This chapter analyses the role of institutional investors in Asian capital markets, examining their importance, ownership patterns and the regulatory frameworks shaping their policies. Drawing on an original OECD survey, it explores how institutional investors engage with investee companies, the barriers they face and the extent to which they exercise their voting rights. It concludes by outlining policy considerations to strengthen domestic investor bases, reinforce stewardship and transparency, and embed investor policies within broader capital market reforms that support long-term value creation and investor confidence.
Asia Capital Markets Report 2026
Abstract
Institutional investors play a more limited role in Asian equity markets than in other regions, with 21% of market capitalisation compared to 47% globally. Ownership is more concentrated in the hands of corporate, public sector and strategic individual shareholders.
Institutional ownership in Asia is heavily dominated by non-domestic investors, who hold more than half of all institutional equity in the region, while domestic institutional investor bases remain relatively underdeveloped in many markets.
Index inclusion and the rise of passive investing increasingly shape capital allocation, with companies included in major indices attracting several times higher institutional ownership than companies outside indices.
Stewardship and fiduciary frameworks have developed rapidly across the region but follow heterogeneous models, ranging from rule-based regimes to comply-or-explain stewardship codes, industry-led initiatives and hybrid approaches, with uneven disclosure of voting records and management of conflicts of interest.
Engagement practices in Asia are predominantly private and consensual, with informal dialogue with management dominating, while shareholder resolutions and public campaigns remain rare.
Engagement focuses primarily on business fundamentals, with environmental, social and governance topics playing a more limited role than in other regions.
Investors face significant barriers to engagement, including cultural and language barriers, complex ownership structures, the dominance of controlling shareholders, limited access to decision-makers and capacity constraints, with stewardship teams typically small or non-existent.
Collaborative engagement remains underused despite its potential effectiveness, constrained by resource limitations, lack of trust among investors, competitive concerns and legal risks linked to concert party and disclosure rules.
Despite high levels of voting participation, shareholder opposition to management proposals remains limited, and investor activism in Asia accounts for a limited share of global campaigns.
Strengthening domestic institutional investor bases, refining stewardship frameworks, removing barriers to engagement and embedding investor policies within broader capital market reforms can enhance market functioning, transparency and long-term value creation.
Since the 1980s, the global investment landscape has undergone a profound transformation. The ways individuals save and invest in capital markets have changed dramatically. In the 1960s and 1970s, individual investors held shares directly in their own name (Schlarbaum, 1978[1]). Since then, individual participation in equity markets has become increasingly indirect, channelled through pension funds, insurance products, mutual funds and other pooled investment vehicles managed by professionals. These shifts in saving and investment behaviour have contributed to the rise of institutional investors as the dominant category of shareholders worldwide. Today, institutional investors collectively hold 47% of global listed equity, reflecting in part the growing reliance of households on institutional investors to invest their savings.
In line with global trends, institutional investors have also become more prominent in Asia, but to a lesser degree. This expansion has been supported by the development of capital markets, financial liberalisation in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and continued improvements in market infrastructure and corporate governance frameworks (Purfield et al., 2008[2]; Yasser, 2011[3]). Several economies, including China, India and Indonesia, have gradually relaxed restrictions that previously limited foreign institutional participation in their equity markets. This has deepened market integration and liquidity. At the same time, the domestic institutional investor base has expanded steadily, driven by rising household incomes, demographic changes and increasing demand for pension and insurance products (Hu, 2012[4]; Park, 2009[5]).
The rise of institutional investors has helped channel assets into broadly diversified, low-fee products, enhancing risk-adjusted returns. At the same time, it has lengthened investment chains, increasing the distance between beneficial owners and the agents who exercise shareholder rights. From a corporate governance perspective, this separation can create challenges if incentives along the chain are not properly aligned, or if institutional investors lack the capacity or motivation to monitor and engage with their investee companies.
Institutional investors can, however, play a constructive role in promoting long-term value creation. With their significant ownership stakes and typically longer investment horizons, they are well placed to foster improvements in corporate governance, transparency, accountability and sustainability. Yet, the degree of engagement varies depending on their business models, investment strategies and incentive structures.
3.1.1. Overview of listed companies and institutional investors
At the end of 2025, around 51 000 companies were listed on stock exchanges worldwide, with a combined market capitalisation of USD 150 trillion. The United States is by far the largest market, accounting for USD 73 trillion, or 48% of the total global market capitalisation. Europe accounts for 14%.
Asia hosts over half the world's listed companies but a much smaller share of global market capitalisation
Note: The figure shows the market capitalisation and number of listed companies for the 50 795 listed companies in 104 economies, and the bubble size represents their share in global market capitalisation. The sample includes firms listed on both main markets and growth markets.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; FactSet; LSEG; Bloomberg; see Annex A for details.
Asia is a major centre of equity activity, with 29% of global market capitalisation and 56% of listed companies. This reflects the rapid development of domestic equity markets in jurisdictions such as China, India, Japan and Korea. However, despite the large number of listed firms, the region’s share of global market capitalisation remains modest relative to its listing activity. Asian markets continue to be characterised by smaller average firm size than in the United States, driven in many cases by low valuations (see Chapter 2).
Despite the large number of listed companies, institutional investor ownership in Asia remains relatively limited. Institutional investors hold only 21% of total market capitalisation, less than half the global figure of 47% (Figure 3.2). Instead, Asian equity markets are characterised by large corporate and public sector ownership. Corporations hold 24% of market capitalisation, compared to 9% globally and only 2% in the United States, reflecting the prevalence of corporate groups and cross shareholding structures. Public sector ownership is also high at 12%, a sign of the importance of SOEs in several Asian markets. In addition, strategic individual shareholders account for 12% of market capitalisation, underscoring the continued importance of family and founder ownership structures across the region.
Institutional ownership in Asia remains limited, while corporate and public sector ownership are comparatively high
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; FactSet; LSEG; Bloomberg; see Annex A for details.
At the jurisdiction level, the share of listed equities held by institutional investors varies widely, ranging from 34% in Japan to 2% in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Figure 3.3). In general, institutional investors tend to hold larger equity positions in jurisdictions with deeper and more developed capital markets. This is reflected not only in ownership shares, but also in the overall size of equity markets relative to the economy. Japan, Hong Kong (China), Korea and Chinese Taipei combine comparatively high institutional ownership with market capitalisation levels exceeding their GDP.
China is a notable exception. Despite being the world’s second largest public equity market, institutional ownership remains low at just 10% of market capitalisation. This likely reflects the substantial holdings of government entities and corporations, as well as regulatory restrictions and operational frictions that constrain foreign institutional investor participation. ASEAN jurisdictions tend to have lower market size and institutional ownership levels. Singapore stands out as the main exception, with institutional investors holding 16% of market capitalisation and the size of the equity market roughly equivalent to GDP. By contrast, institutional investor participation remains limited in Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam, where institutional investors account for only around 5-6% of market capitalisation.
Institutional investor holdings remain limited across most Asian markets
Note: Data is not available for Cambodia, Lao PDR and Mongolia. Sri Lanka’s GDP is calculated using 2024 data.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; FactSet; LSEG; Bloomberg; see Annex A for details.
3.1.2. Domicile of institutional investors
A notable feature of institutional ownership in Asia is the significant share of non-domestic investors in many markets. Non-domestic institutional investors collectively own around 11% of Asia’s listed equity, slightly more than domestic institutional investors (8%) (Figure 3.4, Panel A). In other words, non-domestic investors hold over half of all institutional equity holdings in Asia. This partly reflects the relatively underdeveloped domestic institutional investor base in the region, as well as the active allocation of global asset managers to Asian equity markets. The trend has accelerated with financial liberalisation, with many Asian economies gradually relaxing restrictions on foreign investment in the 2000s, making it easier for global funds to invest in Asian stocks.
In general, Asian markets with a high level of institutional ownership have substantial participation from non-domestic institutional investors. This is the case of Japan, Chinese Taipei, Korea, Hong Kong (China) and Singapore. In contrast, in markets such as China and Pakistan, non-domestic institutional investors have relatively low levels of holdings compared to domestic ones.
Over half of non-domestic institutional holdings in Asia are held by investors based in the United States (Figure 3.4, Panel B). The second-largest share comes from the United Kingdom (20%). Intra-Asian investment is also notable, with institutional investors based in Hong Kong (China), China and Singapore accounting for 5%, 3% and 3% of non-domestic institutional holdings in Asia, respectively.
Non-domestic investors account for a significant share of institutional ownership across many Asian equity markets
Note: Data is not available for Cambodia, Lao PDR and Mongolia.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset’; FactSet; LSEG; Bloomberg; see Annex A for details.
3.1.3. Index inclusion and passive investing
Global benchmark indices and the rise of passive investing are increasingly shaping how institutional investors allocate capital across markets. Many investment funds now either replicate major indices or use them as performance benchmarks. As of Q1 2026, approximately USD 7.4 trillion in global indexed equity assets tracked MSCI indices (MSCI, 2026[6]). Consequently, inclusion in or exclusion from key indices can prompt significant portfolio adjustments with markets with higher representation in global indices attracting greater capital inflows from index-tracking investors. This could lead to notable differences in institutional ownership between companies included in major indices and those not included.
Listed companies in Asia account for a much smaller share of global indices than their share of global market capitalisation would suggest. Only three Asian jurisdictions (Hong Kong (China), Japan and Singapore) are included in the MSCI World index, together accounting for only 6% of the MSCI World Index, much lower than the 29% Asian listed companies represent in global market capitalisation (Figure 3.5, Panel A). This contrast partly reflects the MSCI World Index’s construction, which covers developed markets only. However, even for the three Asian jurisdictions included in the MSCI World Index, their index weight falls short of their 8% share of global market capitalisation.
By contrast, Asian economies dominate the MSCI EM Index. Nine of the 18 Asian jurisdictions analysed in this report are represented in the Index. Together they account for 75% of the Index’s total weight, just above their share of total EM market capitalisation (74%). India, Korea and Chinese Taipei are the most represented in the Index, together making up nearly half of it (Panel B). Smaller markets such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines each account for less than 2% of the Index’s total weight.
Asian companies are underrepresented in the MSCI World Index but dominate the MSCI Emerging Markets Index
Note: The figure shows the total weight of companies listed in Asian exchanges. The company weights in the MSCI World Index correspond to those in iShares MSCI World ETF and cover 96% of the total weight. The company weights in the MSCI EM Index correspond to those in iShares MSCI EM ETF and cover 99% of the total weight. In Panel B, other Asian markets correspond to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Index composition is as of end 2025.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; FactSet; LSEG; Bloomberg; see Annex A for details.
Inclusion in major global or regional indices can significantly increase a company’s visibility among large institutional investors. In Asian markets, institutional ownership is consistently higher for companies included in indices than for those not included. For instance, in Japan, companies included in the MSCI Japan Index have on average 34% of their equity held by institutional investors, roughly three times the average of non-index companies (Figure 3.6).
Across Asian markets, institutional ownership is higher in companies included in major equity indices
Note: The institutional investor ownership shows the average share of the equity owned by institutional investors in companies included or not included in an investible index. Companies listed in Asian exchanges are categorised based on their inclusion in the “MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Index” and “MSCI Japan Index”, with the index composition as of Q4 2025. Chinese investors are considered as domestic for companies listed in Hong Kong (China).
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; FactSet; Bloomberg; see Annex A for details.
In Singapore, India and Indonesia, the institutional holdings of index constituent companies are about 6-7 times greater than that of companies not included. Even in China, where overall institutional participation remains relatively limited, companies included in major indices exhibit institutional ownership levels more than double those of non-index constituents. The difference is even more pronounced when looking at non-domestic institutional investor ownership. Listed companies included in the index have between 4 to 11 times more non-domestic institutional ownership compared to those not included in the index.
The growth of passive investing has further amplified the impact of index inclusion on capital allocation. Passive investment vehicles, such as index mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), aim to replicate the performance of benchmark indices by holding constituent securities in proportion to index weights. These vehicles now account for more than half of global equity fund assets, almost tripling from 21% in 2008 to 57% in 2025 (Figure 3.7, Panel A).
Passive investment strategies have expanded rapidly in Asia and globally
Source: Morningstar Direct; OECD calculations; see Annex A for details.
Asian markets have also experienced a marked shift towards passive investing, with the share of passive funds increasing from 28% of all Asian equity funds in 2008 to 70% in 2025. This expansion has been the main driver of asset growth, with the assets under management (AUM) of equity funds reaching around USD 3.4 trillion by the end of 2025 (Figure 3.7, Panel B and C). As a result, a substantial share of Asian equity funds is now allocated passively to index constituents.
However, Asia’s asset management industry remains relatively small among domestic investors. In 2025, equity funds domiciled in Asia accounted for just 9% of global equity fund AUM, well below the region’s share of global market capitalisation. Further development would help deepen domestic institutional demand for local assets and broaden the range of products available to Asian households.
The size and composition of equity investment funds vary significantly across jurisdictions. Japan’s equity investment fund assets are by far the largest in the region, with AUM reaching nearly USD 1.4 trillion in 2025 (Figure 3.8). China (USD 1 trillion) and India (USD 0.5 trillion) come next. Notably, jurisdictions with higher AUM in investment funds also tend to have a larger proportion of passive funds, with India being the notable exception. Japan, China, Chinese Taipei, Korea and Hong Kong (China) each have passive funds accounting for more than two-thirds of total equity fund assets, highlighting the growing popularity of passive investment strategies in these markets.
Japan and China have the two largest equity fund AUM in Asia, with passive investment exceeding two-thirds
Note: The figure shows funds focusing on equity investment by domicile of the fund.
Source: Morningstar Direct; OECD calculations; see Annex A for details.
3.1.4. Ownership concentration and governance implications
The growth in institutional ownership has been accompanied by an increasing concentration of equity holdings among a small number of large investors. In 2022, the world’s 50 largest institutional investors collectively held USD 20 trillion in publicly listed equities, nearly double the USD 11 trillion recorded in 2007 (Figure 3.9, Panel A). The five largest investors alone held USD 8 trillion, representing around 9% of all listed equities and one-fifth of institutional holdings.
The world’s largest institutional investors have nearly doubled their listed equity holdings since 2007, with a similar but more moderate trend in Asia
Note: In the figure, Asia’s market capitalisation is calculated as companies headquartered in Asia. The largest institutional investors in Asia are calculated based on their public equity ownership in listed companies headquartered in Asia.
Source: OECD-ORBIS Corporate Finance dataset; OECD Capital Market Series dataset; see Annex A for details.
A similar, albeit more moderate, trend has taken place in Asia. Participation of institutional investors in Asian listed companies has expanded substantially, with the 50 largest investors in the region holding almost USD 4 trillion in equities in 2022, more than double their 2007 holdings (Figure 3.9, Panel B). Importantly, ownership has also become more concentrated: the share of equity held by the five largest institutional investors rose from 2% of market capitalisation in 2007 to 5% in 2022.
At the company level, institutional ownership concentration is lower in Asia than in other major markets. The five largest institutional investors hold 17% of listed companies on average globally and 24% in the United States (Figure 3.10). In Asia, the top five institutional investors hold around 9% on average.
The degree of concentration varies considerably across Asian jurisdictions. In markets such as Japan, India and Chinese Taipei, where institutional investor participation is well established, the five largest institutional investors together hold more than 10% of total market capitalisation. In contrast, in jurisdictions including China, Viet Nam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, institutional investors are generally minority shareholders, with the five largest institutional investors holding only between 1% and 5% of total market capitalisation.
Institutional ownership is less concentrated in Asia than globally
Note: Lao PDR and Mongolia are excluded due to small sample size. Data is not available for Cambodia.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; FactSet; Bloomberg; see Annex A for details.
One key reason for the lower concentration of institutional investors in Asia is the significant ownership stakes held by the public sector and corporations as well as family-controlled businesses. In many Asian markets, the public sector and corporations are frequently the largest shareholders, accounting for a significant proportion of listed equity. Consequently, institutional investors have limited scope to influence corporate decisions as they often lack sufficient voting power, even when acting collectively (OECD, 2025[7]).
The growing role of institutional investors in capital markets has fundamentally reshaped expectations regarding shareholder behaviour and corporate oversight. Pension funds, insurance companies and asset managers now account for a substantial share of listed equity ownership globally, and their approach to voting, engagement and monitoring increasingly influences corporate governance outcomes. In this context, stewardship, understood as the active and informed exercise of ownership rights, has emerged as a central element of modern corporate governance frameworks. Reflecting this development, the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance call on jurisdictions to establish clear expectations regarding the responsibilities of institutional investors and the intermediaries that support them.
3.2.1. Overview of the regulatory frameworks
Over the past decade, the regulatory landscape for institutional investors and their intermediaries in Asia has evolved significantly. This reflects a growing recognition of the important role these investors play in shaping the corporate governance practices of the companies in which they invest. A central focus of this evolution has been to define and strengthen fiduciary and stewardship responsibilities. Fiduciary duty generally refers to the legal obligation of institutional investors to act in the best interests of clients or beneficiaries, with care, loyalty and prudence. It defines the minimum standards of conduct, limits conflicts of interest and helps prevent self-dealing. Stewardship, by contrast, has a broader and more forward-looking focus, entailing the active exercise of ownership rights, such as voting, dialogue and engagement, to promote the long-term, sustainable value of investee companies (OECD, 2017[8]).
Four broad models exist across Asian jurisdictions: rule-based frameworks, comply-or-explain frameworks, industry-led regimes and a hybrid model (Figure 3.11). The first group includes India, where stewardship obligations have been embedded in laws or regulations. These frameworks require institutional investors to monitor investee companies, conduct effective engagement, ensuring effective supervision when outsourcing, establish voting policies, and report to beneficiaries. This approach treats stewardship as an integral component of fiduciary duty rather than a voluntary practice.
Note: In Hong Kong (China), large fund managers are legally required to address material climate-related risks.
Source: OECD (2025[9]), OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f4f43735-en.
The second group comprises jurisdictions such as Japan, Korea and Malaysia, which have adopted stewardship codes based on a comply-or-explain approach. These codes set out principles of good practice, such as active monitoring and constructive engagement, while allowing institutions flexibility in implementation, provided that any deviations are publicly explained.
The third group includes Singapore, where industry-led or self-regulatory initiatives perform a similar role. While these frameworks are not legally binding, they often operate as de facto standards of professional conduct, achieving compliance primarily through market expectations and reputational discipline rather than regulatory enforcement. Finally, Indonesia has adopted a hybrid model combining statutory obligations and a stewardship code.
3.2.2. Stewardship codes
Stewardship codes occupy a distinctive position within the broader regulatory framework as soft-law instruments designed to complement binding corporate governance and securities laws. While traditional regulations focus on market integrity, investor protection and transparency through mandatory rules and disclosures, stewardship codes emphasise the voluntary principles of responsible ownership and engagement. They aim to encourage institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies and asset managers, to move beyond passive investing and play an active role in monitoring and influencing the governance of their investee companies.
Stewardship codes bridge the gap between basic legal compliance and the ethical, long-term investment behaviours expected of institutional investors. Rather than imposing prescriptive obligations, these codes promote transparency and accountability through mechanisms such as the public disclosure of stewardship activities and the comply-or-explain principle, whereby institutions either adhere to the code’s principles or publicly explain why they do not. By facilitating communication between investors and corporate boards, stewardship codes reinforce corporate governance frameworks and ensure that investment practices align with broader public policy objectives, such as promoting sustainable economic growth and enhancing corporate performance.
Asian regulators began adopting stewardship codes in the mid-2010s as part of a shift towards greater investor engagement and accountability (Figure 3.12). Japan was the first Asian jurisdiction to integrate a stewardship code into its regulatory framework, with the Financial Services Agency (FSA) introducing the Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors in 2014. This marked a significant development in Japan’s corporate governance framework, as the code sought to strengthen investor engagement and improve corporate accountability in tandem with the Corporate Governance Code introduced the following year.
Other major markets in the region soon followed suit. Malaysia launched its Code for Institutional Investors in 2014 and updated it in 2022. This was accompanied by the establishment of an Investors Council to promote adherence. In 2016, Korea introduced a national stewardship code, explicitly linking the stewardship role of institutional investors to their fiduciary duty to foster the sustainable growth of investee companies. Stewardship frameworks were also rolled out in subsequent years in Hong Kong (China), Chinese Taipei, Singapore, India, Thailand and Pakistan, among others. Today, over half of Asian economies have some form of stewardship code or principles in place.
Beyond broad adoption, the effectiveness and role of stewardship codes vary significantly across Asian markets. Many Asian listed companies are family-controlled or part of company groups. This often limits institutional investors to relatively small minority stakes, thereby curbing their influence over corporate decisions (Fukami, Blume and Magnusson, 2022[10]). Consequently, stewardship in Asia tends to function more as a complementary governance mechanism than as a driver of systemic change.
Early stewardship codes in Asia were closely modelled on the UK Stewardship Code. However, differences in business culture, ownership structures and market conditions meant that some provisions proved less applicable or effective in practice. Consequently, the governance outcomes of these codes have often diverged from the objectives originally envisaged under the UK framework (Goto, Koh and Puchniak, 2020[11]). Over time, regulators have drawn lessons from these experiences and, in several cases, have refined national codes to better reflect local contexts.
Source: See Table A.A.13 in Annex A.
Notably, Japan has periodically revised its Stewardship Code, most recently in 2025. The 2025 revision introduced stronger incentives for collaborative engagement among investors and streamlined the Stewardship Code by emphasising overarching principles rather than detailed prescriptions. It also enhanced transparency requirements, for example by encouraging the disclosure of beneficial ownership and clarifying expectations for proxy advisory firms. These changes aim to foster more substantive dialogue between investors and companies and to reduce information asymmetries in the market. Korea is also preparing a further revision of its Stewardship Code scheduled for 2026, reflecting a broader regional trend towards adapting stewardship frameworks to evolving market conditions and governance challenges.
3.2.3. Disclosure and transparency requirements
Disclosure of stewardship responsibilities, especially those concerning voting policies, actual voting outcomes, and the management of conflicts of interest, are fundamental to ensuring transparency and accountability within the investment ecosystem. By clearly communicating their approaches to these matters, institutional investors allow beneficiaries and stakeholders to evaluate whether they are fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities, exercising shareholder rights to support long-term value creation, and managing conflicts that could undermine objective decision-making. For investors, such transparency also helps strengthen trust with clients, beneficiaries and the broader public.
One important element of stewardship transparency is the disclosure of voting policies or guidelines. These policies detail how investors intend to vote on key issues such as board elections, executive pay and shareholder proposals, including those addressing environmental or social concerns. Almost all Asian jurisdictions have now introduced at least a recommendation, and in many cases a requirement, for institutional investors to disclose their voting policies. India, Indonesia and Korea have notably made disclosure of voting policies mandatory via laws or binding regulations (Figure 3.13). This reflects the view of regulators that greater transparency in how investors exercise their voting rights will strengthen market discipline and promote accountability to the ultimate owners. In some jurisdictions, industry associations have established self-regulatory frameworks. For instance, in Singapore, industry associations have established stewardship codes or guidelines that also encourage their member institutions to disclose their voting approaches in practice. Other jurisdictions have also incorporated relevant provisions into their stewardship codes, regardless of whether they operate on a comply-or-explain basis.
Notes: 1. In Hong Kong (China), two public frameworks apply to investment funds and asset managers. The Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the SFC and Fund Managers Code of Conduct, and the Principles of Responsible Ownership. The former does not require disclosure of voting policies, so it is rated “Code without comply or explain,” while the latter includes such disclosure. 2. Service providers include proxy advisers. 3. Specific bans. 4. In India, proxy advisers give voting recommendations to their clients (institutional investors) and generally do not vote on behalf of their clients. Proxy advisers in India are required to formulate and disclose the voting recommendation policies to their clients. 5. In Indonesia, OJK Regulation No 10/POJK.04/2018 (Section 53) provides that Investment Managers are encouraged to disclose voting policy and actual voting records. 6. Law if holding equities more than a certain level.
Source: OECD (2025[9]), OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f4f43735-en.
By contrast, relatively few jurisdictions require the disclosure of detailed voting records showing how investors voted on each resolution. In markets such as Hong Kong (China) and Singapore, there are no explicit rules mandating the publication of proxy voting records. In Korea, disclosure is only required for holdings above a specified threshold; smaller holdings are covered by a comply-or-explain provision. Many other Asian markets adopt a similar flexible approach, acknowledging the value of voting disclosure for transparency but stopping short of requiring comprehensive reporting. This reflects the concern that publishing full voting records can create reputational or legal risks and may strain business relationships.
Another key aspect of transparency is managing and disclosing conflicts of interest. These conflicts may arise when the commercial interests of an institutional investor differ from those of the beneficiaries whose assets they are managing. Effective management of conflicts of interest is critical to maintaining the integrity and independence of investment decisions. Most Asian jurisdictions recognise the importance of conflict-of-interest management, though the degree of regulatory enforcement varies.
3.2.4. Regulatory frameworks for proxy advisors
The growing influence of institutional investors, coupled with the operational complexity of voting across diversified portfolios, has led to an increased reliance on proxy advisers. Two firms dominate this global market: Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis (GL), which together account for around 90% of the global proxy advisory market (Shu, 2024[12]). Their presence in Asia is considerable. In 2024, ISS reported that about 17% of its total revenues were generated from its Asia-Pacific operations, reflecting strong growth in markets such as Indonesia and Singapore (ISS, 2024[13]).
The growing reliance on proxy advisers has prompted policymakers to establish regulatory frameworks to ensure that proxy advisers disclose their methodologies, manage conflicts of interest and maintain adequate analytical resources. The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance explicitly call on jurisdictions to require the disclosure and mitigation of conflicts of interest by proxy advisers, as well as greater transparency regarding their analytical methodologies and voting criteria (OECD, 2023[14]). Regulatory scrutiny has particularly intensified in the United States. In late 2025, an executive order was issued calling for stronger oversight of proxy advisory firms, reflecting growing concerns over their influence on corporate decision-making, the transparency of voting recommendations and potential conflicts of interest (The White House, 2025[15]). These developments suggest that proxy adviser oversight is becoming an increasingly important component of broader corporate governance and stewardship frameworks (OECD, 2026[16]).
Across Asia, regulatory approaches to proxy advisers vary widely. Only a handful of markets maintain comprehensive frameworks for proxy advisers. India stands out with a well-developed regime: the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has established a comprehensive framework that recognises proxy advisers as regulated entities and subjects them to registration requirements, codes of conduct, and grievance redress mechanisms (OECD, 2026[16]). In contrast, Japan and Korea have adopted soft-law approaches, relying on national stewardship codes and voluntary guidelines.
Some regulators are indirectly addressing proxy voting by placing greater obligations on institutional investors. For example, in Malaysia, indirect oversight is exercised through investor governance codes and licensing requirements, together with direct provision to proxy advisers. The Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors encourages investors and their service providers, including proxy advisers, to apply its principles and align with investors’ stewardship approaches (OECD, 2023[17]).
Many emerging Asian markets are still in the early stages of developing specific regulations for proxy advisers. Smaller markets, such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Mongolia and Sri Lanka, continue to prioritise foundational corporate governance reforms and shareholder protection, paying limited attention to proxy advisory regulation. The concept of proxy adviser oversight has only recently begun to feature in policy discussions in these jurisdictions.
Institutional investors differ in their characteristics, mandates and investment strategies, leading to diverse approaches to shareholder engagement. Investors following active strategies tend to interact more directly and frequently with investee companies, whereas those pursuing passive, index-tracking strategies have traditionally taken a more limited role. Even within the same category of investors, engagement practices can differ markedly, reflecting variations in investment horizon, portfolio concentration and strategic objectives. The degree of investor engagement is also influenced by cost-benefit considerations and available resources. Active engagement requires substantial time and analytical capacity, which can be particularly challenging for investors with broadly diversified portfolios or limited in-house expertise, conditions often associated with passive investment models (Çelik, S. and M. Isaksson, 2013[18]).
Moreover, engagement outcomes are typically non-exclusive, giving rise to a free-rider problem whereby some investors may benefit from others’ efforts without directly contributing (Gomtsian, 2019[19]). By contrast, investors with longer-term horizons, such as pension funds and insurance companies, are more likely to view engagement as a means to enhance sustainable performance and long-term value creation.
To gain a comprehensive understanding of how institutional investors in Asia engage with their portfolio companies and the challenges they face, the OECD conducted an original survey on institutional investor stewardship and engagement practices in Asia: the OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia (hereafter referred to as the “OECD survey”). This section summarises the main findings and supplements them with further data on investor activism in the region.
390 institutions across Asia answered the OECD survey, the majority of which are asset management firms
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
The survey, developed by the OECD and disseminated with the assistance of Asian securities regulators, targeted institutional investors headquartered in Asia or operating regional offices in the region. In total, 390 institutions responded. The majority of respondents were asset management firms (74%), followed by insurance companies (6%) and banks (4%) (Figure 3.14). The respondents were predominantly smaller institutions: 40% reported AUM of less than USD 150 million, whereas only 9% managed over USD 100 billion.
Among the responding institutional investors, just over half reported having some form of stewardship team in place, of which: 32% have a full-time, Asia-based team dedicated to stewardship; 17% have stewardship responsibilities shared across other functions within the institution; and 6% have a global or central team overseeing stewardship activities in Asia (Figure 3.15). In contrast, 45% of respondents stated that they do not have a dedicated stewardship team of which 5% are considering establishing a stewardship team.
Just over half of responding Asian institutional investors have some form of stewardship team
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
Many institutional investors in Asia have limited resources dedicated to stewardship. According to the OECD survey, among those with a stewardship team, the majority have very small teams: 30% have fewer than five staff, while only 10% have more than ten specialised stewardship personnel (Figure 3.16).
Most stewardship teams in Asia are small, with fewer than five dedicated staff
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
3.3.1. Engagement practices
Despite capacity constraints, the survey indicates that most Asian institutions engage with investee companies at least occasionally. Almost half (46%) of respondents regularly engage with investee companies in Asia, while a third (34%) do so occasionally (Figure 3.17). However, around 20% indicate that they never engage with their portfolio of Asian companies, potentially due to resource limitations or strategic choices.
Most Asian institutional investors engage with their investee companies at least occasionally
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
In Asia, engagement tends to take place behind the scenes. The most widely used form of engagement is informal, private dialogue with company management, utilised by 77% of respondents (Figure 3.18, Panel A). Many investors also leverage their shareholder voting rights (50%), while 41% communicate with company boards via formal letters or emails. Collaborative engagement, where investors team up with each other, is used by 39% of respondents. By contrast, confrontational or public tactics are uncommon in Asia: just 12% of respondents have ever filed or co-filed shareholder resolutions, and only 7% have used public campaigns or media pressure to influence companies. This preference for discreet engagement aligns with the norms of Asian markets, where investors often avoid open confrontation. Consequently, public activist interventions remain uncommon in the region (see more in the subsection Investor activism).
Asian institutional investors tend to focus on fundamental corporate performance issues. The most frequently cited topics were financial performance (74%) and business strategy (73%) (Figure 3.18, Panel B). Nearly half also engage in capital allocation or capital structure (49%), and risk management oversight (43%). This reflects a strong focus on core business fundamentals. Board and management composition (31%) and overall ESG strategy (29%) were mid-tier priorities, whereas specific social or ethical issues appeared lower on the agenda. Classic ESG subjects such as diversity, equity and inclusion, executive compensation, anti-corruption and audit quality ranked at the bottom of the list. This suggests that many Asian institutional investors tend to prioritise business fundamentals over environmental or social initiatives in their engagement discussions. This emphasis on business fundamentals aligns closely with the value-up agenda discussed in chapter 2, where these same levers are identified as central to addressing the persistent undervaluation of Asian equity markets. This contrasts with practices in Europe and North America, where a much higher proportion of institutional investors also focus on sustainability issues such as climate change and diversity (ISS ESG, 2021[20]).
Engagement in Asia takes place mostly through informal dialogue and focuses on business fundamentals
Note: Respondents could select multiple options. Percentages therefore sum to more than 100 per cent.
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
The two most frequently cited barriers to engagement were cultural and language barriers, and the prevalence of complex ownership structures and the dominance of controlling shareholders; both were reported by more than 40% of respondents (Figure 3.19). This second reason is consistent with the level of concentrated ownership in many Asian markets, which can hinder effective shareholder engagement. The third most common reason, difficulty accessing key decision-makers (42%), further highlights the relational and communication challenges that constrain meaningful dialogue between investors and companies. Other obstacles include a lack of corporate disclosure (34%) and limited responsiveness or resistance from companies to shareholder engagement (33%), reflecting ongoing issues around transparency and accountability. Legal or regulatory constraints or uncertainty were cited by 32% of respondents as further impediments to proactive stewardship.
Cultural and language barriers, and complex ownership structures are the leading barriers to engagement in Asia
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
From an investor perspective, capacity constraints could also act as barriers to engagement. Limited internal resources or staff capacity were identified as obstacles by 25% of respondents, while 24% noted a lack of internal expertise on local corporate governance and market practices. These findings echo a broader theoretical point. As the benefits of engagement are shared across all shareholders while the costs are borne by the engaging investor alone, monitoring is systematically underprovided, reflecting the classic free-rider problem in collective action (Edmans and Holderness, 2017[21]). The challenge is particularly acute for institutional investors with broadly diversified portfolios, where engagement costs are amplified by the sheer number of holdings, a constraint often associated with passive investment models. Finally, 10% of respondents cited the lack of proxy adviser services, highlighting the limited availability of external service providers for engagement.
Collaborative engagement can amplify investor influence and improve dialogue with investee companies by pooling insights and presenting a consistent voice. The empirical evidence points to a marked difference in effectiveness: collaborative ESG engagements achieve a success rate of around 45%, against only 3% for ESG engagements pursued individually (Dimson, Karakaş and Li, 2026[22]). Despite these potential gains, the OECD survey reveals significant obstacles. Resource limitations and the lack of trust or alignment among investors are the two most frequently cited barriers, each identified by 53% of respondents (Figure 3.20). Institutional investors often diverge in investment strategies, engagement priorities and attitudes towards corporate intervention, while limited resources hinder sustained collaboration, especially for smaller asset managers without the staff or expertise to participate in joint initiatives. Concerns about competitive conflicts (44%) and legal risks such as concert party rules and antitrust restrictions (42%) further deter co-operation. Finally, the free-rider problem, where investors benefit from others’ engagement efforts without contributing themselves, was cited by 20% of respondents. Together, these factors have constrained the broader use of collaborative engagement to strengthen corporate governance and promote long-term value creation.
Resource limitations and lack of trust among investors are the most frequently cited obstacles
Note: Respondents could select multiple options. Percentages therefore sum to more than 100 per cent.
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
Importantly, legal risk remains a key barrier to collaborative engagement. In some jurisdictions, such engagement may risk breaching concert party rules. In others, investors acting collectively may be deemed to hold shares jointly, thereby triggering additional administrative requirements, such as the obligation to file a large shareholding report. Japan offers a recent example of how regulators can respond to such concerns. The third revision of Japan’s Stewardship Code, published in June 2025, was explicitly aimed at promoting collective and collaborative engagement and increasing the transparency of beneficial shareholders, building on a prior amendment to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act that clarifies the scope of joint holders under the large shareholding reporting rules (JFSA, 2025[23]). These efforts have provided investors with greater legal certainty to engage collectively and signalled the regulator’s intention to foster a more open and co-operative environment for stewardship activities.
3.3.2. Voting and sustainability integration
Voting remains one of the most common forms of shareholder engagement among institutional investors in Asia. According to the OECD survey, 63% of respondents reported regularly exercising their voting rights. Of these, 48% vote for most of the companies in their portfolios, while 15% limit their voting activity to their top holdings or a select number of companies (Figure 3.21, Panel A). In contrast, 37% of respondents indicated that they do not exercise their voting rights. This relatively high rate of non-participation may reflect a combination of practical challenges, such as limited resources and the outsourcing of voting functions to global headquarters, as well as a perceived lack of influence in markets with concentrated ownership structures.
The majority of institutional investors in Asia have established formal voting policies to guide proxy voting decisions. Specifically, 55% of respondents indicated having a formal, documented voting policy in place (Panel B). This suggests a growing trend in stewardship practices in the region, as well as an effort to align voting activities with internal governance frameworks or fiduciary obligations. However, the results also show that a significant proportion of investors have less formalised approaches. Nineteen per cent of respondents said they follow informal internal guidelines, and 18% said they have no voting policy at all.
Most Asian institutional investors regularly vote, and the majority have a formal voting policy in place
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
Institutional investors in the region tend to align with company management on most voting matters, with only a minority consistently opposing proposals. In particular, 26% of respondents vote against management proposals less than 1% of the time and 29% between 1% and 5% (Figure 3.22). This means that over half (53%) of investors rarely oppose management decisions. Meanwhile, 21% report voting against management proposals between 5% and 10% of the time. Only 17% of respondents indicate that they oppose management proposals more than 10% of the time, reflecting a smaller, yet still significant, group of investors who are more active or critical. Finally, 7% of respondents say they never vote against management proposals.
Over half of Asian institutional investors oppose fewer than 5% of management proposals
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
Although only a small share of institutional investors engages directly with companies on their ESG strategy, a growing number are integrating ESG considerations into their investment processes. Among the institutions surveyed, 68% reported that they consider ESG factors when making investment decisions, while 32% do not take them into account at all (Figure 3.23, Panel A).
Among investors who consider ESG factors, the most common approach is negative screening or exclusion: 64% use this strategy to avoid or divest from companies that fail to meet specific ESG criteria (Panel B). The second most prevalent strategy, used by 59% of investors, involves ESG integration, which means incorporating ESG metrics into financial analysis and valuation models to inform investment decisions. Furthermore, 48% of investors practise active ownership to promote better ESG performance and disclosure. For example, they use voting and direct dialogue to encourage investee companies to improve their ESG performance.
Around two-thirds of Asian institutional investors consider ESG factors, most often through negative screening
Note: For Panel B, respondents could select multiple options. Percentages therefore sum to more than 100 per cent.
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional Investor Engagement in Asia; see Annex A for details.
3.3.3. Investor activism
Investor activism aims to influence a company’s strategy or decisions to improve financial performance or advance specific goals, such as enhancing corporate governance, increasing transparency or integrating ESG considerations into corporate decisions. Common forms of activism include shareholder proposals, proxy campaigns and direct engagement with management.
Investor activism has been most prevalent in the United States, which alone accounted for about 80% of campaigns in 2025 (Figure 3.24, Panel A). In contrast, Asian companies were targeted by only 29 activism campaigns in 2025, representing only 6% of the global total. While this share remains low, Asia experienced an upward trend in activism between 2016 and 2021, followed by a decline in recent years (Panel B). Institutional investors were the most common activist shareholders every year, initiating nearly two-thirds of all activism campaigns in Asia during the period.
Asia records less investor activism compared to globally, with moderate increase over the last decade
Note: In Panel B, investors are classified following De La Cruz, Medina and Tang (2019[24]) “Owners of the world’s listed companies”.
Source: LSEG; OECD calculations; see Annex A for details.
A notable feature of shareholder activism in Asia is its strong concentration within a few jurisdictions. Of the 18 Asian jurisdictions analysed, half did not see any activist campaign since 2010. Japan had the highest number of campaigns, accounting for 43% of all campaigns in Asia during the period (Figure 3.25). China and Korea also experienced relatively high levels of activism compared to other jurisdictions. Together with Japan, these three markets accounted for 78% of all activist campaigns in Asia.
Investor activism campaigns are mostly concentrated in few jurisdictions
Note: Data shows shareholder activism in Asia between 2010-2026. Data is only available until end of March 2026.
Source: LSEG; OECD calculations; see Annex A for details.
Across the four regions analysed, investor activism campaigns generally raise similar issues, with the top three topics accounting for around two-thirds of all campaigns. The most common topic is shareholder rights (Figure 3.26), which accounts for 41% of activism campaigns. This reflects investor concerns relating to concentrated ownership structures, limited protections for minority shareholders and the need for more equitable treatment of investors.
The second most common topic is “seeking alternatives”, which typically involves proposals for strategic actions such as divestitures, spin-offs or company sales, to enhance shareholder value. This topic is prevalent in the United States, where it constitutes 27% of all campaigns. In Asia, it represents 17% of activist campaigns, reflecting a growing appetite for value-enhancing corporate restructuring. Board representation is the third most common topic across all regions and represents 9% of all investor activism in Asia.
Shareholder rights is the most common investor activism topic across all regions and especially prevalent in Asia
Note: Figure shows top 3 topics for shareholder activism campaigns in each region. The data covers global shareholder activism campaigns between 2010-2026. Data is only available until end of March for 2026.
Source: LSEG; OECD calculations; see Annex A for details.
Supporting the development of a strong and diversified institutional investor base. Institutional investors continue to play a relatively limited role in many Asian capital markets, where ownership remains concentrated among corporate, public-sector and strategic individual shareholders. In particular, non-domestic investors hold the majority of institutional equity in Asia, but their participation remains uneven and concentrated in a few markets. Policy efforts to strengthen the domestic institutional investor base could include widening pension-fund coverage, gradually shifting towards asset-backed pension systems and providing appropriately flexible investment mandates, while preserving prudential safeguards. These measures can expand the pool of long-term capital and support market liquidity and price discovery. At the same time, policy efforts to facilitate greater participation by non-domestic investors could focus on improving market accessibility, harmonising disclosure standards and reducing cross-border investment frictions. Such reforms can complement domestic institutional capacity and deepen capital markets. The growing influence of global benchmark indices and passive investing further increases the importance of accessibility reforms.
Reinforcing stewardship frameworks and aligning incentives across the investment chain. As savings are increasingly intermediated through complex investment chains, the distance between beneficial owners and the agents exercising shareholder rights has grown. Many Asian jurisdictions have stewardship codes, but their design and enforcement vary and resources remain limited. Further refinement of stewardship frameworks could help ensure that they reflect local conditions, align incentives with the long-term interests of beneficiaries, and benchmark against the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
Promoting issuer practices that facilitate constructive engagement and ensure equitable treatment of shareholders. Effective stewardship also depends on issuer readiness. Consistent with the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, listed companies are expected to ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign investors, and provide accessible channels for dialogue on material governance matters. Reducing practical barriers, such as restrictive annual general shareholder meetings access, short notice periods and limited English-language documentation, would broaden the scope for meaningful engagement, particularly for non-domestic investors.
Enhancing transparency, disclosure and voting infrastructure. Transparency on voting policies, voting records and conflicts of interest underpins accountability across the investment chain. Most Asian jurisdictions expect disclosure of voting policies, but far fewer require detailed voting outcomes, and investors face operational obstacles to voting. Policymakers can promote greater consistency and granularity of voting disclosure, modernise voting infrastructure and address practical constraints such as the clustering of annual general meetings.
Strengthening oversight of proxy advisers and other intermediaries. Proxy advisers play a growing role in voting outcomes in Asia, yet regulatory approaches differ widely. In line with the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, it is important to ensure that proxy advisers disclose their methodologies, manage conflicts of interest and maintain adequate analytical resources. Oversight calibrated to market size and maturity can reinforce trust in the broader stewardship framework.
Coordinating capital market regulation, corporate governance frameworks and investor policies. Effective institutional investor engagement depends on consistency between market rules, governance frameworks and stewardship expectations. Family-controlled groups, cross-shareholding structures and significant state ownership often confine institutional investors to minority positions. Strengthening minority shareholder protection, board independence and related-party transaction enforcement would enhance engagement, while narrowing overly broad concert party rules avoids disproportionate consequences for constructive dialogue. Governance reforms of state-owned enterprises can further improve responsiveness to shareholders.
Strengthening active ownership to support long-term value creation and market trust. Engagement in Asia tends to focus on financial performance and business strategy, with sustainability topics playing a more limited role and shareholder activism remaining rare. Persistent valuation discounts have been linked to ownership concentration, conservative capital allocation and limited institutional-investor pressure. Active and well-resourced stewardship can encourage more efficient capital allocation, stronger shareholder returns and more consistent integration of long-term value drivers, including sustainability and human capital, into investment processes. Policymakers can support this through capacity building, fiduciary-duty frameworks that recognise financially material long-term factors, and broader reforms to expand the investor base.
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