Central Asia is well endowed with Critical Raw Materials (CRMs); however, this potential remains largely untapped. The mining sector in the region has traditionally been dominated by a few state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but is gradually opening to foreign investment, and this creates the opportunity for the development of a dynamic, higher value-added CRM sector. Nevertheless, limited geological mapping, the lack of harmonisation in reserves reporting and past disputes with foreign investors make new investment harder to attract. Connectivity bottlenecks, the environmental impacts of mining activities, labour rights issues and gender inequality remain major challenges for Central Asia’s mining sectors.
Advancing Security and Transparency for the Governance of Critical Raw Materials in Central Asia
Abstract
Latest economic developments in Central Asia
Central Asia has been one of the fastest growing regions in the world in recent years. Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan experienced a sharp recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic, with the region quickly returning to its previous growth trajectory and outperforming projections (IMF, 2025[1]). This recovery, and subsequent growth, were largely supported by strong domestic demand, including infrastructure investments, rising real wages, and a rebound in the services and industrial sectors.
Source: (IMF, 2025[2])
The three countries inherited substantial mining industries and discovered deposits at independence
In Kazakhstan, the metals mining sector contributed 12.1% of GDP in 2024 (AIFC, 2025[3]); the main mining products include uranium (of which Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer), aluminium, iron, gold, copper, lead and zinc (Grata International, 2025[4]) (World Nuclear Association, 2025[5]). It holds more than 200 mineral production sites (Vakulchuk, 2021[6]), and 38 new mineral deposits were discovered in 2025 alone (Kazinform, 2025[7]). The country is rich in rare earth elements and is the largest producer of uranium in the world, accounting for 40% of total production (World Nuclear Association, 2025[5]). Kazakhstan can currently export 21 out of the 34 CRMs outlined in the official EU list. The country possesses the world’s largest reserves of chromium, the seventh largest zinc reserves, and the eighth largest lead reserves. It stands among the first 20 countries for copper, cadmium and bauxite (Vakulchuk, 2021[6]) (AIFC, 2025[3]). The government also expects to produce 15% of the world’s graphite market through the development of the Sarytogan graphite mining site (Annex 1.B).
In the Kyrgyz Republic, the mining sector accounted for 2% of GDP in 2023, the main mining industries being gold and coal (Grata International, 2025[8]). However, the gold industry is classified as manufacturing in national statistics, which may explain this relatively low share. Nevertheless, estimates indicate that mining, particularly gold mining, accounts for nearly 13% of GDP and over 60% of exports (World Bank, 2023[9]). Mining and metals are also the sectors attracting the largest volumes of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country (World Bank, 2025[10]). The Kyrgyz Republic possesses substantial reserves of antimony, copper, iron and uranium, among other minerals. China’s current ban on antimony exports has opened opportunities for the Kyrgyz Republic, which holds 13% of the world’s antimony reserves (Carnegie Endowment, 2025[11]) (Annex 1.B).
In Uzbekistan, mining represented 17% of GDP in 2023, with the dominant industries being gold, copper and uranium (Grata International, 2025[12]) (Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 2023[13]). The country is endowed with the world’s 11th largest copper reserves, as well as substantial reserves of silver, molybdenum, selenium and lithium (Vakulchuk, 2021[6]), which are key to Uzbekistan’s affirmation as a top investment destination. The country is also one of the main gold exporters and the fifth largest uranium supplier in the world (World Nuclear Association, 2025[14]) (Annex 1.B).
Central Asia's abundant natural resources, including its substantial gold deposits, became an integral component of the Soviet Union’s mineral resource base. Since independence, gold has remained a cornerstone of the economies of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan, albeit with varying degrees of macroeconomic dependence. Its importance has intensified over time, not only as a key source of export revenues, industrial output and strategic reserves, but also due to its role in modern electronic and digital technologies, where it functions as a highly efficient, corrosion-resistant conductor of electricity.
Kazakhstan ranks 14th globally in terms of gold production. Notably, most of the deposits currently mined were either already in operation during Soviet times or discovered during that period.
In the Kyrgyz Republic, gold has become the central focus of the mining sector since independence. In 2020 its largest mine, Kumtor, accounted for approximately 11% of GDP and 52% of total industrial output.
In Uzbekistan, gold mining began in the late 1960s with the development of the Muruntau deposit, one of the world’s largest gold reserves. Gold continues to play a prominent role in the country’s export basket: in 2023, gold accounted for approximately $8.1 billion or 33.4% of total exports, and this share increased to 41.7% in early 2024.
Gold mining is increasingly relevant to the CRM agenda, as many gold deposits also contain valuable co- or by‑product minerals essential for clean energy, electronics and defence technologies. In addition to gold, these deposits may host recoverable elements such as antimony, tellurium, cobalt, tungsten, arsenic, manganese and in some cases zinc and silver. Historically, mining activities have focused mainly on gold extraction, leaving these associated minerals largely unexploited and often discarded in waste rock and tailings. However, with advances in tailings processing and trace‑element accounting, such by‑products can now be recovered economically. This enables existing gold mines to evolve into multi‑mineral operations, supporting domestic CRM supply without the need to develop entirely new mines.
Central Asian trade remains dependent on a few commodities and partners
Central Asia’s concentrated exports reinforce the need for trade-partner diversification. Central Asian countries currently present a rather undiversified export profile, each country being dependent on the export of one or two commodities (oil and gold for Kazakhstan; gold for the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan). They also export a range of metals and CRMs, including copper, aluminium, ferroalloys, and various metallic ores. Current export patterns indicate that trade in metals and CRMs remains largely oriented towards China, Russia and Türkiye, while the EU also serves as a destination for some of these materials, notably uranium and aluminium from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (OEC, 2025[22]) (Euratom Supply Agency, 2025[23]). Diversifying export profiles and strengthening participation in global value chains will depend on the development of efficient and secure transport links connecting Central Asia with a wider range of global markets (Box 1.2).
CRMs are mainly transported by road and rail
CRMs leaving Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan are mainly shipped by land, with rail carrying the heaviest flows where networks are strong and road freight filling gaps where they are not.
Kazakhstan’s CRM logistics are strongly rail-centred: Kazakhstan Temir Zholy reported transporting over 122 million tonnes in January-June 2024, including large bulk mineral categories (e.g. iron ore and manganese; non-ferrous ore and sulphur) and increased oil transport. At the same time, rail freight with China reached a record 32 million tonnes in 2024, with ores and metals being primary exported cargo (The Times of Central Asia, 2024[24]) (Interfax, 2025[25]). Kazakhstan’s freight system still reflects its Soviet industrial legacy, which was tailored to transporting bulk raw materials: coal, ore, grain and chemicals, by rail in conventional wagons. As a result, only around 11% of freight stations are currently equipped to handle containers, limiting the expansion of containerised mineral and metal exports (The Times of Central Asia, 2025[26]).
In the Kyrgyz Republic, freight transport is road-dominated: in 2024, 82.1% of total freight volumes were carried by road. Mineral exports rely predominantly on truck-based cross-border movements rather than organised wagonload rail corridors (stat.gov.kg, 2025[27]).
From Uzbekistan, CRM-related exports, particularly toward the European Union, are increasingly structured around rail and multimodal corridors. In the first nine months of 2023, railway shipments accounted for 44% of physical imports from Uzbekistan to the EU, compared to 36% by road and 16% by sea. Bulk mineral commodities and fertilisers show particularly strong rail intensity: potash fertiliser deliveries by rail increased from 7.6 to 62.9 thousand tonnes, and nitrogen-based fertilisers rose from 35 to 44 thousand tonnes, with specialised freight wagons used for bulk transport. Metal products are distributed across modes, with 63% transported by road and 36% by rail in 2022 (ERAI, 2023[28]).
At the regional level, international rail freight in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan is conducted under the Agreement on International Goods Transport by Rail (SMGS) within the framework of the Organisation for Co-operation of Railways, of which all three countries are members (OSJD, 2026[29]). National regulations operate alongside this framework. In Kazakhstan, for instance, materials such as lithium, cobalt, manganese, chrome, copper, nickel, lead, zinc and molybdenum ores are explicitly classified as bulk cargo under rail freight rules, while materials classified as dangerous or valuable (notably gold) are subject to stricter containment, packaging and documentation requirements (Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2019[30]).
Central Asian countries are working to offset their landlocked geography and better integrate into global value chains. The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), which connects Europe and China through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Türkiye, offers Central Asia the opportunity to not only become a major transit hub but also to increase its own trade volumes. The TCTC has gained renewed importance since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; in 2024, traffic along the corridor increased by around 62% as exporters sought reliable East-West trade alternatives. Before the full-scale invasion, the corridor already served as an alternative route for exports of some CRMs and hydrocarbons to Western markets. Kazakhstan in particular has long relied on the corridor for its grain, oil, minerals and uranium exports: in 2023, about 64% of Kazakhstan’s uranium exports to Western markets were transported via the TCTC. Since 2022, the country has also increased its oil exports along the TCTC, using the well-established Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline connection.
However, the development of the TCTC still faces multiple challenges, including insufficient multimodal infrastructure and the lack of regional harmonisation of national border-crossing procedures. The European Union has prioritised the development of the corridor to strengthen East-West supply chain resilience, including for the transport of CRMs. The OECD published a comprehensive report ‘Enhancing the Competitiveness of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor in Central Asia’, which assesses recent developments along the TCTC and provides tailored policy recommendations to strengthen its efficiency, predictability and regional integration potential.
Central Asian exports are rising while China is becoming the region’s main trade partner
Growth in Central Asia has been driven, among other factors, by a significant rise in exports: from 2010 to 2023, exports increased more than threefold, from USD 45.9 billion to USD 148.3 billion. In 2023, China was the main destination of Central Asian exports (20%), just ahead of the EU (19%). The United Kingdom and Switzerland, both major gold importers, represented, respectively, 13% and 10% of Central Asian exports that year, while Russia remained an important export partner with a 10% share.
China has become Central Asia’s main import partner. In 2010, the EU, Russia and China each represented 21% of Central Asia’s imports. In 2023, China represented 38%, while Russia’s and the EU’s shares declined to 17% and 14%, respectively. Given that Central Asian imports almost doubled between 2010 and 2023, China’s role in Central Asia’s trade has increased considerably (see Figure 1.2).
Percent, import sources (left), export destinations (right)
Note: In this graph, Central Asia covers the five countries: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Note: Russia has not published its trade statistics since 2022.
Source: (OEC, 2025[22])
Kazakhstan’s trade relies on oil and gold exports, with China and the EU being the country’s main trade partners
Kazakhstan’s exports are dominated by crude oil and gold, which represented 36.5% and 19.9%, respectively, of the country’s exports in 2023. This concentration exposes the economy to risks associated with oil price volatility, as observed in 2015-2016, when a prolonged decline in oil prices reduced export revenues, investment returns and budget income (OECD, 2021[39]). The country’s main export partners in 2023 were the EU (26% of exports), China (16%) and the UK (16%). China remained Kazakhstan’s leading import partner (31.2% of imports), followed by Russia (23.5%) and the EU (18%). Beyond hydrocarbons and gold, Kazakhstan also exports metals, such as copper, ferroalloys, aluminium, zinc and titanium, which display varying levels of integration with the European market. Exports to Europe account for approximately 7.7% of Kazakhstan’s total refined copper exports, 15.1% of ferroalloy exports, 29.7% of raw aluminium exports, 9.3% of raw zinc exports, and 59.6% of titanium exports. Uranium exports, in particular, hold increasing strategic significance: Kazakhstan was the second-largest source of uranium delivered to EU utilities in 2024, accounting for 24% of total deliveries to the EU, an increase of 11% compared with 2023 (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2025[40]) (Euratom Supply Agency, 2025[41]).
The Kyrgyz Republic mainly relies on gold exports, thus being exposed to price volatility
The Kyrgyz Republic’s exports are dominated by gold, which represented 38.4% of the country’s total exports in 2023. As for Kazakhstan, this overreliance exposes the country to market price volatility. The main export partners in 2023 were Switzerland (29% of exports), Russia (19%) and Kazakhstan (15%), reflecting a one-off gold purchase by Switzerland (76% of the Kyrgyz Republic’s gold exports) and possible re-exports to Russia. On the imports side, China accounted for 60.1% of Kyrgyz imports in 2023, underlining its major role in the country’s trade and economy. The Kyrgyz Republic also exports small quantities of metallic and mineral commodities to Europe, although their export values remain modest. In 2023, around 58% of its scrap-iron exports were destined for the EU, 11% of scrap-aluminium exports went to Italy and all tungsten exports went to Germany (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2025[42]).
Uzbekistan’s trade profile is dominated by gold exports, resulting from its recent decline in gas exports
Uzbekistan’s export profile went through a major shift towards gold exports in recent years (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2025[43]). In 2018, gas and gold were the country’s main export products, representing, respectively, 23.3% and 23.6% of total exports. However, Uzbekistan’s gas industry experienced a significant decline between 2018 and 2023, mainly due to the depletion of existing gas reserves. By 2023, gold represented 45.6% of exports, while gas accounted for only 2.19%. This shift is reflected in the rise of Switzerland and the UK as the country’s first and third export partners in 2023, respectively. Both are major gold importers, accounting for 73% and 23%, respectively, of Uzbekistan’s total gold exports. On the imports side, China and Russia traditionally remained the two largest import sources for Uzbekistan, respectively representing 32.3% and 16.6% of total imports in 2023.
Uzbekistan also exports some metals and minerals, including CRMs, to Europe. In 2024, Uzbekistan was the source of approximately 2% of all uranium delivered to the EU. In 2023, roughly 8% of its raw zinc was exported to European countries, although these flows make up only a small share of Uzbekistan’s total exports (Euratom Supply Agency, 2025[41]), (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2025[43]).
Critical Raw Materials are indispensable for a wide range of strategic sectors
Critical Raw Materials are materials which are intensely used in technologies central to the green and digital transition (OECD, 2023[44]) as well as to AI, robotics, defence, and are characterised by a high risk of supply chain disruption. These materials are indispensable for wind turbines, solar panels, electric vehicles, energy storage batteries, smartphones, computers and 5G networks. Defence and aerospace industries also require large quantities of CRMs, making the latter crucial for a wide range of strategic sectors. Under the IEA Net-Zero Emission scenario, demand for CRMs will be multiplied by 16 in 2050 compared to 2020 (Liang, 2023[45]). Recent OECD findings point out that the current global CRM supply is failing to meet increasing demand (OECD, 2024[46]), which creates opportunities for CRM-endowed economies to increase production and stimulate growth.
Central Asia is well endowed with CRMs, but this potential is yet to be leveraged
Central Asia possesses large reserves of CRMs (Table 1.1). The region holds 39% of global manganese ore reserves, 31% of chromium, 20% of lead, 13% of zinc, 9% of titanium, 6% of aluminium, 5% of copper, 5% of cobalt and 5% of molybdenum (Vakulchuk, 2021[6]). This endowment positions the region as a potentially crucial supplier for the global energy transition and technology industries, but it remains largely untapped. Extractives exports from the region continue to be dominated by hydrocarbons (oil, gas, coal) and gold, the latter having historically played a significant role in the development of Central Asian economies (Box 1.1). Other mineral industries, while being fairly developed for metals like copper, aluminium, uranium and zinc, remain rather secondary in the region’s export profile.
Note: Minerals that are classified in the UK critical minerals list 2024 and/or in the EU 2023 list of critical/strategic raw materials are highlighted in grey. Cadmium, chromium, lead, molybdenum, selenium and silver were added because of their importance for the green transition. Iridium, rhodium and ruthenium are classified as critical by the UK but are not present in Central Asia.
The region’s mining infrastructure is outdated and existing processing capabilities remain limited
Most countries in Central Asia have legacy mining operations served by outdated infrastructure. Although Kazakhstan (Minex Forum, 2025[49]) and Uzbekistan (Mining Technology Insights, 2025[50]) are planning to significantly modernise their mining infrastructure, there are still substantial efforts to be made to converge with world mining leaders such as Australia, Canada and South Africa. The mining infrastructure in the Kyrgyz Republic necessitates significant investment as well. The regional energy grids are also not well equipped to provide electricity for mass mineral mining. Mining necessitates considerable amounts of energy: as an example, mining currently accounts for 69% of Kazakhstan’s industrial energy use. Central Asian power systems cannot currently meet energy demand, which has led to frequent blackouts, gas rationings and residential heating shortages. To be able to substantially increase its mineral production, the region will need new and modern power plants as well as upgraded high-voltage transmission lines (Atlantic Council, 2025[51]) (Center of Global Energy Policy at Columbia, 2023[52]).
Central Asian countries have limited mineral processing and refining capacity, although efforts to expand it are underway. China plays a key role in the establishment of new processing and refining facilities in Central Asia, as in Kazakhstan for copper, gold, silver and tungsten processing, and in Uzbekistan for the processing of iron ore and copper (Trends Research, 2025[53]). Despite these developments, Central Asia’s processing and refining capacity remains insufficient for the region’s autonomy in such operations. Kazakhstan, the country with the most advanced capabilities in the matter, possesses large processing and refining capabilities for titanium, tantalum, beryllium and niobium, and can refine some base metals like zinc and lead, but it cannot process CRMs such as lithium, nickel and cobalt, which are exported in raw form to Russia or China for these purposes (Atlantic Council, 2025[51]). The Kyrgyz Republic possesses gold refining infrastructure but lacks such capabilities for other metals. Uzbekistan’s major mining SOE, the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine (AMMC), produces 148,000 tonnes of copper cathode each year, and also refines by-products such as gold and silver; however, the processing of other metals is still at an early stage.
Currently available geological data is significant but has not been updated since Soviet times
Central Asia has inherited significant mining infrastructure and geological data from the Soviet Union. However, limited geological exploration since the 1990s has led to a lack of a reliable, transparent and easily accessible data about mineral reserves in Central Asian countries (Carnegie Endowment, 2025[11]). Most of the currently available data comes from pre-independence geological mapping projects. For example, Soviet Kazakhstan’s exploration spending in 1990 alone matched independent Kazakhstan’s total expenses from 2003 to 2023 (Carnegie Endowment, 2025[11]). In the Kyrgyz Republic, the Kumtor mine, accounting for 90% of the Kyrgyz gold exports, is set to close in 2031 due to reserves depletion: the lack of exploration since independence will make it harder to offset this decline quickly with the development of new industries or deposits, putting at risk the Kyrgyz Republic’s growth prospects (World Bank, 2023[9]).
Central Asian countries lack both accessible and up-to-date databases of mineral reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan lack an official list of CRMs considered strategic for their economies. During the 3rd EU-Central Asia Economic Forum the parties signed the Data4CRM agreement which aims to address this problem through the modernisation of geodata systems and the improvement of the access to geological information, for a total budget of EUR 7.5 million and with the support of the Geological Survey of Finland (EEAS, 2025[38]).
In 2018, Kazakhstan introduced a new Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (SSU Code) that included provisions to expand public access to geological information. The Code also clarified rules on data confidentiality and established institutional mechanisms for storing and systematising geological data (OECD, 2018[54]). Since its adoption, the country has been modernising its geological information system, including through the large-scale digitalisation of both modern and archival geological materials. To support more transparent and accessible data for investors, in 2025, Kazakhstan launched the Unified Subsoil Use Platform (minerals.e-qazyna.kz), which now offers access to more than 66 000 geological reports, licensing data, online application services and interactive mapping. The digitalisation of primary geological data is ongoing: as of 2025, over 73% of the national geological information had been digitalised, with full digitalisation expected by 2026 (Primeminister.kz, 2025[55]).
The Law on Subsoil of the Kyrgyz Republic designates all geological information gathered on subsoil as state property (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2018[56]). Access to geological information is paid and granted only through written requests to the Department of Geology, with fees directed to the State Geological Information Fund. Currently, only about 30% of the materials in the Fund have been converted to electronic format; much of the archive is not digitalised, reports are neither geocoded nor available online, and some information may be classified as a state secret. This system creates costs that discourage investment in early-stage exploration and contrasts with good practices in places like Canada or Chile, where geological data is treated as a public good and is available for free (World Bank, 2023[9]). Nevertheless, the Kyrgyz Republic Strategic Development Programme for Critical Minerals through 2030 aims to digitise at least 95% of archival materials during the 2025-2030 period and integrate them into the Unified Integrated Geological Platform to ensure open access for investors.
Uzbekistan’s revised Subsoil Law, in force since early 2025, introduces a requirement to establish an interactive geological portal that provides public access to a wide range of non-confidential geological data. The portal includes information on mineral deposits, legacy mining sites, contaminated areas and relevant environmental factors (including soil and hydrogeological conditions). In practice, it will enable access to the national subsoil cadastre, which brings together geological, geophysical, geochemical and hydrogeological datasets covering all known deposits and prospective areas. Sensitive information will remain protected; however, the law requires that geological data generated with public funding, as well as data from expired private licenses, be made publicly accessible, subject to confidentiality safeguards where appropriate (CIS Legislation, 2024[57]) (Grata International, 2025[12]). Prior to the law’s adoption, Uzbekistan had already started publishing selected geological maps on its national Geoportal (geoportal-uz.org). Geological institutions have likewise been digitalising historical materials; Uzbekgeologorazvedka, for instance, has been gradually scanning Soviet-era exploration records and developing 3D models of major ore deposits in the Kyzylkum region (uzgeo.uz, 2025[58]).
The harmonisation of mineral reserves reporting systems is pending
All three Central Asian countries initially inherited the Soviet-derived mineral reserves classification system, known as the GKZ system (Gosudarstvennaya Komissiya po Zapasam poleznykh iskopayemykh – the State Commission for Mineral Reserves). International standards recognised by the Committee for Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO) include frameworks such as the Australian JORC (Australasian Code for Reporting Exploration Results, Mineral Resources and Ore Reserves), the Canadian CIM (Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum Definition Standards for Mineral Resources and Mineral Reserves), and the European PERC (Pan European Reserves and Resources Reporting Committee). Unlike these systems, the GKZ does not distinguish between mineral resources and reserves, using instead the term ”balance reserves”, which does not align with international reporting practices.
Kazakhstan joined CRIRSCO in 2016 (CRIRSCO, 2025[59]) to transition towards international standards. The government took its inspiration from the Australian JORC standards when designing its new KAZRC (Kazakhstan’s code for the Public Reporting of Exploration Results, Mineral Resources and Mineral Reserves) system. At the time of writing, Kazakhstan uses both the new KAZRC system and the old GKZ system which is still recognised in national regulations but is being progressively replaced (KAZRC, 2021[60]).
The Kyrgyz Republic is not a CRIRSCO member but officially transitioned to CRIRSCO standards in 2017, when it started designing its own KyrRC system. The harmonisation project, supported by the UN, was approved by Presidential Decree in February 2024. However, the GKZ system is still widely used, while large projects like Kumtor were reported to use both the GKZ and the CRIRSCO-compliant system (Grata International, 2025[8]) (CRIRSCO, 2022[61]). Under the Kyrgyz Republic Strategic Development Programme for Critical Minerals through 2030, KyrRC standards are expected to be fully integrated, while the GKZ system will be maintained for national oversight.
Uzbekistan is not yet a CRIRSCO member but transitioned to the JORC system in 2019-2020. Like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan still maintains the GKZ system for internal accounting purposes, but this system is being phased out (Grata International, 2025[12]).
In all three Central Asian countries, the mining sector is dominated by SOEs, and joint ventures requiring a minority stake for the state are frequent in the region. Domestic private participation remains limited, as most local companies are smaller firms engaged primarily in mining support activities such as geological studies, drilling, and blasting.
In Kazakhstan, besides the large mining SOE Tau-Ken Samruk, deposits are mined by a small number of corporations, some of which are jointly owned by Kazakh and foreign investors and subject to significant state involvement, the most important being the Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) for high carbon ferrochrome, bauxite and iron ore and Kazzinc for zinc, copper, lead and gold (Vakulchuk, 2021[6]). Major domestic private sector actors in the mining industry are concentrated in Kazakhstan. These include ERG, in which the government holds a 40% stake, but which is primarily owned by domestic private actors, as well as Kazakhmys, the country’s largest copper producer; Kaz Minerals, another major copper producer active in Kazakhstan and in the Kyrgyz Republic; and Solidcore Eurasia, a major gold producer. The main uranium mining SOE, Kazatomprom, also holds significant processing capabilities for tantalum, beryllium and niobium at its Ulba plant in Öskemen, which is one of the world’s leading producers of these three minerals (Ulba.kz, 2026[62]).
In the Kyrgyz Republic, the mining sector is dominated by an SOE, Kyrgyzaltyn, which controls most of the mining sites, including the Kumtor gold mine, the largest in the country. Kyrgyzaltyn is the only company to produce pure gold in the Kyrgyz Republic, while doré, a semi-pure alloy of gold and silver, is banned from export, which means that smaller gold mining companies must refine their gold at the Kyrgyzaltyn-owned Kara-Balta refinery. The Precious Metals and Stones Law stipulates that gold produced in the country must be sold to the National Bank and can only be sold to third parties if the National Bank declines to purchase it. Finally, the state holds at least a minority stake of 30% in every major gold or silver mining project in the country (World Bank, 2023[9]).
In Uzbekistan, three SOEs, the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine (AMMC), the Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Combine (NMMC), and NavoiUran, dominate the country’s mineral extraction, including gold, silver, copper and uranium: NMMC alone is estimated to have accounted for more than 20% of Uzbekistan’s budget revenues in 2024 (Mining.com, 2025[63]). The Uzbekistan Technological Metals Complex (UzTMK), created in 2024 as a subsidiary of AMMC, is set to become a major actor in Uzbekistan’s CRM industry: with an asset portfolio of over 100 development and R&D projects, UzTMK is expected to become a dominant enterprise in Central Asia for metals like tungsten, molybdenum, rhenium, tellurium, selenium, graphite, tantalum and others. UzTMK’s activities involve upstream mining operations, midstream metal production and end-product manufacturing, thus considerably reinforcing Uzbekistan’s metal processing capabilities.
Foreign actors, predominantly Chinese, actively invest in Central Asia’s mining industry. All three Central Asian countries host mining projects with foreign involvement. Joint ventures between foreign companies and domestic SOEs are the most frequent form of foreign investment in mining. An important tendency is the expanding Chinese involvement in Central Asia’s mining industry. In 2021, China was already the most important foreign investor in the mining sector of the Kyrgyz Republic (Vakulchuk, 2021[6]). China is also increasing its presence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, not only by investing in extraction facilities but also by supporting the development of initial processing capabilities in these countries (Trends Research, 2025[53]).
Kazakhstan is expanding and diversifying its international partnerships in the CRM sector
Kazakhstan is pursuing its co-operation with the UK, the EU and China. The on-going EU-Kazakhstan co-operation on critical raw materials was reinforced following the first EU-Central Asia summit in April 2025, with a Roadmap for 2025-2026, complementing the Memorandum of Understanding signed between parties in 2022. In parallel, the EU-funded project “GROW CRM” was launched in March 2025 for the EBRD to support joint CRM project identification and development, financing pre-feasibility and feasibility studies and offering targeted technical assistance to strengthen regulatory frameworks. The Kazakh National Geological Survey (NGS) and the British Geological Survey signed a three-year partnership in 2024 to digitalise NGS’s data management system and develop a comprehensive, accessible geological data platform with advanced mapping and analysis tools (The Astana Times, 2025[64]). In November 2025, Kazakhstan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US focusing on CRMs, with notably a plan for the construction of a tungsten mining and processing plant (US Department of State, 2025[65]).
Among the main foreign investors in the Kazakh mining sector, the Anglo-Swiss mining giant Glencore is active in the exploitation of one gold mine, two silver mines and three zinc mines in the country (AIFC, 2025[3]), while the UK-based Central Asia Metals is active in the copper industry (World Bank, 2023[16]). An Australian-British mining giant, Rio Tinto, holds large copper and lithium exploration properties, including a lithium exploration project at the Kalba South-West site in the East Kazakhstan region under a license running until 2029 (kursiv.media, 2024[66]).The Australia-based Sarytogan Graphite Ltd. is currently operating at the Sarytogan graphite deposit, which is officially considered as strategic by the EU and is financially supported by the EBRD. In 2023, the German company HMS Bergbau acquired two controlling shares in mining and exploration licences for lithium, tantalum and rare earths in eastern Kazakhstan (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2025[67]). In 2025, the American Kaz Critical Minerals and the Canadian Ivanhoe Mines were also granted exploration licenses for rare earth, copper and other metal development (AIFC, 2025[3]). More recently, in February 2026, a major new development occurred when the US backed a USD 1.1 billion deal by California-based Cove Capital to develop two tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan, south of Karaganda, thus marking the first major US entry into Central Asia’s CRM sector (Eurasianet, 2026[68]).
Chinese investment, primarily from Chinese SOEs, has been increasing in Kazakhstan’s mining sector, making China the leading foreign investor in the country’s CRMs industry, with involvement extending from research collaboration to extraction and processing. China is currently supporting a new USD 1.1 billion copper smelting project led by KAZ Minerals in the Abai region, which would simultaneously yield by-products from copper mining such as gold, silver and industrial sulfuric acid. Chinese companies are also active in Kazakhstan’s tungsten sector: Jiaxin International Resources Investment runs an ore-processing joint venture at the Boguty deposit in Almaty region, and East Hope Group is supporting the country’s first tungsten processing plant and a new vertically integrated non-ferrous complex (Trends Research, 2025[53]).
The Kyrgyz Republic is re-opening its mining sector to foreign investment
The relationship between the government and foreign investors in the mining sector has been marked by frequent disagreements around social and environmental issues, resulting in repeated license suspensions, notably for Chinese companies (Nuraiym, 2025[69]). In 2021, a new Mining Code which was approved but never adopted was set to ban all foreign companies, except those who had already been granted licenses, from participating in future large mining projects, and planned to put all mineral development under State control (Mining.com, 2021[70]) (USGS, 2025[71]) (USGS, 2025[72]). In the same year, the Kyrgyz government took control of the Kumtor mine, the largest gold mine in the country, from the Canadian Centerra Gold which was operating the site. The final agreement between the two parties was reached in 2022, when the mine was effectively nationalised and put under Kyrgyzaltyn’s control (Mining.com, 2022[73]). A July 2022 reform required that at least 90% of all employees working on mining projects in the Kyrgyz Republic be Kyrgyz citizens (World Bank, 2023[9]). The years 2022-2024 were also punctuated by temporary partial bans on the export of ferrous ingots, ferrous metal scrap and waste, gold-bearing ore and concentrate, as well as coal, which increased uncertainty about the government’s goals in mining policy (USGS, 2025[72]).
The government is currently operating a policy shift in favour of new investment from abroad. The new Kyrgyz Republic Strategic Development Programme for Critical Minerals through 2030 plans for Memorandums of Understanding with foreign partners and for membership in international organisations such as the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA) and the Critical Minerals Association (CMA). However, these recent developments have not yet resulted in substantial foreign investment in the Kyrgyz mining sector.
Chinese actors are now the main foreign players in the Kyrgyz gold mining sector. Notably the Ishtamberdy mine is operated by the Chinese Full Gold Mining, the Kichi-Chaarat mine is owned by China National Gold (Nuraiym, 2025[69]) and the Taldybulak Levoberezhny site operated by the Zijin Mining Group through a joint venture with Kyrgyzaltyn (Trends Research, 2025[53]). It is not unusual that Chinese construction companies own shares in such projects, as they also build road infrastructure to ship the extracted gold resources to China (Nuraiym, 2025[69]). Recently, the Kyrgyz Republic and China launched a strategic partnership around lithium extraction (Trends Research, 2025[53]).
Russia remains an important player in the Kyrgyz gold mining sector, notably through projects led by Russian-owned companies Alliance Altyn (Talas region) and Highland Exploration LLC (Manas region) (World Bank, 2023[9]). Other foreign actors in Kyrgyzstan’s mining sector include the Turkish Eti Bakir, which operates the Tereksay gold mine through a joint venture with Kyrgyzaltyn, the British Chaarat Gold, which operates two gold mines in the Manas region, and the Kazakh Kaz Minerals, which operates the Bozymchak gold-copper mine. Additionally, an Australian company, Vertex Gold Company, operates a gold mine in the Manas region (Alliance "For Budget Transparency", 2023[74]).
Uzbekistan is looking to diversify partnerships away from China, notably with EU countries and the US
In February 2026, Uzbekistan and the US signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths (Tashkent Times, 2026[75]). The government has also recently launched an ambitious USD 2.6 billion initiative to bolster its critical minerals sector, notably counting on US investment and support (Mining.com, 2025[76]). Some projects have already been announced with the multinational company Traxys on the exploration and extraction of tungsten, molybdenum and copper (Frank.uz, 2025[77]). Uzbekistan also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the EU in 2024 focusing on CRMs, with the perspective of further EU investment in the country’s mining sector (The Brussels Times, 2025[78]). Foreign involvement in Uzbekistan’s mining sector includes the French company Orano, which established a joint venture with the uranium mining SOE NavoiUran, and partnerships with Japanese JOGMEC and Turkish MTA and Calik Holding (Grata International, 2025[12]). AMMC has recently concluded a partnership with the Finnish Metso for the construction and equipment of a new copper smelting facility (Metso, 2024[79]).
However, most foreign investment in mining comes from China, which has notably been supporting several projects of initial processing facilities. In the Tashkent region, the Limaomaoli Metal Company is building a new mining complex in Syurenata which is set to extract 2.4 million tons of ore each year and to process it into 850,000 tons of ore concentrate. In the Namangan region, the China Mining Energy Group invested USD 200 million in a project in the Chust district combining mining and processing facilities set to produce an annual amount of 30,000 tons of refined copper (Trends Research, 2025[53]).
Central Asian countries are reforming their legal frameworks for mining with implementation of the new provisions on-going
The legal frameworks for Central Asia’s mining sectors have undergone substantial changes in recent years. Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic have amended their existing subsoil use laws and Uzbekistan has adopted a new law on subsoil. Kazakhstan is developing new partnerships as part of its plan to boost its critical minerals industry, while the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan are working to attract new foreign investment into their mining sectors through the lifting of restrictions and new investment legislation.
Kazakhstan has accelerated reforms to its subsoil use regime to attract investment and support critical minerals development
Kazakhstan’s SSU Code, adopted in 2017 and amended in 2024, aims to attract investment in the country’s mining sector by liberalising access to the geological data, mineral exploration and mineral production. The Code replaced the contract-based framework of the 2010 law, under which mining rights were granted through negotiated contracts or auctions and required lengthy multi-agency approvals. The Code introduced a streamlined licensing system for most solid minerals, while retaining contracts for hydrocarbons and uranium. For non-uranium solid minerals, rights are granted through an administrative, non-discriminatory procedure based on the order in which applications are received, enabling both domestic and foreign entities to obtain licences for geological study, exploration or extraction (Adilet, 2022[80]).
For solid minerals, extraction is carried out under licences and governed by a mining plan. Operators must meet annual minimum expenditure requirements, ensure that at least a minimum share of domestic value is reflected in the works and services they procure, and provide staged financial guarantees for mine closure. Extraction of common minerals is limited to 10 years, while hydrocarbons and uranium remain under the contract regime; uranium extraction contracts may last up to 25 years, including up to four years of experimental-industrial extraction.
The recent Comprehensive Plan for the Development of the Rare and Rare Earth Metals Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2024-2028 aims to introduce technologies for the complex extraction of CRMs, modernise the current mining infrastructure, develop new standards to regulate the mining industry and lift the secrecy regime of certain minerals. Under this Plan, the government has concluded several agreements, notably with the British Maritime House Ltd, the German HMS Bergbau AG and the American Cove Capital Investments LLC for deposits development and processing (Mining See, 2024[81]) (Minex Forum, 2023[82]). In parallel, amendments to the SSU Code approved in December 2025 introduced electronic auctions for granting subsoil rights and a new contract regime for underexplored territories that gives priority to investors financing geological studies. The reforms also strengthened state control over uranium through expanded priority rights for the national uranium company (Trend.az, 2025[83]).
The Kyrgyz Republic has finalised a new CRM strategy which should open the sector to foreign investment and to more transparent licensing procedures
The Kyrgyz mining sector is regulated by the Law on Subsoil, last amended in 2024. The State Agency for Geology and Subsoil Use under the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology, and Technical Supervision is responsible for overseeing subsoil use in the Kyrgyz Republic. Licenses are granted through bidding processes and auctions, and less frequently through direct applications (Grata International, 2025[8]). The law provides three main mechanisms for granting rights: tenders, auctions and the “first-filed application” rule, while rights may also be granted to SOEs directly by decision of the Cabinet of Ministers. The 2024 amendments clarified auction rules by explicitly naming the highest bidder as the winner; for large and medium gold and silver deposits, the winning offer must also include a state share. License terms range up to three years for prospecting, four years for exploration and twenty years for extraction, with extensions permitted until the depletion of reserves. Following license issuance, subsoil users must pay the bonus and first-year license-holding fee, submit a technical project with positive industrial, environmental and subsoil-protection expertise, and comply with reporting and payment requirements.
Under an extraction license, the subsoil user obtains the exclusive right to develop a deposit within a designated mining allotment and acquires ownership of extracted minerals. Extraction activities must be carried out on the basis of a technical project with positive industrial, environmental and subsoil-protection expertise, and operators are required to ensure the fullest possible extraction of reserves while avoiding excessive losses or selective development. Subsoil users must comply with industrial safety and environmental protection requirements, submit annual geological and operational reports, and undertake land reclamation and mine-closure works (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2022[84]).
In recent years, the government has re-opened the mining sector to foreign investment. In February 2024, a presidential decree on a national project for the extraction of polymetals and rare earth elements was signed, signalling a first opening-up. In June 2024, the government lifted a five-year-old ban on uranium and thorium mining and geological exploration (The Times of Central Asia, 2024[85]) (Interfax, 2024[86]), enabling advancement of projects such as Kyzyl-Ompol.
In 2025, the government finalised, with the support of the Boston Consulting Group, the Kyrgyz Republic Strategic Development Programme for Critical Minerals through 2030, containing an official list of 22 minerals present in the country’s subsoil which the government considers as critical. In the Programme, the government recognises that the current requirement for the state to hold a minimum 30% share in all gold and silver mining projects should be brought into balance with the goal of attracting foreign investment, and that the Kyrgyz Republic is considered higher-risk by international rating agencies than other Central Asian countries. The Programme plans to increase annual foreign direct investment in the Kyrgyz mining sector to USD 700 million, to launch at least 5 new mining investment projects, and to reach USD 1 billion in annual CRM exports by 2030. The Programme also sets to replace the paper-based licensing system with a digital system and electronic auctions, while reducing license retention fees which are currently higher than in neighbouring countries. Finally, the establishment of special economic zones and industrial clusters is considered to incentivise deep processing of CRMs.
Uzbekistan updated subsoil and investment laws to streamline licencing, expand investor rights and improve access to information and data
Uzbekistan’s new Law on Subsoil entered into force in early 2025, replacing the 2002 framework that had fragmented licensing processes, restricted transfers of subsoil rights, and offered limited access to geological data (Kun.uz, 2024[87]). The law establishes a one-stop shop for subsoil use permits granted by the Centre for Subsoil Use and improves access to geological and practical information for both government and investors. The law also grants license holders the right to transfer, sell and pledge their subsoil usage rights under state supervision, and introduces environmental standards for geological exploration and project development (Kun.uz, 2024[88]). The law was drafted by the government with the support of the EBRD, taking into account the existing legislation in countries with strong mining industries such as Canada and Australia to create better visibility for potential investors from these countries (Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 2024[89]). However, the contract stability guarantees exclude changes to labour and environmental protection frameworks, allowing the state to impose new requirements retroactively, creating the risk of regulatory unpredictability. Uzbekistan does not yet have an official critical minerals strategy, but the government is currently working with the Boston Consulting Group on a draft project for such a document.
The Centre for Subsoil Use issues licenses for all stages and types of mining, including artisanal mining. The licenses can be issued on a “first come – first served” basis or via auctions and tenders. The maximum term for extraction authorisations is generally up to 25 years. Authorisations may only be issued for free cadastral squares: excluded areas include areas designated as protected natural territories, reserved for auctions or tenders, subject to state geological study, or designated as prohibited by the Ministry of Mining Industry and Geology. The authorisation may be re-registered in the case of a change in cadastral squares. The authorisation holder may request the exclusion of specific cadastral squares at any time, provided that the remaining squares are contiguous. Payments include the application processing fee and the annual license payment (Lex.uz, 2024[90]).
The main legal provisions on investment are contained in the Law On Investment and Investment Activities approved in 2025: this new law enhances investor protections, raises the land use rights term for investors, reduces foreign investor equity participation requirements from 15% to 10% and improves legal certainty (OECD, 2025[91]) (Eurasian Star, 2025[92]). The new Law on Environmental Expertise, Environmental Impact Assessment and Strategic Environmental Assessment mandates environmental impact assessments for relevant projects and programmes (Grata International, 2025[12]).
The green and digital transitions open opportunities for women’s participation in the mining sector, but the latter remains limited due to structural barriers
As efforts to improve labour conditions in the mining sector continue, policy discussions increasingly emphasise that gender equality is also a central element of a responsible mining agenda (ILO, 2021[93]). At the global level, women account for only about 15% of the mining workforce (World Bank, 2024[94]). Advancing their equal participation is both a global commitment under the Sustainable Development Goals (notably SDG 5 on gender equality and SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth) and an economic imperative, as the underutilisation of women’s human capital hinders long-term economic development (Duflo, 2012[95]) (OECD, 2024[96]). Empirical studies in labour economics further demonstrate that gender-based barriers, particularly in high-productivity sectors such as large-scale mining, have historically misallocated talent and reduced aggregate productivity, thereby suppressing output and slowing GDP growth (Hsieh, 2013[97]) (Cuberes, 2016[98]). Recent OECD analysis also highlights that increasing women’s participation has become strategically important for the mining sector’s long-term competitiveness. Industry evidence shows that mining companies with more gender-diverse leadership teams have a 25% higher likelihood of exceeding performance goals, and mixed-gender crews report injury rates about 67% lower than homogeneous teams (McKinsey & Company, 2023[99]) (OECD, 2025[100]).
Women’s low representation in mining results from a combination of longstanding legal, cultural and structural barriers that restrict their access to both traditional and new occupations. Historically and on a global scale, women were prohibited from underground and hazardous mining work, a restriction formalised under the ILO Underground Work (Women) Convention, 1935 (No. 45), which was abrogated only in 2024 (ILO, 2024[101]). These legislative constraints have reinforced entrenched perceptions of mining as a physically demanding and inherently masculine field and have contributed to workplace cultures where harassment and gender-based discrimination are well documented. Structural barriers also limit women’s employment in mining. A 2019 gender analysis in Western Australia found that inadequate childcare and basic social services at remote sites, combined with long and inflexible shift rotations, deter around 60-70% of female applicants. Consequently, women remain concentrated in administrative and office roles, while operational, technical and site-based positions remain male-dominated. These patterns are reinforced by a 15-25% gender pay gap in the sector and by a higher prevalence of part-time or casual contracts among women (OECD, 2025[100]).
The ongoing digital and green transitions are reshaping labour demand in mining and creating new opportunities to expand women’s participation. Advances in automation, remote-operated machinery and digital monitoring systems reduce the physical demands of frontline mining work and shift many tasks from remote sites to urban control centres, easing structural barriers for women, such as long, inflexible shift rotations and distance from family support systems. These transitions are also generating new roles in programming, data analytics, remote operations management and environmental monitoring. Fully realising these opportunities, however, requires continued efforts to close STEM education gaps so that women, who make up only 35% of STEM graduates and around 40% of the global STEM workforce, can access the emerging high-skill occupations shaping the future of mining (OECD, 2025[100]) (ILOSTAT, 2023[102]) (UNESCO, 2024[103]).
In Central Asia, hazardous mining environments reinforce persistent gender inequality, as women’s participation continues to be hindered by both physical risks and long-standing legal barriers. For decades, labour codes across the region directed women toward the services sector, specifically health and education. Although all three Central Asian countries have recently amended or repealed prohibitions on women’s employment in hazardous industries, none guarantee equal access to employment in the construction, manufacturing and mining sectors (UNDP, 2016[104])); women’s participation in mining continues to be constrained by educational gaps, occupational segregation and limited career development opportunities.
Kazakhstan recently lifted regulatory restrictions on female employment including in the mining sector
In 2023, women represented about 17.8% of the mining and quarrying workforce in Kazakhstan (QazStat, 2024[105]), with participation highest in metallurgy (26%) and metal ore mining (23.6%). Operational roles, such as field-based extraction, continue to be male-dominated, reflecting the legacy of long-standing legal restrictions (EnergyProm, 2019[106]) (Atakhanova and Howie, 2022[107]). In 2021, the Kazakh Labour Code was amended to lift occupational restrictions for women in industrial jobs previously classified as hazardous (World Bank, 2023[108]); nevertheless, structural and educational factors continue to influence progress toward full gender parity. In 2024, women comprised 31.1% of STEM graduates (down from 35.1% in 2016) (World Bank, 2025[109]), with particularly low representation in mechanical engineering. Moreover, STEM-educated women often do not pursue mining and other STEM-related careers, due to societal expectations, prevailing gender norms and limited career support (CohenMiller, 2021[110]). Leading companies such as ERG and KAZ Minerals have reaffirmed their commitment to eliminating gender-based discrimination, reporting that women constitute 26.2% and 21% of their workforces, respectively, with 38% and 26% of managerial positions held by women (MINEX Kazakhstan, 2023[111]).
The Kyrgyz Republic possesses more granular data on female employment in the mining sector, although the latter remains limited
In 2022, women made up 6.54% of all employees in the extractive sector in the Kyrgyz Republic (StatKG, 2023[112]). A more specific gender diagnostic conducted among 10 major mining companies in the country found that in 2021 women made up only 12% of the workforce of the analysed companies, with just 7% holding managerial positions (Alliance "For Budget Transparency", 2023[74]). In this context, the Kyrgyz Republic Strategic Development Programme for Critical Minerals through 2030 aims to raise women’s participation in the critical minerals sector to 15%. More broadly, women across the country are primarily employed in tertiary sectors such as real estate, education and healthcare, which tend to pay lower average wages, while men are more prevalent in industrial sectors, including construction and mining (StatKG, 2023[112]). Amendments to the Kyrgyz Labour Code in 2025 removed employment restrictions for women (except for pregnant and lactating women) in nearly 400 occupations classified as hazardous, including underground mining and heavy lifting (The Times of Central Asia, 2025[113]). Nevertheless, practical and cultural factors continue to influence women’s participation in these sectors: relatively few girls pursue studies in mining or engineering, resulting in a limited pool of qualified female candidates (GIZ, 2014[114]). Recent international initiatives have sought to address these gaps; for instance, in 2023-24, UNDP implemented a mentoring and leadership programme in the Kyrgyz Republic aimed at increasing women’s representation in STEM fields, where they currently account for only about 34% of graduates (UNDP, 2024[115]) (World Bank, 2025[109]).
Uzbekistan’s largest mining SOEs and line ministry have undertaken initiatives to promote female employment in mining
Women currently represent 16% of the workforce in Uzbekistan’s mining sector. Since 2019, occupational restrictions for women have been lifted in several industries; however, some restrictive norms persist in mining and metallurgy (The Times of Central Asia, 2024[116]). Leading mining companies have begun promoting gender equality initiatives: in 2024, the Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Combine (NMMC) joined the International Women in Mining (IWiM) initiative as a partner and currently reports that women constitute over 13% of its workforce, including approximately 13% of leadership positions (NMMC, 2024[117]). In 2025, the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine (AMMC) and the German bank KfW created a joint Uzbekistan-Europe Women Leaders Society which organised several conferences to promote female leadership, as well as mentorship and ambassador programmes to advance the inclusion of women in the mining sector. The Ministry of Mining Industry and Geology has also publicly promoted women’s participation, reporting a steady increase in female geology students. In 2024, women accounted for 30.5% of STEM graduates in Uzbekistan, in consistency with regional patterns (Ministry of Mining Industry and Geology of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 2025[118]) (World Bank, 2025[109]).
Enhance geological mapping through renewed exploration and harmonised reporting of reserves
Governments of Central Asian countries should consider scaling up their subsoil exploration projects to provide domestic companies and potential investors with better visibility on the types of minerals present and the scale of available reserves. Governments should also consider providing more exploration licenses to foreign companies and creating joint ventures for soil exploration. The mineral reserves reporting systems should be harmonised, not only with CRIRSCO member countries but within Central Asia as well:
Kazakhstan, which is already a CRIRSCO member, could finalise its transition to CRIRSCO reporting standards and completely phase out the GKZ system in favour of the KAZRC system.
The Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan could finalise their transition to CRIRSCO standards and consider becoming CRIRSCO members as well.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could also consider publishing official lists containing minerals they consider as critical and/or strategic for their economies. The Kyrgyz Republic already has an official list.
Clarify legislation and rules to potential investors
Governments could consider providing investors with clear guidance on legislation and rules touching upon mining revenue taxation and environmental and social standards. This would avoid future misunderstandings and disagreements between investors and governments, leading to less litigations and fewer project terminations. Fuller, clearer and more systematic provision of information and guidance in this respect will allow governments to attract foreign investment more easily and lead to better informed co-operation between different parties in the mining process.
Promote fair hiring conditions and skills development for a more inclusive and productive mining sector
Advancing women’s participation in mining requires addressing both remaining legal barriers and broader structural constraints. Governments and companies could consider strengthening the implementation of gender-equal labour regulations, encouraging fair recruitment practices, including the use of structured or automated hiring tools that can help reduce bias, and fostering workplace environments that better support inclusion (Box 1.3). Building on existing regional initiatives supported by international organisations, Central Asian governments could invest in expanding opportunities for women’s skills development and training in relevant fields to help widen the pool of qualified female candidates. Mining companies could also promote women’s career progression by creating more pathways into technical and leadership roles and by increasing the visibility of women’s contributions across the sector. Over time, the more effective utilisation of women’s human capital would help strengthen labour-market efficiency across the region.
Bias in recruitment processes can limit women’s entry into traditionally male-dominated sectors such as mining. Introducing more structured or technology-supported methods can help improve fairness in early screening. One example is “Applied”, a UK hiring platform informed by behavioural-science principles that supports skills-focused shortlisting and limits the role of subjective judgement in hiring decisions.
Applied provides a range of structured assessment tools, including analytical and numerical exercises, situational-judgement questions and short work-sample tasks, as well as anonymised CV review and structured interviews. Its screening process anonymises candidate responses, reviews them by skill area and applies independent scoring by multiple reviewers. The platform then brings these scores together into a single ranking to support more consistent, evidence-based decisions. Applied also includes tools to review job-description language for potential bias and provides analytics to help organisations monitor diversity patterns.
While such tools cannot address the broader structural barriers to women’s participation in mining outlined in this chapter, they can complement wider policy and company-level efforts by encouraging more transparent and fairer recruitment practices and supporting the identification of female candidates who may otherwise be overlooked at the initial screening stage.
Source: (Be Applied, 2025[119])
Collect gender-disaggregated data to inform policymaking and support women’s employment in the mining sector
Better availability of gender-disaggregated data in mining statistics would allow for more detailed information on women’s participation and roles in the sector, as well as information regarding the challenges they are facing. While gender-disaggregated data for the mining sector is accessible in the Kyrgyz Republic, this is not the case for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Wider availability of such data would help governments, SOEs and domestic private enterprises design targeted and evidence-based policies to mainstream gender-specific objectives. Disaggregated data would not only help assess the difference of the mining sector’s economic impact on men and women, but also its social and cultural impact, which would allow policymakers to make targeted decisions in favour of better employment opportunities and working conditions for women in mining.
Building on this analysis, the following chapters address three critical dimensions of sustainable CRM governance, which together underpin the social, environmental and economic resilience of the sector. The next chapter examines how responsible business conduct (RBC) can help manage social and ethical risks across the CRM value chain, ensuring that mining contributes positively to local communities. The subsequent chapter focuses on the management of environmental risks and identifies policy tools to align CRM development with climate and resource sustainability objectives. The final chapter turns to tax policy and illicit financing, analysing how transparent and equitable fiscal frameworks can strengthen public revenues and curb base erosion and profit shifting.
References
[32] ADB (2024), Unlocking Transport Connectivity in the Caucasus and Central Asia, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/1009086/unlocking-transport-connectivity-caucasus-and-central-asia.pdf (accessed on 10 November 2025).
[80] Adilet (2022), О недрах и недропользовании, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/K1700000125 (accessed on 12 September 2025).
[3] AIFC (2025), Kazakhstan as a Minerals Investment Hub: Unlocking Potential through the AIFC, https://aifc.kz/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/mining-report-aifc-2025-eng.pdf.
[125] AIFC (2024), The reserves of critical raw materials allow Kazakhstan to become a leading supplier in the energy transition, https://aifc.kz/news/the-reserves-of-critical-raw-materials-allow-kazakhstan-to-become-a-leading-supplier-in-the-energy-transition/ (accessed on 1 August 2025).
[74] Alliance "For Budget Transparency" (2023), ГЕНДЕРНАЯ ДИАГНОСТИКА ГОРНОДОБЫВАЮЩЕЙ ОТРАСЛИ В КЫРГЫЗСТАНЕ, https://resourcejustice.org/ru/25308/ (accessed on 4 December 2025).
[107] Atakhanova, Z. and P. Howie (2022), “Women in Kazakhstan’s Energy Industries: Implications for Energy Transition”, Energies, https://doi.org/10.3390/en15134540 (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[51] Atlantic Council (2025), Central Asia’s geography inhibits a US critical minerals partnership, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/central-asias-geography-inhibits-a-us-critical-minerals-partnership/ (accessed on 5 August 2025).
[119] Be Applied (2025), Hire faster and smarter without bias, https://www.beapplied.com/ (accessed on 4 December 2025).
[11] Carnegie Endowment (2025), Can Central Asia Secure Growth With Rising Critical Minerals Investments?, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/01/central-asia-crm-offers?lang=en (accessed on 30 July 2025).
[123] Cbonds (2024), Rhenium reserves Kazakhstan (annual frequency), https://cbonds.com/indexes/193891/ (accessed on 31 July 2025).
[52] Center of Global Energy Policy at Columbia (2023), Central Asia’s Overlooked Energy Crisis: What It Means for the Global Gas Market, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/central-asias-overlooked-energy-crisis-what-it-means-for-the-global-gas-market/ (accessed on 5 August 2025).
[129] Central Asian Geoportal (2025), Geoportal of Kyrgyzstan - Ore Minerals, https://geoportal-kg.org/ore-minerals/ (accessed on 22 July 2025).
[57] CIS Legislation (2024), LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN About Subsoil, https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=163156 (accessed on 9 December 2025).
[110] CohenMiller, N. (2021), “Gender Equity in STEM Higher Education in Kazakhstan”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363415085_Gender_Equity_in_STEM_Higher_Education_in_Kazakhstan (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[59] CRIRSCO (2025), Members, https://crirsco.com/members/ (accessed on 1 August 2025).
[61] CRIRSCO (2022), Progress of the CRIRSCO implementation in the Kyrgyz Republic, https://crirsco.com/progress-of-crirsco-implementation-in-the-kyrgyz-republic/ (accessed on 13 October 2025).
[98] Cuberes, T. (2016), “Aggregate Effects of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market: A Quantitative Estimate”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26456402?seq=1 (accessed on 24 November 2025).
[132] Daryo.uz (2024), Kyrgyzstan’s 70 coal deposits hold 24bn tons of reserves, https://daryo.uz/en/2024/06/21/kyrgyzstans-70-coal-deposits-hold-24bn-tons-of-reserves (accessed on 18 August 2025).
[35] DGAP (2025), Rethinking EU Strategy in Central Asia, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/rethinking-eu-strategy-central-asia (accessed on 10 November 2025).
[95] Duflo, E. (2012), “Women Empowerment and Economic Development”, https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2022-08/Women%20Empowerment%20and%20Economic%20Development%202012.pdf (accessed on 24 November 2025).
[38] EEAS (2025), Global Gateway: 3rd EU-Central Asia Economic Forum - Key Deliverables, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/uzbekistan/global-gateway-3rd-eu-central-asia-economic-forum-key-deliverables_en?s=233 (accessed on 9 December 2025).
[37] EIB (2025), Kazakhstan: EIB Global lends €200 million to Development Bank of Kazakhstan to support energy and transport infrastructure, https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2025-140-eib-global-lends-eur200-million-to-development-bank-of-kazakhstan-to-support-energy-and-transport-infrastructure (accessed on 10 November 2025).
[131] EITI (2022), Отчёт ИПДО Кыргызской Республики.
[18] Energy Research & Social Science (2026), Critical minerals and the shaping of Central Asian economies through the ages, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2025.104507 (accessed on 18 February 2026).
[106] EnergyProm (2019), Женщины-геологи в РК зарабатывают больше мужчин: в нефтяном секторе — на 7%, в сфере добычи угля — сразу на 23%, https://energyprom.kz/articles-ru/industries-ru/zhenshiny-geologi-v-rk-zarabatyvayut-bolshe-muzhchin-v-neftyanom-sektore-na-7-v-sfere-dobychi-uglya-srazu-na-23/#:~:text=%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%BE%2C%20%D (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[124] E-Qazyna (2025), Minerals, https://minerals.e-qazyna.kz/en/start (accessed on 1 August 2025).
[28] ERAI (2023), Cargo flows between Uzbekistan and the European Union: opportunities and constraints for rail transit, https://index1520.com/upload/medialibrary/dbe/zhaxnhmutw5vvlm7jo2zm8xhe1nz9a55/231227_OTLK_en.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2026).
[92] Eurasian Star (2025), Uzbekistan Investment Law: Key Updates and Insights, https://www.eurasianstar.com/uzbekistan-parliament-approves-new-investment-law/ (accessed on 31 July 2025).
[68] Eurasianet (2026), Cove Kaz Capital CEO lays out vision as US puts minerals at heart of Central Asia strategy, https://eurasianet.org/cove-kaz-capital-ceo-lays-out-vision-as-us-puts-minerals-at-heart-of-central-asia-strategy (accessed on 11 February 2026).
[23] Euratom Supply Agency (2025), Annual Report 2024, https://euratom-supply.ec.europa.eu/publications/esa-annual-reports_en (accessed on 7 November 2025).
[41] Euratom Supply Agency (2025), Annual Report 2024, https://euratom-supply.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4991f977-5fa7-415e-8b7f-04714f01c533_en?filename=202509773_PDFA2A_MJ0125120ENA_002.pdf (accessed on 10 November 2025).
[48] European Commission (2025), Critical Raw Materials, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials_en (accessed on 1 August 2025).
[36] European Commission (2025), Joint press release on the EU-Central Asia Summit, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_983 (accessed on 10 November 2025).
[127] Forbes.kz (2025), Уголь насущный: успеет ли Казахстан сократить выбросы к 2060 году, https://forbes.kz/articles/ugol-nasushnyy-uspeet-li-kazahstan-sokratit-vybrosy-k-2060-godu (accessed on 18 August 2025).
[77] Frank.uz (2025), Traxys and Uzbekistan are launching $1 billion worth of critical mineral extraction projects, https://frank.uz/en/news-en/traxys-and-uzbekistan-are-launching-1-billion-worth-of-critical-mineral-extraction-projects/ (accessed on 20 October 2025).
[134] Geoportal of Uzbekistan (2025), Mineral Resources, https://www.geoportal-uz.org/mineral-resources/ (accessed on 31 July 2025).
[114] GIZ (2014), Kyrgyzstan: Gender Analysis for GIZ Programme Mineral Resources for Development, https://gender-works.giz.de/competitions/kyrgyzstan-gender-analysis-for-giz-programme-mineral-resources-for-development/ (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[128] Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2022), Концепция развития геологической и горнодобывающей отрасли Кыргызской Республики на 2023-2035 годы, https://mnr.gov.kg/storage/npa/files/32/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82_%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%BF%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8_5.12.2022_1-64885ce83c3cc.pdf.
[84] Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2022), Сборник нормативных правовых актов в области охраны окружающей среды, https://aarhus.kg/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Sbornik-NPA-Tom-1.pdf (accessed on 10 December 2025).
[56] Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2018), Закон КР от 19 мая 2018 года № 49 “О недрах”, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjKxqfh4q6RAxUbaqQEHa68PDcQFnoECAsQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcbd.minjust.gov.kg%2F4-2593%2Fedition%2F1198304%2Fru&usg=AOvVaw2NUB08I4cDTYs-lGmZvuh9&opi=89978449 (accessed on 8 December 2025).
[89] Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2024), The Law ‘On Subsoil’ was adopted, https://gov.uz/en/mingeo/news/view/26149 (accessed on 31 July 2025).
[13] Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2023), Annual Mining Report 2023, https://api-portal.gov.uz/uploads/15cc8922-2c58-829b-bc3a-4ab208da4812_media_6716.pdf.
[4] Grata International (2025), GILS Mining: Kazakhstan, https://gratanet.com/publications/gils-gornodobyvausaa-promyslennost-kazahstan?region=kazakhstan (accessed on 1 September 2025).
[8] Grata International (2025), GILS Mining: Kyrgyzstan, https://gratanet.com/publications/gils-mining-kyrgyzstan?region=tajikistan (accessed on 1 August 2025).
[12] Grata International (2025), GILS Mining: Uzbekistan, https://gratanet.com/publications/gils-mining-uzbekistan (accessed on 31 July 2025).
[97] Hsieh (2013), “THE ALLOCATION OF TALENT AND U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH”, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w18693/w18693.pdf (accessed on 24 November 2025).
[101] ILO (2024), Abrogation of four international labour Conventions, https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_861902.pdf.
[93] ILO (2021), Women in mining Towards gender equality, https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40ed_dialogue/%40sector/documents/publication/wcms_821061.pdf (accessed on 24 November 2025).
[102] ILOSTAT (2023), Where women work: female-dominated occupations and sectors, https://ilostat.ilo.org/where-women-work-female-dominated-occupations-and-sectors/ (accessed on 24 November 2025).
[1] IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook, https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/text.pdf (accessed on 9 January 2026).
[2] IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook, https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2025/october/english/text.pdf (accessed on 26 January 2026).
[25] Interfax (2025), Cargo transportation by railway between Kazakhstan and China increases 13% in 2024, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/109195/#:~:text=Jan%2016%20(Interfax)%20%2D%20The,of%20Kazakhstan%27s%20Transport%20Ministry%20said. (accessed on 12 February 2026).
[86] Interfax (2024), Kyrgyzstan ready to lift ban on uranium production, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/102750/ (accessed on 22 July 2025).
[130] Interfax (2024), Kyrgyzstan resumes uranium extraction - law, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/103792/ (accessed on 22 July 2025).
[122] Jp-kz.org (2016), Exploration of Tungsten and Molybdenum Deposit “South Zhaur” in the Karaganda Region of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://www.jp-kz.org/data/proposal/4.%20South%20Zhaur.pdf (accessed on 22 July 2025).
[7] Kazinform (2025), Kazakhstan discovers 38 promising mineral deposits in Q1 2025, https://qazinform.com/news/kazakhstan-discovers-38-promising-mineral-deposits-in-q1-2025-138a49 (accessed on 21 July 2025).
[121] Kazphosphate (2025), Kazphosphate Mining and Processing Complex, https://www.kpp.kz/en/branches/gorno-pererabatyvayushhii-kompleks-karatau?id=23 (accessed on 21 July 2025).
[60] KAZRC (2021), Kazakhstan Public Recording Code for Exploration Results, Mineral Resources and Mineral Reserves (KAZRC), https://kazrc.kz/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/KAZRC.pdf (accessed on 1 August 2025).
[88] Kun.uz (2024), Uzbekistan enacts revised law on subsoil resources to attract investment and ensure sustainable use, https://www.kun.uz/en/news/2024/11/02/uzbekistan-enacts-revised-law-on-subsoil-resources-to-attract-investment-and-ensure-sustainable-use (accessed on 31 July 2025).
[87] Kun.uz (2024), Uzbekistan enacts revised law on subsoil resources to attract investment and ensure sustainable use, https://kun.uz/en/news/2024/11/02/uzbekistan-enacts-revised-law-on-subsoil-resources-to-attract-investment-and-ensure-sustainable-use (accessed on 11 November 2025).
[66] kursiv.media (2024), Subsidiary of British mining company to search for lithium in eastern Kazakhstan, https://kz.kursiv.media/2024-04-22/zhnb-riotintolithiumkz/ (accessed on 11 February 2026).
[90] Lex.uz (2024), Закон Республики Узбекистан О недрах, https://lex.uz/en/docs/7182163 (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[45] Liang, K. (2023), “Increase in demand for critical materials under IEA Net-Zero emission by 2050 scenario”, Applied Energy, Vol. 346, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2023.121400.
[99] McKinsey & Company (2023), Increasing diversity in mining: Three years on, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/metals-and-mining/our-insights/increasing-diversity-in-mining-three-years-on (accessed on 24 November 2025).
[79] Metso (2024), Metso books first parts of the orders related to Almalyk MMC’s copper smelter project in Uzbekistan, https://www.metso.com/corporate/media/news/2024/10/metso-books-first-parts-of-the-orders-related-to-almalyk-mmcs-copper-smelter-project-in-uzbekistan/ (accessed on 20 October 2025).
[49] Minex Forum (2025), Kazakhstan Unveils Ambitious Mining Reforms at PDAC-2025 Forum in Toronto, https://minexforum.com/2025/03/19/kazakhstan-unveils-ambitious-mining-reforms-at-pdac-2025-forum-in-toronto/ (accessed on 5 August 2025).
[82] Minex Forum (2023), Kazakhstan has developed a comprehensive plan for the development of rare earth metals for five years, https://minexforum.com/2023/11/03/kazakhstan-has-developed-a-comprehensive-plan-for-the-development-of-rare-earth-metals-for-five-years/ (accessed on 22 July 2025).
[111] MINEX Kazakhstan (2023), Highest-paying mining industries still out of reach for women, https://2023.minexkazakhstan.com/2023/03/17/highest-paying-mining-industries-still-out-of-reach-for-women/ (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[120] Mining See (2024), Kazakhstan’s rare earth deposits: A strategic asset for clean technology and international collaboration, https://www.miningsee.eu/kazakhstans-rare-earth-deposits-a-strategic-asset-for-clean-technology-and-international-collaboration/#:~:text=Data%20from%20the%20National%20Geological%20Service%20also%20indicates,28%2C100%20tons%2C%20beryllium%20with%2058%2C00 (accessed on 21 July 2025).
[81] Mining See (2024), The Kazakhstan Rare and Rare Earth Metals Industry set to expand with new investment and partnerships, https://www.miningsee.eu/the-kazakhstan-rare-and-rare-earth-metals-industry-set-to-expand-with-new-investment-and-partnerships/ (accessed on 22 July 2025).
[50] Mining Technology Insights (2025), Uzbekistan’s $2.6B Plan Aims to Reshape Global Mineral Market, https://miningtechnologyinsights.com/2025/03/19/uzbekistans-2-6b-plan-aims-to-reshape-global-mineral-market/ (accessed on 5 August 2025).
[63] Mining.com (2025), Op-Ed: How NMMC became the golden asset of Uzbekistan’s economy, https://www.mining.com/op-ed-how-nmmc-became-the-golden-asset-of-uzbekistans-economy/ (accessed on 31 July 2025).
[76] Mining.com (2025), Uzbekistan launches $2.6B initiative to bolster minerals sector, https://www.mining.com/uzbekistan-launches-2-6b-initiative-to-bolster-minerals-sector/ (accessed on 1 October 2025).
[73] Mining.com (2022), Centerra Gold hands Kumtor mine to Kyrgyzstan, ending dispute, https://www.mining.com/centerra-gold-hands-kumtor-mine-to-kyrgyzstan-ending-dispute/ (accessed on 22 July 2025).
[70] Mining.com (2021), Kyrgyzstan bans foreign companies from future mining projects, https://www.mining.com/web/kyrgyzstan-bans-foreign-companies-from-future-mining-projects/ (accessed on 22 July 2025).
[30] Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2019), On approval of the Rules for transportation of cargo by railway transport, https://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/V1900019188 (accessed on 12 February 2026).
[118] Ministry of Mining Industry and Geology of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2025), Women in the geological sector of Uzbekistan, https://gov.uz/en/mingeo/news/view/79906 (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[133] Ministry of Mining Industry and Geology of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2024), Uzbekistan’s Critical Minerals: Unlocking Investment Opportunities for the Clean Energy Transition, https://asiacleanenergyforum.adb.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Kuhinur-Shukurjonov.pdf (accessed on 31 July 2025).
[67] Netherlands Enterprise Agency (2025), Critical raw materials sector in Kazakhstan.
[117] NMMC (2024), NMMC Champions Gender Agenda by Joining International Women in Mining, https://www.ngmk.uz/en/press-center/news-and-press-releases/1948-nmmc-champions-gender-agenda-by-joining-international-women-in-mining/ (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[69] Nuraiym, L. (2025), Case Study 4.2 - The Impact of Chinese Investments on the Gold Mining Sector in Kyrgyzstan, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/casebook-on-chinese-outbound-investment/impact-of-chinese-investments-on-the-gold-mining-sector-in-kyrgyzstan/50F9D8BBE4F7421B8464E6412BC936CA.
[40] Observatory of Economic Complexity (2025), Kazakhstan, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/kaz (accessed on 14/04/2025).
[42] Observatory of Economic Complexity (2025), Kyrgyzstan, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/kgz (accessed on 20 March 2025).
[43] Observatory of Economic Complexity (2025), Uzbekistan, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/uzb (accessed on 5/03/2025).
[22] OEC (2025), , https://oec.world/en (accessed on 27 June 2025).
[31] OECD (2025), Enhancing the Competitiveness of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor in Central Asia, OECD Publishing.
[100] OECD (2025), Mining for talent, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/06/mining-for-talent_ca2ef39b/d89677f7-en.pdf (accessed on 24 November 2025).
[91] OECD (2025), Roadmap for Sustainable Investment Policy Reforms in Uzbekistan.
[96] OECD (2024), Gender Equality and Economic Growth: Past progress and future potential, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/03/gender-equality-and-economic-growth_7d0c8365/fb0a0a93-en.pdf (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[46] OECD (2024), Making critical minerals work for sustainable growth and development, https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sustainable-mining-for-development.html (accessed on 21 July 2025).
[44] OECD (2023), Raw Materials Critical for the Green Transition: Production, International Trade and Export Restrictions, OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/04/raw-materials-critical-for-the-green-transition_85a69007/c6bb598b-en.pdf.
[39] OECD (2021), Improving the Legal Environment for Business and Investment in Central Asia, OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/improving-the-legal-environment-for-business-and-investment-in-central-asia_d3d8daca-en.html.
[54] OECD (2018), Reform of the Mining Sector in Kazakhstan: Investment, Sustainability, Competitiveness, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2018/08/reform-of-the-mining-sector-in-kazakhstan_d1c6c8b4/2a7555f0-en.pdf (accessed on 8 December 2025).
[29] OSJD (2026), Member countries, https://en.osjd.org/ (accessed on 12 February 2026).
[55] Primeminister.kz (2025), Investment in Geological Sector Growing Annually – Ministry of Industry and Construction, https://primeminister.kz/en/news/investment-in-geological-sector-growing-annually-ministry-of-industry-and-construction-30711 (accessed on 8 December 2025).
[105] QazStat (2024), Women and men of Kazakhstan 2019-2023, https://stat.gov.kz/upload/iblock/6b4/e2spyxs1nfjyld3ovbpyca056e0ey3cq/%D0%A1-11-%D0%93%20(%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB).pdf (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[20] Resource World Magazine (2020), Uzbekistan aims to become one of world’s largest gold producers, https://resourceworld.com/uzbekistan-aims-to-become-one-of-worlds-largest-gold-producers/ (accessed on 18 February 2026).
[27] stat.gov.kg (2025), О деятельности транспорта в Кыргызской Республике в 2024г., https://stat.gov.kg/media/files/32e73408-f129-46fb-af43-8fb6b67a3290.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2026).
[112] StatKG (2023), ЖЕНЩИНЫ И МУЖЧИНЫ КЫРГЫЗСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ 2018-2022, https://stat.gov.kg/media/publicationarchive/4379def4-3fa9-4932-ae72-884f4b04b73b.pdf (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[75] Tashkent Times (2026), Uzbekistan, United States sign Critical Minerals MoM, https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/16916-uzbekistan-united-states-sign-critical-minerals-mom (accessed on 5 February 2026).
[64] The Astana Times (2025), UK, Kazakhstan Explore Critical Minerals Partnership with Strategic Depth, https://astanatimes.com/2025/06/uk-kazakhstan-explore-critical-minerals-partnership-with-strategic-depth/ (accessed on 30 July 2025).
[15] The Astana Times (2025), Why Safe-Haven Asset Matters and How Kazakhstan is Betting on Gold, https://astanatimes.com/2025/09/why-safe-haven-asset-matters-and-how-kazakhstan-is-betting-on-gold/ (accessed on 17 February 2026).
[33] The Astana Times (2024), Kazakhstan Increases Uranium Shipments via Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, https://astanatimes.com/2024/05/kazakhstan-increases-uranium-shipments-via-trans-caspian-international-transport-route/ (accessed on 10 November 2025).
[78] The Brussels Times (2025), Uzbekistan and EU: Significance and prospects in critical minerals, https://www.brusselstimes.com/1801528/uzbekistan-and-eu-significance-and-prospects-in-critical-minerals (accessed on 12 November 2025).
[26] The Times of Central Asia (2025), Containerization: A Game-Changer in Global Logistics, https://timesca.com/containerization-a-game-changer-in-global-logistics/ (accessed on 12 February 2026).
[34] The Times of Central Asia (2025), Kazakhstan to Boost Oil Exports to Turkey via BTC Pipeline, https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-to-boost-oil-exports-to-turkey-via-btc-pipeline/ (accessed on 10 November 2025).
[113] The Times of Central Asia (2025), New Labor Code Comes Into Force in Kyrgyzstan, https://timesca.com/new-labor-code-comes-into-force-in-kyrgyzstan/ (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[17] The Times of Central Asia (2025), Sharp Rise in Global Gold Prices Expected to Benefit Kyrgyz Economy, https://timesca.com/sharp-rise-in-global-gold-prices-expected-to-benefit-kyrgyz-economy/ (accessed on 18 February 2026).
[24] The Times of Central Asia (2024), Kazakhstan’s Rail Transportation of Cargo Rises to Over 122 Million Tons, https://timesca.com/kazakhstans-rail-transportation-of-cargo-rises-to-over-122-million-tons/ (accessed on 12 February 2026).
[85] The Times of Central Asia (2024), New Era of Mining Starts in Kyrgyzstan, https://timesca.com/the-new-era-of-mining-starts-in-kyrgyzstan/ (accessed on 22 July 2025).
[19] The Times of Central Asia (2024), Uzbekistan’s First Quarter 2024 Gold Exports Rise to $2.66 Billion, https://timesca.com/uzbekistans-first-quarter-2024-gold-exports-rise-to-2-66-billion/ (accessed on 18 February 2026).
[116] The Times of Central Asia (2024), Women in Uzbekistan May Now Drive Buses and Heavy Trucks, https://timesca.com/women-in-uzbekistan-may-now-drive-buses-and-heavy-trucks/ (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[83] Trend.az (2025), Kazakhstan introduces new model for subsoil use rights in hydrocarbons and uranium sectors, https://www.trend.az/casia/kazakhstan/4125485.html (accessed on 9 December 2025).
[53] Trends Research (2025), Differentiated Engagement: China’s Adaptive Strategy for Critical Minerals in Central Asia, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/differentiated-engagement-chinas-adaptive-strategy-for-critical-minerals-in-central-asia/ (accessed on 6 August 2025).
[21] U.S. Geological Survey (2025), Critical Minerals in Orogenic (Gold) and Coeur d’Alene-Type Mineral Systems of the United States, https://doi.org/10.3133/dr1198 (accessed on 18 February 2026).
[47] UK Critical Minerals Intelligence Centre (2024), UK 2024 Criticality Assessment, https://nora.nerc.ac.uk/id/eprint/539735/1/OR24059.pdf.
[62] Ulba.kz (2026), Ulba Metallurgical Plant - Production, https://ulba.kz/en/production (accessed on 18 February 2026).
[115] UNDP (2024), UNDP contributes to the building future of women’s leadership in STEM, https://www.undp.org/kyrgyzstan/press-releases/undp-contributes-building-future-womens-leadership-stem#:~:text=Dogdurkul%20Kendirbaeva%2C%20Minister%20of%20Education,to%20establish%20feedback%20with%20students (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[104] UNDP (2016), Gender inequalities in labour markets in Central Asia, https://files.acquia.undp.org/public/migration/eurasia/Gender-inequalities-in-labour-markets-in-Central-Asia.pdf#:~:text=Asian%20%20%20countries,these (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[103] UNESCO (2024), Gender Report - Technology on her terms, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000389406 (accessed on 24 November 2025).
[65] US Department of State (2025), A New Era in U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/a-new-era-in-u-s-kazakhstan-relations (accessed on 12 November 2025).
[71] USGS (2025), 2022 Minerals Yearbook: Kyrgyzstan, https://pubs.usgs.gov/myb/vol3/2022/myb3-2022-kyrgyzstan.pdf.
[72] USGS (2025), 2023 Minerals Yearbook: Kyrgyzstan, https://pubs.usgs.gov/myb/vol3/2023/myb3-2023-kyrgyzstan.pdf.
[126] USGS (2024), Barite, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-barite.pdf.
[58] uzgeo.uz (2025), Geological data is being digitized, https://uzgeo.uz/ru/news/geologik-malumotlar-raqamlashtirilmoqda (accessed on 9 December 2025).
[6] Vakulchuk, O. (2021), “Central Asia is a missing link in analyses of critical materials for the global”, One Earth, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.11.012.
[10] World Bank (2025), Kyrgyz Republic Country Economic Memorandum, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099060325113092254/pdf/P180956-f7efb47c-2095-46e9-8fa8-51d24d5b5559.pdf.
[109] World Bank (2025), Share of graduates by field, female (%), https://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/indicator/se-ter-grad-fe-zs?fieldOfStudy=Science%2C+Technology%2C+Engineering+and+Mathematics+%28STEM%29&year=2016 (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[94] World Bank (2024), Breaking barriers for women in mining, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/energy/breaking-barriers-for-women-in-mining-#:~:text=Women%20make%20up%20only%2015,robust%20safety%20protocols%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B. (accessed on 23 October 2025).
[108] World Bank (2023), Kazakhstan, https://wbl.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/wbl/2023/snapshots/Kazakhstan.pdf (accessed on 10 23 2025).
[16] World Bank (2023), Mining Sector Diagnostic - Kazakhstan, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099081823001539573/pdf/P17674501063760b08b290a4ae6547845d.pdf#:~:text=This%20report%20is%20the%20result%20of%20the%20Kazakhstan,consultant%29%2C%20Timur%20Odilov%2C%20Tatyana%20Sedova%20and%20Helga%20Treichel.
[9] World Bank (2023), Mining Sector Diagnostic - Kyrgyz Republic, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099081623044079341/pdf/P17582903fc8890509e870f396f978774e.pdf.
[5] World Nuclear Association (2025), Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/kazakhstan (accessed on 21 July 2025).
[14] World Nuclear Association (2025), Uranium in Uzbekistan, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/uzbekistan (accessed on 31 July 2025).
Source: OECD analysis.
Note: This list only includes mineral reserves for which data has been found. Other CRMs present in Kazakhstan include arsenic, feldspar, gallium, hafnium, helium, magnesite, selenium and sodium.
Note: This list only includes mineral reserves for which data has been found. Other CRMs present in the Kyrgyz Republic include nickel and titanium.
Note: This list only includes mineral reserves for which data have been found. Other CRMs present in Uzbekistan include cadmium, magnesium, niobium, platinum group metals, rare earth elements and tantalum.