Climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution pose a growing threat to the environment and the economy. While each challenge is individually pressing, interlinkages among them can also magnify their cumulative impact. Under current policies, many aspects of these challenges are set to worsen by 2050 in a mutually reinforcing manner. More ambitious policies are therefore necessary but insufficient. Effective responses must address the interconnected nature of these challenges.
However, knowledge on the extent to which countries consider interlinkages among climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution is currently limited. Due to their whole-of-government reach, national reporting and planning documents mandated under multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity can offer a window into how countries are considering interlinkages between climate change and biodiversity loss, as well as between each of these challenges and pollution.
A first-of-its-kind stocktake across ten countries1 reveals a mixed picture. Analysis of 20 national reporting and planning documents (Biennial Transparency Reports and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans) under their respective multilateral frameworks finds relatively extensive discussions on biophysical interlinkages between climate change and biodiversity loss. However, considerations of how both challenges might affect the severity and extent of pollution are largely lacking. Policies for managing trade-offs – particularly for pollution – are also sparse.
More needs to be done to advance integrated policies. Countries can further strengthen consideration of interlinkages among the three challenges in national documents. Additionally, countries can consider developing national approaches for pollution comparable to those for climate and biodiversity. Inter-ministerial co-ordination and sectoral plans can also improve alignment of policy objectives, alongside strategic and project-level assessments including Environmental Impact Assessment. Interlinkages can also be better addressed through financing and budgets designed, tracked and delivered jointly rather than in silos.
Bridging the silos to tackle climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution
Climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution pose a growing risk to the environment, the economy, human health and well-being. Each challenge is individually pressing. Climate change affects virtually every inhabited region, with wide ranging repercussions in the form of heat waves, wildfires, sea level rise and drought. Available metrics for biodiversity suggest that it is in overall decline, with around one-quarter of assessed plants and animals threatened with extinction – a larger proportion than ever before (IPBES, 2019[1]). Pollution is a widespread and multifaceted challenge, affecting air, water and soil. It also has significant adverse health consequences. In 2019 alone, it is estimated that pollution was responsible for nine million premature deaths, equivalent to one in six deaths globally (Fuller et al., 2022[2]). While conventional pollutants remain problematic in many parts of the world, new pollutants continue to emerge in tandem, with uncertain impacts on nature and human health.
Beyond their individual importance, climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are intricately connected. The evolution of the triple planetary crisis is fundamentally driven by socioeconomic trends, technological developments and current policies. Socioeconomic trends, such as population growth, underpin changes in economic activity, which in turn shape the scale and trajectory of environmental change. As the population and economy grow, so too do key drivers of the triple planetary crisis, including food and energy demand as well as resource use. Under current policies, OECD projections indicate that all of these drivers are set to increase globally through to 2050, albeit at different rates (Figure 1, left panel) and with significant differences across regions. The population is projected to increase by roughly a quarter, while GDP will more than double. Technological and behavioural changes will enable some decoupling between economic growth and the drivers underpinning the triple planetary crisis. However, these factors fall short of halting global demand growth in energy, food and resources. Notably, plastics use will see a significant increase, doubling by 2050.
Socioeconomic trends and drivers in turn lead to environmental pressures in the form of greenhouse gas emissions, emissions and releases of pollutants, and land use and land use change. Most environmental pressures are set to increase by 2050 under current policies (Figure 1, right panel). Driven by rising plastics use, mismanaged plastic waste is projected to increase by roughly two-thirds, despite advances in waste management. Meanwhile, land covered by built-up area also exhibits a significant increase, rising by almost half.
There are also some signs of progress. Pressures primarily related to air pollution are expected to decline, not least black carbon and sulphur dioxide. However, ammonia emissions, which contribute to particulate matter as well as water and soil pollution, are the exception and projected to rise by almost half by 2050.
Length of bars represents evolution from 2020 to 2050
Source: (OECD, 2025[3])
As environmental pressures rise, most dimensions of the triple planetary crisis are set to worsen in the coming decades under current policies. Global mean temperatures are projected to rise from 1.2°C in 2020 to 2.1°C in 2050 above pre-industrial levels, and to continue to increase by more than 0.25°C per decade thereafter. Biodiversity measured in terms of the terrestrial mean species abundance index is projected to further decline from 59.7 in 2020 to 56.5 in 2050. Outcomes for pollution are more mixed. Air pollution (measured in population-weighted PM2.5 concentrations) is projected to decline globally by over one-fifth between 2020 and 2050. Conversely, plastic leakage into the environment and the nitrogen surplus are projected to increase by two-thirds and a third, respectively, over the same period.
As the dimensions of the triple planetary crisis worsen, several interaction effects are expected to intensify over time. Climate change is projected to overtake land use change as the leading driver of biodiversity loss. In turn, declining biodiversity can compromise important regulating ecosystem services, such as carbon sequestration and erosion control, that are themselves important for climate change mitigation and adaptation. While air pollution is projected to decline, the relative contribution of air pollutants and short-lived climate pollutants to climate change is projected to continue to grow over time. Finally, nutrient pollution will continue to pose a threat to biodiversity loss. Although biodiversity loss linked directly to nitrogen pollution is projected to decline slightly at the global level, this masks important regional differences, with nitrogen-driven losses increasing in some regions. Ultimately, these modelling projections point to the need for more integrated approaches that reflect the interconnected nature of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, not merely greater policy ambition on each dimension.
National policymaking can play a key role in advancing integrated action
Policymaking at the national level – from long-term strategies and sectoral plans to the development of regulatory frameworks – is a key unit of analysis for measuring progress towards multilateral environmental goals, while setting direction for regional and local implementation. However, knowledge on whether and how countries acknowledge interlinkages among climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution in national policymaking is currently limited. As national documents such as Biennial Transparency Reports and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans reflect whole-of-government priorities, they can offer a rich opportunity to examine broad trends across countries as well as to identify potential gaps.
A first-of-its-kind policy stocktake examines how ten diverse countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada, People’s Republic of China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru and Uganda) recognise interlinkages among climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution in national documents. To do so, it analyses their first Biennial Transparency Reports2 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the latest National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans under the Convention on Biological Diversity, revised to align with the 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Attention to pairwise (e.g. between climate change and biodiversity loss) interlinkages was assessed with respect to both their biophysical impacts and policy responses. Documents were assessed on a five-point qualitative scale, from absent to extensive and in-depth. In the absence of comparable documents covering all aspects of pollution, pollution-related interlinkages were assessed indirectly through the aforementioned documents.
Climate and biodiversity interlinkages are relatively well-recognised, while pollution remains a potential blind spot
All ten countries acknowledge biophysical interlinkages among the triple planetary crisis dimensions in some fashion. Both sets of documents provide relatively detailed discussions on how climate change impacts biodiversity (Figure 2). In particular, Biennial Transparency Reports in all ten countries discuss country-specific impacts. For instance, Australia notes that 18 out of 19 ecosystems assessed across the country are under pressure from climate change (CCEEW, Australia, 2024[4]). Country-specific examples provided in National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans also detail various climate-induced impacts on biodiversity, such as changes in their distribution and with respect to interactions between species. For instance, Japan mentions the northward expansion of its native warm-climate bamboo species (moso bamboo and giant timber bamboo) (MoE, Japan, 2023[5]), while Uganda discusses the climate-driven spread of invasive species (NEMA, Uganda, 2024[6]).
Impacts of biodiversity loss on climate change are acknowledged, though to a lesser extent. While all ten countries discuss the interlinkages in their Biennial Transparency Reports and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans, these documents contain few detailed country-specific examples. Nonetheless, some Biennial Transparency Reports clearly illustrate the vital contributions of biodiversity to climate mitigation and adaptation, as well as how biodiversity loss can exacerbate climate change. For instance, with the Amazon biome covering around 60% of its territory, Peru identifies deforestation as the country’s primary driver of greenhouse gas emissions (MoE, Peru, 2024[7]).
In contrast, climate–pollution and biodiversity–pollution interlinkages receive less attention across the ten countries analysed. Notably, consideration of how climate change and biodiversity loss affect the severity and the extent of pollution is largely lacking from both sets of national documents. In Biennial Transparency Reports, while all ten countries discuss how pollution contributes to climate change – such as solid waste releasing greenhouse gas emissions – consideration of how climate change may affect pollution is sparse. Similarly, interlinkages between biodiversity loss and pollution receive less attention in National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans than those between biodiversity loss and climate change, although there are some exceptions. These include the relationship between wetlands and water quality in Uganda and Canada (NEMA, Uganda, 2024[6]; ECCC, Canada, 2024[8]) and the role of urban green spaces in reducing harmful effects of air pollution in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024[9]).
Note: 1. The stocktake covered ten countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru and Uganda). For climate change, it analysed the first Biennial Transparency Reports under the Paris Agreement, supplemented by National Communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change for India and Uganda, whose first reports were not available at the time when the stocktake was conducted in 2025. 2. Impacts refer to the biophysical impacts of climate change on biodiversity (loss) and vice versa or to the biophysical impacts of biodiversity (loss) on pollution and vice versa.
Source: (OECD, 2025[3])
Most countries emphasise policy synergies, while risks of trade-offs tend to be overlooked
Although the consideration of three-way interlinkages remains limited, most countries discuss approaches to harness synergies between policy objectives in their national documents. This is particularly the case for fostering synergies between climate mitigation and adaptation and biodiversity conservation, such as through nature-based solutions. National documents also highlight the intrinsic co-benefits to addressing common drivers of the triple planetary crisis, such as unsustainable resource use. For instance, Australia’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan highlights its goal to reduce impacts of pollution on biodiversity through its circular economy strategy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024[9]).
In contrast, potential risks and management of policy trade-offs are largely absent from national documents or are discussed in generic terms. This may constitute a missed opportunity for anticipating and managing trade-offs during policy design and implementation. While it may seem intuitive that addressing one dimension of the triple planetary crisis would automatically contribute towards resolving others, this is not always the case. The clean energy transition provides a salient example. Although the expansion of renewable energy can reduce carbon emissions, improve air quality and ease climate-induced pressures on biodiversity, it can also put pressure on natural habitats and lead to waste management concerns at the end of its lifecycle (e.g. wind turbines and solar photovoltaics). Anticipating unintended impacts early on is therefore critical, so that one environmental challenge is solved together with, and not at the cost of, other policy objectives.
Notwithstanding these limitations, national documents already offer a wealth of insights on policy instruments that countries have developed to address at least some synergies and trade-offs between climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. These span the gamut of economic instruments, regulatory instruments and information policies as well as government provision of goods and services (Table 1).
National documents also offer examples of institutional mechanisms and tools that can help broaden the “lens” used in decision-making and budgetary allocation. In Canada, the standardised Climate, Nature and Economy Lens, introduced under the Cabinet Directive on Strategic Environmental and Economic Assessment, requires federal public servants to assess the proposals across a number of environmental dimensions including greenhouse gas emissions, as well as effects on species and air, water and soil (Government of Canada, 2026[10]). Additionally, since its launch in 2020, green budgeting in France has gradually evolved from an additional budgetary document providing greater transparency on public expenditure to a tool that can inform policy planning and support budgetary decision-making (Government of France, 2023[11]). Examining these and other examples can help identify practical approaches for enhancing synergies and managing trade-offs across policy domains.
Considering and addressing the gaps identified in this policy stocktake in national reporting and planning documents can be an important starting point. Given the whole-of-government processes underpinning the development of these documents, they can help harness synergies and anticipate risks for trade-offs that may have otherwise been overlooked. However, national reporting and planning documents constitute only part of a broader toolkit. Policymakers can also leverage a range of existing tools and develop new approaches to support more integrated policies.
Strengthen consideration of interlinkages in Biennial Transparency Reports and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans, with particular attention to possible trade-offs. To deepen the integration of potential synergies and trade-offs in national policy documents, countries can use indicators within existing frameworks and consider how the implementation of National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans can support progress in Biennial Transparency Reports (and vice versa) to strengthen alignment across climate, biodiversity and pollution targets.
Harvest and scale up existing integrated approaches. Highlighting innovative policy tools that countries have developed to enhance synergies and manage trade-offs as well as drawing lessons from their implementation can support countries in scaling up more integrated responses.
Develop an overarching approach to pollution comparable to that available for climate change and biodiversity loss. Applying a “multi-pollutant, multi-effect” approach can help establish policy linkages and prevent types of pollution that do not fit neatly into a single category from becoming overlooked. If a strategy on one dimension (e.g. air quality) already exists, outlining interlinkages with biodiversity and climate change can be an important step. Countries can start small by focusing on national priorities through a modular approach.
Reinforce institutional mechanisms and tools for horizontal and vertical integration. To tackle the triple planetary crisis, policy synergies and trade-offs need to be considered both horizontally across sectors and policy domains and vertically across levels of government. Inter-ministerial committees and multiyear plans for sectors can help enhance the alignment between policy objectives, alongside strategic and project-level assessment tools such as Environmental Impact Assessment.
Align financing and resource allocation. The interlinkages among climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution can be better addressed through financing and budgets that are designed, tracked and delivered jointly, rather than in separate silos. For example, synergies can be promoted by using national budgeting processes to incentivise collaboration across ministries and ensuring government support measures are well-targeted.
OECD (2025), Environmental Outlook on the Triple Planetary Crisis: Stakes, Evolution and Policy Linkages, OECD Environmental Outlook, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/257ffbb6-en.
References
[4] CCEEW, Australia (2024), Australia’s First Biennial Transparency Report, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/01.%20Australia%27s%20first%20Biennial%20Transparency%20Report%20%28BTR%29.pdf.
[9] Commonwealth of Australia (2024), Australia’s Strategy for Nature 2024-2030, Commonwealth of Australia, https://ort.cbd.int/api/v2013/documents/BA0A669A-8A52-431A-ED5A2175663825DF/attachments/615828/au-nbsap-v4-en.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2026).
[8] ECCC, Canada (2024), Canada’s 2030 Nature Strategy: Halting and Reversing Biodiversity Loss in Canada, Environment and Climate Change Canada, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2024/eccc/en4/En4-539-1-2024-eng.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2026).
[2] Fuller, R. et al. (2022), “Pollution and health: a progress update”, The Lancet Planetary Health, Vol. 6/6, pp. e535-e547, https://doi.org/10.1016/s2542-5196(22)00090-0.
[10] Government of Canada (2026), Climate, Nature and Economy Lens (CNEL) reference template, https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/sustainability/strategic-environmental-economic-assessment/reference-template.html (accessed on 9 November 2026).
[11] Government of France (2023), Report on the Environmental impact of the central government budget.
[1] IPBES (2019), Summary for policymakers of the global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services, IPBES Secretariat, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3553579.
[5] MoE, Japan (2023), The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan of Japan 2023-2030: The Roadmap to Realizing Nature-Positive by 2030.
[7] MoE, Peru (2024), First biennial transparency report of Peru, Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Peru, https://unfccc.int/documents/645280. (accessed on 26 October 2026).
[6] NEMA, Uganda (2024), National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan III (2025-2030) - Advance Copy, National Environment Management Authority of the Republic of Uganda, https://api.cbd.int/api/v2013/documents/E09B9149-0A80-3FD6-7BFB780D09F4998D/attachments/615914/Uganda%20Adance%20NBSAP%20III%20aligned%20to%20KMGBF.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2026).
[3] OECD (2025), Environmental Outlook on the Triple Planetary Crisis: Stakes, Evolution and Policy Linkages, OECD Environmental Outlook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/257ffbb6-en.
Contact
Shardul Agrawala, Head, Environment and Economy Integration Division, Shardul.Agrawala@oecd.org
← 1. Argentina, Australia, Canada, People’s Republic of China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru and Uganda
← 2. Under the Enhanced Transparency Framework, Parties to the Paris Agreement are required to submit Biennial Transparency Reports every two years. For countries from which the first Biennial Transparency Reports were not yet available at the time of the analysis (India and Uganda in this stocktake conducted in 2025), National Communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change were consulted as complementary materials.