighbouring countries, of which 54% (124 160) came from France. This has a series of important consequences. For instance:

• It caused significant traffic congestion between French and Luxembourgian border communities and increased CO₂ emissions from commuting.

• Housing costs on the French side of the border have risen due to the higher spending power of French cross-border workers and increasing demand from Luxembourg residents facing expensive housing in their own country.

Continued growth of Luxembourg’s economy is estimated to result in a doubling of cross-border workers between 2022 and 2050, potentially exacerbating the existing economic, environmental and social challenges faced by the cross-border region.

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on (EUROSTAT, 2024[11]; EUROSTAT, 2024[12]; OGBL, n.d.[13]; Fondation Idea, 2023[14]; OECD, 2023[5]; AGAPE, 2024[15]; AGURAM, 2024[16]).

Despite the many benefits of cross-border governance bodies involving institutions from multiple levels of government, there are also challenges involved. Typically, there are important differences in the territorial-administrative organisation and decentralisation arrangements among co-operating countries that could hinder effective cross-border co-operation. An example comes from the EGTC Alzette Belval.

With three levels of subnational government (regions, departments and municipalities), France has a more elaborate territorial-administrative structure than Luxembourg, which only has one subnational tier (municipalities). This difference can lead to longer decision-making processes in France, as more levels of government may need to be involved in, and sign off on, cross-border initiatives (e.g. design of a cross-border strategy or development of a project proposal) (OECD, 2023[5]). This requires the EGTC Alzette Belval and its partners to carefully manage expectations of their members regarding decision-making procedures on either side of the border. For instance, it is important for members to understand that the involvement of multiple layers of government in France can lead to slower processes and the need for more extensive co-ordination. This understanding is crucial for setting realistic timelines and ensuring effective co-ordination and co-operation among the two countries (OECD, 2023[5]).

Beyond managing the expectations of its members, the cross-border governance bodies also have to carefully sequence engagement with government bodies in co-operating countries when developing joint initiatives. This means that the EGTC Alzette Belval often engages first with French partners to reach a common position, or co-develop project proposals, before bringing in the Luxembourgian partners (OECD, 2024[17]). This practice can help avoid situations where Luxembourgian partners, who may be able to reach an agreement sooner than their French counterparts, experience delays. Such an approach can help minimise potential frustration about differences in the decision-making procedures between France and Luxembourg.

Governance bodies solely involving subnational governments may not be able to fully deliver on their mandate

There are also examples of cross-border governance bodies whose members only include subnational governments. This structure may reflect a desire to address local cross-border issues more directly and efficiently. The participation of only subnational governments, can have a number of benefits, including streamlined decision making and a focus on local solutions. A relevant example comes from the EGTC Rio Minho (Annex Table 2.A.4. ), which is composed solely of subnational governments (CIM Alto Minho, 2024[18]; Deputación Pontevedra, 2024[19]; OECD, 2023[5]). Interviews with local stakeholders indicated that having only local governments represented within the EGTC has made reaching agreements on cross-border initiatives (e.g. development of a sustainable mobility project) relatively straightforward (OECD, 2023[5]). This is likely because the Spanish and Portuguese members, as local governments, are able to easily identify shared challenges and develop practical, citizen-centred solutions.

Despite the ease of working only at the same tier of government, doing so can have significant drawbacks for cross-border governance and co-operation. For instance, again in the case of the EGTC Rio Minho, it has contributed to a limited understanding among national and regional-level actors of the challenges and priorities facing border municipalities within the cross-border region (OECD, 2023[5]). Moreover, it has made it hard to attract attention and mobilise national level support for addressing certain cross-border challenges for which relevant competences reside with regional and national government bodies (OECD, 2023[5]). This is particularly the case with respect to water quality in the Minho river and issues related to navigation on the river. Several members of the EGTC are keen to work on resolving these problems but are not empowered to do so.

Cross-border governance bodies composed solely of subnational governments, or a single tier of subnational government, can pursue different actions to address or mitigate the challenges described above. One approach would be to involve relevant national-level stakeholders in an advisory role, for example by inviting them to participate as observers in one or more relevant working groups. This could keep them informed of local challenges and ensure their expertise and support are accessible (see Chapter 5). Alternatively, cross-border governance bodies could also consider establishing from the outset or adjusting overall objectives to focus more closely on sectors and issues where subnational governments (or a single level of government) have the necessary competencies and resources to act effectively.

Ensuring balanced representation in terms of territorial scope and population

Beyond deciding which levels of government should be represented, it is important to ensure balanced representation in terms of the number of participating government bodies, as well as the territories and populations they represent. Balanced representation can facilitate an equitable distribution of the resources needed for cross-border co-operation and can help ensure that development initiatives benefit all participating regions relatively equally.

Achieving parity can be challenging, however due to factors such as demographic and territorial disparities, as well as differences in administrative structures. As such, most cross-border governance bodies are not perfectly balanced in terms of the number of members or the population and territory they cover. For instance, the Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai spans 3 636 km² and encompasses a population of 2.2 million (Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, 2024[20]). While the population is fairly evenly distributed across Belgian and French members, the territory itself is not, with 19% located on the French side and 81% on the Belgian side. Conversely, in the EGTC Alzette Belval, which covers 147 km² and serves 106 000 inhabitants, the Luxembourg side has a significantly higher population density, though both sides have a similar land area (EGTC Alzette Belval, 2022[21]).

There are also cases where the imbalances are more marked. For instance, the EGTC Nemunas-Niemen was founded by a Polish regional association of subnational governments, representing 35 regional and local governments that have a population exceeding one million — and a single Lithuanian local government home to approximately 50 000 inhabitants (Statistics Poland, 2023[22]; OECD, 2023[5]) (Annex Table 2.A.5. ). Such imbalances can pose financial, management and operational risks if not carefully managed.

Imbalanced membership structures can lead to disproportionate financial responsibilities for smaller delegations, creating potential financial strain for certain members. Moreover, it may result in decisions that do not fully consider the diverse needs of all territories involved, particularly if one side is underrepresented. Finally, delegates from more populated regions might feel discouraged from fully participating if they perceive an unequal influence in decision-making processes.

Whether imbalances in the membership composition of cross-border governance entities are large or small, they need to be carefully considered when establishing internal governance bodies. This includes making informed decisions on the distribution of voting rights and membership contributions (see Chapter 4).

Establishing and managing internal governing bodies

Before establishing a cross-border co-operation initiative to address particular development challenges, it is essential that policy makers or founding members first consider which governance mechanism(s) would be most suitable to achieve joint objectives. There are two particularly important elements for policy makers to consider.

First, they need to assess which type of cross-border governance body is most suitable for meeting their aims. In the EU, one possibility is to establish a formal cross-border governance body, such as an EGTC, Euroregion or Eurodistrict. Euroregions or Eurodistricts are relatively flexible organisations, with no mandated structures. This flexibility can make them suitable for local-level co-operation, where quick adaptability is essential for meeting a variety of co-ordination needs. In contrast, creating an EGTC offers a formal, legally-binding structure that can streamline cross-border co-operation, making it especially valuable for more structured and long-term co-operation (European Committee of the Regions, 2018[23]). An EGTC enables partners to pool resources effectively and provides a stable framework for managing shared cross-border actions.

Second, when establishing a cross-border governance body, policy makers need to think carefully about the internal governing structures that can enable relevant actors to make timely and effective decisions on transboundary issues. These structures determine which actors have a voice, who can make decisions, how those decisions are made, and critically, how voting power is divided up among co-operating partners.

Deciding which internal governing structures to establish can depend on a variety of factors, including the purpose of the cross-border body, as well as any formal requirements that may apply. For instance, the EU Regulation on a European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation requires an EGTC to establish, at a minimum: i) a representative assembly of EGTC members; and ii) a director to act on its behalf (EUR-Lex, 2014[24]). EGTCs are, however, free to create additional internal governing structures, and many do. Annex Table 2.A.6. shows the range of internal structures established by different cross-border governance bodies. In addition to a General Assembly, many created an executive board or council and an advisory and/or supervisory council, each of which serve specific purposes (Table 2.1). Moreover, most cross-border governance bodies have also set up formal teams to work on technical issues.

Table 2.1. Examples of internal governing structure used by cross-border governance bodies

Governing body	Description
General Assembly	˗ Typically composed of elected representatives from the formal members (e.g. local, regional and national governments) and leads decision making. ˗ Generally responsible for reviewing and approving the cross-border governance body’s strategic plan, budget, and annual activities report. ˗ May have authority to modify or approve the body’s internal regulations and statutes, appoint or remove the director, and dissolve the body if deemed necessary.
Presidency	˗ Typically chairs its General Assembly and serves as the high-level representative of the organisation. ˗ While often a more ceremonial position, the Presidency can also play an active role in supporting the preparation and implementation of decisions adopted by the General Assembly or Bureau. ˗ Generally rotates every between national delegations to ensure balanced representation.
Executive Bureau or Council	˗ Generally composed of representatives from formal members. ˗ Typically serves as a strategic deliberation body responsible for preparing or reviewing documents such as strategic plans and budgets before they are presented to the General Assembly.
Supervisory and advisory bodies	˗ Usually established to enhance oversight and guidance. ˗ A Supervisory Board may be charged with reviewing the cross-border governance body’s annual accounts and financial report, notifying the General Assembly of any irregularities. ˗ An Advisory Council may provide non-binding advice on strategic matters such as strategic priorities. To carry out this responsibility, Advisory Councils are often composed of non-member public institutions and non-governmental actors, thus helping to foster diverse perspectives on strategic matters.
Director	˗ Leads the cross-border governance body’s technical team and oversees daily operations. ˗ Responsibilities typically include implementing decisions from the General Assembly or Executive Bureau/Council, drafting reports and budgets, and managing organisational, and administrative tasks. ˗ Co-ordinates relationships with external entities, supports project delivery, and leads efforts to mobilise project funding.
Technical working groups	˗ The statutes of many cross-border governance bodies allow for the creation of technical working groups at the discretion of the General Assembly or Executive Bureau/Council. ˗ Can be composed of representatives from EGTC members, non-member public institutions and non-governmental actors (e.g. academia, civil society organisations) can discuss thematic priorities and co-develop proposals for cross-border projects.

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on (Smart Minho, 2018[25]; EGTC Cerdanya Hospital, 2014[8]; EGTC Alzette Belval, 2023[26]; OECD, 2023[5]; Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, 2021[2]; OECD, 2023[3]).

Despite the variation in internal governing structures, cross-border governance bodies commonly face similar obstacles regarding their operations, including:

• Difficulties in fully operationalising some of the formal bodies;

• Maintaining a fair rotation of the presidency to balance representation across and within national delegations;

• Striking the right balance between high-level political direction and operational autonomy to maintain both accountability and flexibility;

• Providing adequate space for non-governmental actors to participate meaningfully;

• Achieving an equitable and fair distribution of voting rights among formal members.

Ensuring internal governance bodies are operational depends on having a clear purpose and using resources effectively

Operationalising internal governing bodies enables critical deliberative, decision making and advisory and oversight functions to be performed as set out in founding statutes. However, not all cross-border governance bodies are equally successful in this. Factors that can explain difficulties in operationalisation include limited technical human resources within the cross-border governance body, an unclear purpose for certain cross-border governance bodies, and limited interest from stakeholders in participating.

With regard to human resources, many cross-border governance bodies have small technical teams, consisting of only a few staff members (OECD, 2023[3]). This limits their ability to manage day-to-day operations, including organising meetings (e.g. General Assembly), preparing agendas and documents (e.g. draft budgets, activity plans), and supporting follow-up on decisions. For instance, the EGTC Nemunas-Niemen does not yet have a dedicated, full-time technical team (OECD, 2023[3]). It was set up in March 2023, however neither its General Assembly nor its Supervisory Board have yet been made operational (OECD, 2023[5]). While the organisation is still in its early stages of institutional development, this delay is problematic, as it hinders critical decision making that is needed to set strategic objectives for the organisation and establish a sustainable funding model.

In other cases, internal bodies can become deprioritised if they are not considered essential to the overall functioning of the governance body or if their purpose is not clearly defined. A striking example comes from the EGTC Rio Minho. Since the EGTC’s creation in 2018, it has held only one meeting of its Advisory Council, which convenes at the Director’s discretion and is responsible for issuing non-binding opinions on topics selected by the Co-ordinating Council (OECD, 2023[5]). The fact that the objective of the Advisory Council is relatively unclear may have contributed to its deprioritisation.

Finally, limited stakeholder interest or capacity to engage on certain topics can further hinder the ability of cross-border governance bodies to organise regular meetings and fully operationalise their internal governing structures. For instance, the EGTC Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai created eight thematic working groups in which a range of public and non-governmental actors participate. While some working groups are very active and meet multiple times a year, others are dormant (e.g. those focused on language learning and alternative energy). The main reason for this is the limited interest of cross-border public and private stakeholders in these specific areas (OECD, 2023[3]).

To avoid creating internal governing bodies that may not become fully operational, policy makers involved in designing them should ensure:

• That the necessary human and financial resources are available to support these bodies' functioning (e.g. for organising meetings, preparing agendas).

• That each body has a clear, well-defined purpose (e.g. help draft, review, provide an opinion on or approve strategic documents, including activity plans, budgets or financial statements). Without this focus, there may be a lack of incentive for the cross-border governance body to allocate scarce resources towards their operation. The lack of a clear purpose may also discourage outside stakeholders from participating.

Detailing rules on presidency rotation can enhance leadership diversity

Ensuring a balanced and inclusive rotation of the presidency in cross-border governance bodies is essential for integrating diverse perspectives, building ownership, and leveraging the unique competencies of each member. However, when the leadership role is consistently held by the same member, it can, however, lead to a loss of fresh perspectives and insights, and may reduce the interest of other members in the work and strategic direction of the cross-border body.

These challenges are seen in the Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, where the General Assembly elects a new EGTC President every two years, with the position alternating between representatives from France and Belgium (Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, 2021[2]). Yet, the presidency has not been broadly shared across the various government levels within the EGTC. Since its inception 16 years ago, only the European Metropolis of Lille has held the presidency on the French side, possibly due to its larger annual financial contributions to the EGTC’s budget (OECD, 2023[5]). Yet, other members (e.g. Hauts-de-France Region, Nord Department), which have never held the presidency, also play crucial roles in cross-border co-operation. These entities, each of which have distinct geographic coverage and responsibilities, could bring valuable perspectives, insights, and priorities to the EGTC, potentially enriching its overall approach and effectiveness. The lack of rotation of the presidency within national delegations may have contributed to the limited participation of EGTC members in General Assembly meetings (see Chapter 5) (OECD, 2023[5]).

To ensure a balanced and inclusive rotation of the presidency and integrate diverse perspectives, it may be beneficial for cross-border governance bodies to adopt more specific guidelines on rotating the presidency of the governance body. Such guidelines could, for example, call for rotation between national delegations as well as within them, especially when they include government entities at different levels. For instance, internal regulations could stipulate that one specific member is not allowed to hold the national presidency twice in a row.

Striking the right balance between high-level political direction and operational autonomy

Achieving a functional balance between political prerogatives and operational autonomy is essential for sustaining member engagement and operational stability. High levels of political involvement in setting the organisation’s direction and guiding concrete action can ensure political priorities are well-reflected and help build a strong political commitment to cross-border initiatives. However, it can also lead to shifts in focus based on political changes, potentially disrupting long-term goals. Meanwhile, high levels of operational autonomy and steering by technical teams can support continuity and effectiveness in managing day-to-day activities, ensuring that the governance body functions smoothly. Too much autonomy, however, can result in disconnection from political priorities and a lack of accountability, which may weaken overall support and alignment with member interests.

In the pilot projects analysed, there appears to be limited political steering within the cross-border governance bodies (e.g. Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai and EGTC Alzette Belval). Presidencies tend to be viewed as ceremonial roles and presidents are seldom active in setting or influencing the governance body’s agenda (OECD, 2023[5]; OECD, 2024[17]). As a result, technical directors and their support teams often take a leading role in shaping agendas and steering activities. This autonomy can ensure continuity and effectiveness but also reduce political engagement.

To avoid this situation, cross-border governance bodies could consider establishing guidelines that require newly elected Presidents to define priorities and propose actions for cross-border initiatives during their term (e.g. two years). This could strengthen member interest in (and ownership of) the actions of the cross-border governance body. At the same time, it is fundamental that these priorities align with the cross-border governance body’s mid- to long-term strategic objectives in order to ensure coherence and stability.

Secondment of core staff by individual members can reduce their focus and jeopardise their neutrality

For cross-border governance bodies to function effectively, it is important for technical teams to be highly skilled. First, the team needs to be sufficiently staffed and equipped with the relevant skills and knowledge to handle day-to-day operations and support critical functions such as budget preparation, strategic planning, and project funding mobilisation (see Chapters 3 and 4).

Second, technical staff must be adept at managing the complexities of engaging with a diverse range of public institutions across different government levels, each of which may operate under distinct political leadership. In particular, when cross-border governance bodies establish a joint technical team—as is the case in most EGTCs—the team must be allowed to balance the distinct interests of founding members, make unbiased decisions, and function in a manner that is relatively insulated from the individual interests of members.

In some cases, however, technical support teams are vulnerable to shifting political priorities, especially when core staff are employed and funded by individual members rather than the cross-border governance body itself. For example, the EGTC Nemunas-Niemen does not yet have its own dedicated technical staff, relying instead on support from personnel within its founding members (OECD, 2023[5]). This means that the EGTC Director, employed by the Euroregion Niemen Association, must balance their cross-border co-operation duties with their primary role in the Association. This dual responsibility can make it hard for staff to balance the time commitments, interests and priorities of the EGTC and the Euroregion Niemen Association.

Similarly, there have been periods during which one of the two technical secretaries of the EGTC Rio Minho was hired by the EGTC—and paid through membership contributions—and the other was seconded from one of the body’s founding members (OECD, 2024[17]; OECD, 2023[5]). This is in line with the EGTC’s statutes, which suggest that its two technical secretaries should, ideally, be on the payroll of the EGTC’s founding members (Smart Minho, 2018[25]). Such an arrangement risks leaving the work of the technical secretariat vulnerable to budgetary decisions within one of the EGTC’s members. For example, a member can decide to no longer pay the salary of the seconded staff or may request that the individual be reincorporated into the member’s own organisational structure. It also creates an accountability challenge for the technical secretaries, given that the interests of internal governing bodies and the interests of the local governments providing funding for the technical secretary may not always align.

To avoid these issues, cross-border policy makers should make sure that technical staff can be hired and paid for by the cross-border governance body. This is particularly critical for the head of the technical support team (e.g. EGTC Director), whose responsibilities require neutrality and a clear alignment with cross-border governance objectives. For more technical or project-focused staff, reliance on shared or seconded personnel may pose less of a risk, as their roles are often more narrowly focused on project-specific tasks with fewer conflicting interests.

Balanced representation requires adapting seat and vote distribution to local contexts

A further challenge for cross-border governance bodies is how to manage asymmetries in the composition of national delegations. Such asymmetries, which can be profound, can reflect differences in the territorial-administrative structures of the co-operating countries. For instance, one country may have more subnational government tiers than its neighbour. Local government units may also vary in size across borders, with smaller, more numerous units on one side compared to the other. To ensure fair representation, these asymmetries require careful consideration when assigning seats and votes in the primary governing bodies, such as the General Assembly or Executive Bureau. There is no single model for seat and vote distribution. Instead, solutions must be adapted to the specific local context and needs.

The EGTC Alzette Belval initially had a 50%-50% division between France and Luxembourg in both seats and votes (OECD, 2023[5]). However, when an additional Luxembourg municipality joined the cross-border governance body, and the seat distribution was adjusted accordingly. Luxembourg now has nine representatives in the General Assembly (including four from the national government and one from each municipality), while France is represented by eight members (representatives from the national government, a region, two departments, and four inter-municipal groupings) (EGTC Alzette Belval, 2023[26]). Despite this shift in seats, voting power remains evenly distributed, with each national delegation holding 20 votes to maintain decision-making parity.

Another model was adopted by the EGTC Cerdanya Hospital, where, in each core governing body (e.g. Board of Directors, Advisory Council, and Executive Committee), the delegation from Catalonia (Spain) holds 60% of the seats, with the French delegation holding the remaining 40% (EGTC Cerdanya Hospital, 2014[8]). This distribution reflects differences in the population size of the French and Catalan parts of the Cerdanya cross-border region (OECD, 2023[5]).

Importantly, the distribution of votes within each national delegation can also differ. For example, in Alzette Belval, the French representatives each hold an equal number of votes (four per member). In contrast, Luxembourg's votes are allocated with greater weight given to the national government (ten votes), while each municipality has two votes (EGTC Alzette Belval, 2023[26]). This nuanced distribution reflects the unique governance priorities and territorial organisation within each country, enabling balanced yet context-sensitive representation in cross-border decision-making processes.

The experience of these cross-border governance bodies shows that there is no “golden rule” for achieving a fair and balanced representation across borders. Decisions regarding seat and vote distribution should be strategic, mutually agreed upon, and could be based on factors such as population, territory size, and financial contribution to the cross-border governance body. Another critical factor is flexibility; that is, representation structures should be adaptable, with periodic reassessments to ensure that they continuously reflect the evolving needs and context of the cross-border region.

Cross-border governance bodies frequently lack formal spaces for engagement with non-governmental actors

Determining whether and how to enable the structured participation of non-governmental actors (e.g. academia, businesses, individual residents) is another challenge faced by different cross-border governance bodies. Depending on the core objective of the cross-border governance body, facilitating the participation of non-governmental actors in its internal governing bodies can have substantial benefits. For example, it can help foster their interest in cross-border initiatives, create a shared sense of purpose, and generate ownership of concrete projects. Moreover, by integrating the perspectives of those who will be directly involved in or affected by cross-border initiatives, establishing spaces for engagement with non-governmental actors can help ensure that cross-border strategies and projects are both practical and meet the needs of local communities.

Few cross-border governance bodies, however, enable the structured participation of non-governmental actors in cross-border decision making (OECD, 2023[5]). Several factors may explain this limitation. First, only public actors can be formal members of an EGTC. This restriction does not, however, preclude an EGTC and its members from finding alternative ways to facilitate non-governmental participation, such as their participation in working groups. Second, cross-border bodies sometimes struggle to identify relevant non-governmental actors (e.g. from civil society organisations and academia) who are willing and able to join regular meetings (OECD, 2023[5]). This challenge may stem from limited knowledge within the body about which actors to engage with or, alternatively, a lack of awareness among non-governmental actors about the body and how it can support its work (OECD, 2023[5]).

A notable exception is the Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, which set up a Civil Society Forum as one of its core internal governing bodies when it was founded in 2008 (Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, 2024[20]). Moreover, in 2017, it created several thematic working groups, in which non-governmental actors can also participate (Box 2.6).

Box 2.6. The working groups of the Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai

In 2017, nine years after its establishment, the Eurometropole amended its by-laws to emphasise the co-development of cross-border initiatives. This led to the creation of eight thematic working groups in which non-governmental actors can participate. The groups cover the following topics: Blue Park; higher education; cross-border employment and mobility; digitalisation; cross-border job placements; language learning; and promoting alternative energy.

The creation of the working groups, in which representatives from the EGTC’s members, academia, the business sector and community organisations participate, has helped ensure that cross-border decision making takes better account of specific regional and local needs. For instance, through the EGTC’s sectoral working groups, elected representatives of the General Assembly, non-governmental actors with sectoral expertise and technical staff of the cross-border agency work together to develop initiatives that are well-matched with local priorities and resources.

Source: Author’s elaboration based on (OECD, 2023[5]).

Cross-border governance bodies interested in reinforcing their structural engagement with non-governmental actors could consider piloting a multi-actor working group and closely monitoring its performance over a defined period. This approach could enable the body to assess the effectiveness of the engagement model and gather insights that could inform the establishment of additional thematic working groups in the future. Such a pilot could also enable the body to adjust and refine the engagement approach with a view to ensuring it is still practical and contributes to organisational goals.

Given that in some regions there is limited public awareness of and interest in cross-border co-operation (see Chapter 5), it may be important to select a topic for the pilot that generates strong interest and enthusiasm among non-governmental stakeholders on both sides of the border (e.g. healthcare, tourism, jobs). This could help build momentum and demonstrate the value of such engagement to the leadership of the cross-border governance body, relevant non-governmental actors, and the general public.

To ensure sustained stakeholder engagement, the outcomes of working group meetings must be valuable and relevant to the organisation’s mission and the cross-border region’s strategic priorities. Aligning the focus of the working groups with these priorities can ensure that their work supports long-term goals, making their contributions more meaningful, and likely to gain support from decision makers. Equally critical is ensuring that the outcomes of the working group meetings are relevant for the public and non-governmental actors participating. To ensure continued engagement over time, the governance body should provide regular feedback to the working groups that clearly state how their input is used. This step is vital but often overlooked, and result in participants feeling their input is disregarded, thereby reducing their willingness to contribute to future engagement processes.

Periodic revision of internal governing structures can reinforce the effectiveness of cross-border governance bodies

National and subnational policy makers involved in cross-border governance bodies should periodically review their mandates and governing structure(s). These reviews can be crucial for ensuring continued relevance as socio-economic dynamics in cross-border regions shift, potentially altering regional priorities and necessitating adjustments to the governance body’s mandate and objectives.

Additionally, changes in multi-level governance arrangements within co-operating countries, such as shifts in local or regional government competences or municipal amalgamations, can affect the frameworks for collaboration. Such developments may call for adjustments to the governance structure within cross-border bodies in order to ensure continued effectiveness. Finally, regular assessments of existing internal governance structures are also essential. If certain bodies are not performing effectively, this could signal that structural adjustments are needed. These considerations can lead to essential revisions to the mandate, mission, or broader governance architecture of cross-border co-operation initiatives.

Conclusion

While establishing formal governance bodies is not essential for cross-border co-operation, it can offer significant benefits, such as aligning objectives among partners, streamlining decision making, and supporting resource mobilisation. Creating a formal cross-border governance body can also enhance stability in co-operation, even amid political changes, and reinforce accountability in joint initiatives.

Cross-border governance bodies can pursue various objectives, from fostering socio-economic development and territorial cohesion to delivering essential public services. The objectives they aim to achieve are shaped by factors such as regional challenges, historical context, and the previous co-operation experience of cross-border partners. In turn, their specific goals and the sectors they are mandated to work in often influence the architecture of the governance body.

To effectively carry out their work, cross-border bodies require governance structures tailored to the unique challenges and opportunities of their regions, as well as the multi-level governance arrangements of the co-operating countries. In addition, securing the participation of those public actors with the necessary competences and resources to help address cross-border challenges is fundamental. Success also depends on establishing a fair distribution of voting rights among founding members. Creating a capable and independent technical team can help internal governing bodies become operational and, ultimately, help their cross-border initiatives move forward. Finally, it is essential for governance bodies to be adaptable when cross-border needs, priorities, or circumstances change.

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Annex 2.A. Composition and internal governing bodies of select EGTCs

Annex Table 2.A.1. Members of the EGTC Cerdanya Hospital

Government tier	France	Spain
National	- Ministry of Healthcare - French National Health Insurance Fund for Salaried Workers
Regional		- Catalan Healthcare Department

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on (EGTC Cerdanya Hospital, 2014[8]).

Annex Table 2.A.2. Members of the EGTC Alzette Belval

Government tier	France	Luxembourg
National	- National government	- National government
Regional	- Grand Est region
Departmental	- Meurthe-et-Moselle and Moselle departments*
Municipal	- One inter-municipal grouping representing eight municipalities**	- Five municipalities

Note: *The Meuse Department (FR) is an associated member of the EGTC Alzette Belval; **Rumelange joined the EGTC in 2022, becoming the 13^th municipality to form part of the organisation.

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on (EGTC Alzette Belval, 2023[26]; PRO-SUD, n.d.[27]; OECD, 2023[5]; OECD, 2023[3]).

Annex Table 2.A.3. Members of the Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai

Government tier	Belgium	France
National	- Belgian Federal Government	- Government of France
Regional	- Flanders and Flemish Community - Wallonia and French Community - Wallonia and Brussels Federation	- Hauts-de-France Region
Intermediate	- Province of West Flanders - Province of Hainault	- Nord Department
Other (e.g. inter-communal authority, inter-municipal grouping)	- LEIEDAL (inter-municipal company serving the district of Kortrijk) - WVI (inter-municipal company serving the districts of Roeselare, Ieper and Tielt) - IDETA (inter-municipal company serving the arrondissements of Tournai (exc. Estaimpuis) and Ath, municipalities of Lessines, Silly and Enghien) - IEG (inter-municipal company serving the district of Mouscron and municipality of Estaimpuis)	- European Metropolis of Lille

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on (Eurometropolis, 2023[28]).

Annex Table 2.A.4. Members of the EGTC Rio Minho

Government tier	Portugal	Spain
National
Regional
Intermediate	- Intermunicipal Community of Alto Minho – composed of ten municipalities that are located close to the Minho river	- Provincial Council of Pontevedra: 16 of its municipalities that are located close to the Minho river
Local

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on (CIM Alto Minho, 2024[18]; Deputación Pontevedra, 2024[19]).

Annex Table 2.A.5. Members of the EGTC Nemunas-Niemen

Government tier	Lithuania	Poland
National
Regional		- Podlaskie Voivodeship
Intermediate		- Four county governments located within Podlaskie Voivodeship - Two county governments located within Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship
Local	- Alytus City Municipality	- 23 city and/or municipal governments located within Podkaskie Voivodeship - Five city or municipal governments located within Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship

Note: The polish members are part of the Euroregion Niemen Association.

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on (Euroregion Niemen Association, 2024[29]).

Annex Table 2.A.6. Internal governing bodies of select EGTCs

EGTC Alzette Belval	EGTC Cerdanya Hospital	EGTC Niemen-Nemunas	EGTC Rio Minho	Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai
General Assembly	Board of Directors	General Assembly	General Assembly	General Assembly
Presidency	Presidency	Director	Director	Presidency
Bureau	Executive Committee	Supervisory Board	Co-ordinating Council	Bureau
Director	Advisory Council		Advisory Council	Civil Society Forum
	Director		Supervisory Council	Working Groups
			Technical Secretariat	Cross-border agency

Source: Author’s elaboration based on Alzette Belval: (EGTC Alzette Belval, 2023[26]); EGTC Cerdanya Hospital: (EGTC Cerdanya Hospital, 2014[8]); EGTC Niemen-Nemunas (EGTC Nemunas-Niemen, 2023[6]); EGTC Rio Minho: (Smart Minho, 2018[25]); Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai (Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, 2021[2]).

Note

← 1.  This report builds on the work with cross-border governance bodies in five pilot cross-border regions in the European Union (see Foreword and Chapter 1). The main cross-border governance body that the OECD worked with in each region was an EGTC. Therefore, Chapters 2 to 5 focus primarily, though not exclusively, on this form of cross-border governance body.