This chapter examines the resilience of African public equity markets by analysing recent market developments and the policy frameworks that support their long-term development. It reviews developments in public equity markets and in corporate governance policy frameworks. The analysis focuses on three policy areas: trust and confidence in equity markets, access to public equity financing, and market infrastructure. It concludes with policy considerations to strengthen the resilience and long-term development of African public equity markets.
Africa Capital Markets Report 2026
Abstract
African equity markets recorded substantial gains in 2025. This strong performance contributed to African equity markets outperforming the MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) Index over 2025 and the first half of 2026. However, many African markets remain relatively small with limited liquidity. Most of the market activity is concentrated in just a few countries, including South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco.
Recent updates to African corporate governance codes show increasing alignment with international practices and the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Efforts to strengthen corporate governance regulatory frameworks and oversight are essential for building investor confidence, enhancing market trust and supporting the development of equity markets. There remains an opportunity for African countries undertaking future reviews of national corporate governance codes to explicitly incorporate the African Principles and Guidelines on Corporate Governance and further strengthen alignment with global and regional standards.
Many African regulators have strengthened their independence and market credibility by adopting self-funding or hybrid funding models. While moving towards self-funding models can help ensure greater operational autonomy, stronger governance arrangements around appointments to the regulator’s governing body could further reduce perceptions of political interference in regulatory activities, thereby enhancing investor confidence and supporting equity market development.
At the company level, corporate governance reforms remain particularly important given the prevalence of concentrated ownership structures across African markets. Enhancing frameworks for board independence and related party transactions can help reassure investors that minority shareholder rights are protected and that key decisions are taken free from undue influence. A clearer role for independent directors in reviewing and approving related party transactions can reinforce appropriate oversight of conflicts of interest and bolster investor confidence, helping to attract long-term domestic and foreign investment.
African companies face significant financial, regulatory and market-related barriers to accessing public equity markets. These costs can be particularly burdensome for smaller companies, limiting their ability to access public equity and constraining the pipeline of new listings. Some African companies choose to list on foreign exchanges to access deeper capital markets, greater liquidity and more flexible listing requirements. Expanding the use of public equity markets will require lowering the cost and regulatory barriers to admission, building trust and confidence in equity markets, and improving broader market conditions such as the trading and post-trading infrastructure and deepening liquidity.
Resilient public equity markets play a critical role in supporting sustainable economic development by enabling companies to access equity capital for long-term investment, innovation and growth. By providing risk-sharing capital, public equity markets strengthen companies’ capacity to absorb economic shocks and adapt to changing economic conditions and allow companies to have continued access to financing. They also provide households with opportunities to participate in corporate wealth creation and offer a range of options for managing and investing their savings.
The ability of public equity markets to fulfil this role depends on a supportive institutional and regulatory environment. Investors are more likely to provide long-term capital where market trust exists based on high standards of corporate governance, effective investor protection and confidence in the integrity of institutions. Companies are also more likely to join public markets when regulatory frameworks strike an appropriate balance between investor protection and efficient access to capital, supported by adequate market liquidity and well-functioning market infrastructure.
Against this background, this chapter examines the resilience of African public equity markets, reviews recent market developments and assesses the evolution of corporate governance frameworks across the region. It then examines key policy issues in African equity markets, including measures to strengthen market trust and investor protection and factors affecting companies’ access to public equity markets.
African public equity markets have continued to evolve in recent years, supported by reforms aimed at strengthening regulatory frameworks, modernising market infrastructure and improving the functioning of capital markets. While markets across the region differ considerably in size, depth and levels of development, many jurisdictions have introduced measures to improve market efficiency, broaden investor participation and facilitate companies’ access to public equity financing. Despite this progress, important structural challenges remain, including relatively small and illiquid markets, concentrated ownership structures and limited institutional investor participation.
2.2.1. Overview of African public equity markets
African public equity markets remain relatively small compared with other regions. By the end of 2025, the market capitalisation of companies listed on African exchanges was equivalent to 43% of the region’s GDP, markedly below the corresponding share for EMs (68%) and well below the global level (128%). Most African markets are characterised by a limited number of listed companies, and a few countries concentrate most of the region’s market capitalisation. South Africa alone accounts for nearly 60% of the region’s total market capitalisation, while Morocco, Egypt and Nigeria also represent considerable shares. Together, these four markets make up 88% of the region’s market capitalisation.
Despite these features, African markets recorded strong growth in 2025, outpacing both EMs and global markets. Compared to 2024, African market capitalisation increased by 49%, nearly two and a half times the growth by EMs (20%) and globally (21%). At the country level, Ghana recorded the largest increase in market capitalisation (153%), followed by Zambia (111%) and Nigeria (77%). Mauritius was the only market to record a decline, of 6%.
The increase in Africa’s market capitalisation largely reflects higher valuations of already listed companies rather than an expansion in the number of listed firms. In 2025, there were only seven new listings in African markets, in Egypt, Ghana, Morocco and South Africa, accounting for only 3% of the market capitalisation increase in the region. Improved investor sentiment and, in some markets, rising valuations of mining companies amid higher metal prices also contributed to this growth (see Figure 2.1 for more details).
Note: “T” stands for trillion and “B” stands for billion. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) serves as a regional stock exchange, and the number of listed companies also includes those listed from Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The market capitalisation to GDP ratio for Côte d’Ivoire is calculated as the total market capitalisation of 34 companies listed on the BRVM and headquartered in Côte d’Ivoire divided by the GDP.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; IMF (2026[1]), World Economic Outlook (April 2026) dataset, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD; see Annex 2.A for details.
African equity markets are characterised by relatively high levels of corporate and public sector ownership, and comparatively lower institutional participation. Corporations hold 23% of listed equity in Africa, well above their global share of 9% and higher than the 19% in EMs. Institutional investors account for only 21% of listed equity, compared with 47% globally. Public sector ownership is also significant, representing 19% of listed equity, almost twice the global share. This concentrated ownership structure reduces free float, limits trading activity and investor diversity, and may constrain markets’ ability to finance a broader range of companies and adjust to shifts in investors’ portfolio allocations.
Ownership patterns vary considerably across individual markets. Despite a 21% share of ownership at the regional level, institutional investor ownership remains below 10% in most African markets, with Botswana and South Africa being the two exceptions. At the same time, public sector ownership is particularly prominent in several markets, including Egypt and Tanzania, where it accounts for 27% of listed equity (Figure 2.2).
Note: Investors were classified into the five categories: corporations, public sector, strategic individuals, institutional investors and other free-float following (De La Cruz, Medina and Tang, 2019[2]).
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; FactSet; Bloomberg; see Annex 2.A for details.
2.2.2. Access to capital and market liquidity
Despite a modest increase in equity issuance in 2025, the use of public equity markets remains limited across most African economies, which constrains their contribution to economic development and ability to offer counter cyclical funding during external shocks and periods of economic stress. Seven companies raised a total of USD 1 billion through initial public offerings (IPOs) in 2025, up from four companies in 2024. The capital raised via secondary equity offerings (SEOs) was higher, with 38 companies raising a total of USD 5.7 billion, compared with USD 4.7 billion in 2024 (Table 2.1).
Equity issuance remains highly concentrated in a small number of African markets, although 2025 saw signs of IPO activity emerging outside the traditionally dominant markets, such as in Ghana. Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa accounted for the majority of IPOs and SEOs between 2020 and 2024, while Botswana and Zambia recorded no activity over the same period. In 2025, Morocco recorded the largest amount of capital raised through IPOs, with three new listings raising a combined USD 658 million, more than ten times the annual average amount raised through IPOs over the preceding five years. Ghana also recorded its first IPO since 2020.
The market for secondary equity offerings, by contrast, is considerably more concentrated, with South Africa accounting for the bulk of activity. In 2025, 11 South African companies raised a total of USD 4.3 billion through SEOs, more than two and a half times the annual average recorded over the 2020-2024 period. Beyond South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, SEO activity has been relatively absent since 2020.
The limited use of African equity markets for capital raising is also reflected in relatively low levels of secondary-market liquidity. Even the most liquid African markets, Morocco, South Africa and Egypt, had turnover ratios ranging from 13% to 42% in 2025, while all other markets recorded ratios below 9%. Uganda and Namibia recorded the lowest turnover ratios among the markets covered, pointing to particularly limited trading activity. Nevertheless, trading activity strengthened in several jurisdictions during 2025. Botswana and Tanzania more than doubled their turnover ratios, while in Zimbabwe the turnover ratio rose from 3.3% in 2024 to 6.1% in 2025 (Figure 2.3).
Note: Botswana and Zambia are excluded as there was no capital raising activity between 2020-2025.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; FactSet; Bloomberg; see Annex 2.A for details.
Note: Turnover ratio is total traded value divided by year-end market capitalisation. Côte d’Ivoire includes trading in other listed securities, including bonds, and should therefore be considered an upper-bound estimate of stock market liquidity.
Source: Publicly available sources, see Annex 2.A for details.
2.2.3. Market performance
While overall activity is limited and concentrated in a few markets, African equity markets outperformed the MSCI Emerging Markets Index over the 2021-2026 period. This shows that the region has remained competitive despite structural challenges and a challenging external environment marked by elevated global policy uncertainty, tighter financial conditions and, in 2026, renewed geopolitical tensions that disrupted commodity and energy markets (Figure 2.4, Panel A).
The strong performance of African equity markets was particularly evident in 2025. Several markets, such as Ghana and Zambia delivered triple-digit USD returns (Panel B). Large markets including Egypt, Kenya and South Africa also recorded substantial gains both in local currency and USD terms, making Africa one of the best-performing regions during the year.
This performance reflected a combination of favourable external conditions and improving domestic fundamentals. Externally, African markets benefited from a weaker US dollar and lower fiscal volatility just like other emerging markets, which supported stock valuations (OECD, 2025[3]). Elevated commodity prices, gold in particular, further benefited mining-exposed markets and resource-dependent economies. Domestic factors also played an important role. In Ghana, robust economic growth, currency appreciation and rapid disinflation to single-digit levels contributed to a marked improvement in investor confidence (IMF, 2025[4]). Zambia, a major copper exporter, benefited from higher copper prices together with strong Kwacha appreciation against the US dollar (Ecofin Agency, 2025[5]).
Note: In Panel A, indices shown are MSCI EM Index and STOXX AFRICA 90 Index, respectively.
Source: LSEG; OECD calculations, see Annex 2.A for details.
However, the strong performance of 2025 was accompanied by relatively high market volatility, in line with the heightened volatility observed across global equity markets during the year (see Chapter 1). Many African markets experienced pronounced intra-year price corrections, reflecting their continued sensitivity to both global financial conditions and domestic macroeconomic developments. Even in 2025, a year of particularly strong market performance, markets such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa fell more than 15% from their within-year peaks.
2.2.4. Recent regulatory developments
Since the last OECD Africa Capital Markets Report, several African jurisdictions have advanced reforms to strengthen corporate governance frameworks and modernise their market infrastructure. These developments reflect continued reform momentum across the region and support the broader objective of enhancing investor confidence, market efficiency and the long-term resilience of African public equity markets.
Over the past year, countries have strengthened corporate governance frameworks by updating corporate governance codes, listing rules and guidance materials. Botswana, Egypt, Ghana and South Africa have updated listing rules, while Kenya has released the Draft Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Code for Issuers of Securities to the Public as an adjunct to the national code that embeds ESG considerations into board oversight and company operations (Capital Markets Authority, 2026[6]).
Three countries (Morocco, South Africa and Zambia) have updated their corporate governance codes applicable to publicly listed companies, and two countries (Namibia and Zimbabwe) plan to review their codes. Updated codes have drawn on the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance as a benchmark for reform. These reforms point to several common priorities, including strengthening board independence and accountability, improving corporate disclosure, and enhancing the oversight of sustainability, technology and other emerging risks. For example, Morocco’s new framework strengthens board responsibilities and independence, while incorporating sustainability considerations across a general code and five specific codes (MICEPP, 2025[7]). South Africa’s King V Code introduces a dedicated disclosure framework and reinforces expectations concerning board independence and the oversight of sustainability and technology-related risks. Its approach to double materiality incorporates the philosophy of Ubuntu, which encourages good corporate citizenship alongside corporate value creation (Institute of Directors South Africa, 2025[8]), and underpins the African Principles and Guidelines on Corporate Governance (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2025[9]).
Similar priorities are reflected in the ongoing review of Namibia’s NamCode and the development of Zimbabwe’s ZimCode II, notably in relation to digital governance, cybersecurity, disclosure and risk management (Namibia Institute of Corporate Governance, 2025[10]; Europe Says, 2026[11]). Zambia’s new National Corporate Governance Code also places greater emphasis on sustainability, ethical leadership, accountability, risk management and stakeholder transparency (Ministry of Justice, 2026[12]). Collectively, these developments indicate a broader effort to update corporate governance frameworks in response to evolving market practices, such as data and digital governance (including AI) as well as sustainability, and emerging governance risks.
Over the past two years, several African markets have implemented reforms aimed at strengthening trading and post-trade infrastructure, improving market efficiency and facilitating investor participation. A particular focus has been on modernising settlement systems and reducing settlement risk. For instance, Nigeria moved progressively from T+3 to T+2 in 2025 and to T+1 in June 2026 while Zimbabwe advanced from T+3 to T+2 in April 2025 (SEC Nigeria, 2026[13]; African Financials, 2025[14]). Namibia has also modernised its post-trade infrastructure by launching a central securities depository replacing the use of paper-based share certificates with electronic securities records (Xinhua, 2025[15]).
Several jurisdictions have also introduced reforms to strengthen market resilience and broaden the range of available market services. In Egypt, the Financial Regulatory Authority revised the rules governing the Settlement Guarantee Fund, enabling market participants to complete settlements worth up to six times their fund subscription ahead of the standard T+2 cycle, thereby reducing settlement risk (Global Exchanges, 2025[16]).
In Morocco, the launch in 2026 of the Marché à Terme and the accompanying derivatives clearing house, the Chambre de Compensation du Maroc, marked an important milestone in the development of the country’s capital market infrastructure, providing the institutional framework needed to support organised derivatives trading (African Capital Markets News, 2026[17]). Zimbabwe also further developed its capital market by listing the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange on its own market, bringing its ownership and governance structure more closely into line with international practice (African Markets, 2025[18]).
The resilience and effective functioning of public equity markets depend on interconnected policy and institutional factors. This section focuses on three key interrelated policy issues: trust and confidence in equity markets; access to public equity financing; and the required market infrastructure. Together, these areas strengthen the capacity of public equity markets to mobilise capital from investors to finance corporate investment.
2.3.1. Trust and confidence in equity markets
Trust and confidence in public equity markets are essential for facilitating companies’ access to finance and strengthening market resilience. The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance recognise that effective corporate governance supports market confidence, improves access to capital and contributes to financial stability (OECD, 2023[19]).
Supporting effective supervision through independent and well-resourced regulators
Well-functioning capital markets require effective regulators with the independence, accountability and capacity needed to ensure robust supervision and enforcement. In Africa, capital market authorities generally play a key role in the supervision and enforcement of regulatory frameworks, including the corporate governance practices of listed companies.
African capital market authorities operate under different funding models, with 11 institutions across 11 countries combining public and self-funding, while 5 institutions are fully self-funded (Figure 2.5). Diversifying revenue sources can support the operational independence required for effective supervision and enforcement, particularly in smaller equity markets. However, reliance on government funding may create perceptions of political influence over regulatory priorities and decision-making.
The G20/OECD Principles note that the creation of a formal governing body is the solution adopted by many jurisdictions to promote the independence of supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities (Principle I.E.). Consistent with this approach, all of the African authorities reviewed have established a formal governing body (e.g. a board, executive committee or college of members) with the aim of enabling these authorities to operate independently (Annex Table 2.A.3). Governing body members are usually given fixed terms of appointment ranging from three to five years (Figure 2.5), with all institutions allowing re-appointment. This is consistent with global practices across the 52 jurisdictions covered by the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2025, where appointment terms generally range from two to seven years and re-appointment is typically permitted (OECD, 2025[20]).
While the G20/OECD Principles highlight mechanisms to strengthen regulatory autonomy and ensure adequate resources for market regulators, including levies on supervised entities as an alternative or complement to government funding, they emphasise that such fees should be transparent, based on objective criteria and designed to safeguard regulatory independence (OECD, 2023[19]). The Principles also provide guidance to mitigate conflicts of interest in the appointment of governing body members, including through staggered terms, insulation from political cycles and appropriate review mechanisms.
Source: Based on 16 institutions for 15 countries (one country has two main institutions). See Annex Table 2.A.3 for data.
Strengthening board independence
Strong board independence requirements can enhance trust and financial resilience in equity markets by strengthening strategic oversight, providing effective challenge to management, and improving risk governance in listed companies. These measures can provide greater assurance to investors and other stakeholders of accountability and transparency in decision-making, supporting investor participation and market integrity. Across Africa, approaches to board independence vary considerably. Twelve countries require the separation of Chief Executive Officer and Chairperson roles, while Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritius and Morocco recommend, rather than mandate, this practice.
Requirements for independent directors also differ. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda require at least one-third of board members to be independent directors, Zimbabwe requires a majority of independent directors, and Ghana requires at least two independent directors as well as a majority of independent non-executive directors. Mechanisms to preserve independence over time are less common. While several countries have no specified board tenure limits linked to independence, maximum terms range from six years in Egypt and Tunisia to nine years in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria and Tanzania, and ten years in Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa. Botswana and South Africa additionally require a review of director independence at the end of the prescribed term.
In African markets, where ownership is often concentrated, 13 countries require independent directors to be independent of substantial shareholders, but only 3 specify shareholding thresholds. Uganda and Tanzania set the threshold for substantial shareholding at 15% or more of the voting power, while Ghana sets the threshold at 30% or more of the voting power. These thresholds are in line with global practices reported in the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2025, with 10-15% being the most common threshold (OECD, 2025[20]). The absence of clear thresholds may weaken safeguards against undue shareholder influence and related party transactions, potentially reducing protection for minority shareholders.
Approval of related party transactions
As highlighted in the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, related party transactions (RPTs) are an important issue in all markets, but particularly in those characterised by concentrated ownership structures, as found in many African equity markets. At the regional level, African listed companies exhibit greater concentration than their global and emerging market counterparts. South Africa has the lowest level among the African markets (Figure 2.6).
Note: Companies where the combined holdings of the largest 3 shareholders surpass 50% of the equity are considered to have a concentrated ownership structure.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; FactSet; Bloomberg; see Annex 2.A for details.
Consistent with international practice covered in the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2025, all countries covered in this chapter require board approval for non-routine RPTs (Annex Table 2.A.5). However, approaches to managing conflicts of interest vary. Ten countries require directors with a material interest in a transaction to abstain from board deliberations and voting, while shareholder approval requirements differ across jurisdictions. Only 2 countries do not require shareholder approval for RPTs, whereas the remaining 13 apply different thresholds and conditions (Annex Table 2.A.5).
Given the prevalence of concentrated ownership, strengthening the role of independent directors in review and approval processes for RPTs could enhance minority shareholder protection and investor confidence. One approach could involve a majority of independent directors serving on the audit committee and issuing an opinion on RPTs. Director abstention in situations involving conflicts of interest is an important governance safeguard, contributing to effective conflict management and reinforcing market integrity.
2.3.2. Access to equity markets
Whether a company chooses to access public equity markets depends on a range of factors, including listing costs, regulatory requirements, disclosure obligations, market liquidity and broader market conditions. Together, these determine the attractiveness of public equity markets as a source of finance and companies’ decisions on whether, where and how to raise equity capital.
In several African markets, including Egypt, Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa and Zimbabwe, a substantial share of the already limited equity capital raised by domestic companies is issued on foreign exchanges that may offer a wider pool of investors. High listing costs may partly explain this pattern in Ghana and South Africa (Figure 2.8), while relatively stringent listing requirements may influence listing decisions in Egypt and Zimbabwe. In addition, except for South Africa and Egypt, these markets are characterised by relatively low levels of liquidity, which may further reduce the attractiveness of domestic public equity markets and reinforce incentives to raise capital abroad.
Mauritius is an exception. Despite relatively moderate listing costs and requirements, 97% of equity capital raised by Mauritian companies takes place on foreign exchanges (Figure 2.7, Panel A). This partly reflects the country’s efforts to establish its market as a cross-border financial centre, with a wide network of investment treaties and tax agreements that facilitate cross-border listings (Bizweek, 2026[21]). The United Kingdom is the most common destination for African companies seeking to raise equity capital abroad (Figure 2.7, Panel B), while South Africa is the only African market that attracts a significant share of foreign listings by African companies.
Note: In Panel B, the category “Other” includes Canada, Botswana, Australia, Chinese Taipei, Morocco and France.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; FactSet; Bloomberg; see Annex 2.A for details.
The cost of listing
Financial listing costs vary considerably across African markets and by company size. Across all markets, smaller companies face higher listing costs relative to the IPO size than larger companies (Figure 2.8). This gap is particularly pronounced in Tanzania and Zambia, where relative costs are up to ten times higher for smaller firms, but is limited in Kenya and Nigeria.
In most African markets, listing costs are driven by one-off application and initial listing fees, while annual fees to maintain the listed status are modest. In Botswana, Mauritius, Tanzania and Uganda, however, annual fees account for between 40 and 69% of total listing costs for large companies.
Overall, listing costs for large companies are lowest in Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius and Botswana, ranging from 0.005% of the IPO proceeds in Zambia to 0.02% in Botswana. For smaller companies, listing costs are the lowest in Zambia and Namibia, while Uganda has the highest costs for both large and small companies in Africa.
Note: The cost of listing includes only application, initial and annual listing fees, where applicable, and is calculated for USD 120 million for large and USD 12 million for small IPOs on the main market, assuming a 25% free-float ratio. The USD 120 million IPO size reflects the average value of offerings on African stock exchanges since 2000. EU listing refers to a listing in Euronext.
Source: Publicly available sources, see Annex 2.A for details.
In addition to financial costs associated with listing, stock exchanges across the region impose a range of eligibility and regulatory requirements (Annex Table 2.A.2) to satisfy requirements concerning minimum free-float and number of shareholders, while many also require minimum share capital, a financial track record or a history of profitability. Free-float requirements typically range between 10% and 30%, with Morocco and Tunisia being the only exceptions with no such requirement. Botswana and Zimbabwe have among the highest minimum free-float requirements.
In addition, most African markets require companies to provide three years of audited financial statements, although Uganda requires five years, alongside a proven track record of profitability, between one and five years. Requirements relating to board composition are less common and apply only in a few markets including Egypt, Kenya and Uganda.
Compared with selected peer markets, African listing requirements are broadly aligned in some areas but tend to rely more extensively on financial eligibility criteria. Africa’s listing requirements are comparable to those of some emerging markets, such as the Philippines and Thailand. Minimum free-float requirements are likewise broadly comparable to those observed in Euronext, Saudi Arabia and Thailand, generally ranging between 20% and 30%. While African exchanges continue to apply profitability track-record or minimum share-capital requirements, markets such as the United Kingdom place greater emphasis on disclosure and investor protection than on financial performance criteria. Brazil and India have also introduced alternative listing pathways that relax profitability requirements (B3, 2026[22]; SEBI, 2025[23]).
Proportional and flexible requirements
Listing requirements, and in some cases corporate governance requirements, can be adapted to the needs of younger and smaller companies to facilitate their access to public equity markets. For example, South Africa’s King V Code on Corporate Governance for South Africa (King V Code) allows companies to scale practices to suit their organisational type, size and operating sector in accordance with proportionality considerations (Institute of Directors South Africa, 2025[8]). Nigeria’s SME Corporate Governance Guidelines 2024 extend and adapt the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 2018 (NCCG) to Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (MSMEs), to promote growth, sustainability and access to capital for adhering MSMEs (Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, 2024[24]).
Many African exchanges have also established growth market segments to facilitate smaller companies’ access to public equity markets. These platforms typically offer more flexible listing requirements than main markets, including lower free-float, shareholder and financial track-record requirements (Annex Table 2.A.2). To balance more flexible eligibility requirements, many growth markets apply additional safeguards, including mandatory sponsors or advisers and forward-looking business plans. For example, companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Alternative Exchange (AltX) must retain a designated adviser, while their directors must complete an induction programme (JSE Limited, 2026[25]).
The limited number of new listings across African markets (Section 2.2) suggests that listing activity continues to be constrained by factors beyond admission requirements alone, including market size, market liquidity and investor demand. Moreover, the degree of regulatory flexibility varies considerably across jurisdictions, with some growth market segments retaining admission criteria that differ only modestly from those of the main market, potentially limiting their effectiveness in attracting new listings.
Strengthening the liquidity, resilience and long-term sustainability of African equity markets requires a comprehensive approach that combines measures to enhance trust and confidence in markets through better corporate governance and by increasing access to companies of all sizes. These efforts can be reinforced by greater regional integration and co-operation across African capital markets.
Greater co-operation among stock exchanges and regulators, including through cross-listing arrangements, cross-border trading and more interoperable market infrastructure, can help connect fragmented markets, broaden the investor base and facilitate companies’ access to a wider pool of capital. Further advancing such initiatives can therefore complement reforms at the national level and support deeper, more liquid and resilient public equity markets across the region.
Support the review and update of corporate governance codes to align with regional and international standards. As governance expectations continue to evolve, African countries may consider drawing on internationally recognised frameworks, including the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, and the King V Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, when revising their codes. Areas for consideration include digital governance, cybersecurity, sustainability-related governance and disclosure, as well as the oversight of emerging and strategic risks.
Reinforce transparency and informed market participation through initiatives that improve awareness and understanding of corporate governance frameworks for listed companies. Given that corporate governance requirements may be established through national corporate governance codes, listing rules, sector-specific regulations and regional frameworks, greater transparency and accessibility could facilitate compliance by issuers and support private companies’ listing decisions. Publicly available guidance from regulators and exchanges could also support potential and current issuers to understand and apply applicable requirements, while also helping investors make informed investment decisions. For example, the UK Financial Reporting Council has published guidance to support listed companies to apply the UK Corporate Governance Code (UK Financial Reporting Council, 2026[26]). The guidance includes advice, examples and a summary of overlapping requirements with the Financial Conduct Authority’s Listing Rules and Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules.
Enhance board independence frameworks across the region by combining mandatory independent director requirements, periodic independence assessments, and clear thresholds for substantial shareholders for assessing independence. In an environment characterised by high levels of ownership concentration in African companies, strengthened independence of listed company boards can increase confidence in equity markets by helping to improve investor confidence that boards exercise independent oversight of substantial shareholders and management.
Strengthen frameworks for related party transactions by establishing clear thresholds and criteria for their review and approval and requiring conflicted directors to abstain from related decision-making. Given the prevalence of concentrated ownership structures in African equity markets, enhancing the role of independent directors in reviewing material RPTs can strengthen minority shareholder protection and bolster investor confidence in the objectivity of board decisions and the management of conflicts of interest. For example, audit committees composed primarily or entirely of independent directors could be tasked with reviewing material RPTs and providing an opinion to the board or shareholders, as appropriate. Improving the accuracy and accessibility of beneficial ownership records is equally important, as it helps identify related parties, detect potential conflicts of interest and support the effective oversight of RPTs.
Ensure public equity markets are accessible to companies of all sizes. Simplifying IPO requirements and reducing listing costs, while maintaining appropriate standards of investor protection and market integrity, can lower barriers to market access. Proportionate and flexible corporate governance and listing frameworks can facilitate market entry by allowing companies to implement governance arrangements that are appropriate to their size and stage of development, without compromising investor protection or market integrity. A larger and more diverse pool of listed companies would expand investment opportunities, attract a broader range of domestic and international investors, and contribute to deeper and more liquid capital markets.
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The information on the number of listed companies and their market capitalisation is based on LSEG and the following criteria are used to clean the data:
Securities with instrument type classified as “trust”, “fund” and “ETF” are excluded.
For firms with multiple listings, only primary listings are kept.
For firms with multiple observations but different countries of domicile, their true country of domicile is manually checked to remove the duplicates.
Firms trading on over-the-counter (OTC) markets and those listed on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) or SME/growth markets are excluded. SME/growth markets included in the analysis are: Korea Exchange (KOSDAQ), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq Capital Market (NASDAQ).
Securities with industry classification of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) and Collective Investments are excluded.
The ownership figures for publicly listed companies are based on OECD calculations using firm-level information from the FactSet Ownership database. The data are complemented and verified using LSEG and Bloomberg. Data are collected at the end of 2025 in current USD, thus no inflation adjustment is needed. Market information for each company is collected from LSEG. The dataset includes the records of owners for 43 852 companies listed across 104 countries covering 99% of the world market capitalisation. For each of the countries/regions presented, the information corresponds to all listed companies in those countries/regions with available information.
The records of owners are collected for each company. Some companies have up to 5 000 records in their list of owners. Each record contains the name of the institution, the percentage of outstanding shares owned, the investor type classification, the origin country of the investor, the ultimate parent name, among other things.
The table below presents the five categories of owners defined and used in this report following De La Cruz, Medina and Tang (2019[2]). Different types of investors are grouped into these five categories of owners. In many cases, when the ultimate owner is identified as a government, a province or a city and the direct owner was not identified as such, ownership records are reclassified as public sector. For example, public pension funds that are regulated under public sector law are classified as public sector, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are also included in that same category.
Note: Growth market in Botswana refers to Venture Capital Board. Namibia (NSX) has the Development Capital Board that is dedicated for companies that do not fulfil the criteria to be listed on the main board; however, the criteria to be listed on this board is not available.
Source: (BSE, 2026[27]), (BRVM, 2026[28]), (FRA, 2014[29]), (NILEX, 2015[30]), (BVMAC, 2019[31]), (GSE, 2026[32]), (NSE, 2026[33])
(SEM, 2026[34]), (CDVM, 2012[35]), (NSX, 2026[36]), (NGX, 2026[37]), (JSE, 2025[38]), (CMSA, 2026[39]), (BVMT, 2012[40]), (USE, 2025[41]) (USE, 2012[42]), (LuSE, 2026[43]), (ZSE, 2026[44]),
Note: Gabon is excluded due to data unavailability.
Sources: (Government of Botswana, 2023[45]), (AMF-UMOA, n.d.[46]), (Andersen, 2026[47]), (GISI, 2016[48]), (NIFCA, 2012[49]), (Nexus, 2007[50]), (JuriTheque, 2013[51]), (LAC, 2006[52]), (SEC, 2025[53]), (OECD, 2025[20]), (CMSA, 1997[54]), (CMF, 1994[55]), (CMA, n.d.[56]), (Government of Zambia, 2016[57]), (SECZ, 2004[58]).
Note: Gabon is excluded due to data unavailability.
Sources: (IODSA, 2016[59]), (BRVM, 2023[60]), (OHADA, 2014[61]), (EGX, 2026[62]), (Lexology, 2025[63]), (SEC, 2020[64]), (GISI, 2016[48]), (PolicyVault, 2015[65]), (NCCG, 2016[66]), (MauritiusLII, 2017[67]), (ECGI, 2025[68]), (NSX, 2024[69]), (ENS, 2026[70]), (iCRP, 2020[71]), (ICSAN, 2018[72]), (Jackson, Etti & Edu, 2026[73]), (OECD, 2025[20]), (CMSA, 2014[74]), (CMF, 2022[75]), (IGPPP, 2019[76]), (ULII, 2025[77]), (LuSE, 2012[78]), (ZIMLII, 2019[79]), (ZSE, 2019[80]).
Note: Gabon is excluded due to data unavailability.
Sources: (BSE, 2026[27]), (OHADA, 2014[61]), (Andersen, 2025[81]), (GIPC, 2019[82]), (BRS, 2021[83]), (MauritiusLII, 2017[67]) (AMMC, 2017[84]), (WIPO, 2004[85]), (NSX, 2004[86]), (NGX, 2014[87]), (OECD, 2025[20]), (TANZLII, 2016[88]), (DSE, 2022[89]), (CMF, 2022[75]), (ULII, 2012[90]), (LuSE, 2012[78]), (ZIMLII, 2019[79]).
The information on initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary equity offerings (SEOs) presented in this report is based on transaction and/or firm level data gathered from several financial databases, such as LSEG (Screener, Datastream), FactSet and Bloomberg. Considerable resources have been committed to ensuring the consistency and quality of the dataset. Different data sources are checked against each other and, whenever necessary, the information is also controlled against original sources, including regulator, stock exchange and company websites and financial statements.
Country coverage and classification
The dataset includes information about all initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary equity offerings (SEOs or follow-on offerings) by financial and non-financial companies. All public equity listings following an IPO, including the first-time listings on an exchange other than the primary exchange, are classified as an SEO. If a company is listed in more than one exchange within 180 days, those transactions are consolidated under one IPO. The country breakdown is carried out based on the domicile country of the issuer. In the dataset, the country of issue classification is also made based on the stock exchange location of the issuer. It is possible that a company becomes listed in more than one country when going public. The financial databases record a dual listing as multiple transactions for each country where the company is listed. However, there is also a significant number of cases where dual listings are reported as one transaction only based on the primary market of the listing. For this reason, the country breakdown based on the stock exchange is currently carried out based on the primary market of the issuer. The IPO and SEO data are collected on a deal basis via commercial databases in current USD values. Issuance amounts initially collected in USD were adjusted using the 2025 US Consumer Price Index.
Exclusion criteria
With the aim of excluding IPOs and SEOs by trusts, funds and special purpose acquisition companies, the following exclusion criteria are used:
Financial companies that conduct trust, fiduciary and custody activities
Asset management companies such as health and welfare funds, pension funds and their third-party administrators, as well as other financial vehicles
Open-end investment funds
Other financial vehicles
Grant-making foundations
Asset management companies that deal with trusts, estates and agency accounts
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs)
Closed-end funds • Listings on an over-the-counter (OTC) market
Security types classified as “units” and “trust”
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
Transactions with missing or zero proceeds
LSEG uses the Reference Data Business Classification (TRBC) Industry Description. The economic sectors used in the analysis are the following:
The table below presents the equity indices used in Figure 2.4.