This chapter examines the evolution of trade in agricultural and food products along with related policies over the past three decades since the WTO Agreement on Agriculture was established. It then analyses how the environmental sustainability of agriculture and food production has been addressed, looking particularly at the growing use of trade-related measures to address environmental concerns and at an increasing prevalence of voluntary sustainability initiatives in agriculture and food. The final section of this chapter focusses on public policies to measure and mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in agriculture and food systems, exploring their links with trade and the associated opportunities and challenges.
Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2025
Making the Most of the Trade and Environment Nexus in Agriculture
Abstract
Trade in agricultural and food products has evolved considerably over the three decades since the establishment of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, an evolution that reflects both structural shifts and policy changes.
Agro-food trade has grown rapidly, outpacing production and leading to an increasing differentiation between net-exporting regions (the Americas, Oceania and Europe) and net-importing regions (Asia and Africa). Production and processing increasingly occur across countries, reflecting the development of agro-food global value chains.
However, progress in advancing the agricultural trading system reforms initiated under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture has stalled. While overall trade protection levels have declined, including through a growing number of trade agreements, agro-food products continue to be subject to significantly higher most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs than other sectors, quantitative restrictions, and a higher prevalence of non-tariff measures, which may have trade-limiting effects.
The past three decades also saw an evolution of the global conversation around environmental sustainability, with increased attention from governments and other actors, including consumers, to the environmental sustainability of agriculture and food systems.
This has led to the adoption of a range of government policies and sector initiatives − including at the interface of trade policy – aimed at reducing environmental pressures.
Special emphasis has been given to climate change mitigation, considering that agro-food systems are estimated to account for one-third of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
One key development is the growing use of trade-related measures to address environmental concerns, with an increasing number of measures specifically referring to the environmental sustainability of agriculture or food systems.
Another key development is the growing use of voluntary initiatives to evaluate or demonstrate the sustainability performance of activities and products. Across sectors, agro-food supply chains now show the highest prevalence of such initiatives. Some governments are also beginning to incorporate references to these initiatives into their trade agreements.
Governments have introduced a broad spectrum of mitigation policies. Some of these measures have explicit or implicit links to trade based on their design or sectoral focus.
The countries covered in this report self-reported 120 public sector GHG mitigation policies in agriculture and food value chains that may relate to trade, including 43% that promoted mitigation of GHG emissions in export products or sectors.
OECD Members and emerging economies have also developed numerous initiatives to perform carbon footprint calculations at the farm level, product level, or for specific sub-sectors, with 114 public or public-private tools or initiatives identified in this chapter.
Linking trade-related measures to environmental objectives presents opportunities and challenges, as the interactions of trade and environmental policies are multiple and complex. While carefully designed policies can help speed up the transition towards more sustainable agriculture and food systems, the multiplication of measures and their lack of harmonisation raise concerns about potential trade barriers and additional costs, which could particularly impact small producers and developing countries.
Agro-food trade is vital for global food security, farmer livelihoods and nutrition, and it can support improved environmental outcomes. However, if its expansion incentivises unsustainable practices or occurs under weak governance, it can also generate negative environmental externalities.
Governments face the challenge of ensuring that food remains available and affordable for consumers, protecting the environment, and mitigating negative environmental impacts, while avoiding undue trade costs and barriers. Reconciling these goals demands careful coordination and policy coherence.
To ensure global food security and environmental sustainability, it is essential to align the promotion of open and transparent agro-food trade with efforts to achieve tangible environmental improvements.
The entry into force of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture, on 1 January 1995, marked an historic point in the reform of global agricultural trade, with the development and implementation of new rules and a framework to address trade barriers in market access, as well as domestic support and export subsidies. Thirty years on, the trade of agricultural and food products has evolved considerably, while remaining essential for global food security. This evolution reflects, on the one hand, structural shifts − such as production increasingly occurring across countries, in global value chains that make use of inputs sourced from around the world – and, on the other hand, policy changes: in a context of limited progress at the multilateral level, many countries have shifted their focus toward bilateral and regional trade agreements, so that an important share of global trade now takes place under regional or preferential trade agreements. Moreover, new policy measures and approaches are increasingly being used to address emerging challenges, such as environmental pressures from agriculture and food systems.
Agro-food trade expanded considerably over the last three decades
Over the past three decades, the value of global agro-food trade has expanded significantly. In 2021-23, world agro-food exports1 reached USD 1.4 trillion in current prices, almost five times their level in 1995-97. Trade has also grown at a faster rate than agricultural production, with the share of traded production for key agricultural commodities2 increasing from an average of 16% in 2000 to 23% in 2022-24 (OECD/FAO, 2025[1]).
Trade growth has been mostly positive throughout the three-decade period, with a few exceptions. The most dramatic slowdown occurred in 2009, when the global economic crisis saw factors such as a drop in domestic demand and the temporary drying up of short-term trade finance provoke a severe collapse in global trade (OECD, 2010[2]). While trade experienced another slump in 2015 in a weak global economic context, agro-food trade did not suffer a similar collapse over the period 2020-21 as a result of the COVID‑19 pandemic. This was in part due to government responses that included urgent measures to ensure supply (such as actions to ensure the functioning of government agencies or co-ordinate responses with the private sector), no-regrets measures (such as trade facilitation), and temporary relief measures (such as compensation for affected actors or consumer assistance) (OECD, 2021[3]). This resilience provides evidence of the extent to which policy makers invested in the mechanisms and policies to avoid a repetition of the 2007-08 food price crisis, such as the Agriculture Market Information System (AMIS) (OECD, 2021[4]) (see also Box 1.5 below). At the same time, a new decline in 2023 suggests that global trade patterns remain volatile and further challenges lie ahead.
Even if global agro-food markets demonstrated their resilience in the face of disruptions such as the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries remain vulnerable to the impact of trade shocks such as supply chain bottlenecks. Moreover, following a surge in the early 2000s associated with the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the accession of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) to the WTO, the share of exported agricultural products with respect to global production has stabilised in recent years and is expected to remain stable. The impact of past trade liberalisation efforts is also diminishing, with slower progress in reducing multilateral tariffs and addressing trade-distorting producer support in recent years (OECD/FAO, 2024[5]).
Globally, the Americas is the largest exporting region, originating approximately 40% of the value of world agro-food exports in 2021-23 (Figure 1.1). The European Union (treated as a single entity for trade purposes) is the world’s largest individual exporter. In 2021-23, it accounted for 17% of world agro-food exports, with beverages and spirits, cereal preparations, and dairy as its top export products. The EU was followed by the United States, which had a share of 13% and oilseeds, cereals and meat as its top export products, and Brazil, which accounted for 10% and had oilseeds, meat, and sugar as main export products. While the shares of the European Union and the United States in global exports decreased with respect to the base period 1995-97 (when each accounted for around 20%), Brazil doubled its share in world exports and has positioned itself as a leading world exporter of several commodities (United Nations, 2025[6]).
Asia has emerged as the top agro-food importer
Asia was the destination of 47% of the world’s agro-food imports in 2021-23 (Figure 1.2). This region has become a leading net importer due to factors such as population growth, income-driven consumption expansion, and increasing urbanisation (OECD/FAO, 2025[1]). In terms of individual importers, China accounted for 15% of world imports, followed by the United States and the European Union at 14% and 12% respectively. In particular, China significantly increased its share from 3% in 1995-97 and is the largest global importer of its top import products (oilseeds, meat, and cereals). The United States’ top import products were beverages and spirits, fats and oils, and fruits, while the European Union’s were fruits, fats and oils, and oilseeds (United Nations, 2025[6]).
Three regions, the Americas, Oceania, and Europe, were net agro-food exporters in 2021-23. The first two have been net exporters with a growing surplus since 1995, while Europe turned into a net exporter after 2016 (Figure 1.3). For its part, Asia’s agro-food import deficit grew from USD 58 billion in 1995-97 to USD 294 billion in 2021-23. This gap between agricultural commodity net-exporting and net-importing regions is expected to widen due to different comparative advantages and production capacities as well as food and feed demand developments, with key exporters projected to continue generating surpluses, and regions with significant population growth and an expanding middle class projected to see their net imports rise over the next decade (OECD/FAO, 2025[1]).
Oilseeds have experienced the strongest export growth
The top five export product categories in 2021-23 were cereals, fats and oils, oilseeds, meats, and fruits and nuts, which together represented 44% of the value of world agro-food exports. Between 1995-97 and 2021-23, the export value of oilseeds and vegetable oils grew the most, respectively by over 600% and 500% (Figure 1.4). Along with quantity increases, this also reflects sharp price rises, as exports measured in tonnes increased at a slower pace over the same period: 135% for soybeans, 176% for other oilseeds and 88% for vegetable oils (OECD, 2024[7]).3 Global oilseed trade has grown rapidly due to increasing demand for protein meals used in livestock feed, the geographic separation between oilseed production and processing, and rising demand for vegetable oils for food, feed, biofuels, and industrial uses (OECD/FAO, 2025[1]).
Within the oilseeds category, soybeans are the most traded product, with 44% of global production volume traded in 2021-23 (up from 25% in 1995-97) against 14% for other oilseeds. More than one-third of the global production of vegetable oils is also traded (Figure 1.5). Only around a quarter of the production volume of oilseeds and other oil crops (such as palm oil) is for direct human consumption (OECD/FAO, 2024[5]). Over half of oilseed production is used as animal feed, mainly as protein meal, for which China has been a key driver of demand. While not among the top export products in terms of value, milk powders are also highly traded, with exports representing over half of production in 2021-23.
Agriculture and food are increasingly integrated into global value chains
Agro-food trade is increasingly organised within global value chains (GVCs), with the production of food occurring increasingly across countries and making use of inputs sourced from around the world. The development of GVCs means that agro-food production from one country can cross borders multiple times by being exported either directly or indirectly (when embedded in a processed good).
OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA)4 data show that since 1995 there has been a significant expansion of trade related to GVCs − that is, of products that cross at least two international borders before being absorbed in final demand − both for primary agriculture and for food manufacturing (Figure 1.6). GVCs have also become more global as more countries participate, with countries showing different patterns of engagement (Box 1.1) (OECD, 2020[8]).
Exploring trade in value added provides insight into the different types of value creation for the agricultural sector. Direct exports of agricultural value added occur from the sector itself through primary product exports. Indirect exports of agricultural value added embodied in other exports represent the agricultural value added that is exported by other domestic industries, for example in processed or transformed products. At the same time, there are important shares of value addition from services and industrial sectors in the export value of agricultural products. Services were found to represent around a quarter of the total value-added in traded agricultural products and around 35% of food sector exports, through a wide range of activities including business services (such as agricultural consultants and contractors), transport and trade services. In the same way as food processing, these activities can increase domestic value creation.
OECD research has identified primary and processing value adding pathways related to trade and GVC engagement. In the primary pathway, domestic value addition is made to the primary product, and the sector’s engagement in trade and GVCs is via direct exports for foreign processing or foreign final demand. In the processing pathway, domestic value addition to agriculture and links to trade and GVCs occur through downstream processing sectors. The research found that countries participating in trade and GVCs via the primary pathway generated equivalent overall trade-related domestic value-added returns as those participating via the processing pathway. A key difference was the share of services value-added, which was higher in countries that followed the primary pathway.
These two pathways are captured in two key indicators that measure a country’s degree of engagement in GVCs: i) backward participation, which measures the share of imported intermediates embedded in the country’s exports and represents the processing pathway; and ii) forward participation, which measures the share of exports that form an intermediate into other countries’ exports and represents the primary pathway.
Country participation in GVCs can be measured through several indicators, including the share of foreign value added in a country’s gross exports (backward participation). Between 1995 and 2022 (latest available data), backward participation increased in the agriculture and forestry sector for all but two of the economies covered. Increases were also observed in the food industry for all but five economies (Figure 1.7). This means that most countries’ agriculture and food exports have a higher share of imported intermediate goods and services embodied. This value added can come from different foreign industries upstream in the production chain.
The development of agro-food GVCs creates opportunities for countries to increase economic activity and broaden the gains from specialisation and trade. OECD research has found evidence that involvement in GVCs is a key driver of economic transformation. Countries with higher levels of GVC participation have experienced stronger sector and employment growth and have been able to reap productivity gains from new technologies and wider innovations. Participation in GVCs also has wider spillover effects on productivity, growth, and livelihood improvements: through a more efficient allocation of resources, GVC development has raised the availability of food, lowered prices and improved consumer choice, while also supporting income growth and job creation (OECD, 2020[8]).
Modelling analysis shows that the openness and diversification of input sources and output destinations in GVCs can also offer options for adjusting to disruptions and mitigating exposure to shocks, thereby boosting supply chain resilience (OECD, 2025[11]). Specifically for food, a shift to a more localised regime (where economies are less interconnected via GVCs), was found to result in reduced global production (Arriola et al., 2020[12]). At the same time, the transformation driven by GVCs can create both winners and losers, underscoring the need for effective policies to maximise benefits and support those facing adjustment.
The emergence of agro-food GVCs, and the closer connections they create between sectors and countries also means that trade and domestic support measures that restrict or unnecessarily increase the costs of trade not only harm countries’ own economies but also those of their trading partners (OECD, 2019[13]). Just as GVC participation expands the gains from open trade, so trade protection along GVCs magnifies the losses: in a context where goods cross borders numerous times, border barriers such as tariffs or non-tariff measures with unnecessarily high compliance costs have a cumulative impact. Thus, trade protection and distorting agricultural support policies can reduce the gains from GVC participation and impose costs along the value chain (OECD, 2020[8]).
But multilateral progress on agricultural trade policy reform has stalled
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture mandated, in Article 20, the continuation of negotiations to achieve the “long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in [agricultural] support and protection.” Thirty years on, progress towards this objective has been limited. The most important result was the 2015 Nairobi Decision to eliminate all forms of agricultural export subsidies. Other deliverables of the WTO agriculture negotiations include a 2022 decision exempting food purchases by the World Food Programme from export prohibitions or restrictions. However, no meaningful agreements have been reached in areas such as improving market access or reducing trade-distorting domestic support. Most recently, the thirteenth Ministerial Conference (MC13) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), held in 2024, ended with no outcomes of agriculture reform (OECD, 2024[14]).
Producer protection remains high across OECD, and increasingly, emerging economies
Agricultural producer protection, measured by the Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient (PNPC),5 decreased overall for OECD Members and increased somewhat for certain emerging economies between 1995 and 2024 (Figure 1.8). In 1995-97, prices received by farmers in OECD countries were 27% above border reference prices, while in emerging economies prices received by farmers were at level with border reference prices. While these aggregates hide wide disparities and different domestic and trade policies across countries, policy reforms in some OECD economies and a shift in the landscape of support towards certain large emerging economies have narrowed this gap: by 2022-24, prices received by farmers were 6% above international prices for OECD economies and 3% for emerging economies.
In 2022-24, the highest producer nominal protection coefficients continue to be observed in OECD Members, particularly Iceland, Korea, Switzerland, Japan, and Norway, even if these countries also made the largest cuts in producer protection between 1995 and 2024 (Figure 1.9). The lowest PNPCs in 2022‑24 were recorded in India, Argentina and Viet Nam, all of which have negative market price support, meaning that on average producer prices have been below border reference prices.
Numerous OECD studies have assessed the impacts of agricultural support measures on production, trade, and the environment. Previous analysis estimated trade impact indices of support to agriculture − an indicator of the trade-impact potential of countries’ support package expressed as a percentage of gross farm receipts − for all countries covered by the 2017 Monitoring report. It found that the overall trade impact index almost halved between 1995-97 and 2014-16, although with variations across individual countries (OECD, 2017[15]). This was driven by reductions and restructuring of the way countries provide support to their producers, including shifts away from market price support (MPS). Trade impacts vary for different types of support. The largest trade impact was found for support for variable inputs with no limits on their use, which was even greater than that of market price support (MPS). The trade impact of countries’ policy packages was distributed in a broadly similar manner to the distribution of the percentage producer support estimate (%PSE). Among the countries with high producer protection, despite similar %PSE levels, higher trade impact indices were estimated for countries with a higher share of input subsidies, MPS and output payments (such as Korea, Iceland and Japan) than for those with larger shares of other forms of support such as Switzerland and Norway (OECD, 2017[15]).
In general, countries’ contributions to the global trade impact of agricultural support depend not only on the relative trade impact of their policy mix but also on their share of global agricultural production. Consequently, large agricultural producers such as China, the European Union and the United States exert significantly more influence in the global system than smaller producers (OECD, 2017[15]).
Multilateral dialogue and negotiations have been key drivers in reducing production- and trade-distorting forms of support over the years, which was reflected in the changes in the levels and landscape of support observed since the OECD started publishing monitoring reports in the late 1980s. However, the impetus has waned in recent years, leading to little change in the relative composition of support: in 2022-24, the potentially most distorting forms of support, including MPS, payments based on output and on the unconstrained use of variable inputs, made up 66% of the overall positive producer support, only four percentage points down from 70% in 2000-02. OECD research has also studied the links between agricultural support policies and the environment (Box 1.2).
Lankoski, Nales and Valin (2025[16]) combine microeconomic analysis, applied modelling and a literature review to compare the effects of different forms of producer support across environmental domains (greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity, water quality and resources, air and soil quality). A proposed typology characterises the level of environmental risk or potential benefit of each form of support (Table 1.1). Potential environmental benefits found for specific instruments do not imply that these are the most efficient measures to address the environmental issues at stake. Moreover, the currently available data allows to characterise some but not all of the support instruments, underscoring the need for better data collection to ensure that granular features of programmes are better captured, particularly since environmental outcomes highly depend on the local context.
Support coupled to production was found to be the most likely to generate environmentally harmful impacts. However, these vary depending on the type of production or input targeted by the support, as well as on the possible presence of environmental conditions attached to the support instrument.
Less coupled forms of producer support can generate lower environmental harm. If they are accompanied by production and input restrictions and strong, well-designed and implemented environmental cross-compliance, it is possible to achieve further reduction of the negative impacts and even some environmental benefits. The measures most likely to be environmentally beneficial are agri-environmental payments, particularly performance- or results-based payments directly tied to environmental outcomes.
The role of MPS on the environment was found to be complex. At the domestic level and in absence of production constraints, MPS is among the most potentially harmful through the production incentives it generates. However, impacts on some global environment domains (such as climate or biodiversity) can be ambiguous when considering that the removal of MPS may, in some contexts, relocate production to currently less environmentally efficient regions of the world.
Notes: Classes: High risk (potentially most harmful), Medium risk (potentially (less) harmful), Low risk (potentially least harmful), No risk (neutral impact), Uncertain (ambiguous), Slight potential benefit (slightly potentially beneficial), Potential benefit (moderately potentially beneficial), High potential benefit (potentially most beneficial).
Grey cells correspond to non-applicable combinations. Slight p. benefit = slight potential benefit; Pot. benefit = potential benefit; High p. benefit = high potential benefit; env. = environment; R/I = receipt or income. * Market price support impacts relate here to domestic effects, while noting that global effects on some environmental variables can be ambiguous.
Despite some declines, agro-food tariffs remain higher than for other products
Prior to 2025, the average tariffs applied on the imports of agro-food products have declined over time.6 However, agro-food continues to be subject to higher tariffs relative to other sectors. In 2023, the simple average most-favoured nation (MFN) tariff7 applied by WTO members to agro-food products was almost twice the rate applied to non-agricultural products (Figure 1.10).
Applied tariff rates vary substantially amongst agro-food subsectors, with beverages and tobacco subject to the highest, and cotton to the lowest (Table 1.2). Agro-food products also tend to face more tariff peaks, both in developed and developing economies, with tariffs on some products approaching or even exceeding 100%, or increasing with higher levels of processing (tariff escalation). These forms of “residual” protection (i.e. protection that remained high even after the general liberalisation of the Uruguay Round) often fall on products that countries deem as sensitive.8
Simple average for all WTO members that notified MFN tariffs in the corresponding year
Note: The average includes an estimation of ad valorem equivalents for tariffs expressed in non-ad valorem form. Agriculture defined according to Annex I of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
Source: World Trade Organization (2025). WTO Stats [database], https://stats.wto.org/, consulted in February 2025.
Trade at zero tariffs is also less common for agro-food products. In 2023, an average of 29% of agro-food imports (in terms of value) entered into WTO Members’ markets MFN duty-free, against 43% for non-agricultural sectors. Agro-food products are also more often subject to higher seasonal tariffs and to non-ad valorem (NAV) tariffs,9 which are considered to be less transparent, and which can confer higher levels of protection when prices are low. The average share of tariff subheadings subject to non-ad valorem MFN duties in 2023 was 5%, against 1% for non-agricultural goods (World Trade Organization, 2025[17]).
Many countries also continue to use tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for agro-food imports. While quantitative restrictions for non-agricultural goods are generally not permitted under WTO rules, TRQs were allowed to guarantee some import access for sensitive agricultural products. Most multilateral TRQs have their origin in the Uruguay Round, while others stem from processes of accession to the WTO. As of 2022, WTO Members’ schedules of commitments included 1208 TRQs, even if only 534 of them were opened that year (World Trade Organization, 2024[18]).10 Multilateral quotas are most concentrated (i.e. covering a higher percentage of a product group’s subheadings) in dairy, sugar, and animal products (World Trade Organization, 2019[19]).
More agricultural trade is taking place in the context of preferential agreements
Not all trade occurs under MFN conditions. Rather, it often takes place under regional trade agreements (RTA) or other preferential arrangements,11 the number of which has increased steadily since 1995 (Figure 1.11). While an estimation for agro-food is not available, an estimated 64% of world exports was covered by some type of trade agreement (including unilateral preferences) in 2020, up from 55% in 2000 (Dadush and Dominguez Prost, 2023[20]).
Already in 2015, the OECD found that liberalisation of agriculture under most trade agreements went beyond individual countries’ WTO commitments. This is the case even if the sector was generally treated as sensitive and thus often subject to special treatment, including partial reductions in duties, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) or the exclusion of certain products from liberalisation commitments (OECD, 2015[21]). The increasing number of RTAs has thus been found to enable some liberalisation of agro-food trade. At the same time, the liberalisation only benefits parties to the agreements. Moreover, features such as the heterogeneity in rules of origin from multiple agreements can create a “spaghetti bowl” effect that makes it hard for traders to navigate the different requirements, raising the costs of trade and diminishing the extent of liberalisation (Thompson-Lipponen and Greenville, 2019[22]).
Non-tariff measures affect agriculture and food products more than other sectors
The trade of agricultural and food products is frequently subject to non-tariff measures (NTMs12). NTMs tend to be more common in agro-food trade: one study found a frequency index (percentage of traded products subject to at least one NTM) of over 90% against an average of 40% for all other sectors, as well as a higher prevalence score, with an average of 8 NTMs applied to a given agro-food product against less than 2 in most other sectors (UNCTAD/World Bank, 2018[23]).
The most common type of NTM applied on agro-food products are sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, which represented 69% of all NTMs implemented in 2022 (Figure 1.12). This reflects the nature of agro-food products and the link between agricultural inputs and food production. Technical barriers to trade (TBT), such as standards for food packaging and labelling, are the second most common type of measure.
One OECD study found that over 80% of agro-food trade is subject to at least one type of SPS measure. By contrast, TBT measures covered a smaller set of products (roughly 50% to 60%). Border control measures (related to customs formalities) were found to be less frequent than SPS and TBT and to concern animal products, vegetables and fruits more often than processed foodstuffs. Quantitative restrictions (such as tariff rate quotas or import prohibitions) were found more or less uniformly across agricultural sectors but covering less than 20% of products (Gourdon, Stone and van Tongeren, 2020[24]).
Given their diverse nature, measuring NTMs and estimating their effects on trade is complex. They often stem from domestic regulations that aim to overcome or reduce the impacts of market imperfections, such as those related to negative externalities (e.g. pollution), information asymmetries, and risks for human, animal or plant health. As such, they can have benefits as well as costs for trade: for example, labelling to address information asymmetries can increase the costs to businesses, but at the same time strengthen consumer confidence in both domestic and foreign products (OECD, 2019[25]).
In a context of increasing use of NTMs, which can respond to a need to address emerging concerns in areas such as health, safety, and environmental quality, there is scope for minimising unnecessary costs and trade distortions while respecting governments’ right to regulate to meet public policy objectives. The issue is not the regulatory objectives, which may even be shared across countries, but is more often the application of different standards or methods to achieve those objectives that can unnecessarily raise costs for businesses (OECD, 2019[25]). The WTO SPS and TBT Agreements and the International Standard-Setting Bodies (ISSBs) − such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Protection Convention, and the World Organisation for Animal Health − serve as pivotal instruments in promoting harmonised science-based regulations that help with minimising unnecessary trade barriers, while upholding each government's sovereign right to safeguard public health and safety.
Numerous studies have attempted to quantify the trade impacts of NTMs. Specifically for agriculture, an OECD model-based impact estimation found that TBT and SPS measures together can increase import prices of agricultural products by almost 15%. Conformity assessment requirements were also found to significantly increase the cost of trade. But not all NTMs have the same effect: some TBT and SPS measures were found to have a trade enhancing effect and relatively low associated trade costs (Box 1.3). A meta-analysis of studies published between 1990 and 2017 found that the estimated trade effects of NTMs are case-specific and likely to depend on the countries, products and standards examined (Santeramo and Lamonaca, 2019[26]). For example, a recent country study estimated that the average effect on Australian agricultural export quantities of NTMs applied as of 2022 was equivalent to a 19% tariff (Fell and Creed, 2024[27]).
Trade costs from NTMs are often estimated as tariff equivalents or ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) and expressed as the percentage increase of the import price due to the policy. One OECD study estimated average AVEs as being above 13% for animal products and for processed food and as nearly 10% for vegetables and fruits. The AVEs for fats and oils were lower (around 6%). Looking at specific measure types, the price-raising effects of TBT measures was more pronounced for processed foods than for agricultural products. SPS regulations were found to have a smaller effect. Due to their relatively lower frequency, border control measures and quantitative restrictions were found to have less impact on prices.
Certain regulations can also facilitate trade. NTM impacts on traded quantities were investigated to identify possible trade-enhancing effects. Border control measures, quantitative control measures, and conformity assessment measures were found to have almost exclusively trade-hampering impacts. However, certain SPS and TBT regulations (e.g. for maximum residue levels, labelling or production process requirement) were found to have a strong positive effect on trade flows and relatively low AVEs. Regulations can thus be trade-creating by helping to address information asymmetries that would otherwise keep suppliers out of markets altogether.
Greater harmonisation of regulatory approaches is an important means by which countries can secure that regulations have a trade enhancing effect while reducing their associated costs. Incorporating regulatory co-operation provisions into trade agreements is one way through which this can be achieved.
SPS measures are increasingly important in a more interconnected world
The increasingly central role of SPS measures within global agro-food trade is a result of the expansion of trade, the growing complexity of regulations, and the high degree of interconnectedness among country approaches to the management of the risks to plant, human, and animal health.
Countries are also making more use of digital technologies within their SPS systems to facilitate trade (OECD, 2021[28]). In particular, the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic motivated a wider adoption of digital SPS systems, including electronic SPS certificates (e-certificates) and remote audits for food safety. Recent OECD work has looked into the opportunities and challenges of e-certificates and estimated the trade impact of their use. E-certificates were found to be used more frequently in plant and plant-based products, but less so in animal and food products (Ryan, Avery and Kahn, 2023[29]). Another OECD study examined the costs, benefits and effectiveness of remote audits for international food safety (Deuss and Honey, 2023[30]).The OECD has also analysed issues related to SPS approval procedures, which are essential to ensure the safe movement of animals, plants and food between markets but can increase costs and negatively impact trade if administered poorly (Box 1.4).
Electronic SPS certificates have positive effects on trade, but some challenges must be overcome
An SPS certificate is a document issued by the relevant competent authority of the exporting country to attest that a consignment complies with the SPS regulations of the importing country. The use of e-certificates can improve the efficiency of SPS compliance verification processes. Their transmission saves time and can reduce the risk of fraud. Digital records of product characteristics from SPS e-certificates can also support traceability in supply chains. One OECD study using quantitative analysis found a significant trade facilitation impact of using SPS e-certificates for animal and plant products. E‑certificates were also found to help avoid large trade losses during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Introducing digital technologies, including SPS e-certificates, within SPS systems can be challenging. Challenges stem from the planning and analysis required to successfully implement digital technologies; the mixed capacities of countries and supply chain actors to adopt these technologies; and trust concerns regarding the treatment and use of data. They can be particularly significant for developing countries, which already face greater difficulty in complying with the SPS measures and standards of trading partners. Successful expansion of the use of digital tools thus requires careful design, sharing expertise and building trust, and supporting uptake with training and resources for countries and businesses. Ensuring the interoperability between the different digital systems implemented at the border is also essential to increase the uptake of e-certificates by traders.
SPS approval procedures are fundamental, but can become barriers to trade if administered poorly
Another OECD study examined issues related to approval procedures used by countries to ensure the fulfilment of SPS measures. On the one hand, the analysis looked at Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) related to approval procedures raised by Members in the WTO SPS Committee. On the other hand, it identified positive developments and measures undertaken to address seven pressing issues: i) undue delay; ii) inconsistency and discrimination between domestic and imported products; iii) lack of transparency; iv) excessive information-gathering and administrative requirements; v) excessive fees; vi) lack of trust in country or product equivalence; and vii) the application of approval procedure requirements in excess of objective scientific risk assessment.
The existence of an STC related to approval procedures was found to be associated with a trade reduction of 26% against a 12% trade reduction associated with other types of STCs. A survey showed that countries can act to improve SPS approval procedures by simplifying SPS measures, implementing digital solutions, making greater use of international standards, and improving co-ordination between SPS agencies and other border agencies.
Export restrictions on staple crops remain a significant concern
Countries temporarily restricted exports of some agro-food products to shield their domestic consumers from rising and volatile prices many times in the past decades. When these restrictions affect staple crops and are implemented by key producers, they negatively impact the global availability and increase the price of essential foodstuffs. The Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), a G20 initiative established in 2011, monitors developments in food markets, including export restrictions (Box 1.5). As part of its involvement in AMIS, the OECD maintains a database with information on export restrictions on staple crops introduced from 2007 onwards.
Between 2007 and the first quarter of 2024, AMIS member countries generally introduced more export restrictions during three crisis periods: the global food price crisis of 2007-08, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21, and following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Different commodities were subject to different types of measures (Figure 1.13, top panel): maize was mostly targeted by export taxes and prohibitions and rice by minimum export prices and export quotas, followed by export prohibitions. For soybeans, export taxes were the most used measure, followed by export prohibitions, while export quotas and taxes were the most frequently applied on wheat exports. Rice was the most frequently restricted commodity, accounting for 39% of the export restrictions imposed (Figure 1.13, bottom panel).
While many measures are intended to be temporary, in practice they can remain in place longer than expected. Around 45% of export bans introduced between January 2007 and April 2024 lasted between one and six months, and around 50% of export quotas lasted between six months and one year. Export taxes tended to last longer: over a quarter of export taxes were in place for longer than a year (OECD, 2024[33]). In particular, export restrictions were relatively short-lived during the COVID-19 pandemic (28% lasted less than one month), whereas one-quarter of the measures applied during the global food crisis lasted more than one year.
Export restrictions were also implemented in response to rises in international prices of fertilisers. Prices began to rise sharply in 2020 and had increased fourfold by April 2022, remaining at elevated levels in the subsequent months (Adenäuer, Laget and Cluff, 2024[34]). Many measures were introduced after 2021; in particular, major fertiliser exporters such as China and Russia imposed various restrictions (bans, quotas, taxes) to maintain domestic supply. Some of these restrictions changed frequently or were deemed insufficiently transparent (Jones and Deuss, 2024[35]). Other recent policy developments on fertilisers are addressed in Chapters 2 and 3.
The effects of export restrictions go beyond the restricting countries, where they can curtail agricultural investments and affect the long-term development of the sector (Akter, 2022[36]). Export restrictions can also influence prices in the restricting countries’ trading partners and globally (Deuss, 2017[37]). Moreover, they often have a “domino effect”: when one country announces a restriction, others follow suit, further aggravating price spikes and raising concerns over the reliability of world food markets (OECD, 2013[38]). Some authors consider that agricultural export restrictions are “underregulated” by WTO rules (Anania, 2013[39]; Kleimann, 2022[40]; Mitra and Josling, 2009[41]). Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture requires Members to notify new export restrictions on foodstuffs as early as possible, consult upon request with interested importers, and consider their impact on importing countries’ food security. However, these requirements are often ignored: between 1995 and mid-September 2025, only 43 export restrictions had been notified (World Trade Organization, 2025[42]), despite monitoring systems identifying a higher number of measures. For instance, AMIS member countries notified only three export prohibitions on rice and four on wheat to the WTO as having been introduced between January 2007 and April 2024. In contrast, the OECD database records 29 export prohibitions for rice and 21 for wheat introduced by AMIS members over the same time period.
Past crises have provided important lessons for the international community to improve the management of subsequent events. In particular, the 2007-08 food price crisis highlighted the need to improve market information and international co-ordination in order to strengthen readiness and avoid uncoordinated responses. The development of AMIS was part of this effort (OECD, 2013[38]). The lessons from 2007-08 also helped policymakers better manage the COVID-19 crisis: even if countries did introduce export restrictions, overall, their number and impact were limited (OECD, 2021[4]).
AMIS is an inter-agency platform that aims to avoid or mitigate food price crises by enhancing the transparency of food markets and policy responses. To achieve this, AMIS provides timely information on the global supplies of staple crops (wheat, maize, rice and soybeans) and improves policy co‑ordination in international food markets.
Launched in 2011 by the G20 Ministers of Agriculture following the food price hikes of 2007-08 and 2010, AMIS is composed of the G20 members plus Spain and seven additional major exporting and importing countries of AMIS crops. Together, AMIS participants represent around 80-90% of global production, consumption and trade volumes of the targeted crops.
The AMIS Secretariat consists of ten international organisations: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Group on Earth Observations Global Agricultural Monitoring (GEOGLAM), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Grains Council (IGC), OECD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank Group, World Food Programme (WFP), and the WTO. Each brings their comparative advantage and expertise to this initiative. The OECD and WTO lead the work on policy monitoring, reporting, and analysis.
Note: For more information, see www.amis-outlook.org.
Source: (OECD, 2024[33]).
The developments outlined in this section show how the past 30 years have brought significant changes in agro-food trade and agricultural support, shaped by structural changes and evolving policy frameworks. In this context, growing attention is being paid to the environmental dimensions of agro-food trade, paving the way for more integrated policy approaches.
Agriculture is essential for food security and livelihoods…
Agriculture and food systems are expected to provide food security and nutrition for a growing world population, as well as livelihoods for millions of households around the world. At the same time, food systems are both highly dependent on the environment and also exert important pressures on it (OECD, 2021[43]).
Just like the global economy consists of interactions between national and local economies, food systems globally consist of a multitude of national and local food systems which shape and are in turn shaped by global processes and trends. As a result, policymakers must navigate a web of complex synergies and trade-offs to address the “triple challenge” of ensuring food security and nutrition for all, providing opportunities for livelihoods and promoting rural development, and ensuring environmental sustainability (OECD, 2021[43]).
…but is also an important source of environmental pressures
Environmental pressures from agriculture have accelerated in the past two centuries as the world population grew from 1 billion in the early 1800s to more than 8 billion today. Due to its link with the natural environment, most environmental impacts related to food systems occur either through land use change or at the stage of agricultural production, with agricultural practices directly affecting natural resources and ecosystem services (OECD, 2021[43]; Deconinck and Toyama, 2022[44]; OECD/FAO, 2023[45]).
On average, agriculture accounts for around 70% of freshwater withdrawn from aquifers, streams and lakes worldwide (FAO, 2011[46]), a share that has risen with the global irrigated area and contributes to water stress. Unsustainable agricultural practices also worsen soil degradation. According to a 2015 estimate, 33% of land globally is moderately to highly degraded due to the erosion, salinisation, compaction, acidification, and chemical pollution (FAO and ITPS, 2015[47]). Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from agrifood systems increased by 9% between 2000 and 2020, even if their share in global emissions declined from 38% to 31% due to an increase in other global emission sources (OECD/FAO, 2023[45]). While improvements in both emissions intensity and nutrient use efficiency signalled a relative decoupling of environmental effects of production in OECD countries, this trend has decelerated in recent years (OECD, 2025[48]) (see also section on “Domestic policies” below).
Agricultural expansion is also a leading cause of recent deforestation globally, which in turn is strongly linked with biodiversity loss. A 2018 study found that 27% of global forest loss between 2001 and 2015 was associated with deforestation driven by permanent land use change for the production of commodities (including agriculture, mining and energy infrastructure) (Curtis et al., 2018[49]), while the production of cattle, soybeans and palm oil is estimated to have accounted for 40% of tropical deforestation between 2000 and 2010 (OECD/FAO, 2023[45]).
Despite rapid growth in the availability of data sources and techniques, gaps still exist in the available evidence of the environmental impacts of agriculture. While GHG emissions, land use, and freshwater use are generally the most studied impacts, biodiversity and soil carbon have been much less studied. There is also important heterogeneity among producers and “blind spots” for certain regions and products (Deconinck and Toyama, 2022[44]).
Governments are increasingly paying attention to sustainability concerns associated with agriculture and food systems
The past three decades have seen an evolution of the global conversation around environmental sustainability.13 Since the first definition of the concept of sustainable development in the 1987 report Our Common Future, the groundbreaking discussions of the 1992 Earth Summit, the incorporation of sustainable development and environmental protection in the preamble of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, and the first UN Climate Change Conference in 1995, the international agenda has evolved along with increased knowledge and awareness of emerging environmental challenges. Most recently, in light of environmental challenges including extreme weather events and natural disasters, many countries have raised the ambition of their environmental objectives.
This evolution includes increased attention to the environmental sustainability of agriculture and food production and to the impacts of agricultural activities. This has been reflected in high-level commitments − such as those by the OECD, G7 and G20 Agriculture Ministers − to improving the environmental sustainability of agriculture and food systems (OECD, 2022[50]; G20, 2024[51]; G7, 2024[52]).
Governments are also acting with the aim to reduce environmental pressures from agriculture and food production through numerous approaches and policies, which includes an increasing use of trade-related measures intended to address agri-environmental concerns. The growing awareness of social and human rights risks in agro-food supply chains has also led to the development of international instruments such as the OECD-FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains (Box 1.6).
Agriculture and food production activities are a key source of economic growth and employment in many countries. An estimated 1.3 billion people were employed in agrifood systems across the world in 2021, equivalent to 39% of the global workforce (FAO, 2024[53]). At the same time, agricultural supply chains can be associated with various types of risks of adverse social and human rights impacts (OECD/FAO, 2016[54]). According to the International Labor Organization, agriculture workers regularly face high levels of working poverty, food insecurity, poor health and safety conditions, and lack of labour and social protection (ILO, n.d.[55]).
The international fragmentation of production in global value chains implies that products consumed in one country often incorporate labour provided by workers across different production stages in other countries. Thus, a final product consumed in a country with high labour standards may nevertheless incorporate labour contributions from countries where practices are less favourable. Recent OECD analysis applied input-output techniques to map patterns of worker rights in international supply chains. One of the indicators examined was freedom of association, for which the analysis found scope for improvement in international agriculture and food supply chains. Workers in countries allocated to the quartiles indicating weaker rights accounted for 66% of the employment embodied in the final demand of OECD countries in agriculture (61% in the case of the food industry). This indicates a relatively stronger protection of unions and of the right to organise than in the textiles and electronics supply chains, but relatively weaker when compared to sectors such as IT and financial services (Figure 1.14).
In response to the social and environmental risks identified around agro-food supply chains, the OECD-FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains was developed to help companies observe standards of responsible business conduct and undertake due diligence along agricultural supply chains to ensure that their operations contribute to sustainable development. More specifically on labour and human rights issues, the OECD recently developed handbooks for addressing specific risks in selected supply chains. The Business Handbook on Due Diligence in the Cocoa Sector: Addressing Child Labour and Forced Labour (OECD, 2023[57]) and the Handbook on due diligence for enabling living incomes and living wages in agriculture, garment and footwear supply chains (OECD, 2024[58]) are part of these efforts to help companies avoid and address adverse social impacts.
Agro-food trade underpins global food security and can contribute to improved environmental outcomes…
International trade in food and agricultural products plays a crucial role in global food security. By enabling the exchange of products from regions with optimal production capabilities to areas of need for processing or consumption, trade is vital for diversifying food sources, ensuring the affordable availability of food and mitigating the impact of localised shocks. As approximately 20% of all calories consumed in the world cross at least one international border, well-functioning international agricultural commodity markets will remain essential for food security (OECD/FAO, 2024[5]). Model-based OECD analysis has found that trade integration makes countries less vulnerable to negative yield shocks, such as extreme weather events, by mitigating the risk of extreme food prices and stabilising food availability (Adenäuer, Frezal and Chatzopoulos, 2023[59]). By facilitating the imports of fruits, vegetables, legumes and nuts, trade has also been found to reduce dietary risks and reduce the global mortality from non-communicable diseases (Springmann et al., 2023[60]).
Trade can also help improve the efficiency of natural resource use by agriculture by helping countries overcome national constraints in land and water and allowing them to meet their food requirements above their domestic production capacity. Trade is also recognised as a key mechanism for adaptation, for example to water risks, allowing populations suffering a decrease in production to access substitute products from other countries not facing the same risks, with reduced price increase consequences (OECD, 2017[61]). As production takes place in regions with relatively more efficient water and land use, trade can result in global water and land savings (OECD/FAO, 2023[45]). One study has also found that trade could “help to cushion the impacts of climate change on global food production and consumption” (Guerrero et al., 2022[62]).
Other ways in which trade can contribute to improved environmental outcomes are by providing countries with access to environmental goods and services they might otherwise lack (OECD, 2021[63]), improving access to technologies that make local production processes more efficient and environmentally sustainable, driving innovation and productivity growth by broadening market competition, and creating incentives for exporting sectors to adopt higher environmental standards, for example in response to requirements from importing partners or to market trends (see Box 1.8 below). Ultimately, the impact of trade liberalisation on the environment will depend on whether countries have appropriate agri-environmental policies in place (OECD, 2019[13]).
…but trade expansion can also come with environmental concerns
Even if trade can improve resource allocation globally by shifting production to countries with relatively higher resource use efficiency, this is not sufficient to ensure environmental sustainability. Trade can also generate negative environmental externalities, particularly if it provides an economic incentive for unsustainable practices or is combined with weak or inadequate regulatory frameworks (FAO, 2022[64]; OECD/FAO, 2023[45]).
The development of agriculture and the expansion of export sectors have also led to environmental degradation from deforestation, excessive use of agro-chemical inputs (sometimes reinforced by payments supporting their use), intensive cultivation, water pollution and erosion (OECD, 2019[13]). Greater demand for imported products in some regions can also lead to the depletion of natural resources or increased pollution in exporting countries (Zimmermann and Rapsomanikis, 2023[65]), or even encourage production shifts in importing countries that result in environmental pollution (Sun et al., 2018[66]).
Key concerns include greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, deforestation, forest degradation, water pollution and biodiversity loss. For example, a model-based estimation attributed 29–39% of deforestation-related GHG emissions to trade, particularly driven by international demand for beef and oilseeds (Pendrill et al., 2019[67]). An OECD model-based analysis found that the removal of border measures could motivate a relocation of production that could slightly increase global GHG emissions from land use change in the absence of effective policies (Guerrero et al., 2022[62]), although the literature finds varying outcomes for global GHG emissions when market price support is removed worldwide (Lankoski, Nales and Valin, 2025[16]). Negative biodiversity impacts can also arise from production shifts exacerbating land use change and pollution, the trade in environmentally sensitive goods such as timber and wildlife or from the (generally not trade-related) introduction of invasive alien species (OECD, 2021[63]).
Due to the nature of agricultural production, most negative (non-GHG) environmental externalities associated with agricultural production are highly localised (OECD/FAO, 2023[45]). Negative impacts from trade thus depend on local conditions and are exacerbated in contexts of weak governance (Schiavo, 2022[68]; FAO, 2022[64]).
The interactions of trade and environmental policies are multiple and complex
The relationship between trade and the environment is complex, and the linkages between trade and environmental policies are characterised by multiple channels and interactions. Today, policymakers are revisiting the interplay of trade and environmental policies to consider their complementarities, in an important shift from earlier views that saw raising environmental ambition and fostering trade as conflicting objectives (OECD, 2025[69]).
At the same time, the nexus of trade and environmental policies presents several challenges. Diverging environmental priorities and levels of ambition across countries often result in differing national policy targets and efforts. If governments adopt a variety of environmental policies diverging on instrument choices and approaches and on policy stringency, this can create international spillovers. (Gruère et al., 2023[70]) identify two key trade and environmental concerns associated with such heterogeneous policy responses for agro-food trade:
On the one hand, growing differences in regulation across countries may create a wedge in farm competitiveness internationally. This occurs when domestic producers face higher production costs and become less competitive due to domestic (environmental) regulations or policies.
On the other hand, international regulatory differences can result in “leakage” effects that limit the effectiveness of environmental policy efforts. This leakage (e.g. of carbon or pollution) occurs when the implementation of stringent environmental policies leads to an increase in emissions or pollution in countries with weaker environmental regulations (Gruère et al., 2023[70]), (Arvanitopoulos, Garsous and Agnolucci, 2021[71]).
A further concern relates to the impact of new environmental requirements in importing countries on producers in exporting countries, and the fear that such requirements may be discriminatory or burdensome. A rapid increase in trade-related environmental policies – i.e. environmental policies with potential trade effects, for example because they put requirements on foreign producers that want to sell on the domestic market – often implemented without co-ordination, also adds complexity to the regulatory landscape, increasing compliance costs for businesses, notably in developing countries (OECD, 2025[69]).
Trade and the environment interact in a complex and fast-changing governance ecosystem that includes actions by governmental and non-governmental actors, consumer demand, and mandatory and voluntary instruments. This broader ecosystem for sustainability governance encompasses various elements, including international legal instruments, national environmental laws and regulations, as well as trade and investment policy instruments such as trade agreements. Another critical element of this ecosystem are voluntary sustainability initiatives (OECD, 2025[11]).
Trade-related measures are increasingly part of the policy mix through which governments address environmental concerns
Trade-related measures are increasingly becoming part of the policy mix that governments use to address environmental concerns. Particularly in recent years, some governments have been revisiting their trade policy approaches with the aim of pursuing global environmental objectives and reducing trade-related environmental damages.
There are different ways in which this is done. Countries can incorporate environmental considerations in the RTAs that they negotiate with trading partners (Box 1.7), or they can modify their national regulatory frameworks to incorporate trade-related measures with environmental considerations. In general, environmental provisions have long been part of RTAs, but their use has intensified in recent years. The average number of environmental provisions14 included per agreement signed in each year increased from around 8 in the 1990s to over 44 in the 2010s, with 87% of RTAs as of 2021 containing at least one type of environmental provision (OECD, 2025[69]). These provisions are also becoming more diverse and far-reaching (Brandi and Morin, 2023[72]). Trade-related national regulatory framework measures are much less common; in particular, some recent measures making market access conditional on meeting specific environmental requirements are not yet in force (Frezal and Deuss, 2025[73]).
Most RTAs include some type of environmental provision, either in the form of dedicated environment chapters and articles, or through “greening” of other chapters. The purpose, nature, scope, and language of RTA environmental provisions can differ even between agreements negotiated by the same country. A provision referring to a similar issue may be included in two different RTAs, but it may take different forms, be located in different parts of the agreement, or be expressed in different wording.
Carve-outs or exceptions for environment objectives was the predominant approach to environmental provisions pre-1990 and remains the most frequent type of environmental provision in RTAs. Other types of provisions started to be used in the 1990s. They include references to Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), commitments to uphold environmental law, provisions to enhance environmental co-operation among parties, and references to specific environmental issues (such as biodiversity, circular economy, climate change, chemicals, or air pollution).
In the 2000s, new types of environmental provisions emerged. They include preamble clauses setting broad environmental goals for the agreement; the establishment of a specific body to monitor the application of environmental provisions; public participation mechanisms; dispute settlement mechanisms for environmental commitments; and provisions on environmental impact assessments.
Source: (OECD, 2023[74]).
A growing number of trade-related measures refer specifically to the environmental sustainability of agriculture
A growing number of trade-related measures refer specifically to agriculture or food systems. A recent OECD report took stock of trade-related measures15 linked to the environmental sustainability of agriculture and identified 130 measures applied or approved in 15 OECD member countries and the European Union between 1997 and 2024 (Frezal and Deuss, 2025[73]). The measures were categorised using a newly developed typology, consisting of two broad groups: measures contained in regional trade agreements (RTAs) and measures contained in national regulatory frameworks (Figure 1.15). The measures identified were largely in application, with only five approved but not yet applied as of the end of 2024.
Note: Definitions of the categories and types of trade-related measures can be found in (Frezal and Deuss, 2025[73]).
Source: (Frezal and Deuss, 2025[73]).
The use of trade-related measures linked to the environmental sustainability of agriculture is a relatively recent development: 80% of the 130 measures were approved or entered into force after 2010, and 60% were approved or have entered into force since 2018 (Figure 1.16).
The vast majority (93%) of the measures identified are provisions in RTAs (i.e. Group 1 in the typology) (Figure 1.17). Over 80%, or 107 measures, aim to enhance co-operation between the parties to the RTA on agri-environmental matters (type A1). They involve 15 OECD Members and the European Union and 56 non-OECD partners. This type of provision is usually considered to be difficult to enforce, as they are often formulated in non-binding language or are not subject to the general dispute settlement mechanism of the RTA.
Note: Measures applied or approved by OECD members between 1997 and 2024, as identified in the stocktake exercise.
Source: (Frezal and Deuss, 2025[73]).
The environmental co-operation provisions (type A1) vary in terms of their placement in the agreement, language and scope. Thirty-two of the 107 provisions are of a general nature, with parties agreeing to co-operate on sustainable agriculture and/or food systems without reference to any specific issue. Twenty-eight provisions include commitments to co-operate on specific issues of shared interest (e.g. water and soil management and conservation, climate change mitigation, or the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems). A further 27 measures make an emphasis on capacity building. In 14 provisions, parties commit to work towards the development, improvement or harmonisation of agri-environmental laws, policies, and standards. Finally, five provisions focus on information sharing and dialogue, and one mentions both capacity building and co-operation on developing harmonised policies and standards.
In recent years there has been an emergence of new types of RTA provisions different from − or going beyond − the more traditional environmental co-operation provisions. All entered into application or were approved after 2019. In eleven measures (found in RTAs that have Chile, the United Kingdom, the European Union (EU), New Zealand or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members as OECD partners), the parties commit (in some cases using binding language) to the implementation and improvement of their domestic agri-environmental laws and policies (type A2). Three additional measures (found in one RTA entered into by EFTA members) set specific environmental requirements that need to be met to benefit from a tariff preference (category B1) or a tariff rate quota (type B2).
While most trade-related measures identified are part of RTAs, the stocktake identified nine measures that are contained in national regulatory frameworks. All of them concern market access. Six measures, implemented respectively by Canada, the EU, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States and all applied after 2009, condition the eligibility of agricultural products to certain government programmes on complying with specific environmental criteria, usually as part of renewable fuel or renewable energy regulations (type C1). The remaining three measures (two by the EU and one by the United Kingdom, all approved after 2021 but not yet applied at the end of 2024) condition the placing of agricultural products on the market on complying with specific environmental criteria (type C2).
The 130 measures identified in the stocktake have diverse environmental objectives. Most of them (84 measures) have the overarching goal of promoting “sustainable agricultural production”, and either mention it as a general objective or by focusing on specific agri-environmental issues. Key agri-environmental issues covered include “water management and conservation” (33 measures), the “protection of biodiversity and ecosystems” (27 measures), and “climate change mitigation” (24 measures).
While 90% of the measures refer to agriculture or food systems as a whole, some of them are designed to target specific commodities or processed products, which are associated with certain environmental risks. In particular, palm oil and its derivatives are covered by eight measures, spanning all three categories of trade-related measures. The measures conditioning the eligibility for certain government programmes (type C1) all cover bioenergy made from agricultural biomass. Other measures specifically target cattle, cocoa, soybeans, and coffee (Frezal and Deuss, 2025[73]).
Voluntary sustainability initiatives are also very prevalent in agro-food supply chains
Businesses, governments, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) use a variety of multistakeholder, government-run or industry-led initiatives to evaluate or demonstrate the sustainability performance of economic activities and outputs along global value chains (GVCs), as well as to encourage good practices according to specific standards.
“Sustainability initiatives” encompass a wide range of schemes and programmes that have been defined in numerous ways.16 The OECD and the International Trade Centre recently proposed a typology framework to better navigate the complex landscape of sustainability initiatives, which are defined as:
Any multistakeholder, government-run or industry-led scheme or programme that provides tools, information, guidance, framework, capacity building or otherwise facilitates, sets requirements and/or expectations for, and/or assesses an organisation's operations, products, services, suppliers and/or other business relationships in relation to sustainability objectives. (…) “[S]ustainability initiatives” do not include national legislation or international binding, non-binding, and regional legal instruments. (OECD/ITC, 2024[75])
There is a particularly large number of sustainability initiatives in the agro-food sector. Recent OECD analysis examining 282 sustainability initiatives from the ITC StandardsMap database found that agriculture and food were the sectors with the largest number of sustainability initiatives with environmental objectives, followed at some distance by textiles and chemicals (Figure 1.18). Many of the initiatives examined are active in more than one sector. Over 200 applied to agriculture, and 170 to food production. A further extension of the analysis combined the information of ITC StandardsMap with the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) tables to measure how widespread sustainability initiatives are along different supply chains and estimate their distribution across the global production network. Consistent with the large number of initiatives present, this exercise confirmed the highest prevalence indices of sustainability initiatives with environmental objectives in the agriculture and food supply chains (Balaban et al., 2025[76]). Government policies are also increasingly engaging with voluntary sustainability initiatives, a trend evidenced by a growing number of RTAs in force that include references to such initiatives, which went from one in 1997 to 66 in 2024 (Balaban et al., 2025[76]).
Efforts to support sustainable agro-food production can have many drivers, including an interest in maintaining and preserving productive land, improving resource efficiency, or a general willingness to protect the environment. Trade can also be a force behind a country’s or a sector’s efforts to produce more sustainably and to adopt sustainability initiatives that evaluate or demonstrate this. A recent OECD case study seeks to shed light at the most important trade-related drivers behind the adoption of sustainability initiatives in export-oriented sectors (Box 1.8).
In line with the widespread use of sustainability initiatives in the agro-food sector, there has been a rise of food labelling initiatives to communicate aggregate environmental impacts of food products (Deconinck and Hobeika, 2022[77]). These initiatives could play a role in driving changes in consumer behaviour that, coupled with actions by producers and other actors, improve the environmental sustainability of food systems. At the same time, open questions remain around consumers’ beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. An OECD study, based on survey responses from 37 000 consumers in 40 countries, confirmed that trust and broader attitudes and beliefs regarding the environment play an important role in shaping consumers’ willingness to pay more for products with a sustainability claim. The findings also suggest that consumer trust may be shaped less by the specifics of a label or assurance scheme and more by country-specific factors (Deconinck et al., 2025[78]).
There is no international agreement on the environmental outcomes that should be considered by such labelling schemes or on the measurement methods of the environmental outcomes they should use. In collaboration with private actors, policymakers can contribute to building trust in these initiatives in order to effectively encourage consumer behaviour change. For example, they could support the development of a reliable evidence base on the actual environmental impacts of food products, or collaborate at the international level to improve coherence and consistency in the labelling landscape (OECD, 2025[79]).
Well-designed and well-governed sustainability initiatives can be a useful tool to support companies’ sustainability performance along global supply chains and can provide motivation and reward for specific producers to achieve sustainability objectives (OECD, 2025[11]). However, there are some concerns around their role in global governance and their sustainability impact. Among them are challenges related to the inclusion of low-income and small producers, such as the costs of certification and compliance, and questions related to their credibility, particularly in light of their proliferation and the wide range of claims some of these schemes make. Moreover, evidence of their sustainability impacts is mixed and context-specific, but suggests that they can play a role of catalysts by accelerating the adoption of credible sustainability policies by public and private actors (Marx et al., 2024[80]).
The global demand for agricultural products with environmental credentials is increasing, leading in turn to growing expectations for producers and exporters to demonstrate to their trading partners their actions to improve sustainability and to provide detailed information and reporting on their environmental sustainability performance.
The OECD is conducting in-depth case studies to enhance the understanding of how countries are managing the environmental sustainability of their trade-intensive agricultural sectors. A first case study examined key trade-related drivers behind the growing development and implementation of environmental sustainability initiatives across the Australian beef and wheat sectors. Since both sectors are strongly export-oriented, the drivers identified are primarily on the export side.
The case study identified four key drivers, with the first two standing out as attracting the strongest attention in the marketplace:
Securing access to capital and finance, in the context of increasing reporting requirements against sustainability criteria from the financial sector for which sustainability was emerging as a key business risk.
Maintaining and increasing access to export markets with high environmental standards, particularly as environmental sustainability requirements become an increasingly important aspect of market access regulations in importing countries.
Securing supply chain partners, which increasingly demand information, and in some cases verification, of GHG emissions from upstream suppliers as part of a stronger focus and obligations associated with emissions reporting.
Meeting global demand for carbon-neutral and nature-positive products in the context of growing consumer interest in environmentally sustainable, carbon neutral, net zero or nature-positive food products.
Additional case studies of other countries and sectors will help build up evidence on the various demands that are placed on exporters, and the diverse approaches that producers and governments are implementing to support sustainable food production and trade.
Recent initiatives to liberalise trade in environmental goods and services include some agricultural products and related services
The liberalisation of trade in environmental goods and services is another way through which countries use trade policy to promote environmental goals. The development, adoption, and spread of technologies embedded in environmental goods are crucial for transitioning to a low-carbon economy; furthermore, the identification and liberalisation of environmentally related services is also important for the green transition, as it can support the adoption of green production methods, facilitate the implementation of environmental projects, and help the production of environmental goods (OECD, 2025[69]).
Environmental goods and services have been the focus of a number of plurilateral initiatives, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) list of environmental goods (agreed in 2012) or the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) at the WTO. Several countries are also including provisions on environmental goods and services in their RTAs. Some countries, even partners to already existing RTAs, are entering into new types of agreements that combine trade and sustainability elements.
While the majority of products in environmental goods lists are industrial, some recent agreements include a small number of agricultural products that are considered environmentally preferable products (EPPs).17 This is the case of the Singapore-Australia Green Economy Agreement (2022), the New Zealand-United Kingdom Free Trade Agreement (2023), and the New Zealand-European Union Free Trade Agreement (2024) (Yamaguchi and van der Ven, 2025[82]). Examples of agricultural EPPs in the lists include plants for use in the restoration and recovery of landscapes, ethanol biofuel, plant-based fibres such as jute, flax or coconut fibres, and wool.
Some agreements also include agriculture-related service activities in their lists of environmental services. For example, the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS), signed in 2024 by Costa Rica, Iceland, New Zealand, and Switzerland, includes commitments to promote the liberalisation of research and experimental development services on agricultural sciences that can be key to addressing environmental concerns (such as services related to organic agriculture and to the sustainable use and reduced risks of pesticides and fertilisers), along with other services related to agriculture.
The emergence of sustainability requirements presents opportunities and challenges
Linking trade-related measures to environmental objectives in agriculture presents both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, carefully designed policies can leverage synergies and mitigate challenges, thus speeding up the transition towards more sustainable agriculture and food systems. For example, trade policies can support sustainable agriculture by encouraging the adoption of environmentally friendly practices to meet standards in export markets, or via potentially improved market access or price premiums for products adhering to voluntary sustainability standards (OECD, 2025[69]). Trade-related measures can also be a tool for resilience-building to better respond to extreme weather events (UNCTAD, 2023[83]) (World Trade Organization, 2023[84]). Empirical analysis (not specific to agriculture) has found that environmental provisions in trade agreements can help reduce “dirty” exports (defined as goods that incur high pollution abatement costs) and increase “green” exports (i.e. of goods that reduce or remedy environmental damage) from developing countries (Brandi et al., 2020[85]).
On the other hand, the proliferation and lack of harmonisation of trade-related measures for environmental objectives, as well as the potential barriers to trade posed by the cost of compliance have given rise to concerns. For example, five of the trade-related measures identified in the OECD stocktake −all of Type C, or contained in national regulatory frameworks− have been subject of Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) at the WTO (Frezal and Deuss, 2025[73]).18 The nature of STC claims varies from seeking further information and clarification on draft measures to claims about perceived incompatibility with WTO rules, potential trade barriers, or an absence of scientific justification for a measure (Frezal and Deuss, 2025[73]). An increasingly complex landscape of environmental policies with potential trade effects creates a fragmented regulatory environment and risks further marginalising low-income countries and small producers in global trade (OECD, 2025[69]).
Another challenge relates to demonstrating compliance at the border. Some mandatory sustainability requirements (such as the measures that condition market access on certain environmental requirements) must be enforced at the border; that is, companies will be required to demonstrate compliance prior to their products being released into the importing country’s market. The ability of customs and other border agencies to verify compliance, and the costs for businesses of meeting the requirements, will depend on the reporting standards (information that needs to be collected and the quality of that information) and the necessary mechanisms to exchange information (including data elements, documents and technologies). In the context of a fragmented landscape of proliferating sustainability standards, different standards for reporting and exchange of information will emerge at different border crossings, which could lead to additive costs of compliance along the supply chain and to a reduced ability of border agencies to effectively enforce and monitor implementation (OECD, 2025[86]).
The production of agriculture and food accounts for a significant share of GHG emissions
The expansion of both land use dedicated to agriculture and agricultural production and trade have continued to contribute to GHG emissions. The agriculture sector contributes 11% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions directly through on-farm activity, and food systems as a whole contribute one-third of total GHG emissions (OECD, 2025[87]). Moreover, progress in emissions reduction in OECD countries has slowed: agricultural GHG emissions that were previously stable started to increase at an average rate of 0.4% per year in the 2010s, and the decline in the median emission intensity has slowed down from -0.6% per year in the 1990s and 2000s to -0.2% per year in the 2010s (OECD, 2025[48]). At the same time, agriculture also holds potential to contribute to GHG removals through soil carbon sequestration (Henderson et al., 2022[88]).
Changes in land use and agricultural production accounted for about two-thirds of the GHG emissions from global food systems in 2019 (Figure 1.19). A smaller share of GHG emissions is generated by the post-farm and post-retail stages, although these stages of the supply chain are more important for high-income countries (Deconinck and Toyama, 2022[44]; OECD, 2025[89]).
The growth in agro-food trade and global agro-food value chains over the past decades has also linked environmental impacts and GHG emissions across countries. In instances where agro-food supply chains span numerous countries, the interconnected nature of trade may make decisions in one country influence environmental impacts in another country. The relative role of international and domestic value chains thus matters for discussions on the environmental impact of food systems and for determining which instruments are most effective to improve environmental performance (Deconinck and Toyama, 2022[44]).
Governments use diverse policy approaches for emissions mitigation
A number of countries are introducing policy measures to address GHG emissions related to agriculture and food production. The range of measures utilised is broad, partly responding to a need to accommodate different national circumstances. A recent OECD inventory of policy instruments for GHG mitigation in agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sectors identified and categorised over 1 300 policies in 44 countries, grouped in three broad instrument categories (Table 1.3). The inventory includes both direct policies that intentionally aim to reduce GHG emissions (e.g. agricultural emissions pricing) and indirect policies that have potential mitigation co-benefits or create an enabling environment (e.g. water quality protection policies).
Note: Each instrument type consists of several individual policy instruments.
Source: (OECD, 2024[91]).
About two-thirds of the policies identified were categorised as economic instruments, i.e. those that incentivise specific actions generating a change in outcomes through direct economic benefit. Ninety-six percent of the economic instruments identified were subsidies. Regulatory and other instruments represented respectively 16% and 17% of the policies (Figure 1.20) (OECD, 2024[91]).
Source: (OECD, 2024[91]).
The development of policy responses is essential to enabling transformative capacity of the agriculture sector and respond to environmental sustainability challenges. However, the mitigation effectiveness of many of these policies has not yet been established, complicating the ability to effectively monitor and evaluate their overall impact on mitigation efforts (Lee and Ignaciuk, 2025[92]).
An OECD review of studies providing quantitative mitigation estimates found that effectiveness varies widely across different types of instruments. Instruments aiming to conserve natural ecosystems through zoning policies (e.g. protected areas) are reported to mitigate the most GHG emissions per hectare, with an average of about 86 tCO2eq per hectare per year. Technology standards are also reported to have a high mitigation potential.19 For example, biofuels with carbon capture and storage standards have been estimated to mitigate 30 tCO2eq per hectare per year on average. Government investments in research and development (R&D) were estimated to have an average mitigation potential of 28 tCO2eq per hectare per year. Subsidies to support climate mitigation in AFOLU were estimated to reduce emissions at a lower average level (5.3 tCO2eq per hectare per year) (Lee and Ignaciuk, 2025[92]). While the review focussed on production-related policies which support mitigation, a comprehensive policy approach to meet climate targets would also include reorienting policies which induce emissions, and considering supply chains, consumption and waste (Lee and Ignaciuk, 2025[92]).
Country policies can have both explicit and implicit links with trade
Mitigation measures within international agro-food supply chains can have varying impacts on trade based on their design. Even if they were not designed with a specific trade objective, in principle all domestic mitigation measures that affect producer decision-making and therefore agricultural production have the potential to impact competitiveness and trade. Some measures may have higher potential trade impacts based on their sectoral focus (e.g. if they apply to sectors that are highly traded) or on their policy design (e.g. if they were designed with the specific purpose of facilitating or promoting trade of low emission products).
In order to better understand how domestic GHG mitigation measures relate to trade, governments from M&E countries were requested to provide information on the five most important mitigation policies that they consider are relevant to trade, and to provide details on the nature of the links. In particular, they were requested to indicate whether the policies:
promote mitigation of GHG emissions of an export product or sector
promote mitigation of GHG emissions in the supply chain of an import product or sector
facilitate trade of low-emission products
have any other link to trade.
Countries were also asked if they perform impact assessments of the measures reported, in particular whether potential trade and environmental impacts are assessed.
This section presents an overview of the information collected. As it is based on self-reporting of a predetermined number of measures per country, it must be underlined that it does not present an exhaustive picture of all public sector GHG mitigation policies that may relate to trade. Information on the potential links to trade is presented as reported by countries. An analysis or estimation of the trade impacts of specific GHG mitigation measures (or of their actual mitigation effects) is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The information received covered over 170 domestic GHG mitigation measures. A link to trade was specified for 120 measures. The highest share of measures (43%) was identified as promoting mitigation in an export product or sector. Twenty-one percent were identified as facilitating the trade of low-emission products, and 13% as promoting mitigation in the supply chain of an import product or sector. The remaining 24% of measures were associated with other links to trade.
For the largest number of measures, the link to trade is on the export side. Particularly in economies that are strongly export-oriented, efforts to mitigate agro-food emissions or reduce other environmental impacts are often seen as intrinsically linked to trade, as an important share of production is destined for international markets.
In a few cases, the need to respond to market demands for sustainable products or meet the requirements of trading partners were specifically highlighted in the rationale for promoting measures to reduce GHG emissions. For example, Australia’s Carbon Credit Unit (ACCU) Scheme assists the industry in continuing to be competitive in export markets and meet expectations of international markets. Costa Rica’s NAMA-Coffee initiative seeks to reduce emissions and promote sustainable practices for a key export product, with emphasis made on the need to meet the sustainability requirements of trading partners.
Some countries highlighted the use of labels or certifications to communicate sustainable production. For example, as part of its CAP Strategic Plan for 2023-27, Bulgaria uses measures such as eco-schemes to promote sustainable agriculture, with product certification seen as a key requirement for high-value trade markets. Mexico is developing a deforestation-free and sustainable production label aimed at small producers of key commodities, including export products such as avocado.
Many countries are making efforts to reduce GHG emissions of key export products. In Argentina, the Program for Scaling Up Climate Ambition in Land Use and Agriculture through Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans (SCALA), promotes production, traceability and certification strategies for low carbon beef and maize in the Pampa region. Other examples of initiatives directed at specific export commodities are Indonesia’s National Action Plan on Sustainable Palm Oil and Viet Nam’s 1 million Hectares of High-Quality, Low-Emission Rice Project.
Denmark’s agreement on a Farm Carbon Tax on livestock and the Netherlands’ CO₂ regulation for greenhouse horticulture are examples of tax instruments directed at sectors for which a large share of production is exported. A key focus of New Zealand’s Emissions Reduction Plan (EPR2) is reducing agricultural emissions in a way that does not compromise exports or lead to emissions leakage.
Many EU Member States also apply measures such as eco-schemes under the CAP 2023-27 that seek to promote climate-friendly practices in key agricultural sectors, including their main export products. Some, such as Czechia, Greece, Hungary, and Italy, highlighted the promotion of organic production, which can also represent an opportunity in export markets.
In some cases, countries undertake efforts for reducing GHG emissions in the supply chain of import products. This is the case of Japan’s Enhanced Linkages between Private sector and Small-scale producers (ELPS) initiative, which connects agro-food companies seeking sustainable sourcing to small farmers undertaking sustainable practices, in order to contribute to both reducing emissions and improving rural livelihoods.
Some country programmes aimed at promoting and facilitating trade of agro-food products support farmers’ actions for improving the sustainability of their products, including GHG reduction. For example, Canada’s Agri-Marketing Program supports industry associations in increasing and diversifying access to international markets, encouraging them to use carbon off-set credits, use green practices in their marketing materials, and the promotion of sustainable products. Similarly, Ireland’s Market Access programme helps facilitate the trade of relatively GHG-efficient, robustly regulated and sustainable agro-food products, including through assistance for meeting regulatory requirements.
Even if not specifically trade-oriented, mitigation plans and programmes can create opportunities for trade. For example, Chile’s National Climate Mitigation Plan for Agriculture and the Programme on Promotion and Strengthening of the Sustainable Production of Traditional Crops, are seen as creating opportunities for producers to trade low-emission agro-food products in the short- and medium-term and for producers to be able to highlight sustainability attributes in their marketing.
Over half (56%) of the measures reported are subject to environmental impact assessments. Potential trade impacts, on the other hand, were only assessed for 16% of the measures reported. In all cases, the evaluation of trade impacts is done in the form of ex-ante assessments. For 62% of the measures that reported environmental impact assessments, the impacts are evaluated ex-post.
In general, countries use numerous measures to mitigate GHG emissions from agriculture and food systems. The number and variety of measures reported illustrates the complexity of the global ecosystem for sustainability governance and of the links between trade and the environment. More analysis and dialogue are needed for a better understanding of this issue.
There has been a rapid rise in carbon footprint measurement and reporting requirements in recent years
The past few years have also seen a “fast and furious” rise of environmental impact reporting in food systems, including for carbon footprints (Deconinck, Jansen and Barisone, 2023[93]). This trend has been characterised by a large number of initiatives interacting in a sometimes confusing landscape of organisations, approaches, proposals and methodologies and responds to a growing demand for information by consumers, civil society, investors, and governments. Companies are also increasingly expected to report not only direct emissions from their own or controlled sources (Scope 1) and indirect emissions from the generation of purchased energy (Scope 2), but also all other indirect emissions in their supply chain, both upstream and downstream (Scope 3) (OECD, 2025[89]).
The term “carbon footprint” typically refers to all GHG emissions embodied in a product or service (including non-CO2 gases such as methane or nitrous oxide). The term can also refer to total emissions of a firm, a sector, a country, or other levels of reporting (e.g. financial portfolios).20 The growing importance of Scope 3 reporting also makes the calculations of product- and firm-level carbon footprints increasingly intertwined (OECD, 2025[94]).
OECD and emerging economies have developed a wide range of tools to measure agro-food carbon footprints
Directly measuring agricultural emissions is impractical and typically only done for research purposes. Based on such studies, simplified models can be constructed, which are used to estimate emissions based on key indicators (such as animal numbers, animal feed data, or information on manure management techniques). Surveys or representative samples can then be used as the basis for calculating average carbon footprints for a given sector and geography. However, the available evidence shows that carbon footprints can vary considerably among farmers in the same region (OECD, 2025[89]). For this reason, a growing number of initiatives aim to provide farmers with farm-specific emissions estimates, using farm-level calculation tools. Yet, some limitations persist, particularly for small and medium-sized farms, which often lack the resources for monitoring and reporting or face challenges due to digital tools that do not fully integrate farm management data with emissions modelling.
As a result, currently there is a wide range of methods and tools for performing carbon footprint calculations for the agro-food sector. Several countries have developed public policies or initiatives to measure GHG emissions at the farm level, product level, or for specific sub-sectors. As part of the collection of information on agro-food GHG measures, governments from M&E countries self-reported 114 carbon footprint measurement tools or initiatives applicable either to agriculture in general or to specific agricultural or food products or sectors. The exercise focussed on public or public-private initiatives, thus presenting a partial picture of the universe of carbon footprint measurement tools, as initiatives fully developed and managed by the private sector are not considered.
Forty-six per cent of the measures reported apply at the farm level, followed by 25% applied at the sector level and 18% at the product level. The remaining measures indicated a different level of application, such as a combination of farm and agri-business or a regional level. A scope of emissions was indicated for 72% of the measures, with the largest share covering Scope 1 (on-farm emissions) (Figure 1.21).
Many of the initiatives are calculation tools or databases, but some are methodological frameworks, such as New Zealand’s Farm Emissions Method (FEM), a standardised methodology for calculating on-farm emissions in beef, sheep, dairy and deer farming; a calculation standard for greenhouse gas balances at farm level, developed in Germany with the aim of supporting agricultural farm advisory services (Berechnungsstandard für einzelbetriebliche Klimabilanzen in der Landwirtschaft - BEK); and Argentina’s Methodological Guide for the Estimation of Carbon Footprint in Wine. Some other initiatives focus on providing information to consumers through labels, e.g. Japan’s “visualization” initiative, part of the government’s MIDORI Strategy for Sustainable Food Systems; and Denmark’s climate labelling system for food, aiming to promote environmentally friendly food production and help consumers make sustainable choices. Yet other initiatives are broader strategies covering several of these activities, such as the Food Data Transparency Partnership in the United Kingdom.
Initiatives can vary in the types of agricultural activities or food products in scope. Several calculation and measurement approaches are applicable to multiple agricultural activities. For example, Australia’s forthcoming Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Estimation and Reporting Standards will provide a basis for a nationally consistent approach to estimating and reporting emissions and removals from agriculture, fisheries and forestry operations; Canada’s Holos, a software application that estimates GHG emissions and changes in soil carbon in crop and livestock farming systems; and the CarbOn Management & Emissions Tool (COMET-Farm) in the United States, which estimates carbon sequestration and GHG emissions for crops, pastures, animal activities, agroforestry, and forestry.
A relatively large number of tools measure the emissions of animal production activities, with dairy being the most frequently mentioned activity. Examples include Ireland’s AgNav tool, focussing on dairy, beef, and sheep; the Netherlands’ Cycle Guide (KringloopWijzer) measurement tool for dairy; the ECOGAN tool for estimating on-farm emissions in Spain (currently applicable to pork and poultry farming); and France’s CAP'2ER tool, applicable to several livestock activities. In the LIFE Green Sheep project, a group of European Union (EU) members that account for an important share of production (France, Ireland, Italy, Romania, and Spain) collaborate to reduce the carbon footprint of sheep meat and milk, including through the development of tools and assessment methodology.
Some measures focus specifically on crop production. Examples include the Climate Check Crop Farms – Greppa initiative in Sweden; the Low-carbon agricultural product certification and labelling in Korea; and the RiceMoRe rice production monitoring system in Viet Nam.
While most of the measures reported are fully under the responsibility of ministries, government departments or public agricultural research institutes, some are implemented in partnerships or consortia with the private sector. For example, the Irish AgNav tool is a collaboration between Teagasc (the agricultural research agency), BordBia (a state agency to promote and market Irish food and drink), and the Irish Cattle Breeding Federation, and in Germany, the BEK calculation standard is managed by a network of interested experts from different organisations (including research institutes and chambers of agriculture) that co-operate on a voluntary basis. The Australian Agricultural Sustainability Framework (AASF) is an industry-led partnership with the government and co-ordinated by the National Farmers Federation; and Argentina’s Methodological Guide for the Estimation of Carbon Footprint in Wine is implemented by the National Institute of Viticulture and Winemaking (a public institute) with Bodegas de Argentina, a business chamber of wineries. In Switzerland, projects such as KlimaStaR Milk bring together the government and the private sector in pilot initiatives for GHG accounting.
It is essential to avoid fragmentation…
The question of measuring and communicating environmental impacts such as carbon footprints becomes especially important in an interconnected world. There is a potential tension between ensuring that methods are able to capture context-specific factors and avoiding unnecessary trade barriers arising from countries taking divergent approaches. Avoiding fragmentation and unnecessary transaction costs thus becomes essential. Some of the elements for achieving widespread and reliable carbon footprint measurement at the international level are already in place, but others require further work for greater alignment (Box 1.9).
Measuring and reducing carbon footprints in food systems must consider the specificities of agriculture and food production. The scientific literature to date provides four key findings:
A significant share of the GHG emissions in food systems comes from agricultural production and land use change. This means that the carbon footprint of a food product depends heavily on emissions upstream in the supply chain, making a life cycle view essential.
Food products differ strongly in terms of their carbon footprint and other environmental impacts. For example, on average, the carbon footprint of food products is higher for animal-based foods than for plant-based foods.
At the same time, studies have found large heterogeneity among producers of the same product, which can be explained by differences in farm management practices and techniques, variations in local climate and soil conditions, and their interactions.
There are many options to reduce GHG emissions along the food supply chain, including not only through farm-level practices and techniques but also by using less emissions-intensive processes for the production of fertilisers, or reducing food loss and waste.
This suggests that three levers can be used to reduce GHG emissions from food systems: shifting to product categories with a lower average carbon footprint; shifting to suppliers with a lower carbon footprint within each product category; and incentivising producers at all stages to adopt emissions-reducing techniques.
Making carbon footprints visible all along the agro-food supply chain through widespread and reliable product carbon footprint information based on primary (producer-specific) data would help unlock the three levers.
Recent OECD research identified eight “building blocks” that would be essential to achieve such widespread and reliable carbon footprint measurement:
1. Reporting standards and guidelines for carbon footprint measurement.
2. Science-based methods for measuring or estimating emissions.
3. Farm level calculation tools that allow farmers to use primary data on their activities and management practices as inputs to calculate their carbon footprint.
4. Databases with secondary data, to fill the gaps when primary data is not available.
5. A way of communicating carbon footprint data to the next stage along the supply chain.
6. A way to ensure the integrity and quality of the data and calculations.
7. A way to scale up carbon footprint calculations to ensure widespread adoption.
8. A way to update these elements as new scientific insights and techniques become available.
Many of these elements are already in place. However, some were initially developed for a different purpose, while several building blocks were developed independently of each other. Further developments, adjustments, and alignment will therefore be necessary. This will require collaboration among researchers, farmers, other supply chain actors, governments, and civil society, both at domestic and international levels.
Source: (OECD, 2025[89]).
The principles of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) become relevant in this context. This agreement encourages WTO Members to align their standards and regulations to common international standards, to accept, when possible, conformity assessments performed by other members, and to pay special attention to the needs of producers in developing countries (World Trade Organization, 2022[95]). In terms of the eight “building blocks”, international standards would be most relevant in the context of reporting standards and guidelines, and science-based methods. More broadly, however, each building block could benefit from an international exchange of experiences and (where relevant) alignment (OECD, 2025[89]).
…and to consider the capacity limitations of developing countries and small players
Small producers and SMEs in low- and middle-income countries are likely to face even greater barriers in calculating and sharing carbon footprints than their counterparts in high-income countries. Various forms of technical assistance can help reduce the burden of cost and complexity (OECD, 2025[89]). However, the effectiveness of capacity-building efforts for developing countries has been uneven. There is scope to continue developing tools and guidance targeting developing countries’ needs to ease their resource burdens and institutional challenges in establishing effective emission measurement, reporting and verification systems for emissions data (OECD, 2024[96]). This is true for other sectors as well, but particularly for agriculture given the large number of small producers in the sector.
In the three decades since the WTO Agreement on Agriculture entered into force, the international trade of agricultural and food products has expanded and evolved significantly, adapting to various economic and geopolitical challenges and demonstrating resilience in the face of crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Agro-food trade growth has outpaced production growth and has become increasingly integrated into global value chains, with many products now crossing borders multiple times before reaching consumers.
However, progress in reforming agricultural trade has slowed. Agro-food products continue to face significantly higher most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs and quantitative restrictions compared to other sectors, along with a greater incidence of non-tariff measures. Producer protection remains prevalent across OECD Members and emerging economies, and market price support, among the potentially most production and trade distorting measures, remains the dominant form of agricultural support.
Governments are increasingly recognising the environmental impacts of agriculture and food systems and implementing policies to address these pressures. This includes an increased use of trade-related measures, with a growing number specifically addressing the sustainability of agriculture and food systems. A growing number of trade agreements engage with voluntary sustainability initiatives, which are highly prevalent in agro-food supply chains.
The relatively high contribution of agriculture and food systems to global GHG emissions has prompted governments to introduce a wide array of GHG mitigation policies. The countries covered in this report were requested to self-report public GHG mitigation policies in agriculture and food value chains that may relate to trade. Nearly half of the 120 policies identified aim to promote the mitigation of GHG emissions within export-oriented sectors. Countries have also developed numerous initiatives to perform carbon footprint calculations at the farm level, product level, or for specific sub-sectors, with 114 public or public-private tools or initiatives identified in the information collection exercise.
Integrating environmental objectives into trade policies in agriculture and food presents opportunities and challenges. While trade-related measures for environmental objectives can be key to facilitate a green transition, their proliferation and lack of harmonisation also risks creating trade barriers and increasing compliance costs, which can be particularly concerning for small producers and developing economies. Policymakers must strike a careful balance between ensuring effective environmental protection and minimising distortions and unintended trade effects.
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← 1. All trade values are expressed in current USD. The definition of agro-food products does not include fish and fish products. Agro-food codes in H0: 01, 02, 04 to 24 (excluding 1504, 1603, 1604 and 1605), 3301, 3501 to 3505, 4101 to 4103, 4301, 5001 to 5003, 5101 to 5103, 5201 to 5203, 5301, 5302, 290543/44, 380910, 382360.
← 2. This refers to the commodities covered by the OECD/FAO Agricultural Outlook: cereals, oilseeds, vegetable oils, sugar, meat, fish, dairy products, cotton, roots and tubers, pulses, bananas and tropical fruits and biofuels. While this global share includes fish, other trade data shown in this chapter excludes fish and fish products.
← 3. “Other oilseeds” refers to rapeseed (canola), sunflower seed, and groundnuts (peanuts). “Vegetable oils” is defined as rapeseed oil (canola), soybean oil, sunflower seed oil, coconut oil, cottonseed oil, palm kernel oil, groundnut oil, and palm oil.
← 4. “Value-added” refers to the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. Trade in value-added data considers the value that each country adds in the production of goods and services that are traded and consumed worldwide. It captures international flows of value added that are not shown by traditional trade statistics and provides new insights of where value is created along each stage.
← 5. The Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient (PNPC) is an indicator developed by the OECD that reflects the level of price distortions. It is the ratio between the average price received by producers (including support payments) and the border reference price. A coefficient of 1 suggests that producer prices are in line with international prices.
← 6. This section does not account for recent changes in tariffs in 2025.
← 7. Most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs are the tariffs WTO Members normally charge on imports from other Members, unless they are subject to preferential (lower) rates under regional trade agreements or other preferential schemes.
← 8. Sensitive products are those that countries designate for special treatment in trade negotiations, for example because they consider that domestic production could be negatively affected by increased import competition.
← 9. Non-ad valorem (NAV) tariffs are those in which the duty rate is expressed in a form different that a percentage of the product’s value. They can include specific, compound, mixed or technical tariffs. Their use can make the analysis of tariff rates more challenging, as they cannot be directly compared or aggregated and must first be converted into ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs), for which methodologies differ (González Marentis and Deuss, 2023[97]).
← 10. A TRQ is opened when shares of the quota are allocated to importers in the corresponding year. TRQs are usually not opened when the MFN applied tariff for the product is equal to or below the in-quota rate, which in practice eliminates any tariff advantage from opening the quota.
← 11. Preferential trade can occur under reciprocal agreements − such as bilateral or regional free trade agreements or customs unions − or under unilateral trade preference arrangements (through which developed countries grant nonreciprocal preferential tariffs to imports from developing countries). In this chapter, the term “regional trade agreement” (RTA) will be used broadly to refer to all types of reciprocal agreements.
← 12. The term “non-tariff measures” (NTMs) refers to all measures affecting trade flows that are not tariffs. NTMs generally stem from domestic regulations and aim to overcome or reduce the impact of market imperfections, such as those related to negative externalities, information asymmetries, and risks for human, animal or plant health (OECD, 2019[98]).
← 13. While acknowledging that there are three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental), this chapter will largely focus on the environmental dimension.
← 14. These figures refer to environmental provisions in general, without distinguishing whether they apply to the agro-food sector.
← 15. For the purposes of this section, and as detailed in (Frezal and Deuss, 2025[73]), “trade-related measures” are understood as trade measures and other measures with direct implications for trade. They can take several forms, including tariffs, tariff rate quotas (TRQs), non-tariff measures (NTMs) and co-operation provisions in RTAs, and can apply either to all trading partners of a country or to RTA partners only. Although government support policies can have implications for both trade and the environment, they are outside the scope of this definition.
← 16. There are different definitions, which reflect different purposes and perspectives characterising the numerous communities of practitioners, researchers and policy makers who work on such initiatives. The definitions can also overlap. The terms used by different organisations include environmental labelling and information schemes (ELIS), voluntary sustainability standards (VSS), and sustainability systems or schemes (OECD/ITC, 2024[75]).
← 17. The term “environmentally preferable products” was first defined at the international level by UNCTAD in 1995 as “products which cause significantly less environmental harm at some stage of their life cycle (…) than alternative products that serve the same purpose, or products the production and sales of which contribute significantly to the preservation of the environment” (Tothova, 2005[99]).
← 18. At the WTO, any Member may raise a Specific Trade Concern (STC) with respect to a trade-related measure of another Member that may affect its trade. STCs are routinely raised in different WTO bodies, including the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
← 19. The estimates for this type of measures are largely based on predictive (ex-ante) studies. The anticipated mitigation benefits are not yet realised due to various challenges, including technological barriers.
← 20. The term “carbon intensity” is also used when emissions are expressed relative to a measure of total output (e.g. physical volume, economic value) (OECD, 2024[96]).